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तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च इति॥ चैतन्यस्य तद्धर्माणां च इत्यर्थः।

1.11. (The bhāṣya further makes the statement) – [“In contrast to it (i.e., conversely), of the subject and its properties – viṣayiṇaḥ tad-dharmāṇāñca”]. This means – of consciousness (cetana) and of its properties (there can be no superimposition on the object).

ननु विषयिणः चिदेकरसस्य कुतो धर्माः? ये विषये अध्यस्येरन्,

Well, since the subject is of the essence of consciousness, whence could it possess properties which might be conceived as being superimposed on the object?

उच्यते; आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वमिति सन्ति धर्माः, अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिव अवभासन्ते इति न दोषः।

This is our reply: Joy, experience of sense-objects and eternity, these are the properties. Though non-distinct they appear as distinct from the cit (pure consciousness). Hence (there is) no blemish (in the above argument).

1.12 ✅

अध्यासो नाम अतद्रूपे तद्रूपावभासः।

1.12. Superimposition (adhyāsa) means the manifestation of the nature of something in another which is not of that nature.

सः मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् इति। मिथ्याशब्दो द्व्यर्थः अपह्नववचनोऽनिर्वचनीयतावचनश्च। अत्र अयमपह्नववचनः। मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम् अभाव एवाध्यासस्य युक्तः इत्यर्थः।

That (manifestation), it is reasonable to hold, is false (mithyā). The word ‘mithyā’ is of double signification – it is denotative of negation as well as of inexpressibility (anirvacanīyatā). Here it is an expression of negation. (The above statement) “mithyeti bhavitum yuktam” means that it is reasonable to ascribe nonexistence alone to superimposition (adhyāsa).

[BrS.1. L.4]

1.13 ✅

यद्यप्येवं; तथापि नैसर्गिकः प्रत्यक्चैतन्यसत्तात्रामानुबन्धी। अयं युष्मदस्मदोः इतरेतराध्यासात्मकः। अहमिदं ममेदमितिलोकव्यवहारः।

1.13. Though it is so (i.e., though superimposition is not warranted), yet it is seen to be congenital, or a constant accompaniment of the mere being (mātra) of the inner self. This means the mutual superimposition of the ‘thou’ and the ‘I’ as exemplified in the worlds (loka) usage (vyavahāra) – [‘I am this’ and ‘mine is this’].

तेन यथा अस्मदर्थस्य सद्भावो न उपालम्भमर्हति, एवमध्यासस्यापि इत्यभिप्रायः।

Hence (because it is established by experience), just as the existence of the ‘I’ notion cannot be negated (being indubitable), even so that of superimposition; (the ego-concept necessarily involves the notion of superimposition).

लोक इति मनुष्योऽहमित्यभिमन्यमानः प्राणिनिकायः उच्यते।

By the word ‘loka’ is meant the whole class of beings permeated by the conceit, ‘I am a man’ (i.e., ego-conscious).

व्यवहरणं व्यवहारः; लोक इति व्यवहारो लोकव्यवहारः; मनुष्योऽहमित्यभिमानः इत्यर्थः।

Vyavahāra is usage. (How)? Superimposition as is evident in ‘I’ and ‘mine’ means egoity in the form of ‘I am a man’. (Hence the sentence means that the conceit ‘I am a man,’ is a matter of common experience and is beginningless).

1.14 ✅

सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य इति।

1.14. [Satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya – coupling together truth and error].

सत्यम् अनिदं, चैतन्यम्।

‘Satyam’ means, ‘not this’ (i.e., other than the world of perception; intelligence – caitanya).

अनृतं युष्मदर्थः; स्वरूपतोऽपि अध्यस्तस्वरूपत्वात्।

‘An-ṛtam,’ that which is connoted by the ‘thou’ (i.e., the insentient world), because even in itself (svarūpatopi) it is illusory knowledge.

‘अध्यस्य’ ‘मिथुनीकृत्य’ इति च क्त्वाप्रत्ययः, न पूर्वकालत्वमन्यत्वं च लोकव्यवहारादङ्गीकृत्य प्रयुक्तः; भुक्त्वा व्रजतीतिवत् क्रियान्तरानुपादानात्।

In the phrase “having made an erroneous transfer”, as also in “having coupled” (adhyasya, mithunīkṛtya) the suffix ‘ktvā’ is not used on the admission that it denotes a time prior to and an action different from ‘loka-vyavahāra’ (egoism taking the form ‘I am a man’, etc.), as in the statement, ‘having eaten he goes’; because there is no reference to a different act.

‘अध्यस्य नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः’ इति स्वरूपमात्रपर्यवसानात्।

The phrases ‘adhyasya and ‘naisargikoyam lokavyavahāraḥ,’ both, in substance point to the act of erroneous transference (adhyāsa kriyā, and not to priority in time or to a distinct act).

उपसंहारे च ‘एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासः’ इति तावन्मात्रोपसंहारात्॥

Further in the concluding part (of this section on superimposition, the Bhāṣyakāra) has only this as the final statement: “In the matter aforesaid this superimposition is beginningless and endless (till the rise of knowledge)”, because, it is naisargika (continuous like a stream).

अतः चैतन्यं पुरुषस्य स्वरूपम् इतिवत् व्यपदेशमात्रं द्रष्टव्यम्।

Hence like the phrase – “the Self’s nature is intelligence” (the termination ‘ktvā’) should be understood as used in a figurative sense only (vyapadeśamātram).

1.15 ✅

मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः इति। मिथ्या च तदज्ञानं च मिथ्याज्ञानम्।

1.15. [“Mithyājñāna nimitta iti” – that which is mithyā (erroneous) and at the same time, ajñāna (nescience) is mithyājñāna].

मिथ्येति अनिर्वचनीयता उच्यते।

The word ‘mithyā’ means ‘inexpressible’ (anirvacanīya),

अज्ञानमिति च जडात्मिका अविद्याशक्तिः ज्ञानपर्युदासेन उच्यते।

and by the word ‘ajñāna’ is meant the potency of avidyā which is of the nature of insentience and is the negation of jñāna.

तन्निमित्तः तदुपादानः इत्यर्थः॥

And ‘tan-nimitta’ means ‘having that (viz., mithyājñāna) as the material cause.’

1.16 ✅

कथं पुनः नैमित्तकव्यवहारस्य नैसर्गिकत्वम्?

1.16. When superimposition is proved to be the product of (mithyājñāna), how could it be said to be beginningless (naisargika)?

अत्रोच्यते; अवश्यं एषा अविद्याशक्तिः बाह्याध्यात्मिकेषु वस्तुषु तत्स्वरूपसत्तामात्रानुबन्धिनी अभ्युपगन्तव्या; अन्यथा मिथ्यार्थावभासानुपपत्तेः। सा च न जडेषु वस्तुषु तत्स्वरूपावभासं प्रतिबध्नाति; प्रमाणवैकल्यादेव तदग्रहणसिद्धेः,

Here is the answer: – It cannot but be admitted that there exists this potency of nescience in things external, as well as internal, its existence being a constant accompaniment of their inner nature. Otherwise (i.e., if nescience is not admitted) the appearance of illusory objects becomes inexplicable. And that nescience does not cause any impediment to the manifestation of the real nature of insentient objects since their non-cognition is caused merely by the absence of the (necessary) means of valid knowledge.

रजतप्रतिभासात् प्राक् ऊर्ध्वं च सत्यामपि तस्यां स्वरूपग्रहणदर्शनात्,

Prior to the manifestation of ‘silver’ and after (its manifestation also), even though it (avidyā) exists, its real nature (i.e., of silver) is apprehended.

अतः तत्र रूपान्तरावभासहेतुरेव केवलम्।

Hence it (avidyā) is but the cause of the manifestation of something different (from the original, the real; e.g., appearance of silver in shell – rūpāntara. This is due to the vikṣepa-śakti of avidyā).

प्रत्यगात्मनि तु चितिस्वभावत्वात् स्वयम्प्रकाशमाने ब्रह्मस्वरूपानवभासस्य अनन्यनिमित्तत्वात् तद्गतनिसर्गसिद्धाविद्याशक्तिप्रतिबन्धादेव तस्य अनवभासः।

In the inner self however which is of the nature of (pure) intelligence and as such self-lucent, since the non-manifestation of Brahman cannot be accounted for by anything else, its non-manifestation (it must be admitted) is due to the obstruction caused by the potency of nescience which is existent therein (in Brahman) and is beginningless.

अतः सा प्रत्यक्चिति ब्रह्मस्वरूपावभासं प्रतिबध्नाति, अहङ्काराद्यतद्रूपप्रतिभासनिमित्तं च भवति, सुषुप्त्यादौ च अहङ्कारादिविक्षेप संस्कारमात्रशेषं स्थित्वा पुनरुद्भवति,

Hence it (primal nescience) obstructs the manifestation of the real nature of Brahman in the inner self (jīva) and it becomes the cause of the appearance of something other than its nature, like the ego notion, etc.; and in deep slumber, etc. having remained in the residual state of mere impressions of ego-notion, etc., which are the outcome of its projective power, it revives again (on waking).

इत्यतः नैसर्गिकोऽपि अहङ्कारममकारात्मको मनुष्याद्यभिमानो लोकव्यवहारः मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः उच्यते, न पुनः आगन्तुकत्वेन; तेन नैसर्गिकत्वं नैमित्तिकत्वेन न विरुध्यते॥

Hence though the superimposition as evidenced in the notions of men such as ‘I’ and ‘mine’ is beginningless (because the hetu, viz., avidyā is beginningless) it is spoken of as having mithyājñāna as its cause, but not as adventitious. Therefore its beginninglessness is not in conflict with its coming into existence as the result of a cause.

1.17 ✅

‘अन्योन्यधर्मांश्च’ इति पृथक् धर्मग्रहणं धर्ममात्रस्यापि कस्यचिदध्यास इति दर्शयितुम्।

1.17. [“And (erroneously transferring the attributes) of the one with those of the other – anyonya-dharmāṃśca”]. The reason why the attributes are taken separately is to show that in some cases superimposition of mere attributes (without reference to the substance) is perceived (as in ‘I am deaf’. Deafness is the property of the organ of hearing and not of the self).

इतरेतराविवेकेन इति॥ एकतापत्त्यैव इत्यर्थः।

[“Because of not discriminating the one from the other” – itaretarāvivekena], which means confounding the one with the other (lit. regarding both as one; ekatāpatti).

कस्य धर्मिणः कथं कुत्र च अध्यासः? धर्ममात्रस्य वा क्व अध्यासः?

Of which dharmin, how and where is the adhyāsa? Again, where is the superimposition of attributes perceived?

इति भाष्यकारः स्वयमेव वक्ष्यति। ‘अहमिदं ममेदम् इति’ अध्यासस्य स्वरूपं दर्शयति।

These (questions) the Bhāṣyakāra himself answers. He points to the form that superimposition takes in “This am I’’ and “This is mine “.

अहमिति तावत् प्रथमोऽध्यासः।

The ego notion so far is the first adhyāsa.

ननु अहमिति निरंशं चैतन्यमात्रं प्रतिभासते, न अंशान्तरम् अध्यस्तं वा।

Is it not that the integral (partless) cit alone manifests itself in the ‘aham – ego’ and that there is no additional part (seen in the ego-notion) either superimposed or not superimposed?

यथा अध्यस्तांशान्तर्भावः, तथा दर्शयिष्यामः।

We will show; (when explicating the ‘ego’) how the superimposed part (viz., the insentient) is involved therein.

1.18 ✅

ननु इदमिति अहङ्कर्तुः भोगसाधनं कार्यकरणसङ्घातः अवभासते, ममेदमिति च अहङ्कर्त्रा स्वत्वेन तस्य सम्बन्धः। तत्र न किञ्चित् अध्यस्तमिव दृश्यते।

1.18. Well, in the notion – ‘this’ (referring to one’s body), the body – the aggregate of cause and effect which is the means of the enjoyment (of the agent denoted by the ego – ‘aham kartā’) is manifest to view (i.e., is seen as the object of perception); and in ‘this is mine’, (the body) is related to the agent as his property (i.e. as a thing distinct from him). There (in consequence) nothing appears to be superimposed.

उच्यते; यदैव अहङ्कर्ता अध्यासात्मकः, तदैव तदुपकरणस्यापि तदात्मकत्वसिद्धिः। न हि स्वप्नावाप्तराज्याभिषेकस्य माहेन्द्रजालनिर्मितस्य वा राज्ञः राज्योपकरणं परमार्थसत् भवति,

Here is the answer: When the notion of ego as agent is (admitted to be) a case of superimposition, then alone is it evident that its auxiliary also is an erroneous notion; (when the notion of self – jīva as manifested in the ‘I’ is error-ridden, the body which is intended for its service is likewise an erroneous notion, i.e., of like nature, when spoken of as ‘this is mine’). Of one who has been crowned king in a dream, or of a king who is a creation of mighty magic, the paraphernalia of royalty cannot have any real existence.

एवम् अहङ्कर्तृत्वप्रमुखः क्रियाकारकफलात्मको लोकव्यवहारः अध्यस्तः नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावे आत्मनि। अतः तादृग्ब्रह्मात्मानुभवपर्यन्तात् ज्ञानात् अनर्थहेतोः अध्यासस्य निवृत्तिरुपपद्यते, इति तदर्थविषयवेदान्तमीमांसारम्भः उपपद्यते॥

It is thus that all worldly activities beginning with the ego-agency (I am doer, etc.), and embracing action, means and results (phala) are superimposed on ātman which is by nature eternal, pure, enlightened and free. Hence it is by such knowledge as culminates in the experience of the identity of ātman with Brahman, thus characterised, that freedom from the evil-causing adhyāsa (superimposition) results, so that the beginning of a study of the Vedānta philosophy having such (knowledge) as its content becomes appropriate.

[BrS.1. L.5]

1.19 ✅

‘आह – कोऽयमध्यासो नाम’ इत्याद्यारभ्य अध्याससिद्धिपरं भाष्यम्।

1.19. The Bhāṣya beginning with [“well, what is it that superimposition means?” (up to ‘sarva-loka-pratyakṣaḥ) is intended to substantiate (the doctrine of) ‘superimposition’ (adhyāsa).

तत्रापि ‘कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि’ इत्यतः प्राक् अध्यासस्वरूपतत्सम्भावनाय,

[BrS.1. L.21]

In that again, what precedes the passage – ‘How again (can perception, etc., which are the means of right knowledge) have reference to that which is error-contaminated?’ – is intended to delineate the nature of superimposition and to prove its probability (sambhāvana).

तदादि तत्सद्भावनिर्णयार्थम् इति विभागः।

Beginning with that (viz., how again, etc., and ending in ‘sarva-loka-pratyakṣaḥ’) the Bhāṣya is meant for demonstrating its existence (by pramāṇa) – thus (is the Bhāṣya) to be split up (while construing).

1.20 ✅

यद्येवं तत्स्वरूपतत्सम्भावनोपन्यासः पृथक् न कर्तव्यः; न हि अनिर्ज्ञातरूपम् असम्भाव्यमानं च निर्णीयते च इति, दुःसम्पादं विशेषतः अध्यक्षानुभवनिर्णये,

1.20. If that be so, there is no need for a separate exposition of its definition and its probability. What cannot be defined and is improbable cannot be established by any instrument of knowledge. And when its existence is specifically assured by perceptive knowledge, there arises no need for a specific mention (of definition and probability) (lit. indefinability and improbability cannot be predicated of what is actually given in perception).

उच्यते – न देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहंममाभिमानवत एव प्रमातृत्वप्रदर्शनमात्रेण तस्य अध्यासात्मकता सिध्यति; तत् कस्य हेतोः?

(The objection) is thus met: It is not merely by showing (the agency in knowing), in the case of that man only who is under the conceit of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ in respect of the body and the senses, etc. (i.e., of the man who confounds his self with his body and who thinks that the self possesses the senses) that its erroneous nature can be established. What is the cause of it? (i.e., what is the reason of its not being possible to determine that such a conceit is due to nescience?)

लोके शुक्तिरजतद्विचन्द्रादिवत् अध्यासानुभवाभावात्। बाधे हि सति स भवति, नेह स विद्यते। तस्मात् अध्यासस्य लक्षणमभिधाय तल्लक्षणव्याप्तस्य सद्भावः कथनीयः॥

Ordinarily, experience of nescience is non est unlike that of shell-silver or double-moon. It is only when the apprehension is sublated that it becomes evident (i.e., that the apprehension was erroneous); but here (in the conceit of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’) it (sublation) is not perceived. Hence the definition of adhyāsa (superimposition), having (first) been stated the nature of the notions (of ‘I’ and ‘mine’) has to be described as falling under that definition.

1.21 ✅

ननु एवमपि तल्लक्षणस्य वस्तुनः सद्भावमात्रम् इह कथनीयम्; न हि यत्र यस्य सद्भावः प्रमाणतः प्रतिपन्नः, तत्रैव तस्य असम्भावनाशङ्का, येन तद्विनिवृत्तये तत्सम्भावना अपरा कथ्येत;

1.21. Well, even then what is pertinent to the present context is the proof of the existence of an object illustrative of that definition and nothing more. Where the reality of a thing is not vouched for by a valid means of knowledge, there alone can doubt as to its existence arise. If it did, there would then be the necessity of a distinct statement of probability for its (doubt’s) removal.

1.22 ✅

सत्यमेवं, विषयविशेषस्तु प्रयत्नेन अन्विच्छद्भिरपि अनुपलभ्यमानकारणदोषे विज्ञाने अवभासमानोऽपि पूर्वप्रवृत्तेन सकललोकव्यापिना निश्चितेन प्रमाणेन असम्भाव्यमानतया अपोद्यमानो दृश्यते।

1.22. True, it is even so. Though a particular object becomes manifest to knowledge (in the origination of which knowledge) no blemish of any kind is perceived even if attempted to be sought, it is within one’s experience that the knowledge of that object is discredited as being improbable on the basis of a precedent pramāṇa (means of right knowledge) which is of universal acceptance and of unquestioned validity;

तद्यथा – औत्पातिकः सवितरि सुषिः, यथा वा माहेन्द्रजालकुशलेन प्रासादादेः निगरणम्। एवम् अविषये असङ्गे केनचिदपि गुणादिना अध्यासहेतुना रहिते निष्कलङ्कचैतन्यतया अन्यगतस्यापि अध्यासस्य अपनोदनसमर्थे अध्यासावगमः अविभाव्यमानकारणदोषः विभ्रमः इति आशङ्क्येत,

for instance, the sun-spots portending calamity, or the (phantom of) swallowing of a mansion by one expert in magic. In like manner, the superimposition on the self which is not comprehended as the object, which is void of all relation, which exhibits none of the properties which constitute the reason for superimposition and which, because of its intrinsic nature as pure intelligence, is potent to dispel even the error with which an external object is encompassed, (in such ātman, the notion of superimposition), when no defect in the sense-organs is perceived to exist, might be supposed to be unreal. Thus would one entertain a doubt regarding the possibility of superimposition.

तत् मा शङ्कि इति, सद्भावातिरेकेण सम्भवोऽपि पृथक् कथनीयः; तदुच्यते;

In order that there may be no room for such a doubt, it is essential that as distinct from the proof of the existence of superimposition, its probability also must be set forth. Now, that (viz., the triad consisting of definition, probability and valid reason) will be stated (in order).

[BrS.1. L.5]

1.23 ✅

“आह कोऽयमध्यासो नाम” इति किंवृत्तस्य प्रश्ने आक्षेपे च प्रयोगदर्शनात् उभयस्य च इह सम्भवात् तन्त्रेण वाक्यमुच्चरितम्।

1.23. [What is it that is meant by the term adhyāsa (superimposition)? asks (the opponent)]. The word ‘what – kim’ is, as is well known, used to denote a question as well as an objection and both are possible here; hence a statement comprehending both is (tantreṇa – by design) made.

तत्रापि प्रथमं प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं स्वरूपम् आख्याय पुनः तस्यैव सम्भवम् आक्षिप्य प्रतिविधत्ते।

And there again having first stated the definition (of superimposition) in answer to the question (presuming it to be such), and again anticipating the objection to the probability of that very thing (superimposition), (the siddhāntin) meets it.

तत्र एवंभूते विषये श्रोतॄणां सुखप्रबोधार्थं व्याचक्षाणाः प्रतिवादिनं तत्रस्थमिव समुत्थाप्य तेन आक्षिप्तम् अनेन पृष्टमिति मत्वा प्रत्युक्तं, पुनरसौ स्वाभिप्रायं विवृणोति इति आक्षेपमवतार्य प्रतिविधानं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। सर्वत्र एवंविधे ग्रन्थसन्निवेशे एष एव व्याख्याप्रकारः।

In regard to a topic of this nature (i.e., where the subject under discussion is difficult of comprehension) the writers, for the easy understanding of the learners, proceed as if a questioner were in their very presence and meet his criticism supposing that he has raised that criticism with a particular object; and again postulating an objection on the ground that he is making his own meaning explicit (i.e., that he meant something else) endeavour to satisfy him. This is the method of exposition in all such contexts in the work.

[BrS.1. L.6]

1.24 ✅

‘स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः’ इति प्रश्नवाक्यस्थितम् अध्यासम् उद्दिश्य लक्षणम् अभिधीयते। तत्र परत्र इत्युक्ते अर्थात् परस्य अवभासमानता सिद्धा। तस्य विशेषणं स्मृतिरूपत्वम्। स्मर्यते इति स्मृतिः; असंज्ञायामपि अकर्तरि कारके घञादीनां प्रयोगदर्शनात्।

1.24. [It (superimposition) is “the manifestation, in some other object, of that which is of the nature of recollection of what had been observed before] – thus is enunciated the definition of the term ‘superimposition’ (adhyāsa) found in the question (viz., ‘what is it that is meant by adhyāsa?’). Here, when it is said ‘paratra’ (‘in some other object’) it becomes evident by implication that the manifestation is of something other (than the presented object). (The phrase) ‘being of the nature of recollection’ is its (manifested object – parasya) attribute. What is recollected – that is ‘recollection’. This construction is justified on the ground of usage, for the termination ‘ghañ’, etc., is sometimes used in kāraka which is not denotative of subject though its sense is derivative.

स्मर्यमाणरूपमिव रूपम् अस्य, न पुनः स्मर्यते एव; स्पष्टं पुरोऽवस्थितत्वावभासनात्। पूर्वदृष्टावभासः इति उपपत्तिः स्मृतिरूपत्वे। न हि पूर्वम् अदृष्टरजतस्य शुक्तिसम्प्रयोगे रजतम् अवभासते।

The manifested object only resembles the object remembered (i.e., the appearance, i.e., rūpa of the superimposed object, is only similar to the appearance of the recollected object), but is not the thing (actually) recollected; and this is clear from the fact that what is presented to the sense (and not what is remembered) is (what is) manifested. That it (adhyāsa) resembles recollection is corroborated by the explanation that it is the manifestation of what was perceived in the past. There can be no manifestation of silver to one in direct sense-contact with the shell, who has not seen silver before.

यतोऽर्थात् तद्विषयस्य अवभासस्यापि इदमेव लक्षणम् उक्तं भवति।

And since, on the strength (of this sentence – vākya-sāmarthyāt), it is clear that this definition is also the definition of the knowledge (avabhāsa) of the illusory object. (There is no need for a separate definition of illusory knowledge as apart from illusory object).

कथम्? तदुच्यते – स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपमस्य, न पुनः स्मृतिरेव; पूर्वप्रमाणविषयविशेषस्य तथा अनवभासकत्वात्।

How? (Yes), it will be answered. Of this (i.e., of the illusory knowledge) the manifestation is similar to the manifestation of recollection (i.e., recollective knowledge); but not recollection itself, since the knowledge of the particular object (say, silver in the mart) given in past pramāṇa (Perception, etc.), does not manifest itself as such (i.e., as the object of past experience. If it did, the silver in illusion should have assumed the form ‘that silver – tadrajatam’, but it appears as ‘this silver – idam rajatam’).

कथं पुनः स्मृतिरूपत्वम्? पूर्वप्रमाणद्वारसमुत्थत्वात्। न हि असम्प्रयुक्तावभासिनः पूर्वप्रवृत्ततद्विषयप्रमाणद्वारसमुत्थत्वमन्तरेण समुद्भवः सम्भवति॥

Then how do you account for its similarity (rūpa) with recollection? Because it arises through having the past pramāṇa as its origin. The origination of the knowledge which illumines an object (viz., the presented silver) with which there is no sense-contact is impossible unless that origination be through that (i.e., saṃskāra) arising from the pramāṇa which in the past occasioned the knowledge relating to that object, viz., silver.

1.25 ✅

अपर आह – ननु अन्यसम्प्रयुक्ते चक्षुषि अन्यविषयज्ञानं स्मृतिरेव, प्रमोषस्तु स्मरणाभिमानस्य।

1.25. Some one (who is opposed to this view) says: When the eye is in contact with a particular object and the knowledge is of some other object, is that not recollection only? But the knowledge that it is recollection – (smṛtirityanubhavaḥ) is lacking.

इन्द्रियादीनां ज्ञानकारणानां केनचिदेव दोषविशेषेण कस्यचिदेव अर्थविशेषस्य स्मृतिसमुद्बोधः क्रियते। सम्प्रयुक्तस्य च दोषेण विशेषप्रतिभासहेतुत्वं करणस्य विहन्यते।

Owing to some special affection of the sense-organs, etc., which are the means of knowledge, some particular object (say silver) is revived in memory (and not some other nacre though there is very close affinity with the ‘this’). Further, owing to that affection the instrumentality (capacity) of the sense-organ to manifest the special feature of the object (viz., nacreness or distinctness from silver) with which it has come into contact is destroyed.

तेन दर्शनस्मरणयोः निरन्तरोत्पन्नयोः करणदोषादेव विवेकानवधारणाद् दूरस्थयोरिव वनस्पत्योः अनुत्पन्ने एव एकत्वावभासे उत्पन्नभ्रमः।

Hence, because of the failure to mark the distinction, due only to this sense-defect, between the perceived and the remembered which arise without intermission, a unitary cognition is spoken of as if arisen when actually there is none, very like the use of the expression “(I perceive) a single tree” when two trees which are at a distance (are seen).

1.26 ✅

ननु अनास्वादिततिक्तरसस्यापि बालकस्य पित्तदोषात् मधुरे तिक्तावभासः कथं स्मरणं स्यात्?

1.26. How could (one may urge) it be recollection (when there is absence of memory-reviving impressions – saṃskāra) in the case of a boy who has never tasted (anything) bitter, but who owing to bilious disorder feels the bitter taste in that which is sweet?

उच्यते – जन्मान्तरानुभूतत्वात्, अन्यथा अननुभूतत्वाविशेषे अत्यन्तम् असन्नेव कश्चित् सप्तमो रसः किमिति नावभासेत।

Here is the answer: – because of its (i.e., of bitter) experience in some other birth. If it were not so, the fact of not having previously experienced being on a par (with what is experienced) would (naturally) lead to the question – why should not an absolutely non-existent seventh taste be felt?

तस्मात् पित्तमेव मधुराग्रहणे तिक्तस्मृतौ तत्प्रमोषे च हेतुः; कार्यगम्यत्वात् हेतुभावस्य। एतेन अन्यसम्प्रयोगे अन्यविषयस्य ज्ञानस्य स्मृतित्वतत्प्रमोषौ सर्वत्र व्याख्यातौ द्रष्टव्यौ॥

Hence the bile itself (which is the doṣa) is the cause of the inability to feel the sweet taste, of the recollection of the bitter taste, and of the obscuration of that recollection. (How is it known that the doṣa has such potency?) The nature of the cause is ascertained from the effect. (We must infer that a doṣa causes only this and not that on the evidence of the result – kārya). Hence it must be understood that, in all cases where the cognition of something different from the one with which the sense is in contact arises, the explanation is that there has been a revival of memory and its obscuration.

1.27 ✅

उच्यते – कोऽयं स्मरणाभिमानो नाम? न तावत् ज्ञानानुविद्धतया ग्रहणम्। न हि अतिवृत्तस्य ज्ञानस्य ग्राह्यविशेषणतया विषयभावः। तस्मात् शुद्धमेव अर्थं स्मृतिरवभासयति, न ज्ञानानुविद्धम्।

1.27. Siddhāntin. – But it may be asked – what is it that is meant by ‘smaraṇābhimāna’? It is not, however, presentation (i.e., perception, say, of silver) as associated with (the past) knowledge (jñānānuviddhatayā). It cannot be that past experience (because it is past), will, as the attribute of what is presented (silver), become the object (viṣaya) of recollection (smṛti). Hence memory manifests the object pure and simple and not as associated with the (past) knowledge.

तथा च पदात् पदार्थस्मृतौ न दृष्टो ज्ञानसम्भेदः; ज्ञानस्यापि शब्दार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

In like manner, in the recall of meanings from words, the association of (past) cognition is not perceived, for then cognition also would be regarded as word-meaning (i.e., a word instead of denoting an object would also denote knowledge which on the face of it is absurd).

तथा इष्टभूभागविषयास्मृतिः ‘स सेव्यः’ इति ग्राह्यमात्रस्था, न ज्ञानपरामर्शिनी।

Likewise the recollection having a desired spot as its content takes the form ‘that is to be resorted to’; and that recollection compasses only what was presented (viz., the pleasant object of previous knowledge) and it makes no reference to the past cognition (anubhava-jñāna).

1.28 ✅

अपि च भूयस्यः ज्ञानपरामर्शशून्या एव स्मृतयः। नापि स्वगतो ज्ञानस्य स्मरणाभिमानो नाम रूपभेदः अवभासते। न हि नित्यानुमेयं ज्ञानम् अन्यद्वा वस्तु स्वत एव रूपसम्भिन्नं गृह्यते।

1.28. And as a matter of fact, nearly all recollections do occur without any cognitive reference. Nor is (recollective) cognition seen to possess in itself a special form that may be regarded as smaraṇābhimāna. Indeed cognition which is ever an object of inference (as e.g., according to the Bhāṭṭas) is not in itself seen to be associated with any special form like any other object (whose existence is always to be inferred; e.g., virtue, Dharma or ākāśa).

अत एवोक्तम् ‘अनाकारामेव बुद्धिं अनुमिमीमहे’ इति। अनाकाराम् अनिरूपिताकारविशेषाम्; अनिर्दिष्टस्वलक्षणाम् इत्यर्थः। अतो न स्वतः स्मरणाभिमानात्मकता।

Therefore it is said – “We infer ‘jñāna’ which is indeed devoid of form. The word ‘anākāra’ means that which is of indefinable form or has no particularity of its own (svalakṣaṇa). Hence the quality of smaraṇābhimāna (smaraṇābhimāna-dharma) is not perceived in itself (i.e., in recollective cognition) distinct (from the) object (of anubhava).

1.29 ✅

नापि ग्राह्यविशेषनिमित्तः स्मरणाभिमानः; प्रमाणग्राह्यस्यैव अविकलानधिकस्य गृह्यमाणत्वात्, नापि फलविशेषनिमित्तः; प्रमाणफलविषयमात्रावच्छिन्नफलत्वात्।

1.29. Nor can smaraṇābhimāna be inferred from some object of cognition serving as its probans (liṅga), because recollection gives us neither more nor less than what the (past) pramāṇa (say, perception) actually did convey. Nor does any distinct (specific) phala (not given in cognition, say, fetching a pot, or avoiding a road – hānopādāna) serve as the mark (liṅga, of smaraṇābhimāna) since the phala is (always) limited to the object of (the past) pramāṇa (see T.D.).

1.30 ✅

यः पुनः क्वचित् कदाचित् अनुभूतचरे ‘स्मरामि’ इत्यनुवेधः, सः वाचकशब्दसंयोजनानिमित्तः, यथा सास्नादिमदाकृतौ गौः इत्यभिमानः।

1.30. No doubt in some cases and on certain occasions the cognitive relation as expressed in ‘I remember’ with the recollection of a past experienced object, does arise, and that relation is the result of the apprehension of the phrase denotative of recollection; it is like relating the perceptive cognition of the form ‘cow’ with ‘an animal having a dew-lap’ (caused by the apprehension of the word ‘cow’).

तस्मात् पूर्वप्रमाणसंस्कारसमुत्थतया तद्विषयावभासित्वमात्रं स्मृतेः, न पुनः प्रतीतितः अर्थतो वा अधिकोंशः अस्ति, यस्य दोषनिमित्तः प्रमोषः परिकल्प्येत।

Hence, (i.e., there being no smaraṇābhimāna), revival consists only in the manifestation of the object as brought to mind through impressions left by the past pramāṇa (i.e., by previous experience). And neither cognitively nor existentially is there any additional element, whose obscuration, through some defect, could have been supposed.

न चेह पूर्वप्रमाणविषयावभासित्वमस्ति; पुरोऽवस्थितार्थप्रतिभासनात्, इत्युक्तम्। अतः न अन्यसम्प्रयोगे अन्यविषयज्ञानं स्मृतिः, किन्तु अध्यासः॥

Moreover, here (in the case of shell-silver) is no manifestation of an object of a past pramāṇa (perception, etc.), because it is the manifestation of an object that is actually present before one’s eye – this point has already been noticed. Hence, the cognition of something (silver) when the contact (of the eye) is with something other (shell) is not to be classed under memory; but it is illusion.

1.31 ✅

ननु एवं सति वैपरीत्यमापद्यते, रजतमवभासते शुक्तिरालम्बनम् इति, नैतत् संविदनुसारिणाम् अनुरूपम्।

1.31. If that is so, it would be abnormal: the knowledge is of silver, but its substrate is shell. This view appeals to none who set any value by experience.

ननु शुक्तेः स्वरूपेणापि अवभासने संवित्प्रयुक्तव्यवहारयोग्यत्वमेव आलम्बनार्थः, सैव इदानीं रजतव्यवहारयोग्या प्रतिभासते, तत्र किमिति आलम्बनं न स्यात्?

(Anyathā-khyātivādin): Well, even where the shell appears in its real nature (i.e., shell as shell), the ālambanatva (ground) means only fitness for (initiating) activity promoted by the apprehension (samvit). The same (shell) here (i.e., in ‘shell-silver’ apprehension) manifests itself as being fit for activity in relation to silver. Hence why should it not serve as the ground? (The substratum is the same in both cases.)

1.32 ✅

अथ तथारूपावभासनं शुक्तेः पारमार्थिकं? उताहो न? यदि पारमार्थिकं, नेदं रजतमिति बाधो न स्यात् नेयं शुक्तिः इति यथा। भवति च बाधः। तस्मात् न एष पक्षः प्रमाणवान्।

1.32. (A-khyātivādin). – Is the manifestation of the shell as of the form of that (viz., silver) absolutely true or not? If absolutely true, there should be no sublation of the form – ‘This is not silver’ just as (the notion) ‘this is not shell’ (does not arise when we perceive a real shell). But there is the sublation. Hence this view is unsupported by any valid reason.

1.33 ✅

अथ शुक्तेरेव दोषनिमित्तो रजतरूपः परिणाम उच्यते, एतदप्यसारम्; न हि क्षीरपरिणामे दधनि ‘नेदं दधि’ इति बाधो दृष्टः; नापि क्षीरमिदम् इति प्रतीतिः, इह तु तदुभयं दृश्यते।

1.33. If it be argued that the appearance of silver caused by some ocular defect is but the shell so transformed, even that (argument) is jejune (empty, insignificant). When milk changes into curds, sublation in the form ‘this is not curds’ does not occur; nor is there the notion, ‘this is milk’. But here both these are perceived (viz., ‘this is not silver’, ‘this is shell’).

किञ्च रजतरूपेण चेत् परिणता शुक्तिः, क्षीरमिव दधिरूपेण, तदा दोषापगमेऽपि तथैव अवतिष्ठेत।

Again if the shell has transformed itself into silver just as milk into curds, then even after the disappearance of (ocular or other) defect, it should remain as such only (i.e., unchanged).

1.34 ✅

ननु कमलमुकुलविकासपरिणामहेतोः सावित्रस्य तेजसः स्थितिहेतुत्वमपि दृष्टं, तदपगमे पुनः मुकुलीभावदर्शनात्, तथा इहापि स्यात्,

1.34. (Anyathākhyātivādin). – Well, is it not seen that the lotus-bud changes into the blossom and remains as such so long as its cause – the light of the sun, remains and with its disappearance returns to the state of the bud? The same may happen here.

न; तथा सति तद्वदेव पूर्वावस्थापरिणामबुद्धिः स्यात्, न बाधप्रतीतिः स्यात्।

(Akhyātivādin). – No (this cannot be accepted). If it were so, just as in the case of the other (viz., the resumption of the bud form), let the after-cognition arise in the form ‘(the shell which hitherto was silver) has resumed its former state’ and let there be no notion of the sublation (of silver).

1.35 ✅

अथ पुनः दुष्टकारणजन्यायाः प्रतीतेरेव रजतोत्पादः इति मन्येत, एतदपि न सम्यगिव; कथम्?

1.35. (Ātma-khyātivādin). – It may again be thought that the (illusory) silver is the product of the apprehension (pratīti) begotten of some vitiated cause. Even that docs not stand to reason. How? (It may be asked.)

यस्याः प्रतीतेः तदुत्पादः तस्यास्तावत् न तत् आलम्बनम्; पूर्वोत्तरभावेन भिन्नकालत्वात्, न प्रतीत्यन्तरस्य; पुरुषान्तरप्रतीतेरपि तत्प्रसङ्गात्।

Whatever cognition (pratīti) it be from which that (the silver manifestation) arises, that cognition anyhow will not have that (silver) as its object, because of the difference in time, owing to the cognition being prior and the other (silver-manifestation) subsequent. It cannot be maintained that the silver-manifestation is due to some other cognition (i.e., not the one generated by defective cause) for then the right cognition of some other person also would manifest this (error-contaminated) silver.

1.36 ✅

ननु किमिति पुरुषान्तरप्रतीतेरपि तत्प्रसङ्गः? दुष्टसामग्रीजन्मनो हि प्रतीतेः तत् आलम्बनम्,

1.36. How could it be argued that the cognition of another person also would have that (i.e., the silver as its object)? It is in fact the cognition resulting from vitiated causes only that has that (the silver) as its object (and not the right cognition – samīcīnajñāna).

मैवम्; प्रतीत्यन्तरस्यापि तद्विधस्य रजतान्तरोत्पादनेनैव उपयुक्तत्वात् प्रथमप्रत्ययवत्। अतः अनुत्पन्नसममेव स्यात्। तदेवं पारिशेष्यात् स्मृतिप्रमोष एव अवतिष्ठेत॥

Akhyātivādin. – Not so. Even a separate cognition, if it is of the same character (i.e., generated by duṣṭa-karaṇa), has its function fulfilled in creating a distinct ‘silver (manifestation)’ just like the first cognition (i.e., it cannot have the silver in question as its object). Hence (it all comes to this that) the silver is as good as not having come into existence. As such what is left (i.e., the right conclusion) is (that the illusory knowledge is caused by) the obscuration of memory.

1.37 ✅

ननु स्मृतेः प्रमोषो न सम्भवति इत्युक्तं, तथा च तन्त्रान्तरीया आहुः – ‘अनुभूतविषयासम्प्रमोषा स्मृतिः’ इति।

1.37. Objection. – Has it not been said that obscuration of memory cannot occur? (The Akhyātivādin is reminded by Anyathākhyātivādin). This is also what the followers of other schools of thought aver. ‘Memory is that which recalls the object of past experience and is free from the obscuration (of the cognition that it was an object of past experience)’.

का तर्हि गतिः शुक्तिसम्प्रयोगे रजतावभासस्य?

Akhyātivādin. – Then what is the solution of the manifestation of silver when the sense-contact is (only) with the shell?

1.38 ✅

उच्यते – न इन्द्रियजज्ञानात् संस्कारजं स्मरणं पृथगेव स्मरणाभिमानशून्यं समुत्पन्नं, किन्तु एकमेव संस्कारसहितात् इन्द्रियात्।

1.38. Anirvacanīyākhyātivādin. – This is the solution – It is not that the memory, caused by the mental impressions (saṃskāra) and divested of the knowledge that it is memory (smaraṇābhimāna-śūnya), arises distinct from the cognition arising from sense-contact (viz., of the ‘this’). On the contrary it is a unit cognition only, (arising) from the sense allied with the mental impressions.

कथमेतत्?

Akhyātivādin. – How could it be so?

उच्यते – कारणदोषः कार्यविशेषे तस्य शक्तिं निरुन्धन्नेव संस्कारविशेषमपि उद्बोधयति; कार्यगम्यत्वात् कारणदोषशक्तेः। अतः संस्कारदुष्टकारणसंवलिता एका सामग्री। सा च एकमेव ज्ञानम् एकफलं जनयति।

Anirvacanīyākhyātivādin. – Well, thus it is: the vitiated cause having inhibited its (sense) potency to produce the proper result (i.e., to give rise to correct knowledge) revives at the same time the particular mental impression (causing illusory apprehension). It is from the effect that the potency of the vitiated cause is inferred. Hence the impression as associated with the vitiated cause is the single instrument. And that produces a single cognition and a single phala (practical end).

1.39 ✅

तस्य च दोषोत्थापितसंस्कारविशेषसहितसामग्रीसमुत्पन्नज्ञानस्य उचितमेव शुक्तिगतमिथ्यारजतमालम्बनमवभासते। तेन मिथ्यालम्बनं ज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानम्, न स्वतो ज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वमस्ति, बाधाभावात्।

1.39. And of that cognition which has arisen through the instrumentality of the particular impression revived by some perverted cause, the erroneous silver-in-the-shell manifests itself as the appropriate object (ālambana). Hence that cognition which has something unreal as its object is unreal cognition, for unreality cannot be attributed to cognition as such, since its sublation does not take place.

1.40 ✅

भिन्नजातीयज्ञानहेतुसामग्र्योः कथमेकज्ञानोत्पादनमिति चेत्, नैष दोषः; दृश्यते हि लिङ्गज्ञानसंस्कारयोः सम्भूय लिङ्गिज्ञानोत्पादनं, प्रत्यभिज्ञानोत्पादनञ्च अक्षसंस्कारयोः।

1.40. (Akhyātivādin ): How is it pertinent (it may be questioned) that a single cognition is produced by ingredients which serve as the cause of disparate cognitions? There is nothing wrong. It is well known that the apprehension of the probans (the evidence, liṅga) and the mental impression (of the concomitance [vyāpti] between the probans and the probandum [thing needing to be proved]) conjointly produce the inference. Recognition also arises from sense (contact) and mental impression (saṃskāra).

उभयत्रापि स्मृतिगर्भमेकमेव प्रमाणज्ञानम्; संस्कारानुद्बोधे तदभावात्। तस्मात् लिङ्गदर्शनमेव सम्बन्धज्ञानसंस्कारमुद्बोध्य तत्सहितं लिङ्गिज्ञानं जनयतीति वक्तव्यम्।

In both cases (inference and recognition) there is only a single valid cognition having intimate relation with memory. For without the revival of the impressions it is impossible that it (i.e., either inference or recognition) could arise. Hence it must be said that it is only the perception of the probans that, having recalled the impression of vyāpti-jñāna (i.e., the saṃskāra left by the former experience of the concomitance between the probans and probandum) generates in association with it, the inferential cognition.

1.41 ✅

अयमेव च न्यायः प्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽपि। न पुनः ज्ञानद्वये प्रमाणमस्ति। तथा भिन्नजातीयज्ञानहेतुभ्यो नीलादिभ्य एकं चित्रज्ञानं निदर्शनीयम्।

1.41. The same reasoning holds good even as regards recognition. And there is no valid means by which to prove (here) the (origination of) two cognitions, (viz., recollection and perception). Even so is to be exemplified the unit cognition of a portrait drawn from (a variety of colours) like blue, (red, green, etc.) which serve as causes of separate cognitions.

तत्र लैङ्गिकज्ञानप्रत्यभिज्ञाचित्रज्ञानानामदुष्टकारणारब्धत्वाद् यथार्थमेवावभासः,

There is this difference however: cognitions of the nature of inference, recognition and cognition of complex colours (i.e., a portrait) manifest themselves as being true to reality (vyāvahārika) because they have originated from non-vitiated causes.

1.42 ✅

इह तु कारणदोषादतथाभूतार्थावभासः इति विशेषः। एवंच सति नानुभवविरोधः; प्रतिभासमानस्य रजतस्यैवावलम्बनत्वात्, अतो मायामयं रजतम्।

1.42. Here (in the case of ‘shell-silver’, ‘rope-serpent’, etc.), owing to vitiated causes, the cognitions are not true to reality. Hence (in the light of what has been said) since the manifested silver is the object of cognition (illusory), there is no going counter to experience. Hence the ‘silver’ is the product (i.e., transformation) of māyā.

अथ पुनः पारमार्थिकं स्यात्, सर्वैरेव गृह्येत; यतो न हि पारमार्थिकं रजतं कारणदोषं स्वज्ञानोत्पत्तावपेक्षते। यद्यपेक्षेत, तदा तदभावे न तत्र ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः; आलोकाभावे इव रूपे।

Were it real it would have been apprehended by all, since the real silver (relatively pāramārthika) does not presuppose a vitiated cause in the origination of its cognition. If it (real silver) did require (the aberration) in the origination of its cognition, then where it is absent there its cognition will not arise, as when the light is absent, the form (of a thing) is not perceived.

1.43 ✅

मायामात्रत्वे तु मन्त्राद्युपहतचक्षुष इव दोषोपहतज्ञानकरणा एव पश्यन्तीति युक्तम्। किञ्च नेदं रजतम् इति बाधोऽपि मायामयत्वमेव सूचयति।

1.43. If on the contrary (the shell-silver is admitted to be) the product of māyā, it would be right to conclude that only those whose knowledge-giving senses have been rendered morbid, perceive (the illusory silver), very like the person whose sight has been assailed by incantations, etc. Moreover sublation also which takes the form ‘this is not silver’ points to its being only the product of māyā.

कथम्? तेन हि तस्य निरुपाख्यतापादनपूर्वकं मिथ्यात्वं ज्ञाप्यते। ‘नेदं रजतं मिथ्यैवाभासिष्ट’ इति।

How? (it may be asked). It is indeed from that (i.e., the cognition of sublation) that its (shell-silver) māyā-origin is brought to mind preceded by the negation of its (silver) very essence. Witness the nature of the cognition that arises after sublation, viz., ‘this is not silver; what manifested itself was false only’.

न च तत् केनचिद्रूपेण रूपवत्त्वेऽवकल्पते; सम्प्रयुक्तशुक्तिवत् निरस्यमानविषयज्ञानवच्च॥

And such cognition would be inappropriate if (the shell-silver) is admitted to exist in its real nature in some form (as the mart-silver) such as it would be (inappropriate) to negate the shell with which the sense is in contact and (as it would be inappropriate to negate) cognition where its object is regarded as a nullity, (the Buddhist idealists admit jñāna alone as real, but regard its content as non est).

1.44 ✅

ननु न व्यापकमिदं लक्षणम्; स्वप्नशोकादावसम्भवात्, न हि स्वप्नशोकादौ केनचित् सम्प्रयोगोऽस्ति, येन परत्र परावभासः स्यात्। अत एव वासनातिरिक्तकारणाभावात् स्मृतिरेव, न स्मृतिरूपता,

1.44. Well, is not this definition (fallacious inasmuch as it is) of partial applicability (navyāpakam) since (illusions of) dream, sorrow, etc., cannot come within it’s scope? In one’s experience of dream, sorrow, etc., there is no sense-contact with anything (i.e., some substratum) by which one object could be regarded as manifesting itself in another. Hence there being no cause other than the mental traces we must conclude (that the dream-experiences, etc.), are outright memory-pictures and not memory-like (smṛti-rūpa).

अत्रोच्यते न तावत् स्मृतित्वमस्ति; अपरोक्षार्थावभासनात्।

This will be said (in answer) here – It is not in reality of the nature of recollection, for the manifestation is of a presented object.

ननु स्मृतिरूपत्वमपि नास्ति; पूर्वप्रमाणसंस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वात्,

Nor is it memory-like either (says the opponent), since the cognition has arisen only through the mental-impressions left by a past valid means of knowledge (say, perception).

1.45 ✅

अत्रोच्यते; उक्तमेतत् पूर्वप्रमाणविषयावभासित्वमात्रं स्मृतेः स्वरूपमिति। तदिह निद्रादिदोषोपप्लुतं मनः अदृष्टादिसमुद्बोधितसंस्कारविशेषसहकार्यानुरूपं मिथ्यार्थविषयं ज्ञानमुत्पादयति।

1.45. Here we reply thus: It has been stated that what constitutes recollection is the mere manifestation of the object of a past valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa). And here the mind disturbed by sleep (which in itself is a doṣa) and in association with such impressions as are revived by one’s adṛṣṭa (unseen principle) etc., gives rise to a cognition which has something unreal for its object.

तस्य च तदवच्छिन्नापरोक्षचैतन्यस्थाविद्याशक्तिरालम्बनतया विवर्तते।

And of this cognition, the potency of avidyā resident in the immediate consciousness delimited by the inner sense (tad-avacchinna) evolves into (vivartate) its content (viz., the illusory object, say – elephant).

1.46 ✅

ननु एवं सति अन्तरेव स्वप्नार्थप्रतिभासः स्यात्?

1.46. Well, in that case the appearance of the dream-object would be internal only (antaḥ).

को वा ब्रूते नान्तरिति?

Whoever says that it is not internal?

ननु विच्छिन्नदेशोऽनुभूयते स्वप्नेऽपि जागरण इव, न तदन्तरनुभवाश्रयत्वे स्वप्नार्थस्योपपद्यते,

But is it not one’s experience that the locus of dream-objects is distinct (from and outside the subject) as in the waking state? And that (experience) if its locus is internal, cannot account for the dream-object.

ननु देशोऽपि तादृश एव, कुतस्तत्सम्बन्धात् विच्छेदोऽवभासते? अयमपि तर्ह्यपरो दोषः,

Well, the space also (where the dream-object appears – pṛthaktvāvabhāsa) is like it (i.e., internal only); how then could relation with such space make (the object) appear outside? Then this also is an additional blemish. (If internal, the cognition would take the form – aham deśaḥ).

1.47 ✅

नैष दोषः; जागरणेऽपि प्रमाणज्ञानादन्तरपरोक्षानुभवात् न विषयस्था अपरोक्षता भिद्यते; एकरूपप्रकाशनात्।

1.47. No, there is no blemish. Even in the waking state by no valid means of knowledge could it (in reality) be proved that the internal consciousness (caitanya) is different from the external consciousness (in other words there is no difference between internal consciousness and object-consciousness); for the manifestation (in both) is identical.

अतोऽन्तरपरोक्षानुभवावगुण्ठित एव जागरणेऽप्यर्थोऽनुभूयते; अन्यथा जडस्य प्रकाशानुपपत्तेः। यथा तमसाऽवगुण्ठितो घटः प्रदीपप्रभावगुण्ठनमन्तरेण न प्रकाशीभवति, एवम्।

Hence an object even in the waking state is perceived as intimately associated with the internal consciousness (i.e., the inner witness); otherwise the manifestation of the insentient (object-world) would be unintelligible. For instance a pot shrouded in darkness does not become visible except in contact with the light of a lamp – so here.

1.48 ✅

यः पुनर्विच्छेदावभासः, स जागरेऽपि मायाविजृम्भितः; सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चजातस्य चैतन्यैकाश्रयत्वात्, तस्य च निरंशस्य प्रदेशभेदाभावात्।

1.48. As for the appearance of objectivity (of objects in dreams) as distinct (from the ego) even in the waking state, it must be (regarded as but) the display of māyā. Because the whole of the universe stands on the single basis of consciousness and because that consciousness is void of parts and as such there could be no distinction of space (as internal and external loci),

प्रपञ्चभेदेनैव हि तत् कल्पितावच्छेदं सदवच्छिन्नमिव बहिरिव अन्तरिव प्रकाशते। अथवा दिगाकाशौ मनोमात्रगोचरौ सर्वत्राध्यासाधारौ विद्येते इति न परत्रेति विरुध्यते॥

it is the world-diversity (and that is anādi) which superimposes limitations on that (viz., the cit, the one reality), which then manifests itself as if conditioned, as if external, as if internal. Or ‘diś’ (quarter) and ākāśa (space) which the mind alone can apprehend, do serve as the substratum of superimposition everywhere (in dream and waking) and as such (the insertion of) ‘paratra – elsewhere’ (in the definition of adhyāsa, viz., paratra parāvabhāsaḥ) is unexceptionable.

1.49 ✅

कथं तर्हि नामादिषु ब्रह्माध्यासः?
किमत्र कथम्?
न तत्र कारणदोषः, नापि मिथ्यार्थावभासः,

1.49. Then how is the superimposition of Brahman on names, etc., to be accounted for?
What is it that is meant here by ‘how’ (katham, i.e., by what reason has superimposition been denied here)?
There (in the superimposition of Brahman on names) neither a defective cause nor even the manifestation of an illusory object is perceived. (Hence this is no case of superimposition.)

सत्यम्; अत एव चोदनावशात् इच्छातोऽनुष्ठेयत्वात् मानसी क्रियैषा, न ज्ञानं; ज्ञानस्य हि दुष्टकारणजन्यस्य विषयो मिथ्यार्थः। न हि ज्ञानमिच्छातो जनयितुं निवर्तयितुं वा शक्यं; कारणैकायत्तत्वादिच्छानुप्रवेशानुपपत्तेः।

It is true. Therefore only, since it is undertaken voluntarily on the authority of an injunction, this (the superimposition of Brahman on names) is (to be regarded as) a mental act and it is not cognition (jñāna). Knowledge generated by a defective cause has indeed for its object one that is erroneous. By one’s will it is not possible either to create knowledge or negate it; because it (cognition) is dependent solely on definite causes, there is no just scope for will.

1.50 ✅

ननु स्मृतिज्ञानमाभोगेन जन्यमानं मनोनिरोधेन च निरुध्यमानं दृश्यते।

1.50. Is it not an observed fact that recollective knowledge is generated by one’s will (ābhoga – icchā – T.D.) and suppressed also by inhibiting the mind?

सत्यं; न स्मृत्युत्पत्तिनिरोधयोस्तयोर्व्यापारः, किन्तु कारणव्यापारे तत्प्रतिबन्धे च चक्षुष इवोन्मीलननिमीलने, न पुनर्ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ व्यापार इच्छायाः।

Yes, it is so; but they (i.e., will and inhibition) are inoperative in originating or suppressing (recollective knowledge); they however either stimulate or obstruct the causes (which generate recollective knowledge) as witness the cognitive function which is limited to the opening or shutting the eye and has no part in the origination of knowledge.

1.51 ✅

तस्मात् ब्रह्मदृष्टिः केवला अध्यस्यते चोदनावशात् फलायैव, मातृबुद्धिरिव रागनिवृत्तये परयोषिति। तदेवम् अनवद्यमध्यासस्य लक्षणं – स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः इति॥

1.51. Hence the ascription of Brahman-nature to names is merely an act of superimposition and it is done with a view to secure some reward and is effected by voluntary effort as the result of (Scriptural) injunction (vide, ChanU.7.5), very like regarding another man’s wife as one’s mother, in order to inhibit (carnal) desire. Therefore the conclusion is that the definition of adhyāsa, viz., the manifestation in some other place (or thing) of what was seen before (elsewhere) which is similar to memory, is faultless.

[BrS.1. L.7]

1.52 ✅

‘तं केचित्’ इत्यादिना अध्यासस्वरूपे मतान्तरमुपन्यस्यति स्वमतपरिशुद्धये। कथम्? अन्यत्र शुक्तिकादौ, अन्यधर्मस्य अर्थान्तरस्य, रजतादेः ज्ञानाकारस्य बहिष्ठस्यैव वा; अध्यासः इति वदन्ति।

1.52. By the phrase – [‘tam ke cit’], “some (define it),” etc., he (the Bhāṣyakāra) discusses the doctrines of other schools with a view to clarifying his own doctrine. How? They maintain that superimposition means the ascription to nacre, etc., of the qualities of something which is quite distinct from it, viz., either silver which is but a form of jñāna (as held by the Vijñāna-vādins) or silver which exists elsewhere (say, in the shop as held by the Naiyāyikas).

[BrS.1. L.8]

1.53 ✅

केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासः तद्विवेकाग्रहणनिबन्धनो भ्रमः इति॥ यत्र यस्याध्यासः, तयोर्विवेकस्याग्रहणात् तन्निबन्धनोऽयमेकत्वभ्रमः इति वदन्तीत्यनुषङ्गः।

1.53. Others (referring to the Prābhākaras) hold [that where one thing is imposed on another, the bhrama (confusion) is due to the non-discrimination (of the two factors involved, viz., the perceptive cognition of the shell and the recollective cognition of silver)]. The sentence has to be construed thus – the illusion that it is a single cognition (which it is not) is caused, they say, by the failure to comprehend the distinction between the two things of which one is superimposed on the other.

[BrS.1. L.9]

1.54 ✅

अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षते इति। यत्र शुक्तिकादौ, यस्य रजतादेरध्यासः, तस्यैव शुक्तिशकलादेः, विपरीतधर्मत्वस्य रजतादिरूपत्वस्य, कल्पनाम् अविद्यमानस्यैवावभासमानताम्, आचक्षते।

1.54. [Others again (referring to the nihilist Mādhyamika and a particular school of Naiyāyikas) maintain that where one thing is superimposed on another, the (false) ascription of a totally opposed quality to that (another) alone constitutes illusion]. (The sentence is explained thus): – yatra – in the shell, etc., yasya= of silver, etc., adhyāsaḥ= superimposition, tasyaiva= of the bit of shell, etc., viparīta-dharmatvasya= of the form of silver, etc., kalpanām= the manifestation of what does not exist, ācakṣate= they say.

[BrS.1. L.10]

1.55 ✅

सर्वथापि तु इति। स्वमतानुसारित्वं सर्वेषां कल्पनाप्रकाराणां दर्शयति। अन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासत्वं नाम लक्षणं, परत्रेत्युक्ते अर्थात् परावभासः सिद्धः इति यदवादिष्यम्, तत् न व्यभिचरति।

1.55. By the phrase [sarvathāpi tu] – ‘taken in whatever sense’ – he (the Bhāṣyakāra) points out that all the different (conflicting) explanations (of adhyāsa) are in conformity with his own doctrine. Because the mention of the word ‘paratra’ (in something or place) necessarily implies ‘parāvabhāsa’ (manifestation of some other thing), we stated that the manifestation of a quality belonging to one object in another object is what constitutes the definition (of adhyāsa) and that does not go astray (i.e. the definition holds good for all schools).

कथम्? पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पे ज्ञानाकारस्य बहिष्ठस्य वा शुक्तिधर्मत्वावभासनात् न व्यभिचारः, द्वितीयेऽपि शुक्तिरजतयोः पृथक् सतोरपृथगवभासः अभिमानात्, तृतीयेऽपि शुक्तिशकलस्य रजतरूपप्रतिभासनात्॥

How? According to the first view the definition does not stray since the silver of the form of consciousness or the silver existing outside appears as of the essence of nacre. Even according to the second view, (it does not fail) since, to be consistent (it must be conceded that) the two real distincts – shell and silver – appear as non-distinct through illusion. Again (it holds good) as regards the third view, since the shell manifests itself in the form of silver.

पूर्वदृष्टत्वस्मृतिरूपत्वयोः सर्वत्राव्यभिचारात् न विवादः इत्यभिप्रायः।

As regards the prior perception and the similarity of recollection (the other components of the definition), what (the Bhāṣyakāra) means is that since these are found in all (definitions), there is no room for controversy.

1.56 ✅

तत्र ‘स्मृतिरूपः पूर्वदृष्टावभासः’ इत्येतावति लक्षणे निरधिष्ठानाध्यासवादिपक्षेऽपि निरुपपत्तिके लक्षणव्याप्तिः स्यादिति तन्निवृत्तये ‘परत्र’ इत्युच्यते॥

1.56. If it (adhyāsa) were defined only by the terms ‘what resembles recollection’ and ‘the manifestation of what was experienced before the scope of the definition would even extend to the irrational view of the Nihilist that superimposition has no locus (adhiṣṭhāna). To obviate it therefore the word ‘paratra’ is used.

1.57 ✅

कथं? निरुपपत्तिकोऽयं पक्षः।

1.57. How is this view irrational?

न हि निरधिष्ठानोऽध्यासो दृष्टपूर्वः, सम्भवी वा।

Because indeed there has been no experience of adhyāsa devoid of a locus, nor is it likely to occur hereafter.

ननु केशाण्ड्रकाद्यवभासो निरधिष्ठानो दृष्टः,

Well, is it not within one’s experience that one perceives a dark mass of hair having no locus?

न; तस्यापि तेजोऽवयवाधिष्ठानत्वात्॥

No, even that has the locus constituted by the light-particles (for such dark mass appears only in the light – vide VPS., p. 41).

ननु रजते संवित्, संविदि रजतमिति परस्पराधिष्ठानो भविष्यति, बीजाङ्कुरादिवत्, नैतत् सारं; न तत्र यतो बीजात् योऽङ्कुरः तत एव तद्बीजम्,

Well, (we maintain that) like the seed and sprout (series), knowledge – samvit, (having its substratum) in the ‘silver’, and ‘the silver’ in knowledge manifest themselves each serving as the locus of the other.

अपि तु अङ्कुरान्तरात्, इह पुनः यस्यां संविदि यत् रजतमवभासते, तयोरेवेतरेतराध्यासः, ततो दुर्घटमेतत्। बीजाङ्कुरादिष्वपि न बीजाङ्कुरान्तरपरम्परामात्रेण अभिमतवस्तुसिद्धिः; प्रतीतितो वस्तुतश्चानिवृत्ताकाङ्क्षत्वात्,

This is jejune. There (in the seed-sprout series) the sprout is produced from a particular seed, but that seed is not produced from that very sprout; (on the contrary) from a different sprout. Here, however, we have a particular knowledge in which a particular ‘silver’ manifests itself; between these two only, there is mutual superimposition. Hence this (mutual superimposition) is hard to reconcile. Even as regards the seed and sprout what is aimed at (viz., that the seed is the material cause) is not established merely because the seed and sprout form an infinite series, for neither on grounds of apprehension nor of reason will the ākāṅkṣā (the longing to find what the material cause is) be dispelled.

तथा च ‘कुत इदमेवं’ इति पर्यनुयोगे ‘दृष्टत्वादेवं’ इति तत्र एव दूरं वा परिधाव्य स्थातव्यम्; अन्यथा हेतुपरम्परामेवावलम्ब्य क्वचिदप्यनवतिष्ठमानो नानवस्थादोषमतिवर्तेत।

On this again, if it be questioned how (it could be proved that of the two – seed and sprout – the one is instrumental in producing the other), the answer is that it is proved by actual experience (i.e., by perception) and there enquiry should stop however far it may have gone. Otherwise, (i.e., if he does not accept empirical truth) the enquiry, relying on the infinite cause-series, will find no resting-place (anavasthā) and cannot extricate itself from the fallacy of infinite regress (i.e., regress of the unverified type – ‘andha-paramparā’).

1.58 ✅

अपि च न क्वचिन्निरवधिको ‘न’ इत्येव बाधावगमो दृष्टः, यत्राप्यनुमानादाप्तवचनाद्वा न सर्पः इत्येवावगमः, तत्रापि ‘किं पुनरिदम्? ’ इत्यपेक्षादर्शनात् पुरोऽवस्थितं वस्तुमात्रमवधिर्विद्यते। प्रधानादिष्वपि जगत्कारणे त्रिगुणत्वादिबाधः अधिगतावधिरेव।

1.58. Again, nowhere does the knowledge of negation arise in the form of mere ‘No’ without reference to some terminus. Where the knowledge of the mere absence of the serpent (in the form ‘not serpent’) arises either from inference or from the word of a trustworthy person, there again the desire to know what it is, is seen to arise (which desire is expressed thus – ‘what then is this’?): and because it is so, only the object that is before one’s eye remains as (i.e., to be regarded as) the terminus. Even in the case of ‘pradhāna’ (which is regarded by the Sāṅkhyas as the cause of the Universe), etc., the negation of (the existence of) the triad of the guṇās, etc., in the cause of the universe has indeed a known terminus.

1.59 ✅

अथवा सर्वलोकसाक्षिकमेतत् केशोण्ड्रकादावपि तद्बाधे तदनुषङ्ग एव बोधे बाध्यते, न बोधः। अतः तदवधिः सर्वस्य बाधः;

1.59. Or (it may be stated that) this (illusory knowledge) has as its locus the universal witness (i.e., the Eternal Seer). And in the case of the illusory knowledge of the dark hairy mass, when that (hairy mass) is negated it is only the (intimate) relation that it has with knowledge (bodha) that is negated and not knowledge (as such). Hence the negation of all things has that (the Witness) as its terminus.

तेन तन्मात्रस्य बाधाभावात्, स्वतश्च विशेषानुपलब्धेः कूटस्थापरोक्षैकरसचैतन्यावधिः सर्वस्य बाधः। नाप्यध्यस्तमप्यसदेव; तथात्वे प्रतिभासायोगात्॥

Therefore since negation so far as it (the Witness) is concerned is non est and since in itself no attributes are perceived (the Sākṣin in its nature, is pure, but it is the upādhis or limiting adjuncts that confer qualities on it), all negation must stop with the immutable, immediate and integral consciousness. Nor is the superimposed (object) a mere nullity. If it were so (i.e., if the object of illusion were absolutely non-existent) it would not be directly perceptive.

1.60 ✅

ननु सर्वमेवेदमसदिति भवतो मतम्।

1.60. Bauddha. – Well, is it not your doctrine that all this (the whole universe) is non-existent?

क एवमाह? अनिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्यात्मकमित्युद्घोषितमस्माभिः।

Siddhāntin. – Who said so? We have proclaimed that all this is error-ridden, which error is inexplicable and beginningless.

अथ पुनर्विद्योदये अविद्याया निरुपाख्यतामङ्गीकृत्यासत्त्वमुच्येत, काममभिधीयताम्।

If, however, admitting that the total effacement of ignorance (avidyā or error) on the rise of knowledge (vidyā) you postulate the non-existence (of the world), you are at liberty to do so.

तथा च बाधकज्ञानं ‘नेदं रजतम्’ इति विशिष्टदेशकालसम्बद्धं रजतं विलोपयदेवोदेति, न देशान्तरसम्बन्धमापादयति; तथाऽनवगमात्।

As such (i.e., when it is established that avidyā ceases after the rise of vidyā) the knowledge of negation as in ‘This is not silver’ arises only by negating the silver associated with some specific region or time and it does not bring about (i.e., point to) its (silver) relation with some different region, for it is not so experienced.

तथा च दूरवर्तिनीं रज्जुं सर्पं मन्यमानस्य निकटवर्तिनाऽऽप्तेन ‘नायं सर्पः’ इत्युक्ते सर्पाभावमात्रं प्रतिपद्यते, न तस्य देशान्तरवर्तित्वं; तत्प्रतिपत्तावसामर्थ्यात् वाक्यस्य।

Again one who mistakes a rope that is at a distance to be a serpent, when told by a trustworthy person who is near him that it is not a serpent, gets knowledge of only the absence of the serpent and not of its existence in a different place, for the sentence (viz., ‘nāyam sarpaḥ’ – this is not serpent) is incapable of generating that knowledge (viz., that the serpent exists elsewhere).

1.61 ✅

नार्थापत्त्या; इह भग्नघटाभाववत् तावन्मात्रेणापि तत्सिद्धेः। यत्रापि सर्पबाधपूर्वको रज्जुविधिरक्षजन्यः तादृशवाक्यजन्यो वा, तत्रापि स एव न्यायः; तथाऽनवगमात्,

1.61. Nor is it to be proved by arthāpatti (presumptive evidence) like the negation of ‘pot-that-is-destroyed-here’ (iha bhaṅga-ghaṭaḥ). From that alone it (negation) is established. Where again a positive cognition of existence (vidhi) – ‘this is rope’ arises, preceded by a negative cognition – ‘this is not a serpent’, – either by direct perception or by a corresponding verbal statement, even there the same reasoning (per force) holds good. For it is not so experienced (i.e., the negation of a superimposed object does not bring to mind its existence elsewhere).

तदेवं न क्वचिन्निरधिष्ठानोऽध्यासः? तस्मात् साधूक्तं परत्र इति॥

From all this we conclude that illusory knowledge can nowhere arise without a substratum. Hence the appositeness of the word ‘paratra’ (in the definition of adhyāsa).

1.62 ✅

यद्येवं ‘परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः’ इत्येतावदस्तु लक्षणम्, तथाविधस्य स्मृतिरूपत्वाव्यभिचारात्,

1.62. If it be so let merely the words – ‘the manifestation somewhere else of what was seen before’ (paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ) – suffice for the definition (of adhyāsa); for when thus defined its recollective character does not stray.

सत्यम्; अर्थलभ्यस्य स्मृतित्वमेव स्यात्, न स्मृतिरूपत्वम्। न च स्मृतिविषयस्याध्यासत्वमित्युक्तम्।

Yes, it is true; but then what is implied (by the word pūrva-dṛṣṭa) would be pure remembrance and not that which is similar to remembrance (smṛti-rūpa). And it has already been stated that what constitutes the object of recollection cannot be characterised as illusory.

1.63 ✅

यद्येवमेतावदस्तु लक्षणं परत्र स्मृति रूपावभासः इति, तत्र परत्रेत्युक्ते अर्थलभ्यस्य परावभासस्य स्मृतिरूपत्वं विशेषणं, न हि परस्यासम्प्रयुक्तस्य पूर्वदृष्टत्वाभावे स्मृतिरूपत्वसम्भवः,

1.63. If it be so, let these words alone – ‘the manifestation elsewhere of what is similar to the object of memory’ – ‘paratra smṛtirūpāvabhāsaḥ’ – suffice for the definition (of ‘adhyāsa’). There in that (definition) the mention of the word ‘paratra’ suggests, by implication, the manifestation of a different object (parāvabhāsa) and ‘smṛtirūpatva’ is its qualifying adjunct. It is clear that ‘similarity with the recollected’ (smṛtirūpatva) is not possible of a distinct entity (parasya, i.e., of the silver) which is not in conjunction (with the eye), in the absence of past perception (pūrva-dṛṣṭatva).

सत्यम्; विस्पष्टार्थं पूर्वदृष्टग्रहणमिति यथान्यासमेव लक्षणमस्तु।

It is true. The use of the phrase – pūrvadṛṣṭa is however for the better clarification (of the nature of adhyāsa). Hence let the definition stand in the manner set forth (viz., smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ).

[BrS.1. L.11]

1.64 ✅

तथा च लोके अनुभवः
इत्युदाहरणद्वयेन लौकिकसिद्धमेवेदमध्यासस्य स्वरूपं लक्षितं, किमत्र युक्त्या? इति कथयति – शुक्तिका हि रजतवदवभासते इति॥

1.64. [Even so is one’s experience in the world]. (Tathā ca loke anubhavaḥ’)
So that, by the adduction of two instances, the nature of illusion (i.e., the manifestation of the relation of the false and the true) as attested by ordinary experience alone, is indicated by the definition. What is the use of reasoning here? As to this he (Śaṅkara) says, “it is the shell indeed that manifests itself as the silver”.

1.65 ✅

ननु न शुक्तिका प्रतिभासते, रजतमेव प्रतिभासते, तेन शुक्तिकेति, रजतवदिति चोभयं नोपपद्यते,

1.65. Well, (in the illusion of ‘shell-silver’) the shell does not manifest itself, the silver alone manifests itself; hence the use of both the terms – ‘the shell’ – ‘śuktikā and ‘like the silver’ – ‘rajatavat’ (śuktikā hi rajatavat avabhāsate) is inappropriate.

उच्यते – शुक्तिकाग्रहणमुपरितनसम्यग्ज्ञानसिद्धं परमार्थतः शुक्तिकात्वमपेक्ष्य, वतिग्रहणं तु सम्प्रयुक्तस्यारजतस्वरूपस्य मिथ्यारजतसम्भेद इवावभासनमङ्गीकृत्य।

This is our answer – The use of the word ‘śuktikā’ is justified on the ground that what is ascertained by the subsequent valid knowledge is (none other than) the final reality of the shell; and the use of (the termination) ‘-vat’ (in rajatavat) is justified on the ground that the non-silver (viz., shell or mother of pearl) with which there is sense-contact, manifests itself as if inseparably related to the illusory silver.

मिथ्यात्वमपि रजतस्य आगन्तुकदोषनिमित्तत्वादनन्तरबाधदर्शनाच्च कथ्यते, न पुनः परमार्थाभिमतात् रजतादन्यत्वमाश्रित्य।

We speak of even the illusoriness of the silver, because it is produced by adventitious defects and because it is immediately negatived (in the empirical sphere itself), and not on the ground of its distinctness from silver which is accepted as ultimately real.

तत्र असम्प्रयुक्तत्वाद्रजतस्य नेदन्तावभासस्तद्गतः, किन्तु सम्प्रयुक्तगत एव।

There, (in shell-silver apprehension) since no contact exists (between the eye and) the silver, the manifestation of the ‘thisness’ (idantā) cannot belong to it – (the silver; in other words, the silver cannot be the āśraya of idantā), but it belongs only to that with which the eye is in contact (viz., the shell).

अपरोक्षावभासस्तु संस्कारजन्मनोऽपि रजतोल्लेखस्य दोषबलादिन्द्रियजज्ञानान्तर्भावाच्चेतिद्रष्टव्यम्।

As for the direct manifestation of silver), even though its apprehension is produced by the revival of memory-impressions, it must be understood as being due to the potency of defects and to its intimate association with what the sensory knowledge gives (viz., the ‘this’).

1.66 ✅

तत्र शुक्तिकोदाहरणेन सम्प्रयुक्तस्यानात्मा रजतमिति दर्शितम्। निरञ्जनस्य चैतन्यस्य अस्मदर्थे अनिदमंशस्य अनात्मा तदवभास्यत्वेन युष्मदर्थलक्षणापन्नः अहङ्कारः अध्यस्तः इति प्रदर्शनार्थं

1.66. There (in the Bhāṣya) by adducing the instance of the ‘shell’, it is pointed out that the ‘silver’ is not of the nature of (i.e., is something other than) that which is in sense-contact; and the purpose (of this illustration) is to show that the egoity (ahaṅkāra), because it is lit up (manifested) by it (cit), comes under the category of the ‘thou-notion’ (yuṣmad-artha), and that as such, it is superimposed on the pure sentience (cit) which is unattached (nirañjana) and is the ‘not – this’ element in the ‘I-notion’ (asmad-artha).

द्विचन्द्रोदाहरणेन जीवेश्वरयोः जीवानां चानात्मरूपो भेदावभासः इति दर्शितम्।

By adducing the instance of the double-moon, what is pointed out is that the manifestation of difference between jīva (individual soul) and Īśvara and between soul and soul is not of the nature (of cit). (Like the single moon, there is only one caitanya; and yet ignorance creates difference as does the doṣa in the former).

1.67 ✅

ननु बहिरर्थे कारणदोषोऽर्थगतः सादृश्यादिः इन्द्रियगतश्च तिमिरादिरुपलभ्यते, तन्निमित्तश्चार्थस्य सांशत्वादंशान्तरावग्रहेऽपि अंशान्तरप्रतिबन्धो युज्येत,

1.67. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, in the case of an object outside oneself, the defect of the cause, such as similarity, etc. existing in the object (substratum, the shell) and morbid affection (timira) etc., existing in the sense of sight (and desire, etc., existing in the deluded seer) is perceived (to exist) and as due to that (defect), the substratum being constituted of parts, it is perhaps intelligible that though one part (the ‘this’) is apprehended, the other part (the ‘shell’) remains obscured.

न त्विह कारणान्तरायत्ता सिद्धिः, येन तद्दोषादनवभासोऽपि स्यात्, निरंशस्य चैतन्यस्य स्वयञ्ज्योतिषस्तदयोगात्।

But here (in ahamkārādhyāsa) it is not from any extraneous cause that it (substratum, viz., the sākṣin) is avouched; for if it had been so, its obscuration would have been possible as due to any defect in it (i.e., the cause). But that (i.e., specific feature, viz., having corners, etc., as in the case of the shell), can by no means exist in the self-luminous and partless caitanya.

1.68 ✅

ननु ब्रह्मस्वरूपमनवभासमानमस्त्येव,

1.68. Siddhāntin. – Well, the fact is there that the real nature of Brahman remains unknown.

न तदनवभासनाज्जीवेऽनवभासविपर्यासौ भवतः। न हि शुक्तेरग्रहणात् स्थाणावग्रहणं विपर्यासो वा।

Pūrvapakṣin. – From the non-manifestation of that (Brahman), neither non-manifestation nor illusion would occur in regard to the individual soul. Because the ‘shell’ is unapprehended, it does not follow that non-manifestedness and superimposition would result in the case of a stump.

ननु न ब्रह्मणोऽन्यो जीवः, ‘अनेन जीवेनात्मना’ (छा. उ. ६-३-२) इति श्रुतेः, अतः तदग्रहणमात्मन एव तत्,

Siddhāntin. – Well, the individual soul is not different from Brahman, as witness the Scriptural text – “With this soul which is my very self, etc.” (ChanU.6.3.2). Hence its (Brahman’s) non-apprehension is verily the non-apprehension of the soul.

एवं तर्हि सुतरामविद्यायास्तत्रासम्भवः; तस्य विद्यात्मकत्वात्, ‘तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति’ (क. उ. २-२-१५) इति तच्चैतन्येनैव सर्वस्य भासमानत्वात्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – If that be so, there exists no possibility whatever for avidyā to arise there since Brahman is of the nature of knowledge, as witness the Scripture – ‘From its refulgence all this (the world) stands revealed’ (MunU.2.2.2; KathU.2.2.15), and since it is from the pure sentience itself that the revelation of all this is made possible.

1.69 ✅

उच्यते – विद्यत एव अत्राप्यग्रहणाविद्यात्मको दोषः प्रकाशस्याच्छादकः।

1.69. Siddhāntin. – This is to be said (in reply) that even here (i.e., in Brahman) there exists the doṣa (perversion) constituted by avidyā (beginningless ignorance), which is hostile to knowledge, and which veils the luminosity (of Brahman).

कथं गम्यते?
श्रुतेः तदर्थापत्तेश्च। श्रुतिस्तावत् – ‘अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः’ ‘अनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः’ इत्येवमाद्या। तदर्थापत्तिरपि विद्यैव सर्वत्र श्रुतिषु ब्रह्मविषया मोक्षाय निवेद्यते,

Pūrvapakṣin. – How is this known? (i.e., from which pramāṇa?)
Siddhāntin: From the Scriptures (śabda) and from the Śrutārthāpatti (verbal presumption). As for Śruti we have, “Wholly immersed in ignorance (anṛta)” (ChanU.8.3.2); “without cognising his identity with Īśvara he sorrows, lost in delusion” (MunU.3.1.2), and the rest. Likewise Śrutārthāpatti also exists (as evidence of avidyā). In all the Śrutis it is the vidyā (knowledge) of Brahman that is set forth as the means of release.

तेनार्थादिदमवगम्यते जीवस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपतानवगमोऽविद्यात्मको बन्धो निसर्गत एवास्तीति॥

Hence by presumptive evidence this becomes clear – that the bondage of ignorance, which is of the nature of non-comprehension of the individual’s identity with Brahman, exists congenitally.

1.70 ✅

ननु न जीवो ब्रह्मणोऽन्यः इत्युक्तम्॥

1.70. Well, was it not said that Jīva is non-distinct from Brahman?

बाढम्; अत एवाऽर्थाज्जीवे ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रकाशाच्छादिका अविद्या कल्प्यते;

True, it is for that very reason that avidyā, which conceals in Jīva the luminous nature of Brahman, is posited by implication (arthāt).

अन्यथा परमार्थतस्तत्स्वरूपत्वे तदवबोधोऽपि यदि नित्यसिद्धः स्यात्, तदा तादात्म्योपदेशो व्यर्थः स्यात्।

Otherwise (if the individual soul is admitted to be, distinct from the Absolute, insentient, or of finite intelligence, avidyā, a positive entity having the capacity of concealment cannot be maintained), when the Jīva is in reality (of the nature of) Brahman, if the knowledge of identity also were eternally established, then the teaching of identity (tādātmyopadeśa) would be purposeless.

अतः अनादिसिद्धाविद्यावच्छिन्नानन्तजीवनिर्भासास्पदमेकरसं ब्रह्मेति श्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायकोविदैरभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।

As such it must be admitted by those learned in the Śruti, Smṛti and Nyāya that Brahman which is homogeneous consciousness is the substratum of the illusion of the endless souls which are conditioned by the beginningless nescience.

1.71 ✅

तथा च स्मृतिः – ‘प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विद्ध्यनादी उभावपि’ (भ . गी १३ - १९) इति क्षेत्रक्षेत्रज्ञत्वनिमित्तामनादिसिद्धामविद्यां प्रकृतिशब्देनाह; ‘मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्’ (श्वे. उ. ४-१०) इति श्रुतेः।

1.71. We have the Smṛti (in support of this view) – ‘You had better know that Prakṛti (avidyā) and Puruṣa (Īśvara) are both beginningless’ (BhG.13.19); i.e., Avidyā which serves as the cause of the distinction between kṣetra (body) and kṣetrajña (the individual soul) and which is there from eternity, is expressed by the word ‘prakṛti’. The Śruti has ‘As for māyā, know that it is prakṛti’ (SvetU.4.10).

अतो मायावच्छिन्नरूपत्वादनन्यदपि ब्रह्मरूपमात्मनो न वेत्ति। तथा चोक्तम् – ‘अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुद्ध्यते। अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा’ (गौ.का.१/१६) इति॥

Hence, conditioned as it is by māyā, (the soul) though non-distinct, fails to perceive its own (identity with Brahman) nature. So it is said: “When the Jīva is awakened from the sleep of the beginningless māyā, then it understands (itself to be) the unborn, the ever-awake, the dreamless, the secondless” – (ManKa.1.16).

1.72 ✅

ननु प्रमाणान्तरविरोधे सति श्रुतिः तदर्थापत्तिर्वा नाविद्यां निवेदयितुमलम्?

1.72. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, when invalidated by some other pramāṇa, neither Śruti nor implication from words (śrutārthāpatti) is competent to prove (that) avidyā (has Brahman as its viṣaya).

किं तत् प्रमाणं?

Siddhāntin. – Which is that pramāṇa by which this (Brahman’s being the object of nescience) is invalidated?

येन सह विरोधः, निरंशस्य स्वयञ्ज्योतिषः स्वरूपानवभासानुपपत्तिः।

Pūrvapakṣin. – (What you say is appropriate to things having parts). It does not stand to reason that an entity which is devoid of parts and self-luminous remains unrevealed (lit. its nature unlit up).

ननु भोक्तुः कार्यकारणसङ्घातात् व्यावृत्तता स्वयञ्ज्योतिषोऽपि न प्रकाशते,

Siddhāntin. – Well, the separateness (distinguishability) of the enjoyer (bhoktā, the inner self) from the bodily aggregate (kārya-karaṇa-saṅghāta) does not become manifest even though the bhoktā is self-luminous. (The otherness from the body is not distinct from the self-luminous ātman, and hence it is immediate, and is also not manifest as distinct from the body. As such even what is self-luminous may be the content of ajñāna).

ननु न भोक्ता स्वयञ्ज्योतिः, किं त्वहंप्रत्ययेनावभास्यते।

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, the bhoktā is not self-luminous; on the contrary, he is revealed by the notion of ego (aham-pratyaya-viṣaya).

यथा स्वयम्प्रकाशमानता, अहङ्कारो न प्रत्ययस्तथा वक्ष्यते॥

Siddhāntin: How ātman is self-luminous and how ahaṅkāra is not jñāna (pratyaya – which illumines ātman) will be explained in the sequel (vide Pancapadikā – Viziagnagaram Sanskrit Series pg. 18).

1.73 ✅

कथं पुनः भोक्ता स्वयञ्ज्योतिः कार्यकरणसङ्घातात् व्यावृत्तो न प्रकाशते?

1.73. Pūrvapakṣin. – How then is it that the self-luminous enjoyer (the inner self) is not revealed as distinct from the aggregate (of the body and the senses)?

‘मनुष्योऽहमि’ति मिथ्यैव एकताभिमानात्।

Siddhāntin. – It is due to the erroneous apprehension of unity as in ‘I am man’.

ननु गौणोऽयं, न मिथ्या?

Pūrvapakṣin. – This is only a metaphorical usage and not illusory.

यथा न गौणः, तथा भाष्यकार एव वक्ष्यति॥

Siddhāntin. – How this is not a case of metaphor the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) himself will explain (in the sequel).

1.74 ✅

ननु ‘अहमि’ति यदि देहसमानाधिकरणः प्रत्ययः, न तर्हि तद्व्यतिरिक्त आत्मा सिध्यति; अन्यस्य तथाग्राहिणः प्रत्ययस्याभावात्, आगमानुमानयोरपि तद्विरोधे प्रमाणत्वायोगात्।

1.74. Pūrvapakṣin. – If the ego-cognition (aham-pratyaya) has the same substrate as the body, then the existence of ātman as independent of the body becomes untenable, since there is no other notion having as its object (ātman as apart from the body) and since even Scriptures and inference if opposed to it (i.e., the perceptive ego-cognition) lose their claim to validity as means of right knowledge (pramāṇatva).

मिथ्यात्वात् तस्य न विरोधः इति चेत्, कुतस्तर्हि मिथ्यात्वम्? आगमादनुमानाद्वा अन्यथाऽवगमादिति चेत्, नैतत्; अन्योऽन्याश्रयता तथा स्यात् आगमानुमानयोः प्रवृत्तौ तन्मिथ्यात्वं तन्मिथ्यात्वे तयोः प्रवृत्तिरिति।

If it be argued that the ego-cognition (where the bodily aggregate and ātman are perceived in intimate relation) is illusory and as such there is no opposition (between the perceptive ego-notion on the one hand and inference and Scriptures on the other), on what basis do you presume this illusoriness? (we ask). Because (it may be answered) what is understood from the testimony of the Scriptures or of inference is otherwise. (But) it is not so, for then it will result in the fallacy of mutual dependence – if Scripture and inference are valid means of cognition (with reference to ātman being independent) perception will be invalid; and if perception is invalid Scriptures and inference will be valid.

तस्मात् देहादिव्यतिरिक्तविषय एवायमहङ्कारः इत्यात्मवादिभिरभ्युपेयम्; अन्यथा आत्मसिद्धिरप्रामाणिकी स्यात्, अतो गौणो मनुष्यत्वाभिमानः।

Hence the fact that the ego-cognition (aham-pratyaya) denotes ātman as its content, as distinct from the body, etc., has to be admitted by those who uphold the doctrine of ātman (viz., that it is a distinct entity). Otherwise there would be no valid means to prove the existence of ātman. Therefore the ascription of ‘manuṣyatva’ (i.e., identifying ‘ego’ with ‘man’, etc., as in ‘I am man’) is to be understood in a figurative sense.

1.75 ✅

उच्यते – यद्यपि देहादिव्यतिरिक्तभोक्तृविषय एवायमहङ्कारः; तथापि तथा अनध्यवसायात् तद्धर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति। दृश्यते हि स्वरूपेणावभासमानेऽपि वस्त्वन्तरभेदानध्यवसायात् तत्सम्भेदेनावभासः, यथा एकस्मिन्नप्यकारे हृस्वादिसम्भेदः॥

1.75. Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer. It is no doubt true that (in reality) this ego-notion has the bhoktā (enjoyer) distinct from the body, etc., as its object; but still there being no certain knowledge as such (tathā), there occurs the erroneous superimposition of its qualities (i.e., the bodily attributes) on ātman. And it is a well-known fact that a thing, though revealing its true nature, is seen as manifesting itself in intimate relation with another thing for lack of the definite knowledge that this other is distinct, as when short (and long) sounds are found intimately related to the ‘akāra’ (the ‘a’), single though it is.

1.76 ✅

अथ पुनरेकान्ततो भिन्न एव देहादेरहङ्कर्ता अवभासेत, रसादिव गन्धः, ततः तत्सद्भावे न विप्रतिपत्तिरिति, तत्सिद्धये जिज्ञासा नावकल्पेत।

1.76. If again ātman (ahaṅkartā) reveals itself invariably as distinct from the body, etc., as does say, scent from taste, then no controversy will arise regarding its existence (as a distinct entity) so that no inquiry for establishing it would be undertaken.

1.77 ✅

जिज्ञासोत्तरकालं तर्हि गौण एव युक्तः, कथम्? जिज्ञासा नाम युक्त्यनुसन्धानम्। न हि युक्तिः पृथक् ज्ञानान्तरजननी, किन्तु सिद्धस्यैवाहंप्रत्ययस्य विषयविवेचिनी।

1.77. Pūrvapakṣin: If after the inquiry (jijñāsā) it is ascertained that ātman is distinct from the body, then it is only right to admit that (the apprehension of identity as in ‘I am man’ which recurs) is figurative (and not illusory). How? (it may be asked). Inquiry means the thinking out of a reason, and reason is incompetent to produce a distinct piece of knowledge but it only explicates what was implicit already there, viz., the object of the ego-notion (viz., ātman).

तस्मात् विविक्तविषयत्वात् व्यतिरिक्तात्मानुभवपर्यन्त एवाहङ्कारो जिज्ञासोत्तरकालं युक्तः,

Hence it is but right to hold that ahaṅkāra after careful inquiry denoting a distinct object (i.e., distinct from the body) ends only in bringing prominently to one’s knowledge the distinguishability of ātman.

1.78 ✅

न युक्तः; अकार इव हृस्वत्वाभिमानः।

1.78. Siddhāntin. It is not right (to conclude that reasoning establishes its figurative nature). It is like the illusion of ‘hrasvatva’ (short vowel-length) in ‘a’ varṇa.

ननु तत्रापि कथम्?
अनुभव एव। एवमहङ्कारेऽपि समानश्चर्चः।

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, even there (i.e., in ‘a’ sound) how (is the illusion tenable)?
Siddhāntin: It is experience only (that points to superimposition in the notion of shortness in ‘a’). Similar is the reasoning in regard to the ego-notion.

ननु अनुभवः तर्कबलाद्यथावभासिन्यप्यकारे सम्भवति; हृस्वादेः पृथक्सतस्तथानवगमात्,
तन्न; एकस्य पृथक्त्वेऽपि अर्थादितरस्यापि पृथक्त्वात्॥

Pūrvapakṣin: Well, aided by reasoning one gets the experience (of identity – adhyāsa) in ‘akāra’ which is of that nature (i.e., distinct from ‘hrasva’), since, though in reality ‘hrasva’ is distinct from ‘akāra’, it is not understood as such.
Siddhāntin. – It is not so; because the distinctness of the one, by implication, establishes the distinctness of the other. (The exclusion is mutual.)

1.79 ✅

ननु महदेतदिन्द्रजालं यत् तर्कानुगृहीतात् प्रमाणात् यथायथमसाधारणरूपयोरेवावभासमानयोरेकत्वावगमो न गौण इति,

1.79. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is extraordinary jugglery to maintain that the knowledge of identity between two things which manifest themselves, each in its distinctive nature on the basis of pramāṇa (perceptive) strengthened by reasoning, is not metaphorical (but illusory).

1.80 ✅

बाढम्; इन्द्रजालमेवैतत्, अविद्याकृतत्वात्। तथाहि – अहंप्रत्ययस्य स्वविषयप्रतिष्ठितस्यैव सतः तदेकप्रतिष्ठितता प्रतिबन्धकृदनाद्यविद्याकृतं देहादिप्रतिष्ठितत्वमपि दृष्टम्;

1.80. Siddhāntin. – Yes, surely; it is really legerdemain as it is the work of avidyā. To explain: the ego-notion assuredly related to its object (viz., ātman distinct from the body) is also observed to point to the body, etc., owing to the operation of the beginningless avidyā which obstructs it (ego-notion) from revealing ātman only as its object.

अतो देहादिविषयत्वाविरोधिस्वविषयप्रतिष्ठत्वमहंप्रत्ययस्य।

Hence, that the ego-notion has its own object, (viz., ātman) is non-hostile to the object constituted by the body, etc.

अतो युक्त्या विषयविवेचनेऽपि स्वविषयोपदर्शनेन तत्प्रतिष्ठत्वमात्रं कृतं नाधिकमादर्शितम्। स्वविषयप्रतिष्ठत्वं च देहादिषु अहंममाभिमानेन न विरुध्यते इत्युक्तम्।

Hence by reasoning though the distinction of the objects (viz., soul and body) is clarified, it only shows its object (i.e., ātman undifferentiated from the body); and as such, reason has merely emphasised what the object of the ego-notion is – viz., ātman along with the body, and has not brought to light anything in addition. And it has been stated that its (ego-notion) terminating in (revealing) its object, (viz., ātman as undifferentiated from the body-aggregate) does not conflict with the ascription of the notions of ‘I’ and ‘Mine’ to the body, etc.

अतः न्यायतो विषयविवेचनादूर्ध्वमपि न प्रागवस्थातो विशिष्यते अहंप्रत्ययः। तेन न कदाचिदपि ‘मनुष्योऽहमि’ति प्रत्ययो गौणः।

Hence even after the differentiation of objects is effected by reasoning, the ego-notion does not in any way differ from its previous state. Therefore the notion ‘I am man’ is at no time to be regarded as ‘gauṇa’ (figurative, but is illusion only).

1.81 ✅

तदेवं स्वयञ्ज्योतिष एव सतो जीवस्य कार्यकरणसङ्घातव्यतिरिक्ततायाः तथा अनवभासदर्शनात् ’मनुष्योऽहमि’ति चाध्यासोपलब्धेः ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वस्यापि तत्स्वरूपस्यानवभासनं पूर्वकालकोटिरहितप्रकाशाच्छादिततमोनिमित्तं

1.81. Such being the case, the individual soul (Jīva) which is self-luminous and distinct from the bodily aggregate is not seen to manifest itself as such, so that there arises the illusory cognition as evidenced in the expression ‘I am man’. And the cause (of this illusion) which obscures the nature of the Jīva which in reality is one with Brahman, is the avidyā (lit. darkness) which has no starting point in the past (i.e., beginningless) and which envelopes the luminosity (of ātman).

श्रुति तदर्थापत्तिसमर्पितं, तन्निमित्ताहङ्काराध्यासश्च सम्भाव्यते। अनादित्वाच्च पूर्वदृष्टत्वं स्मृतिरूपत्वं च।

That this is so is vouched for by the Scriptures and verbal presumption (śrutārthāpatti – implication from words). And it is on that basis that the illusory conception of the ego (ahaṅkārādhyāsa) becomes explicable. And since this superimposition is beginningless, its being a past cognition – pūrvadṛṣṭatva, and its being similar to recollection – smṛtirūpatva, are also explicable.

पृथग्भोक्तृविषयानुभवफलाभावात् भोक्तृचैतन्यसंवलितैकानुभवफलत्वाच्च परत्र परावभासस्यान्योन्यसम्भेदस्य विद्यमानत्वादध्यासलक्षणव्याप्तिरिहाप्युपपद्यते॥

Because the enjoyer (which is the substrate) is not the content (viṣaya) of a cognition as distinct from the non-ātman-cognition, and because there is the unit-cognition arising from the association of the enjoyer-consciousness (with the non-ātman) there results the apparent manifestation of something previously observed in some other thing, – that is, their intimate mutual relation and as such it stands to reason that the definition of superimposition applies here also (i.e., in the ego – superimposition).

[BrS.1. L.12]

1.82 ✅

‘कोऽयमध्यासो नामे’ति किंवृत्तस्य प्रश्न आक्षेपे च समानवर्तिनो विशेषानुपलब्धेः ‘पृष्टमनेने’ति मत्वा अध्यासस्वरूपे अभिहिते पुनः ‘आक्षिप्तं मये’त्यभिप्रायं विवृणोति – कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषये अध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणामिति॥

1.82. [“What is it that is meant by ‘adhyāsa’?”] Since the word (‘vṛttasya’ the term vṛtti is applied to a word having either primary or figurative significance) ‘kim’ is equally significative of both question and objection, (the Siddhāntin), not knowing which in particular was meant, (by the opponent when he put the question ‘koyamadhyāso nāma’) expounded the nature of adhyāsa under the impression that the question (relating to the definition of adhyāsa) only was put. Then the opponent says, “objection (to ātmādhyāsa) was also raised by me”. This latter view is expressed in the following words – [How then could there be the superimposition of the (inert) object and its qualities on the inner self (pratyag-ātmā) which is non-objective?]

[BrS.1. L.13]

1.83 ✅

बाढमेवंलक्षणोऽध्यासः, स चेह न सम्भवति। कथम्? यतः सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषयान्तरमध्यस्यति; युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि॥

1.83. It may be admitted that the (adhyāsa) is as thus defined, but that will not fit in here. ‘How’ (it may be asked)? Because [it is indeed on the object that is present before one’s eyes that every one superimposes a distinct object. And you (referring to the Siddhāntin) predicate non-objectivity to the inner self which is unfit to be brought under the ‘thou-notion’ (yuṣmat-pratyaya)].

[BrS.1. L.14]

1.84 ✅

न ह्यविषये अध्यासो दृष्टपूर्वः सम्भवी वा,
उच्यते – न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः; अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वात्॥

And in what is not an object, superimposition was not observed in the past nor will it be observed in the future.
1.84. Siddhāntin. – [(This is the answer.) It is not that it (ātman) is absolutely a non-object (aviṣaya), because it is the object of the ‘ego-notion’)].

ननु विषयिणश्चिदात्मनः कथं विषयभावः? पराग्भावेन इदन्तासमुल्लेख्यो हि विषयो नाम, भवति तद्वैपरीत्येन प्रत्यग्रूपेणानिदम्प्रकाशो विषयी; तत् कथमेकस्य निरंशस्य विरुद्धांशद्वयसन्निवेशः?

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, how can the subject (viṣayī – self) which is of the nature of pure intelligence become an object (viṣaya – non-self)? That indeed becomes viṣaya which being external becomes obvious in the ‘this-notion’. Opposed to this is the subject which constitutes the inner-self, which is not the ‘this’ and which is self-luminous. Then how could these two properties (viṣayatva and viṣayitva) which are mutually hostile co-exist in ātman which is one and devoid of parts?

अत्रोच्यते – अस्मत्प्रत्ययत्वाभिमतोऽहङ्कारः। स चेदमनिदंरूपवस्तुगर्भः सर्वलोकसाक्षिकः। तमवहितचेतस्तया निपुणतरमभिवीक्ष्य रूपकपरीक्षकवत् स्वानुभवमप्रच्छादयन्तो वदन्तु भवन्तः परीक्षकाः – किमुक्तलक्षणः? न वा? इति॥

Siddhāntin. – Here, this will be said in answer: The word ‘ego-notion’ (asmat-pratyaya in the Bhāṣya) means the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇa). And that (ahamiti-pratyaya – the notion, viz., ‘I’) embraces both the ‘this’ and the ‘not this’ elements is a matter of universal experience. Let those worthy critics say whether the ego-notion (asmat-pratyaya) is as defined here or not, after intelligently analysing it (i.e., the aham-pratyaya) with concentred mind like a connoisseur of coins and without concealing their own experience.

1.85 ✅

ननु किमत्र वदितव्यम्, असम्भिन्नेदंरूप एव अहमित्यनुभवः, कथम्? प्रमातृ - प्रमेय - प्रमितयस्तावदपरोक्षाः,

1.85. Prābhākara. – Well, what is there to be said here except that the ego-notion (ahamity-anubhavaḥ) is one that is evidently disparate from the ‘this’ notion? It may be asked ‘How’? The knower (pramātā), the known (prameya – object), and knowing (pramiti-jñāna) are all immediately perceptive (i.e., of direct experience).

प्रमेयं कर्मत्वेनापरोक्षम्, प्रमातृप्रमिती पुनरपरोक्षे एव केवलम्, न कर्मतया; प्रमितिरनुभवः स्वयम्प्रकाशः प्रमाणफलम्, तद्बलेन इतरत् प्रकाशते, प्रमाणं तु प्रमातृव्यापारः फललिङ्गो नित्यानुमेयः।

The prameya is perceptive (in its nature) as objectivity. As for pramātṛ and pramiti, they are altogether perceptive only (i.e., directly experienced) but not as object. Pramiti is experience (anubhava), self-luminous and is the result of pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge). Through its (pramiti) instrumentality the other (pramātṛ as well as prameya) manifests itself. Pramāṇa however represents the function (or activity) of the pramātā and is always something inferred on the basis of the result (i.e., with the phala serving as the middle term).

तत्र ‘अहमिदं जानामी’ति प्रमातुर्ज्ञानव्यापारः कर्मविषयः, नात्मविषयः, आत्मा तु विषयानुभवादेव निमित्तादहमिति फले विषये चानुसन्धीयते॥

Hence in the statement – ‘I know this (aham-idam janāmi)’, the cognitive function of the pramātā relates to the object and not to ātman. Ātman however reveals itself as ‘aham’ (ego) both in the phala (jñāna) and viṣaya (pot, cot, etc.), by the sole reason of the cognition of the object (viṣaya).

1.86 ✅

ननु नायं विषयानुभवनिमित्तोऽहमुल्लेखः, किं तु अन्य एव आत्ममात्रविषयः ‘अहमि’ति प्रत्ययः। तस्मिंश्च द्रव्यरूपत्वेनात्मनः प्रमेयत्वं, ज्ञातृत्वेन प्रमातृत्वमिति,

1.86. Bhāṭṭa. – It should not be supposed that the ego-notion arises because of the object perceived, on the other hand the ego-notion is indeed different, having ātman only as its viṣaya. And in that (ego-notion), objectivity (prameyatva) of ātman is secured in its feature as substance (dravya) and subjectivity (pramātṛtva) in its feature as knower (jñātṛtva).

प्रमातृप्रमेयनिर्भासरूपत्वादहंप्रत्ययस्य ग्राह्यग्राहकरूप आत्मा। तस्मादिदमनिदंरूपः; प्रमेयांशस्येदंरूपत्वात्, अनिदंरूपत्वात् प्रमात्रंशस्य

Thus, because the ego-notion reveals the subject and the object, ātman is both the cogniser and the cognised. Hence it (ātman) combines both the features – ‘the this’ and the ‘not this’ – the object-part since it comes under ‘the this’ notion and the subject-part, since it comes under the ‘not-this’ notion.

1.87 ✅

न चैतद्युक्तम्; अनंशत्वात्, अपरिणामित्वाच्चात्मनः, प्रमेयस्य चेदंरूपतया पराग्रूपत्वादनात्मत्वात्।

1.87. Prābhākara. – This does not stand to reason because ātman is devoid of parts and is not subject to evolution. And the object being indicated by the ‘this’ is of the nature of parāk (outward as opposed to pratyak – inward) and non-ātman (and as such ātman loses its claim to be either the knower or the known).

तस्मान्नीलादिज्ञानफलमनुभवः स्वयम्प्रकाशमानो ग्राह्यमिदन्तया, ग्राहकं चानिदन्तयाऽवभासयति, ग्रहणं चानुमापयतीति युक्तम्, अतो नेदमंशोऽहङ्कारो युज्यते,

Hence, anubhava is the result of the perception of blue, etc., and this anubhava being self-luminous reveals the object (the cognised) as the ‘this’ and the subject (the cogniser) as the ‘not-this’ and leads to the inference of pramāṇa (grahaṇa). This is the right view to take. Therefore ātman (ahaṅkāra) cannot assume ‘the this’ aspect.

1.88 ✅

उच्यते – तत्रेदं भवान् प्रष्टव्यः, किमात्मा चैतन्यप्रकाशोऽनुभवो जडप्रकाशः? उत सोऽपि चैतन्यप्रकाशः? अथवा स एव चैतन्यप्रकाशः, आत्मा जडस्वरूपः? इति। तत्र न तावत्प्रथमः कल्पः; जडस्वरूपे प्रमाणफले विश्वस्यानवभासप्रसङ्गात्, मैवम्; प्रमाता चेतनस्तद्बलेन प्रदीपेनेव विषयमिदन्तया, आत्मानं चानिदन्तया चेतयते, इति न विश्वस्यानवभासप्रसङ्गः,

1.88. Siddhāntin: This is to be urged – concerning the view you have expressed (tatra), your worthiness has to be questioned whether (i) of the two, ātman and anubhava, the former manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness and the latter manifests itself being of the nature of insentience, or (ii) whether that also (i.e., anubhava together with ātman) manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness, or (iii) whether that only (i.e., anubhava) manifests itself being of the nature of consciousness while ātman is of the nature of insentience. The first alternative is untenable for it (experience, i.e., jñāna) resulting from pramāṇa were insentient it would result in the world remaining totally unrevealed.

तन्न; स्वयञ्चैतन्यस्वभावोऽपि सन् विषयप्रमाणेनाचेतनेनानुगृहीतः प्रकाशत इति,

Pūrvapakṣin: It is not so. The pramātā (the cogniser, ātman) being of the nature of consciousness manifests, with its aid (i.e., of anubhava), the object as the ‘this’ and itself (ātmānam) as the ‘not-this’ like light (which illumines objects as well as its own self) so that there occurs no non-revelation of the world.

नैतत् साधु लक्ष्यते। किं च प्रमाणफलेन चेत् प्रदीपेनेव विषयमात्मानं च चेतयते, तदा चेतयति क्रियानवस्थाप्रसङ्गः॥

Siddhāntin: That cannot be. It does not appear to be reasonable to hold that (ātman) being itself of the nature of consciousness illumines (others and its own self) through the benevolent instrumentality of anubhava (viṣayānubhava – the experience of the object) which is inert (jaḍa). Moreover, if ātman is said to manifest like light, both the object and its own self with the help of pramāṇa-phala (i.e., anubhava) then the act of manifestation (cetana-kriyā) will be interminable.

1.89 ✅

द्वितीये कल्पे आत्मापि स्वयमेव प्रकाशेत, किमिति विषयानुभवमपेक्षेत?

1.89. As regards the second alternative ātman also (like anubhava) would of its own accord manifest itself; and why should it need the aid of the object-experience?

अथ चैतन्यस्वभावत्वेऽपि नात्मा स्वयम्प्रकाशः, विशेषे हेतुर्वाच्यः। न हि चैतन्यस्वभावः सन् स्वयं परोक्षोऽन्यतोऽपरोक्ष इति युज्यते। किं च समत्वान्नेतरेतरापेक्षत्वं प्रकाशने प्रदीपयोरिव।

If it be urged that in spite of its partaking of the nature of consciousness ātman is not self-revealing, a reason must be adduced for this discrimination (i.e., for conceding the right of self-revelation to anubhava only. The implication is, there is no hetu). It is not intelligible that (ātman) being of the nature of intelligence is in itself mediately perceptible and immediately perceptible with the aid of another. Again since there is parity between them (both the ātman and anubhava are cetana-rūpa) like two lights, the one need not require the help of the other.

1.90 ✅

तृतीयेऽपि कल्पे अनिच्छतोऽप्यात्मैव चिति प्रकाश आपद्यते, न तदतिरिक्ततथाविधफलसद्भावे प्रमाणमस्ति।

1.90. Even as regards the third alternative (viz., ātman is jaḍa and anubhava is citi-prakāśa) in spite of one’s will it will lead to the inevitable conclusion that ātman alone is the luminous consciousness. No valid reason could be adduced to substantiate the existence of such an anubhava (i.e., self-luminous like ātman) distinct from it (ātman).

कथम्? प्रमाणजन्यश्चेदनुभवः, तथा सति स्वगतेन विशेषेण प्रतिविषयं पृथक् पृथगवभासेत, सर्वानुभवानुगतं च गोत्ववदनुभवत्वमपरमीक्ष्येत।

How? If it be argued that anubhava (which is self-luminous) is established by pramāṇa then by the differentia (bheda-sādhaka- dharma) inhering in it (anubhava), it would reveal each object as distinct from the other (and not by the fact of there being distinct objects), and it would reveal in addition the anubhavatva (the universal concept) the common characteristic of all anubhavas like gotva (i.e., the cow-hood common to all cows).

न च ‘नीलानुभवः पीतानुभवः’, इति विषयविशेषपरामर्शशून्यः स्वगतो विशेषो लक्ष्यते॥

But the particularity (viśeṣa) inherent in itself (anubhava) is not seen to manifest itself as blue-experience, and yellow-experience to the exclusion of any reference to the particularity existing in the object.

ननु विनष्टाविनष्टत्वेन विशेषः सिध्यति।

Well, the differentiation (i.e., viśeṣa – distinction in knowledge) can be maintained on the ground of the destruction and non-destruction (of jñāna).

सिध्येत्, यदि विनष्टाविनष्टता सिध्येत्; सा च जन्यत्वे सति, तस्यां च सिद्धायां जन्यत्वम् इति परस्परायत्तस्थितित्वेन एकमपि न सिध्येत्। एतेन अतिसादृश्यादनुभवभेदो न विभाव्यत इति प्रत्युक्तं भेदासिद्धेः।

Yes, this could be maintained if the destruction and non-destruction could be established. If (jñāna is something) that is born, then (destruction as well as non-destruction) will result; if that (destruction as well as non-destruction) is established then the origination (of jñāna will result). Hence owing to such mutual dependence neither (janyatā nor nāśa) will become tenable. For this very reason the argument (of the Vijñānavādins) that owing to extreme similarity the cognitive distinctions (i.e., differences in anubhava itself), are not perceived, stands refuted, for the view (that distinction is due to jñāna) is lacking in proof.

न हि चित्प्रकाशस्य स्वगतो भेदो न प्रकाशते इति युक्तिमत्; येन तदप्रकाशनात् सादृश्यनिबन्धनो विभ्रमः स्यात्।

Nor is it grounded in reason to aver that the distinctness pertaining to the luminosity of consciousness is not revealed; for only if that (bheda) remained obscured could we regard that the bhrama (viz., the apprehension of a single jñāna) as due to similarity.

न च यथा जीवस्य स्वयञ्ज्योतिषोऽपि स्वरूपमेव सत् ब्रह्मरूपत्वं न प्रकाशते तद्वत् स्यादिति युक्तम्; अभिहितं तत्राप्रकाशने प्रमाणम्, इह तन्नास्ति।

The analogy of the individual soul (not revealing its Brahman-nature), though it is self-luminous and of the same essence (as Brahman), does not hold good. As for its (Brahman’s) non-manifestation, the reason (viz., the operation of avidyā) has already been stated; here no such reason exists (i.e., there is no obstructive cause for the apprehension of the differentia inhering in jñāna).

न हि सामान्यतोदृष्टमनुभवविरोधे युक्तिविरोधे च समुत्तिष्ठति; दर्शिते चानुभवयुक्ती।

Nor indeed can the ‘sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa’ inference step in (to prove the cognitive distinctions), being opposed to both experience and reason, and attention has already been drawn to both experience and reason (in this behalf).

तस्मात् चित्स्वभाव एवात्मा तेन तेन प्रमेयभेदेनोपधीयमानोऽनुभवाभिधानीयकं लभते, अविवक्षितोपाधिरात्मादिशब्दैरभिधीयते; अवधीरितवनाभिधाननिमित्तैकदेशावस्थाना इव वृक्षा वृक्षादिशब्दैः इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्,

Hence ātman being of the nature of consciousness only, gets the appellation of anubhava when conditioned by the differing objects of knowledge, but when the limiting adjuncts are out of purview it is described by the terms ātman, etc., just as the trees lose the appellation of forest when the fact of their standing together in one spot (which was the justification for the appellation), is ignored and are described as trees, etc.; that analogy should be admitted (here also).

1.91 ✅

बाढम्; अत एव विषयानुभवनिमित्तोऽनिदमात्मकोऽहङ्कारो वर्ण्यते,

1.91. Prābhākara. – Well, let it be as you say (i.e., let ātman be self-luminous and anubhava-rūpa); therefore only ahaṅkāra, which the object-cognition (viṣayānubhava) gives rise to, is described (by us) as being of the nature of the ‘not this’.

सत्यमेवं; किन्तु तथा सति सुषुप्तेपि ‘अहमि’त्युल्लेखः स्यात्।

Siddhāntin. – So far right (i.e., that the ego-consciousness is dependent on object-cognition). But (we do not admit that the ego itself is ātman). If ahaṅkāra is admitted to be ātman even in deep sleep ahaṅkāra, ‘the I-cognition’ would manifest itself (lit. would reach the consciousness level).

कथम्?
नीलानुषङ्गो यश्चैतन्यस्य, स नीलभोगः, नासावहमुल्लेखार्हः। ’अहमि’ति आत्मा अवभासते। तत्र यदि नाम सुषुप्ते विषयानुषङ्गाभावादिदं जानामी’ति विषयतदनुभवपरामर्शो नास्ति, मा भूत्; अहमित्यात्ममात्रपरामर्शः किमिति न भवेत्?

Prābhākara. – How? (It is wrong to urge that the ‘I-notion’ should be manifest in sleep. The object-consciousness being absent there, the ‘I-notion’ is absent.)
Siddhāntin. – The contact of the self-luminous consciousness (caitanya) with ‘blue’ (i.e., objects like blue) – that is blue-manifestation (i.e., such contact only, reveals the object) and that (viṣayānubhava however) is not competent to reveal the ego. (Now) ātman manifests itself as ‘aham’ (for Prābhākara, aham and ātman are one and ātman, it has been shown, is self-luminous). If, when one is asleep owing to the absence of contact with objects, there is no reference to the object and its experience as is evidenced in ‘I cognise this let them not be (revealed); but why should not there be the revelation of the bare ‘aham’ (which is no other than ātman and which is admitted to be self-luminous)?

1.92 ✅

ननु अहमिति भोक्तृत्वं प्रतिभासते, तदभावे कथं तथा प्रतिभासः?

1.92. Prābhākara. – Well, the ‘I’ signifying enjoyment (bhoktṛtva) is (as a matter of fact) experienced (in sleep). (But) when that (object-cognition) is absent how could the manifestation be like that (i.e., as aham)?

नैतत् सारम्; समुत्कालितोपाधिविशेषं चैतन्यमात्रमस्मदर्थः, ततः सर्वदा अहमिति स्यात्, नैतच्छक्यम्; उपाधिपरामर्शेन चैतन्यमहमित्युल्लिख्यत इति वक्तुम्; तत्परामर्शो हि तत्सिद्धिनिमित्तः, न स्वरूपसिद्धिहेतुः स्वमाहात्म्येनैव तु स्वरूपसिद्धिः।

Siddhāntin. – There is no substance in it. The word ‘aham’ means consciousness (caitanya) divested of all limiting adjuncts, and as such it should always (even in sleep) reveal itself as ‘aham’. And it is not possible to hold that caitanya has to depend upon the (mental) recall of the limiting adjunct (upādhi) to reveal itself as ‘aham’; (in other words the object-consciousness cannot serve as the cause of ‘aham-ullekha’ – becoming explicit as ‘aham’). Its (of upādhi) recall indeed substantiates that (viz., viṣaya only) and is not the means by which the real nature (of ātman disassociated from all objects) is substantiated. The substantiation of its true nature, however, is effected by its own potency (self-luminosity).

ततश्च विषयोपरागानुभवात्मत्वशून्यः स्वरूपतः अहमिति सुषुप्तेऽप्यवभासेत; दृशिरूपत्वाविशेषात्। भवत्येवेति चेत्, न; तथा सति स्मर्येत ह्यस्तन इवाहङ्कारः। अविनाशिनः संस्काराभावात् न स्मर्यते इति चेत्, ह्यस्तनोऽपि न स्मर्येत॥

And hence in its own true nature devoid of all experience resulting from contact with objects it (ātman) would reveal itself as ‘aham’ even in sleep because of the fact that it is not different from the intelligence principle the luminous caitanya or inner witness). If you should concede that it is so (i.e., that aham is manifest in sleep) we say it cannot be. For then one would remember (on waking, his consciousness of the ego) just as one remembers to-day one’s yesterday’s ego-consciousness. If it be argued that it is not remembered because of the absence of mental impressions (saṃskāra) due to the ‘aham’ being indestructible, then yesterday’s ego-consciousness also would not be remembered.

1.93 ✅

ननु अस्त्येव सुषुप्ते अहमनुभवः ‘सुखमहमस्वाप्समि’ति; सुषुप्तोत्थितस्य स्वापसुखानुभवपरामर्शदर्शनात्, नात्मनोऽन्यस्य तत्रानुभवः सम्भवति,

1.93. Pūrvapakṣin. – There does exist the consciousness of ‘aham’ in deep sleep, since it is perceived that a person waking from sleep has the recollection of the happiness he enjoyed when he slept as when he says – ‘I slept happily’; and there (i.e., in sleep) no experience other than that of ātman occurs.

सत्यमस्ति; न तत् स्वापे सुखानुभवसंस्कारजं स्मरणम्, किं तर्हि? सुखावमर्शो दुःखाभावनिमित्तः, कथम्? स्वप्ने तावदस्त्येव दुःखानुभवः, सुषुप्ते तु तदभावात् सुखव्यपदेशः। तदभावश्च करणव्यापारोपरमात्।

Siddhāntin. – True, it does exist (viz., the recollection in the form ‘I slept happily’); but that recollection is not produced from the mental impressions of the pleasure experienced in sleep. What else then? Because of the absence of pain in (sleep) we get the recollection of pleasure. How? (you may ask). In the dream state indeed there certainly is the experience of pain. But in sleep because it is absent we express it (i.e., the absence of pain) by the term ‘pleasure’. And its absence (i.e., of the pain) is due to the quiescence of sense-activity.

यदि पुनः ‘सुप्तः सुखम्’ इति च तद्विषयं स्मरणं स्यात्, तदा विशेषतः स्मर्येत, न च तदस्ति। व्यपदेशोऽपि ‘सुखं सुप्ते न किञ्चिन्मया चेतितम्’ इति हि दृश्यते।

If on the other hand there should be the recollection of having experienced happiness, then it would be recollected as associated with some object (i.e., specifically), but there is no such (specific recollection). Indeed even the expression is seen to take these forms – ‘slept happily’ ‘nothing was cognised by me‘.

1.94 ✅

यत् पुनः सुप्तोत्थितस्य अङ्गलाघवेन्द्रियप्रसादादिना सुखानुभवोन्नयनमिति, तदसत्; अनुभूतं चेत् सुखं स्मर्येत, न तत्र लिङ्गेन प्रयोजनम्।

1.94. If again it be said that the experience of pleasure can be inferred from the lightness of limbs and the composure of the senses in one, after waking from sleep, (we say) that is not right. If happiness had been experienced it would be remembered and no purpose is served therein by a probans (i.e., when a thing could be an object of recollection where is the need to call in the aid of a hetu to prove it inferentially)?

यद्येवं, सुप्तोत्थितस्य कथं कस्यचिदङ्गलाघवं कस्य चिन्न? इति;

Pūrvapakṣin: If it be so, how is it that when awake from sleep one person feels the lightness of limbs, while another not?

उच्यते– जागरणे कार्यकरणानि श्राम्यन्ति; तदपनुत्तये व्यापारोपरमः स्वापः। तत्र यदि सम्यक् व्यापारोपरमः, तदा अङ्गानि लघूनि, इतरथा गुरूणीति। तदेवं नायं नीलादिप्रत्ययादन्य एवात्मविषयोऽहंप्रत्ययः, नापि विषयानुभवादेवाहमुल्लेखः।

Siddhāntin: Here is the answer: The actively engaged senses get tired in the waking state and quiescience of activity for its (fatigue) removal is sleep and there (i.e., in sleep) if the cessation of activity is complete lightness of limbs ensues, otherwise heaviness. Hence in the light of the above, this ego-consciousness (aham-pratyaya) is not that which being quite distinct from the cognition of blue, etc., has ātman as its object, or is aham (aham-pratyaya) rendered manifest only through the object-cognition; (nor is ātman to be identified with ahaṅkāra.

तस्मात् ब्रह्मविदामेकपुण्डरीकस्य लोकानुग्रहैकरसतया सम्यग्ज्ञानप्रवर्तनप्रयोजनकृतशरीरपरिग्रहस्य भगवतो भाष्यकारस्य मतमागमयितव्यम्॥

Therefore the doctrine enunciated by the revered commentator (Bhāṣyakāra, viz., Śaṅkara) who is alone, the supreme among the knowers of Brahman, who put on the bodily vesture, moved by the one desire to help mankind and with the object of disseminating true knowledge, is to be accepted.

1.95 ✅

तदुच्यते – येयं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेषु नामरूपम्, अव्याकृतम्, अविद्या, माया, प्रकृतिः, अग्रहणम्, अव्यक्तं, तमः, कारणं, लयः, शक्तिः, महासुप्तिः, निद्रा, अक्षरम्, आकाशम् इति च तत्र तत्र बहुधा गीयते,

1.95. Here, (i.e., when the query regarding the material cause, etc., of ahaṅkāra is raised) the answer is given. That which is variously described in Śruti, Smṛti, Itihāsa (history), and Purāṇa in different contexts as nāma-rūpa, avyākṛta, avidyā, māyā, prakṛti, a-grahaṇa, avyakta, tamas, karaṇa, laya, śakti, mahāsupti, nidrā, akṣara, ākāśa;

चैतन्यस्य स्वत एवावस्थितलक्षणब्रह्मस्वरूपतावभासं प्रतिबध्य जीवत्वापादिका अविद्याकर्मपूर्वप्रज्ञासंस्कारचित्रभित्तिः सुषुप्ते प्रकाशाच्छादनविक्षेपसंस्कारमात्ररूपस्थितिरनादिरविद्या,

that which having prevented caitanya from manifesting itself as of the nature of Brahman which is its essential characteristic, brings about its individuation (jīvatva); that which serves as the wall on which are picture-illusion, action, and residual impressions of past cognitions; that which exists in deep slumber enveloping (āvaraṇa) the light (of ātman) and remaining only as mental traces of the world-projection (vikṣepa) – that is the beginningless avidyā.

1.96 ✅

तस्याः परमेश्वराधिष्ठितत्वलब्धपरिणामविशेषो विज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिद्वयाश्रयः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वैकाधारः कूटस्थचैतन्यसंवलनसञ्जातज्योतिः स्वयम्प्रकाशमानोऽपरोक्षोऽहङ्कारः,

1.96. And of this avidyā, the ahaṅkāra is a particular transformation (evolute) resulting from its having Parameśvara as substratum; it (viz., ahaṅkāra) is the substratum of jñāna-śakti (thought-energy) and kriyā-śakti (kinetic energy); it is the sole basis of agency and enjoyment (i.e., it gives rise to notions of doer and enjoyer); it is a light generated by its association with the unchanging intelligence (caitanya); it is self-luminous (for it manifests itself as long as it exists, unlike pot, etc., – T.D.) and it is immediate cognition, (not inferred as held by the Naiyāyikas).

यत्सम्भेदात् कूटस्थचैतन्योऽनिदमंश आत्मधातुरपि मिथ्यैव’भोक्ते’ति प्रसिद्धिमुपगतः। स च सुषुप्ते समुत्खातनिखिलपरिणामायामविद्यायां कुतस्त्यः?

And due to its intimate relation with it (ahaṅkāra) the unchanging Intelligence (kūṭastha caitanya) has acquired erroneously indeed the vogue of enjoyer, though it is of the nature of the ‘not-this’ and is the ātman-entity. And whence could it (the ‘I’ notion) arise in suṣupti where all the transformations (evolutes) of avidyā have been rooted out? – (i.e., ahaṅkāra has no existence in deep sleep).

1.97 ✅

न चैवं मन्तव्यम्, आश्रितपरिणतिभेदतयैवाहङ्कारनिर्भासेऽनन्तर्भूतैव तन्निमित्तमिति; तथा सति अपाकृताहङ्कृतिसंसर्गो भोक्तृत्वादिस्तद्विशेषः केवलमिदन्तयैवावभासेत, न च तथा समस्ति॥

1.97. It should not be thought thus (as the Sāṅkhyas do) i.e., since it is only one of the evolutes of its ground (viz., Pradhāna) and not implicit in the śākṣin which manifests the ahaṅkāra; it (ahaṅkāra) has that only (viz., pradhāna) as its originator (i.e., material cause). For if it were so, then enjoyment (bhoktṛtva) which is its (ahaṅkāra) essential property, deprived of all relation to the śākṣin would manifest itself only as ‘the this’ only. But it is not so.

स च परिणामविशेषः, अनिदञ्चिदात्मनो बुद्ध्या निष्कृष्य वेदान्तवादिभिः अन्तःकरणं, मनः, बुद्धिरहंप्रत्ययी इति च विज्ञानशक्तिविशेषमाश्रित्य व्यपदिश्यते, परिस्पन्दशक्त्या च प्राणः इति।

And that particular evolute (viz., of avidyā) having been thoughtfully abstracted from ātman which is of the nature of the ‘not-this’ and consciousness, is termed by the Vedānta-philosophers, antaḥkaraṇa, manas, buddhi and aham-pratyayatvam (i.e., the ground of the ‘I-notion’) in so far as its cognitive power is concerned, and prāṇa in so far as its movement (is concerned).

तेन अन्तःकरणोपरागनिमित्तं मिथ्यैवाहङ्कर्तृत्वमात्मनः, स्फटिकमणेरिवोपधाननिमित्तो लोहितिमा॥

Hence the ego-agency (ahaṅkartṛtva) that is attributed to ātman because of its intimate relation with the inner sense (antaḥkaraṇa) is illusory only like the red colour of the crystal stone, due to the superimposition (of the red in the japākusuma).

1.98 ✅

कथं पुनः स्फटिके लोहितिम्नो मिथ्यात्वम्?

1.98. How could it be maintained (says the akhyātivādin) that the redness of the crystal is illusory?

उच्यते – यदि स्फटिकप्रतिस्फालिता नयनरश्मयो जपाकुसुममुपसर्पेयुः, तदा विशिष्टसंनिवेशं तदेव लोहितं ग्राहयेयुः। न हि रूपमात्रनिष्ठश्चाक्षुषः प्रत्ययो दृष्टपूर्वः; नापि स्वाश्रयमनाकर्षद्रूपमात्रं प्रतिबिम्बितं क्वचिदुपलब्धपूर्वम्।

This is the explanation: If the ocular rays impinging on the crystal were deflected and reached the japākusuma (China-rose) then they would encompass (reveal) that red only which inheres in the japākusuma (viṣiṣṭa). But visual apprehension pertaining to colour exclusively, has not hitherto been within one’s experience. Nor again has the cognition of the reflected colour alone with no reference to its substratum (japākusuma) been ever experienced before.

1.99 ✅

ननु अभिजातस्येव पद्मरागादिमणेः जपाकुसुमादेरपि प्रभा विद्यते, तया व्याप्तत्वात् स्फटिकोऽपि लोहित इवावभासते; तथापि स्वयमलोहितो मिथ्यैव लोहित इत्यापद्येत।

1.99. But (it may be argued) just like a pure ruby gem the japākusuma also has its lustre and because it is similarly pervasive the crystal also shines as if it were red. Even then it would come to this that what is not red in itself (viz., crystal) appears erroneously as red. (Hence the relation of red with the crystal is illusory.)

अथ प्रभैव लोहितोऽवभासते, न स्फटिक इति;

It may be argued that it is the lustre only (of japākusuma) that shines red and not that the crystal (appears red).

शौक्ल्यमपि तर्हि स्फटिके प्रकाशेत। अथ प्रभया अपसारितं तदिति चेत्, स तर्हि नीरूपः कथं चाक्षुषः स्यात्?

Siddhāntin. – Then whiteness also would shine in the crystal (because the crystal is not seen as red). But if it be said that it is obstructed (apasāritam – lit. driven out) by the lustre then how could it being colourless, become an object of sight?

न च रूपिद्रव्यसंयोगात्; वायोरपि तथात्वप्रसङ्गात्। न प्रभानिमित्तं लौहित्यं तत्रोत्पन्नम्; उत्तरकालमपि तथा रूपप्रसङ्गात्।

And the ocular perception of the crystal (as red) cannot be attributed to its relation with a coloured substance (viz., prabhā). For then the same thing would have to be said of air (when it is in conjunction with a coloured substance); nor again could it be averred that due to the lustre, redness is (actually) produced in it (crystal) for then the crystal would continue to shine red even subsequent (to the removal of japākusuma).

1.100 ✅

अभ्युपगम्य प्रभामिदमुक्तम्। यथा पद्मरागादिप्रभा निराश्रयापि उन्मुखोपलभ्यते, न तथा जपाकुसुमादेः॥ तदेवं स्फटिकमणावुपधानोपराग इव चिदात्मन्यप्यहङ्कारोपरागः। ततः सम्भिन्नोभयरूपत्वात् ग्रन्थिरिव भवतीति अहङ्कारो ग्रन्थिरिति गीयते।

1.100. It has been argued so far assuming the lustre (of japākusuma). The lustre of the ruby, etc., shines before us even without its substratum – (i.e., the lustre is perceived though the ruby is not within sight); the same is not the case with the japākusuma. This being so, just as in the crystal there exists the illusory relation of the upādhi (viz., japākusuma), in ātman there exists the illusory relation of ahaṅkāra; hence on account of the (erroneous) relation of these dual forms (cit and a-cit – the intelligence and the inert) it becomes as it were a knot (granthi) so that ahaṅkāra is spoken of as granthi (i.e., a tangle of the conscious and unconscious elements).

1.101 ✅

तत्र जडरूपत्वादुपरक्तस्य न तद्बलादुपरागस्य साक्षाद्भावः, चिद्रूपस्य पुनरुपरागः तद्विषयव्यापारविरहिणोऽपि तद्बलात् प्रकाशते॥ तेन लक्षणत इदमंशः कथ्यते, न व्यवहारतः।

1.101. There (i.e., in the crystal-red cognition) because the crystal (which is covered by upādhi) is an inert substance the perception of the superimposed (viz., the redness) is not dependent on it (crystal). On the contrary the relation of cit (i.e., between cit and antaḥkaraṇa) though in the absence of any mental activity, (i.e., of the psychosis of the internal organ) relating to it, manifests itself by its potency. Hence (because its manifestation depends on cit), it (ahaṅkāra) is stated to be of ‘the this’ aspect considered in its real nature and not according to usage.

व्यवहारतः पुनः यदुपरागादनिदमात्मनोऽहङ्कर्तृत्वं मिथ्या, तदात्मनः तद्व्यापारेण व्याप्रियमाणस्यैव व्यापारपूर्वको यस्य परिच्छेदः, स एवेदमात्मको विषयः।

In the sphere of ordinary experience however, that by whose association the agency of that which is of the essence of the ‘not this’ is illusory (is the ahaṅkāra); the self, only as identifying itself with ahaṅkāra and intimately associated with its activity has its experience through the vṛtti of that (viz., of the external world such as the body, senses, etc.), and that alone (viz., the ahaṅkāra) is the object of the nature of the ‘this’.

1.102 ✅

अत एव अहमि’त्यसम्भिन्नेदमात्मकोऽवभासः इति विभ्रमः केषाञ्चित्। दृष्टश्च लक्षणतः तद्व्यवहारार्होऽपि तमननुपतन्।

1.102. It is on account of this that some people are under the delusion that the notion of ego (aham) manifests itself as disconnected altogether with what is characterised as the ‘this’. It is indeed seen that though on the strength of its real nature (lakṣaṇataḥ) it is fit to be so expressed (i.e., as the ‘this’) it does not fall under the ‘that’ category.

तद्यथा अङ्कुरादिफलपर्यन्तो वृक्षविकारो मृत्परिणामपरम्परापरिनिष्पन्नोऽपि घटवल्मीकवत् न मृण्मयव्यवहारमनुपतति, व्युत्पन्नमतयस्तु तद्व्यवहारमपि नातीवोल्बणं मन्यन्ते।

For instance, from the sprout up to the fruit all the changes of the tree are product of the gradual transformation of the earth substance, as it is the case with ‘pot’ and ‘ant-hill’ but yet usage is different, (the tree is not spoken of as composed of earth though the other two are); as for thoughtful men, they do not consider that usage even (viz., the non-inclusion of ahaṅkāra under the ‘this’ element) as a matter of much seriousness.

अत एव निपुणतरमभिवीक्ष्य रूपकपरीक्षकवदहङ्कारं निरूपयतां सम्भिन्नेदंरूपः सः इत्यभिहितम्।

Hence, it has already been stated that for those who, like the scrutineer of coins, examine and decide the nature of the ego-notion with more than ordinary skill, the ahaṅkāra is (apparently) mixed up with the ‘this’ aspect.

1.103 ✅

यत् पुनः दर्पणजलादिषु मुखचन्द्रादिप्रतिबिम्बोदाहरणम्, तत् अहङ्कर्तुरनिदमंशो बिम्बादिव प्रतिबिम्बं न ब्रह्मणो वस्त्वन्तरम्, किं तु तदेव तत्पृथगवभासविपर्ययस्वरूपतामात्रं मिथ्या इति दर्शयितुम्।

1.103. Now as regards the illustration of the reflection of the face in the mirror as well as of the moon in water, what is intended to bring home is the fact that the ‘not-this’ (ātman) as evidenced in the expression ‘I am doer’ is an entity not distinct from Brahman but on the contrary that only, just as the reflected image is not distinct from the object. It is to point out that (in the mirror-instance) the only elements to be regarded as illusory are their (viz., object and reflection) appearance as distincts (the one as different from the other), and appearance as contrawise (i.e., the object and the reflection appearing opposite to each other).

1.104 ✅

कथं पुनस्तदेव तत्? एकस्वलक्षणत्वावगमात्।

1.104. How is (one to know) that it is the same as that? Because of the cognition of the essentially identical object.

तथा च यथा बहिःस्थितो देवदत्तो यत्स्वलक्षणः प्रतिपन्नः, तत्स्वलक्षण एव वेश्मान्तःप्रविष्टोऽपि प्रतीयते, तथा दर्पणतलस्थितोऽपि; न तत् वस्त्वन्तरत्वे युज्यते।

For instance, with whatsoever individual trait Devadatta is found when he is outside (the house) with the same trait he will be found even when he has entered the house; in the same manner (Devadatta) even when (reflected) in the mirror (is identical with Devadatta that is outside). And that (cognition of identity, i.e., recognition) would not be intelligible if it (the object reflected) were different.

अपि च अर्थात् वस्त्वन्तरत्वे सति आदर्श एव बिम्बसन्निधावेव तदाकारगर्भितः परिणतः इति वाच्यम्;

Again if it were a different object it should be stated on the basis of presumptive evidence that the mirror itself when in the vicinity of the object transforms itself into the features of the object-as-contained-within-it.

विरुद्धपरिमाणत्वात् संश्लेषाभावाच्च प्रतिमुद्रेव बिम्बलाञ्छितत्वानुपपत्तेः, तथा सति बिम्बसन्निधिलब्धपरिणतिरादर्शः तदपायेऽपि तथैवावतिष्ठेत।

It cannot be argued that it (reflection) is of the nature of a mark left by the object (bimba) similar to the impress of a seal, because of the incompatibility of size and of the absence of contact. If it be so the mirror whose transformation was brought about by the vicinity of the object would remain in the same state (i.e., the reflection would persist) even when the object is removed.

1.105-6 ✅

न खलु संवेष्टितः कटो निमित्तलब्धप्रसारणपरिणतिः निमित्तापगमे तत्क्षणमेव संवेष्टते यथा, तथा स्यादिति मन्तव्यम्; यतश्चिरकालसंवेष्टनाहितसंस्कारः तत्र पुनःसंवेष्टननिमित्तम्।

1.105-6. And it ought not to be thought that the analogy of the rolled-up mat getting spread out by some (nimitta) karaṇa (say, stretching with the hands) and rolling itself up (assuming its previous state) the moment the cause disappears, applies here. For there, the cause of the mat again turning over upon itself is the saṃskāra, produced by its having been kept rolled up for a considerable time (and not the removal of the nimittta-kāraṇa).

तथा च यावत्संस्कारक्षयं प्रसारणनिमित्तानुवृत्तौ पुनःसंवेष्टनोपजनः,

As such, until the destruction of this capacity (saṃskāra) there occurs the self-folding as soon as the cause of spreading out (i.e., keeping it stretched with one’s hands) is removed.

एवं चिरकालसन्निहितबिम्बनिमित्ततदाकारपरिणतिरादर्शः तथैव तदपायेऽपि यावदायुरवतिष्ठेत, न च तथोपलभ्यते;

Hence the mirror which has changed into the shape of the object owing to the fact that the object has been in its neighbourhood for long, would remain till one’s life-time in the same state even when that (object) has disappeared; but it is not perceived as such.

यः पुनः कमलमुकुलस्य विकासपरिणतिहेतोः सावित्रस्य तेजसो दीर्घकालानुवृत्तस्यापि विगमे तत्समकालं पुनर्मुकुलीभावः, स प्रथमतरमुकुलहेतुपार्थिवाप्यावयवव्यापारनिमित्तः; तदुपरमे जीर्णस्य पुनर्मुकुलतानुपलब्धेः, नादर्शे पुनस्तथा पूर्वरूपपरिणामहेतुरस्ति।

If, – another analogy may be brought to the fore – however it is pointed out that the lotus bud whose transformation into a blossom is effected by the sun’s light, closes again into the form of the bud at the same time as the light vanishes even though that light has remained with it long, (it should be borne in mind) that what constituted the cause of the earliest bud (i.e., the very first bud as it shoots forth), viz., the activity (active process) of the earth-and-water-components of the lotus operates also when again reverting to the bud-state. When that ceases, the faded-flower is not seen to again close into the bud. In the case of the mirror on the other hand there exists no such cause as brought about its former state (pūrva-rūpa).

1.107 ✅

अत्राह – भवतु न वस्त्वन्तरं, तदेव तदिति तु न क्षम्यते; शुक्तिकारजतस्य मिथ्यारूपस्यापि सत्यरजतैकरूपावभासित्वदर्शनात्,

1.107. Here (the opponent of the doctrine that the object and the image are identical) says – let it be conceded that there is no distinct object, but the assertion, ‘that alone is that’ (i.e., that pratibimba is nothing but bimba) cannot be tolerated, for it is perceived that the silver (appearing) in the nacre though unreal, manifests itself as identical in nature with the real silver.

मैवम्; तत्र हि बाधदर्शनात् मिथ्याभावः, नेह स बाधो दृश्यते। यः पुनः दर्पणापगमे तदपगमः, न स बाधः; दर्पणेऽपि तत्प्रसङ्गात्॥

It is not so. There (in the shell-silver cognition) because of the sublation it is regarded as illusory. Here no sublation of the image as such is in evidence. The disappearance of that (i.e., the image on the removal of the mirror is not a case of sublation; for then it (sublation) would overtake the mirror also.

1.108 ✅

ननु तत्त्वमसिवाक्यात् बाधो दृश्यते,

1.108. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, is not sublation evident from the sentence ‘That thou art’?

मैवम्; तत्र’तत्त्वमि’ति बिम्बस्थानीयब्रह्मस्वरूपताप्रतिबिम्बस्थानीयस्य जीवस्योपदिश्यते; अन्यथा न’तत्त्वमसी’ति स्यात्, किन्तु‘न त्वमसी’ति भवेत्, ‘न रजतमस्ती’तिवत्।

Siddhāntin. – Not so; there (in the sentence) ‘that thou (art)’ what is intimated is that the individual soul (jīva) which is in the position of the image (pratibimba) is of the nature of Brahman occupying the position of the object (bimba). Otherwise the sentence would not be (of the form) – ‘that thou art’ but would be ‘thou art not’ like ‘silver is not’.

1.109 ✅

किं च शास्त्रीयोऽपि व्यवहारः प्रतिबिम्बस्य पारमार्थिकमिव बिम्बैकरूपत्वं दर्शयति ‘नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्यं नास्तं यन्तं कदाचन। नोपरक्तं न वारिस्थं न मध्यं नभसो गतम्’ इति॥

1.109. Moreover the śāstra usage also confirms the view that the reflection is in reality identical with the object. “At no time, should one see the sun when it is just rising, when it is setting, when it is eclipsed, when it is reflected in water, and when it has reached the mid-sky.”

1.110 ✅

यस्तु मन्यते न पराक्प्रवणप्रवृत्तनयनरश्मिभिः बिम्बमेव भिन्नदेशस्थं गृह्यते, किन्तु दर्पणप्रतिस्फालितैः परावृत्त्य प्रत्यङ्मुखैः स्वदेशस्थमेव बिम्बं गृह्यते इति, तमनुभव एव निराकरोतीति, न पराक्रम्यते।

1.110. He who thinks that it is not the original (bimba) alone, that as existing outside itself is revealed by the visual rays which have turned back from the reflector but that the original remaining in its own place (viz., the neck) is revealed by the rays which having impinged upon the mirror turn back and proceed in the opposite direction – him, experience itself condemns; as such his view is not controverted.

1.111 ✅

कथं पुनः परिच्छिन्नमेकमेकस्वभावं विच्छिन्नदेशद्वये सर्वात्मना अवभासमानमुभयत्र पारमार्थिकं भवति?

1.111. Prābhākara. – How could, that which is circumscribed, singles, of the nature of being one (eka-svabhāva) and which manifests itself in its wholeness in two separate regions, be absolutely in both?

न वयं विच्छेदावभासं पारमार्थिकं ब्रूमः, किं तु एकत्वं विच्छेदस्तु मायाविजृम्भितः। न हि मायायामसम्भावनीयं नाम; असम्भावनीयावभासचतुरा हि सा॥

Siddhāntin. – We do not say that the manifestation (of a single object) in separate spots (at the same time) is absolutely real, but (we maintain) ekatva (oneness). The appearance (of the object) as distinct is the display of māyā and as is well-known there is nothing incongruous to māyā. That (Māyā) indeed is adept in creating improbabilities.

1.112 ✅

ननु सत्येव बिम्बैकतावगमे प्रतिबिम्बस्य तद्गतो विच्छेदादिमिथ्यावभासः, तथा ब्रह्मैकतावगमेऽपि जीवस्य विच्छेदादिमिथ्यावभासो न निवर्तितुमर्हति,

1.112. Pūrvapakṣin. – Even when the identity of the reflection with the original is cognised there (still) exists the erroneous manifestation of separateness, etc., pertaining to it the reflection); similarly even when the identity of the individual soul with Brahman is cognised (through study and reflection), there does exist the erroneous manifestation of separation, etc. (between the jīva and Brahman) which cannot be got rid of (i.e. even though one is cognizant of the oneness with the Absolute one cannot get rid of the notion of one’s separation from the Absolute).

उच्यते – देवदत्तस्याचेतनांशस्यैव प्रतिबिम्बत्वात्, सचेतनांशस्यैव वा प्रतिबिम्बत्वे प्रतिबिम्बहेतोः श्यामादिधर्मेणेव जाड्येनाप्यास्कन्दितत्वात् न तत् प्रतिबिम्बं बिम्बैकरूपतामात्मनो जानाति; अचेतनत्वात्, तथा चानुभवः ‘न बिम्बचेष्टया विना प्रतिबिम्बं चेष्टते’ इति।

Siddhāntin. – This is how it is met. The reason is that what is reflected is only Devadatta’s insentient part. Even admitting that what is reflected is insentient (we say) that just as the duskiness of the mirror – the cause of reflection – (affects the reflected image) even so being pervaded (lit. assailed) by the inertness of the mirror that reflection (of Devadatta’s face) does not cognise its identity with the proto-type (bimba). Because it is inert (it is not sentient as held by the Cārvāka). And such is experience (i.e., experience corroborates that reflection is insentient); without the movement of the bimba the pratibimba does not move.

1.113 ✅

यस्य हि भ्रान्तिरात्मनि परत्र वा समुत्पन्ना, तद्गतेनैव सम्यग्ज्ञानेन सा निवर्तते, यस्तु जानीते देवदत्तः प्रतिबिम्बस्यात्मनोऽभिन्नत्वं, न स तद्गतेन दोषेण संस्पृश्यते, नापि ज्ञानमात्रात् प्रतिबिम्बस्य निवृत्तिः; तद्धेतोः दर्पणादेः पारमार्थिकत्वात्।

1.113. Indeed when illusion arises in a person whether in relation to himself (e.g., as in ‘I am enjoyer’, etc.) or in something extrinsic (as in ‘shell-silver’) that illusion is sublated by the right knowledge appertaining only to him. Devadatta who understands his identity (lit. non-separateness) with the reflection is untouched by the defects belonging to it. And neither is the reflection sublated merely by the right knowledge, because the cause of reflection, viz., mirror is real (i.e., in a relative sense – laukika-pāramārthika).

जीवः पुनः प्रतिबिम्बकल्पः सर्वेषां न प्रत्यक्षश्चिद्रूपः नान्तःकरणजाड्येनास्कन्दितः। स चाहङ्कर्तृत्वमात्मनो रूपं मन्यते, न बिम्बकल्पब्रह्मैकरूपताम्; अतो युक्तस्तद्रूपावगमे मिथ्यात्वापगमः॥

The jīva on the other hand which may be likened to reflection is of the nature of cit (sentience) as is within the cognizance of us all and is not pervaded by the inertness pertaining to the inner sense. And that (jīva) entertains the notion of self-agency of itself as of the nature of active agent) but not of its oneness with Brahman which resembles the original (bimba). Hence it is reasonable that the illusion should disappear with the knowledge of its nature (as Brahman, because of the disappearance of upādhi, viz., the inner sense, etc.).

1.114 ✅

ननु तत्र विभ्राम्यतो विभ्रमहेतुर्दर्पणालक्तकादिपरमार्थवस्तु सन्निहितमस्ति, न तथेह किञ्चित् सर्वत्रैव चिद्विलक्षणे विभ्रमविलासाभिमानिन

1.114. Pūrvapakṣin. – Is it not a fact that there (i.e., in the cognition of reflection and crystal-red) a real thing which constitutes the cause of illusion, such as the mirror or the China-rose, is in close proximity of the person who is deluded? Here (in ātman) in every case of the superimposition of non-sentience (including egoity, etc.), when a person is attracted by illusory diversions no such real object exists in the vicinity?

इति मा भूदाशङ्केति रज्जुसर्पमुदाहरन्ति॥

Siddhāntin. – That such a doubt may not arise they (Scriptures) give the rope-serpent example.

1.115 ✅

ननु तत्रापि यदि नामेदानीमसन्निहितः सर्पः, तथापि पूर्वनिर्वृत्ततदनुभवसंस्कारः समस्त्येव,

1.115. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, even there (i.e., in the rope-serpent) if indeed the serpent is not in the vicinity now (at the present moment) still the saṃskāra (impression) of the experience which must have arisen in the past certainly does exist; (this saṃskāra is itself the upādhi).

बाढम्; इहाप्यहङ्कर्तृतातत्संस्कारयोर्बीजाङ्कुरयोरिवानादेः कार्यकारणभावस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् तत्संस्कारो विभ्रमहेतुः विद्यते।

Siddhāntin. – It is true (that there exists the cause afforded by the persistent impressions). Even here the notion of the agency of the Self and its residual, impression are beginningless like the seed-sprout (series) and since their relation as cause and effect will be later demonstrated (vide, S. Bh. I. 4 and II. 1) there exists the saṃskāra as the ground of illusion.

1.116 ✅

तत्र यद्यपि अनिर्वचनीयतयैव अरुणादिना स्फटिकादेः सावयवत्वेन सम्भेदयोग्यस्यापि असम्भेदावभासः सिद्धः; तथापि तदासङ्गीव स्फटिकप्रतिबिम्बमुत्प्रेक्षते,

1.116. There (in the red-crystal) the non-relation of the red colour with the crystal becomes evident on the basis of anirvacanīyatā (the principle of inexplicability, or on that of sublation by jñāna) though the crystal, etc., possessing parts are fit to be so related; still (the person under delusion) imagines as if (the redness which is) reflected in the crystal is related to it (crystal).

रज्ज्वां पुनः सर्पबुद्धिरेव, न तत्सम्भिन्नत्वमसम्भिन्नत्वं वा तस्याम्। तेन ‘असङ्गो न हि सज्जते’ (बृ. उ. ३-९-२६) ‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ (बृ. उ. ४-३-१५) इत्यादिश्रुतिसमर्पितासङ्गता आत्मनो न स्पष्टं दर्शितेति तदर्थं घटाकाशोदाहरणम्। तत्र हि तत्परामर्शादृते न भेदरूपकार्यसमाख्याः स्वगता दृश्यन्ते।

In the rope on the other hand there arises only the serpent-notion and neither the idea of relation nor of non-relation. From (examples such as) these, the non-relational character of ātman as vouched for in the Scriptural tests, viz., “Ātman is unattached, for it does not attach itself”, (BrhU.3.9.26); “This person is unattached” (BrhU.4.3.15), etc., is not clearly brought out. With this in view the example of ether-in-the-pot (is adduced). There (in the pot-ether) indeed, apart from reminding it (viz., the limitation constituted by the ‘pot’), difference, form, serviceability and name are not perceived as belonging to itself.

1.117 ✅

एतच्च सर्वमुदाहरणजातं श्रुतितन्न्यायानुभवसिद्धस्य तदसम्भावनापरिहाराय बुद्धिसाम्यार्थं च, न वस्तुन एव साक्षात् सिद्धये।

1.117. And all this aggregate of examples is for the purpose of removing the doubt that may arise regarding what has been established by the Scriptures, conformatory logic and experience, and also for mental concord; it is not for directly stabilising the thing itself (viz., ātman).

1.118 ✅

तदेवं यद्यपि चैतन्यैकरसोऽनिदमात्मकत्वादविषयः; तथाप्यहङ्कारे व्यवहारयोग्यो भवतीति गौण्यावृत्त्या अस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयतोच्यते; प्रमेयस्य च व्यवहारयोग्यत्वाव्यभिचारात्॥

1.118. That being so, no doubt (ātman) which is ‘consciousness entire’ cannot be an object since it is of the nature of the ‘not this’; but still when (associated) with the ego-notion (asmat-pratyaya) it becomes fit for vyavahāra, so that in a figurative sense it is spoken of as the ego-notion (asmat-pratyaya); because the fitness of an object of cognition for vyavahāra never strays (the figurative use is tenable since ātman has vyavahāra-yogyatva).

ननु व्यवहारयोग्यत्वे अध्यासः, अध्यासपरिनिष्पन्नाहंप्रत्ययबलात् व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् इति प्राप्तमितरेतराश्रयत्वम्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, if it be said that superimposition is (prerequisite) for vyavahāra and that fitness for practical purpose is dependent on the ego-notion which is the outcome of superimposition, does it not result in reciprocal dependence?

न; अनादित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्।

No, (this argument has been refuted on the ground of (the adhyāsa) being beginningless.

1.119 ✅

तत्र एवंभूतस्य अहङ्कर्तुरिदमंशस्य ज्ञानसंशब्दितो व्यापारविशेषः सकर्मत्वात् कर्मकारकाभिमुखं स्वाश्रये कञ्चिदवस्थाविशेषमादधाति;

1.119. There the particular activity described by the term jñāna belonging to the ‘this’ aspect of what has thus become ahaṅkāra (i.e., the notion ‘I am doer’), because it is transitive in sense, conveys a reference to the object and produces some result in that which is its āśraya (i.e., its abode), for it is the nature of (all) action to effect a change in that in which it inheres.

स्वाश्रयविकारहेतुत्वात् क्रियायाः। स च प्राप्नोतिक्रियाहितकर्तृस्थविशेषवत् कर्मसम्बन्धो ज्ञातुः ज्ञेयसम्बन्धः इति गीयते।

And that (avasthā-viśeṣa) is described as the relation of the cogniser with the cognised and it is like the particular change (atiśaya, say, reaching the village) produced in the kartā (i.e., the man who is proceeding to it) by the action (of going). The inner sense (antaḥkaraṇa) only as related to a particular object through that (i.e. the vṛtti) particularises the caitanya (ghaṭāvacchinna-caitanya for instance).

1.120 ✅

तेन विषयविशेषसम्बद्धमेवान्तःकरणे चैतन्यस्यावच्छेदकम्। कर्मकारकमपि प्रधानक्रियासिद्धौ स्वव्यापाराविष्टं चैतन्यविवर्त्तत्वात् प्रधानक्रियाहितप्रमात्रवस्थाविशेषावच्छिन्नापरोक्षतैकरूपामपरोक्षतामभिव्यनक्ति।

1.120. When the modal change – antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti, begins to function, that which is in the objective relation also (say, the jar) when impinged upon by the vṛtti, because it is the vivarta (transformation) of caitanya, manifests the consciousness (jar-caitanya) which is identical with the consciousness conditioned by the particular aspect (viz., the relation of the cogniser and the cognised) constituted by agency, which aspect (again) is generated by the vṛtti (pradhāna-kriyā).

ततश्चात्मनोऽन्तःकरणावस्थाविशेषोपाधिजनितो विशेषः विषयानुभवसंशब्दितो विषयस्थापरोक्षैकरसः फलमिति क्रियैकविषयता फलस्य युज्यते।

And then the particular aspect of ātman brought about by the particular modal change of the internal organ constitutes (its cognisership). That is the phala (i.e., the result of the cognitive process) which is none other than the immediate perception revealing the object and spoken of as the experience of the object – (viṣayānubhava), so that the phala has the same object as the kriyā (i.e., vṛtti).

एवं चाहङ्कर्ता स्वांशचैतन्यबलेन व्यापाराविष्टतया च प्रमाता, इति बुद्धिस्थमर्थं पुरुषश्चेतयत इत्युच्यते।

When this is so, (i.e., when the vṛtti, i.e., kriyā and anubhava phala point to the same object and have the same locus, viz., the jar and ātman is erroneously identified with the ego), the ego (‘ahaṅkartā’) assumes the role of cogniser both on the strength of its consciousness aspect and of its association with the vṛtti; and as such it is said that the puruṣa (the self) cognises the object presented in the intellect.

1.121 ✅

तत्र च प्रमातुः स्वयञ्ज्योतिषो विषयसम्बन्धसञ्जातविशेषोऽनुभवोऽपरोक्षतया सर्वान् प्रत्यविशिष्टोऽपि कारकाणां सम्भूय प्रधानक्रियासाधनत्वात्, येन सह साधनं, तन्निष्ठ एव, नान्यत्र। कर्मकारकमपि येन सह साधनं, तस्यैवापरोक्षं; गन्तृसम्बन्ध इव ग्रामस्य॥

1.121. And there, the anubhava of the self-luminous cogniser, an entity revealed from its contact with the object, though embracing all objects, because of its all-pervadingness (aparokṣatayā) is restricted only to that (viz., the object) since along with the combination of other accessories (such as the senses, etc.), it brings about the activity of the pradhāna-kriyā (vṛtti); with whatever karma-kāraka (a thing that is in the objective relation), the main activity in the form of vṛtti is in contact, that thing only (i.e., the cit reflected in it) is the anubhava and none other. And with whatsoever person the karma-kāraka jointly serves as the means (of the activity of the vṛtti), that person alone has the immediate cognition just as contact with the village is of the person (who has journeyed to reach the village).

1.122 ✅

ननु नीलादिविषयोऽपि चेदपरोक्षस्वभावः, नीलात्मिका संविदित्युक्तं स्यात्; अतः स एव माहायानिकपक्षः समर्थितः,

1.122. Objection: If objects like blue (pot), etc., are of the nature of aparokṣa (i.e., immediate cognition) it amounts to the same thing as saying that jñāna (samvit) is of the nature of blue. Hence it is as good as maintaining the Māhāyānika contention.

मैवम् – परस्परव्यावृत्तौ नीलपीताववभासेते, अपरोक्षता तु न तथा, एकरूपावगमाद्विच्छेदावभासेऽपि, अतः न तत्स्वभावता। यदि स्यात्, तद्वदेव व्यावृत्तस्वभावताऽप्यवभासेत, न च तथा।

Answer: It is not so; blue and yellow manifest themselves each excluding the other, but aparokṣatā (jñāna) on the other hand is not so; for it is comprehended as a single entity though the cognitions (of objects) manifest themselves as disparate. Hence (blue, etc.), are not of that nature (i.e., of jñāna). If it had been so then jñāna would also manifest itself like that only (i.e., like the external object) one excluding the other. But it does not so (reveal itself).

किं च तैरपि नीलात्मकसंविदोऽन्य एव पराग्व्यावृत्तोऽपरोक्षः प्रत्यगवभासः स्वरूपमात्रे पर्यवसितो विकल्प उपेयते, प्रतीयते च नीलसंवित् प्रत्यग्व्यावृत्तेदन्तया ग्राह्यरूपा; ततश्च वस्तुद्वयं ग्राह्यग्राहकरूपमितरेतरव्यावृत्तं सिद्धम्॥

Moreover, even by them (the Vijñānavādins) is it admitted that as distinct from the consciousness of the blue there is a separate cognitive entity (vikalpa) of the nature of internal consciousness (lit. that which is internally manifest as ‘aham’) which is turned away from (i.e., unrelated to) the external (like pot, etc.), which is characterised by immediacy and which ends in its own self. And the blue (object) it is evident is experienced as distinct from that which is pratyak (i.e., the ego-consciousness), and as the ‘this’, which is of the nature of an object of cognition. Hence it is obvious that there are two entities which are of the nature of the apprehender and the apprehended and which are mutually exclusive.

1.123 ✅

नैतत् – द्वयोरपि स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठयोः कुतो विषयविषयिभावः?

1.123. Vijñānavādin. – No, it is not so; since both (i.e., the ego-consciousness and the blue) are self-cognising how could there arise the distinction between the object and the subject (i.e., the cogniser and the cognised)?

कथं पुनः ‘इदमहं जानामी’ति तयोर्ग्राह्यग्राहकतावभासः?

Siddhāntin. – How then (do you account for) the distinct manifestation of the cogniser and cognised as evidenced in (the statement) ‘I know this’ – ‘aham-idam jānāmi’?

नायं तदवभासः, किन्तु ‘अहमि’ति ‘इदमि’ति ‘जानामी’ति च परस्परव्यावृत्ता विकल्पा एते।

Vijñānavādin: This is not such manifestation (i.e., of the cogniser and the cognised – grāhya-grāhaka), but as ‘aham’ (the ego-consciousness), ‘idam’ (‘this’ consciousness), and ‘jānāmi’ (cognition of cognition, – jñāna-viṣayaka-jñāna) they are mutually exclusive determinate cognitions.

कथं पुनः तेषु कटाक्षेणाप्यन्योन्यमनीक्षमाणेष्वयं सम्बन्धावगमः?

Siddhāntin. – How then (do you account for) this knowledge of the (prior-posterior) relation between them when there is not even so much as a mutual exchange of glances (i.e. when not even a remote connection exists among these cognitions)?

तद्वासनासमेतसमनन्तरप्रत्ययसमुत्थं सङ्कलनात्मकं प्रत्ययान्तरमेतत्; नेह सम्बन्धावगमः?

Vijñānavādin. – That is a distinct cognition, complex in character, generated by the immediate preceding cognition (samanantara-pratyaya) conjoined by the impressions (left behind by the isolated determinate cognitions of ‘aham’ and ‘idam’); and here is no knowledge of relation.

किं पुनः एवमनुभवानारूढामेव प्रक्रियां विरचयति भवान् !

Siddhāntin. – How is it that your worthiness (sarcastic) elaborates a technique such as would not conform to experience?

क्षणविध्वंसिनः क्रियानुपपत्तेः; स्थायित्वे हि सत्यहमुल्लेख्यस्य स्थायिनैव नीलादिना क्रियानिमित्तः सम्बन्धः, ततश्च क्रियानिमित्तैव नीलादेरप्यपरोक्षता स्यात्, न च स्थायित्वमस्ति।

Vijñānavādin: Because entities which suffer instant destruction cannot subserve any practical purpose. It is only when what is denoted by ‘aham’ (i.e., ātman or vijñāna) is of an enduring nature, there would arise the relation with the ‘blue’ which is also enduring, as the result of the activity (of vijñāna), and then there would be the immediate cognition also of ‘blue’, etc., dependent upon that activity; but they are not enduring.

1.124 ✅

यद्येवं, ’अहमि’ति संविदः प्रतिक्षणं स्वलक्षणभेदेन भाव्यं, स किं विद्यते? न वेति? स्वसंविदमगूहमानैरेवाभिधीयताम् !

1.124. Siddhāntin: If that be so (i.e., if momentariness is accepted) the ego-cognition should be regarded as an unrelated unique particular (svalakṣaṇa) changing moment by moment. Now, let those people tell us who do not conceal their own experience (svapratyakṣam) whether that (unceasing change) is a fact or not.

अथ अत्यन्तसादृश्यात् न भेदोऽवभासते इति,

Vijñānavādin. – There is distinctness, but it is not perceived owing to extreme similarity (between momentary cognitions which are in reality distincts).

संविदोऽपि चेत् स्वरूपं नावभासते, आयातमान्ध्यमशेषस्य जगतः !

Siddhāntin. – If the distinctness (bheda) is regarded as of the very nature of jñāna (samvit) and if there is not its manifestation then the whole universe would be an absolute blank.

अपि च तद्रूपप्रतिभासे सादृश्यकल्पना प्रमाणविरुद्धा, निष्प्रमाणिका च !

Again the postulation of similarity to account for the manifestation of unit-cognition (tad-rūpa= aikya-rūpa) is opposed to pramāṇa and is unsupported by any pramāṇa.

तद्रूपप्रतीतेः व्यामोहत्वात् न प्रमाणविरुद्धता, नाप्यप्रामाणिकता; निर्बीजभ्रान्त्ययोगादिति चेत्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Since the unit-cognition is illusory, it is not opposed to pramāṇa; nor is it unsupported by pramāṇa for illusion is impossible without a cause.

न इतरेतराश्रयत्वात्। सिद्धे व्यामोहे सादृश्यसिद्धिः; प्रमाणविरोधाभावात्, प्रमाणसद्भावाच्च, सिद्धे च सादृश्ये तन्निमित्ता व्यामोहसिद्धिः॥

Siddhāntin. – No, it is not so; for it is open to (the fallacy of) mutual dependence. It is only when illusoriness (of unit-cognition, i.e., recognition or pratyabhijña) is proved that similarity can be maintained as it then would be unopposed to pramāṇa and would also be supported by pramāṇa. And if similarity is proved then could illusoriness as adduced from it, be maintained.

1.125 ✅

स्यादेतत्, अव्यामोहेऽपि तुल्यमेतत्, सिद्धे हि सादृश्यकल्पनाया अप्रामाणिकत्वे प्रमाणविरोधे च तद्रूपप्रतीतेरव्यामोहत्वम्, अव्यामोहत्वे चास्याः सादृश्यकल्पनायाः निष्प्रमाणकत्वं प्रमाणविरोधश्च,

1.125. Pūrvapakṣin. – Yes, it would be so, but then this (charge of mutual dependence) applies equally (to the unit-cognition – aikya-jñāna) if held to be non-illusory. When the postulation of similarity is proved to be unsupported by pramāṇa and also hostile to pramāṇa then would be established the non-illusoriness of the cognition in that form (i.e., as a single entity – aikya-pratīti); again if this (aikya-jñāna) is (proved to be) non-illusory the postulation of similarity would both be unsupported by pramāṇa and hostile to it.

नैतत्; स्वारसिकं हि प्रामाण्यं प्रतीतेरनपेक्षम्। तथा च तत्प्रामाण्यात् सादृश्यकल्पना निष्प्रामाणिकी प्रमाणविरुद्धा च, न तु सादृश्यकल्पना स्वतःसिद्धा, येन प्रामाण्यमावहेत्, अप्रामाण्यपूर्विकैव सा।

Siddhāntin. – No, it is not so. The validity of cognition (in the present context it is pratyabhijña which reveals identity) is self-proven (i.e., it does not require proof ab extra) and (as such) is not dependent upon anything else. Hence, because of its validity the postulation of similarity has not only no pramāṇa in its support but is opposed to it. The cognition of similarity (kalpanā, i.e., cognition by postulation) does not exist in its own right; if it did it would have become pramāṇa. It (the postulation of similarity) is possible only on the presupposition of the invalidity (of recognition).

1.126 ✅

अथ अन्ते क्षयदर्शनादौ क्षयानुमानम्; अतो भिन्नत्वात् सादृश्यकल्पनेति?

1.126. Pūrvapakṣin: But since destruction is patent at the end, the inference of destruction at the beginning (is inevitable). Hence seeing that the cognitions are distincts similarity is postulated.

आदौ सत्तादर्शनादन्तेऽपि सा किं नानुमीयते? क्षयानुभवविरोधादिति चेत्, इहापि तद्रूपसत्त्वादनुभवविरोधः; न ह्युभयोरनुभवयोः कश्चिद्विशेषः !

Siddhāntin. – Well, since the existence of pot (beyond a moment) is perceived at the moment of its existence why is it not (existence – sattā) inferred at the end (the moment of destruction) also? If it be argued that such inference is opposed to the (actual) perception of destruction, (we say) that here also your own inference is opposed to the evidence of recognition which gives the very object (that was seen before). And certainly there is nothing to distinguish between the two experiences.

1.127 ✅

अथ मन्येत योऽसौ स्थिरत्वेनाभिमतोऽहमुल्लेखः, स किं काञ्चिदर्थक्रियां कुर्याद्वा? न वा?

1.127. Pūrvapakṣin. – But if you hold that the ego-consciousness is a permanent entity, (we ask) whether it possesses any practical efficiency or not.

यदि न कुर्यात् असल्लक्षणप्राप्तेर्न परमार्थवस्तु; अथ कुर्यात्, न तर्हि स्थायी; स्थायिनोऽर्थक्रियाऽयोगात्।

In case it does not (produce anything) it acquires the character of non-being and as such loses its claim to reality. If, however, it does (produce) then it is not permanent. For casual efficiency is incompatible with an object that is permanent.

कथमयोगः? इत्थमयोगः – स तां कुर्वन् क्रमेण कुर्याद्यौगपद्येन वा? न तावत् क्रमेण; पूर्वोत्तरकालयोः तस्य विशेषाभावेऽपि, किमिति पूर्वस्मिन्नेव काल उत्तरकालभाविनीमपि न कुर्यात्? नापि यौगपद्येन; यावज्जीवकृत्यमेकस्मिन्नेव क्षणे कृतमित्युत्तरकाले तद्विरहादसल्लक्षणत्वप्राप्तेः।

How incompatible (it may be asked)? Incompatibility comes about this wise – while producing it (artha-kriyā) does it (one may question) produce it successively or simultaneously? Not however successively; seeing that it (the permanent object) undergoes no change, i.e., remains the same in the future as it was in the past (the question will naturally arise) why should it not bring into effect at the preceding time that also which it is going to effect in the succeeding time? Nor even simultaneously; for having effected in a single moment only, what has to be done during a whole life-time, it (the so-called permanent object) acquires the character of non-being owing to its absence (i.e., of the causal power) the next moment.

अतोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वादेव न स्थायी। तेन प्रतिक्षणं भिन्नेष्वहमुल्लेखेषु तद्बुद्धिः सादृश्यनिबन्धनेति,

Hence permanency is ruled out from the very fact of causal efficiency. It is evident therefore that the apprehension of permanency (permanence implying the identity of ego-notions) is due to similarity.

1.128 ✅

उच्यते – अथ केयमर्थक्रिया? यदभावादसल्लक्षणत्वप्राप्तिः।

1.128. Siddhāntin. – Well, this has to be urged: – which is this causal efficiency (artha-kriyā) in the absence of which (you say) a thing acquires the character of non-being?

स्वविषयज्ञानजननम्?

Pūrvapakṣin. – (Causal efficiency means the capacity of) originating the cognition of its object (in the same series, in the cognition series of another person, or in that of Īśvara, c.f. VPS., p. 79).

प्राप्तं तर्हि सर्वासामेव संविदां स्वसंविदितरूपत्वेन स्वविषयज्ञानाजननादसल्लक्षणत्वम्। न सन्तानान्तरेऽपि तज्जननम्; अनैन्द्रियकत्वात्, अनुमानेऽपि अर्थजन्यत्वाभावात्।

Siddhāntin. – It follows then that all cognitions (without exception) will acquire the character of non-being since they are all by nature self-revealed and as such they need no other cognition to reveal them. Nor even in a different series have they the capacity of such revelation, because of its (i.e., another’s cognition series) not being apprehended by the senses. And in the case of inference also (it should not be forgotten that) it is not generated by what is real. (In perception reality can be the cause but not in inference where only universals which are mental constructs form the content. See Nyāyabindu Ṭikā by Dharmottara, p. 16).

सार्वज्ञ्येऽपि न साक्षात् स्वसंविदं जनयति; संसारसंविदेकरूपत्वप्रसङ्गात्, अतद्रूपत्वे तद्विषयत्वायोगात्॥

Even as regards the knowledge possessed by the All-knowing (Īśvara) it cannot be held (that the cognition of the jīva – individual soul) produces Īśvara’s own knowledge directly as non-different from it with all its affections). For then it (the knowledge of the All-knowing) would become identical in nature with that of the jīvas (struggling) in the world. In case its nature is not that, it ceases to be its object (i.e., if the cognition of Īśvara is not non-different from the contaminated individual cognitions, the latter cannot serve as the object of the former).

अथ क्षणान्तरोत्पादोऽर्थक्रिया?

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, we maintain that causal efficiency means the giving rise to the (next) momentary state (the reference here is to the realm of being).

चरमक्षणस्यासल्लक्षणत्वप्रसङ्गः, न च सर्वज्ञज्ञानजननेनार्थवत्त्वम्; चरमत्वानुपपत्तेः मुक्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात्।

Siddhāntin. – The last moment (then) will acquire the character of non-being. And it cannot be argued that the cogency (of the definition of causal efficiency) is secured by the fact that the last moment gives rise to the cognition of the All-knowing. For then it cannot be held to be the last moment and as such it will come to this that there will be no release (mukti).

न च संवित्संविदो विषयः; संविदात्मना भेदाभावात् प्रदीपस्येव प्रदीपान्तरम्।

Again one cognition cannot serve as the object of another cognition for the reason that both are in essence cognition (nirākāra-jñāna – formless cognition) and as such are not different from one another, just as one light cannot be said to be the object (viṣaya) of another light.

किञ्च नार्थक्रियातः सत्त्वं भवति; स्वकारणनिष्पन्नस्य कार्यजननात्। अतः प्रतीतिः वक्तव्या। तत्र तस्या अन्यतः सत्त्वप्रतीतिः तस्या अप्यन्यतः इत्यनवस्थानात् न क्वचित् सत्तानवगमः, इति शून्यं जगदभविष्यत्।

Moreover its acquiring the status of being is not due to the fact of causal efficiency, because it gives rise to its effect having already come into being through the operation of its (specific) causes (such as in the case of pot, the potter, the wheel, the clay, etc.). Hence it can (only) be said (that casual efficiency) produces the cognition of the existence (of the cause; it does not make it real). Then the cognition of its existence (i.e., of the practical, efficiency – artha-kriyā) would depend upon something else (i.e. cognition of its own artha-kriyā), that again upon another ad infinitum, resulting in the cognition of nothing that is existent so that the world would become a mere blank.

ननु स्वज्ञानार्थक्रियायाः स्वयंसिद्धत्वात् न अनवस्था?

Pūrvapakṣin. – But there is no regress since the causal efficiency of the nature of jñāna resulting from itself (i.e., the first moment) is self-revealed (being of the nature of cognition).

न तर्ह्यर्थक्रियातः सत्तावगमः; न हि स्वरूपमेव स्वस्यार्थक्रिया॥

Siddhāntin: If so it is not from the causal efficiency that the cognition of its existence (i.e., of the precedent moment which is the hetu of the next moment) arises. And it cannot be that its own self is its causal efficiency.

1.129 ✅

यत् पुनः क्रमेणार्थक्रिया न युज्यते; पूर्वोत्तरकालयोः तस्य विशेषाभावादिति, नैष दोषः;

1.129. You have argued that causal efficiency (resulting in some action) does not take place in succession (as opposed to instantaneous origination), on the ground that in the preceding and succeeding moments (i.e., time past and time future) it (the karaṇa) remains the same without any special feature (viśeṣa). It is no defect.

स्थायिनोऽपि कारणस्य सहकारिसव्यपेक्षस्य जनकत्वात् विशेषाभावादित्ययुक्तम्।

Even a permanent karaṇa can effectuate (causal efficiency in succession) since it desiderates the auxiliaries and as such it is wrong to say that the causal entity has no additions (viśeṣa) but remains the same.

अथ कारणस्यान्यापेक्षा न युक्ता, अकारणस्यापि नतरामित्यसहकारि विश्वं स्यात्। अथाकारणं कारणोत्पत्तयेऽपेक्षत इति चेत्, अथ तत् कारणस्य कारणम्? अकारणं वा?

If it be argued that to speak of the need for an auxiliary is improper in the case of karaṇa (i.e., an entity which has the capacity to produce an effect), more so is it in the case of akāraṇa (i.e., of an entity which through lack of capacity is impotent to be a cause). And it follows therefore that the world will exhibit no instance of any co-operation whatsoever. If again it be argued that what is not in itself the cause (akāraṇa) is in need of auxiliaries in the production of what really constitutes the cause (viz., the aggregate – sāmagrī of, say, the sprout) then the question will be whether that (viz., the inefficient seed) is the cause or not the cause (of the karaṇa – the sāmagrī which produces the sprout).

कारणं चेत्, नापेक्षितुमर्हति। अकारणं चेत् नतराम्। अथ नापेक्षा हेतूनां सहकारिणीति ब्रूयात्, दर्शनेन बाध्येत;

In case it is the cause (i.e., potent in producing the aggregate) it is in no need (of auxiliaries). If it is not the cause (akāraṇa) by no means (is there a need for auxiliaries). If it be averred that in regard to the auxiliaries (sahakāri) the causes (in general) are in no need of them, that statement would stand condemned by the testimony of experience (darśana).

दृष्टं हि सहकार्यपेक्षत्वं हेतूनाम्। तस्मात् यथैव हेतोः हेतुत्वं सति कार्ये केनाप्यतर्कणीयेन क्रमेण ज्ञायते; सत्येव हेतौ कार्यस्य दर्शनात्, तथा समेतसहकारिण्येव दर्शनात् सहकार्यपेक्षस्य तद्विज्ञेयम्॥

It is indeed perceived that causes do require auxiliaries. Hence when the effect is present the causal capacity of the cause is – no matter how – apprehended, because it is a matter of experience that only when cause is given, the effect is seen; even so is the effect perceived as resulting from the cause in association with the auxiliaries; as such the hetutva (tat) in the hetu along with the auxiliaries has to be admitted.

1.130 ✅

यस्तु मन्यते – सहकारिजनितविशेषो हेतुः कार्यं जनयति; अन्यथाऽनुपकारिणोऽपेक्षायोगादिति; स वक्तव्यः – विशेषस्य स हेतुरहेतुर्वा?

1.130. One who thinks that the cause constituted by viśeṣa (additament or supplementation) produced by the auxiliaries brings the effect (kārya) into being since otherwise it would be relating what can render no help (viz., the auxiliary) to (the effect) which does not need it, he should be questioned whether that (i.e. the main or basal entity) is the cause or not (of the viśeṣa or additament).

अहेतुश्चेत्, विशेषोत्पत्तौ नापेक्ष्येत; तत्र केवला एव सहकारिणो विशेषमुत्पादयेयुः, ततश्च कार्यं स्यात्। अथ हेतुः? सहकारिभिरजनितविशेषस्तमेव कथं कुर्यात्? विशेषस्य वा जनने अनवस्था।

If it (the basal entity) is not the cause in the production of the viśeṣa then it would not be needed. What follows then is that the auxiliaries alone would originate the viśeṣa (since the seed remains inert) and from the latter the kārya would result (but this is absurd). If on the other hand it (viz., the bare seed) does serve as a hetu, (the question is) how could it produce that (very) viśeṣa when (another) viśeṣa is not generated in it (seed) by the auxiliaries? If (the basal entity together with the viśeṣa is) regarded as producing the viśeṣa there would be infinite regress.

1.131 ✅

अथ मतं – न सर्वं कार्यं सहकारिजनितात्मभेदहेतुजन्यम्, समग्रेषु हेतुषु तावत्येवाभवदङ्कुरादि; तथा किञ्चित्सन्निहितसहकारिहेतुजन्यं, यथा अक्षेपकारीन्द्रियादिज्ञानम्; तत्र आद्यो विशेषः सहकारिसन्निधानमात्रलभ्यः; अक्षेपकारीन्द्रियादिज्ञानवदिति नानवस्था?

1.131. Pūrvapakṣin. – We maintain this view: not that every effect is the product of an entity in which the additament is wrought by the auxiliaries; when there is the full complement of causes and yet there is no effect as in the case of the sprout, etc., it is so (i.e., it requires the production of a viśeṣa – puffing up – of the seed). In some (other instances) the effect is produced by the cause constituted by the auxiliaries when the cause and the auxiliary are together present as witness the sensory cognition which brooks no delay. Such being the case, (tatra), the first viśeṣa (viz., ucchūmnatā or turgescence) results from the mere proximity of the auxiliaries like the sensory cognition which brooks no delay – as such there is no infinite regress.

अनुपकुर्वन्नपि तर्हि सहकारी अपेक्ष्येत। न हि तत्र हेतोः सहकारिभ्य आत्मभेदः।

Siddhāntin: Then it comes to this that the auxiliary though it renders no aid to the basal cause is desired by it (but this is self-stultifying). In the production of protuberance (tatra) there is indeed no self-transformation (i.e., no atiśaya) in the basal cause (viz., the seed).

नानुपकुर्वन्नपेक्ष्यते; अतिप्रसङ्गात्। स्वरूपे तु नोपकरोति, किन्तु कार्ये; तत्सिद्धेस्तन्नान्तरीयकत्वात्?

Pūrvapakṣin. – The (auxiliary) which renders no aid is not desired (by anyone) as otherwise it would lead to unwelcome results (i.e., anything might become auxiliary to anything). The auxiliary does no service to the seed as such, but is of service in the origination of the kārya, viz., the sprout, because it is indispensable for its effectuation, since it results immediately after.

नित्योपि तर्ह्यनाधेयातिशयो भावः कार्यसिद्धये क्षणिक इव सहकारिणमपेक्षत इति किं नाभ्युपेयते? यथैव क्षणिको भावः सहकारिसमवधाने एव कार्यं जनयति; सामग्रीसाध्यत्वात्, तथा नित्योऽपि स्वरूपानुपयोगित्वेऽपि सहकारिसमवधानं कार्योपयोगादपेक्षेत॥

Siddhāntin. – Then why is it not admitted that the entity (i.e., the basal seed) though permanent desiderates even when no viśeṣa is generated in it, the auxiliary for the effectuation of the kārya (the sprout) like the momentary seed? Just as the momentary entity produces the kārya at the very instant the subsidiaries are present because it (kārya) is contingent on the combination of the causes (such as earth, water, seed, air, etc.), even so the permanent entity also needs the compresence of the auxiliaries though they are of no service to itself (i.e., not producing any viśeṣa in it) since they are indispensable in (the origination of) the kārya.

1.132 ✅

अथ मतम् – क्षणिकोऽपि नैवापेक्षते, जन्यजनकस्य स्वयमन्यापेक्षानुपपत्तेः, कार्यं तु यदन्यसन्निधौ भवति तत्; तस्यान्यसन्निधावेव भावात् अन्यथा चाभावात्,

1.132. Pūrvapakṣin. – But this is our view: the momentary seed also does not require (the presence of the auxiliaries) for when it is itself competent to produce the other (viz., the sprout) there is no reason that it should require any external aid. The kārya (i.e., the sprout) however which comes into being only in the co-presence of something (does need the auxiliary) because its coming into being is effected only, in the co-presence of something other, and otherwise not effected.

नित्यस्य तु जनकस्य सर्वदा जननप्रसङ्गः। को हेतुरन्यापेक्षायाः? क्षणिकस्तु यो जनको भावः स न पुरस्तात्, न पश्चादिति न पूर्वोत्तरकालयोः कार्योत्पादः॥

But regarding the cause that is permanent, it is inevitable that it should always be effectuating (i.e., an enduring begetter must ever begetting). And which is the cause that brings about the desired (co-presence)? As for the entity which is momentary and originates (the next moment) it (exists) neither before nor after, so that the effect (kārya) does not come into being either in the preceding or the succeeding instant.

इदमयुक्तं वर्तते !
किमत्रायुक्तम्?

Siddhāntin. – This does not stand the test of reason.
Pūrvapakṣin. – What is it here that does not stand to reason? (We admit, say the Bauddhas, that kārya requires the proximity of the auxiliary, but not their cause-effect relation).

सति नियमेऽपि निरपेक्षत्वम्।

Siddhāntin. – The fault lies in this that while admitting the relation of positive and negative concomitance (niyama) you reject the cause-effect relation (nirapekṣatvam).

तथा हि – यः कश्चित् कस्यचित् क्वचिन्नियमः, स तदपेक्षाप्रभावितः; अनपेक्षत्वे नियमानुपपत्तेः।

To explain – if the relation of something with something else is one of positive-negative concomitance, that relation (it is evident) has arisen because of the cause-effect relation. If it were not so the niyama (viz., the positive-negative, anvaya-vyatireka-sambandha) would be unintelligible.

एवं हि कार्यकारणभावसिद्धिः। कार्यार्थिभिश्च विशिष्टानां हेतूनामुपादानम्। तत्र यदि न क्षणिकं कारणं सहकारिणमपेक्षते, नापि तत् कार्यम्, कथं नियमः?

It is indeed thus that the nature of cause-effect relation is determined and (it is further observed that) those who wish to bring about a desired result utilise the entire aggregate of causes. As such, if it is averred that since the momentary cause does not need the auxiliary and its effect also (is not in need of the auxiliary), how is the niyama (positive-negative concomitance) possible?

तथा हि – हेतुपरम्पराप्रतिबन्धात् न हेतुः स्वरूपे सहकारिणमपेक्षते, न कार्ये; स्वयञ्जननशक्तेः। नापि कार्यम्; एकस्यापि शक्तिमत्त्वेन प्रसह्यजननात् तत्र सहकारिसन्निधिनियमोऽनर्थकः स्यात्। काकतालीयमुच्यते?

To explain – since the causes follow in unremitting succession, one casual moment giving rise to another the subsidiary is not needed either for the origination of itself (in the succeeding moment) or for (producing) the kārya (say, sprout), since it has in itself the potency to originate (the kārya). Not even does the kārya (require the auxiliary) for the unaided (moment – the seed immediately preceding the sprout) only has the power of forcibly producing the effect and as such the principle that the auxiliary should be in close proximity (at the moment of the sprout coming into being) would be purposeless. It would be a matter of fortuitous coincidence (kāka-tālīyam).

तथा च कार्यकारणव्यवहाराः सर्व एवोत्सीदेयुः। तस्मात् क्षणिकस्यापि भावस्य स्वयं जनकस्य स्वरूपानुपयोगिन्यपि सहकारिणि कार्यसिद्धये अपेक्षा वाच्या; कार्यस्यैव वा सामग्रीसाध्यत्वात्, तत्र नियमात्; तथा नित्येऽपीति न विशेषं पश्यामः॥

If that be so (i.e., if the auxiliary is something unlooked for) there would be an end to all dealings based on cause-effect relation. Hence (i.e., seeing that your doctrine is liable to such grave objections) it has to be said that though the momentary causal entity which, of its own accord, produces (the kārya) is in no need of the auxiliaries for producing itself (sva-svarūpa) it requires them for effectuating the kārya (say, sprout). Or (it has to be admitted that) the kārya (directly) requires them since it is brought about by the aggregate. That the aggregate constitutes the cause is evident from the invariable concomitance of the aggregate of the causes and the effect. Similar is the case with even a permanent causal entity so that we perceive no difference.

1.133 ✅

तदेवमहङ्कर्तुः सदा एकरूपावगमात् स्थायित्वेऽप्यर्थक्रियासम्भवात् न नीलस्य स्वगतापरोक्षत्वमात्रेण माहायानिकपक्षः समर्थ्यते, किन्तु ग्राहकस्याहङ्कर्तुरात्मनः स्थायिनोऽभावे। स चैकरूपः अनुभवात् युक्तिबलाच्च प्रसाधितः।

1.133. When this is so, since the ego-consciousness is perceived to ever retain a uniform nature and since it possesses causal efficiency, though it is permanent the Māhāyānika-doctrine ought not to be supposed to be held (by the Vedāntin) merely on the ground (that he admits the relation) of identity between the blue and vijñāna or cognition. It would, however, (amount to his siding with the Māhāyānika vijñānavādin) if a permanent self which is the cogniser and which is manifest in ego-consciousness is not taken to exist. And the existence of such ātman (aham-kartā) which is the (unchanging) one has been proved on the strength of both experience (viz., of recognition) and reason.

1.134 ✅

ननु नानुमेयादिष्वपरोक्षता दृश्यते?

1.134. Pūrvapakṣin: The object of inferential cognition, etc., is not apprehended as directly perceptive (which it ought to be in your view).

उच्यते – नानुमेयादिष्वपरोक्षत्वम्; स्वज्ञानोत्पत्तावव्यापृतत्वात्, लिङ्गादीनामेव कुतश्चित् सम्बन्धविशेषाद्विशिष्टैकार्थज्ञानहेतुत्वात्,

Siddhāntin. – This is the answer: As regards the object of inference, etc., there is no immediate presentation (i.e., the object of inference is not perceptive) because in the origination of its own cognition there is no activity (on the part of that which is the object of inference), and because with whatsoever object the probans is in (concomitant) relation that particular object only manifests itself in inferential cognition.

प्रमेयस्य च स्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे प्रमाणाभावात्।

That the object of valid cognition (in general) is the hetu in the origination of its cognition is unsupported by any pramāṇa.

अलं प्रसङ्गागतप्रपञ्चेन। स्वावसर एवैतत् सुगतमतपरीक्षायां निपुणतरं प्रपञ्चयिष्यामः॥

Let there be no further elaboration of this incidental topic; in its proper context when examining the Buddhistic doctrine, we shall enlarge it with greater precision.

1.135 ✅

तदेवमहङ्कारग्रन्थिरस्मच्छब्दसंशब्दितः। प्रत्ययश्चासौ; आदर्श इव प्रतिबिम्बस्य अनिदञ्चित्सम्वलितत्वेन तस्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुत्वात्।

1.135. (In what follows the Bhāṣya text – asmat-pratyayaviṣayatvāt – is commented upon). The contexture of ego (ahaṅkāra-granthi) is termed ‘aham’ as well as ‘pratyaya’ since like a mirror which reflecting the image becomes the cause (hetu) of the cognition of the image, the ‘ahaṅkāra’ because it contains the consciousness element, manifests (i.e., becomes the hetu of the cognition of) the cit (consciousness).

अतः तस्य विषयवत् भवतीत्युपचारेण अनिदञ्चिदात्मधातुरस्मत्प्रत्ययविषय उच्यते।

Hence, because it assumes as it were the nature of object (viṣayatvāt), the entity which is not the ‘this’ which is consciousness, and which is (no other than) ‘ātman-entity’ is by courtesy described as the object of ‘asmat-pratyaya’ (ahaṅkāra-granthi).

स पुनरेवंभूतो जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोरहमुल्लेखरूपेण, सुषुप्ते तत्संस्काररञ्जिताग्रहणाविद्याप्रतिबद्धप्रकाशत्वेन च गतागतमाचरन् संसारी, जीवः विज्ञानघनः, विज्ञानात्मा, प्राज्ञः, शरीरी, शारीरः, आत्मा, सम्प्रसादः, पुरुषः, प्रत्यगात्मा, कर्ता, भोक्ता, क्षेत्रज्ञः इति च श्रुतिस्मृतिप्रवादेषु गीयते।

And that (ātman) – of the nature of the ‘not this’ conditioned as ego in the waking and dream states, and conditioned in deep slumber by avidyā which has within it traces of the impressions (that the inner sense has left behind), which is the opposite of jñāna and which obstructs the light (of ātman) – keeps going forwards and backwards and as such is termed in Śruti, Smṛti and in common parlance as saṃsārī, jīva, vijñāna-ghana, vijñānātmā, prājñā, śarirī, śārīraḥ, ātmā, samprasādaḥ, puruṣa, pratyag-ātmā, kartā, bhoktā and kṣetrajña.

1.136 ✅

किञ्च न केवलमस्मत्प्रत्ययविषयत्वादध्यासार्हः - अपरोक्षत्वाच्च। [BrS.1. L.14]

1.136. Moreover, it is not that ātman becomes fit for superimposition only because it is the viṣaya of ‘asmat-pratyaya’. It is so because of the nature of immediate direct presentation.

तत्साधनार्थमाह – प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेरिति॥ न ह्यात्मन्यप्रसिद्धे स्वपरसंवेद्ययोः विशेषः।

To substantiate that (ātman is of immediate cognition) the Bhāṣyakāra says, ‘because pratyag-ātmā is self-proven’ (for no one denies the self). If ātman remains an unknown entity there would be no distinction between what is cognised by oneself and what is cognised by another.

न च संवेद्यज्ञानेनैव तत्सिद्धिः; अकर्मकारकत्वादतिप्रसङ्गात्।

Prābhākara view criticised: Ātman’s existence is not substantiated by the cognition of an object only (lit. what is cognised, like jar, cow, etc.) because it (ātman) is not in the objective relation (to that cognition) and because it leads to unwarrantable conclusions.

न च ज्ञानान्तरेण; भिन्नकालत्वे संवेद्यसम्बन्धानवगमात्, स्वपरसंवेद्याविशेषात्।

Bhāṭṭa view criticised: Nor (can ātman be established) by (its being regarded as the object of) a cognition which is distinct from it (say, cognition of pot). If that (cognition should arise) at a time distinct from that of the cognition of ātman then there could be nothing to distinguish one’s object of cognition from that of another owing to the non-cognition of the relation of the object of cognition (and ātman).

न ह्येककालं विरुद्धविषयद्वयग्राहिज्ञानद्वयोत्पादः। न हि देवदत्तस्याग्रपृष्ठदेशस्थितार्थव्यापिगमनक्रियाद्वयावेशो युगपत् दृश्यते।

Nor can it be maintained that (the cognition of the object is simultaneous with the cognition of (ātman) since the two cognitions relating to (two) opposed objects (viz., ātman and viṣaya) arise simultaneously. It is not perceived that Devadatta has established simultaneously a double contact, one with an object that is in front of him by moving forwards and another that is behind him, by moving backwards.

आह – मा भूत् चलनात्मकं क्रियाद्वयं युगपत्, परिणामात्मकं तु भवत्येव;

Bhāṭṭa Defence. – Let not two acts of the nature of movement take place simultaneously, but what is of the nature of transformation certainly takes place (i.e., a thing – here ātman – can undergo a double transformation at the same time).

मैवं; परिस्पन्दात्मकमपि भवत्यविरुद्धम्, यथा गायन् गच्छतीति, परिणात्मकमपि न भवति विरुद्धं, यथा यौवनस्थाविरहेतुः।

Siddhāntin. – No, it is not so; even what is of the nature of movement can take place without self-contradiction (i.e., there may be two simultaneous movements), as in the case of a person who walks while singing. (Per contra) what is of the nature of transformation cannot take place (i.e., a double transformation of a single object simultaneously) without self-contradiction, as the transformation due to youth and that due to old age cannot occur simultaneously (in the body).

तस्मात् प्रत्यगात्मा स्वयम्प्रसिद्धः सर्वस्य हानोपादानावधिः स्वयमहेयोऽनुपादेयः स्वमहिम्नैवापरोक्षत्वादध्यासयोग्यः॥

Hence the pure consciousness – ātman, is self-established, is the final limit (avadhi) of all our aversions and covetings (hānopādana), itself is not an object, fit neither for abandonment nor for possession and because it is self-luminous (and so always immediately present) is fit to be the substratum of illusory knowledge.

1.137 ✅

ननु न क्वचिदपरोक्षमात्रेऽध्यासो दृष्टपूर्वः, सर्वत्राक्षिसम्प्रयोगितया पुरोवस्थितापरोक्ष एव दृश्यते,

1.137. Pūrvapakṣin: Well, superimposition on the mere basis of immediate presentation has been nowhere observed hitherto; everywhere it is seen that illusory knowledge arises only when the eye comes into contact with a presented object.

[BrS.1. L.15]

इत्याशङ्क्याह – न चायमस्ति नियमः इति॥

Siddhāntin. – Having premised this objection (the Bhāṣyakāra) says – [“There is no such rule”].

[BrS.1. L.16]

अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे इति परोक्षे इत्यर्थः; अथवा – अक्षव्यापारमन्तरेणाप्यपरोक्ष आकाशे। बालाः अयथार्थदर्शिनः। तलम् इन्द्रनीलतमालपत्रसदृशम्, मलिनतां च धूमादिकमन्यच्च नीलोत्पलसमानवर्णतादि अध्यस्यन्ति।

[“In ākāśa (ether) though it is not an object of perception, etc.,”] which (latter statement) means that it (ākāśa) is parokṣa – not perceived (by the eye); or bālaḥ – men who cannot discern the truth, superimpose ‘talam’ – colour resembling that of sapphire and ‘tamāla’-leaf and also ‘malinatā,’ (i.e. smoke, etc.), or something else similar to the colour of blue lotus, etc., on ākāśa which is perceptive though not through the activity of the visual sense; (ākāśa is perceived by the śākṣin).

[BrS.1. L.17]

एवमविरुद्धः इति सम्भावनां निगमयति। यथा आकाशस्याक्षव्यापारमन्तराप्यपरोक्षता, तथा दर्शयिष्यामः॥

[“So there is no discrepancy (in the superimposition of the insentient on the pure consciousness (cf., Bhāṣya, p. 39)”], – in these words the Bhāṣyakāra concludes (the section on) probability (i.e., of ātman’s being the substratum of illusory knowledge which the opponent had denied). How ākāśa though not in contact with the sense of sight is perceptive, we will show (in the sequel).

1.138 ✅

ननु ब्रह्मविद्यामनर्थहेतुनिबर्हणीं प्रतिजानता अविद्या अनर्थहेतुः सूचिता, ततः सैव कर्तृत्वाद्यनर्थबीजमुपदर्शनीया, किमिदमध्यासः प्रपञ्च्यते?

1.138. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, is not avidyā suggested (by Vyāsa) as the cause of the endless afflictions of mankind since he has set out with the proposition that the knowledge of Brahman is the destroyer of the cause of the miseries? Hence the nature of that alone (i.e.,avidyā) which is the root cause of the ills of life in the shape of agency (activity, enjoyment, etc.), has to be expounded. Then why is the nature of superimposition described at length (by the Bhāṣyakāra)?

[BrS.1. L.18]

इत्याशङ्क्य आह – तमेतमेवंलक्षणमध्यासं पण्डिताः प्रमाणकुशलाः ‘अविद्ये’ति मन्यन्ते।

Siddhāntin. – Presuming this objection the commentator gives the answer in the following words – this very superimposition (adhyāsa) which is defined in the manner above, the pandits – those who are skilled in appraising the means of knowledge – understand to mean avidyā.

1.139 ✅

तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः॥ अध्यस्तातद्रूपसर्पविलयनं कुर्वत् वस्तुस्वरूपं रज्जुरेवेत्यवधारयत् विज्ञानं विद्येति प्रसिद्धमेव लोके ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति।

1.139. They also give the name vidyā to the ascertainment of the essence of reality by its being differentiated from avidyā. The knowers of Brahman amongst mankind (loke) term as vidyā, the discriminating knowledge which effects the dispelling of the superimposed and false serpent (lit. serpent which is of the nature of the not-that, viz., the rope), and which thereby brings home the fact that the object in its real nature is no other than the rope only, a fact borne out by common experience.

1.140 ✅

यद्येवं अध्यास इति प्रक्रम्य पुनस्तस्याविद्याभिधानव्याख्याने यत्नगौरवात् वरमविद्येत्येवोपक्रमः कृतः?

1.140. Pūrvapakṣin. – If it is so, after having begun with super-imposition, to have again commented on its appellation of avidyā is unnecessary effort and as such it would have been better if (the Bhāṣya) had started with avidyā.

नैतत् सारम्; अविद्येत्येवोच्यमान आच्छादकत्वं नाम यत् तस्यास्तत्त्वं, तदेवाभिहितं स्यात्, न अतद्रूपावभासितया अनर्थहेतुत्वम्।

Siddhāntin. – This is not a sound objection. If the (Ācārya) had begun with (the exposition of) (avidyā) only, its feature as an enveloping entity (āvaraṇa) alone would have been denoted and not its causal potency to produce the ills of life by projecting something other than the real object.

अतोऽतद्रूपावभासित्वमध्यासशब्देन प्रकृतोपयोगितया उपक्षिप्य पुनस्तयाविद्याशब्दतया विद्यामात्रापनोदनार्हत्वं दर्शनीयम्।

Hence the necessity of first characterising its potency to distort reality (lit. to make things appear different from what they are) as adhyāsa, since that aspect of it viz., vikṣepa is pertinent to the context. Again by terming it avidyā, its fitness for sublation by vidyā alone, has to be rendered explicit.

[BrS.1. L.19]

तदेतदाह – यत्र यदध्यासः, तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न सम्बध्यते इत्यवास्तवमनर्थं दर्शयति। वास्तवत्वे हि ‘ज्ञानमात्रात् तद्विगमः’ इति प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत॥

That being so, (i.e., since superimposition is dispelled by knowledge) the Bhāṣyakāra says (‘where something is superimposed on something else, not even to a tittle is the entity (on which something is superimposed) affected by either the bad or the good effects accruing from it (adhyāsa). Thus the Bhāṣyakāra shows the unreality of anartha (enjoyership, etc.). If they were real (the Sūtrakāra’s) asseveration (pratijñā) that its sublation results only from jñāna would become void.

1.141 ✅

एवं तावत् ‘युष्मदस्मदि’त्यादिना ‘मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्याहमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः’ इत्यन्तेन भाष्येण सिद्धवदुपन्यस्तमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतरविषयमविद्याख्यमध्यासं सिषाधयिषुः,

1.141. Thus up to this point the bhāṣya commencing from ‘the notions of non-ego and ego, etc.,’ and ending with ‘due to erroneous knowledge, not differentiating truth from error men carry on their empirical activities from eternity’ has discoursed on superimposition, called avidyā which consists in the mutual confounding of ātman and non-ātman, as if it were validated (by pramāṇa).

तस्य लक्षणमभिधाय तत्सम्भवं चात्मनि दर्शयित्वा पुनस्तत्र सद्भावनिश्चयमुपपत्तित उपपादयितुमिच्छन्नाह –

And desirous of (establishing its existence) the commentator having given its definition and having shown the possibility (prima facie) of its occurrence in ātman and again desirous of determining its existence (i.e., of superimposition) on the basis of sound logic, says:

[BrS.1. L.20]

तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्चप्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणीति॥

[“And this erroneous mutual transference of ātman and non-ātman, otherwise termed avidyā is presupposed in all activities – secular and sacerdotal based on the distinction between the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge as also in all the Scriptural statements whether injunctive or prohibitive or relative to liberation”].

मोक्षपरत्वं च शास्त्रस्य विधिप्रतिषेधविरहिततया उपादानपरित्यागशून्यत्वात् स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठत्वमङ्गीकृत्य पृथक् क्रियते।

The liberation texts of the śāstra demarcate it (i.e., the topic of mokṣa) from the ritualistic section having admitted that their function is only to expound the real nature of ātman, since there is no occasion here for either injunction or prohibition and since consequently it is irrelevant to speak of possessing or eschewing (hānopādāna).

[BrS.1. L.21]

1.142 ✅

कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति॥

1.142. Pūrvapakṣin. – [“But how could it be maintained that perception and other means of valid cognition as also the Scriptures have in view one who is under the spell of nescience“?]

बाढमुक्तलक्षणा अविद्या प्रत्यग्दृश्यपि सम्भवेत्, न एतावता तत्सम्भवः सिध्यति। तेन निदर्शनीयः सः।

Well, we admit that avidyā as defined (above, viz., that it is the manifestation elsewhere of what was seen before) may have the pure ātman as its locus. By this alone its (avidyā) actual existence is not really established.

प्रमातारमाश्रयन्ति प्रमाणानि, तेन प्रमाता प्रमाणानामाश्रयः, नाविद्यावान्; अनुपयोगादित्यभिप्रायः।

Hence its existence has to be substantiated (by cogent reasons). The pramāṇas are dependent on the knowing subject (pramātā); hence the knowing subject is the locus (āśraya) of the pramāṇas (i.e., he is the ground of the means of right knowledge), and not the one who is under illusion – which means that avidyā has no place here.

अथवा – कथमविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि शास्त्राणि च प्रमाणानीति सम्बन्धः। अविद्यावद्विषयत्वे सति आश्रयदोषानुगमादप्रमाणान्येव स्युरित्याक्षेपः॥

Or, the sentence (katham punaḥ, etc.) may be construed thus: – How can perception, etc., and also the Scriptures be the valid means of knowledge when they relate to one who is deluded (bhrānta)? If they have their seat in one who is a bhrānta (i.e., if they have a deluded person as their āśraya), they cease to be pramāṇas being vitiated by their contact with the defects inherent in such a person – this is the adverse criticism.

[BrS.1. L.22]

1.143 ✅

उच्यते – देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानहीनस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरिति भाष्यकारस्य वस्तुसङ्ग्रहवाक्यम्॥

1.143. Siddhāntin. – [“This will be answered. For one who is free from the erroneous notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ in the body and the senses, the idea of ‘a knower’ is inappropriate and as such the operation of pramāṇas is unintelligible”] – so far it is the Bhāṣyakāra’s succinct statement.

[BrS.1. L.23]

अस्यैव प्रपञ्चः – ‘नहीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाये’त्यादिः। न हि देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहं ममाभिमानहीनस्य सुषुप्तस्य प्रमातृत्वं दृश्यते।

The same is elaborated in, [without employing the senses] (there can be no talk of perception, etc.). The capacity to know is not perceived in one who is in deep slumber since in that state one is free from the erroneous notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ in the body and the senses, (so that in the absence of superimposition the triad of vyavahāras – pramāṇa, prameya, pramātā, is impossible).

यतो देहे अहमभिमानः इन्द्रियादिषु ममाभिमानः।

Because, the illusory ascription of the ego is to the body, the notion of ‘mine’ is to the senses;

आदिशब्देन बाह्वाद्यवयवग्रहणम्। देहशब्देन सशिरस्को मनुष्यत्वादिजातिसम्भिन्नोऽवयव्यभिमतः, न शरीरमात्रम्; देहोऽहमिति प्रतीत्यभावात्।

from the word ādi (and so on), the bodily organs, such as the arm, etc., have to be taken. The term ‘body’ (deha) has to be understood as pointing to the whole (avayavī) possessing, the head, etc., and distinguished by the generic concept of ‘man’ etc., and not merely to the physical body; for it is evident that the usage does not take the form ‘I am the body’ (but rather ‘I am man’).

सर्वो हि ‘मनुष्योऽहम्’ ‘देवोऽहमि’ति जातिविशेषैकाधिकरणचैतन्य एव प्रवर्तत इति स्वसाक्षिकमेतत्।

Activity of every kind presumes that the conscious principle (caitanya) has a locus (identical with that of) a particular genus, as exemplified in the usage, “I, who am a man, know”, “I, who am a deity, know”, and that this is a matter of immediate, intuitive experience is self-evident.

न स्वत्वेन सम्बन्धिना मनुष्यावयविना तदनुस्यूतेन वा चक्षुरादिना प्रमात्रादिव्यवहारः सिध्यति; भृत्यादिमनुष्यावयविनापि प्रसङ्गात्॥

It cannot be (maintained) that any empirical activity (as evidenced by the employment of expressions) like the knower, (knowing and what is known), is possible on the basis of the relation of overlordship either by the bodily configuration or by the eye, etc., organically connected therewith, based on the relation of possession; for then such activity would be possible even through the servant, etc., possessing a human body.

1.144 ✅

अपर आह – आत्मेच्छानुविधायित्वं कार्यकरणसङ्घातस्यात्मना सम्बन्धः, तस्यापि तस्य यथेष्टविनियोजकत्वं तेन सम्बन्धः, तत आत्मनः प्रमात्रादिकः सर्वः क्रियाकारकफलव्यवहारः।

1.144. Some one else says: – The relation of the body (lit. the aggregate of the bodily organs and the senses) with the self is one of (subordination) being directed by one’s will, and the relation of the self again with the body is one of (controller), directing the body at its own will. From that (takes place) every activity of the self as the knowing subject, etc., involving action, means of action and the result (phala).

तथा च उत्तिष्ठामीति इच्छयोत्तिष्ठत्युपविशति च। न च भृत्यादिषु तदस्ति।

For example, with the desire to stand one stands up; and also with the desire to sit one sits down. But there is no such thing (i.e., this kind of relation – that of controller and controlled) in the case of servants, etc.

तेन तत्र प्रमात्रादिव्यवहाराभावो न मिथ्यामुख्याभिमानाभावादिति।

Hence the absence of vyavahāra there – involving the knowing subject, etc., – is not wrong, because there is no direct dependence of action upon the will.

1.145 ✅

नैतत् संविदि बहुमानवतो युक्तम्। तथाहि –

1.145. Siddhāntin. – What you say is not convincing to one who sets any value by experience; to explain –

‘मनुष्योऽहमि’ति स्वसाक्षिका संवित्, ‘न मे मनुष्यः’ इति गौणीति चेत्, भवानेवात्र प्रमाणम्।

it is self-evident that our experience takes the form ‘I am man’ and not ‘my man’. If you argue that this is only a figurative use, all that can be said is your honour alone (i.e., your bare assertion only) is the pramāṇa here.

अपि च इच्छापि परिणामविशेषः, स कथमपरिणामिन आत्मनः स्यात् परिणाम्यन्तःकरणसम्वलिताहङ्कर्तृत्वमन्तरेण।

Moreover even desire is a specific modal change (of the inner sense) and how can that (desire) be of ātman which is changeless (lit. not subject to any transformation) unless it be through the ego which is ātman as (erroneously) related to the transformed inner sense?

तथा चानुभवः ‘अहमुत्तिष्ठामी’ति; इच्छयोत्तिष्ठत्युपविशति च। तस्मात् यत्किञ्चिदेतत्।

Hence the experience ‘I will stand’ which implies that it is by one’s desire that one stands up as well as sits down. As such no value attaches to that (viz., the attempt to explain vyavahāra by relations other than the identity-in-difference – tādātmya).

1.146 ✅

अतः स्वयमसङ्गस्याविकारिणोऽविद्याध्यासमन्तरेण न प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते।

1.146. Therefore the knowership (pramātṛtva) cannot be predicated of the entity (viz., ātman) which is in itself relationless and changeless except (on the basis of) erroneous superimposition.

तेन यद्यपि प्रमातृत्वशक्तिसन्मात्रं प्रमाणप्रवृत्तौ निमित्तम्, तदेव तु अविद्याध्यासविलसितमित्यविद्यावद्विषयता प्रमाणानामुच्यते।

Hence (i.e., since the knowership is not intelligible without superimposition) though pramāṇa (means of valid cognition) in its application desiderates one who has the capacity of functioning as the knower, yet that (knowership) itself is an offshoot of avidyā; as such it is stated that all pramāṇas presume one who is under the spell of avidyā; (Cp. ‘Tasmād avidyāvadviṣayaṇyeva pratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāni, ca’).

तथा निरपेक्षाणां स्वसामर्थ्येनार्थसिद्धिं विदधतां बाधानुपलब्धेः प्रामाण्यम् अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं च विधिमुखोपदर्शितं ‘न ने’ति शक्यमपह्नोतुम्।

(Just as the pramāṇas presuppose a person who is under the sway of nescience) even so pramāṇas requiring as they do no other aid and revealing objects from their own self-potency possess validity since their negation is not perceived, and as such it is not possible to say ‘no’ and deny what has been demonstrated by primarily adducing perception (vidhi), i.e., that pramāṇas are (relatively, in the empirical realm) valid, and that they have as their viṣaya one who is under illusion.

दोषस्तु आगन्तुक एव मिथ्यात्वे हेतुः, न नैसर्गिकः; तथोपलब्धेः। न च सर्वसाधारणे नैसर्गिके दोषबुद्धिः।

It is only the adventitious defect that is the cause of invalidity in knowledge (jñāna) and not the defect that is beginningless (naisargika); even so is our experience. And there arises no idea of the existence of defect in what is universal and natural.

1.147 ✅

तथाहि – क्षुत्पिपासोपजनिते सन्तापे शश्वदनुवर्तमाने जाठराग्निकृतविकारे अन्नपाननिष्यन्दे वा न रोगबुद्धिर्जनस्य,

1.147. To illustrate (the above) – neither as regards the distress produced by hunger and thirst, nor as regards the digestion (lit. destruction) of food and drink brought about by the frequently recurring change effected by the gastric juice (jaṭharāgni – the digestive fire of the stomach) does any one conceive the idea of disease.

मुहूर्तमात्रपरिवर्तिनि मन्दे ज्वरे प्रतिश्याये वा अल्पकफप्रसूतावपि रोगबुद्धिः; अनैसर्गिकत्वात्। अनैसर्गिकं च दोषमभिप्रेत्योक्तं ‘यस्य च दुष्टं करणं यत्र च मिथ्येति प्रत्ययः स एवासमीचीनः प्रत्ययो नान्यः’ इति॥

(On the contrary) as regards even a mild fever returning for a brief period or cold caused by slight phlegm, there arises the idea of disease because of its adventitious occurrence (lit. non-natural). And it is with the notion that the defect pertains to the non-natural (has Śabara) said “Jñāna which is produced from defective sense-organs and where jñāna turns out to be false (the moment after it arises) – that alone is wrong knowledge and none other”. (T.D.)

[BrS.1. L.26]

1.148 ✅

इतश्चैतदेवं – पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्।

1.148. On account of this also that is so – [Those learned in the Śāstras] are on a par with the brute creation.

तथा च पश्वादयः प्रमातृत्वादिव्यवहारकाले प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यं भजमानाः कार्यकारणसङ्घात एवाहंमानं कुर्वन्तीति प्रसिद्धं लोके।

For example, it is indubitable knowledge that cattle, etc., at the time of exercising their judgment as knowing beings (pramātṛtva) assume an attitude either of purposeful activity or withdrawal or indifference, thereby indicating that they too illusorily conceive the aggregate of the body and the senses as identical with the self.

तदेकरूपयोगक्षेमा हि मनुष्या जन्मत एव पश्वादिभ्योऽधिकतरविवेकमतयः शास्त्राधेयसाम्परायिकमतिसामर्थ्या अपि;

In the matter of empirical activities (lit. yoga means acquisition, and kṣema, safeguarding what has been acquired) there is indeed similarity between their behaviour and that of men who are from their birth superior to them in intelligence and even of those who have acquired competency in the knowledge of the future world (derived) from a study of the Śāstras.

अतः तदेकरूपकार्यदर्शनात् कार्यकारणसङ्घातेऽप्यात्माभिमानः समानो युक्तः।

Hence, that is, since it is seen that the empirical behaviour (kārya) of even learned men is of the same character as theirs it is only right to conclude that the superimposition of the self on the aggregate of the body and the senses is similar.

1.149 ✅

ननु पश्वादीनामपि कार्यकारणसङ्घाते अहङ्कारानुबन्ध इति कुतोऽवसीयते? येन सिद्धवदभिधीयते,

1.149. Pūrvapakṣin: Will, on what grounds is it determined that in the case of cattle even, there is the superimposition of the self on the aggregate of the body and the senses, so that you speak of it as if it were already established?

उच्यते – प्रौढमतिभ्य एव प्रत्यक्षादिवृत्तकुशलैरात्मा व्युत्पाद्यते; अन्यथा तदनर्थकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। एवमेव प्रमाणविचारविरहं सर्वः सम्प्रतिपद्येत॥

Siddhāntin. – It is thus answered: – It is only to persons of superior intelligence that ātman is taught by those expert in the knowledge of the real nature of pramāṇas like perception, etc. Otherwise it would result in its (i.e., instruction) becoming purposeless; and likewise the whole world would understand what ātman is without inquiry into the means of valid knowledge.

1.150 ✅

ननु गोपालाङ्गनादयः प्रमाणविरहमेव वर्तमानदेहपातेऽपि स्थायिनं भोक्तारं मन्यमानाः तदर्थमाचरन्ति

1.150. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, cowherds, women and others ignorant of the knowledge of pramāṇas (like the Veda, etc.) understand that a permanent enjoyer survives the fall of the present body and perform (religious rites) for his sake.

न तदभिज्ञव्यवहारमात्रप्रमाणकत्वात्। तथा च ते पृष्टाः कः परलोकसम्बन्धीति? ‘न विद्मो विशेषतः, प्रसिद्धो लोके’ इति प्रतिब्रुवन्ति।

Siddhāntin. – No, the practical behaviour, (the vyavahāra of the common people), has for its pramāṇa only the vyavahāra of those who are cognizant of that (viz., that the soul is permanent and survives the body). Therefore it is that when asked who it is that (survives and) is related to the other world, they answer, “we do not know what it is in particular; it is, however, a well-understood belief in the world”.

तस्मात् युक्तमुक्तं, पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्धोऽविवेकपूर्वकः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः, तत्सामान्यदर्शनात् व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समानः इति।

As such it is rightly said, [‘action based on perception, etc., of animals evidently presupposes non-distinction (between the self and the not-self, viz., the body). And because such resemblance (with the vyavahāra of animals) is observed, the vyavahāra in the nature of perception, etc., of even men of understanding so long as superimposition lasts, is of the same character only (i.e., originates in nescience)’].

1.151 ✅

एवं तावत् प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि चक्षुरादिसाधनानि। तानि च नाधिष्ठानशून्यानि व्याप्रियन्ते। अधिष्ठानं च देहः।

1.151. What has been said so far is this: – perception and other means of valid knowledge are established through the instrumentality of (the sense-organs like) the eye, etc., and they (i.e., the instruments) cannot operate without a basis (adhiṣṭhāna) and the body is the adhiṣṭhāna (i.e., the body on which ātman has been superimposed serves as the ground).

न तेनानध्यस्तात्मभावेनासङ्गस्याविकारिणः चैतन्यैकरसस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते,

And the cognitive function is ill-suited to the ātman-entity which is relationless, immutable and of the essence of pure intelligence, without its identification with the body, etc., through superimposition.

इत्यनुभवारूढमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं प्रत्यक्षादीनामुपदिश्य, पश्वादिव्यवहारसाम्येन कार्यतोऽप्यापाद्य,

In this way having pointed out that as a matter of experience, perception, etc., have as their āśraya (locus) one who is under the spell of nescience, and having explained the same on the basis of their kārya (procedure) also because of its similarity with the procedure of animals, (in other words kārya or vyavahāra of learned men being similar to that of animals is made the probans to infer that they also act under illusion),

शास्त्रं पुनः प्रतिपन्नात्मविषयमेव, तेन न तत्राध्यासपूर्विका प्रवृत्तिः इति विशेषमाशङ्क्य, तस्याप्यविद्यावद्विषयत्वप्रदर्शनायाह –

the Bhāṣyakāra premising (now) a specific doubt, viz., that the Śāstra on the contrary (i.e., action enjoined in the Scriptures) is intended only for one who is cognizant of ātman (as distinct from the body) and as such activity therein does not proceed from superimposition, shows that even in his case action presupposes avidyā, and says

[BrS.1. L.32]

शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसम्बन्धमधिक्रियते इति॥

[‘As regards activities enjoined by the Scriptures it is true no doubt that an intelligent man who undertakes them does so not without knowing (beforehand) that ātman (is distinct from the body and) is related to the other world’].

1.152 ✅

ननु फलनैयमिकनैमित्तिकप्रायश्चित्तचोदना वर्तमानशरीरपातादूर्ध्वकालस्थायिनं भोक्तारमन्तरेणापि प्रमाणतामश्नुवत एव।

1.152. Pūrvapakṣin: Well, the injunctions (Veda mandates) relating to interested action, obligatory action, occasional action and expiatory action do certainly possess validity without the presupposition of an enjoying agent who survives the collapse of the present body.

यथा चैतदेवं, तथा – ‘एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्’ (ब्र. सू. ३-३-५३) इत्यधिकरणारम्भे दर्शयिष्यामः,

We will point out how (it is argued that the Veda texts acquire validity without necessitating a disembodied ātman) when commenting on the section beginning with the Sūtra – “Some (maintain that) the self (is non-different from the body, because knowledge, etc., are manifest) when the body exists (and not when the body does not exist)” (BrSEng.3.3.53).

सत्यमेवम्; तथापि सकलशास्त्रपर्यालोचनापरिनिष्पन्नं प्रामाणिकमर्थमङ्गीकृत्याह भाष्यकारः।

Siddhāntin: This is true as you say (i.e., ātman as an entity distinct from the body is not established). But yet the Bhāṣyakāra has made this statement (viz., that ātman as related to Heaven exists apart from the body) admitting the reality of such an entity as vouched for by a consideration of all the Śāstras.

1.153 ✅

तथा च विधिवृत्तमीमांसाभाष्यकारोऽप्युत्सूत्रमेवात्मसिद्धौ पराक्रान्तवान्।

1.153. Even so the commentator (Śabara) in commenting on the sūtras (of Jaimini) purporting to explicate the Veda mandates has advanced ab extra a powerful defence for the existence of an independent ātman (though ātman is not established in the sūtras).

तत् कस्य हेतोः?

Pūrvapakṣin: On what ground (does he undertake to establish ātman)?

‘धर्मजिज्ञासे’ति कार्यार्थविचारं प्रतिज्ञाय तदवगमस्य प्रामाण्ये अनपेक्षत्वं कारणमनुसरता सूत्रकारेण विशेषाभावात् स्वरूपनिष्ठानामपि वाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमनुसृतं मन्यते,

Siddhāntin. – Having in the sūtra – ‘Inquiry into Dharma’ Jai. Sut., I. i, resolved to expound the nature of kārya and basing the validity of its (i.e., Dharma) knowledge on the non-requirement of any other pramāṇa, the Sūtrakāra (Jaimini), it is to be supposed, admits the validity of even those Veda statements which relate to self-existent objects because of the absence of any distinction.

तथा ‘चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमित्येवंजातीयकमर्थं शक्नोत्यवगमयितुम्’ इति वदन् चोदनाशेषत्वेनापि स्वरूपावगमेऽनपेक्षत्वमविशिष्टमवगच्छतीत्यवगम्यते।

Similarly having stated that codanā (the vidhi or mandatory statement) is indeed competent to convey the knowledge of the past, the present, the future, the supersensuous, the separated (in space), the distant (in time) and all other objects of this nature, (Śabara), it is seen (understands) that in the knowledge of existent entities even though as auxiliary to mandatory statements, the non-requirement (of pramāṇas other than śabda) is of equal application.

स च स्वरूपावगमः कस्मिन् कथं वेति धर्ममात्रविचारं प्रतिज्ञाय, तत्रैव प्रयतमानेन भगवता जैमिनिना न मीमांसितम्; उपयोगाभावात्,

And as to where or how the Veda texts relating to the cognition of the existent entity serve as a pramāṇa is not explained by the revered Jaimini since in accordance with his resolve he set about investigating into the nature of dharma only and since such knowledge (i.e., of ātman as distinguished from the body) is not to the purpose.

1.154 ✅

भगवांस्तु पुनर्बादरायणः पृथक् विचारं प्रतिज्ञाय व्यचीचरत् समन्वयलक्षणेन।

1.154. But the revered Bādarāyaṇa on the other hand having resolved to inquire into a different topic altogether, has expounded (the subject of the separate existence of ātman) in the ‘samanvayādhikaraṇa’ – (BrS.s1.1.4).

तत्र च देहान्तरोपभोग्यः स्वर्गः स्थास्यति। तच्च सर्वं कार्यकरणसङ्घातादन्येन भोक्त्रा विना न सिध्यति। तत्सिद्धिश्च न आगममात्रायत्ता;

And there svarga the bliss of which is to be enjoyed in a world other than ours is (as good as) proved to exist. And all that is pertinent to svarga can never become significant without an enjoyer different from the aggregate of the body and the senses (being premised). And its proof (i.e., ātma-siddhi) does not depend solely on the Scriptures.

प्रमाणान्तरगोचरस्य तदभावे तद्विरोधे वा शिलाप्लवनवाक्यवदप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्। अतस्तत्सिद्धौ पराक्रान्तवान्।

A statement relating to a thing which when fit for cognition by a different pramāṇa is unsupported by such pramāṇa or is contradicted by it would become as invalid as the statement that stones float. Hence (Bādarāyaṇa) has devoted his sole attention to the demonstrability of that (i.e., ātman as described in the Upaniṣad).

1.155 ✅

तेन सत्यं विनापि तेन सिध्येत् प्रामाण्यम्, अस्ति तु तत्।

1.155. It is true that validity would belong (to the injunctions relating to the performance of ritualistic duties) even without that (i.e., without the necessity of ātman as distinguished from the body being established). But that (validity) does exist (in regard to existent objects like svarga).

तस्मिन् विद्यमाने न तेन विना प्रमाण्यं सिध्यति फलादिचोदनानाम्

And when Veda passages relating to existent objects are valid, the Veda utterances relating to phala (i.e., the reward accruing from the performance of sacrifices) will have no validity without it (i.e., unless the self as distinct from the body is substantiated).

इति मत्वा आह – शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि विद्यमाने बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वात्मनः परलोकसम्बन्धमधिक्रियते इति॥ [BrS.1. L.32]

Knowing this the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) says, [“as regards the duties enjoined by the Scriptures on the person qualified, it is true no doubt that an intelligent man who undertakes them does so not without knowing beforehand that ātman is distinct from the body and is related to the other world”].

1.156 ✅

तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यमिति॥

1.156. [“And yet (a knowledge of the real nature of ātman) to be had from the Vedānta (is not required in the performance of karma).”]

किं तदिति?

Which is that ātman (i.e., of what essence is that ātman which is to be known from a study of the Vedānta)?

अत आह – असंसार्यात्मतत्वं, न तत् अधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते अनुपयोगादधिकारविरोधाच्च।

To this query he (Śaṅkara) says, [“the knowledge of the real nature of ātman as an entity free from transmigratory existence is not required in the performance of karma (adhikāra)= karmānuṣṭhāna – performance of sacrifices) because it serves no purpose and (not merely that), it is opposed to karma”].

अशनायाद्यतीतमित्यसंसार्यात्मतत्त्वं दर्शयति। अशनायाद्युपप्लुतो हि सर्वो जन्तुः स्वास्थ्यमलभमानः प्रवर्तते, तदपाये स्वास्थ्ये स्थितो न किञ्चिदुपादेयं हेयं वा पश्यति।

By (the phrase), “that which is free from longing for food, etc.”, he points out the negation of transmigratory existence. Indeed every creature that is afflicted by the gnawings of hunger finding no rest (i.e., not being free from love and hate) will be engaged in some kind of activity; when that (hunger) disappears, remaining in peace perceives nothing that is either to be acquired or rejected.

अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम् इति प्रपञ्चशून्यमेकरसं दर्शयति।

By (the phrase) “unassociated with all distinctions of Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, etc.,” he points out the total negation of the world and (the existence of) the one entire consciousness-entity of the nature of Bliss (rasa).

[BrS.1. L.33]

1.157 ✅

प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रमविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते इति॥

1.157. He further says, [“And prior to the rise of such knowledge (as described above), the Veda (i.e., the Scriptural injunction) in its application cannot step beyond, but must refer to one who is under the spell of avidyā”].

‘तत्त्वमसी’तिवाक्यार्थावगमादर्वागविद्याकृतं संसारमहमुल्लेखमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रं नाविद्यावद्विषयत्वमतिवर्तते।

(This means) that prior to the rise of the knowledge derived from the (Mahāvākya – the great pronouncement) – “That thou art”, the śāstra which proceeds (to instruct) on the presupposition of saṃsāra, (empirical life) the creation of avidyā, rendered manifest in the ego notion, does not step beyond the man who is deluded (i.e., it addresses itself only to one who is still in the realm of nescience).

तस्मात् युक्तमुक्तं प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणानां शास्त्रस्य च अविद्यावद्विषयत्वम्॥

Hence it was rightly said that the pramāṇas like perception, etc., as well as the Śāstras are operative in relation to those under the spell of nescience.

[BrS.1. L.34]

1.158 ✅

तदेव दर्शयति – तथाहि – ‘ब्राह्मणो यजेते’त्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मन्यतदध्यासमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते।

1.158. He establishes that same point. To explain: – The Veda mandates, ‘Let the Brāhmaṇa perform the Sacrifice etc. proceed on the basis of the superimposition on ātman of what is not that (viz., ātman).

वर्णवयोऽध्यासः ‘अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयनीते’त्यादिः। आश्रमाध्यासः – ‘न ह वै स्नात्वा भिक्षेते’ति। अवस्थाध्यासः – ‘यो ज्योगामयावी स्यात् स एतामिष्टिं निर्वपेदि’ति। आदिशब्देन‘यावज्जीवं जुहुयादि’ति जीवनाध्यासः।

The statements ‘Initiate a Brāhmaṇa (i.e., perform Upanayana) in his eighth year’, etc., (presuppose) caste and age-superimposition. The āśrama-superimposition is indicated in “Do not beg after ‘having bathed’. The superimposition of a particular state (avasthā) is indicated in ‘if one is suffering from a chronic disease one should perform such and such a sacrifice’. The word ‘ādi’ points to the text ‘Till life lasts perform (agni-hotra)’ whereby the superimposition of ‘living’ (is premised).

[BrS.1. L.35]

1.159 ✅

एवमध्याससद्भावं प्रसाध्य, ‘स्मृतिरूपः’ इत्यादिना ‘सर्वथाऽपि त्वन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति’ इत्यन्तेन सर्वथाऽपि लक्षितं निरुपचरितमतदारोपम् – अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम् इति परामृशति,

1.159. Thus having established the existence of super-imposition (prasādhya – by defining it and adducing pramāṇas in its support), the Bhāṣyakāra, with the statement “we have explained that all that superimposition means is the apprehension of something in what is not that something” reminds us that, what has already been defined in the commentary beginning with ‘of the nature of recollection’ etc., and ending with ‘adhyāsa’, however understood, does not depart from the definition that it is the apparent manifestation of the attributes of one thing in another”, is literally the superimposition of ‘what is not that’.

कस्य युष्मदर्थस्य कस्मिन्नस्मदर्थे तद्विपर्ययेण चाध्यासः इति विवेकतः प्रदर्शयितुम्। अतस्मिन् अयुष्मदर्थे अनिदञ्चिति तद्बुद्धिः युष्मदर्थावभासः इत्यर्थः।

(And this statement is made) in order to specifically point out, which thing, as denoted by the ‘thou (object)’, is superimposed on which thing, as denoted by the ‘ego’ (subject) and again in the reverse order. What it means is the apparent presentation of the notion of what is denoted by the ‘thou’ (i.e., ‘the this’) in what is denoted by the ‘not this’-ego; (again) in what is the ‘not-this’, (i.e., in what is denoted by the ‘not-thou’).

[BrS.1. L.36]

तदाह – तद्यथा पुत्रभार्यादिष्वित्यादि॥

Hence says (the commentator) – ‘As when sons and wife, etc.’

1.160-61 ✅

ननु प्रणव एव विस्वरः; न हि पुत्रादीनां वैकल्यं साकल्यं वा आत्मनि मुख्यमध्यस्यति, मुख्यो ह्यतदारोपो दर्शयितुं प्रारब्धः,

1.160. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is not literally (i.e., in the primary sense) that the soundness or the unsoundness (of health) of one’s children, etc., that one attributes through ignorance to one’s own self and indeed it was undertaken by you to show the superimposition of what is not the ‘that’ in a primary sense (and not in a figurative sense).

सत्यं; स एव निदर्श्यते। कथम्?

Siddhāntin. – Yes, it is true (that superimposition is literal and not figurative). That only is illustrated. How?

तद्यथा बालके प्रातिवेश्यमात्रसम्बन्धिना केनचित् वस्त्रालङ्कारादिना पूजिते निरुपचरितमात्मानमेव पूजितं मन्यते पिता। पूजयितापि पितरमेवापूपुजमिति मन्यते। यतो न बालकस्य पूजितत्वाभिमानः; अव्यक्तत्वात्,

It is thus – when a baby-son is decorated with clothes and ornaments by someone who is in no way related (to the child) except as a neighbour, the father thinks in no figurative sense that he has honoured the father only, because of the fact that he himself is honoured; and the person honouring also thinks that he honoured the father only, because of the fact that the sense of pride at being honoured has not developed in the child.

तथैव राजानमुपहन्तुकामोऽनन्तरो विजिगीषुः तद्राष्ट्रे ग्राममात्रमप्युपहत्य तमेवोपघ्नन्तमात्मानं मन्यते, सोऽप्युपहतोऽस्मीति सन्तप्यते।

Similarly, with the object of vanquishing a king a neighbouring king who is desirous of victory, having destroyed only a single town in his kingdom thinks that he has vanquished him only; and he also (i.e., the pillaged king) grieves (saying) ‘I am vanquished’.

तदेवं प्रसिद्धव्यतिरेकस्यात्मनि मुख्य एवाध्यासो दृष्टः, किमु वक्तव्यं, कृशस्थूलाद्यभिमानस्य मुख्यत्वमिति कथयितुमाह –

Hence in this wise, superimposition in a real sense is perceived in the self which is patently distinct (from children, wife, etc.). Where then is the need to state that superimposition is real (not figurative) in the case of one who imagines thus – ‘I am lean, I am stout’, etc.? To point this out (the Bhāṣya) says,

अहमेव विकलः सकलो वेति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यतीति॥

[“myself alone am unsound or sound”; thus he superimposes on the self qualities which do not pertain to him].

बाह्येषु पुत्रादिषु पूजादेः धर्ममात्रस्यैव युष्मदर्थस्याध्यासः॥

The super-imposition of what is denoted by the ‘Thou’ (Yuṣmat) is only that of the attributes (dharma) belonging to external objects as (when one appropriates to oneself) the honour, etc., done to the sons and so on.

अस्मदर्थश्चाहंप्रत्ययिसम्भिन्न एवानिदञ्चिदंशो विषयः, न पुनः शुद्ध एवाहंप्रत्ययिन इवाध्यासे अध्यासान्तरानास्कन्दितः।

The meaning of the word ‘asmat’ is in fact that which is interrelated to the ground of the ego-notion (i.e., the inner sense or antaḥkaraṇa), which is the sentient part as distinguished from the ‘this’ (i.e., the non-sentient world), and which is the object (viṣaya and not viṣayī); but it is not pure consciousness only, as in the case of the superimposition of the inner sense (on ātman) where there is no interposition of an additional superimposition (except ajñāna);

तथा देहधर्मान् कृशत्वादीनिति॥ धर्मिणोऽपि;

even so ‘the attributes of the body such as leanness, etc.,’ (are superimposed on the self); alike the superimposition of the thing possessing attributes (dharmiṇopi, viz., the body, etc., which are the locus of leanness, etc.).

धर्मशब्दस्तु मनुष्यत्वादिधर्मसमवायिन एवाध्यासः, न ‘देहोऽहमि’ति कथयितुम्। तन्निमित्तश्च शास्त्रेणेतश्चेतश्च नियमः क्रियते।

The use of the word ‘dharma’ is to indicate that the super-imposition is of the body, only as associated with attributes like ‘manhood’ (being a man), etc., and not to denote (association with others as illustrated in) ‘I am body’. And based on that (viz., the superimposition of attributes – dharmādhyāsa) distinct (lit. such and such) rules relating to distinct actions are enjoined by the Scripture.

[BrS.1. L.37]

तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् मूकत्वादीनिति धर्ममात्रम्। तथा अन्तःकरणधर्मान् कामादीनिति धर्मग्रहणम्।

Even so, ‘the attributes of the senses such as dumbness, etc.,’ so that only the attributes (are superimposed on the Self). Likewise in the bhāṣya [‘the attributes of the inner sense such as desire, etc’] the attributes alone are to be understood as superimposed (on the self).

अन्तःकरणमित्यहंप्रत्ययिनो विज्ञानशक्तिभागोऽभिधीयते। तस्य धर्माः कामादयः।

The word ‘antaḥkaraṇa’ (inner sense) denotes (here) the cognitive potency aspect of what is denoted by the ego-notion and desire, etc., are its (antaḥkaraṇa in its cognitive aspect) characteristic properties.

[BrS.1. L.38]

1.162 ✅

एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमिति धर्मिग्रहणम्।

1.162. (From the bhāṣya), ‘evam ahampratyayinam’ the dharmin (having attributes) is to be understood.

प्रत्ययाः कामादयोऽस्येति प्रत्ययी, अहं चासौ प्रत्ययी चेत्यहंप्रत्ययी॥ तं अशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्येति॥

(Padmapāda proceeds to explain the bhāṣya text – “evam ahampratyayinam – aśeṣa-svapracāra-śākṣiṇi pratyag-ātmanyadhyasya, tam ca pratyagātmānam sarva-sākṣiṇam tad-viparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣvadhyasyati”) – pratyayāḥ, desire, etc., (kāmādayaḥ); asya – of this (antaḥkaraṇa); hence pratyayī (the inner sense is called ‘pratyayī’ because it undergoes modal changes – vikarāḥ to express desire, aversion, etc.; it is the āśraya). It is aham-pratyayī because it is both ego and the modally transformed; and having superimposed that (aham-pratyayī) on the inner ātman (pratyag-ātman) which is the witness of all its transformations;

स्वशब्देन अहङ्कारग्रन्थिः संसारनृत्यशालामूलस्तम्भोऽभिधीयते। तस्य प्रचारः कामस्सङ्कल्पकर्तृत्वादिरनेकविधः परिणामः, यन्निमित्तं ब्रह्मादिस्थावरान्तेषु प्रदीप्तशिरा इव परवशो जन्तुर्बम्भ्रमीति।

by the word ‘svam’ is denoted the ego-complex (the intelligence and non-intelligence tangle – cid-acid-granthi) which is (as it were) the main pillar of the dancing-hall of the life-cycle (saṃsāra). Its (antaḥkaraṇa) operations are the innumerable modal changes (psychoses) in the shape of desire, resolve, agency, etc., on account of which (transformations) the creature from Brahman down to an immobile object (like plants) wander again and again, forlorn, as if with a blazing head.

तं प्रचारमशेषमसङ्गितया अविकारित्वेन च हानोपादानशून्यः साक्षादव्यवधानमवभासयति चितिधातुः।

And the whole of that (modal change of the inner sense, as desire, aversion, etc.) the consciousness entity (cid-vastu) manifests directly, without the intervention (of another vṛtti), itself remaining unattached, undergoing no change, and (therefore) being void of (the desire) to own or disown (anything).

स एव देहादिष्विदन्तया बहिर्भावमापद्यमानेषु प्रातिलोम्येनाञ्चतीवोपलक्ष्यते, इति प्रत्यगुच्यते,

And that (i.e., the consciousness entity) only, is spoken of as the inner self (pratyak) since it appears as if shining inwards in the direction, opposite to that of the body, etc., which have acquired the character of externality being designated by the ‘this’.

1.163 ✅

आत्मा च; निरुपचरितस्वरूपत्वात् तत्राध्यस्य। तं च प्रत्यगात्मानमिति॥

The term ‘ātman’ itself (is justified on the ground that it is so) in its own nature (i.e., not in a figurative sense).
1.163. Having superimposed (the non-sentient) on that (the self), again, the superimposition of that, viz., the inner self on the non-sentient is effected.

यदि युष्मदर्थस्यैव प्रत्यगात्मनि अध्यासः स्यात्, प्रत्यगात्मा न प्रकाशेत;

If the superimposition were only of that which is denoted by the ‘thou’ on the inner self then the inner self would not reveal itself.

न हि शुक्तौ रजताध्यासे शुक्तिः प्रकाशते। प्रकाशते चेह चैतन्यमहङ्कारादौ।

(For instance) in the superimposition of ‘silver’ on the nacre, is not revealed. But here consciousness (caitanya) manifests itself in the ego, etc.

तथा यदि चैतन्यस्यैवाहङ्कारादावध्यासो भवेत्तदा नाहङ्कारप्रमुखः प्रपञ्चः प्रकाशेत;

Similarly if there were only the super-imposition of consciousness on the ego (the insentient part) then the world beginning with the ego would cease to manifest itself.

तदुभयं मा भूदित्यनुभवमेवानुसरन्नाह – तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यतीति॥

In order to obviate both (the Bhāṣyakāra) in conformity with experience says – [“And vice versa, the inner self which is the universal witness is superimposed on the internal organ (antaḥ-karaṇa), etc., (including the senses)”].

नात्र विवदितव्यम्, इतरेतराध्यासे पृथगवभासनात् न मिथ्या गौणोऽयमिति; तथा अनुभवाभावात् मुख्याभिमानः। न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम॥

It ought not to be contended here that because in the sphere of mutual superimposition the manifestation is (of two) separate (entities) it is (a case of) figurative (usage) and not (of) mithyā (illusion). Since experience contradicts it (i.e., that it is a figurative expression) it is illusion proper. The validity of what is given in experience cannot be questioned.

1.164 ✅

ननु अन्तःकरणे एव प्रत्यगात्मनः शुद्धस्याध्यासः, अन्यत्र पुनः चैतन्याध्यासपरिनिष्पन्नापरोक्ष्यमन्तःकरणमेवाध्यस्यते,

1.164. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is only on the antaḥkaraṇa that the inner self – the pure consciousness, is superimposed. Elsewhere on the other hand, (say the body, the senses and so on) it is only the antaḥkaraṇa when it has become endowed with the property of immediate cognition as the result of the superimposition of consciousness on it, that is superimposed (and not the pure ātman).

अत एव ‘तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्’ इत्युक्तम्; अन्यथा चैतन्यमात्रैकरसस्य कुतो धर्माः? येऽध्यस्येरन्,

For that reason (because the conditioned self only is superimposed on the senses, etc.,) it was said: [“Tad-viparyayeṇa viṣayinaḥ, tad-dharmāṇām ca viṣaye adhyāso mithyeti bhavitum yuktam – vice versa it is wrong to superimpose the subject (viṣayī) and its attributes also on the object (viṣaya)”]. Otherwise (if the superimposition of the conditioned ātman is not accepted) whence could ātman which in its entirety is consciousness get its attributes which may be superimposed (on the senses, etc.)?

सत्यमाह भवान्; अपि तु अन्यत्रान्तःकरणं सचित्कमेवाध्यस्यमानं यत्राध्यस्यते, तस्यैवात्मनः कार्यकरणत्वमापाद्य स्वयमविद्यमानमिव तिरस्कृतं तिष्ठति,

Siddhāntin. – Your honour has spoken the truth only; but still elsewhere (i.e., apart from antaḥkaraṇa) the inner sense as associated with cit only (consciousness) is superimposed and at such where it is superimposed (say on the senses, etc.), there it remains discarded, as if itself were non-existent, having assigned to that only (viz., the sense) the function of generating action in ātman.

चिद्रूपमेव सर्वत्राध्यासे, स्वतः परतो वा न विशिष्यते,

In every case of superimposition (on the body as well as on the inner sense) it is ātman (cid-rūpa – consciousness) alone that remains unaltered either in itself (sva-rūpeṇa – as when superimposed on the inner sense) or when distinct (upādhi-rūpeṇa – as when along with the inner sense, it is superimposed on the senses, etc.).

तेनोच्यते – तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यतीति॥ अत एव बुद्ध्यादिष्वेव चिद्रूपमनुस्यूतमुत्प्रेक्षमाणा बुद्धिमनःप्राणेन्द्रियशरीरेष्वेकैकस्मिन् चेतनत्वेनाहङ्कर्तृत्वं योजयन्तो भ्राम्यन्ति॥

Hence it is said – “tam ca pratyag-ātmānam sarva-sākṣiṇam tad-viparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇādiṣvadhyasyati” (vide above). Because it is so (i.e., since ātman only is superimposed on the body, etc., the disbelievers – Cārvākas) and others fancying that consciousness which accompanies (all mental modes) is no other than buddhi (intellect), etc., and associating ātmatva (self-hood), with intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), vital breath (prāṇa), sense-organ (indriya), and body, ascribing consciousness to each, delude themselves.

1.165 ✅

[BrS.1. L.39]

एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यास इति निगमयति॥

1.165. (The Bhāṣyakāra) thus concludes: [“evam ayam anādirananto naisargikodhyāsaḥ”) – In this manner proceeds this natural beginningless and endless superimposition.

ननु उपन्यासकाले नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहार इति लोकव्यवहारो नैसर्गिक उक्तः, कथमिहाध्यासो निगम्यते? अनादिरिति चाधिकावापः,

Pūrvapakṣin: Well, when prefacing this topic it was said that all empirical activity (loka-vyavahāra) was natural (naisargikaḥ – beginningless) as witness – ‘aham-idam mamedamiti naisargikoyam loka-vyavahāraḥ’ How then is it that here it is concluded with ‘adhyāsa’ (superimposition – i.e., that adhyāsa is beginningless)? And further how is it that the word ‘anādi’ – ‘without beginning’, is added? (cf. ‘evam ayam anādirananto naisargikodhyāsaḥ’).

अत्रोच्यते – तत्रापि प्रत्यगात्मन्यहङ्काराध्यास एव नैसर्गिको लोकव्यवहारोऽभिप्रेतः; स च प्रत्यगात्मा अनादिसिद्धः; तस्मिन् नैसर्गिकस्यानादित्वमर्थसिद्धम्। अतः प्रक्रमानुरूपमेव निगमनम्, न चाधिकावापः॥

Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer. There also (i.e., in the introductory bhāṣya beginning with “tathāpyanyonyasmin, etc.,” and ending with “loka-vyavahāraḥ”) it is only the superimposition of the ego (the ‘not-self’) on the inner self that is meant by ‘the natural empirical activities’. And that inner self (which is the substratum of superimposition) is a beginningless entity and as such the beginningless superimposition on it should be presumed as established. Hence the conclusion is in conformity with the beginning and there is no inclusion of any adventitious matter.

1.166 ✅

ननु भवेदनादिः, अनन्तः कथम्? यदि स्यात्तत्प्रहाणाय कथं वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते?

1.166. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, let us grant (that superimposition is) beginningless; but how endless (an-anta)? If it be (endless) how can for its eradication the study of the Vedāntas be commenced?

अन्तवत्त्वेऽपि तर्हि कथम्? स्वतोऽन्यतो वा तत्सिद्धेः। तस्मात् अनन्तस्य प्रहाणाय वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते इत्युक्ते, अर्थादेष एव प्रहाणहेतुः, असत्यस्मिन् अनन्तः इति निश्चीयते।

Siddhāntin. – Suppose it ends, even then (we rejoin why should one begin the study of the Vedānta for its effacement)? Its end is brought about either by itself or some other (cause). Hence what is intended to convey from the statement that all the Vedāntas are begun for the destruction of what is endless, is that this alone (i.e., Vedānta study) is presumably the cause of its removal. If that (Vedānta study) be absent it is evident that it (adhyāsa) will be endless.

1.167 ✅

‘मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूप’ इति रूपग्रहणं लक्षणतस्तथा रूप्यते, न व्यवहारतः इति दर्शयितुम्।

1.167. (In the phrase) ‘mithyā-pratyaya-rūpa’ the inclusion of the word ‘rūpa’ is to show that it appears so (i.e., false), only if judged by its definition (lakṣaṇataḥ) and not in the empirical sphere (e.g., in the ordinary usage ‘I am a man, I am lean, etc.,’ no one regards it as false knowledge – mithyā; it is only when scrutinised that falsity is detected).

‘कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः’ इति अनर्थहेतुत्वं दर्शयति हेयतासिद्धये।

From the phrase ‘kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-pravartana – (pravartakaḥ)’ – being the cause of agency and enjoyment, it is pointed out that superimposition is the cause of the afflictions of mankind (because agency and enjoyment are the source of all evil as evidenced in (‘I’ and ‘mine’) in order that they (ahantā – egoity and mamatā – acquisitiveness) may be avoided.

तेन कर्तृर्भोक्तुश्च सतो मिथ्याज्ञानं दोषप्रवर्तनमिति येषां मतं, तन्निराकृतं भवति।

By this statement the doctrine of those who maintain that while ātman’s agency and enjoyment are actual wrong knowledge leads to erroneous deeds, stands refuted.

सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः इति ‘देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानहीनस्ये’त्युपन्यस्य‘नहीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाये’त्यादिना योऽनुभवो मिथ्यात्वसिद्धये अनुसृतः तं निगमयति॥

Now as to the phrase ‘sarva-loka-pratyakṣaḥ’ perceived by all, (the Bhāṣyakāra) having explained to start with, that pramātṛtva – cognisership, is impossible without the erroneous notion that the body, the senses and the rest are identical with the self, and stating that ‘without the employment of the senses, etc., perceptive and other activities cannot take place’, points to anubhava (pratyakṣa) as the determining factor in the establishment of mithyātva (adhyāsa) and concludes with it (i.e., anubhava).

[BrS.1. L.40]

1.168 ✅

एवं तावत् सूत्रेणार्थादुपात्तयोः विषयप्रयोजनयोः सिद्धये जीवस्याब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वमध्यासात्मकमुपदर्श्य, अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायेति प्रयोजनं निर्दिशति।

1.168. Thus up to this point, having shown that Jīva’s appearing as something other than Brahman is due to nescience, in order to substantiate (that the Vedānta has a definite) result, which (content and fruit – viṣaya and prayojana) can be presumed from the Sūtra (viz., athāto Brahmajijñāsā), the commentator (Śaṅkara) pointedly draws attention to the fruit (result) by the phrase – ‘asyānartha-hetoḥ prahāṇāya’ – for the eradication of the cause of this evil.

हेतोः प्रहाण्या हि हेतुमतः प्रहाणिरात्यन्तिकी यतः।

It is indeed from the destruction of the cause that there results the total destruction of that which is the effect of that cause (viz., the kārya in the shape of agency, enjoyment, etc.).

1.169 ✅

ननु अनर्थहेतुरध्यासोऽनादिः, स कथं प्रहीयते? तथा हि – मनुष्यादिजातिविशेषमात्राध्यासः ततो विविक्तेऽपि न्यायतः अहंप्रत्यये अनादित्वात् पूर्ववदविकलो वर्तते।

1.169. Pūrvapakṣin: Well, adhyāsa (erroneous transference, the cause of the ills (of life) is beginningless; how can it be terminated? To explain – in the ego-notion the superimposition relates specifically to the entire class of men (manuṣyatva); hence though (ascertained) by reasoning that the ego is distinct (from ātman) the superimposition remains unaltered (shrouding the self) as before, because it is beginningless.

1.170 ✅

नायं दोषः॥ तत्त्वमसीत्यादिवाक्याद्ब्रह्मरूपावगाहिज्ञानान्तरोत्पत्तेरिष्टत्वात्। तद्धि ब्रह्मणोऽवच्छिद्यैव चैतन्यस्य ब्रह्मरूपत्वप्रच्छादनेन जीवरूपत्वापादिकामनादिसिद्धामविद्यामहङ्कारादिविक्षेपहेतुं निराकुर्वदेवोत्पद्यते।

1.170. Siddhāntin: This is no defect. For what we seek is the unique knowledge (jñānāntara) which pointing to the nature of Brahman arises from (the comprehension of) the proposition ‘That thou art – (tatvamasi= tat tvam asi)’. And that (knowledge) arises revealing simultaneously the real nature of Brahman, and dispelling nescience which by concealing the Brahman-nature of consciousness, brings on jīvahood (i.e., finitizes it as individual self), and exists from eternity and which (again) is the cause of the manifestation of the ego-notion, etc.

ततः कारणनिवृत्तौ तत्कार्यम् ‘अहमि’ति जीवे भोक्तृत्वरूपता सपरिकरा निवर्तत इति युज्यते।

From that (i.e., from the Brahma-knowledge) arises the effacement of the cause (viz., nescience) and then its effect, which as the notion of ego assumes enjoyership in the individual self, is destroyed together with all its paraphernalia; and this stands to reason.

अहंप्रत्ययः पुनरनादिसिद्धोऽनादिसिद्धेनैव कार्यकरणमात्रेण सहभावादविरोधात्

The ego-notion again, is existent from eternity and is in intimate association with the entire bodily aggregate which is also existent from eternity and as such there is no antagonism between them.

न स्वरूपविवेकमात्रेण निवर्तते। नापि ज्ञानान्तरमुत्पन्नमिति विशेषः॥

Hence superimposition cannot be eradicated by one’s merely discriminating ātman from the bodily aggregate; nor has the other knowledge (viz., ‘aupaniṣadātma-jñāna’ – ‘the knowledge of ātman as revealed in the Upaniṣads’) yet arisen – this is the distinction.

1.171 ✅

ननु निरतिशयानन्दं ब्रह्म श्रूयते, ब्रह्मावाप्तिसाधनं च ब्रह्मविद्या ‘स यो ह वै तत् परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवती’त्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः;

1.171. Pūrvapakṣin: Well, the Scriptures declare that Brahman is of the nature of transcendental bliss (cf., ‘vijñānam Brahma’; ‘ānando Brahma’) and that the means of attaining Brahman is the knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-vidyā) as witness such Śrutis, ‘He who knows the supreme Brahman does indeed become Brahman only’ – (MunU.3.2.9).

तस्मान्निरतिशयसुखावाप्तय इति वक्तव्यम्, किमिदमुच्यते – ‘अनर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाये’ति?

Hence it must be stated that (the study of the Vedānta) is for the attainment of the highest happiness; how then is this said that it is for the eradication of the cause that brings on the evil (of metempsychosis)?

ननु चानर्थस्यापि समूलस्य प्रहाणं श्रूयते ब्रह्मविद्याफलं ‘तरति शोकमात्मवित्’ (छा. उ. ७-१-३) ‘जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः’ (मु. उ. ३-१-२) इति च॥

It may however be urged that the Scriptures also declare that the eradication of the evil together with its cause is the end (phala) of Brahma-vidyā, as witness, ‘the knower of ātman steps across sorrow (which is evil)’ (ChanU.7.1.3); ‘when he sees the other, the adored, the Lord and His greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow’ (MunU.3.1.2; SvetU.4.7 respectively).

उभयं तर्हि वक्तव्यं; श्रूयमाणत्वात् पुरुषार्थत्वाच्च?

If so both should be mentioned (as phala), because of the declaration of the Scriptures and of their serving as the highest human end.

1.172 ✅

न वक्तव्यम्॥ कथम्? ‘आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये’ इत्यात्मनो जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मकता शास्त्रस्य विषयः, तेनानन्दात्मकब्रह्मस्वरूपताप्राप्तिः जीवस्य विषयतयैव संवृत्ता।

1.172. Siddhāntin. – It is needless to state (both). How? From the Bhāṣya ‘for the attainment of the knowledge of the unity of the self’ (we gather) that the subject-matter of the Vedānta śāstra is ātman’s, i.e., jīva’s identity with Brahman. From this (i.e., because this unity is the viṣaya of the śāstra) the jīva’s attainment of the nature of Brahman which is identical with Bliss, itself becomes the viṣaya (for whatever is the subject-matter must be the subject of investigation).

न च सा विषयाद्बहिः, येन पृथङ्निदेशार्हा स्यात्, समूलानर्थहानिस्तु बहिः शास्त्रविषयाद्ब्रह्मात्मरूपात्।

And it (the attainment of bliss) is not something outside the viṣaya (i.e., it is viṣaya itself), and it would have been appropriate to have predicated separately (the end – prayojanatva of ānandāvāpti) in case (it had not partaken of the nature of the viṣaya). On the other hand, the eradication of evil with its root-cause falls outside the content of the śāstra which is (no other than) the unity of the self with Brahman.

1.173 ✅

अनर्थहेतुप्रहाणमपि तर्हि न पृथङ्निर्देष्टव्यम्? यतः सर्वेषु वेदान्तेष्वलौकिकत्वाद्ब्रह्मणस्तत्प्रतिपादनपूर्वकमेव जीवस्य तद्रूपता प्रतिपाद्यते।

1.173. Pūrvapakṣin. – If so, even the eradication of the cause of evil need find no separate mention, the reason being that in all the Vedānta texts the identity of the individual soul jīva) with Brahman is enunciated only after expounding the nature of Brahman since the (latter) is beyond the range of the empirical means of knowledge.

तद्यथा – ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदि’त्युपक्रम्य ‘ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत् सत्यं स आत्मे’त्यवसानं निरस्तसमस्तप्रपञ्चं वस्तु तत्पदाभिधेयं समर्पयदेकं वाक्यम्;

To explain: – All the texts beginning with “my dear, this (world) was verily being (sat – i.e., the object of sad-buddhi – mere existence) in the beginning” (i.e., before the world came into existence – ChanU.6.2.1) and ending with “All this (the entire universe) is of the essence of that (viz., the Being, sat); that (being) is Reality, that is ātman” – (ChanU.6.16.3), should be construed as a single sentence intended to show that what is denoted by the word ‘that’ (‘tat’ in ‘tatvamasi’) points to an entity which is of the nature of the sublation of the entire universe.

तथा सति तादृशेन तत्पदार्थेन संसृज्यमानः त्वम्पदार्थः पराकृत्यैव निर्लेपमनर्थहेतुमग्रहणमन्यथाग्रहणं च तथा निश्चीयत इति।

Because of this (viz., that all these sentences cohere and point to the world-sublated Brahman), the import of the ‘thou’ (in tatvamasi’) coalescing with the import of the ‘that’ of the above description is determined (from the knowledge of the mahāvākya) to be also such (i.e., as rid of all the ills of life) preceded by the total destruction of both nescience and illusion, i.e., avidyā, which serve as the cause of misery, which obscure reality, and which generate erroneous knowledge.

1.174 ✅

यद्येवं ब्रह्मात्मावगतिनान्तरीयकम् अनर्थहेतोरविद्यायाः प्रहाणं, न शब्दस्य तत्र व्यापारः, तेन पृथङिनर्दिश्यते।

1.174. Siddhāntin: If that be so, i.e., if the eradication of avidyā which is the cause of evil must necessarily precede the knowledge of Brahman-identity then śabda is not operative there (i.e., in the eradication of nescience). Therefore it is separately mentioned (by Śaṅkara).

युक्तं चैतत् – न हि विपर्यासगृहीतं वस्तु तन्निरासादृते तत्त्वतो निर्णेतुं शक्यम्।

And this (separate mention) stands to reason also: – it is indeed impossible to determine the real nature of a thing cognised in a false light (i.e., illusorily apprehended like shell taken for silver) without its (illusion) eradication.

तस्मात् पूर्वावसितमतद्धर्मं निरस्यदेव तत्त्वावद्योति वाक्यं तत्त्वमवसाययति॥

Hence the sentence (mahāvākya) establishes the reality, only by first eradicating the unreal (a-tad-dharma – what is not the ‘that’ – the real) which was (the object of illusory cognition before).

1.175 ✅

ननु च नञादेः निरासकृतो निरस्यमानवाचिनश्च पदस्याश्रवणात् कथं तन्निरस्यदेवेति?

1.175. Pūrvapakṣin: Well, how could you make the statement (that the mahāvākya teaches the pure Brahman) only by first eliminating the world, in the absence of (lit. when not heard) the negating particle ‘na’, etc., and of the word denotative of the thing that is negatived.

उच्यते – नेदं रजतमिति यत्र विपर्यासमात्रं निरस्यते, न वस्तुतत्त्वमवबोध्यते; तत्र तथा भवतु;

Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer: Where the illusory knowledge alone is got rid of as in ‘this is not silver’ and the real nature of the object is not brought to light, (viz., this is nacre), there let it be so (i.e., begin with the negative particle).

इह पुनः विज्ञानमेव तादृशमुत्पन्नं, यद् विरोधिनिराकरणमन्तरेण न स्वार्थं साधयितुमलम्, तुलोन्नमनव्यापार इव आनमननान्तरीयकः।

Here on the other hand (in the sentence, ‘tatvamasi’) the cognition itself arises in that very manner (i.e., negating the world and its illusory knowledge at the very moment of its origin) since without first negating its opposite it would be incompetent to bring home what its object is (viz., Brahman) – just as the act of raising one scale-pan of a balance necessarily, without a separate effort, lowers the other scale-pan.

तथा हि – उन्नमनव्यापारः स्वविषयस्य तुलाद्रव्यस्योर्ध्वदेशसम्बन्धं न साधयितुमलं, तत्कालमेव तस्याधोदेशसम्बन्धमनापाद्य। न चोन्नमनकारकस्य हस्तप्रयत्नादेरानमनेऽपि कारकत्वं; प्रसिद्ध्यभावादनुभवविरोधाच्च।

To explain – the act of raising cannot bring about the contact of its object (viz., the scale-pan, which is raised by the act) with the space above without at that very time effecting its (the other pan) contact with the space below. And it is not (to be supposed) that the effort of the hand, etc., which serves as the cause in the raising is also the cause of the lowering, for such a view does not obtain currency and it is against all experience.

1.176 ✅

तदेवं विपर्यासगृहीते वस्तुनि तत्त्वावद्योतिशब्दनिमित्त आत्मनो ज्ञानव्यापारो ‘नाहं कर्ता ब्रह्माहमि’ति ग्राहयति; ‘नेदं रजतं शुक्तिकेयमि’ति यथा। तस्मात् ‘शुक्तिकेयमि’त्येव निराकाङ्क्षं वाक्यम्, ‘नेदं रजतमि’त्यनुवादः।

1.176. Similarly in regard to the object that is apprehended under the spell of illusion, the cognitive activity arising from śabda (viz., mahāvākya) which illuminates the Reality underlying that object comprehends the notions – ‘I am Brahman’, ‘I am not agent’; it is like our having the notions – ‘this is nacre’, ‘this is not silver’. Hence ‘this is nacre’ is a non-desiderative sentence and ‘this is not silver’ is an explanatory (or repetitive) sentence.

1.177 ✅

अत एवाख्यातपदस्य वाक्यत्वे क्रियाज्ञानादेव तत्साधनमात्रेऽपि प्रतीतिसिद्धेः पदान्तराणि नियमायानुवादाय वेति न्यायविदः। तथा चाहुः – ‘यजतिचोदना द्रव्यदेवताक्रियं समुदाये कृतार्थत्वादि’ति।

1.177. For this reason only, when the word denoting a verbal idea constitutes a sentence, from the mere knowledge of the action (as indicated by the verb) the knowledge of all its accessories (of necessity) results. Therefore, the exegetists (the Mīmāṃsakas) aver that the other words in a sentence (apart from the verb) are meant either for exclusion or explanation. And so they say – “The mandate, perform the sacrifice” (instructing action reveals the substance and deity also) because its full import is possible only when the knowledge of the group including the substance, the deity and action arises.

अपरे तु ‘यज्ञं व्याख्यास्यामो द्रव्यं देवता त्यागः’ इति।

Others, however, say – “We expound the nature of Yajna as consisting of the substance, the deity and the gift (to the God)”.

कथं?
क्रियामात्रवाचिनो द्रव्यदेवताभिधानं नान्तरीयकं तद्विषयज्ञाननिमित्तत्वं विहाय। प्रत्यक्षबाधस्याप्ययमेव प्रकारः, असम्प्रयुक्तविषयत्वाद्बाधस्य।

Question. – How (is it that the substance and the deity are known by implication and not directly denoted (by the verb – yaj)?
Answer. – The manifestation of the substance and of the deity by the root ‘yaj’ which by its denotative power expresses only the sacrificial act without being the cause of their cognition is effectuated by implication. Even in the sublation of perceptive cognition the process is the same, for the sublation cannot be the object of sense-contact.

1.178 ✅

तदेवमशाब्दमविद्याविलयं मन्वानः श्रुतिन्यायकोविदो भगवान् भाष्यकारो विषयात् पृथक् निर्दिशति – अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणायेति॥

1.178. Therefore it is that the revered commentator who is master in the knowledge of the Scriptures and Logic, knowing that the destruction of the ills of life (avidyāvilayam) is not something that can be ascertained from śabda (i.e., mahāvākya) points it out as apart (from the viṣaya) in the words ‘for the destruction of the cause of this evil – ‘asyānartha-hetoḥ prahāṇāya’.

चतुर्थीप्रयोगोऽपि विद्यासामर्थ्यसिद्धिमभिप्रेत्य, न तदर्थमुपादानम्। प्रयोजनत्वं च पुरुषाकाङ्क्षाया एवास्तु।

The use of the dative case also is with the object of showing that the destruction of evil results from the potency of the knowledge (of unity): and it is not (that the study of Vedānta) is undertaken for that purpose – viz., the destruction of evil. (But it need not be doubted that because the Brahman-knowledge and not the eradication of evil is the phala of the Vedānta Śāstra the eradication of evil is by no means the fruition of the śāstra). (And the eradication of evil) – the phala – may be regarded as resulting (though indirectly) from man’s desire only (for everyone ardently wishes to be free from the ills of life).

1.179 ✅

n class="accordionDev">Dev:

न हि विद्या गवादिवत् तटस्था सिध्यति, येनाप्तिः पृथगुपादीयेत। सा हि वेदित्राश्रया वेद्यं तस्मै प्रकाशयन्त्येवोदेति।

1.179. Pūrvapakṣin. – It is not that vidyā (the knowledge of unity) is acquired like getting a cow from without as if it stood apart (from the knowing subject), which (standing apart) would render the acquisition from outside possible. But that knowledge having the knower as its locus arises even while manifesting the object (of knowledge) to him.

सत्यमेवमन्यत्र; प्रकृते पुनर्विषये विद्या उदिताऽपि न प्रतिष्ठां लभते; असम्भावनाभिभूतविषयत्वात्।

Siddhāntin: True, it is so elsewhere. But in what we are now considering though knowledge arises in regard to the viṣaya (viz., Brahmātmā-identity) it does not attain indubitable certainty because it (viṣaya) is beset with improbability (and contrariety).

तथा च लोके अस्मिन् देशे काले चेदं वस्तु स्वरूपत एव न सम्भवतीति दृढभावितं, यदि तत् कथं चित् दैववशादुपलभ्येत, तदा स्वयमीक्षमाणोऽपि तावन्नाध्यवस्यति, यावत् तत्सम्भवं नानुसरति।

Such is the experience of men: – when there is a rooted conviction that a particular object by its very nature cannot exist (say) in this region and at the present time, if it should somehow by sheer accident come to view, the person though perceiving it himself will not be convinced of its existence as long as he does not take the trouble to ascertain its probability.

तेन सम्यग्ज्ञानमपि स्वविषयेऽप्रतिष्ठितमनवाप्तमिव भवति। तेन तत्स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठायै तर्कं सहायीकरोति।

Hence the right knowledge also (though it has arisen) not being indubitable as regards its viṣaya (content, viz., Brahmātmā-identity) will be as if it did not compass the viṣaya. As such the knowledge that arises from the vākya calls in the aid of tarka for self-certainty (i.e., for securing indubitableness to its context).

1.180 ✅

अत एव प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकस्तर्कः इति तर्कविदः॥

1.180. Therefore (i.e., since logic clarifies and stabilises the knowledge derived from pramāṇas) it is, that those proficient in tarka (aver) that tarka is an (indispensable) aid to pramāṇas (here verbal means of knowledge).

अथ कोऽयं तर्को नाम?
युक्तिः।
ननु पर्याय एषः? स्वरूपमभिधीयताम्।

What is it that is meant by the term ‘tarka’?
It is reasoning.
Well, this is only a synonym. Its nature had better be explained.

इदमुच्यते – प्रमाणशक्तिविषयतत्सम्भवपरिच्छेदात्मा प्रत्ययः।

This is its explanation: – It is of the nature of discriminating cognition by which the probability (or improbability) of pramāṇa, śakti and viṣaya (viz., the identity of Brahman and the individual soul) is ascertained.

1.181 ✅

ननु एवं तर्कसापेक्षं स्वमर्थं साधयतोऽनपेक्षत्वहानेरप्रामाण्यं स्यात्,

1.181. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, if so (the Vedānta) since it requires tarka to establish the certitude of what it imports becomes invalid having lost its character of non-dependence (on extraneous aid).

न स्यात्; स्वमहिम्नैव विषयाध्यवसायहेतुत्वात्,

Siddhāntin. – It does not (become non-valid merely because it requires tarka); for by its own potency it is productive of the indubitable knowledge of what it denotes (sva-viṣaya, which here is the identity of ātman and the absolute).

क्व तर्हि तर्कस्योपयोगः?

Pūrvapakṣin. – Then what is the purpose served by tarka? (If the mahāvākya itself is competent to bring home the knowledge of identity, what is the function of tarka)?

विषयासम्भवाशङ्कायां तथा अनुभवफलानुत्पत्तौ तत्सम्भवप्रदर्शनमुखेन फलप्रतिबन्धविगमे।

Siddhāntin. – When there is improbability regarding the viṣaya (viz., the unity of the individual soul with Brahman) and the fruition of that kind of experience (which brings about the destruction of an-artha or the evils of life) has not arisen (tarka is useful) in removing the obstacles to the phala (fruition) through pointing to its probability (sambhava).

तथा च तत्त्वमसिवाक्ये त्वम्पदार्थो जीवः तत्पदार्थब्रह्मस्वरूपतामात्मनोऽसम्भावयन् विपरीतं च रूपं मन्वानः समुत्पन्नेऽपि ज्ञाने तावत् नाध्यवस्यति, यावत्तर्केण विरोधमपनीय तद्रूपतामात्मनो न सम्भावयति।

As such in the mahāvākya (tatvamasi) the meaning of ‘tvam’ is the jīva (or individual soul) and this jīva presuming the improbability of his being identical with Brahman which the word ‘tat’ denotes, (nay), further, thinking that he is of an opposite nature, fails to arrive at the truth, though the knowledge (identity) has arisen, so long as he does not recognise the probability of his own self being identical with Brahman, having (first) through the aid of tarka removed the impediments.

1.182 ✅

अतः प्राक् विद्या उदितापि वाक्यात् अनवाप्तेव भवति। अवाप्तिप्रकारश्च वेदान्तेष्वेव निर्दिष्टः साक्षादनुभवफलोद्देशेन। तेनोच्यते – विद्याप्रतिपत्तये इति॥ [BrS.1. L.40]

1.182. Hence, before (rational inquiry), though the knowledge of identity has arisen from the sentence (tatvamasi) it is as good as not having been acquired. The way of acquiring it is pointed out in the Vedānta itself with a view to (help one to attain) the phala of immediate experience. Therefore it is said (by the Bhāṣyakāra); [“The study of the entire Vedānta is intended] for attaining the knowledge (of ātman-identity)”].

1.183 ✅

ननु आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तिः नानर्थहेतुप्रहाणाय प्रभवति; तथाहि –

1.183. Pūrvapakṣin. – The knowledge that the individual self is identical with the supreme self is not potent enough to eradicate the cause of the evil (an-artha that plunges one in saṃsāra).

जीवस्य कार्यकारणसङ्घातादन्यत्वप्रतिपत्तेः ब्रह्मस्वरूपताप्रतिपत्तिः न विशिष्यते; उभयत्राप्यहङ्कारग्रन्थेः मनुष्याभिमानपर्यन्तस्याविकलमनुवर्तमानत्वात्,

To explain: The cognition by the individual self of its identity with Brahman is not any way distinct from the cognition of its difference from the bodily aggregate. It is so because (in both the cognition of ātman as distinct from the body and the immediate cognition of identity with Brahman) there is the unabated persistence of the ego-tangle extending up to the illusory ascription of the notion of man (to the pure being as in ‘I am man – manuṣyoham’).

उच्यते – भवतु तत्राविद्याया अनिवर्तितत्वात् तत्, इह पुनरपसारिताविद्यादोषं ब्रह्मात्मज्ञानमुदयमासादयत् कथं तन्निमित्तं भोक्त्रादिग्रन्थिप्रवाहं नापनयति?

Siddhāntin: This is our answer: There (when ātman is known as not identical with the aggregate) let that (the persistence of the tangle) exist, as avidyā (in the shape of saṃsāra) is not seen to have disappeared; but here however (in the cognition of identity with Brahman) when the Brahma-cognition has dawned having dispelled the taint of illusion, how could it remain without arresting the current (i.e., the continuous succession of complexes) of the notions of enjoyer, etc., generated by nescience?

न हि जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मावगमः तद्विषयानवगममबाधमानः उदेति॥

It is indeed evident that the cognition of the Supreme by the individual cannot come about before destroying the ignorance that shrouds it (viz., the Reality) – which is its object.

1.184 ✅

ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानादग्रहणापाये तन्निमित्तस्याहङ्कारग्रन्थेः तत्कालमेवाभावः प्रसज्येत?

1.184. Pūrvapakṣin: If from the knowledge of Brahman, avidyā (lit. non-comprehension) should disappear then there ought to occur at that very moment the disappearance of the ego-complex (viz., the body, etc.) which has that (viz., avidyā) as its cause.

न; संस्कारादप्यग्रहणानुवृत्तेः सम्भवात्; भयानुवृत्तिवत्। तथाहि – सम्यग्ज्ञानात् निवृत्तमपि भयं स्वसंस्कारादनुवर्तते, कम्पादिनिमित्तं च भवति।

Siddhāntin: No. Even from mental impressions there results the continuance of avidyā like the continuance of fear (after its cause has disappeared; e.g., the fear of serpent even with the knowledge of the rope in the rope-serpent illusion). To explain: even though removed by the knowledge of the real, fear persists on account of the mental impression and becomes the cause of trembling, etc.

तथा ग्रहणमपि स्वसंस्कारादनुवर्तते अहङ्कारग्रन्थेश्च निमित्तं भवतीति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नमस्ति॥

Similarly avidyā (a-grahaṇa) also through its saṃskāra (mental traces left behind) continues and becomes the progenitor of ahaṅkāra-granthi or ego-complex. As such there is nothing that offends reason.

1.185 ✅

ननु न सर्वे वेदान्ता विद्यार्थमेवारभ्यन्ते, तदेकदेशः क्रममुक्तिफलाय ऐश्वर्याय अभ्युदयार्थं कर्मसमृद्धये चोपासनानि विविधान्युपदिशन् उपलभ्यते।

1.185. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, not all the Vedānta texts proceed to expound vidyā (i.e., the knowledge of Reality); a part of the Vedānta is understood as expounding a variety of upāsanās (or modes of contemplation) for the attainment of the reward of ‘salvation by gradation (karma-mukti)’, for achieving super-human powers and for the speedy fruition of karma performed with the object of attaining svarga (abhyudaya).

सत्यम्; उपासनाकर्म तु ब्रह्म, तच्च अपाकृताशेषप्रपञ्चं जीवस्य निजं रूपमिति निरूपयितुम् अखिलप्रपञ्चजन्मादिहेतुतया प्रथमं सर्वात्मकं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति च ब्रह्म लक्षितम्।

Siddhāntin. – It is true. The object of contemplation however is Brahman (i.e., the qualified Brahman) and that (Brahman) when divested of all determinations is the real nature of the individual soul (jīva); and in order to clarify this point (viz., that jīva is identical with Brahman), Brahman who is the inner self of all, the omniscient, and omnipotent was first (i.e., prior to the negation of attributes) defined as the cause of the origin, etc., of the entire universe.

1.186 ✅

अस्यां चावस्थायामनपाकृत्यैव ब्रह्मणि प्रपञ्चं तेन तेन प्रपञ्चेनोपधीयमानं ब्रह्म तस्मै तस्मै फलायोपास्यत्वेन विधीयते, दर्शपूर्णमासार्थाप्प्रणयनमिव गोदोहनोपरक्तं पशुभ्यः;

1.186. And in that (state of avidyā) without negating the world in Brahman, the contemplation of Brahman as qualified by specific attributes is enjoined for specific rewards. It is like the mandate specifying the ‘milk-jar’ (go-dohana) for fetching water if one desires cattle – which mandate occurs in the Darśa-pūrṇamāsa (new-moon and full-moon sacrifices) context.

तस्मात् तदर्थोपजीवित्वादितरस्य आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्त इति न विरुध्यते॥ [BrS.1. L.40]

Hence since the other (section of the Vedānta) is but subsidiary to that (section relating to the nirguṇa-Brahman) there is no contradiction in the (commentator’s) statement, viz., ‘It is for the elucidation of the knowledge of ātman-identity that all Vedāntas (Vedānta texts) proceed’.

1.187 ✅

ननु अब्रह्मोपासनान्यपि वेदान्तेषु दृश्यन्ते प्राणादिविषयाणि,

1.187. Pūrvapakṣin. – Are not meditations on what is non-Brahman, such as those embracing prāṇa (life-breath), etc., perceived (to be stated) in the Vedāntas?

सत्यं, तान्यपि कार्यब्रह्मावाप्तिक्रमेण मुक्तिफलान्येव। वक्ष्यत्येतत् सूत्रकारः – ‘कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात्’ इति।

Siddhāntin. – It is true. They also have mukti as their end though by gradation (the purified jīva first reaching the Hiraṇya-garbha-loka). And this is mentioned by the composer of the aphorisms – “With the disappearance of the world of Hiraṇya-garbha, they, the purified souls, reach in the company of the Lord of that region, Brahman that transcends Hiraṇya-garbha, as declared in the Śruti”.

[BrS.1. L.41]

1.188 ✅

यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां, तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः इति प्रतिज्ञातेऽर्थे वेदान्तानां तात्पर्यमुपदर्शयितुं समन्वयसूत्रप्रमुखैः सूत्रवाक्यैः ग्रथितो न्यायः इति दर्शयति।

1.188. [“That this is the substance of all the Vedānta texts, we shall show in (expounding) this Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā”] – in these words the commentator points out that the logical proofs (nyāya) which are (as it were) strung together on the aphoristic sentences commencing from the Samanvaya sūtra (i.e., the fourth sūtra of the first pada in the I Chapter) are meant to show that the purport of all the Vedānta-texts is the one set forth here.

शरीरमेव शरीरकं, शरीरके भवः शारीरको जीवः। तमधिकृत्य कृतो ग्रन्थः शारीरकः। तदिह वेदान्तानां जीवस्य तत्त्वमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तानां ब्रह्मरूपतायां पर्यवसानमिति कथयितुं प्रणीतानां शारीरकं जीवतत्त्वमधिकृत्य कृतत्वमस्तीति शारीरकाभिधानम्।

(The word ‘śārirakaḥ’ is thus explained); ‘śarira’ is ‘śarirakam’ (the body), ‘śārirakaḥ’ – jīvaḥ (the embodied soul or the individual self); and the work composed having that (individual self) as its subject-matter (i.e., the Uttara-mīmāṃsā) is śārirakaḥ. Because the Vedānta texts start with the main object of elucidating the nature of the individual self and end in showing that the self is of the nature of Brahman, it comes to this that the aphorisms composed (by Bādarāyaṇa) for pointing out this fact (viz., that the Vedānta teaches the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman) purport to have been composed, having the embodied soul (śārirakam-jivatatvam) as their topic. Hence here (in this commentary) the name ‘śārīraka’ (is given to the sūtras).

1.189 ✅

मुमुक्षुत्वे सति अनन्तरं ब्रह्मज्ञानं कर्तव्यमिति यद्यप्येतावान् सूत्रस्य श्रौतोऽर्थः; तथापि अर्थात् ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य मोक्षः प्रयोजनं निर्दिष्टं भवति।

1.189. Though the sūtra (viz., ‘athāto Brahma-jijñāsā) from its express statement means only that one should endeavour to attain Brahma-knowledge after the longing for release has arisen, still by presumption (arthāpatti) it is as good as declared that the release is the fruit (phala) of Brahma-knowledge.

तथा हि – पुरुषार्थवस्तुकामनानन्तरं यत्र प्रवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते, तस्य तत्साधनत्वमप्यर्थान्निर्दिष्टं प्रतीयते। तथा सति कुतः तत् मोक्षसाधनं ब्रह्मज्ञानं भवतीत्यपेक्षायां अर्थात् अस्माच्छास्त्राद्भवतीति शास्त्रस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विषयो निर्दिष्टः।

To explain: where following a desire to obtain an object which is a human end, a certain course of action is enjoined, there its instrumentality in bringing it about is also seen by presumption to be indicated. As such (i.e., where through Brahma-knowledge inquiry is established as the means of release) when questioned how Brahma-knowledge becomes the means of attaining that mokṣa (we say), that it is intimated from this Śāstra (sūtras), by implication, so that Brahma-knowledge (the Brahma to be known – jñeya-Brahman) is pointed out as the viṣaya (subject or topic) of the śāstra.

1.190 ✅

तदेवं मुमुक्षुत्वानन्तरं ब्रह्मज्ञानकर्तव्यतोपदेशमुखेन वेदान्तानां विषयप्रयोजननिर्देशेऽप्यार्थं सूत्रस्य व्यापारं दर्शयित्वा तदपेक्षितमप्यर्थात् सूत्रितमविद्यात्मकबन्धमुपर्वण्य प्रतिज्ञातार्थसिद्धये हेत्वाकाङ्क्षायामस्मिन्नेव तं प्रदर्शयिष्याम इति व्याख्येयत्वमुपक्षिप्य व्याख्यातुकामः प्रथमं तावत् प्रयोजनविषययोरुपादाने निमित्तमाह –

1.190. Therefore it is that, having shown that the (first) sūtra reveals by implication both viṣaya and prayojana (phala) of the Vedānta-Mīmāṃsā Śāstra, by first inculcating the duty of acquiring Brahma-knowledge following closely upon the longing for freedom, then having described the nescience-constituted bondage which is desiderated by them (viz., viṣaya and prayojana) and which is implicit therein (in the sūtra), and, on the need arising for reasoning to substantiate the proposition set forth (viz., that the whole of the Vedānta is concerned in the exposition of the identity of the individual self with the supreme self), having declared (in these words) – “we will in this very śāstra (i.e., the sūtras) show it (viz., pratijñātārtha) thereby suggesting the propriety of commenting (on the śāstra), – he, the Bhāṣyakāra wishing to undertake the commentary states the reason why at the very commencement, prayojana and viṣaya have been taken for consideration –

[BrS.1.1.1 L.1]

वेदान्तमीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदमादिमं सूत्रम् – अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति॥

[“of the Vedānta-mīmāṃsā or discussion on the meaning of the Vedānta texts to be commented upon, this viz., ‘then therefore the inquiry into Brahman’, is the first sūtra”].

1.191 ✅

अयमस्यार्थः – शास्त्रस्यादिरयम्। आदौ च प्रवृत्त्यङ्गतया प्रयोजनं विषयश्च दर्शनीयः। सूत्रं चैतत्। अतो यः कश्चिदर्थः शब्दसामर्थ्येनार्थबलाद्वा उत्प्रेक्षितः स सर्वः तदर्थमेवेति भवत्ययमर्थकलापः तन्महिमाधिगतः।

1.191. This is what it (the above bhāṣya) means: Of the Vedānta-mimāṃsā śāstra (i.e., the Vedānta-aphorisms) this is the first. And in the beginning, prayojana – the desired end, (and) viṣaya – the content, have to be made known to subserve the purpose of inducing one to undertake (the study). And this is a sūtra; therefore whatever import comes to light either from the denotativeness of the words or from implication, the whole of it, is its import only, so that the sūtra by its very potency is connotative of a number of meanings.

एवं सूत्रस्यादित्वेन कारणेन सूत्रतया च विषयप्रयोजनं तत्सिद्धिकरं चाविद्याख्यं बन्धं तत्सामर्थ्यावगतमापाद्य तत्र सूत्रसामर्थ्यं दर्शयितुं प्रतिपदं व्याख्यामारभ्यते।

Because of the reason that this sūtra is the first (in the series) and because it is an aphorism, having stated that viṣaya, prayojana and bondage of the nature of avidyā, necessitated for securing those (two, viz., viṣaya and prayojana), are all ascertained by postulation (śrutārthāpatti) (the commentator) begins the explanation of every word to show the competency of the sūtra therein (i.e., in yielding the meanings referred to).

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादिश्रीशङ्करभगवद्पादान्तेवासिवरश्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायामध्यासभाष्यं नाम प्रथमवर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the First Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

जिज्ञासाधिकरणविषयाः
अथ द्वितीयवर्णकम्

VARṆAKA II VEDĀNTA – NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI

2.1 ✅

सिद्धैव ननु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा? ‘अथातो धर्माजिज्ञासे’ति सकलवेदार्थविचारस्योदितत्वात्।

2.1. Anārambhavādin. – Well, the inquiry into Brahman is as good as accomplished since the investigation into the meaning of the whole body of the Veda is rendered explicit in (the Sūtras of Jaimini’s Pūrvamīmāṃsā beginning with) – ‘Then therefore inquiry into the nature of Dharma.’

ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य च चोदनालक्षणत्वेन धर्मस्वरूपत्वात्, अतः सिद्धैव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि॥

Further, since the knowledge of Brahman comes within the purview of vidhi (Veda mandate) it acquires the character of Dharma. Hence Brahma-jijñāsā also has indeed received full treatment (in the scholium of Jaimini).

2.2 ✅

अभ्यधिकाशङ्काभावादिति।

2.2. Because (also) there exists no additional doubt to demand a fresh inquiry.

2.3 ✅

अत्र केचिदभ्यधिकाशङ्कां दर्शयन्तो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां पृथक् आरभन्ते। केयमत्राभ्यधिका॥

2.3. Ārambhavādin. – Here some (critics) pointing to the existence of an additional doubt (āsamkā) (find the need to) commence a separate investigation into the nature of Brahman.

शङ्का चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः इति ब्रुवता विधेः प्रामाण्यं दर्शितम्।

Now the question is – which is here the additional āsamkā? That Vidhi or Veda injunction is authoritative as a valid means of knowledge was shown (by Jaimini) when formulating (the Sūtra), ‘codanā-lakṣaṇo artho Dharmaḥ’ – (vide : Vol. LXXXIX, p. 17, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series).

अत्र केषुचिद्वाक्येषु विधिरेव न श्रूयते, ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ (छा. उ. ६-२-१) इत्येवमादिषु;

Here (i.e., in the Vedānta) the Vidhi is not declared at all in some statements as in – “Sad eva saumya idam agra āsīt” – “Existence alone this (world) was in the beginning, my dear” (ChanU.6.2.1, etc.).

2.4 ✅

यत्रापि विधिः श्रूयते ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ (बृ. उ. २-४-५) ‘तस्मिन् यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यम्’ (छा.उ.५-१०-५) इति तत्र यद्यपि कृत्या अविशेषेण विधौ स्मर्यन्ते; तथापि, यो भावाभिधायी तव्यप्रत्ययः, स क्रियायां पुरुषं नियोक्तुं शक्नोति।

2.4. And where Vidhi is declared as in “ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ” – “Lo, verily is the ātman to be seen” (BrhU.2.4.5); and in “Tasmin yad antaḥ tad anveṣṭavyam, tad vāvavijijñāsitavyam” – “That which is within it, that is to be sought, and that alone is to be inquired into” (ChanU.5.10.5) – there, no doubt grammar (smṛti) warrants the use of the terminations ‘-tavya’ etc. (as in draṣṭavyaḥ) in the sense of Vidhi, on the ground that there is no distinction (between the ‘tavya termination and liṅ when expressing a mandate).

2.5 ✅

यत्र पुनः कर्म प्राधान्येनोच्यते, तत्र द्रव्ये गुणभूतां क्रियां न कार्यान्तरसम्बन्धित्वेन विधातुं शक्नोति।

2.5. Even then it is only that ‘-tavya’ termination which denotes the root-meaning (as in gantavyaḥ) that is competent to direct the person to undertake an act since primacy (there) is in relation to action, but if it is used with the emphasis on the object (i.e., on that which is in the objective relation), there it cannot enjoin the act that is adjectival (guṇabhūta, i.e., subordinate) to the object as related to some other kārya (phala, viz., mokṣa).

द्रव्यपरत्वे चानुत्पाद्यत्वात्, अविकार्यत्वात्, अनाप्यत्वात्, असंस्कार्यत्वात्, संस्कृतस्य च कार्यान्तरे उपयोगाभावादसंस्कार्यत्वम्।

And if (it be supposed that) the injunction (as expressed in ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ) refers to the ‘atiśaya’ produced in the object (dravya), since (ātman) is not something that is to be originated, something to be modified, something to be obtained, nor, something that is to be purified, (there can be no injunction relating to ātman). And because even when purified it (ātman) serves no purpose in any other act, it does not admit of any purification.

2.6 ✅

अतः ‘आत्मानमुपासीते’त्यात्मन ईप्सिततमत्वं न सम्भवति॥

2.6. Hence, in statements like ‘ātmānam upāsīta’ – ‘meditate on ātman’ ātman ceases to be (sought as) the most desired object.

अथ पुनर्विपरीतो गुणप्रधानभावः सक्तुन्यायेन कल्प्येत,

Anārambhavādin. – Well, why not suppose, on the analogy of ‘saktu-homa’, the reversal of the order of principal and subsidiary?

तत्रापि न ज्ञायते किं तदुपासनम्? कथं चात्मना तत् क्रियत इति?

Ārambhavādin. – Even then it is not known which that meditation is, and how that is done by ātman (i.e., what the instrumentality of ātman is).

अथ ज्ञायते ज्ञानमुपासनम्, आत्मा च विषयभावेन तन्निर्वर्तयतीति,

Anārambhavādin. – Well, it is (certainly) known: – jñāna itself is upāsanā, and ātman in its character as viṣaya is the cause of it (i.e., meditation). (Ātman as the object of meditation is Karma-kāraka and in its capacity as affecting the viṣaya is in the instrumental relation).

2.7 ✅

एवं तर्हि तदेवायातं ज्ञानेनात्माऽऽप्यत इति, तच्च कृतकरणमनर्थकम्; नित्याप्तत्वादात्मनः। संस्कार्यत्वे चोपयोगाभाव उक्तः।

2.7. Ārambhavādin. – If so, (i.e., if ātman stands in the objective relation to jñāna-kriyā) there would be the same predicament that ātman is something to be had (āpyate – to be originated) by jñāna (the cognitive act enjoined by the root terminating in ‘tavya’). And that is purposeless, amounting as it does to doing a thing that has been done (kṛta-karaṇam), for ātman is eternally existent (i.e., self-revealing and is not something to be originated). And it has been said that no purpose is served by the purification of ātman (unlike the purified rice).

अतो विध्यभावादविवक्षितार्था वेदान्ताः, इति धर्मजिज्ञासानन्तरं स्नाने प्राप्त इदमारभ्यते – अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति॥ अनन्तरं ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यं, न स्नातव्यमित्यभिप्रायः।

Hence as there is no room for vidhi (in the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā) one would suppose that the Vedānta texts carry no (direct) import with them and that as such the study-completion-bath should follow immediately after the inquiry into what constitutes Dharma. (To point out that such a view is wrong) this, viz., ‘Then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Brahman’ is begun (i.e., Bādarāyaṇa begins the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā with this aphorism). What is meant is that without a break (anantaram, i.e., immediately after completing Dharma-jijñāsā), Brahman has to be inquired into (Brahma-jijñāsitavyam), and the ‘bath’ should not be performed (na snātavyam).

2.8 ✅

कर्माभिधायिनोऽपि कृत्यप्रत्ययान्नियोगसंप्रत्ययान्न नियोक्तृत्वं निराकर्तुं शक्यते; ‘कटस्त्वया कर्तव्यः’ ‘ग्रामस्त्वया गन्तव्यः’ इतिवत्।

2.8. No doubt the objective relation is denoted (in the vākya) but yet from the ‘-tavya’ termination the vidhi (a niyoga) is apprehended and as such it is impossible to discard niyoktṛtva (i.e., we must posit an agency from which the mandate emanates; here it is the śruti or Veda; ordinarily it is a person); that this is so is evident in commands like ‘the mat has to be made by you’, ‘the village has to be reached by you’.

2.9 ✅

यत्तूक्तं – द्रव्यपरत्वे प्रयोजनाभावादानर्थक्यं नियोगस्येति, तदसत्; अविद्योच्छेदस्योपलभ्यमानत्वात्। अविद्या च संसारहेतुभूता॥

2.9. The statement that niyoga if it points to something (dravya) that is in the objective relation serves no purpose as being incapable of producing any result, is void of truth, because of the destruction of avidyā, which ensues (from this saṃskāra), and avidyā is the (veritable) cause of Saṃsara.

2.10 ✅

अपरे पुनरेवमारभन्ते – ब्रह्मणि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रत्ययान्तराणामसम्भवात् परिनिष्पन्ने वस्तुनि प्रतिपत्तिहेतुतया सम्भावितसामर्थ्यानामपि आम्नायस्य पुनः कार्यविषयतया सुतरामसम्भवं मन्वानस्य भवति

2.10. Others again argue thus: Perception and other pramāṇas (distinct from Śabda) though acknowledged to be capable of revealing existent objects since they generate their cognition, are incompetent in (so far as the revelation of) Brahman (is concerned); and as regards the Veda (āmnāya) it (such revelation) is wholly improbable seeing that it relates to something that is (yet) to be accomplished (kārya).

सङ्कर्षपर्यन्ते एव वेदार्थविचारावसानामिति बुद्धिः, तन्निरासार्थं पुनः प्रतिज्ञातम्।

To one who thinks thus the idea arises that Veda inquiry closes with the close of Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa. Hence this fresh resolve (as evidenced in the 1st Vedānta sūtra) to dispel (such an idea).

2.11 ✅

इहापि सर्वेष्वेवात्मज्ञानविधानेषु कार्यनिष्ठतां वर्णयन्ति समाम्। तत्त्वावबोधश्च कार्यम्; अधिकारिनियोगविषयतया अवगमात् इति; ततः तद्विचारार्थं शास्त्रमारब्धव्यमिति॥

2.11. Here also (in the Vedānta or Uttara-Mīmāṃsā) all the texts enjoining ātma-jñāna (e.g., ātmānam upāsīta-ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ) set out that kārya is their import in the same manner (as in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā). And the knowledge of Brahman (tatvāvabodha) is kārya (i.e., something to be attained by effort – kṛti-sādhya) because it is perceived as being related to the agent (adhikārin) and is the viṣaya of the mandate (niyoga). Therefore the Śāstra (Vedānta) should be begun with the object of investigating it.

2.12 ✅

अत्रोच्यते – नारब्धव्यम्; गतार्थत्वात्। कथम्? यस्तावत् प्रथम आरम्भप्रकारः कर्मणि कृत्यप्रत्यये न नियोगसंप्रत्यय इति, तत् स्वयमेव विधायकत्वं दर्शितम्। प्रसिद्धं चैतत् ‘स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः’ इत्येवमादीनां विधायकत्वम्। नात्राधिकाशङ्काकारणं किञ्चित्।

2.12. Anārambhavādin. – Here this will be said: The (Vedānta Śāstra) need not be commenced for the subject has already been dealt with. How? The reason first stated for commencing (the Vedānta Sūtras) was that from the ‘-tavya’ termination related to the object there arises no knowledge of niyoga (mandate). (But) it was shown that the injunctive character is expressed by itself (i.e., by the termination itself) and it is universally admitted that statements like ‘svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ – one should study one’s branch of the Veda’ are injunctive in character. (Hence) there is no reason to justify the postulation of any additional doubt (śaṅkā).

2.13-15 ✅

ननु चतुर्विधस्यापि क्रियाफलस्यात्मन्यसम्भव उक्तः।

2.13. Ārambhavādin. – Has it not been said that in neither of the four ways is the result of kriyā possible in ātman?

यद्येवं सक्तुन्यायो भविष्यति?

Anārambhavādin. – If that be so the analogy of saktu will step in.

तदपि न; आत्मविषयज्ञानस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वादित्युक्तम्।

Ārambhavādin. – Even that is not (pertinent). We have said that the knowledge pertaining to the self (i.e., ātman-cognition) is eternally established.

सिद्धस्यैव पुनरभ्यासो विधिनिमित्त उपासनाख्यो भविष्यति; अभ्युदयफले हिरण्यधारणवत्।

Anārambhavādin. – Even of that (ātma-jñāna) which is eternally existent concentration (lit. repetition) styled upāsanā (meditation) will be the result of vidhi for effectuating abhyudaya (mokṣa) like the wearing of a golden ornament.

ननु न विधानतोऽप्यात्मविषयज्ञानसन्तानः कर्तव्यः, स तु नित्यमात्मनि जाग्रतः सिद्धः?

Ārambhavādin. – It is not incumbent that the stream of ātman-consciousness should arise from the vidhi either, for that succession of cognitions relating to ātman is always present in one’s waking state.

एवं तर्ह्यर्थाविरुद्धेषु कालेष्वात्मन्येव चेतस्समाधानं भविष्यति॥

Anārambhavādin. – If so let during such times as one is disengaged from attending to the needs of the body (arthāviruddheṣu) the mind remain concentrated in ātman (prompted by vidhi).

यत् पुनरात्मज्ञानादविद्योच्छेदः तदुच्छेदात् संसारनिवृत्तिः फलमित्युपन्यस्तम्, तदसत्; अहमित्यात्मानं नित्यमेव जानाति सर्वो लोकः। न च संसारो निवृत्तः।

Again, you have argued that ātma-jñāna results in the elimination of nescience and that from its elimination results the cessation of the life-cycle (saṃsāra). This is untrue. The entire body of men always experience ātman as the ego (aham) and yet saṃsāra has not ceased.

अथ पुनरहंप्रत्ययावसेयादन्यदेवात्मरूपं पराकृतभोक्तृभोक्तव्यभोगग्रन्थिज्ञेयत्वेनात्मज्ञानविधिना ज्ञाप्यत इति,

Ārambhavādin. – Our contention, however, is that ātman-entity which is quite distinct from what is given in the ego-notion, and which has cut asunder the knot (of the notions) of experiencer-experienced-experiencing, is brought to mind by the Jñāna-vidhi (viz., the mandate – Ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ) as something to be known (i.e., the injunction has as its content the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman).

तदसत्; विधिर्हि सामान्यतः सिद्धस्य क्रियात्मनो विशेषसिद्धौ प्रभवति, नात्यन्तमसिद्धसद्भावे।

Anārambhavādin. – That is wrong; for it is evident that a vidhi is competent to reveal a particular when in its general aspect as action it is understood and not in regard to the revelation of a thing that is absolutely non-existent.

तद्यदि नाम ज्ञानं लोके सिद्धं, तथापि निरस्तप्रपञ्चात्मविषयमसिद्धं आकाशमुष्टिहननवत् न विधातुं शक्यम्।

It may be said that patently such knowledge (i.e., mere ātma-jñāna) is possessed by all; but still the knowledge pertaining to pure consciousness from which the world has been eliminated (i.e., the quality-less pure Being devoid of all upādhis) is asiddha (i.e., unsupported by evidence), and any injunction for its effectuation (kārya) is as impossible as commanding one to strike the void with one’s fist.

अथ तादृगात्मज्ञानं सिद्धम्?

Ārambhavādin. – But the knowledge of such ātman (i.e., ātman divested of all upādhis) is comprehended (by all).

किं विधिना?

Anārambhavādin. – What then is the use of the mandate?

यदपि मतान्तरं प्रत्यक्षादेरगोचरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य च कार्यार्थत्वात् सङ्कर्षपर्यन्त एव विचारे वेदार्थपरिसमाप्तौ प्राप्तायां वेदान्तेष्वपि कार्यनिष्ठता समाना,

Ārambhavādin. – Even as regards the other view (referring to the second critic), viz., that since the revelation of the supreme lies outside the cognitive range of perception, etc., and since the Śāstra (Veda) relates to something that is to be accomplished (kāryārthatvāt), the Veda inquiry closes with the Saṅkarṣa-kāṇḍa (so far pūrva-pakṣa), it should be noted that the mandatory character (kārya-paratā) of the Vedānta texts is equally (evident).

ब्रह्मतत्त्वावबोधश्च कार्यम्; अधिकारिनियोगविषयतया अवगमात्; अतः तद्विचाराय शारीरकारम्भः इति,

The cognition of the nature of Brahman is kārya (i.e., that which can be acquired by effort, kṛti-sādhya), for this is known from the fact that it is in intimate relation to the adhikārin (one who desires liberation) and is the content of niyoga. As such (there is justification for) the commencement of the Śārīraka Mīmāṃsā for its inquiry (i.e., inquiry for the knowledge of Brahman).

तदप्युक्तेन न्यायेन ब्रह्मावगमस्य सिद्धत्वे असिद्धत्वे च कार्यत्वासम्भवेन प्रत्युक्तम्॥

Anārambhavādin. – We have refuted that also having pointed out, on the strength of the reasoning already adduced, that kārya (or Niyoga) is out of place whether the cognition of Brahman does actually exist or does not exist.

2.16 ✅

अपरं मतम् – सत्यं कार्यविषयो वेदः, न तु तावन्मात्रे;

2.16. Another Ārambhavādin. – Here is a different view. It is true that the Veda has kārya as its content but its office is not confined to that alone.

तस्मिन् सति यो योऽर्थोऽवगम्यते स स वेदार्थः, यथा रूपे सति चक्षुषः प्रवृत्तिः, न च रूपमात्रं चक्षुषो विषयः, किं तु तस्मिन् सति द्रव्यमपि;

When it is there (i.e., the vidhi-vākya or mandatory statement (denoting kārya) whatever things are cognised, are each one of them to be regarded as having been denoted by it (viz., the vidhi); for example, when colour is presented to the eye, it starts functioning, but it is not the colour only that is the object of sight; on the other hand the substance also along with the colour.

2.17 ✅

एवमिहापि वस्तुतत्त्वमपि विषयः।
कथम् तत्?

Similarly here (i.e., in the mandatory statement having Kriyā as its content) the essence of Reality (Vastu-tatva – the pure Brahman) also is the viṣaya.
2.17. Anārambhavādin. – How is that?

उच्यते – ‘इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (बृ. उ. २-४-६) इति न तावत् सर्वात्मरूपता आत्मन उपदिश्यते। यदि सर्वरूपता आत्मन उपदिश्येत, ततः सर्वस्य अचेतनत्वात् तद्रूपत्वे बोद्धृत्वहानौ बोधकत्वं शब्दस्य हीयेत;

Ārambhavādin. – This is how – (from the Upaniṣad text) ‘what all this (meaning thereby, the universe) is, that is ātman’ (BrhU.2.4.6), it is not intended to teach that ātman is of the very nature of this all. If ātman were taught as being identical with the all (i.e., the world) then since insentience is the mark of this all, ātman would also assume that form (i.e., become insentient); this would lead to the elimination of knower (lit. the knowerhood – bodhṛtva) thus depriving the śabda (Veda) of its knowledge-imparting character (for when there is none to receive knowledge, the Veda would lose its knowledge-imparting function).

अतः सर्वस्य आत्मस्वभावता विधीयते। अनात्मस्वरूपविलयेन हि वस्तुनोऽवगतिर्दृष्टा।

Hence what is enjoined is that the all is of the essence of ātman (i.e., the universe derives its existence from the Supreme ātman and has no independent existence); it is indeed from the elimination of what is non-ātman (viz., the world) that the knowledge of reality comes.

ननु अत्र विधिः न श्रूयते;
कल्प्यतां तर्हि विधिः।

Anārambhavādin. – Well, here no vidhi is mentioned.
Ārambhavādin. – If so let a Vidhi be understood.

2.18 ✅

किं प्रतीते विध्यर्थे विधिः कल्प्यते? उत अप्रतीते? यदि प्रतीते कल्प्यते, कल्पनावैर्यथ्यम्। अर्थप्रतीत्यर्थं हि शब्दो मृग्यते। प्रतीतेऽर्थे शब्दं कल्पयता किं कृतं स्यात्?

2.18. Anārambhavādin. – Is (the word denoting) a mandate (Niyoga) to be postulated when the meaning of the Vidhi has been comprehended or when it is not comprehended? If postulated after comprehension, the postulation is of no use. A word is sought, as is well known, only for the understanding of the content (of a Vidhi), but what is it that is achieved by one who postulates a word when that content is (already) known?

अथाप्रतीत एव विध्यर्थे विधिं कल्पयित्वा ततोऽर्थः प्रतिपत्तव्य इति, अपूर्वं प्रमाणकौशलम्।

If you should argue that having premised a word denoting vidhi only in relation to what is wholly uncomprehended (viz., vidhyārtha-niyoga or apūrva), the thing – Niyoga is to be understood from that (from the mandatory termination – liṅ. etc.), (it can only be said) that the reasoning (i.e., your way of imagining the vidhi) is highly ingenious.

2.19 ✅

ननु अश्रूयमाणविधिष्वपि ‘तस्मात् पूषा प्रपिष्टभागोऽदन्तको हि’ इत्यादिषु विधिः कल्पितः।

2.19. Ārambhavādin. – Well, even when the vidhis are not declared as in “Therefore the kneaded flour indeed belongs to the sun who is toothless, etc.” the vidhi is premised.

सत्यम्; युक्तं तत्र पूष्णः पिष्टद्रव्यसम्बन्धः समासाभिहितो न सिद्धो वर्तते, नापि कुतश्चिद्भविष्यतीति; प्रमाणाभावात्।

Anārambhavādin. – It is true. There it is appropriate, for the sun’s connection with the flour-substance is (merely) denoted by the compound (prapiṣṭabhāgaḥ, i.e., the relation between substance and deity is known from the ‘Bahu-vrīhi’ compound - prapiṣṭaḥ, bhāgaḥ yasya saḥ); it (the relation) does not exist as accomplished and will not come into being from something (apart from yāga) because of the absence of any corroborative evidence.

नापि विधिना केनचित् पदैकवाक्यता, येन वपोत्खननादिवत् कथञ्चिदालम्बनं कल्प्येत; अतो निरालम्बनत्वपरिहाराय कार्यपरता कल्प्यत इति॥

Nor is this statement (pūṣā, etc., laudatory) to necessitate its connection with some mandatory statement (vidhi-vākya) to secure syntactical unity, as, had it been so, (laudatory vākya) we might, somehow posit the syntactical relation (ālambana) on the analogy of the vākya relating to the unsheathing of the omentum (vapotkhanana). Hence to avoid discontinuity (nirālambana) we presume that this vākya (pūṣā, etc.) has reference to Kārya.

2.20 ✅

ननु इहाप्यात्मपदं चेतनस्य भोक्तुर्वाचकम्; स च नियोज्यत्वान्नियोगमाक्षिपति,

2.20. Ārambhavādin. – Well, even here (i.e., in the sentence – ‘idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā’ – what all this is, that is ātman) the word ātman denotes the sentient agent who is the enjoyer, and because he is the one to be mandated there is need for the mandate (niyoga).

नैतत् सारम्; नियोगो हि पुरुषविशेषमनाश्रित्य अनुपलब्धो लोके तमाक्षिपेत् विश्वजिदादिषु। पुरुषः पुनः किं नियोगमन्तरेण नोपलब्धो लोके?

Anārambhavādin. – This is vapid. It is true that niyoga is not perceived to exist in the world independently of its association with a specifically denoted person and as such it desiderates a specific person as in yāgas like viśva-jit, etc. But is it that a puruṣa independently of any niyoga unthinkable by us so that it would be incumbent to supply a vidhi (niyoga)?

2.21 ✅

येन विधिकल्पना भवेत्। अथापि भवतु नाम विधिः, नासौ धातुना विना केवलो लभ्यते, धातुनैव सह कल्प्यते। कोऽसौ धातुः? यदि तावत् कर्तव्यमिति, तत्र अनात्मस्वभावता न निवृत्ता प्रपञ्चस्य।

2.21. Still let us grant the existence of vidhi (in the statement – idam sarvam, etc., but) that (vidhi) is not perceived to exist by itself unconnected with the root. It is therefore to be postulated along with a root. Which is the root? If (you should answer that) the root is (kṛñ in ‘kartavyam’ understood), (even then) the non-ātman (that is – the insentient) nature of the world will not be eradicated.

यथा – ‘अमी पिष्टपिण्डाः सिंहाः क्रियन्तामि’ति पिष्टस्वभावता न निवृत्ता। इतिकर्तव्यता चानिर्दिष्टा; तत्र साकाङ्क्षं वचनमनर्थकं स्यात्।

It is like the injunction ‘Let these flour-balls be modelled into lions’ where even after the injunction is carried out, the nature of the flour is not effaced. And (it has also to be noted that) the auxiliaries (iti-kartavyatā) have not been indicated, so that the injunction-statement desiderating the auxiliaries would go in vain.

2.22 ✅

अथ ज्ञातव्य इत्यध्याह्रियेत? एवमपि स एव दोषः; अनात्मस्वभावता न निवृत्तेति, अशक्यार्थोपदेशश्च। न हि वस्तु वस्त्वन्तरात्मना ज्ञातुं शक्यते।

2.22. Now the word ‘jñātavyaḥ’ (to be known), it may be urged, is to be understood; but even then, there remains the identical fault – the non-ātman nature (of the world) will not disappear. Further it would amount to enjoining a thing that is unfit to be so enjoined (it is evident that knowledge jñāna, is not kṛti-sādhya). Indeed one thing cannot be understood as of the nature of another.

एवं तर्हि ज्ञातव्य इत्यध्याह्रियेत, तत्र धात्वर्थोनुवादः, प्रत्ययो विधायकः।

Ārambhavādin. – If that be so the word ‘jñātavyaḥ’ may be understood and there (i.e., when the ellipsis is supplied) the meaning of that root (dhātv-artha) is a mere restatement (anuvāda) and the termination (i.e., the ‘-tavya’ ending) is indicative of vidhi or mandate.

कुतः प्राप्तेरनुवादः? अभिधानत इति ब्रूमः।

Would you ask ‘From what is that jñāna derived of which this is the restatement’? We say it is from the words expressly stated (in the Vedānta texts like ‘tatvamasi’ which are distinct from the mandatory words).

एवं तर्हि विधानमनर्थकं, स्वाध्यायकाले एव निष्पन्नत्वात्ज्ञानस्य।

Anārambhavādin. – If that be so the enjoining (vidhānam) would become meaningless since even at the time of learning to chant the Vedas (of course this presupposes one who is competent to understand the significance of the words chanted) the jñāna (it must be admitted) has arisen.

2.23 ✅

पुनः कर्तव्यतया चोद्यते, यथा मन्त्रेषु।

2.23. Ārambhavādin. – As in the case of the mantras, jñāna once acquired is enjoined again to be acquired (i.e., kṛti-sādhya – the object of attainment by following the mandate).

प्रयोगवचनः तत्र विधायकः इति।

Anārambhavādin. – The prayoga-vacana there (in that context) is mandatory (vidhi-vākya; here there is none such).

इहापि प्रयोगवचनो विधायकः?

Ārambhavādin. – We say that here also (in the ātma-jñāna context) the prayoga-vacana is mandatory.

2.24 ✅

ननु मन्त्रेषु स्वार्थस्यान्यतः सिद्धत्वात् प्रत्ययपरत्वं युज्यते, इह तु स्वार्थविधिपराणां शब्दानां प्रत्ययपरत्वं विरुध्यते,

2.24. Anārambhavādin. – Well, as regards the mantras, since what they signify (viz., material, deity, etc.) is established from something other than themselves (viz., Brāhmaṇa) it is right that they should denote the (mere) jñāna (pratyaya), but here (in the sentence ‘idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā’) there would be contradiction if the words composing the vākya refer to the injunction of that which they signify (namely, the Brahman-nature of the world) as also to the injunction of jñāna.

2.25 ✅

नैष दोषः; अन्यार्थमपि कृतमन्यार्थं भवति, तद्यथा – शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते, ताभ्यश्च पानीयं पीयत उपस्पृश्यते च;

2.25. Ārambhavādin. – There is no blemish. What is meant to serve one object does (often) serve another; the instance in point is this: canals are cut for (irrigating) the fields, and from them thirst is quenched and ablutions made.

एवमिहापि। यथा पदार्थानां विधायकः शब्दः क्रमस्यापि विधायकः, एवं स्वार्थस्य विधायकः शब्दः प्रत्ययस्यापि विधायको भविष्यति॥

Even so here. Just as śabda (a Veda statement) enjoining (that one should acquire) the meanings of the words (composing it) enjoins also the order (of performance of a yāga), similarly śabda enjoining the acquisition of its own specific sense becomes the vidhi (mandate of jñāna).

2.26 ✅

तदेतदनिरूपितमिव दृश्यते। कथम्? मन्त्राः स्वाध्यायविधिनोपादापिताः स्वार्थस्यान्यतः सिद्धत्वात् तं प्रमातुमशक्नुवन्तः प्रमाणत्वात् प्रच्युताः व्रीह्यादिवत् प्रमेयतामापन्नाः श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणैः, युक्तं यद्विनियुज्येरन्,

2.26. Anārambhavādin. – This looks as if no thought has been bestowed (upon the subject). How (it may be asked)? The mantras, the prompting to chant which comes from the mandate requiring one to study one’s branch of the Veda, because their significance is determined by some other means (viz., Brāhmaṇas), cannot confer validity on it (i.e., on what they signify); having thus missed their claim, to serve as valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) they are ranked as prameya (object of knowledge) like rice (and barley, etc.) and as such it is but right that they should become auxiliaries to (yāgas) as ascertained from śruti, (liṅga, prakaraṇa, etc.).

विनियुक्ताश्चानुष्ठेयस्यानुष्ठानकाले स्मृत्यपेक्षस्य स्मारकतया गृह्येरन्निति, इह तु ‘इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मे’ति यत् पदसमन्वयनिमित्तं सर्वस्यात्मस्वभावताग्राहिविज्ञानं, तत् स्वविषयस्य अन्यतोऽसिद्धत्वात् प्रमेयपरत्वात् न विधेर्विषयः।

(The Mantras) construed (thus) as auxiliaries should be regarded as reminders since at the time of sacrifice the recollection of what ought to be done (e.g., taking out a certain quantity of grain for preparing the cake for oblation) is desiderated. But here the cognition which arises from the syntactical arrangement of words in the (Upaniṣad) sentence, ‘what all this manifold is, that is ātman’ points to the ātman-nature of this all and that cognition (vijñāna) is not the object of a vidhi; and it is so because its object (viṣaya) is not ascertained by anything ab extra.

अथ विधेर्विषयो न प्रमेयमवगमयितुमलम्। न युगपदुभयं सम्भवति; वैरूप्यप्रसङ्गात्॥

But if it should be the object of a mandate (vidhi) then it loses its capacity to make known a prameya. And neither could both (i.e., vidhi-viṣayatva and prameya-bodhakatva) manifest themselves at the same time for it would result in one and the same vākya denoting opposite senses (vairūpya-prasaṅgāt).

2.27 ✅

ननु एवं सति गुणकर्मणां सर्वत्र विधानं निराकृतं स्यात्।

2.27. Ārambhavādin. – If it be so (i.e., if it be thought that it is a blemish for the same sentence to convey senses which contradict one another) then the mandate, wherever it occurs, relating to auxiliary duties would be to no purpose.

न निराकृतं स्यात्; यत्र प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धं गुणकर्मणः कर्मकारकं, तत्र तस्योत्पत्त्याद्यन्यतमं फलं, तद्विधीयते;

Anārambhavādin. – It will not be purposeless. (There can be guṇa-vidhāna). Where (e.g., in the sentence, ‘he sprinkles rice’) that which stands in the objective relation (viz., rice) to the auxiliary karma (viz., sprinkling) is ascertained from a distinct pramāṇa, there karma (viz., sprinkling) which brings about as its result any one of the following – originations, etc., enjoined;

यत्र पुनः प्रमाणान्तरादसिद्धो ज्ञानस्य कर्मभूतो विषयः, स तेनैव प्रमीयमाणो न सिद्धवदुद्देश्यः, येन तदुद्देशेन तत्रातिशयाधानाय ज्ञानं विधीयते॥

where however the viṣaya that is in the objective relation to jñāna (as in ‘idam sarvam, etc.’) is not ascertained from a distinct pramāṇa, there it (the Karma-kāraka) is vouched for by the same (statement – tenaiva) and as such cannot be pointed to as uddeśya (on the supposition that it is) previously established (like vrīhi); for had it been so, there would be justification for the injunction of knowledge relating to it (Brahman) for the purpose of generating some new feature (atiśaya).

2.28 ✅

तस्मादत्र युगपदुभयासम्भवात् भवत्येव वैरूप्यप्रसङ्गः। न च स एव समन्वयः स्वावयवाद्विधेर्विभक्तः कार्यक्षमः; अवान्तरवाक्यस्य प्रमाणत्वायोगात्।

2.28. Hence here (in ‘idam sarvam, etc.’) since the two cannot arise simultaneously the statement cannot but denote ideas repellent to each other. And the same concourse of words when sundered from the mandatory word which is its (integral part) will be incapacitated from yielding any sense (i.e., no śābda-bodha relating to Brahman is possible) for a truncated sentence cannot convey any valid piece of knowledge (pramā).

2.29 ✅

अथ अर्थवादपदानामिव परस्परतः संसृज्य कञ्चिदर्थमवबोध्य विधिसम्बन्धमनुभवेदित्यभिप्रायः?

2.29. Ārambhavādin. – Well, we opine that like laudatory passages, (the statement ‘Satyam, jñānam, an-antam, Brahma’, etc.), having revealed some sense on the strength of the mutual relation (of the words composing it) gets into contact with a vidhi (or mandate – jñātavyaḥ).

तदसत्; युक्तमर्थवादपदानि स्वार्थफलरहितानि तत्र पर्यवसानाभावात् फलवदङ्गतामश्नुवीरन्निति,

Anārambhavādin. – That is not right. There is reason in the laudatory passages assuming a subsidiary position in relation to a main action which alone yields a fruit, because they cannot independently produce any fruit and as such are not complete in themselves.

इह पुनरपरामृष्टविधिः पदसमन्वयः स्वार्थमवगमयन् निरस्तनिखिलप्रपञ्चावग्रहमपास्तातिशयानन्दनित्यानुभवैकरसं शिवमद्वैतमात्मतत्त्वमवगमयेत्,

Here however (i.e., in “satyam jñānam anantam Brahma”) the collocation of words unrelated to any vidhi (mandatory statement) reveals while revealing its own sense, the real nature of ātman, (which is no other than) the cessation of all the mundane ills, the experience ne plus ultra of bliss, beatitude, and secondlessness.

तत्र कुतो विधिशेषता कृतं कृत्यं प्राप्तं प्रापणीयम्? ‘आत्मलाभान्न परं विद्ययते’ इति स्मृतेः॥

Then for what purpose (when thus the nature of ātman is revealed by ‘satyam jñānam, etc.) should one obtain the phala generated by making it (the ‘satyam, etc.’ vākya) subsidiary to a vidhi? This (viz., that nothing worthy is to be gained further) is borne out by the Smṛti text – “Nothing else is enjoined (i.e., to be gained) beyond the acquisition of ātman (ātmā-jñāna).”

2.30 ✅

अथ पुनः शाब्दज्ञानान्न तथा अनुभवः, तेन साक्षात्करणाय विधिरिति,

2.30. Ārambhavādin. – Well, that variety of experience is not to be had from verbal knowledge (śabda-jñāna). Hence the need of vidhi for its immediate apprehension.

किं तत् ज्ञानमनुभवाय विधीयते?

Anārambhavādin. – (We ask) by what instrument of knowledge is that jñāna which is enjoined for the acquisition of that experience produced?

प्रत्यक्षादीनां तावदगोचरः; ‘न चक्षुषा गृह्यते’ (मु. उ. ३-१-८) इत्यादिमन्त्रवर्णात्। शाब्दं च नेष्यते भवता,

As for perception, etc., they are powerless to generate such experience (lit. the Brahma-jñāna lies beyond the range of the senses), as witness the mantra (MunU.3.1.8; KathU.2.3.9), “With the eye it is not perceived,” and so on. And verbal knowledge (śabda-jñāna having the potency to destroy nescience) is not accepted by you, (because śabda gives only indirect knowledge and it is the immediate knowledge that is potent to dispel nescience).

सत्यम् न शाब्दज्ञानं विधिविकलमनुभवायालं, विहितं तु अनुभवहेतुरिति,

Ārambhavādin. – Yes, it is true. Śabda-jñāna if unassociated with vidhi is incompetent to produce the experience (which implies the negation of avidyā) but if associated it does serve as the hetu (instrument of that experience.)

तदयुक्तम्; यत्तावत् स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविधिग्राहितात् पदसमन्वयात् स्वभावतः समुत्पन्नं, तत् तावन्न विधीयते; प्रमेयपरतया विधिविषयत्वानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तम्।

Anārambhavādin. – That does not stand to reason. As for that jñāna which naturally arises from the contexture of words memorised as the result of the vidhi that one should study one’s branch of the Veda, it is not something that is enjoined; for it has already been said that since its sole purpose is to point to prameya (Brahman) there is no ground to regard it as the valid object (prameya) of a vidhi.

2.31 ✅

अथ पुनस्तदेव ज्ञानं सन्तनुयादिति विधीयते,

2.31. Ārambhavādin. – Well, we maintain that the vidhi (mandate) is to the effect that the same jñāna should be meditated upon continuously.

तत् कथं लभ्यत उपास्तिध्यायत्योः ज्ञानसन्तानवाचिनोरन्यतरस्याप्युपादानमन्तरेण?

Anārambhavādin. – How could it (i.e. the Vidhi relating to jñāna-saṃtāna) result in the absence of either of the verbal roots signifying upāsanā (upāsti) or dhyāna (dhyāyati) which express the cognition series?

नापि ज्ञानेनैव स्वसन्तानो लक्ष्यते; साहचर्याद्यव्यभिचरितसम्बन्धाभावात्।

Nor can it be urged that its own series is implied in a secondary sense in the word jñāna itself, since there exists no inseparable connection such as invariable concomitance (sāhacarya), etc.

नाप्यभ्यासात् साक्षाद्भावः सिद्धः। नापि श्रूयते, येन तदुद्देशेन ज्ञानसन्तानो विधीयेत।

And further the intuitive and immediate cognition of the Supreme cannot result from continual meditation. And there is no Veda text enjoining dhyāna (meditation on Brahman), by which had there been one, meditation on the cognition-series would have been enjoined for its sake (i.e., for immediate knowledge – sākṣāt-kāra).

2.32 ✅

ननु किमत्र श्रवणेन? स्वयमेव साक्षात्कारकरणाय पुरुषार्थत्वादभिमुखः पुरुषः; सिद्धश्च ज्ञानाभ्यासः शास्त्रश्रवणादौ साक्षात्करणे हेतुः,

2.32. Ārambhavādin. – Well, what is the purpose served here by a vidhi (śravaṇa, i.e., a mandate relating to it)? (None); for a man of his own accord (i.e., without the prompting of a vidhi) inclines towards the attainment of immediate knowledge since it (such sākṣāt-kāra) is the most cherished object. When the text (Srotavyo, mantavyo, nididhyāsitavyaḥ) is heard (the nature of ātman is cognised) and constant meditation on that is doubtless the hetu of immediate knowledge.

यद्येवं किं विधिना? स्वयमेव पुरुषार्थे निर्ज्ञाते हेतौ प्रवर्तते।

Anārambhavādin. – If that be so what is the good of vidhi? When it is understood that it leads to puruṣārtha (a human end) and when jñānābhyāsa which is the hetu is also known the person himself begins to act (i.e., practices contemplation ).

2.33 ✅

यत् पुनः निदर्शनं शाल्यर्थं कुल्याः प्रणीयन्ते इति, युक्तं तत्र; प्रत्यक्षत उभयार्थताया उपलभ्यमानत्वात्, इह पुनः निदर्शनं न्यायतः प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। स च न्यायो न युगपत् सम्भवतीत्युक्तम्।

2.33. The example however, which you have adduced, viz., that channels dug for the purpose of irrigating crops (incidentally serve other purposes is beside the point). There no doubt it holds good since it is perceived to actually serve a double purpose; here, on the other hand (i.e., in idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā) it has to be established by reason and it has been said (vide ante) that there exists no reason to suppose that both occur simultaneously.

2.34 ✅

यदपीदमुक्तं – पदार्थानां विधायकः शब्दः क्रमस्यापि विधायकः, एवमैकात्म्यस्य प्रतिपादकः समन्वयो विधिविषयमपि ज्ञापयिष्यतीति, तदप्यपेशलम्।

2.34. And what was said again, viz., that a vākya (śabda) decreeing padārthas (i.e., specifying particular yāgas) decrees also the order (of performance) and that similarly the vākya (samanvaya – fit combination of words, idam sarvam, etc.) which signifies the single ātman entity also puts in mind that to which the injunction relates is something that does not appeal either.

यत् तावत् प्रत्येकं प्रयाजादिविधयः, तैः पुनः न तेषामेव विधानम्। नापि ते क्रमशब्दाभिधेयाः।

Now in regard to the mandatory texts like prayāja referring to separate (yāgas) it must be noted that the mandates as expressed by them (texts) are applicable only to those (yāgas) and not to krama or order of performance. Now are they (viz., the yāgas such as Samit, Tanūnapāt, etc., fit to be) designated by the word ‘krama’.

प्रयोगवचनोऽपि प्रयुञ्जानः तानेव प्रयुङ्क्ते। न ते क्रम इत्युक्तम्॥

And the prayoga vākyas also directing the undertaking of the yāgas (padārthas) refer only to these (viz., prayājādi) and it has been said that they are not identical with krama or order of performance.

न च क्रमो नाम एकान्ततो नास्त्येव; तद्बुद्धिशब्दयोः निरालम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तत्र क्रमो नाम वस्तुभूतो धर्मो विद्यत एव।

And (it should be pointed out) that the existence of such an entity as krama cannot be wholly denied for if so there would be no basis for such a notion (viz., sequence) as well as for such a name (viz., anteriority – posteriority). (Since krama is the ground of both the notion of sequence and the term śabda, viz., the word ‘an-antara’) there certainly is such an entity as krama.

त एव केनचिदुपाधिना वनवत् क्रमबुद्धिशब्दालम्बनं भवेयुः। स्मृतिविज्ञानमेव वा अनुष्ठानकाले यथोपलब्धिपदार्थान् परामृशेत्। सर्वथा अस्ति तावत् एकैकपदार्थालम्बनज्ञानातिरिक्तं ज्ञानान्तरम्॥

They only (i.e., the padārthas like prayāja) become in association with some limiting adjuncts (as space and time) the ground for both the idea and the term on the analogy of ‘forest’. Or the recollective knowledge would, on the occasion of performance, (anuṣṭhāna-kāla) suggest the padārthas (prayājādi) in the order of remembrance (i.e., in the way each yāga is recollected). However it be, there does exist a jñāna (of krama) distinct from the jñānas arising severally from each of the padārthas (samit, iḍā, etc.).

तच्च एकत्वात् कर्तुः अनेकत्वाच्च पदार्थानां, युगपदनुष्ठानासम्भवादपेक्षितं सन्निहितं च प्रयोगवचनेन गृह्यत इति युक्तम्।

And that (distinct cognition of order) which is desiderated and which immediately presents itself is obtained by prayoga-vacana (injunction of performance), since the kartā or agent is one and since padārthas (fore-sacrifices) are many and as such it is out of the question that there could be simultaneous performance – this is right way of understanding.

न तथेह ज्ञानद्वयमस्ति; यदैकात्म्ये विधिविषयत्वे च वर्तेत।

But here no such double cognition exists (as in the other, where we have the knowledge of samit, etc., from Śabda and of krama by arthāpatti), which had it existed would have denoted the universal pervasion of ātman as well as the mandate (that such ātman is to be known).

तस्मादिह विधेयाभावाद्विधानाश्रवणादध्याहारे च प्रमाणाभावात् न प्रयोगवचनोऽस्ति, यो मन्त्राणामिव ज्ञानस्यापि पुनः प्रयोगं विधास्यते।

Therefore, owing to the absence here of anything fit to be enjoined, owing to the absence of any mention of a vidhi (expressed either by liṅ or -tavya termination) and also because no adhyāhāra (postulation of a vidhi to complete the sense) is warranted by any pramāṇa (say, arthāpatti), the prayoga-vacana, which would have decreed again the acquisition of jñāna also as in the case of mantras (where the prayoga-vidhi enjoins both mantra and mantra-jñāna) is not found (in this context).

तस्मादसदेतत् कार्यविषयोऽपि वेदो वस्तुतत्त्वं अवबोधयति इति॥

Hence the view is wrong that the Veda though having kārya (apūrva) as its subject, also expounds the nature of reality (viz., idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā).

2.35 ✅

यत् पुनः निदर्शनं – चक्षू रूपे सति द्रव्यमपि बोधयति एवं कार्ये सति तत्त्वमपि वेदोऽवगमयतीति। युक्तं तत्र यद्यदवबोधयति चक्षुः, तत्र स्वतन्त्रमेव प्रमाणम्, इह पुनः यत्र तात्पर्यं, तस्य प्रमेयता, न यद्यत् प्रतीयते, तस्य तस्य इति वैषम्यम्।

2.35. Again the example that you adduced, viz., just as the eye when it reveals the colour, reveals also the substance, the Veda revealing kārya, reveals also the nature of reality (is also inapplicable). There, no doubt it is appropriate; sense of sight is independently probative in every item of knowledge that it reveals, but here on the other hand the tātparya only, i.e., the sense (of the passage) as a whole invests it with validity (i.e., pramā-viṣayatā) and not each item of knowledge (that is given in isolated words) – this is what distinguishes (verbal from the perceptive knowledge).

2.36 ✅

आह – मा भूद्ज्ञानद्वयं, योऽयमाभिधानिकः प्रत्ययः, स विधिविषय एव भवतु। तस्मिन् विहिते अर्थात् सर्वस्यात्मस्वभावता सिध्यति; सविषयत्वादवगमस्य।

2.36. Ārambhavādin. – Let there be no two cognitions; let the knowledge which the denotative potency of the words yields subserve the object of the vidhi, and when the injunction is with reference to that (viz., what is denoted by śabda) then inevitably by arthāpatti pramāṇa the ātman-nature of the whole (world) results, for cognition means cognition of an object (i.e., cognition implies something cognized).

एवमपि अविवक्षितोऽर्थः शब्दात्, विवक्षितस्त्वर्थादिति शोभतेतरां वाक्यार्थवित्ता?

Anārambhavādin. – Even so (i.e., when you premise that the vākya – idam sarvam, etc., – is injunctive in character and that ātma-tatva results from Śrutārthāpatti) your construing the sentence (i.e., the manner in which you understand the sense of the Upaniṣad text – idam sarvam) is most amazing seeing (that in your interpretation) the sense which is not pertinent to the context (viz., injunction of knowledge results from the śabda, while what is pertinent (viz., the all-ātman nature of the world) results from arthāpatti.

2.37 ✅

न च नियोगतः प्रतिपत्तिविधिः वास्तवं संसर्गं गमयति। भवन्ति हि परिकल्पितविषया अपि प्रतिपत्तयश्चोदनालक्षणाः फलवत्यः ‘वाचं धेनुमुपासीते’त्येवमाद्याः।

2.37. Moreover, (i.e., apart from the fact of your illogical interpretation) it is not that the mandate regarding jñāna (pratipatti) invariably (niyogataḥ) denotes the relation of what it enjoins (viz., jñāna) with an object that is really existent (i.e., the injunction may not reveal that the relation between the world and ātman is real). The cognitions (pratipattayaḥ) which are enjoined by the Veda (codanā), it is well known, have (often) as their objects even those things which are only imagined (and not those which correspond to reality), and which (nevertheless) yield (some) fruit, as witness the statement ‘meditate on speech as the cow’, etc.

एतदेवात्र युक्तम्; अतत्परस्य प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधे तथाध्यवसायहेतुत्वायोगात्। तस्मात् कार्यनिष्ठे वेदे वस्तुतत्त्वसिद्धिः मनोरथ एव।

And this alone (viz., that jñāna has the imagined identity) is appropriate here (i.e., in this vākya, ‘idam sarvam, etc.’) the jñāna which is enjoined is incapable of producing the valid cognition of what stands as its object, very like the case of meditation on the ‘speech-cow,’ vak-dhenu), because the text when it does not (according to you) really mean that (viz., the ātman-identity of this-all) and when such identity-knowledge is also opposed to perception, etc., it becomes incapable of determining the sense as denoted (by the phrase – idam, etc.). Hence it is mere fancy to suppose that the Veda whose object is to denote action establishes the nature of reality (vastu-tatva).

2.38 ✅

अतो अहंप्रत्ययावसेय एवात्मा। न तस्य शब्दावसेयमतीन्द्रियं रूपान्तरमस्ति; शब्दस्य तत्र सामर्थ्याभावात्।

2.38. Therefore ātman is only that which is rendered explicit by the ego-notion (aham-pratyaya) and of that (ātman) there exists no other form (rūpāntaram, i.e., the entity characterised by world-negation – niṣprapañca-svarūpam) which is super-sensuous and determined (only) by verbal testimony, for śabda is not competent to reveal such an entity.

एवं च सति ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ (बृ. उ. २-५-१९) ‘एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतः’ (बृ. उ. ३-७-३) इति ब्रह्मान्तर्याम्यादिशब्दा अहंप्रत्ययावसेय एवात्मनि कथञ्चिद्वर्तन्ते। तेन ‘स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि’ (छा. उ. ६-८-७) इति विद्यमानैरारोपितैश्च गुणैरात्मोपासनं मोक्षफलं च विधीयते इति, युक्तम्।

When this is so the words ‘Brahman’, ‘antar-yāmin’, etc., found in the texts: – “This self (ātman) is Brahman (ayam ātmā Brahma)” (BrhU.2.5.19), “This person is your ātman, indweller, immortal (eṣa te ātmā antar-yāmyamṛtaḥ)” (BrhU.3.7.3) somehow (i.e., figuratively) find this significance in ātman as rendered explicit in the ego-notion. Hence it is but right to conclude that the text: ‘that is ātman, that thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7) (enjoins meditation on ātman in association with the qualities which either actually exist or are imagined, which (meditation) yields the fruit of mokṣa (freedom from bondage).

2.39 ✅

अतः कार्यानुरक्तस्य वेदार्थस्य सम्भवात् तस्य च सर्वात्मना विचारितत्वात् किमपरमवशिष्टम्? यत् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासारम्भं प्रयुञ्जीत,

2.39. Hence since the import of the (whole) Veda is to inculcate action (kārya or karma) and since it (karma) has been in all its aspects investigated (in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) what else is there remaining which would necessitate the commencing of the inquiry into the nature of Brahman?

2.40 ✅

उच्यते – स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि सर्व एव वेदार्थो विचार्यत्वेन ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासे’ति उपक्रान्तो विचारितश्च स्यात्, यावता कार्यनिष्ठ एव वेदभागो विचारितो, न वस्तुतत्त्वनिष्ठः॥

2.40. Parama-siddhānta. – It is thus answered: This would be so (viz., the anticipation of Uttara-Mīmāṃsā by Jaimini) if the whole of the Vedārtha had been taken up by him for investigation in formulating the Sūtra – athāto dharma-jijñāsā – ‘then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Dharma’ and investigated too. (On what ground, it may be asked, is it presumed that the entire Veda is not commented on by Jaimini)? Because (yāvatā) only that portion of the Veda which deals with duty – kriyā – has been inquired into and not that which relates to the essential nature of reality.

2.41 ✅

तथा हि – शास्त्रारम्भो व्याख्यातृभिरेवं निरूपितः। कथम्? धर्मो नाम कश्चित् साधयितुः कालान्तरे श्रेयस्साधनो लोकाख्यप्रमाणाभासोत्थेन ज्ञानेन सामान्यतो विषयीकृतः।

2.41. To explain: The introduction to the (Mīmāṃsā) Śāstra is thus set forth by the commentators. How? Dharma verily is some instrument by which the performer (of karma) obtains happiness (such as Svarga) in the future, (kālāntara, i.e., after death) and this Dharma in its general aspect is the viṣaya of the cognition arising from that semblance of pramāṇa (pramāṇābhāsa – men’s untutored perception) known by the name of loka.

तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपन्नाः परीक्षकाः केचिदग्निहोत्रादिकं धर्ममाचक्षते; केचिच्चैत्यवन्दनादिकम्। तत्र अग्निहोत्रादिलक्षण एव धर्मोऽभिप्रेतः। न तत्प्रतिपादकानां वेदवाक्यानां विचारावसरो नापि विवक्षितार्थत्वम्।

But as regards its specific nature thinkers hold diverse views. Some maintain that Dharma consists in agni-hotra, etc.; others, in the adoration at Buddhistic places of worship. (There being diversity of opinion the pūrvapakṣin like the Bauddha) argues thus: It is not that Dharma means only what is of the nature of agni-hotra, etc.; therefore there is no occasion for inquiring into the meaning of Veda sentences expounding agni-hotra, etc. Nor is there any meaning intended to be conveyed (by these Veda statements).

अतः चैत्यवन्दनादीनामेवान्यतमो धर्मः। तत्प्रतिपादकानां बुद्धादिवाक्यानामेवान्यतमं विचार्यम्; न वा तदपि।

Hence, of the adoration of Caitya, etc., what constitutes Dharma is only one of them and it is some one statement of Buddha expounding that (Dharma) that has to be inquired into, or not even that.

न हि पौरुषेये वाक्ये शब्दशक्त्यनुसारेणार्थः, अपि तु तेन विवक्षितः

For it is clear that in human utterances the meaning is not in conformity with the denotative potency of the word (śabda) but on the contrary with his (speaker’s) intended sense.

2.42 ✅

इत्येवमाशङ्किते धर्माय वेदवाक्यानि विचारयिष्यन् तदर्थविवक्षाविचारावसरप्रदर्शनार्थम् ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’ इति सूत्रयामास जैमिनिः। वेदमधीत्य अनन्तरं धर्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या, न स्नानं गुरुकुलनिवृत्तिरूपमिति दर्शयितुमिति।

2.42. When such a question is raised by the opponent (Bauddha or some other non-follower of the Veda, the Siddhāntin proceeds to answer). Intending to inquire (from the second Sūtra onwards) into the meaning of the Veda texts for (ascertaining what constitutes Dharma) Jaimini framed the (first) Sūtra – Athāto Dharma-jijñāsā – “then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Dharma” – i.e., to point out that the Veda conveys a specific sense that therefore there is occasion for investigation and that after gaining mastery over the Veda text, it is incumbent that one should undertake the inquiry into Dharma and not take the ceremonial bath which amounts to quitting the preceptor’s house.

एवं स्थिते शास्त्रारम्भे, न सर्ववेदार्थविषयं शास्त्रमिति प्रतीतिः, किन्तु धर्मातिरिक्तोऽपि सिद्धरूपो वेदार्थोऽस्ति, स च पर्युदस्तो जैमिनिना; न्यायान्तरविषयत्वादिति, गम्यते॥

When this is so, (i.e., when the introductory Sūtra, restricts the inquiry to Dharma) the idea is not, that the Śāstra (i.e., the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) embraces the entire Vedārtha but it is understood that there exists (a part of) the Veda significant of an accomplished entity (siddha-rūpa – already there, not coming into existence by one’s effort as is the case with Dharma), distinct even from Dharma, which is unnoticed by Jaimini since it forms the subject-matter of a separate philosophical system (Nyāya).

2.43 ✅

तत् कथम्? यत् तावदिदम्

2.43. Anārambhavādin. – How is it to be determined that this alone is (Jaimini’s) view? (i.e., on what grounds are we to suppose that the Pūrva-kāṇḍa deals with Dharma only and not the entire Veda?)

उच्यते; धर्मो नाम लोकप्रवादात् सामान्यतः सिद्धः। तस्य स्वरूपप्रमाणयोः विप्रतिपत्तावग्निहोत्रादिरपि वेदार्थो धर्मतया विचारपदवीमुपारोहति;

Ārambhavādin. – This is how it is determined. Now Dharma is understood in its general sense by what passes muster with the people but when conflicting views exist regarding its nature and its (validating) pramāṇa, even agni-hotra, etc., as the meaning of the Veda become fit for inquiry.

यतः तस्यापि विचारावसरो विद्यते, तेन विवक्षितोऽसौ। न चाध्ययनमात्रात् कृतकृत्यता।

Because inquiry into that also (i.e., whether Dharma means agni-hotra, etc., or something else) has been occasioned, it is but right to understand that the Veda has a specific sense to convey. And the mere recital (of one’s branch of the Veda) does not conclude one’s duty.

अतोऽध्ययनानन्तरं न गुरुकुलान्निवर्त्तितव्यं, किन्तु वेदार्थो धर्मः, किं वा अन्य एवेति जिज्ञासामर्हतीति वदितुं धर्मग्रहणं युक्तम् अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासेति, न वेदार्थजिज्ञासेति; यतो न वेदार्थतया ज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिः।

Hence after finishing the Veda recital, one ought not to quit the preceptor’s abode; on the contrary the question whether Vedārtha (i.e., the import of the Scriptures) is Dharma or anything else merits investigation. It is to point this out that the word Dharma has been rightly introduced into the aphorism ‘athāto Dharma-jijñāsā’ – “then therefore is the inquiry into the nature of Dharma” and not Vedārtha-jijñāsā; for no one will undertake (agni-hotra, etc.) if they are taken as the meaning of the Veda. (It is when agni-hotra means Dharma that one undertakes it.)

2.44 ✅

यत् पुनः धर्मस्य स्वरूपप्रमाणकथनाय द्वितीयं सूत्रं, तत् वेदप्रमाणको धर्म इति स्यात् किमिदं ‘चोदनालक्षणः’ इति? तत् नूनं न सर्वो वेदो धर्म एव कार्यात्मके पर्यवस्यति, कश्चिदस्य भागः कार्यताशून्ये वस्तुतत्त्वेऽपि वर्तते इति मन्यते॥

2.44. Again the second Sūtra (of Jaimini, viz., ‘codanā-lakṣaṇo artho Dharmaḥ’) is intended to elucidate the nature and pramāṇa of Dharma, and (as such) it amounts to this that Dharma has the Veda as its pramāṇa. Why then is the phrase codanā-lakṣaṇa (used in the aphorism)? It is therefore evident that (Jaimini) is of the view that not the whole of the Veda finds its fulfilment in (or ends in expounding) Dharma of the nature of kārya, but that some portion of it bears on the essence of the thing (existent reality) where the idea of kārya is absent.

2.45 ✅

ननु चोदनाग्रहणस्यान्यदेव प्रयोजनं, ‘चुद प्रेरणे’ इति प्रेरणकर्मणश्चोदनेति रूपम्;

2.45. Anārambhavādin. – Well, the use of the word codanā is with a different purpose altogether, the meaning of the root ‘cuda’ is prompting-preraṇa, so that the root cuda which denotes prompting assumes the form codanā.

ततः प्रेरणात्मको विधिरपुरुषार्थे प्रेरयितुमशक्नुवन् पदान्तराभिहितमपि स्वर्गादिकं भावनाकर्मतामापादयति एकपदोपादानात् संनिहिततरं धात्वर्थं विहायेति कथयितुमिति,

Hence the injunction of the nature of prompting being unable (i.e., it being inappropriate) to prompt (one) to an action that does not result in one’s highest good, causes svarga, etc., though denoted by a different word, (viz., svarga, in svarga-kāmaḥ) to get into objective relation with the bhāvanā (or puruṣa-pravṛtti – action) and this it does having discarded the root meaning which is denoted by the same word (as contains the mandatory suffix – yajeta) and which is much nearer (spatially than svarga, etc.); it is to express this idea that the word codanā is used.

2.46 ✅

नैतत् सारम्, अध्ययनविधिरध्ययने माणवकं प्रेरयन् अध्ययनस्य पुरुषार्थरूपार्थावबोधकत्वमनापाद्य न शक्नोति प्रेरयितुम्; पारम्पर्येणाप्यपुरुषार्थे विधेरपर्यवसानात्,

2.46. Ārambhavādin. – That is jejune. The vidhi relating to adhyayana (i.e., the mandate enjoining the getting by rote one’s branch of the Veda) setting about to induce the pupil (māṇavaka) to master the Veda text finds itself incapable of inducing him without first showing that adhyayana is the means of attaining the highest good, for the vidhi fails to fulfil its purpose (viz., that of prompting one to action) when the highest human end is not evident even if remotely.

अतः तदर्थं न चोदनाग्रहणम्; वेदग्रहणेनापि तत्सिद्धेः। अपि च वेदग्रहणमेव युक्तम्; असन्देहात्, चोदनाग्रहणे हि सन्देहः स्यात्; लोकेऽपि विद्यमानत्वात्।

Hence it is not for that (i.e., for denoting puruṣārtha) that the word codanā is used for that may be secured even by the use of the word Veda. Moreover the use of the word Veda alone is appropriate since it leaves no room for doubt, but the use of the word ‘codanā’ surely generates doubt because we have also empirical mandates.

2.47 ✅

अथ वेदाधिकरणे ‘वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षमि’ति विशेषाभिधानात् वैदिकत्वसिद्धिरिति,

2.47. Anārambhavādin. – In the Vedādhikaraṇa, we have the sūtra – “some make the assertion that the Vedas are of recent origin,” (i.e., ascribe nearness of time to the Vedas; because of the presence of names therein). From this it is established, because of specific indication, that the Veda (alone) is intended (and not empirical mandates).

सोऽयमाभाणको लोके ‘पिण्डमुत्सृज्य करं लेढी’ति, सूत्रकारस्याप्यकौशलं प्रदर्शितं स्यात्। ततश्चोदनाग्रहणादचोदनात्मकोऽपि वेदभागोऽभिप्रेत इति गम्यते, येन वेदार्थमात्रस्य धर्मत्वं मा भूदिति चोदनेत्यवोचत्।

Ārambhavādin. – This is as the proverb goes: “Licking the hand having thrown away the morsel of food”. It would be attributing lack of ingenuity to the aphorist (Jaimini). Hence by the employment of the word codanā (meaning a command) it is perceived that the existence of a section of the Veda which is not of a mandatory character was admitted (by Jaimini). And this (viz., the word codanā) he has used in order that the Veda in its entirety might not mean duty (karma).

तदेवं सूत्रकार एव स्वशास्त्रविषयातिरिक्तं वेदभागमविचारितमसूसुचत्॥

Therefore in this way the aphorist himself has hinted that no inquiry has been made into that part of the Veda which deals with a topic different from that of his own treatise (śāstra – sacred work).

2.48 ✅

ननु ‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्’ ‘तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः’ ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वात्’ इति च सर्वस्य कार्यार्थत्वं दर्शितं,

2.48. Anārambhavādin. – Well, (we have the following texts) – “Its (i.e., of the Veda) sense is evidently the inculcation of duty” (i.e., karma or niyoga is the obvious sense of the Veda, Śabara Bhāṣya – Ānandāśrama Edition, p. 6). “The utterance of the words which are implied in the meanings, is with the object of enjoining some action” – Jaimini Sūtra, I. vii-25. “The Veda is meant to inculcate duty (hence whatever portion means something other than that is devoid of purpose.” – Jai. Sut. I. ii-1). The whole of the Veda is thus shown to prescribe duty.

2.49 ✅

सत्यम्; तत् प्रक्रमबलात् तन्निष्ठो वेदभाग इति गम्यते, न सर्वत्र।

2.49. Ārambhavādin. – Yes, it is true. But on the strength of what has been set out (as the object of inquiry, viz., Dharma or duty, the terms used subsequently like ‘tasya’, āmnāyasya, ‘tad-bhūtānām’, etc., though general in character should be understood as referring only) to a portion of the Veda, i.e., to codanā (or mandatory section) and not to the whole of it.

अपि च ‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनमि’ति न सर्वस्य कर्मावबोधनमर्थ उच्यते, कथम्?

(Further Śabara’s statement) – “The knowledge of karma (Niyoga, etc.) is the obvious fruit (prayojana) of the Veda” is not for pointing out that the entire Veda inculcates karma. How? (it may be asked);

वेदाध्ययनानन्तरं स्नानविधायकमाम्नायमुपलभ्य वेदस्यानर्थकत्व आशङ्किते ‘अतिक्रमिष्याम इममाम्नायम्, अनतिक्रामन्तो वेदमर्थवन्तं सन्तमनर्थकमवकल्पयेम;

on completing the Vedādhyayana (i.e., memorising the text of one’s branch of the Veda) one comes across the authoritative statement enjoining the ceremonial bath (which should therefore follow immediately) so that one entertains the impression that the Veda (apart from its committal to memory) carries no sense; then (to eradicate such an impression the Bhāṣyakāra, viz., Śabara says) – “We will transgress this mandate. If we do not transgress it we would be rendering the Veda meaningless when (actually) it is fraught with meaning.

दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्’ इत्यर्थसद्भावः प्रदर्शितो नार्थान्तरासद्भावः। सोऽयमयोगव्यवच्छेदो नान्ययोगव्यवच्छेदः।

The knowledge of karma is indeed its obvious fruit, so that it is clear that what is pointed out is that the Veda does really possess a meaning and not that there exists no other meaning (i.e., other than karma). That statement (i.e., dṛṣṭohi, etc.) is made to dispel the notion that the Veda is unrelated to artha (sense) and not to disprove that anything apart from karma (viz., Brahman) is to be found in the Veda.

कर्मशब्देन धर्म एव कार्यत्वादभिहितः; यतः तदवबोधप्रवृत्तो वेदस्यार्थवत्त्वं मृगयते, किं वेदस्यार्थो विद्यते? न वा? स च धर्मत्वेनावगन्तुं शक्यते? न वा इति?

The word karma denotes Dharma only (like agni-hotra) because it is something to be achieved by effort and because the person who undertakes to acquire the knowledge of Dharma seeks to know if the Veda is significative, i.e., whether there is any meaning yielded by the Veda or not and whether it is possible to understand that significance as being (identical with) Dharma.

तस्मात् न कर्मावबोधनमेव वेदार्थोऽभिप्रेतो भाष्यकृतः।

Hence (to conclude) the Bhāṣyakāra (Śabara) should not be deemed as holding the opinion that the knowledge of karma alone is the fruit of the Veda.

2.50 ✅

यत् पुनः ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानामि’ति,

2.50. Again (let us take the Sūtra) – “Since the object of the Veda is to enjoin kārya, what does not enjoin kārya is purposeless” – Jai. I-ii. 1.

तत्र यद्यानर्थक्यमर्थाभावः, तदसत्; यतः एवमेवभूतार्थमनुवदन्तीति दर्शितोऽर्थः।

There, if the word ‘ānarthakya’ is taken to mean non-denotative (i.e., conveying no meaning), that interpretation is wrong, because the meaning is made clear; we have the Bhāṣya text – “Thus in this manner only they – arthavādas (the laudatory or condemnatory texts) restate existing things” (Śabara Bhāṣya – Ānandāśrama Edition pg. 105).

अथ निष्प्रयोजनत्वम्; स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविधिर्निष्प्रयोजनमक्षरमात्रमपि न ग्राहयतीति, भवतु ‘सोऽरोदीतित्यादीनाम्; अपुरुषार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात् एकवाक्यत्वात् पृथक्कार्यकल्पनानुपपत्तेः, कल्पयितुं चाशक्यत्वात्।

If on the other hand the word means ‘serving no purpose’ (it is unwelcome) since the mandate enjoining the recital of one’s own branch of the Veda (viz., ‘svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ’) does not so much as admit the getting up of even a single letter that is purposeless. We will grant that arthavāda statements like ‘He cried, etc.’ (are purposeless) since in themselves they do not serve a desired human end (puruṣārtha). And it is inappropriate to postulate a separate kārya (vidhi) because it (the arthavāda – so rodīt, etc.) is in syntactical unity (with the negative vidhi – ‘baṛhiṣi rajatam na deyam’). It is not possible either, to supply (a mandate, since it is absurd to enjoin rodana – howling).

2.51 ✅

यानि पुनः अपास्ताशेषाशिवमात्मानमनुभवपर्यन्तम् अवबोधयन्ति वाक्यानि, तान्यनवद्यप्रयोजनत्वाद्भवन्तितरामेव प्रयोजनवन्ति।

2.51. The (Upaniṣad) statements on the contrary (unlike the arthavāda), are productive of that knowledge which enables one to realise the ātman that is rid of every trace of affliction, and fraught as they are with such irreproachable beneficence their value is beyond compare.

अतः स्वयमपुरुषार्थत्वात् तदर्थोपकारितया कथञ्चित् पुरुषार्थस्तावकत्वेन प्रयोजनवत्त्वमुक्तं, न सर्वस्यैवाक्रियार्थत्वेन आनर्थक्यमाशङ्क्य क्रियार्थत्वेनार्थवत्वमुक्तम्। तथा च तद्विधान्येव तत्र वाक्यान्युदाहृतानि॥

Hence (i.e. since the Vedānta passages possess an independent value) it was shown (in the ritualistic section) that arthavādas being in themselves incompetent to serve a human end become purposeful as aids to it (puruṣārtha-yāga which is the means to Svarga) by extolling it (i.e., the injunction) in one way or other (in a secondary sense), and (their utility as auxiliaries to some kriyā was stated) not on the supposition that none of these (texts including both arthavādas and Vedānta texts) served any useful purpose unless related to some kriyā. And therefore, only sentences of that description (like so rodīt, etc.) were there (under Jai. Sut. I. ii. 1) adduced in illustration (and no Vedānta passage was instanced as auxiliary to kārya like Jyotiṣṭoma).

2.52 ✅

यदपि केचित् – शास्त्रप्रस्थानमन्यथा वर्णयन्ति। न हि किलैवं शास्त्रं प्रस्थितं, किं वेदलक्षणो धर्मः? उत बुद्धवाक्यादिलक्षणः? इति।

2.52. Some (Prābhākaras) however account differently for commencing the Śāstra (viz., codanā-lakṣaṇo artho Dharmaḥ). It is indeed not thus (i.e., as stated by the Bhāṭṭa School) that the Śāstra (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) sets about, viz., whether Dharma is what the Veda imports or what the Buddha declares to be such.

किं तर्हि? अधीतवेदस्य योऽर्थोऽवगतः, तत्रैव विप्रतिपत्तयः सन्ति, किमयमसौ? उतायम् इति? तन्निराकरणार्थः शास्त्रारम्भः इति॥

How else then? One who has learnt to recite the Veda will gather (in a general way) some sense (from what he has mastered) and it is there only that views, one discrepant with the other, exist, (leading to the doubt) whether this one is its sense or that. And it is to resolve those doubts that the Śāstra is commenced.

2.53 ✅

तत्रापि न निखिलवेदार्थविचारप्रतीतिः। तत् कथम्? तथा सति ‘अथातो वेदार्थजिज्ञासा’ इति स्यात्; यतो न धर्म इति कृत्वा विचारः, किन्तु वेदार्थ इति,

2.53. Even there, i.e., even in the view of the Prābhākaras, it is not to be understood that inquiry into the Veda in its entirety has been undertaken. How is that (to be known)? If it were so, (i.e., when the inquiry related to the meaning of the entire Veda) the sūtra should have been framed thus: athāto Vedārtha-jijñāsā, since the inquiry is not about Dharma but about Vedārtha (and Vedārtha is the object of inquiry).

सत्यं, तथापि शास्त्रकाराणां पुरुषार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं शास्त्रप्रणयनं, ततश्च पुरुषार्थकथनार्थं धर्मग्रहणमिति।

Prābhākara. – It is true; but then (it must be admitted that authors of sacred writings compose their works to inculcate that which is of value (Puruṣārtha). Hence the inclusion of the word ‘Dharma’ for impressing puruṣārtha.

एवं तर्हि धर्म इत्येव कृत्वा विचारो भवतु; तस्य पुरुषार्थत्वात् सन्दिग्धत्वाच्च।

Siddhāntin. – If that be so, let the inquiry be confined to Dharma only, because it is fraught with a human value and admits of doubt (as to its nature).

2.54 ✅

तथा च उत्तरमपि सूत्रमनुगुणं भवति ‘चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः’ इति धर्मस्वरूपविप्रतिपत्तिनिरासपरं;

2.54. And further the next Sūtra also is in consonance (with the first). It is to dispel contrary notions held regarding the nature of Dharma (that the second Sūtra) – “That which is supported by Veda testimony and beneficent in its results, is Dharma” is intended.

इतरथा वेदार्थविप्रतिपत्तौ तन्निरासार्थं ‘चोदनालक्षणो वेदार्थः’ इति स्यात्, यतो न धर्मग्रहणे सति वेदार्थविप्रतिपत्तिः शक्या निराकर्तुम्।

Otherwise, i.e., if Vedārtha itself is understood as giving rise to contrary notions, then to dispel them the Sūtra should have been (framed as) ‘codanā lakṣaṇo Vedārthaḥ’ (Vedārtha and not Dharma is what the Veda defines), for if ‘Dharma’ is taken (as the right word) then it will not be possible to dispel contrary notions regarding Vedārtha.

कथम्? यत् तावत् चोदनालक्षणो योऽर्थः, स धर्म इति धर्मत्वं ज्ञाप्येत, तदा स एव वेदार्थो नान्य इति न लभ्यते।

How? (Why not regard Dharma as used in the sense of Vedārtha and the second sūtra as intended for the purpose of refuting any wrong interpretation of Vedārtha?) In so far as the thing that is revealed by the mandatory statement is Dharma (this is what the Sūtra means); if thus its (i.e., of the thing denoted – artha) nature as Dharma (Dharmatva) is brought to mind, then it cannot be concluded that that alone (viz., Dharma like Jyotiṣṭoma, etc.) is Vedārtha (i.e., what the entire Veda enjoins) and none other.

अथ पुनः स धर्म इति नामनामिसम्बन्धो विधीयते, तदप्रक्रान्तम्; निष्प्रयोजनम्, अतिप्रसङ्गश्च आपद्येत॥

If however (the second sūtra is interpreted) as laying down that Dharma is the name for what the codanā denotes pointing thus to the relation of the name and the named, such a course would clash with the beginning of the Śāstra (Dharma-vicāra), would lead nowhere, and would be quite arbitrary.

2.55 ✅

अथापि कथञ्चित् धर्मशब्देन वेदार्थ एवोच्यते इति कल्प्येत, तथा सति चोदनालक्षणो वेदार्थो नार्थवादादिलक्षणः, इति सिद्धप्रामाण्यवेदार्थविचारोऽयं स्यात्, उत्तरलक्षणवत्।

2.55. But still if it be maintained that the word ‘Dharma’ somehow means Vedārtha only, then it would amount to saying that Vedārtha is what the codanā defines and not what arthavāda denotes; and this would lead to the conclusion that like the second adhyāya and the sequel of Jaimini sūtras this inquiry (i.e., of the first adhyāya) is in relation to the meaning (artha) of the Veda whose validity has been previously established.

तत्रानन्तरं प्रामाण्यप्रतिपादनं न युज्येत॥ ‘वृत्तं प्रमालक्षण’मिति च मन्त्रार्थवादेषु च कार्यार्थत्वे विप्रतिपत्तिः न स्यात्। सा चोत्तरत्रैव निरस्यते।

‘Tatra,’ i.e., if the validity has been established in the first sūtra itself: ‘anantaram’, i.e., again, the attempt to prove the validity (as Jaimini does in sūtra V – ‘anupalabdhe arthe tat pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasya, etc.) would be out of place; as also useless would be (the statement of Śabarasvamin) – ‘Vṛttam pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam’ – (Bṛhati – Ānandāśrama Edn.. p. 370). (In the first adhyāya Jaimini has established only that the Veda is a valid means of knowledge and if what the Veda imports – arthavatva – has also been established by him, Śabara should have said, “Vṛttam pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam, Vṛttañca Vedasya arthavatva-niścayaḥ”). (Again if the Vedārtha has been determined in the second sūtra as the one denoted by codanā) doubt as to whether mantras and arthavādas signify kārya (or not) would not arise; (but then) that doubt is dispelled only in the sequel (i.e., in the arthavādādhikaraṇa – Jai. I. ii. 1, ‘āmnāyasya’, etc.).

[BS.s1.1.01]

अतः पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन कार्यनिष्ठ एव वेदभागो विचार्यतया प्रक्रान्तो विचारितश्च, न वस्तुनिष्ठः; इत्यतो वस्तुतत्त्वनिष्ठं वेदभागं विचारयितुमिदमारभ्यते - अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा इति॥

Hence on the ground already stated it must be concluded that that part of the Veda only which is associated with kārya was undertaken for inquiry, and inquired into, but not that part of the Veda whose object it is to inquire into the existing entity. That being so, this (first sūtra of Uttara Mīmāṃsā, viz., athāto Brahma-jijñāsā – ‘then therefore the inquiry into Brahman’, is (it is evident) begun with the object of investigating that part of the Veda which deals with the nature of Reality.

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादिश्रीशङ्करभगवद्पादान्तेवासिवरश्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां जिज्ञासासूत्रावतरणं नाम द्वितीयवर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Second Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

अथ तृतीयं वर्णकम्

VARṆAKA III
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT
Inquiry into the meanings of words constituting the Jijñāsā Sūtra – Athāto Brahma-jijñāsā

[BrS.1.1.1 L.2]

3.1 ✅

तत्राथशब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते, नाधिकारार्थः। बह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात् इत्यादि भाष्यम्।

3.1. “There (i.e., in the first sūtra) the word ‘atha’ – then, is to be understood in the sense of immediate succession and not in the sense of adhikāra (which means commencing a fresh topic for exposition), the reason being that the desire to understand Brahman is not (a fit subject for commencement)” – and so on is the Bhāṣya.

तत् जिज्ञासाशब्दस्यावयवार्थेनार्थवत्त्वे युज्यते? अधिक्रियायोग्यस्य ब्रह्मणस्तज्ज्ञानस्य वा प्राधान्येनानिर्देशात्, प्रधानस्य चेच्छाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्॥

The objection is raised that such comment (Śāṅkara Bhāṣya) will be appropriate if the word ‘jijñāsā’ is construed according to its component parts (avayavārtha). For there is no prominence assigned in the Sūtra either to Brahman or to Brahma-jñāna whose exposition may fitly be commenced and of desire which is prominent, such commencement is not possible.

3.2 ✅

अयं तु जिज्ञासाशब्दो विचारवचनो मीमांसापरपर्यायः प्रयुक्तोऽभियुक्तैः – ‘इदमतो जिज्ञासन्ते, किं क्रतुगुणकमुपासनं स्वामिकर्म? उतर्त्विक्कर्मे’ति।

3.2. But this word ‘jijñāsā’ is used by many learned men as a term denoting inquiry – vicāra – otherwise known as mīmāṃsā (investigation or examination); e.g., “This therefore they inquire into (jijñāsamte), viz., whether the meditation pertaining to Veda chanting which is subsidiary to the ritual has to be done by the sacrificer or by the officiating priest.” – (BrSEng.3.4.44).

इदन्तु जिज्ञास्यम्, किं नु खल्विमौ तप्यतापकावेकस्यात्मनो भेदौ? उत जात्यन्तरम्? इति।

“But this has to be inquired into (jijñāsyam), viz., whether these two (tapya – what is fit to be burnt, viz., body and tāpaka – that which burns, viz., saṃsāra) are but features of the single ātman or belong to a distinct species something distinct from ātman – (BrSEng.2.2.10 vide)”.

3.3 ✅

धर्ममीमांसाभाष्यकारोऽपि सङ्घातमेव प्रायुङ्क्त ‘धर्मं जिज्ञासितुमिच्छेदि’ति, सङ्घातवाच्यत्वाद्विचारस्य; अन्यथैवमवक्ष्यत् – ‘धर्मं ज्ञातुमिच्छेदि’ति।

3.3. The commentator of Dharma Mīmāṃsā also (Śabara) has taken the word (jijñāsā) in the aggregate (and not in its component elements) – “Let one desire to investigate (jijñāsitum) Dharma for the aggregate denotes inquiry, otherwise he would have said, “Let one desire to understand (jñātum) Dharma.”

अत एवं धर्माय जिज्ञासा ‘धर्मजिज्ञासे’ति सङ्घातस्यार्थवत्त्वमङ्गीकृत्य चतुर्थीसमासो दर्शितः।

Hence it is that the caturthī samāsa (the compound of the fourth case-ending) has been selected (by Śabara having) admitted that the meaning is of the aggregate and so dissolving the compound (Dharma-jijñāsā) as Dharmāya-jijñāsā (the inquiry is for Dharma).

तदनुसारेण चैतानि भाष्याणि – ‘एवं वेदवाक्यान्येवैभिर्विचार्यन्ते’ ‘वेदवाक्यानि विचारयितव्यानि’ ‘कथं वेदवाक्यानि विचारयेदि’ति च; पुनश्च ‘क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा’ ‘क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थौ जिज्ञास्येते’ इति।

And the extracts that follow are in conformity thereof: – “So the Veda statements are inquired into (vicāryante) by these (Sūtras of Jaimini)”; “The Veda statements are to be inquired into (vicārayitavyāni)”, and “how are the Veda statements to be inquired into (vicārayet)?” And again, “the inquiry regarding kratv-artha and puruṣārtha”, “kratv-artha and puruṣārtha are both inquired into jijñāsyete”.

3.4 ✅

इहापि भाष्यकारो वक्ष्यति – ‘तस्माद् ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमि’ति। पुनश्च ‘वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते’ इति।

3.4. Here also the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) says: – “therefore has Brahman to be inquired into”; and again “the inquiry (mimāṃsā, i.e., jijñāsā) into the meanings of the Vedānta statements, which is based upon ratiocination – logical aids not conflicting with them, and which leads to the ultimate good of the nature of Liberation, is begun.”

अतः सङ्घातस्यार्थवत्त्वादधिकारार्थता युज्यते। शास्त्रवचनो हि जिज्ञासाशब्दः; तेन ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाऽधिकृता वेदितव्येति॥

Hence since the undivided aggregate (viz., jijñāsā taken as a whole) has (investigation) as its sense, adhikārārtha fits in (with the word atha); indeed the word jijñāsā means Śāstra signifying vicāra or inquiry. As such, it should be understood that the commencement of inquiry into Brahman (is what the first Sūtra means).

3.5 ✅

उच्यते – नायं जिज्ञासाशब्दः परित्यक्तावयवार्थः केवलमीमांसापर्यायः प्रयुज्यमानो दृश्यते। नापि स्मरणमस्ति। न चावयवार्थेनार्थवत्त्वे सम्भवति समुदायस्यार्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता।

3.5. This is said in answer: – This word jijñāsā is not used purely as a synonym of mīmāṃsā having altogether abandoned the meaning of the component parts, nor is such usage (jijñāsā in the sense of vicāra) supported by grammar (smaraṇa). Further when a sense is yielded by the component parts it is not right to ascribe a different meaning to the aggregate.

3.6 ✅

ननु न वयं कल्पयामः; दर्शितः शिष्टप्रयोगः,

3.6. Well, it is not merely our fabrication; the usage of the learned has been adduced (in evidence).

न; तस्यान्यथासिद्धत्वात्। कथमन्यथासिद्धत्वम्? अन्तर्णीतविचारार्थत्वाज्जिज्ञासाशब्दस्य।

No, that (usage) can be explained otherwise. You may query – ‘How is it explained otherwise?’ It is on second thoughts (antarṇīta – implied sense) that the word jijñāsā means vicāra or inquiry;

तथाहि – विचारपूर्वकसाध्यज्ञानविषयेच्छा जिज्ञासाशब्दात् प्रतीयते, नोपदेशमात्रसाध्यज्ञानविषया;

to explain – the meaning of the word jijñāsā is the desire in relation to that knowledge which presupposes careful inquiry and not to that which results from mere instruction (upadeśa). It is thus (only) that we find the word jijñāsā used and the idea (sābda-bodha) also conveyed by it.

एवं प्रयोगप्रत्यययोर्दर्शनात्, तेन जिज्ञासाशब्दस्यावयवार्थेनार्थवत्त्वाद् युक्तमुक्तम् – ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वादिति॥

Hence, i.e., since a cogent sense can be had from the constituent parts of the word jijñāsā what the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) has said, viz., that Brahma-jijñāsā is not what can be commenced is perfectly justifiable.

3.7 ✅

ननु एवमपि कुत एतत्? अन्तर्णीतं विचारमाश्रित्य शब्दतो गुणत्वेऽप्यर्थलक्षणेन प्राधान्येन ब्रह्मतज्ज्ञानयोरधिकारयोग्यत्वाच्चाधिक्रियमाणत्वमङ्गीकृत्याधिकारार्थत्वं किमिति न गृह्यते? येन शब्दलक्षणेन प्राधान्येनेच्छाया अनधिकार्यत्वादानन्तर्यार्थत्वमेव परिगृह्यत इति,

3.7. Objection. – Well, even then (i.e, even if the word jijñāsā is taken in its derivative sense) how is it appropriate to maintain that jijñāsā does not mean the undertaking of a fresh topic? Vicāra may no doubt be admitted as secondary form from the word – standpoint; if on the other hand we emphasise the sense-aspect of jijñāsā which brings vicāra into prominence and (remember) that Brahman and Brahma-knowledge are fit topics for being commenced and accept the possibility of commencing them, why not take adhikāra as the meaning of ‘atha’? and for what reason is it maintained – attaching importance to the formal aspect of jijñāsā, and on the basis that desire cannot be willed, that ‘atha’ means consecution (=sequence) only?

उच्यते – शास्त्रस्यानारम्भप्रसङ्गादधिकारार्थत्वानुपपत्तेः। अधिकारार्थत्वे ह्यप्रयोजनं शास्त्रं काकदन्तपरीक्षावदनारभ्यं स्यात्, तत्र कस्याधिकार उच्येत?

Answer. – This will be said (to meet your objection) – Since it would result in the non-undertaking (the study) of the (Brahma-mīmāṃsā) Śāstra, the adhikārārtha (i.e., construing ‘atha’ as commencement) is inappropriate. Indeed the Śāstra serving no purpose if adhikārārtha is accepted would be as valueless as the inquiry into the number of a crow’s teeth and as such would not be undertaken. Hence (i.e., when the Śāstra becomes purposeless) who can be spoken of as qualified for the study?

3.8 ✅

ननु ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रयोजनम्; तदर्थः शास्त्रारम्भः,

3.8. Objection. – Well, the knowledge of Brahman is the prayojana (fruit) and it is for securing it that the (study of the) Śāstra is to be commenced.

न; ब्रह्मज्ञानेऽर्थित्वानुपपत्तेः, ब्रह्मज्ञानाद्धि मनसोऽपि वियोगान्निखिलविषयानुषङ्गनिवृत्तिः श्रूयते। सा च सार्वभौमोपक्रमं ब्रह्मलोकावसानमुत्कृष्टोत्कृष्टसुखं श्रूयमाणं सोपायं निवर्तयति। अतो ब्रह्मज्ञानादुद्विजते लोकः; कुतस्तत्र प्रवृत्तिः?

Answer. – No, there is no possibility of the desire to acquire the knowledge of Brahman arising. The Scripture declares that with the acquisition of Brahma-jñāna one is isolated even from the mind, with the result that there will be no contact with any of the sense-objects. And that (cessation of contact) puts an end to every grade of happiness, declared in the Śruti. (TaitU.2.1.1) beginning with that of the world-sovereign and culminating in that of Brahma-loka, each succeeding happiness excelling the previous one (nay, putting an end also to) the means by which such happiness is attained. Hence the world turns away from Brahma-jñāna in aversion. Why will one covet it?

3.9 ✅

ननु आनन्दरूपताऽपि ब्रह्मज्ञानादाप्यते, अतस्तदर्थं प्रवर्तते तत्र,

3.9. Objection. – Well, the state of bliss also is attained by Brahma-jñāna and as such one strives after it.

मैवम्; न हि ब्रह्मानन्दोऽननुभूतपूर्वोऽनुभूतभोग्यसुखाभिलाषं मन्दीकर्तुमुत्सहते, येन तदुज्झित्वा ब्रह्मज्ञाने प्रवर्तेत।

Answer. – That is not so. Brahmānanda (i.e., the joy that one experiences by Brahma-jñāna) never having been experienced before, is powerless to mitigate the longing for that happiness which has been experienced; had Brahmānanda been potent, it could have prompted one to acquire Brahma-jñāna abandoning the other.

3.10 ✅

ननु परितृप्तरूपताऽपि ब्रह्मज्ञानात्, अतः परितृप्तः किं कामयते? अतृप्तिनिमित्तकत्वात् कामस्य; तथा च श्रुतिः – ‘आप्तकामः आत्मकाम’ इति। स्मृतिरपि ‘आत्मलाभान्न परं विद्यते’ ‘एतद्बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात् कृतकृत्यश्च भारते’ति।

3.10. Objection. – Well, we know that Brahma-jñāna yields also what is of the nature of supreme satisfaction; hence what does the man, who is satisfied, desire, for all desire springs (by reason of) dissatisfaction? To this effect is the (corroboration of) Śruti – ‘whose desire is satisfied, whose desire is ātman’ (BrhU.4.4.6); also of Smṛti – ‘nothing higher than the attainment of ātman is known’; ‘O, Bhārata, knowing this (i.e., ātman) he becomes wise, well-contented too’ – (BhG.15.20).

न; तृप्तेरेवोद्वेगदर्शनाद्विषयविच्छेदात्मिकायाः। तथा च वक्तारो भवन्ति, अहो कष्टं किमिति सृष्टिरेवं न बभूव? यत् सर्वमेव भोक्तुं सामर्थ्यमतृप्तिर्भोग्यानां चाक्षयः – इति।

Answer. – No; from satisfaction itself arises repulsion because it destroys (all appetite for) objects of enjoyment (through satiation). Even so do people say – ‘alas ! how sad that the creation was not thus’; (i.e., did not provide for) ‘capacity for constant enjoyment, non-satiation, and indestructibility’ of the objects of enjoyment’.

रागिगीतं श्लोकमप्युदाहरन्ति – ‘अपि वृन्दावने शून्ये श्रृगालत्वं स इच्छति। न तु निर्विषयं मोक्षं कदाचिदपि गौतम॥ ’ इति।

And they adduce in illustration a verse sung by the sensualist, viz., “O, Gautama, one would rather long for the life of a jackal in a desolate forest but never would one desire liberation which is the negation of all objects of enjoyment.”

3.11 ✅

मा भूद् ब्रह्मज्ञानार्थिता, वेदार्थत्वादेव ब्रह्मज्ञानं कर्तव्यम्; स्वाध्यायाध्ययनस्यार्थावबोधफलकत्वात्।

3.11. Objection. – Let not desire for Brahma-knowledge arise (independently of vidhi). Because of its (Brahman) being (a part of) the very import of the Veda, it is incumbent on one to acquire Brahma-knowledge. (If it should be urged that vidhi is incompetent to initiate vicāra, the answer is no), because the chanting of one’s section of the Veda has the understanding of its import as its phala (end to be achieved).

स्यादेतदेवम्; यद्यर्थावबोधफलाध्ययनक्रिया स्यात्, सा ह्यधीयमानावाप्तिफलत्वादक्षरग्रहणान्ता।

Answer. – Yes, it would be so if the Veda chanting had the understanding of its meaning as its result (phala). The adhyayana-kriyā, obviously has as its phala (only) the acquisition of that which is studied and ends in one’s learning the words of the Veda.

अथाक्षरग्रहणं निष्प्रयोजनमिति न तत्र पर्यवसानं विधेः,

Objection. – Well, it is profitless, the (mere) acquisition of words; as such the mandate does not find its fulfilment there.

भवतु तर्हि सक्तूनां गतिः।

Answer. – Then let the analogy of ‘the saktu’ hold good (i.e., as in the sentence – saktūn juhoti,’ the root meaning ‘homa’ is the principal and the adjacent word – ‘saktu’ is subsidiary).

तदपि न; अक्षरेभ्यः प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधदर्शनात्।

Objection. – Even that will not suit; because it is seen that from the words, a knowledge of the meaning which serves a useful end is obtained.

न तर्हि निष्प्रयोजनान्यक्षराणि; अतस्तत्पर्यन्तमध्ययनं न निष्फलम्; अतोऽक्षरग्रहणादेव नियोगसिद्धेः फलप्रयुक्त एवार्थावबोधः।

Answer. – If so the mere words (i.e., acquiring command over the bare text) are not without serving some end. Hence adhyayana which ends in that (viz., akṣara-grahaṇa) is not without need. As such the purpose of the niyoga or vidhi (mandate) is fulfilled from the mere acquisition of the letters (composing the Veda) and the outcome of the memorised text which is the phala of adhyayana is the knowledge of the meaning (artha).

3.12 ✅

अपि च अक्षरग्रहणान्तो विधिर्निष्प्रयोजनः, इति न सर्वत्र, प्रयोजनवदर्थावबोधपर्यन्तता कल्पयितुमपि शक्यते।

3.12. Again, maintaining the view that the purpose of the mandate is not fulfilled with the acquisition of the bare text, you cannot possibly suppose that everywhere (i.e., in all contexts the vidhi) finds its fufilment in inculcating the knowledge of the meaning which has some purpose to serve.

तत्रावश्यं कल्पनीयाऽक्षरग्रहणान्तता। तद्यथा राजन्यस्य सत्रवैश्यस्तोमबृहस्पतिसवानामाम्नानं वैश्यस्य चाश्वमेधराजसूयसत्राणां पाठः।

In such contexts (tatra, i.e., in regard to statements where the knowledge of the meaning is to no purpose) it becomes incumbent to suppose that the vidhi has its object fulfilled in merely enjoining the acquisition of the mastery over the words – for instance, in the case of a member of the warrior caste (rājanya) Veda statements relating to śāstra (Brahmans only are competent for this ritual), Vaiśya-stoma (Vaiśyas only are competent for this ritual), and Bṛhaspati-sava. Brahmans only are competent for this ritual; and in the case of a Vaiśya, the texts relating to Aśva-medha, Rāja-sūya (intended only for the warrior caste) and Satra.

न च तेषामनध्ययनमेव; स्वाध्यायशब्देन सकलवेदवाचिनाऽध्ययनस्य विहितत्वात्।

And it cannot be said that these sections (i.e., those relating to rituals from which they are excluded) have to be left unchanted (by these respective castes); for from the word svādhyāya (in ‘svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ) it is evident that the study of the whole content of the Veda is enjoined (on all the three castes).

3.13 ✅

ननु चाश्रूयमाणाधिकारोऽध्ययनविधिः, दृष्टश्चाक्षरग्रहणेऽर्थावबोधः, स कल्पनामधिकारस्य निरुन्धन् स्वयमधिकारस्य हेतुः सम्पद्यते।

3.13. Pūrvapakṣin. – The Adhyayana mandate has not stated the adhikārin (i.e., the person competent to study the Veda; hence an adhikārin has to be understood, and the knowledge of the meaning, it is evident, supervenes the acquisition of the mastery over the words. (This is urged to meet the argument that one desirous of Svarga may be considered as the adhikārin on the analogy of Viśvajid-yāga. The knowledge of the meaning is dṛṣṭa-phala and as such the man who desires the knowledge of the meaning is the adhikārin). And that (i.e., arthāvabodha) having obviated the need for supplying the adhikārin (on the analogy of Viśvajid-yāga,) itself becomes the hetu of the adhikārin (viz., the man desirous of acquiring the meaning – arthāvabodha-kāma).

दृष्टाधिकारेषु प्रत्यक्षतस्तदुपलब्धावधिकारसिद्धिः। अतोऽर्थावबोधपर्यन्तः स्वाध्यायाध्ययननियोगः; तेन नियोगसिध्यर्थमेव सकलवेदार्थविचारः,

In all cases where the adhikāra is of the dṛṣṭa type, that adhikāra which is obvious, itself constitutes the circumstance relating the vidhi with the person carrying it out. Hence the scope of the vidhi contained in ‘svādhyāyodhyetavyaḥ’ extends up to the attainment of the knowledge of the meaning (of the memorised texts). It is evident therefore that the inquiry into the meaning of the entire Veda (here of course the Upaniṣads) is only for the fulfilment of the niyoga (or vidhi).

3.14 ✅

अत्रोच्यते – भवेदध्ययनविधेरर्थावबोधः प्रयोजनम्, नाधिकारहेतुता, अध्ययनात्प्रागसिद्धत्वात्। प्राक् चाधिकारज्ञानेन प्रयोजनम्; अतो न विधेर्दृष्टाधिकारत्वेनार्थावबोधसिद्धिः।

3.14. Siddhāntin. – This will be said in answer: Granted that the apprehension of meaning is the outcome of the adhyayana mandate, it (arthāvabodha) fails to be the means of inducing one to undertake the inquiry for the reason that before adhyayana (i.e., Veda study) the meaning is not understood. It is (before the vidhi is heard) that the knowledge as to who the adhikārin is becomes purposeful (i.e., we should know beforehand who is competent and then the vidhi will be fruitful). Hence (since the adhyayana-vidhi is out of the question) no apprehension of the meaning will result as dṛṣṭa-phala (direct experience) from the vidhi (because such a result is not patent).

3.15 ✅

यद्येवमधिकारश्रवणादर्थावबोधे च प्रतिपक्षकल्पनानुपपत्तेस्तस्य चाधिकारहेतुत्वानभ्युपगमादप्रवृत्तिरेवाध्ययने प्राप्ता।

3.15. Pūrvapakṣin. – If that be so (i.e., if as the result of acquiring mastery of the Veda text the meaning is not understood) since the phala is not mentioned in the mandatory sentence and since you do not admit that arthāvabodha (understanding of the sense) is in the attributive relation to the adhikārin (in other words, that the desire to know the sense is the hetu of adhikāra) the result would be that no effort will be made for Veda study.

3.16 ✅

अत्र केचिदाहुः – आचार्यकरणविधिप्रयुक्तस्याध्ययनस्यानुष्ठानम् आधानस्येव कामश्रुतिप्रयुक्तस्य इति।

3.16. The Prābhākara View. – Here some (meaning the Prābhākaras) say: The pursuit of the Veda study (adhyayana) is impelled by the mandate relating to preceptorship on the analogy of ādhāna which (ritual) is undertaken when impelled by a Śruti connected with an interested act.

3.17 ✅

तदयुक्तमित्यपरे। कथम्? ‘अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीते’ति यद्ययमाचार्यस्य नियोगः? माणवको न नियुक्तो भवति। अनियुक्तस्य च स्वाध्यायाध्ययने प्रवृत्तिर्न सम्भवति।

3.17. Siddhāntin – Others (the Siddhāntins) say that it is untenable. How? if it be thought that the mandate – ‘initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year’ is the one relating to the preceptor, then the neophyte (māṇavaka or the boy just initiated) will not be under obligation to carry out the mandate. And in one whom the mandate does not bind, there results no effort to study one’s branch of the Veda.

किञ्चान्यत् – आचार्यकरणविधिरनित्यः, ‘ब्राह्मणस्याधिकाः प्रवचन याजनप्रतिग्रहाः’ इति वृत्त्यर्थोऽधिकारः;

Yet another (flaw has to be pointed out). The mandate governing preceptorship, is optional (anitya). Teaching (the Veda), officiating at a sacrifice (yājana) and acceptance of gifts (pratigraha) are (privileges to which a Brāhmaṇa is entitled) in addition (to those common to all the three castes, viz., learning the Veda, performing a sacrifice and offering gifts) and these special privileges are utilised only for the sake of a living.

अतः स्वेच्छातः प्रवृत्तिः। उपनयनाख्यस्तु संस्कारो नित्यः;

Hence the exercise (of these privileges) is at one’s option. The purificatory ceremony named Upanayana (i.e., of investing the boy with the sacred thread and making him fit to approach a guru for Veda study) on the other hand is obligatory.

अकरणे दोषश्रवणात् – ‘अत ऊर्ध्वं त्रयोऽप्येते यथाकालमसंस्कृताः। सावित्रीपतिता व्रात्या भवन्त्यार्यविगर्हिताः॥ नैतैरपूतैर्विधिवदापद्यपि हि कर्हिचित्। ब्राह्मान् यौनांश्च सम्बन्धानाचरेद् ब्राह्मणः क्वचिदि’ति॥

If not performed (i.e., if the boy is not initiated) there is this imprecation: – ‘Those of the three (castes) who after the prescribed time remain without going through the purificatory ritual, who are deprived of holy association with the Sāvitrī, (and who are therefore) out-castes become fit objects of reproach by the faithful (āryas – the respectable). With such unregenerate men no Brāhmaṇa, even when in distress, should at any time or place enter into authorised (by śāstra) ritualistic or marital relationship.’

संस्कारश्च स्वाध्यायाध्ययनार्थः। एवं च स्वाध्यायाध्ययनमपि नित्यम्। तथा च निन्दाश्रवणम् – ‘अश्रोत्रिया अननुवाक्या अनग्नयः शूद्रसधर्माणो भवन्ती’ति। एवं चेत् कथं नित्यमनित्येन प्रयुज्यते? इति वाच्यम्।

The purification (viz., Upanayana) is for (fitting the pupil) for his Veda study so that the Veda study also is obligatory (as Upanayana is). To this effect is the condemnatory passage – ‘Those who have forsaken the obligatory duties, abandoned Veda study and have not maintained the ritualistic fire are (as good as) pursuing the dharma of a śūdra’ (for none of these is enjoined on the fourth caste). When it is so you (referring to Prābhākara) have to explain how what is nitya (obligatory duty like Upanayana) is brought about by what is anitya (optional duty like the one enjoined on a preceptor)’.

3.18 ✅

ननु कथमाचार्यकरणविधिरनित्यः? यावता वृत्त्यर्थो हि सः। न हि कश्चिद्विना धनेन जीविष्यति। तथा चोक्तं – ‘जीविष्यति विना धनेनेत्यनुपपन्नमि’ति। अतः सर्वेषां सर्वदा समीहितफलः सन् कथमनित्यः स्यात्?

3.18. Pūrvapakṣin. – Prābhākara. – How can it be shown that the mandate relating to the preceptorship (i.e., one relating to instruction) is optional, seeing that it (mandate) is intended to enable one to earn one’s living? It is evident that no one will get on in life without money; and so it is said ‘It does not stand to reason to suppose that one can live without money’ Hence being the means, as it always is, to all, of securing the most desired fruit (viz., money) how could it (the ācārya-karaṇaka-vidhi) become an optional mandate?

3.19 ✅

भवेदेवं नित्यता फलवशेन, न शब्दात्।

3.19. Siddhāntin. – (The vidhi relating to the preceptorship) may be admitted to be nitya in so far as the fruit (phala, viz., money) is considered but not on the authority of śabda (Veda mandate, for there is none such).

तथाहि – फलस्य नित्यसमीहितत्वादवश्यकर्तव्यता वास्तवी। तत्रासति शब्दव्यापार इच्छातः कर्तव्यताप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्, न कर्तव्यताप्रतिपत्तेरिच्छा।

To explain: – Since the fruit is the one always desired, the obligatoriness (of adhyāpana or undertaking the instruction) is dependent upon the vastu (object, because the vastu, viz., the living is always sought after, it confers nityatva on the mandate). There, śabda being inoperative (i.e., in regard to the obligatory performance of adhyāpana) the knowledge of obligatory performance arises from the desire (for wealth) and not the desire (for performance) from a sense of duty.

शाब्द्यां हि नित्यकर्तव्यताप्रतिपत्तौ शब्दस्य सर्वदा सर्वान् प्रत्येकरूपत्वादिच्छाऽपि तद्वशवर्तिनी तथैव स्यात्;

If from a specific mandate (śabda) we come to know that instruction (adhyāpana) is obligatory (nitya) then indeed the desire (for undertaking the instruction of the pupil) also being dependent on it (adhyāpana-vidhi) would become nitya, since Śabda is uniform in its operation and binding always on all (i.e., the first three castes).

औचित्यादिभावेऽपि कस्यचित् कथञ्चित् क्वचित् कदाचिदिच्छायाः। प्रमाणतस्तावान्नित्यः। तेन नित्येन तथाविधमेव प्रयुज्यते, इति न नित्यानित्यसंयोगविरोधः फलवशात्तु तत्कर्तव्यताप्रतिपत्तौ

No doubt the desire to perform karma is greatly mitigated when appropriate means such as some one (fit to undertake the karma), some aid (needed for karma), some place, some time (i.e., a fit place and fit time) are not available. Hence the undertaking of karma (i.e., adhyāpana) prompted by a vidhi that is nitya, becomes nitya similarly, so that the irreconcilability of the obligatory and the non-obligatory getting into relation is obviated. But if the need for undertaking it (adhyāpana) is understood as depending on the phala that it yields then the need to perform the karma, viz., adhyāpana ceases to be obligatory.

3.20 ✅

यद्यपि नित्याभिलषितं फलम्; तथाऽप्युपायान्तरादपि तत्सिद्धेः, तदेकोपायत्वेऽप्यालस्यादायासासहिष्णुतया वा कामस्य कुण्ठीभावे न कर्तव्यतायाः प्रतिपत्तिः, इत्यनित्यत्वे सति न तेन नित्यस्य प्रयोज्यत्वमुपपद्यते॥

3.20. It is true that the phala is always coveted, but since it is possible of achievement by other means also (apart from adhyāpana instruction does not become obligatory). Even when it (adhyāpana) is the only means (as in the case of one who is unqualified otherwise), either from indolence or from inability to bear the strain, one’s desire (for gain) is impeded and as such one fails to regard it (adhyāpana) as obligatory, so that when it becomes non-obligatory (anitya) it (adhyāpana-vidhi) ceases to be the incentive to what is obligatory (viz., adhyayana).

3.21 ✅

ननु पितुः पुत्रोत्पादनविधिरनुशासनपर्यन्तः श्रूयते – ‘तस्मात्पुत्रमनुशिष्टं लोक्यमाहुस्तस्मादेनमनुशासती’ति।

3.21. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, the mandate enjoining on the father the obligation to beget a son (does not stop there) but its scope extends to requiring the father to give proper instruction to the son, as witness: ‘Hence they say that the son who is instructed is the way to the higher worlds (i.e., the father goes to Heaven through the instrumentality of a worthy son); therefore he instructs him.’

अतः पुत्रोत्पादनस्य नित्यत्वात् तस्य चानुशासनपर्यन्तत्वात् तदाक्षिप्तत्वाच्चोपनयनाध्ययनयोः कथमाचार्यकरणविधिरनित्यः स्यात्? कथं वाऽध्ययनस्यार्थावबोधपर्यन्तता न भवेत्?

Hence since the duty of rearing a progeny is obligatory, since its scope extends to ‘instruction’, and since initiation (upanayana) and pupilage (adhyayana) are per force implied, how could the mandate relating to preceptorship (lit. preceptor-making), become non-obligatory (i.e., optional)? How again could Veda study stop short of conveying the meaning (of the memorised text)?

3.22 ✅

उच्यते – नानेन पुत्रानुशासनं विधीयते, पुत्रोत्पादनविधिशेषत्वेन स्वतन्त्रमेव वा, किन्तु सम्पत्तिकर्मविधिशेषोऽयमर्थवादः; तेनैकवाक्यत्वात्। अतो यथाप्राप्तमनुशासनमनुवदति।

3.22. Siddhāntin. – This is to be said: From this (i.e., from the quoted text) it is not to be understood that ‘instruction’ (anuśāsana) is enjoined either as auxiliary to the vidhi relating to the ‘rearing of a progeny’, or independently. But this (viz., anuśāsana – ‘tasmāt putram anuśiṣṭam lokyam āhuḥ, tasmād enam anuśāsati’) is arthavāda being subsidiary (śeṣa) to the injunction relating to the sampatti-karma because it is syntactically connected with it. Hence this (statement, viz., tasmāt putram, etc., merely) reiterates the anuśāsana that has been established (by implication).

किं तदनुशासनम्? कथं वा तत् प्राप्तवदनूद्यते?

Pūrvapakṣin. – What does that ‘instruction’ – anuśāsana, consist in? How again is that to be taken as if it were a reiteration of what has already been established (by some other pramāṇa)?

3.23 ✅

उच्यते – नित्यस्य पुत्रोत्पादनविधेः प्रयोजनं यत् पितॄणां लुप्तपिण्डोदकक्रियाणां नरकपातश्रवणात् पितृपिण्डोदकक्रियाद्यनुष्ठानेन नरकपातत्राणम्। न च शास्त्रीयेण परिज्ञानेन विना तदनुष्ठानं सम्भवति।

3.23. Siddhāntin. – This is the answer – The benefit (phala) of the injunction in relation to ‘the begetting of a son’ which is obligatory is the rescue of the manes of one’s ancestors from falling into hell, by performing the karma consisting of the offering to them of bolus of rice and water, because of the Śruti (Veda statement) ‘that one’s forefathers go to hell if deprived of the offering of bolus (piṇḍa) and water (udaka)’. And its performance (i.e., pitṛ-karma) will not be possible without a knowledge of the Śāstra.

तेन पित्रा नित्यमात्मनः पुत्रोत्पादनाधिकारं परिसमापयितुं पुत्रस्यावश्यकर्तव्यार्थविषयं गर्भाष्टवर्षेण ब्राह्मणेन त्वयोपनयनाख्यः संस्कारः कारयितव्यः, यः स्वाध्यायाध्ययनार्थो विहित इति यदनुशासनम्, तदिहानूद्यते – ‘तस्मादेनमनुशासतीति’॥

Hence in order that the obligatory injunction of ‘begetting the son’ prescribed in his behalf may be fulfilled the father lays down the command (anuśāsana or advice) relating to the duty that should be necessarily carried out by the son, viz., ‘By you who are a Brāhmaṇa the saṃskāra (the purificatory ceremony, viz., upanayana or investiture with the sacred thread) has to be got done in the eighth year of your birth which saṃskāra has been enjoined for the purpose of befitting one for the study of the Veda (adhyayana)’ This is the anuśāsana (upadeśa) and it is here restated (i.e., in the context of putrotpādana-vidhi) with the words, ‘tasmād enam anuśāsati’.

3.24 ✅

तथाच लिङ्गं – ‘श्वेतकेतुर्हाऽऽरुणेय आस। तं ह पितोवाच श्वेतकेतो वस ब्रह्मचर्यम्। न वै सोम्यस्मत्कुलीनोऽननूच्य ब्रह्मबन्धुरिव भवतीति।

3.24. Even so the liṅga (i.e., it is corroborated by liṅga). – “Now there was Śvetaketu, the grandson of Aruna. Him the father (Aruna) addressed: ‘Śvetaketu, lead the life of a Brahma-cārin (i.e., a student of the Veda); in our family indeed, my dear, there is none who fails to study the Veda and remains a degraded Brāhmaṇa (lit. one who can only point to a Brāhmaṇa relative – himself having fallen low).” ChanU.6.1.1.

तदेवमनित्येनाचार्यकरणविधिना कथं नित्यं प्रयुज्यत इति वाच्यम्।

When it is so you have to explain how what is obligatory (nitya) could be brought about by the non-obligatory vidhi relating to preceptorship.

3.25 ✅

किं च आचार्ये प्रेत आचार्यान्तरकरणं न प्राप्नोति; नह्यधिकारी प्रतिनिधीयते, नाप्यधिकारः।

3.25. And it should also be noted that when the preceptor (ācārya) is dead the pupil does not seek another preceptor (ācaryāntara-karaṇa – the pupil will not help another to attain preceptorship). Nor is the adhikārin to be secured by a substitute, nor is adhikāra feasible either.

अधिकारी स्वाधिकारसिध्यर्थं साधनान्तरभ्रेषे साधनान्तरं प्रतिनिधाय स्वाधिकारं निर्वर्तयतीति युक्तम्; एवमेषा बहुदोषा कल्पना दृश्यते। तस्माद् माणवकस्यैवैष नियोगः।

The adhikārin (i.e., the functionary, the sacrificer entitled to enjoy the fruit resulting from the sacrifice), it is right to state, will, in order that he may make good his qualification substitute one auxiliary (ingredient) when another fails and thus secures his title (adhikāra). It is then evident that this view (viz., that Veda study is prompted by adhyāpana-vidhi and not by adhyayana-vidhi) is vitiated by many defects. Hence the niyoga (i.e., the adhyayana-vidhi) pertains to the pupil only.

कथं गुणकर्तृव्यापारसम्बद्धो विधिः प्रधानकर्तृस्थो भवति?

Pūrvapakṣin. – How can the vidhi (injunction) related to the activity of the subordinate agency apply to the principal agent?

यथा – ‘एतया ग्रामकामं याजयेदि’ति ग्रामकामस्य यागो विधीयते, गुणकर्तृव्यापारः प्राप्तोऽनूद्यते; तस्य याजनस्य वृत्त्यर्थत्वात्, एवमिहापि गुणकर्तृव्यापारो वृत्त्यर्थत्वेन प्राप्तोऽनूद्यते॥

Siddhāntin. – In the mandatory sentence – “By this (yāga – iṣṭi) conduct the sacrifice of one who is desirous of acquiring a village;” the yāga is enjoined on the person wishing to obtain a village and the action (vyāpāra) of the subsidiary agent (guṇa-kartā – the priest) is restated because of its having been already established because the officiating at the sacrifice by the priest is done in pursuit of his profession. Similarly here also the function of the subsidiary agent which results from the pursuit of his profession is (merely) repeated.

3.26 ✅

अत्रैके प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते – युक्तं ‘याजयेदि’ति प्रधानकर्तृव्यापाराभिधायिनो यजतेः परस्य गुणकर्तृव्यापाराभिधायिनः शब्दान्तरस्य णिच उपादानात् तस्य चाविधेयत्वात् प्रधानकर्तृव्यापारस्याभिधानम्,

3.26. At this point some critics interpose with this observation – in ‘yājayet’ (cause the performance of the yāga) the causative ‘ṇic’ which denotes the action of the subordinate agent and which is a distinct word (as contrasted with the root ‘yaj’) comes after the root which denotes the action of the principal agent and because it (viz., yājana denoted by ‘ṇic’ is not what is enjoined, it is but right that the injunction should relate to the action of the principal agent (viz., yāga).

3.27 ✅

इह पुनरेको नयतिर्माणवकस्य व्यापारं ब्रूयात्? आचार्यस्य वा? न तावद् माणवकस्य नयत्यर्थकर्तृत्वम्; कर्मकारकत्वात् तस्य। अतोऽनभिधेयव्यापारः कथं नियुज्येत?

3.27. Here on the other hand the single root ‘nī’ – (i.e., having no ṇic termination) may denote either the action of the māṇavaka or of the preceptor. It cannot be that the pupil as the active agent is indicated in the root – meaning of ‘nī’ (nayati) because the word ‘pupil’ is in the objective relation (Brāhmaṇam upanayīta). Hence how could the mandate apply to one to whose activity there is no reference.

न हि परव्यापारे परो नियोक्तुं शक्यते। स्वव्यापारे हि पुरुषस्य नियोगः। तस्मान्नैष माणवकस्य नियोगः। तदेवमाचार्यकरणविधिप्रयुक्तत्वादध्ययनस्य नात्राधिकारचिन्तया मनः खेदयितव्यम् इति।

It is not possible that in the (legitimate) activity of one (ācārya) another (māṇavaka) could be enjoined. Surely it is in one’s own activity that one is enjoined (lit. the niyoga is applicable to the sphere of a person’s own activity). Hence (because upanayana does not constitute the function of the māṇavaka) this mandate (initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year, etc.) does not relate to the pupil. When it is so, adhyāpana is prompted by the mandate enjoined on the preceptor and there need be no mental perturbation as to who is the adhikārin.

3.28 ✅

उच्यते – माणवकस्यैवायं नियोगः, नाचार्यस्येह किञ्चिद्विधेयमस्ति।

3.28. Siddhāntin. – This has to be said: the Niyoga (viz., initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year, etc.) is enjoined on the pupil only and there is nothing that is enjoined to be accomplished by the preceptor.

कथम्? यत्तावत्

Pūrvapakṣin. – What is the proof of the aforesaid statement (viz., that the vyāpāra of the prayojya-māṇavaka, is known by implication, and that the vyāpāra of the prayojaka-ācārya, is only a restatement of what is otherwise established)?

‘उपनयीते’त्यस्याभिधानतो न्यायतश्च निरूप्यमाणोऽर्थ एतावान् प्रतीयते, आत्मानमाचार्यं कर्तुं कञ्चिदात्मसमीपमानीयाध्यापयेत्? इति। एतच्च सर्वं वृत्त्यर्थत्वेन ब्राह्मणस्यान्यत एव प्राप्तम्, नात्र विधातव्यम्।

Siddhāntin. – The meaning of the word ‘upanayīta’ both from the śabda-śakti – primary significance and ‘from rational usage’ amounts only to this – that to make oneself an ācārya one should get some (pupil) to one’s vicinity and impart Veda instruction to him. And all this (i.e., initiation and instruction) having been established from a different pramāṇa (i.e., distinct from scriptural testimony – viz., perception or inference) as meant for a Brāhmaṇa’s vocation, need not here be enjoined.

तत्र कमध्यापयेत्? इति विशेषाकाङ्क्षायां ‘ब्राह्मणमष्टवर्षमि’ति विशेषस्य विधायकमेतत् स्यात्।

Pūrvapakṣin. – There (i.e., in adhyāpayet) the question naturally will be ‘whom shall he teach?’ When there is such specific expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) the vidhi (in adhyāpayet) will relate to the auxiliary (aṅga) a Brāhmaṇa who is eight years old.’

तत्र प्राप्ते व्यापारेऽर्थद्वयविधानमेकस्मिन् वाक्ये न शक्यते वक्तुम्; वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्। अतो नाचार्यस्य किञ्चिद् विधेयमिहास्ति।

Siddhāntin. – There, if the activity (as indicated in the root-meaning) is already established (prāpte – if some other pramāṇa has previously established and it is only anuvāda), it is not possible to ascribe mandatoriness (vidhi) to two things (artha) in a single sentence. as it would result in sentence-split. Hence no duty (vidheya) of any sort is enjoined on the preceptor.

3.29 ✅

ननु माणवकस्यापि न किञ्चिद् विधेयमस्ति,

3.29. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, not even the māṇavaka has any vidheya (activity) enjoined on him, (i.e., viṣaya as ascertained from the root).

अस्तीति ब्रूमः।

Siddhāntin. – We say that it (injunction) does exist.

कथम्?

Pūrvapakṣin. – How?

यदैव ‘उपनयीते’ति शब्दतो न्यायतश्चात्मानमाचार्यं कर्तुमुपनयनेन संस्कृत्य कञ्चिदध्यापयेदिति प्रतीयते, तदैव यागश्रुतौ द्रव्यदेवतामात्रप्रतीतिवदध्ययनार्थोपनयनसंस्कार्योऽपि सामान्यतः प्रतीयते।

Siddhāntin. – At the very time the vākya ‘upanayīta’ (perform the ceremony of the sacred thread) brings to mind, both on the strength of the word – import and reason (nyāyataḥ) the duty of undertaking, for attaining the status of preceptor, the purification by initiation (upanayana) of some one and instructing him in the Veda, there is also this idea in general that there must be some one (māṇavaka) who has to undergo initiation for learning the Veda (i.e., the upagantā – one who should approach the guru); and this idea arises on the analogy of a Veda mandate relating to a yāga where the dravya (the substance to be offered as oblation), and the deity (to whom the offering is to be made) are both understood in general.

3.30 ✅

तस्य च प्रेक्षावतो निष्प्रयोजने प्रवर्तयितुमशक्यत्वात्, विद्यमानस्याप्यध्ययनेऽर्थावबोधस्य प्रागसिद्धेः प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वासिद्धेः, विधितोऽवश्यकर्तव्यतां प्रतिपद्य स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते।

3.30. An intelligent lad will not embark upon a thing that is profitless and though the Veda text, when learnt, yields the sense he will not be aware of it before (he gets it up) and therefore since the knowledge of the Veda import cannot be regarded as prompting him to undertake the study (it must be concluded that) he actively engages in the study because he is aware of the existence of a mandate enjoining such study as his obligatory duty, and this he does of his own will (i.e., neither with any desire to know the sense for he is ignorant that the Veda is pregnant with sense nor prompted by a preceptor).

तेन ‘अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीते’त्यष्टवर्षो ब्राह्मण उपसर्पेदाचार्यमित्यर्थः; ग्रामकामं याजयेद् ग्रामकामो यजेतेति यथा।

Hence the import of the sentence – ‘Initiate a Brāhmaṇa in his eighth year’ (aṣṭa-varṣam Brāhmaṇam upnayīta) is that a Brāhmaṇa lad in his eighth year should go to a preceptor, just as the mandate ‘cause a yāga to be performed by one who longs to own a village’ (grāma-kāmam yājayet’) has to be interpreted as ‘let one who desires to own a village perform a yāga’ (grāma-kāmo yajeta).

3.31 ✅

ननु एवमप्यधिकारो न लभ्यते,

3.31. Pūrvapakṣin. – Even then the agency is not determined.

अस्त्यत्राधिकारहेतुर्नित्यं निमित्तं वयोविशिष्टा जातिः, जातिविशिष्टं वयो वा।

Siddhāntin. – There certainly is the hetu which is nitya (i.e., obligatory or compelling in nature establishing the connection between the performance – kārya and the performer – kartā, prompter and the prompted, – preraka and prerya), viz., caste qualified by one’s eighth year or eighth year qualified by caste.

ननु जातिवयसी विशेषणमुपादेयस्य, अनुपादेयविशेषणमधिकारहेतुरिति स्थितिः,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, caste and age are attributes to what is upādeya and it is an accepted fact that what serves as pointing to agency should be other than the attributes to upādeya, (an attribute to what is not upādeya is alone the hetu of adhikāra).

सत्यमस्तीयं स्थितिः॥ किन्तु कर्तुरधिकार इत्यपि स्थिता न्यायविदः।

Siddhāntin. – True such is the situation (according to some; it is true that aṣṭa-varṣatva and Brāhmaṇatva are attributive to what is upādeya and that what constitutes the attribute of anupādeya only is the hetu of adhikāra). But there are (other) men well versed in the śāstra (Pūrva-mimāṃsā) who admit that whoever is the agent (kartā) is also the adhikārin (one entitled to obtain the fruit of action).

3.32 ✅

किं चेह न माणवको जातिवयोविशिष्ट उपादेय उपनयने, किं तूपनयनमेव तदर्थं विधीयते; संस्कारस्य संस्कार्योद्देशेन विधानात्।

3.32. Again here in the act of initiation the boy who comes under the particular caste and age is not the upādeya, i.e., not kartṛ-kāraka but it is upanayana only that is enjoined having him in view; for (it is a rule that) purification – saṃskāra is enjoined for the sake of that which is to be purified.

अतः संस्कार्यस्यावच्छेदकत्वं वयोजात्यवच्छिन्नं सद् भवति नित्यनिमित्तं माणवकस्य संस्कार्यत्व इति।

Hence age and caste are both limiting adjuncts of the pupil that is to be purified (saṃskārya) and as such these distinguishing (avacchedaka) epithets become obligatory requisites (nitya-nimitta) in the purification (i.e., the investiture ceremony) of the pupil.

3.33 ✅

तदेवमुपनयनस्याध्ययनार्थत्वात् तस्य च साधिकारत्वात् तेन चाधिकारेण साधिकारोऽध्ययनविधिः।

3.33. It comes to this therefore that because upanayana (which has to be taken as upagamana) is for the purpose of adhyayana – Veda study, and because that (upagamana) is associated with the adhikārin (viz., a Brāhmaṇa boy of eight years) it follows that the mandate enjoining adhyayana becomes associated with the adhikārin from that very adhikāra (viz., age and caste).

अक्षरग्रहणमात्रेण चाधिकारसिद्धिः, अर्थावबोधस्तु कारणान्तरादिति॥

The adhikāra (i.e., the title to the phala) is secured by the acquisition of the mastery over the bare text; as for the understanding of the sense of the text it is got from the other sources (such as a knowledge of grammar, etc.).

3.34 ✅

ननु चैवमधीतो वेदो धर्मजिज्ञासाया हेतुर्ज्ञातः, अनन्तरं धर्मो जिज्ञासितव्यः, इति वेद एवाधीतोन्यनिरपेक्षो धर्मजिज्ञासाया हेतुरिति वदन्ति,

3.34. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, “the memorised Veda text is perceived to be the hetu of the inquiry into Dharma; thereafter is Dharma to be inquired into” – thus they say that the memorised text serves as the hetu (incentive) to the inquiry of Dharma requiring no other aid – (Cf., Śabara Bhāṣya, p. 8, Ānandāśrama Edn.).

सत्यम्; तथैव तत्, को वाऽन्यथा वदति? अधीतवेदो ह्यवश्यकरणीयानि नित्यनैमित्तिकान्यकरणे प्रत्यवायजनकानि कर्माणि प्रतिपद्यते, तान्यनन्तरमेवावश्यविचारणीयानि, कथमेतान्यनुष्ठेयानीति।

Siddhāntin. – Yes, it is true. It is even as you say. Whoever takes a contrary view (lit. whoever says otherwise)? Indeed a person who has completed acquiring mastery over the Veda text being aware that the daily and occasional duties which are obligatory and which if neglected are productive of sin, perceives that their import (i.e., of texts relating to obligatory duties) has perforce to be inquired into immediately after the Veda study in order that he may know how these (duties) are to be performed.

अतः प्रागध्ययनादप्रतिपत्तेरयोग्यत्वादधीतवेदत्वमेवान्यनिरपेक्षमर्थावबोधहेतुरिति गीयते।

Hence, i.e., since the existence of the subsequent mandates (uttara-vidhis) is not cognised prior to the Veda study and as such since the uttara-vidhis cannot necessitate the Veda study (the Mīmāṃsaka) declares that the memorised text only without the intervention of anything else becomes the hetu in the understanding of the sense.

3.35 ✅

न तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानमवश्यकर्तव्यम्, अकरणे प्रत्यवायहेतुरिति प्रमाणमस्ति।

3.35. There is no such obligation in the case of Brahman-knowledge for no pramāṇa that its neglect is productive of sin exists.

तस्मादधीतवेदेनावश्यकर्तव्या धर्मजिज्ञासा, नैवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा।

Hence inquiry into Dharma is essential and not inquiry into Brahman for one who has mastered the Veda text.

तदेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अधिकारानर्हत्वादर्हयोश्च ब्रह्मतज्ज्ञानयोरनर्थ्यमानत्वाद् जिज्ञासाऽनुपपन्ना॥

From what has been said so far, since the desire for the knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-jijñāsā) is not a fit subject for commencement and since Brahman and Brahman-knowledge though fit for commencement are not sought after (by such a person) the jijñāsā becomes inadmissible.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.2]

3.36 ✅

मङ्गलस्यापि वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् श्रुतिमात्रोपयोगाच्च साधूक्तम् – अथ शब्द आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते नाधिकारार्थ इति॥

3.36. Since the word ‘atha’ even in the sense of auspiciousness (maṅgala) fails to become an integral part of the import of the statement, and since when merely heard the word ‘atha’ constitutes auspiciousness, (like the sweet sounds of vīṇā), the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) has rightly said, the word ‘then’ is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon.’

3.37 ✅

ननु प्रक्रियमाणात् पूर्वप्रकृतमपि किञ्चिद् नियमेन प्रतीयतेऽथशब्दात्, ततस्तत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं किमिति न गृह्यते?

3.37. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, from the word ‘atha’ we gather for a certainty that there is something antecedent to the topic now under consideration. Hence why not ‘atha’ be understood as denoting such sequence?

3.38 ✅

उच्यते – नैतदानन्तर्याद् व्यतिरिच्यते।

3.38. Siddhāntin. – We say that this (interpretation – arthāntara) is in no way different from its interpretation as immediate consecution – ānantarya.

कथम्?
एवम् – तत् प्रक्रियमाणस्य नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तं भवति, यदि तस्यानन्तरं तन्मात्रापेक्षं तत्प्रक्रियेत, एवं सति प्रक्रियमाणस्य हेतुभूतोऽर्थः पूर्वनिर्वृत्तो भवति;

Pūrvapakṣin. – How?
Siddhāntin. – This is how. That becomes the indispensable precedent of the topic undertaken, if it (Brahma-jijñāsā) should be begun necessarily after that, and if it requires that (the preceding) only. Then (evam sati) that something which has preceded necessarily becomes the immediate cause of what has been undertaken.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.5]

अन्यथा यस्मिन् कस्मिंश्चित् पूर्ववृत्तापेक्षायामनुवादादृष्टार्थत्वयोरन्यतरत्वप्रसङ्गात्, अतो हेतुभूतोऽर्थोऽपेक्षितव्यः, तदेतदाह – पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकादिति।

Otherwise, i.e., if it (the topic on hand) desiderates something or other (not necessarily that which serves as its inevitable cause) then it would result in its becoming either a restatement (anuvāda) or something pointing to adṛṣṭa (unseen good). Hence what is required is some antecedent constituting a necessary condition (hetu). And this is what the Bhāṣyakāra means. – The sense of ‘atha’ as immediate consecution (ānantarya) does not in essence differ from its sense as some precedent topic – (Pūrva-prakṛta).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.6]

3.39 ✅

सति चानन्तर्यार्थत्वे यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाऽपि यत् पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते, तद् वक्तव्यम्। स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यन्तु समानमिति॥

3.39. “When (the word ‘atha’ is understood as) ‘immediate consecution’ it must be rendered explicit on what antecedent, Brahma-jijñāsā, i.e., the inquiry into Brahman, is necessarily dependent, on the analogy of Dharma-jijñāsā, (i.e., inquiry into Veda duties) which necessarily depends upon the antecedent Veda study – adhyayana. Veda study however is common (to both Dharma-jijñāsā and Brahma-jijñāsā).”

येन विना नियमेनानन्तरस्य न प्रक्रिया स तादृशो हेतुः पूर्वनिर्वृत्तो वक्तव्यः; यस्यानन्तर ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा प्रक्रियते।

The cause (hetu) without which what follows is not necessarily undertaken, and following which the inquiry into Brahman is (as a matter of fact) undertaken must be pointed out as having been the (inevitable) antecedent.

3.40 ✅

स्वाध्यायाध्ययनन्तु समानम् साधारणो हेतुर्धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः। अतश्च ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासे’ति पुनरथशब्देन तन्मात्रापेक्षणं व्यर्थं स्यात्।

3.40. Learning the Veda by rote (Svādhyāyādhyayana) however is common, that is, it is the same antecedent of the inquiry into both religious duty and Brahman. And therefore, the word ‘atha’ in ‘athāto Brahma-jijñāsā’ will serve no purpose if it is intended to denote only that (viz., Sa-dhāraṇa-kāraṇa).

अथवा समानं नात्यन्तमपेक्षितं, न स्वयमेव सामर्थ्यं जनयितुं प्रयोक्तुं च शक्तम्। अतः समानो हेतुः, नावश्यं निष्पादक इत्यर्थः॥

Or what is meant by the word ‘samāna’ is a cause which is not unnecessary but which at the same time is, ‘not potent by itself to capacitate a person for inquiry and impel him to commence the jijñāsā in question.’ Hence such a hetu (in this special sense) which is common does not necessarily bring about (the result, viz., inquiry into Brahman).

3.41 ✅

नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः॥

3.41. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, is there not here the additional feature, viz., the subsequence of Brahma-jijñāsā to the knowledge of religious duty (karma)?

तथाच वृत्त्यन्तरे वर्णितम्-कर्मणामधिकारपरम्परया शब्दतो वा संस्कारतया वा यथाविभागं तार्दथ्यावगमाद् निःश्रेयसप्रयोजनत्वाच्चानन्तर्यवचनोऽथशब्दोऽधिगतानन्तरमिति।

Even so, it is stated in another commentary (vṛtty-antara) – “the word ‘atha’ standing for immediate consecution means ‘after acquiring the knowledge of Dharma’ (karma)”; because either by engaging in the performance of graduated karma or by attaining step by step mental purity as enjoined by the Veda or by the enjoyment of the rewards of karma (in succession) choosing at option the one or the other alternative, one obtains through karma that knowledge (that is of Brahman), and also finds it is helpful in the attainment of mokṣa.

अन्यैरपि स्ववृत्तौ वर्णितम् – तत्राथातःशब्दौ प्रथम एवाध्याये प्रथमसूत्रे वर्णितौ। अथेति पूर्वप्रकृतां धर्मजिज्ञासामपेक्ष्यानन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाप्रारम्भार्थः। अत इति पूर्वनिर्दिष्टस्यैवार्थस्य हेतुतामाचष्टे ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां प्रतीति।

By another commentator also it is thus stated, ‘the words ‘atha’ and ‘ataḥ’ were explained in the first sūtra of the first adhyāya only (i.e., the Mīmāṃsā sūtra); the word ‘atha’ is intended to mean that after the inquiry into Dharma which is the antecedent condition, the inquiry into Brahman (follows); the word ‘ataḥ’ states that what has already been indicated is the hetu in regard to Brahma-jijñāsā.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.9]

3.42 ✅

अत्राह न; धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति॥ वेदान्ताध्ययनं यद्यपि केवलं न पुष्कलं कारणम्; तथाऽपि न तेन विनोत्पद्यते ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, उपपद्यते तु धर्मावबोधनं विनाऽपीत्यभिप्रायः।

3.42. Siddhāntin. – No, (it is not as you explain) – “Even prior to dharma-vicāra, inquiry into Brahman is possible to one who has studied the Vedānta section”. No doubt the getting up of the words of (Upaniṣads) is not by itself an adequate hetu (i.e., prerequisite for inquiry into Brahman); still without it desire to understand Brahman does not arise, but it does arise even without the knowledge of Dharma – this is the substance.

3.43 ✅

कथम्?

3.43. Pūrvapakṣin. – How?

तत्र तावद् धर्मजिज्ञासायां त्रयं वृत्तम्-द्वादशलक्षणे प्रतिपादितन्यायसहस्रम्, तदनुग्रहोपजा-तश्च वाक्यार्थनिर्णयः, वाक्यार्थश्चाग्निहोत्रादिकं कर्म।

Siddhāntin. – There, anyhow, in the Dharma Mīmāṃsā three factors become apparent: – (i) the thousand interpretational principles enunciated in the twelve chapters (of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā), (ii) the determination of the meaning of the ritualistic statements, as revealed by the application of those maxims, and (iii) karmas like Agnihotra which form the import of those statements.

तत्र यः प्रथमसूत्रेऽथशब्दोपादानसूचितो न्यायः स्वाध्यायस्यार्थावबोधोपयोगप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः,

Now of these three (tatra) the nyāya (or reason which is implied from the use of the word ‘atha’ in the first aphorism ‘athāto Dharma-jijñāsā’) serves as the instrument (hetu) for producing in us the knowledge that the Veda study (adhyayana) is meant for understanding the sense (of the memorised text).

यदप्यौत्पत्तिकसूत्रे शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्ध-नित्यत्त्वेन वेदान्तानां चापौरुषेयत्वेन कारणेनानपेक्षत्वं नाम प्रामाण्यकारणमुक्तम्,

Again in the Autpattika sūtra (V adhikaraṇa of Jaiminī’s Pūrvamīmāṃsā) the self-validity of the Upaniṣad texts has been made out by establishing their non-dependence (on any other pramāṇa) on the ground of the eternity of the relation between the word and its import and the self-existent nature (apauruṣeya) of those texts.

तदुभयमिहाप्युपयुज्यते; अपेक्षितत्वात्, इतरस्य पुर्नन्यायकलापस्य न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायामुपयोगोस्ति, यतो न निरस्ताशेषप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वं प्रतिज्ञातं तत्र। न तत्प्रतिपादने तत्प्रतिपादनसामर्थ्ये वा शब्दानां कश्चित् न्यायोऽभिहितः।

And let both these be utilised here (in Brahma-vicāra) also since they are required. But the rest of the assemblage of the (Pūrvamīmāṃsā) nyāyas serve no purpose in the investigation into the nature of Brahman. For the topic proposed for consideration is not the identity of the individual soul with Brahman which is rid of all misery. There is no mention of any nyāya by which śabdas (Vedānta passages) could be construed as expounding the nature of Brahman, nor any nyāya that they (śabdas) are potent to expound Brahman.

3.44 ✅

यत्पुनः प्रथमतन्त्रसिद्धन्यायोपजीवनमस्मिन्नपि तन्त्रे, तत् सगुणविद्याविषयम्।

3.44. Again even in this (tantra, viz., Vedānta, as regards the mandates relating to meditation – vide BrSEng.3.3) dependence upon the nyāyas enunciated in the Pūrva-tantra (i.e., the Pūrvamīmāṃsā śāstra), is only so far as it concerns the knowledge of the qualified Brahman.

तत्र च मानसी क्रियोपासना विधेयाऽनित्यफला धर्मविशेष एव। तदेवं न्यायकलापस्य न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायामुपयोगः। अतो न तदपेक्षोऽथशब्दः।

And there (i.e., in passages relating to meditation) what is enjoined in meditation which is a mental act, whose reward is temporal and as such it is but a variety of Dharma (karma); it being so, the total body of such nyāyas can serve no purpose in Brahma-vicāra. Hence the word ‘atha’ does not need that, as its prerequisite.

3.45 ✅

यत्पुनः स्वाध्याय-स्यार्थावबोधोपयोगेऽनपेक्षत्वेन स्वतःप्रामाण्यसिद्धौ च न्यायद्वयम्, तत् अपेक्षितमपि न केवलं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाकारणम्; स्वाध्यायवदेव, तेन न तदपेक्षोऽथशब्दः।

3.45. (It may be urged that ‘atha’ need not mean ‘subsequent to Dharma vicāra,’ but might mean ‘subsequent to the inquiry into the validity of the Veda as a pramāṇa,’ the answer is) that the two nyāyas enunciated, of which the one serves to show that the learning of the Veda text is for understanding the meaning, and the other to show the non-requirement of other pramāṇas to establish the self-evidential character of the Veda, though required (in the Uttara-mīmāṃsā) are not like the Veda study (which is a precondition of the inquiry of both Dharma and Brahman) – the hetu exclusively of inquiry into Brahman. Hence the word ‘atha’ does not mean ‘subsequence’ to mimāṃsā in so far as those two nyāyas are concerned.

3.46 ✅

यः पुनर्वाक्यार्थनिर्णयः, स न कथमपि ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायामुपयुज्यते।

3.46. If it be argued that the determination of the meaning of the Veda statements (is a preliminary requisite) it is evident that it (vākyārtha-nirṇaya) does in no way help in the inquiry into Brahman.

न ह्यन्यविषयं ज्ञानमन्यत्र प्रवृत्तौ हेतुः। प्रतिपत्तौ कदाचित् स्यादपि यथाऽनुमानादौ, तदपीह नास्ति; धर्मब्रह्मणोः सम्बन्धानिरूपणात्,

The knowledge of one thing can by no means initiate effort in the direction of something that is quite different. Sometimes it is possible as in inference, etc., that the knowledge of the one (say, smoke) leads to the knowledge of the other (fire); but even that is absent here, since no relation between Dharma and Brahman could be ascertained.

3.47 ✅

अतः कर्मणामुप-योगः परिशिष्यते। तथा च तैरप्युक्तम् – कर्मणामधिकारपरम्परया शब्दतो वा संस्कारतया वा यथाविभागं तार्दथ्यावगमात् इति।

3.47. Hence the possibility of utilising karma (alone remains). Accordingly this is what was said by them also (viz., by those commentators) – “the word ‘atha’ standing for ‘immediate consecution’ means ‘after acquiring into the knowledge of Dharma (leading to its performance)’ since the karmas (prescribed duties) performed in their ascending order of importance or mental purity cultivated on the authority of Veda testimony or by the enjoyment of the rewards of karma – choosing the one or the other path – will enable a person to obtain that knowledge (i.e., of Brahman)”.

अत्रेदं निरूप्यते- केयमधिकारपरम्परा? कथं वा तार्दथ्य-मिति? यथा तावत् प्रासादमारुरुक्षोः सोपानपरम्परा क्रमशः प्राप्यमाणा प्रासादारोहणहेतुः, न तथेह ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां चिकीर्षोः कर्माणि सहस्रसंवत्सरपर्यन्तानि तत्क्रियाहेतुतया स्थितानि; प्रमाणाभावात्।

This point is discussed by us here. Which is this gradation of acts to be performed? And how are they the means to jijñāsā? For him who wishes to climb to the top of a mansion the flight of steps gradually ascended becomes the means of gaining the top floor, not so here; the prescribed duties performed up to the end of even a thousand years are not the means of inducing that act (viz., Brahma-jijñāsā) in one who is desirous of inquiring into the nature of Brahman, because of the absence of valid proof.

3.48 ✅

अथ कामोपहतमनास्तदभिमुखो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां नावतरति, कर्मभिस्तु कामा-वाप्तौ तदुपशमाद् ब्रह्वजिज्ञासायामवतरति।

3.48. It may be said that a person, whose mind is overpowered by cravings will be ever inclined to gratify them and will not entertain the idea of Brahma-vicāra; when however the cravings are satisfied by the performance of karmas they disappear and then he enters upon the inquiry into Brahman.

तथाच सार्वभौमत्वाद्युत्तरोत्तरशतगुणोत्कर्षावस्थितान् ब्रह्मलोकावाप्तिपर्यन्तान् कामानवापयन्त्यधिकारपरम्परया कर्माणि; ब्रह्मलोकात् परं कामयितव्याभावात्, निर्विषयस्य च कामस्यानुपपत्तेर्दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत् कामोपशमे ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां करोति;

Even so (i.e., in elucidation thereof) it is stated that religious duties performed, cause the fulfilment of one’s cravings by yielding a succession of rewards beginning with universal sovereignty and ending with the attainment of Brahma-loka, each reward (in the ascending scale) being a hundred times more excellent than the one preceding it. Because there exists nothing beyond Brahma-loka and because no desire springs in the absence of objects, cravings subside as fire subsides when the faggots (ritual firewood) are burnt out; then it is that one engages in the Brahman inquiry.

3.49 ✅

कर्मानुष्ठानानन्तर्यं तर्हि वक्तव्यम् न धर्मावबोधानन्तर्यम्॥ कथं वा कामाप्तिः कामोपशमहेतुः?

3.49. Siddhāntin. – If so the wording of the Bhāṣya should have been ‘after the performance of karma’ and not ‘after understanding the nature of dharma’. Again how can the attainment of longings be the means of quelling the longings?

दृष्टान्तसामर्थ्यात्, यथा हविषा कृष्णवर्त्मा वर्धमानोऽपि सर्वहविःप्रक्षेपे सर्वं दग्ध्वा स्वयं शाम्यति, एवं विषयेन्धनः कामो यावद्विषयं वर्धमानोऽपि तत्क्षये क्षीणेन्धनाग्निवत् स्वयं शाम्यतीति युक्तम्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – On the strength of familiar instances of it in life – fire which though it gains in volume by the (pouring in of the) oblation, subsides of its own accord having burnt up the whole oblation when all of it has been offered to it. Even so it is but right to regard that desire having the objects (of sense – viṣaya) for its faggots, though it goes on increasing so long as the objects (last) subsides of itself on its (viṣaya) destruction (brought about by satiation), like the fire when the faggots are destroyed.

सत्यं युक्तम्; यदि हैरण्यगर्भो भोगो न क्षीयेत, क्षीयते तु कृतकत्वात् परिच्छिन्नविषयत्वाच्च; तत्क्षये पूर्ववदनवाप्तोऽवाप्तव्यः, इति कामः समुल्लसत्येव।

Siddhāntin. – Yes, this would be right if the bliss of Hiraṇya-garbha-loka did not wane. It does wane however, because it is the result of action (viz., meditation – upāsanā) and because it is derived from finite objects (unlike Brahmānanda). When that (the bliss of Hiraṇya-garbha-loka) wanes desire is sure to spring afresh as before for the attainment of that which has not been attained.

अतो विषयस्य क्षयादिदोषदर्शनात् कामोपशमो हिरण्यगर्भस्यापि। तथाचोक्तम्-ज्ञानमप्रतिघं यस्य वैराग्यं च जगत्पतेः। ऐश्वर्यं चैव धर्मश्च सह सिद्धं चतुष्टयम्॥ इति।

Hence even for Hiraṇya-garbha the cessation of cravings (is brought about) by his realising the evanescence and other defects (inherent) in the objects of sense (and not from their gratification). And to this effect it is said – “To him who is the Lord (i.e., Hiraṇya-garbha) of the world, unimpeded knowledge, dispassion, sovereignty, and dharma, these four are congenital.”

3.50 ✅

तस्मात् सर्वत्र कामस्य विषयदोषदर्शनमेवोच्छेदकारणम्, नित्यवस्तुदर्शनं च; रसवर्जं रसोऽप्यस्य परं दृष्ट्वा निवर्तते इति स्मृतेः।

3.50. Hence what causes the eradication of all desire is the knowledge of the defects of the objects of sense as well as the realisation of the Eternal Being, as witness the Smṛti – “objects turn away from the man who practises abstinence, but not the subtle attachment for them, but even that attachment vanishes when he sees the Supreme Reality” (BhG.2.59).

नचैवंलक्षण आगमोऽस्ति – हिरण्यगर्भोपभोगाद् निखिलविषयावाप्तौ कामोच्छेदो भवतीति।

And there exists no such scriptural authority to show that from the attainment of all the objects of enjoyment in the region of Hiraṇya-garbha the desire perishes.

3.51 ✅

ननु कामावाप्तौ स्वस्थहृदयः कार्यान्तरक्षमो भवतीति सर्वेषां स्वसंवेद्यमेतत्,

3.51. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, is not this self-evident to all that a man on the attainment of (a particular) desire gets peace of mind and becomes fit to engage in some other act?

सत्यम्; तदुत्कलिकोपशमात्, तदुत्कलिकोपशमश्च तदा सामर्थ्यहानेः; सति च सामर्थ्ये स्वच्छन्दोपभोगसम्भवात्। यदि पुनरेकान्ततो निवृत्तकामो भवेत्, न तं विषयं पुनः सङ्गोपायेत्।

Siddhāntin. – True, (this happens) from the satisfaction of one’s longing. But that satisfaction of longing comes, because the capacity (for enjoyment) ceases at the time; for as long as the capacity exists there results unrestricted self-indulgence. If however one is absolutely rid of all desire for an object, one does not cherish again that object.

तस्माद् न कर्मणां कामनिर्बहणद्वारेण ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायोग्यतापादनम्; अतो न कर्मावबोधापेक्षोऽप्यथशब्दः।

Hence it is not by the eradication of desires (after gratifying them) that the karmas (like agni-hotra) generate capacity in a person to undertake the inquiry into Brahman. As such the word ‘atha’ does not signify the knowledge of karma.

3.52 ✅

भवतु तर्हि संस्कारद्वारेण कर्मणां पूर्ववृत्तत्वम्? यस्यैतेऽष्टाचत्वारिंशत्संस्काराः, अष्टौ चात्मगुणाः स ब्रह्मणः सायुज्यं गच्छतीति महायज्ञैश्च यज्ञैश्च ब्राह्मीयं क्रियते तनुरिति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते पुंसां क्षयात्पापस्य कर्मणः। यथाऽऽदर्शतलप्रख्ये पश्यन्त्यात्मानमात्मनीति च स्मृतेः;

3.52. Pūrvapakṣin. – Let then the antecedent existence of karmas by reason of their purificatory function be admitted. In support thereof are the following quoted: – “He who has gone through the forty purificatory rituals and possesses the eight self-regarding virtues, attains union (with the Absolute)”; “By the performance of mahā-yajñas, and yajñas, the person becomes fit for Brahma-knowledge”; “knowledge arises in men by reason of the destruction of sinful karma; just as (the aspirants) perceive their own selves in the inner sense resembling a (purified) mirror”; these are the smṛtis.

विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेनेति येन केनचन यजेतापि दर्विहोमेनानुप-हतमना एव भवतीति च श्रुतेः।

“They (the aspirants) desire to know (Brahman) through sacrifice, charity, meditation and temperance”; “By the performance of any one of the yāgas or of Darvī-homas one’s mind will get rid of all impurities” – these are the Śrutis.

वक्ष्यति च सूत्रकारः – अत एवाश्रमकर्मापेक्षा सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववदिति च।

And the Sūtrakāra (Vyāsa) also says, “Hence it is that karma pertaining to (each) āśrama is needed”; “There is need of all karmas (for Brahma-jñāna) because of the Śruti relating to Yajña, like the horse”.

3.53 ✅

सत्यमेवम्; यदि समानजन्मानुष्ठितमेव कर्म संस्कुर्वद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा-योग्यत्वहेतुः स्यात्। न च नैयोगिके फले कालनियमोऽस्ति।

3.53. Siddhāntin. – What you say would be true if the karma performed in the same birth did purify the man and render him fit for Brahma-jijñāsā. But there is no time-specification for the eventuation of the reward accruing from enjoined karmas.

तेव पूर्वजन्मानुष्ठितकर्मसंस्कृतो धर्मजिज्ञासां तदनुष्ठानं चाप्रतिपद्यमान एव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां प्रवर्तते, इति न नियमेव तदपेक्षोऽथशब्दो युज्यते।

As such the man regenerated by acts of karma in his previous births enters upon the inquiry into Brahman even without undertaking the inquiry into dharma (karma) and its performance either, so that the word ‘atha’ is not used to indicate subsequence in relation to that (Dharma-jijñāsā or karmānuṣṭhāna).

3.54 ✅

एतेन –ऋणापाकरणद्वारेणापि नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तत्वम्– प्रत्युक्तम्॥ तथाच श्रुति-स्मृती यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत् तस्याश्रमविकल्पमेके ब्रुवते इति॥

3.54. On the parity of this reasoning is refuted the view that through the discharge of one’s debts (to the manes or one’s ancestors) karma constitutes the antecedent condition. To this effect (there is also the authority of) both Śruti and Smṛti – “Because, otherwise also one may enter on the order of saṇnyāsa while yet in the stage of a bachelor” (Jābālopaniṣad – 4). “Some have stated that one may assume saṇnyāsa in any one of the (three) alternative stages – (Gautama Dharma Sūtra – III. 1).

तस्मात् साधूक्तम्– धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागप्यधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेरिति॥

Rightly therefore it is said (by the Bhāṣyakāra) that ‘it is possible for one who has studied the Vedānta portions to undertake the inquiry into Brahman before even inquiring into the nature of Dharma.”

3.55 ✅

अथापि स्यात् – न हेतुत्वेनानन्तरवृत्तकर्मावबोधापेक्षमथशब्दं ब्रूमः, अपितु क्रमप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्; यथा हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यत्यथ जिह्वाया अथ वक्षसः इति, तदेतदयुक्तम्;

3.55. Pūrvapakṣin. – Let it be even so. We do not say that the word ‘atha’ (means subsequence) desiderating a knowledge of karma as an immediately preceding cause, but (is used) only for bringing home the order of succession as evidenced in (the mandate) “First he cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the chest (of the animal to be sacrificed).” – Vide Tait. Sam. VI Kāṇḍa.

3.56 ✅

न्यायसूत्रेऽपि चैककर्तृकाणां बहूनां युगपदनुष्ठानासम्भवादवश्यम्भाविनि क्रमे ब्रूयादपि तन्नियममथशब्दः।

3.56. Siddhāntin. – Even that (namely ‘atha’ meaning succession) is untenable (occurring as it does) in a nyāya-sūtra. And where a number of acts having a single agent cannot be accomplished all at the same time and as such the order of succession being unavoidable, the word ‘atha’ might intimate the rule (by which to determine the order).

एककर्तृकत्वं च शेष-शेषिणोः शेषाणां च बहूनामेकशेषिसम्बद्धानामधिकारान्तरप्रयुक्त्त्युप-जीविनां च भवति, नेतरथा। न हि धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोरेतेषामन्यतमत्वे प्रमाणमस्ति,

And unity of agency (eka-kartṛka) is found where one act is auxiliary to another, or where several auxiliaries are related to a single principal (or main act) or where an act is dependent upon the qualification conferred on a person for another act, but not elsewhere (i.e., in no other context). But indeed there exists no proof to show that one or other of these relations obtains between the inquiry into Dharma and the inquiry into Brahman.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.10–11]

तदिदिमाह – ‘यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानामानन्तर्यनियमः; क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः; शेषशेषित्वेऽधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावाद् धर्म-ब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोरिति॥

The same is thus expressed (by Śaṅkara): – “There is the restriction of (a particular) succession in cutting off of the heart, etc. (of the sacrificial animal) since such order is intended; like that there is no order intended here, because there exists no proof for assuming the inquiry into Dharma and the inquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and auxiliary or the relation of qualification conferred on a person for a particular act.”

3.57 ✅

अथापि स्यात्, यथाऽऽग्नेयादीनां षण्णां यागानामेकं फलं स्वर्गविशेषः, एवं धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोरप्येकं फलं स्वर्गः, ततः क्रमापेक्षायां तन्नियमार्थोऽथशब्द इति,

3.57. Pūrvapakṣin. – It (the order of succession) may also be thus – just as svarga is the specific single reward (phala) for the six yāgas consisting of Āgneya, etc., similarly inquiry into Dharma as well as Brahman has svarga as the single reward (for both) and hence requiring as such inquiries do a certain order, (we have to take) ‘atha’ as intended to determine it.

यथावा द्वादशभिरपि लक्षणैर्धर्म एको जिज्ञास्यः, प्रतिलक्षणमंशान्तरपरिशोधनया, यथावाऽस्मिन्नपि तन्त्रे चतुर्भिरपि लक्षणैरेकं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यम्, तत्र चांशान्तरपरिशोधनेन लक्षणानां क्रम नियमः।

Or just as from all the twelve chapters of (Jaimini’s Pūrva-mīmāṃsā Sūtras) Dharma alone has to be inquired into by an orderly discussion of one or other of its phases in every chapter; or again in the present treatise (tantra, viz., Vedānta) also composed of four chapters it is the one Brahman that is the object of inquiry by an orderly discussion of one or other of its phases in every chapter, it follows that there should be a proper arrangement of the chapters.

एवं तन्त्रद्वयेनैकं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं, तत्र क्रमनियमार्थोऽथशब्द

So that it is the Brahman only that is the object of inquiry in both the tantras (viz., the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās); as such the use of the word ‘atha’ is for the purpose of krama-niyama (i.e., to intimate the order of succession).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.12]

3.58 ✅

इत्याशङ्क्याह – फलजिज्ञास्यभेदाच्च॥ धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोरिति सम्बन्धः॥ तमेव भेदं कथयति – अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्। तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम्।

3.58. Siddhāntin. – Premising this demurrer (the Bhāṣyakāra) says, [“Because of the difference of phala (result of inquiry) and of the object of inquiry”]. After the expression ‘phalajijñāsya-bhedācca’ the inquiry into Dharma and that into Brahman is to be understood. That very difference is explained – (the knowledge of Dharma has prosperity as its phala which is dependent upon action).

अभ्युदयः फलं धर्मज्ञानस्येति प्रसिद्धमेव, न कस्यचिद् विसंवादः। तदपि न ज्ञानस्य फलम्, अपितु ज्ञेयस्य, तस्यापि न ज्ञेयत्वादेव फलम्; किन्त्वनुष्ठीयमानत्वात्।

That prosperity is the reward of the knowledge (and subsequent performance) of Dharma is universally admitted and is disputed by none. Even that (prosperity) is not the result of the knowledge (as such of Dharma) but of the object of knowledge (viz., Dharma or Karma) and of that again it is the result not of Dharma but of its performance.

निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानं, न, चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षमिति॥ ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य फलमपवर्गः। स च नित्यसिद्धोऽव्यवहितः स्वसंवेद्यः, यतोऽविद्या संसारहेतुः। न चाविद्यामनिवर्तयन्ती विद्योदेति।

(“the knowledge of Brahman on the other hand has mokṣa, the bliss-supreme as its phala and does not depend upon the performance of any distinct act”) so that the fruit of Brahma-knowledge is final beatitude (apavarga). And that (apavarga) is eternally accomplished, immediate (i.e., it is one’s own ātman and so always possessed) and self-revealed. Because nescience (avidyā) is the cause of saṃsāra – the world-cycle (there is need for self-regeneration and Vedānta study, for its eradication). And knowledge does not arise without dispelling nescience.

तदेवमत्यन्तविलक्षणत्वात् प्रस्थानभेदाच्च न फलद्वारेणाप्येकोपनिपातः; तेन न क्रमाकाङ्क्षा तन्त्रद्वयस्य।

As such their natures being so radically diverse, and the paths to their approach also being different, a single agency (of both śāstras) does not fit in even through (your postulation of an identical) phala. Hence there arises no requirement (ākāṅkṣā) of the order of precedence as between these two Śāstras.

3.59 ✅

जिज्ञास्यं पुनरत्यन्तविलक्षणं, यतः कार्यो धर्मः पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रः स्वज्ञानकालेऽसिद्धसत्ताकः प्रथमे तन्त्रे जिज्ञास्यः, इह तु नित्यनिर्वृत्तं पुरुषव्यापारानपेक्षं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यम्।

3.59. As for the objects of inquiry (jijñāsya), they are totally distinct; because what is inquired into the first tantra (viz., Pūrva-mīmāṃsā) is Dharma which is a thing to be effected and which is dependent upon man’s action and whose very being (viz., the act of religious duty) is absent at the time of inquiry into its nature. Here on the other hand Brahman which is eternally accomplished and which is not dependent on man’s effort is the object of inquiry.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.15]

3.60 ✅

किं च चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च। इदमपरं प्रमाणोपाधि प्रमेयवैलक्षण्यम्।

3.60. Again [‘owing to the difference in the operation of the Veda texts also’], (the two inquiries differ) – This is another difference in regard to the objects of inquiry depending upon the difference in the pramāṇas (i.e., pramāṇa-vākyas or authoritative texts).

धर्मचोदना हि प्रेरयन्ती पुरुषमसति विषये प्रेरयितुमसमर्था सती विषयमप्यवबोधयति।

The codanā (Veda injunction) relating to Dharma no doubt prompts one to action, but finding itself incapable of prompting in the case of an absent viṣaya the object to be achieved, instructs one in the viṣaya also.

ब्रह्मप्रमाणं पुनर्बोधयत्येव केवलं नावबोधे पुरुषः प्रेर्यते। अवबोधो हि यथावस्तु यथाप्रमाणं चोदेति, न पुरुषस्येच्छामप्यनुवर्तते।

The pramāṇa (text) relating to Brahman on the other hand, is confined only to the instruction (jñāpana-mātra) and the man is not prompted to exert to achieve it. Knowledge indeed arises in conformity with the object and in conformity with the pramāṇa, and does not conform to man’s desire.

तत्र कुतः प्रेर्येत? यथाऽक्षार्थयोः सन्निकर्षे सति तेन सन्निकर्षेणाक्षावगम्यार्थज्ञाने पुरुषो न नियुज्यते, तद्वत्; अनिच्छतोऽपि स्वयमुत्पत्तेः,

How could there be any prompting? When, for example, there is proximity between the sense and the object, cognition is produced in the man by the perceptive sense owing to proximity and the man is not enjoined (to acquire it). It is analogous to it; even if undesired it arises of its own accord.

ब्रह्मणि तु नित्यसिद्धत्वान्न प्रेरणा सम्भवति।

And as for Brahman, however, because it is eternally existing there is no room for prompting.

‘ब्रह्मचोदने’ति चोदनाशब्दो भाष्ये प्रमाणविवक्षया प्रयुक्तः, न प्रेरणाविवक्षया,

The word ‘codanā,’ in the Bhāṣya ‘Brahma-codanā’ is used with the object of denoting pramāṇa (i.e., valid means of proof relating to Brahman) and not with the idea of denoting preraṇa – incitement to action or niyoga

[BrS.1.1.1 L.16–18]

तदाह – या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणं, सा स्वविषये विनियुञ्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति, ब्रह्मचोदना पुनः पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम्; अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वान्न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते; यथाऽक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत्॥

and this (the Bhāṣyakāra) states: – [“That codanā which defines Dharma intimates the knowledge of its own subject (of Dharma) to the person while at the same time enjoining action on him; codanā relating to Brahman on the other hand merely instructs the person (in the knowledge of Brahman and does not urge him to action); the person is not enjoined (to exert) for instruction, because instruction (immediately) results from codanā (i.e., the Veda sentence explicative of Brahman, e.g., ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7). It is analogous to the perception of an object when the perceptive sense and the object are in juxtaposition”].

तदेवं जिज्ञास्यैक्यनिबन्धनाऽपि न क्रमापेक्षा तन्त्रद्वयस्य; येन तदपेक्षोऽथशब्दो व्याख्यायेत,

It is therefore evident that no order of succession between the two tantras (Śāstras) is intended as depending upon the identity of the object of knowledge; and the word ‘atha’ would (no doubt) have been explained in that sense (if there had been identity of objects).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.19]

3.61 ✅

अत उपसंहरति – तस्मात् किमपि वक्तव्यं, यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति॥

3.61. [It comes to this therefore that something (some antecedent) or other must be postulated subsequent to which the inquiry into Brahman is proposed to be undertaken].

[BrS.1.1.1 L.20]

3.62 ✅

उच्यते – नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्, मुमुक्षुत्वं चेति॥

3.62. (The antecedent conditions,) [we say, are discrimination between what is eternal and what is not eternal; renunciation of desire for the enjoyment of the fruit of one’s deeds here as well as hereafter; the acquirement of such aids as tranquillity and self-restraint; and the desire for eternal freedom’].

उक्तं पुरस्ताद् अधिकारार्थत्वेऽथशब्दस्य शास्त्रारम्भवैयर्थ्यम्; प्रवृत्त्यभावादिति, प्रवृत्त्यभावे च कारणमुक्तम्,

It was pointed out before, that the word ‘atha’ if taken to intimate the ushering in of a fresh subject, the undertaking (of the composition) of the Śāstra (viz., the Uttara Mīmāṃsā) would be valueless since none would endeavour to study it. And the reason for the lack of endeavour has also been stated.

अखिलसुखभोगाद्धिरण्यगर्भावाप्तिपर्यन्तान्निवर्तयति ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा क्रियमाणा, तेन तत उद्वेगो लोकस्य, कुतस्तत्र प्रवृत्तिरिति?

(Why there arises no effort is explained). The inquiry undertaken, would be privative of the enjoyment of the whole body of pleasures extending upto the attainment of the Hiraṇya-garbha state so that all inclination to the inquiry into Brahman would be absent and as such what incentive could there be for a person to attempt such inquiry?

3.63 ✅

तस्माद् यावदस्य हिरण्यगर्भावाप्तिपर्यन्तस्य भोगस्योत्पादपरिच्छेदाभ्यां विनाशित्वादनित्यत्वं नावैति।

3.63. Hence as long as one does not realise the ephemerality of that enjoyment culminating in Hiraṇya-garbha, subject as it is to destruction, because it originates and is of restricted scope (one fails to take to jijñāsā).

विनश्यदपीदं कूटस्थनित्यवस्तुपर्यन्तमेव विनश्यति; अन्यथा निरुपादानस्य पुनरुत्पत्त्यसम्भवः, इति वर्तमानस्याप्यसम्भवादभावोऽभविष्यदिति निरूपणाद् नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेको यावन्न जायते।

And though this (world of sense) perishes (to him that is a virakta) it perishes only up to (and not including) the Being – immutable and eternal; otherwise there is no possibility of a thing again coming into existence when its ground is destroyed so that even the present world would vanish and there would be a mere blank (abhāva) – by such exposition (it is evident) that so long as discrimination between the lasting and the evanescent does not arise (‘so long, there arises no detachment’).

3.64 ✅

यावच्चाभिमुखविनाशदर्शनाद् भुञ्जानस्यापि भोगान् स्रक् - चन्दन - वस्त्रालङ्कार - भोगानिवाग्निप्रवेशार्थं भोगार्थव्यापारजनितदुःखानुभवाच्च तन्निमित्तां निर्वृतिमप्यलभमानो भोगाद् विरक्तः।

3.64. And as long as he does not cease to hanker after pleasures, – though in his very presence the pleasures even of him who is in the actual enjoyment of them perish, like the flower-garland, unguent, raiment and other decorations put on by one (the wife) with the object of entering the fire, though experiencing all the worries resulting from attempts to secure the objects of pleasure, and though failing to attain happiness resulting from enjoyment on account of the worries incidental to them, (so long the desire for Freedom does not arise in him).

3.65 ✅

ततो मुमुक्षुत्वं तत्साधनशमदमोपरमतितिक्षासमाधानसम्पन्नो भूत्वा यावन्नालम्बते, तावद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां कः प्रतिपद्येत?

3.65. Therefore as long as he does not entertain the desire for Freedom by cultivating (such virtues as) tranquility, self-control, self-abnegation, endurance, mental equipoise, (earnestness), which are the means of its attainment, so long who will betake to the inquiry into Brahman?

कथञ्चिद् वा दैववशात् कुतूहलाद्वा बहुश्रुतत्वबुद्ध्या वा प्रवृत्तोऽपि न निर्विचिकित्सं ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेनावगन्तुं शक्नोति; यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्तिविरहात्, अनन्तर्मुखचेता बहिरेवाभिनिविशमानः।

If, however, some person under impulsion from the Unseen, or by curiosity, or from a desire for much learning, should undertake the inquiry he will not have the competency to comprehend indubitably, that Brahman is one’s own self, because lacking in the possession of the means just enumerated his mind without turning inward will be engrossed in things external only.

3.66 ✅

तस्माद् वर्णितवस्तुकलापानन्तर्यमभिप्रेत्याथशब्दं प्रयुक्तवानाचार्यः।

3.66. Hence the Ācārya (Bādarāyaṇa) has used the word ‘atha’ to mean ‘subsequence’ to the (acquirement) of the group of disciplines described.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.21–22]

तदाह भाष्यकारः – तेषु हि सत्सु प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये। तस्मादथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यत इति॥

And the same is expressed by the Bhāṣyakāra (in the following words): – [“If those disciplines exist either prior to the inquiry into Dharma or after it, one may engage in the inquiry into Brahman and acquire the knowledge of Brahman but not otherwise (i.e., in the absence of these disciplines). Hence by the word ‘atha’ is pointed out that the inquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquirement of the above-expressed means (disciplines).”]

[BrS.1.1.1 L.23]

3.67 ✅

अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थ इति॥

3.67. [“The word ‘ataḥ’ expresses a hetu or reason.”]

स्यादेतत्, कृतकत्वपरिच्छेदौ नैकान्ततः क्षयिष्णुतां गमयतः; परमाणुषु पाकजलोहितस्य कृतकस्य, तेषां च परिच्छिन्नानां नित्यत्वाभ्युगमात्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Let it be so; but a thing that is a product and a thing that is delimited or conditioned do not for that reason necessarily denote perishability, as for example, the red colour of the atoms which is the result of baking and therefore an effect, is admittedly eternal and the atoms themselves which are delimited (by space) are eternal.

वेदेऽपि ‘अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति’ ‘अपाम सोमममृता अभूमे’त्यादिपुण्यफलस्याक्षयित्वश्रवणात्,

In the Veda also imperishableness is declared of the fruit of meritorious action (puṇya-phala) as witness – “Of one who performs the cātur-māsya-yāga, the merit does indeed become imperishable”; “we drank some and became immortal”.

3.68 ✅

अतो विषयभोगाद् न नियमेन विरागो विवेकिनामपि।

3.68. Hence it is not that even men of discretion invariably renounce the pleasures of sense.

नापि कूटस्थनित्यवस्त्ववष्टम्भेन मुमुक्षुत्वम्। ततश्च न शमदमादिपरिग्रहः, यतो न तादात्म्यं भोक्तुः सम्भाव्यते।

Nor again does desire for liberation arise on the strength of a being that is immutable and eternal (for there is no probability of identity with the inner witness); and because of its absence (viz., renunciation as well as desire for liberation), no one cultivates tranquillity, self-control, etc.; for which reason (i.e., Jīva and Brahman being opposite in nature) the jīva’s (bhoktā’s) tādātmya with that (Brahman) is improbable,

नापि तदवाप्तिः; दुःखाभावेऽपि सुखभोगाभावान्नानवद्यः पुरुषार्थः।

nor does (i.e., since Brahman is all-pervading) jīva’s reaching that – kūṭastha – (desire for liberation on the support of Kūṭastha) arise. Though sorrows have ceased (in the state of mokṣa), since there is no enjoyment of (positive) pleasure that puruṣārtha (i.e., the human end) is not irreproachable.

अतोऽजीर्णभयान्नाहारपरित्यागः, भिक्षुभयान्न स्थाल्या अनधिश्रयणं दोषेषु प्रतिविधातव्यमिति न्यायः।

(Therefore the abandonment of the enjoyment of the fruit of karma does not stand to reason). For fear of indigestion there is no abandonment of food, for fear of mendicants there is no cessation of mounting cooking vessels, on the oven. If consequences that are evil should arise a remedy must be sought – this is the right principle. Hence it (desire for freedom) does not constitute the cause of the inquiry into Brahman.

अतो न तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां हेतुत्वमित्यतस्तस्य हेतुत्वप्रदर्शनार्थोऽतःशब्दः।

Siddhāntin. – To meet this argument it is advanced that the ‘ataḥ’ (therefore) is used to point out that it (desire for freedom) does constitute the reason (for Brahman-inquiry).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.24]

3.69 ✅

कथम्? यस्माद्वेद एवाग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानामनित्यफलतां दर्शयति– ‘तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते’ (छा. उ. ८-१-६) इत्यादिना॥

3.69. How? (It may be asked). [Because the Veda itself declares that the fruit (phala) of Agnihotra and other ritualistic acts which are a means of happiness (śreyas) is non-eternal on the strength of such passages, ‘as everything acquired here on earth by action perishes similarly whatever has been acquired by the performance of religious duties perishes in the other world’ – (ChanU.8.1.6), etc.]. (Hence after the acquisition of the four-fold discipline the inquiry into Brahman has to be undertaken.)

ननु पुण्यस्याप्यक्षय्यफलत्वं वेद एवाहेत्युक्तं,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, we have already said that the Veda itself has declared that even the meritorious acts (like quarterly offerings) yield imperishable fruit.

न; तस्य वस्तुबलप्रवृत्तानुमानविरोधेऽर्थवादस्य नित्यत्वप्रतिपादनासामर्थ्यात्, परमाणूनां पाकजस्य च तद्गुणस्य अनित्यत्वात्।

Siddhāntin. – It is not so. What is a (mere) laudatory statement is incompetent to declare imperishability when it is conflicted (with a Śruti – Veda text) which has the additional strength of reasoning based upon facts of experience. Because of the perishable nature of atoms and of the quality generated therein by heating (we do not admit that either of them is eternal – vide ante).

अतो भवत्यनित्यत्वदर्शनं विषयभोगानां मुमुक्षुत्वे हेतुः।

Hence the knowledge of the non-durability of the enjoyments of the objects of sense does constitute the reason for mumukṣutva (longing for Freedom).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.25]

3.70 ✅

यत्पुनर्मुमुक्षुत्वाभावे निमित्तमुक्तं, तत्राह – तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति – ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमित्यादि॥

3.70. As for the reason urged for the absence of mumukṣutva the Bhāṣyakāra says, [“even so (i.e., as a contrast to what has been said of ritualistic acts) the Veda declares that the highest end of man is realised by one who has the knowledge of Brahman, as witness ‘He who knows Brahman attains the Supreme’” – (TaitU.2.1.1)].

[BrS.1.1.1 L.26]

अत उपसंहरति – तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति॥

Hence the conclusion – [“therefore the inquiry into Brahman has to be made after acquiring the aforesaid means”].

यतः परिपूर्णो हेतुरनन्तरमवश्यं कार्यमारभते, अतः कर्तव्येत्यावश्यकतामाह भाष्यकारः।

It is because the hetu when adequate must immediately bring about the effect that the Bhāṣyakāra has used the word ‘kartavya’ to denote inevitability.

यतो द्वैतानुषङ्गादतितरामुद्विजमानेन ब्रह्मात्मत्वं च हस्तप्राप्तमिव मन्यमानेन प्रवर्तितव्यमेव ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्; प्रदीप्तशिरसेव जलराशौ, स्पृशतेव च सुस्वादु फलमङ्गुल्यग्रेणाग्रपादस्थेन।

By one who recoils from all contact with duality, and is conscious that his identity with Brahman is within grasp the inquiry into Brahman has necessarily to be undertaken on the analogy of one who should plunge in a lake to cool his burning head or of one who standing on tip-toe and touching with his finger-ends a luscious fruit, plucks it.

एवं सत्यर्थाद् धर्मजिज्ञासाया नियमेन पूर्ववृत्तत्वमथशब्देन पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन निराक्रियते॥

When such is the case (i.e., when on the strength of both Scriptures and reasoning it is proved that the four-fold discipline alone serves as the hetu for Brahman-inquiry) the view that the word “atha” involves the necessary antecedence of inquiry into Dharma is on the aforesaid grounds refuted by implication (arthāt, i.e., by arthāpatti-pramāṇa).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.27]

3.71 ✅

ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति॥

3.71. [The phrase ‘Brahma-jijñāsā’ has to be construed as ‘Brahmaṇo jijñāsā’) – desire for the knowledge of Brahman.

अन्तर्णीतविचारार्थान्वये हि चतुर्थीसमासः स्यात्,

If the word ‘Brahman’ in ‘Brahma-jijñāsā’ is construed with ‘inquiry’ – vicāra, which is the secondary sense (antarṇīta, lit. inner sense) of jijñāsā then indeed the ‘dependent determinative compound’ (‘Tat-puruṣa samāsa’) would be preceded by a word in the dative case (Brahmaṇe jijñāsā)

न शब्दाभिधेय इत्यवयवार्थमङ्गीकृत्य षष्ठीसमासो दर्शितः॥

but not when ‘Brahman’ is construed with the primary sense of jijñāsā, i.e., jñānecchā – desire for the knowledge (of Brahman); with this view, accepting the meaning (of the phrase Brahma-jijñāsā) as yielded by its component parts, the Bhāṣyakāra regards it as the genitive (objective) compound.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.28]

3.72 ✅

ब्रह्मशब्दस्यार्थनिर्देशावसरे प्राप्ते सूत्रकार एव निर्देक्ष्यतीति कथयति – ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणं जन्माद्यस्य यत इति॥

3.72. Now that it is time to explain the meaning of the word ‘Brahman’ (in Brahma-jijñāsā) the Bhāṣyakāra says that the author of the Vedānta aphorisms, himself will state it – [‘By Brahman is meant that from which the origin, etc]. (of the world proceed) – Ved. Sut., I. i-2.

तत्र यदन्यैर्वृत्तिकारैर्ब्रह्मशब्दस्यार्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य निरस्यते।

In construing this passage (tatra) the other senses of the word Brahman are premised (by way of Pūrvapakṣa) and discarded by other commentators.

न खलु ब्राह्मणजातिरिह गृह्यते; प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद् जिज्ञास्यत्वाभावात्,

For indeed by the word Brahman the Brāhmaṇa-caste is not meant since the thing is patent and there is nothing to inquire about; nor could it be said that the inquiry is to be undertaken by that (caste alone), for Veda Study is enjoined on all the three castes;

नापि तत्कर्तृका जिज्ञासा; त्रैवर्णिकाधिकारात्, नापि जीवपरिग्रहः; तत्कर्तृत्वे विशेषणानर्थक्यात्, कर्मत्वे नित्यसिद्धत्वात्,

nor does the word Brahman mean the individual soul (jīva), since if jīva is taken as the agent (in the Vedānta inquiry) the attributive (viz., jīva agency) would serve no purpose (for there can be no inquiry apart from jīva); if it is taken as the object (of jijñāsā), because it is ever present (i.e., since its existence is undoubted, there would be no room for inquiry);

न शब्दराशेर्ग्रहणम्; तस्य धर्मजिज्ञासौत्पत्तिकसूत्राभ्यामर्थवत्त्वप्रमाणत्वयोर्निरूपितत्वात्,

nor does (Brahman) mean the Veda (lit. the assemblage of Veda passages), since it has already been elucidated in the Dharma-jijñāsā and ‘autpattika’ sūtras that the Veda is explicative of something productive of good (arthavatva) and that is a valid pramāṇa;

नापि हिरण्यगर्भस्य; तदवाप्तेरपि विरक्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदेशात्, नापि तत्कर्तृकता; ज्ञानवैराग्ययोः सह सिद्धत्वात् इति,

nor is it (Brahman) to be taken to mean Hiraṇya-garbha, since the inquiry into Brahman is enjoined on one who has renounced all thought of reaching even that state (i.e., of Hiraṇya-garbha), nor can it be said that Hiraṇya-garbha is the kartā of (i.e., the person engaged in) Vedānta inquiry since knowledge and renunciation are inseparably associated with him. (He is a jīvan-mukta having attained jñāna and vairāgya and waiting for final release).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.29]

तदपि न कर्तव्यमित्याह – अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यमिति॥

All this (i.e., the objection raised and its rebuttal) need not be undertaken, says Śaṅkara (in the following words) – [“It is therefore not to be imagined that the word Brahman may denote some other sense such as the Brāhmaṇa-caste, etc.”]

[BrS.1.1.1 L.30]

3.73 ✅

ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी॥

3.73. [The genitive in the word Brahmaṇaḥ is used in the accusative sense].

वृत्त्यन्तरे तु शेषलक्षणा व्याख्याता, तां निरस्यति – न शेष इति॥

In another commentary however the genitive is explained as denoting relation in general, but that is discarded (by the statement) – [‘not some supplementary relation in general’].

तत्र हेतुमाह – जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाज्जिज्ञासाया इति॥

The reason for that (i.e., for not taking it as śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī) is given in [‘because the desire for knowledge demands the object of desire’].

अथापि स्यात् अन्यत् जिज्ञास्यमिति,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Even then the object of inquiry may be something different (from Brahman which may have a supplementary relation to the inquiry).

तदर्थमाह – जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्चेति॥

Siddhāntin. – To this it is answered – [‘No other object of inquiry is indicated’].

[BrS.1.1.1 L.31]

3.74 ✅

पुनः शेषषष्ठीवाद्याह – ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते; सम्बन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वादिति॥

3.74. Pūrvapakṣin. – The advocate of Śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī again argues thus: – “Even if ‘śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī’ is accepted the objective relation of Brahman to the inquiry is not jeopardised since that general relation necessarily demands a specific relation”. (C.f., nirviśeṣam na sāmānyam – there can be no general relation without the specific relation).

यद्यपि ‘शेषे षष्ठी’ति सम्बन्धमात्रे षष्ठी विहिता; तथाऽपि व्यवहारो विशेषमवलम्बते, बहवश्च सम्बन्धविशेषाः, तत्रावश्यमन्यतमः प्रतिपत्तव्यः; अन्यथा व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः।

No doubt the rule is that the genitive is used to denote relation in general (śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī), but still Vyavahāra (common transactions) do depend upon particulars. And the specific relations are many, and of them one has to be singled out as otherwise vyavahāra would not be possible.

तत्र प्रकरणोपपदयोर्विशेषहेत्वोरभावादर्थाद्विशेषक्रियोपादानात् कारकत्वेनैव सम्बन्धः।

There (i.e., among the specific relations) in the absence of the context and of the Upapadas (juxtaposed words) from which the specific relations could be determined, the relation is one of kāraka (i.e. one of the six relations of nouns with verbs as determined by implication, since a specific verb has been used, vi.e., jijñāsā).

तत्रापि सकर्मिकायाः कर्मकारकमभ्यर्हितम्, इति कर्मत्वं ब्रह्मणो न विरुध्यते।

There again the objective relation (karma-kāraka) is to be preferred seeing that we have a transitive verb (viz., jijñāsā) so that there is nothing (in this) to conflict with ‘Brahman’ being the object (of inquiry).

एवमपि साधारणे शब्देऽभिप्रेतमर्थं विहायार्थान्तरं परिगृह्य, पुनस्तद्द्वारेणाभिप्रेतमर्थं प्रतिपद्यमानस्य व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्,

Siddhāntin. – With all your reasoning your labour would be wasted if you discard the desired sense (viz., objective relation) of the common word (i.e., the word which denotes either the objective relation or other) and accepting a different sense, again try to cognise through its means the desired sense.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.32]

तदाह – एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यादिति॥

Hence says (the Bhāṣyakāra) – [“But this way (of interpreting) would amount to refusing to take Brahman as the direct object and then again to indirectly (i.e., through the means of the general relation) postulating it (Brahman) in the objective relation – and this attempt (of the Vārtikakāra) serves no purpose”].

3.75 ✅

ननु किमिति व्यर्थः? शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहे सामान्येन यत् किञ्चिद् ब्रह्मसम्बन्धि येन येन जिज्ञासितेन विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति तत्सर्वं जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातं स्यात्;

3.75. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, how is it purposeless? If we take it (Brahmaṇaḥ) as śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī (i.e., as genitive of supplementary relation in general) it would be as good as our resolving to investigate everything that is connected in general (i.e., relations as such) with Brahman, in fact every particular without whose inquiry the nature of Brahman would remain unexpounded.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.33]

अतो न विशिष्टसम्बन्धो विवक्ष्यते; सामान्ये तस्याप्यन्तर्भवादिति यद्युच्यते, तदाह – न व्यर्थः; ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचारप्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेति॥

Hence it is that the specific relation is not directly intended; since it is included in the ‘general’ – this, that is advanced [by the Pūrvapakṣin (the Bhāṣyakāra), states (thus) – “Not needless; it is for promising the discussion of all matters connected with Brahman (that the word ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is to be understood as importing general relation)].

[BrS.1.1.1 L.34]

3.76 ✅

स्वयमेव परोक्तमाशङ्क्योत्तरमाह – न; प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानामर्थाक्षिप्तत्वादिति।

3.76. Himself premising thus, what is said by the pūrvapakṣin, the Bhāṣyakāra says – [“This is not a cogent argument. For the mention of the principal topic naturally implies (by arthāpatti-pramāṇa) all subsidiary topics connected therewith”].

[BrS.1.1.1 L.35–36]

सङ्क्षेपतो वस्तुसङ्ग्रहवाक्यम्। एतदेव प्रपञ्चयति – ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्। तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृहीते यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येव, इति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि।

This statement is a brief summary of what is intended and it is expanded thus: – [“Brahman is indeed the most cherished of all objects of knowledge; and when that principal (entity) is taken as the object of inquiry, all that is related to it, without inquiry into which, the nature of Brahman remains unexpounded, is by implication presupposed; as such those objects need not be specified in the Sūtra;

[BrS.1.1.1 L.37]

यथा ‘राजाऽसौ गच्छती’त्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति, तद्वदिति॥

it is parallel to the sentence, ‘The king is there going’ which is as good as saying that ‘the king is going with his retinue’].

यस्माद् ब्रह्मावाप्तिः पुरुषार्थः, तेन तद् ज्ञानेनाप्तुमिष्टतमम्, अतस्तदर्थत्वात् प्रवृत्तेः प्रधानं तत्।

Because the attainment of Brahman is the highest human end therefore it is the most desired object that is to be attained by knowledge. Hence (its being the most desired object) since effort (by way of study – śravaṇa, etc.) is for its attainment it (Brahman) is the most pre-eminent,

तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञास्यमाने, येन जिज्ञासितेन विना न सम्पूर्णा जिज्ञासा, तत् सामर्थ्यादेव तादर्थ्येन जिज्ञास्यते, न पृथगभिधानेन कृत्यमस्ति।

and when that which is pre-eminent is inquired into, even that (i.e., comprising subsidiary topics, like the definition of Brahman – lakṣaṇa, proof for the existence of Brahman – pramāṇa, etc.) without whose exposition the inquiry would not be complete, by implication only (sāmarthyād eva) will be inquired into with that purpose (i.e., in order that Brahman may be understood in all its aspects) and there is no useful purpose served by its separate mention.

यथा ‘राजाऽसौ गच्छती’त्युक्ते यावता परिवारेण विना राज्ञो गमनं न सम्पद्यते, तावतो गमनमाक्षिप्तमिति न पृथगभिधीयते लोके,

For instance when it is stated ‘the king is going’ because of the presumption that a certain retinue is following him as without which there can be no royal progress, no one makes any explicit statement of it.

तद्वदिहापि स्वरूप - प्रमाण - युक्ति - साधन - प्रयोजनानि ब्रह्मज्ञानपरिपूर्णतार्थमर्थादेव जिज्ञास्यत्वान्न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि।

Analogously here also the inquiry regarding the nature (svarūpa), proof, (valid means of knowledge), helpful reasoning (yukti), means (of attaining – sādhana), and the purpose (prayojana) – all of which is necessary for the knowledge of Brahman to be complete – results by implication (arthāt) and need not find a separate mention in the sūtra.

3.77 ✅

किञ्च शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिरेव कर्मणि षष्ठीं गमयति। कथम्?

3.77. Moreover even the trend of the Śāstra points to the objective genitive. How (it may be asked)?

एवं हि शास्त्रमारब्धव्यम्। ‘पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते’ (छा. उ. ८-१-६) इत्यादिश्रुतेर्न्यायतश्च पुण्यस्य क्षयदर्शनाद् विरक्तस्य ‘ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परमि’त्यादिश्रुतेर्ब्रह्मज्ञानात्पुरुषार्थसिद्धिः परेति।

It is indeed thus that the Śāstra should be begun. To him who has cultivated a spirit of detachment on seeing that the merit (one has acquired by works) vanishes, as evidenced by the Śrutis, like ‘the world gained by one’s puṇya-karma perishes’ – (ChanU.8.1.6), and on the principle – nyāya (what is a product, that is ephemeral) and who ascertaining that the highest human end that is achieved from the knowledge of Brahman is the ne plus ultra as corroborated by the Śruti ‘The knower of Brahman attains the Supreme (TaitU.2.1.1)’

अतस्तज्ज्ञातुमिच्छतः श्रुत्या ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (तै. उ. ३-१-१) इत्येवमाद्यया तत्प्रतिपादनपूर्वकं ‘तद्विजिज्ञासस्व’ (तै. उ. ३-१-१) इति साक्षादेव कर्मतया ज्ञेयत्वेनानुशासनं यत्, तदिदम् – ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासे’ति सूचितम्।

and who as such desires to know (Brahman), (the Ṛṣi Varuṇa) first expounding the nature of Brahman in (the words), “Whence surely these beings are born, etc., instructs (his son Bhṛgu) thus – ‘that seek thou to know’ (TaitU.3.1.1)”; (that is Brahman); – which is a mandate enjoining that Brahman is to be known directly as the object. And this that (Varuṇa taught and Bhṛgu learnt) is aphoristically expressed by the present Sūtra – “Then therefore is the inquiry into Brahman.”

तेन कर्मषष्ठीपरिग्रहे श्रुतिन्यायसूचनपरं सूत्रं तदनुगतं भवति; अन्यथा लक्ष्याननुगतमसम्बद्धं स्यात्।

Hence if (Brahmaṇaḥ) is taken as the objective genitive the sūtra which as the name suggests strings together the reasonings (necessary to determine the import of the śrutis, will be conformable to it (śruti). Otherwise not being conformable to, the lakṣya (i.e., the śrutis which the sūtras – lakṣaṇa, expound) the Sūtra ceases to be coherent (lit. becomes disconnected with the Śruti).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.39–40]

तदाह – श्रुत्यनुगमाच्चेति वस्तुसङ्ग्रहवाक्यम्। तत्प्रपञ्चः – ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (तै. उ. ३-१-१) इत्याद्याश्च श्रुतयः ‘तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद् ब्रह्मेति’ (तै. उ. ३-१-१) प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति।

This the Bhāṣyakāra expresses thus: [‘This interpretation is in agreement with the Scripture’] – a brief statement which is expanded in, [“Whence, surely, are all these beings born, etc.” – śrutis such as these, (again) ‘Desire to know that’, – ‘That is Brahman’, directly represent Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge;

तच्च कर्मणि षष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति। तस्माद् ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी॥

and it is only when the genitive case is taken to denote the object that the sūtra will conform to the Śruti; hence it must be understood that the word ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is in the objective genitive.

3.78 ✅

ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासेति जिज्ञासापदस्यावयवार्थं कथयतीच्छाप्रदर्शनार्थम्। ततश्चेच्छायाः फलविषयत्वात् तज्ज्ञानस्यापवर्गपर्यन्तता सूचिता भवति।

3.78. [“The word jijñāsā means – ‘desire to know‘”] – (by this statement) the Bhāṣyakāra gives the meaning of the component parts of the word jijñāsā for showing that the ‘-san’ termination means desire. It is thereby indicated that that jñāna (knowledge) should terminate in the final beatitude (mokṣa) since in the case of (all) the desires (icchā) the viṣaya is identical with the result (phala).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.42]

तदाह – अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म; फलविषयत्वादिच्छाया इति॥

The Bhāṣyakāra says: [‘The object of the desire as denoted by the ‘-san’ termination is knowledge up to and inclusive of the complete comprehension of Brahman since all desire has for its object that which is its phala].

अवगतिरिति साक्षादनुभव उच्यते। ज्ञानन्तु परोक्षेऽनुभवानारूढेऽपि सम्भवति। सन्निहितेऽप्यसम्भावितविषयेऽनवसितरूपमित्युक्तं पुरस्तात्;

By the word ‘avagati’ is meant direct experience; the word jñāna however may signify even what is mediate (parokṣa) and has not yet been verified by one’s own experience. It arises as stated before in an undetermined form even in that which though immediately present appears improbable.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.43]

तदाह – ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म, ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः॥ ब्रह्मरूपतासाक्षात्करणमित्यर्थः।

Thus the Bhāṣyakāra says: – [“It is indeed knowledge which is the means (pramāṇa) by which the full comprehension (avagati) of Brahman is sought to be obtained; the comprehension of Brahman is the puruṣārtha or the human end”] which means the direct intuition of the self as identical with Brahman.

3.79 ✅

तदेतच्छास्त्रान्तर्भूतं सूत्रम्। अनेन च प्रयोज्यसम्बन्धिनोर्जिज्ञासामुमुक्षाक्रिययोरेकस्याः कारणान्तरसिद्धायाः पूर्ववृत्ततया हेतुत्वमर्थादुपात्तमितरस्यास्तदनन्तरं तत्प्रयुक्तायाः कर्तव्यता श्रुत्याऽभिहिता।

3.79. The Sūtra under consideration (viz., the first sūtra which has been so far explained) is an integral part of the śāstra. And from this sūtra what is understood is that of the two qualifications associated with the person possessing competency (for Vedānta study – adhikārin), viz., desire to comprehend (the Ultimate) and the will to attain Freedom, the one (as well as the other three constituting the four disciplines) which has arisen from other causes constitutes, by implication, the means (hetu), because it precedes (inquiry). The obligation to undertake the other (viz., jijñāsā or inquiry) which follows it (viz., the fourfold discipline) and is prompted by it, is intimated directly (Śrutyā śaktyā – by the primary significance) from the word kartavyaḥ to be understood).

तत्र जानात्येवासौ मयैतत् कर्तव्यमिति, उपायन्तु न वेद। ततस्तस्योपायः कथनीयः।

There no doubt he (the adhikārin) knows that it is his duty to undertake it (i.e., to acquire the knowledge of Brahman; hence the sūtra need not state that the knowledge is to be acquired), but by what means (he should acquire it) he does not know. Hence the means to its acquisition has to be specified (i.e., he should be instructed that the inquiry has to be undertaken by him. It is the inquiry that serves as the means to achieve what is desired – knowledge of Brahman).

शास्त्रस्य च सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनानि वक्तव्यानि; इतरथा प्रेक्षारहितमिव सर्वमापद्येत।

The relation – sambandha, the object – viṣaya, the utility – prayojana, of the śāstra have to be stated. Otherwise everything would appear as if lacking in sense.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.45]

अतोऽनेनैव सूत्रेणेदमपि सर्वं सूचितमिति कथयितुमाह – तस्माद् ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमिति॥

Hence in order to point out that all this (anubandha-caṭuṣṭaya the four essential requisites in any śāstra) has been indicated in this very aphorism the Bhāṣyakāra says: – [Therefore is the desire of knowing Brahman to be cherished].

3.80 ✅

अन्तर्णीत विचारार्थविधेयत्वाङ्गीकारेण मीमांसितव्यमित्यर्थः।

3.80. Admitting that what is vidheya (vidhi-viṣaya) is vicāra implicit in (the term (jijñāsitavyaḥ) that term is to be taken as equivalent to mimāṃsitavyaḥ.

एतदुक्तं भवति – ब्रह्मज्ञानकामेनेदं शास्त्रं श्रोतव्यम्; यस्माद् ब्रह्मज्ञानमनेन शास्त्रेण निरूप्यते।

This is substance in what has been said in the bhāṣya, – “Therefore is the desire of knowing Brahman to be cherished” – by one who is desirous of knowledge of Brahman is this Śāstra (beginning with ‘Janmādyasya yataḥ’) to be heard (i.e., studied and comprehended), because the knowledge of Brahman arises from the study of this treatise.

तेन प्रयोज्यस्याभिमतोपायः शास्त्रम्, इत्यर्थात् शास्त्रस्य सम्बन्धाभिधेयप्रयोजनं कथितं भवति॥

Hence (i.e., since Brahma-knowledge results from the śāstra) the śāstra constitutes the means to what is desired (viz., Brahma-knowledge) by the prayojya (the agent). Therefore it comes to this that (the first sūtra, viz., ‘athāto Brahma-jijñāsā’) has by implication stated the sambandha – relation, abhidheya – viṣaya or object, prayojana – fruit of the śāstra.

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां प्रथमसूत्रार्थवर्णनं नाम तृतीयवर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Third Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

अथ तुरीयं वर्णकम्

VARṆAKA IV
IS BRAHMAN A KNOWN ENTITY?

[BrS.1.1.1 L.46–48]

4.1 ✅

तत् पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्? अप्रसिद्धं वा? यदि प्रसिद्धं, न जिज्ञासितव्यम्; अथाप्रसिद्धं, नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम् इति

4.1. Pūrvapakṣin. – [“It may again be asked whether that Brahman is well known or not well known (before one undertakes the inquiry). If known, there is no need to inquire into it, but if not known, it is not possible to inquire into it”].

प्रयोजनविषयसम्बन्धानाक्षिपति।

In these words the objection points to the absence of prayojana (fruit), viṣaya (content of inquiry), and sambandha (relation).

कथम्?
प्रसिद्धशब्देन प्रतिपन्नमुच्यते। तद् यदि प्रतिपन्नमन्येन केनचित्, तदाऽस्य शास्त्रस्य न विषयः;

Siddhāntin. – How (does your criticism stand)?
Pūrvapakṣin. – The word ‘prasiddha’ (‘tat punar Brahma prasiddham aprasiddham vā syāt’ – bhāṣya) means ‘what is known’. If that (Brahman) is already known by some other pramāṇa, then it is not the content of this Śāstra.

कस्मात्?
प्रतिपाद्यत्वेन हि विषयता, प्रतिपन्ने च तस्मिन्नकिञ्चित्करं शास्त्रम्, इति नास्य विषयः स्यात्।

Siddhāntin. – For what reason (do you maintain that when a thing is once known it cannot be the object of inquiry)?
Pūrvapakṣin. – Because of the rule that viṣayatā (i.e., objectivity) is justifiable only when what is yet to be known is expounded, and when that is already known the śāstra (undertaking to expound its nature) will serve no purpose. Hence Brahman cannot be its viṣaya.

ततश्चानेनानवगमान्नास्य प्रयोजनं ब्रह्मावगतिः स्यात्। अतः प्रयोजनमप्याक्षिप्तम्।

And because the knowledge (which can dispel nescience) does not arise, from this śāstra, the knowledge of Brahman is not the fruit of this śāstra. Hence (i.e., since the knowledge of Brahman which is the instrument by which freedom is attained does not result) even prayojana or phala is negatived.

4.2 ✅

अथाप्रसिद्धं न शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम्॥

4.2. But suppose (Brahman) is altogether an unknown entity then its inquiry is an impossibility.

कथम्?
यत् न कदाचिदपि बुद्धौ समारूढविशेषं, कथं तत् प्रतिपाद्येत?

Siddhāntin. – How (can you maintain this position when you have admitted the absence of previous knowledge as a necessary element)?
Pūrvapakṣin. – How is any exposition possible of a thing which in its real nature has at no time been brought within the ambit of one’s mind?

अतः प्रतिपादनाशक्तेर्न तत् स्पृशत्यपि शास्त्रम्।

Hence (i.e., since Brahman is an unknown entity) the Vedānta śāstra incapable of expounding it cannot even so much as touch it.

प्रसिद्धं पुनर्यदि नामानेन प्रतिपाद्यते प्रसिद्धत्वादेव; तथाऽपि न तेनार्थेन निरालम्बनम्,

If however you ask what about the known Brahman, we say that it is expounded in this śāstra, because of the very fact that it is a known entity, and yet (even though the Śāstra here merely reminds one of what is known), it (śāstra) is not (to be regarded as) supportless (unrelated) merely on the ground that it reveals the significance of the known Brahman (prasiddha Brahman).

अप्रसिद्धं पुनरालम्बनमपि न स्यात्। अतो न केनचिदर्थेन सम्बद्धं शास्त्रम्, इति सम्बन्ध आक्षिप्तः।

The unknown (aprasiddha) on the contrary is supportless (i.e., śabda has no significative potency to reveal such Brahman). Hence (i.e., in the absence of abhidhā or significative potency) the śāstra establishes no relation with any meaning – thus criticised the sambandha (or the significative potency of Śabda).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.49]

4.3 ✅

अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्म इत्यादिना त्रितयमपि समाधत्ते श्रोतृप्रवृत्त्यर्थम्।

4.3. Siddhāntin. – In order to induce effort on the part of the learner, the comment, ‘Brahman is certainly known’ meets the contention that the triad (viz., viṣaya, sambandha, and prayojana) is absent.

ननु प्रेक्षावताऽविसंवादकेन प्रणीतं शास्त्रम्। नेदृशो निष्प्रयोजनं निर्विषयमसम्बद्धं चारभते, इति तद्गौरवादेव प्रवर्तन्ते श्रोतारः;

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, the Śāstra (Vedānta sūtras) is the work of one whose critical acumen and unimpeachable trustworthiness are a guarantee that he will not undertake a work which is devoid of prayojana (fruit), viṣaya (object), and sambandha (relation). Hence the learners begin the study solely from their sense of reverence to him (viz., the sage Vyāsa).

किमनेन प्रयासेन?

As such why this trouble (to establish the triad – anubandha-traya)?

4.4 ✅

सत्यं भवति सामान्येन प्रयोजनवत्त्वप्रतीतिः प्रणेतृगौरवात्, न तु तावन्मात्रेण प्रवृत्तिः। अभिप्रेतप्रयोजनाय हि प्रवर्तन्ते, न तत् निर्देशादृते शक्यतेऽवगन्तुम्।

4.4. Siddhāntin. – Yes, it is true. Because of the respect due to the author there arises in a general way the belief that the Śāstra has some benefit to confer, but that in itself cannot induce effort. It is well known that all effort is for a benefit that is voluntarily sought but what that (benefit) is cannot be understood unless it is distinctly expressed.

4.5 ✅

एवमपि प्रयोजनविशेष एव निर्दिश्यताम्। न च विषयभावमनापन्नमशक्यप्रतिपादनं च प्रयोजनं भवति,

4.5. Pūrvapakṣin. – Even so let the specific benefit (prayojana) alone be expressed (and not the other two, viz., object and relation). What is not identical, with the viṣaya (object of inquiry), and is unfit to be expounded fails to be prayojana.

छिदिक्रियाविषय एव वृक्षश्छिन्नः प्रयोजनमित्युच्यते, दण्डादेरपि मृद्विषयस्य मृदेव घटावस्था प्रयोजनं,

For instance, the tree which is the object of the act of cutting is spoken of as the phala (prayojana or the desired result) after it is cut; again the same clay which is the viṣaya for the operation of the potter’s club becomes the prayojana in its changed condition as pot.

4.6 ✅

सत्यमेवम्; तथाऽपि यथा चिकित्साज्ञानस्य चरकसुश्रुतात्रेयप्रभृतीनि बहूनि, यथा वा तण्डुलनिष्पत्तिप्रयोजना अवघातनखनिर्भेददलनक्रिया बह्व्यः,

4.6. Siddhāntin. – It is true; but even then when (for instance) there are several medical authorities like Caraka, Suśruta, Ātreya and so on, for acquiring knowledge in therapeutics or (to vary the example) when there are different ways for the production of rice (from paddy), like pounding, unhusking with the finger-nails, and grinding, the adoption of the one to the exclusion of the other (say the study of Caraka for the knowledge of medical treatment, pounding for getting rice) is not incumbent.

तत्र नावश्यमेकत्रैव प्रवृत्तिः, तथेहाप्यन्यस्मादपि कथञ्चिद् ब्रह्मावगतिसिद्धौ नावश्यमत्रैव प्रवृत्तिः;

Even so here also if the knowledge of Brahman could be had somehow (i.e., through some other pramāṇa) one does not necessarily undertake the study of this (śāstra) only.

अतोऽनन्यसाधारणो विषयो वक्तव्यः, यथाऽर्जुनस्यायं विषय इत्यनन्यसाधारणता प्रतीयते।

Hence (i.e., to obviate such dubiousness) a viṣaya that stands out distinct from the rest has to be stated; it is like this – when it is said that this (viz., the killing of the demon by name Nīvātakavaca) is the viṣaya of Arjuna (i.e., what is to be accomplished by him) we understand that the viṣaya (the killing) is something not possible for another (in other words the competency to kill the demon is to be found only in Arjuna).

तेनानन्यसाधारणत्वाय विषयो निर्देश्यः प्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वेन।

As such (i.e. since, if the viṣaya is not specifically mentioned the knowledge that is unique – ananya-sādhāraṇa does not arise) the viṣaya as the auxiliary (i.e., the means) to effort has to be stated (i.e., that the nature of Brahman is to be ascertained from this and not from any other śāstra).

4.7 ✅

सम्बन्धोऽपि वक्तव्यः प्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वेनैव।

4.7. Sambandha (relation) also in its character as auxiliary to effort only, has to be stated.

यथा साधुशब्दपरिज्ञानं व्याकरणारम्भात् प्राक् न केनचित्साध्यते, तेन न केनचित् सम्बद्धम्; अतस्तदर्थी न क्वचित् प्रवर्तते,

For instance the knowledge of the correct use of words before one has commenced the study of grammar is not possible of achievement by any other means; hence there exists no relation with anything else. Therefore he who seeks it (i.e., the knowledge of correct usage) does not enter upon any other study (say, the study of medicine).

यथा वौदननिष्पत्तिरेकक्रिया नियताऽपि न गमनाद्येकक्रियासाध्या, तेन न तया सम्बन्धः। ततश्च न गमनादिक्रियायामोदनार्थी प्रवर्तते,

Again, the preparation of food though possible of accomplishment by one process only (i.e., by cooking), it is not possible of accomplishment by the one process of the act of going. Hence there exists no relation between the act of going (gamana-kriyā) and the production of food. Therefore one desirous of food does not undertake a journey, etc.

तेन पुरुषार्थरूपताऽनन्यसिद्धता तत्प्रतिपाद्यता चेति भिद्यन्ते विषयसम्बन्धप्रयोजनानि।

As such the fruit – prayojana, which consists in the fulfilment of some human end, object – viṣaya or what is not possible of attainment from any other than from the one intended, and relation – sambandha being (one of expounder and expounded), all these differ from one another (and therefore have to be stated separately).

4.8 ✅

तानि च त्रीण्यपि प्रवृत्त्यङ्गम्; नापुरुषार्थे काकदन्तपरीक्षायां तुषकण्डने वा प्रवर्तते प्रेक्षावान्। नापि पुरुषार्थे चिकित्साज्ञाने सुश्रुतादिसिद्धे, चरके नियमेन प्रवर्तते। नापि तण्डुलेषु दलनसिद्धेष्ववघाते।

4.8. And these three are the means to effort (pravṛtti). No sensible person will engage in an occupation which serves no end, such as the counting of a crow’s teeth or the threshing of husk. When the knowledge of the healing art which is the end in one’s view is secured by the study of Suśruta, etc., one is not constrained to study Caraka. Nor when rice is produced by grinding (the paddy) would one necessarily resort to pounding – (the latter two examples relate to the absence of viṣaya).

नाप्यनन्यसिद्धेऽपि साधुशब्दपरिज्ञाने पुरुषार्थे, अतत्साधने वैद्यकादौ कश्चित् प्रवर्तते, गमने वाऽनोदनसाधने।

Though the knowledge of the correct use of words which is the object aimed at is not acquired by any other means – (here we have both viṣaya and prayojana), no one would resort to the study of medical science since it is not the means (of acquiring such knowledge) nor resort to ‘gamana’ (setting out on a journey) since it is not the means of producing ‘odana’ (meal).

तत्र विप्रतिपत्त्यैकान्ततः प्रसिद्धतामप्रसिद्धतां च निरस्य शक्यप्रतिपाद्यमानतामनन्यसिद्धतां च दर्शयन् विषयसम्बन्धौ समर्थितवान्,

There (when the opponent raised the query whether Brahman was known or not known and urged that inquiry was out of place in either case), having discarded, on the ground of the conflicting views (held by different schools of thought), the absolute knowability or absolute unknowability (of Brahman, the Bhāṣyakāra) has shown the possibility of explaining the nature of Brahman, as also the impossibility of establishing it by any means other than (the vicāra-śāstra) and thereby has justified the tenability of both viṣaya and sambandha.

‘निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते’ इति च प्रयोजनम्॥ [BrS.1.1.1 L.68]

And when it is stated [that the inquiry having the highest beatitude as its prayojana is begun] (the existence of) prayojana also (has been proved).

4.9 ✅

ननु ब्रह्म वेदान्तानां विषयः, शास्त्रं च तेषां ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनानुसरणोपायन्यायविषयं, तत् कथं शास्त्रस्य विषयसम्बन्धौ भवतः?

4.9. Pūrvapakṣin. – Is not Brahman the subject-matter (viṣaya) of the Vedānta portions and the śāstra (i.e., Vicāra śāstra, Uttara-mīmāṃsā) on the other hand is concerned with stating reasons by means of which the conviction arises that the Vedānta texts generate the knowledge of Brahman? Then how could it be maintained that the śāstra has viṣaya and sambandha?

प्रयोजनन्तु कदाचित् स्यादपि प्रणाड्या धर्मार्थविषययोरिव शास्त्रयोः कामावाप्तिः।

As for prayojana it is even possible of occasionally resulting though indirectly, just as the object of one’s wish is possible of attainment by the study of the śāstras dealing with dharma and artha.

4.10 ✅

ननु आग्नेयादीनां स्वर्गफलानां प्रयाजादीतिकर्तव्यतावत् वेदान्तानामप्यर्थमवबोधयतामितिकर्तव्यता मीमांसा, तेनार्थावबोधे वेदान्तानामुपकारकत्वाद् भवति शास्त्रमपि तद्विषयम्।

4.10. Siddhāntin. – Well, just as the fore-offerings (prayāja, etc.) constitute the ‘iti-kartavyatā’ of yāgas like Āgneya which yield svarga, even so the vicāra (mīmāṃsā) is the iti-kartavyatā of the Vedānta which yields (the fruit in the shape of) the right knowledge of Brahman; hence being of the nature of iti-kartavyatā the śāstra also has the same subject-matter (viṣaya) as the Vedānta itself, seeing that it is auxiliary to it in producing the knowledge of its import (viz., Brahman).

न हि शालिबीजस्याङ्कुरं जनयतः सहकारिणो जलादेरङ्कुरो न कार्यम्।

It cannot be that water, etc., which are aids to the paddy grains in putting forth the sprout have not also the sprout as their product (kārya).

तेन यद्यपि वेदान्ता एव ब्रह्मावबोधे कारणं, मीमांसा चेतिकर्तव्यताभागं पूरयति; तथाऽपि ब्रह्मविषयैव।

Therefore it is indubitable that the Vedānta śāstra alone is means of the knowledge of Brahman and that the inquiry (mīmāṃsā) fulfils the function of iti-kartavyatā (i.e., steps into the place of iti-kartavyatā) and yet it (the vicāra) has Brahman only as its viṣaya.

न हि छेत्तुरुद्यमननिपातनलक्षणो व्यापारः परशुविषयो न वृक्षविषयः; तदर्थत्वात्, करणस्य च द्वारत्वात्; अन्यथाऽन्यत्र कर्तृव्यापारोऽन्यत्र फलमिति वैयधिकरण्यं स्यात्,

It is not that the wood-cutter’s action (vyāpāra) of the nature of raising and bringing down (the axe) having the axe as its viṣaya has not also the tree as its viṣaya because it is meant for that purpose (i.e. for splitting the tree), and because (the action of) the instrument (viz., the axe) is the intermediate step (by which the required object is gained). Otherwise (i.e., if the objective relation of the tree via the axe is not admitted) the agent’s action would be in one locus (viz., the axe) and the result (of such action) in another, (viz., the tree) so that each would be subsisting in a different substratum (and this goes counter to common experience).

4.11 ✅

उच्यते – विषय उपन्यासः; युक्तं यत्र यदुपकारमन्तरेण फलोत्पत्तिरेव न सिध्यति, तस्यापि तद्विषयत्वम्,

4.11. Pūrvapakṣin. – This is to be said – your illustration is inappropriate. It is only where (i.e., in which object) the phala (end in view) itself does not eventuate without the aid of something else, that something also has that object as its viṣaya.

इह पुनर्विनाऽपि मीमांसया सम्बन्धग्रहणतदनुस्मरणबुद्धिसन्निधानमात्रोपकृतं वाक्यमर्थमवगमयति, नापरमपेक्षते।

But here on the contrary even apart from the mīmāṃsā (the Uttara-mīmāṃsā śāstra) the sentence (the Vedānta text) conveys the sense requiring only (on the part of the hearer) a knowledge of the primary significance of words, its recollection and the revival in the mind of the meaning, and it (sentence) does not need any other aid.

4.12 ✅

ननु संशयविपर्यासनिरासद्वारेण निर्णयहेतुत्वान्निर्णयस्य च निर्णेयप्रधानत्वाद्भवति निर्णेयं वस्तु निर्णयहेतोर्विषयः,

4.12. Siddhāntin. – Well, the inquiry (mīmāṃsā) by removing all doubts and erroneous notions becomes the means of determining the sense (of the Vedānta texts) and because the determined (viz., Brahman that is demonstrated) is the principal (viṣaya) of this determination (nirṇaya) the entity that is demonstrated becomes the object of the hetu (viz., vicāra) of the nirṇaya also.

4.13 ✅

नैतत्सारम्; यत्र ह्यनेकं विज्ञानं वाक्यश्रवणे सति जायते मीमांसानिरपेक्षमेव, तत्रैकं वाक्यजन्यम्; एकार्थनियतत्वादेकस्मिन् प्रयोगे वाक्यस्य, इतराणि पुनः सामान्यतोदृष्टनिबन्धनानि।

4.13. Pūrvapakṣin. – Your argument is unsound. Where indeed on the hearing of a sentence more than one cognition arises irrespective of inquiry there one (of them only) must be regarded as having been truly produced by the sentence, because a proposition once stated is by rule capable of conveying only one meaning; the rest on the other hand are due to one’s having observed the same words used in different contexts.

तत्र मीमांसया लोकप्रसिद्धशब्दशक्त्यनुसारिण्येदं शब्दजनितं ज्ञानमिति तदालम्बनं वेदार्थ इति ज्ञात्वाऽन्यदुपेक्षते,

(But then what purpose does the inquiry serve?) There (i.e., where different cognitions arise) when the inquiry is carried on in conformity with the significative potencies of words as commonly accepted, one gets to know that one particular jñāna is truly produced by the words (composing the Vedānta text) and then one comes to the conclusion that its (jñāna) viṣaya is the meaning of the Veda (text in question) and as such one discards the rest,

न पुनर्निर्णयज्ञानोत्पत्तौ व्यापारः शास्त्रस्य।

but (it is to be noted that) by no means does the śāstra (Uttara-mīmāṃsā) function in the production of the determining jñāna, (here, the jñāna by which the Ultimate is comprehended).

यथा चक्षुः कुतश्चिन्निमित्तात्सम्प्रयुक्तेऽपि स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति संशयात्मकं पुरुष एवेति वा विपर्ययस्वरूपं ज्ञानमुत्पाद्य पुनर्निमित्तान्तरानुगृहीतं सन्निर्णयात्मकं सम्यग्रूपं ज्ञानमुत्पादयति,

For instance though the eye has come into contact (with a tree) it may create doubt owing to a certain cause, whether it is a tree or a man, or it may create (owing to some other cause) the erroneous notion that it is a man and subsequently on the strength of other causes it produces the indubitable right knowledge. But this is not analogous.

नैवं शब्दो मीमांसायाः प्राक् संशयितं विपर्यस्तं वा ज्ञानमुत्पाद्य पुनस्तदनुमहान्निर्णयात्मकं सम्यग्ज्ञानं वा जनयति;

It is not that Śabda, before the inquiry is undertaken produces either doubtful or erroneous cognition and then again with the help of the inquiry produces the indubitable right knowledge;

किन्तु प्रागेव मीमांसानुग्रहात् स्वसामर्थ्यजन्यं ज्ञानमजीजनदेव।

but on the contrary even before securing any support from the inquiry it (śabda) has by its own competency (to generate valid cognition) actually produced such knowledge.

तस्मान्न ब्रह्मविषयं शास्त्रम्,

To conclude the (Uttara-mīmāṃsā) Śāstra has not Brahman as its viṣaya.

4.14 ✅

अत्रोच्यते – यद्यपि वाक्यार्थज्ञानं शास्त्रानुग्रहात्प्रागेवोदेति; तथाऽपि स्वोत्पत्तिसमकालसमुत्थेन तत्र सामान्यतोदृष्टनिबन्धनेनार्थान्तरनिवेशिना समकक्षाभिमतेन ज्ञानेन विरोधादुन्मज्जननिमज्जनमिवानुभवद्

4.14. Parama-siddhāntin. – Here is the answer. No doubt the cognition of the propositional import (vākyārtha) arises even before any support is had from the śāstra (Uttara-mīmāṃsā). But still being confronted by a (different) cognition which manifests itself at the very time its import (i.e., of the proposition or vākya) is being determined, which has arisen from the similarity (of the very words used in different contexts), which has as its viṣaya something distinct (from the knowledge of unity), and which is fancied to be of equal validity with itself (viz., the knowledge of oneness), it (the vākyārtha-jñāna) is reduced as it were to the plight of one who sinks and rises in water (i.e., appears as though it were beset with doubt and error).

अस्यामवस्थायां संशयज्ञानकोटिनिक्षिप्तं सत् मीमांसया शब्दशक्त्यनुसरणे सति प्रतिपक्षज्ञानस्यानुत्पत्तौ निमज्जनाभावान्निश्चलं निर्णयज्ञानमिव जातमिति लक्षणया मीमांसया निर्णयः क्रियत इत्युच्यते, न पुनः साक्षान्निर्णयज्ञानहेतुत्वात्।

And in this state, placed in the category of dubious cognitions (it vākyārtha-jñāna) gets support from the inquiry made in conformity with the significative potency of words, with the result that the hostile cognition does not arise and the doubt as regards its validity disappears (nimajjanābhāvāt) so that the inquiry is spoken of in a secondary sense, as if producing an unwavering and indubitable cognition; but it is not the direct cause of indubitable knowledge.

तदेवं लक्षणया वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मविषयाणां सहकारिकारणं मीमांसा इति ब्रह्मज्ञानविषयं शास्त्रमभिधीयते।

This being so the mīmāṃsā (i.e., the inquiry) serves by secondary signification as an auxiliary means in the understanding of the Vedānta passages which expound Brahman (i.e., which have Brahman as their viṣaya); hence it is that the śāstra is spoken of as having the knowledge of Brahman for its content.

4.15 ✅

तच्चेदं त्रयमप्यवश्यं वक्तव्यं प्रयोजनं विषयः सम्बन्धश्च शास्त्रादौ श्रोतुः प्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वेन।

4.15. And this triad consisting of prayojana (benefit) viṣaya (object) and sambandha (relation) has to be rendered explicit at the commencement of the treatise as integral to the hearer’s pravṛtti (i.e., one’s undertaking the study of the śāstra).

यद्यपि प्रणेतृगौरवादेव सप्रयोजनत्वं शास्त्रस्य; तथाऽपि न प्रयोजनविशेषसिद्धिस्तत्प्रत्ययमात्रेण निर्देशादृते।

No doubt from the very fact of our regard for the author we presume that the śāstra is purposeful; but yet what specific purpose it is, we cannot understand from its mere knowledge (i.e., from our respect for the author) if it is not explicitly stated.

तस्मात्तन्निर्देश्यम्। निर्दिष्टेऽपि तस्मिंस्तस्याशक्यप्रतिपादनतां मन्वानो विहतश्रद्धत्वान्न प्रवर्तेतेति साध्यो निर्देश्यः।

Hence it has to be indicated. Even when attention is drawn to it (viz., the specific phala or prayojana) a person may think that the śāstra is incapable of revealing such phala and so his ardour having abated he will not undertake (the study of Mīmāṃsā); as such it is necessary to point out the sādhya.

शक्यप्रतिपादनप्रतिपत्तावप्यन्यतः सिद्धेऽर्थे निर्दिष्टे नैव प्रवृत्तिरित्यनन्यसाध्योऽपि निर्देश्यः। तदेतत् त्रयमेकत्र समवेतं विभक्तं चोपलभ्यत इत्यलमतिविस्तरेण॥

(Again) even when one has the knowledge that this can denote the fruit, pravṛtti does not arise in case this result is seen to accrue from some other means. Hence it is also necessary to show the impossibility of its being revealed by any means (other than the śāstra). And this triad is found together and also separately in one and the same context. Let not the topic be prolonged.

4.16 ✅

‘अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्मे’त्यादिना प्रसिद्धत्वप्रदर्शनेनाप्रसिद्धतां निराकुर्वञ्छक्यप्रतिपाद्यतया सम्बन्धं समर्थितवान्। कथम्?

4.16. The Bhāṣyakāra, by the statement [‘Brahman, we maintain, is known’, etc]. has shown that universal experience vouches for the existence of Brahman and that as such having discarded the view that Brahman is unknown he has maintained that because the nature of Brahman is possible of being expounded (by the śāstra) there exists the relation (of expounder and expounded, pratipādya-pratipādaka sambandha between the śāstra and viṣaya, viz. Brahman). (It may be asked) ‘how?’

ब्रह्मशब्दस्तावज्जातिजीवकमलासनशब्दराशीनां नान्यतमाभिप्रायेण सूत्रे प्रयुक्तः; अनुपपत्तेरित्युक्तम्;

As for the word Brahman (we say, that it is not used in the sūtra (athāto Brahma-jijñāsā) in any one of the senses – (Brāhmaṇa) caste, individual soul, the creator (lit. one who is seated on the lotus), and the Veda (lit. assemblage of words), because it has been pointed out that such an interpretation fits ill (with the definition of Brahman, as given in the second sūtra).

अतो नूनमन्यदेव किञ्चिदभिधेयमभिप्रेत्यायं प्रयुक्त इति गम्यते। तेन स्वर्गापूर्वदेवताद्यर्थवत्पदप्रयोगादेव कश्चिदर्थोऽस्तीत्यवसीयते।

Hence it is seen that the word is in reality used to denote some other entity in view. As such on the analogy of the meanings of words like svarga, apūrva, devatā, it becomes evident that there exists some (special) meaning solely on the ground that it is used (in the Śruti and sūtra).

4.17 ✅

नैतत्सारम्; न हि पदं चक्षुरादिवदप्रतीतपूर्व एवार्थे झटिति विज्ञानं जनयति, येनापूर्वमन्यतोऽसिद्धमर्थं पदप्रयोगादेव प्रतीमः; स्वर्गाद्यर्थोऽपि नैव पदप्रयोगादेव सिद्धः,

4.17. Pūrvapakṣin. – That is jejune. A word does not produce immediately the knowledge of a thing not previously comprehended as does the eye, etc. (if otherwise, i.e., if the word could produce such cognition) we would be in a position to know by the mere use of the word the meaning of a thing which was neither comprehended before nor avouched by any other pramāṇa. And even (the meanings of) entities like svarga, etc., are not determined by the mere use of the words.

4.18 ✅

अत्रोच्यते – यस्मिन् वाक्य एकं पदं मुक्त्वेतरेषां पदानामर्थः प्रसिद्धः, स किमेकपदार्थानवगमापराधेन त्यज्यताम्? उत बहुपदार्थप्रसिद्धिबलेनाप्रसिद्धोऽपि कथञ्चिदगम्येतेति?

4.18. Siddhāntin. – We will answer. Suppose in some sentence with the exception of a single word the meaning of other words is well-known, we put this question – do you abandon that (viz., the well-known import) because of the offence of non-comprehension of a single word or would you attempt to somehow comprehend the meaning of that word though unknown before on the strength of the fact that many words (there), have their significance previously ascertained?

तत्र निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणानामेवंरूपपदार्थानुगमहेतूनां विद्यमानत्वात् तद्बलेनार्थमनुगम्य वाक्यार्थावगतिर्युक्ता, न पुनरेकाप्रसिध्या प्रसिद्धपदार्थसंसर्गस्त्यक्तुं युक्तः।

In such a case (tatra – when we have a sentence of this description) on the strength of nigama, nirukta, and vyākaraṇa which serve as the means of ascertaining the relation of such meaning (i.e., the relation of the distinctive sense of the unknown word with the rest of the words) we should establish the connection and understand the import of the proposition (vākyārthāvagati). This is the right course.

न हि प्रसिद्धिरप्रसिध्या त्यज्यते; प्रसिद्धिबलेनाप्रसिद्धमपि कल्प्यत इति न्यायात्।

What is well comprehended is not to be set aside by what is not comprehended. The rule is that on the strength of the comprehended the non-comprehended even should be rendered explicit.

4.19 ✅

ननु निगमादिवशेनार्थानुगमे सर्वत्रैव कथञ्चिदर्थान्वयस्यानुगन्तुं शक्यत्वादव्यवस्थितः पदार्थः स्यात्; ततश्च वाक्यार्थो नावधार्येत,

4.19. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, if the relation of the meanings (of words) is made to depend on nigama, etc., it would somehow be possible to understand such relation of meanings as existing everywhere and there would be chaos as regards the meanings of words, with the result that the vākyārtha (propositional import) would be left undetermined.

न तर्हि निगमादीनामर्थवत्ता।

Siddhāntin. – If so Nigama, etc., are meaningless.

भवत्यर्थवत्ता, यत्र स्वार्थादन्यत्रापि विनियोगात् प्रयोगस्तत्र कथमभिदध्यात्? इत्यपेक्षायां तद्गतस्यैवावयवार्थान्वयलेशस्यानुगमात्।

Pūrvapakṣin. – (Nigama, etc.,) are significant in contexts where with the main object of elucidating the vākyārtha a word is used in a sense even different from its own: in such a situation when we inquire how that word could denote this (altered sense) we come to know that it is owing to the relation of the meaning of a single constituent element of that word with this (altered) significance.

एवं तर्हि, एकार्थनियमाय प्रयोगपरतन्त्रता मृग्यते, तदन्तरेणापि प्रयोगमेकार्थनियम एव कथञ्चिन्निगमादिव्याप्रियेतेति न कश्चिद् दोषः।

Siddhāntin. – Then it comes to this that for determining one (definite) meaning (discarding the rest) you seek the support of prayoga (i.e., the use of an indeterminate word in association with words of ascertained sense), we say (on the other hand) that even where there is not that prayoga, the nigama, etc., function in determining the (one among the several senses of a word). As such there is no blemish of any kind.

4.20 ✅

तदत्र ब्रह्मशब्दे व्युत्पाद्यमाने बृंहतेर्धातोर्वृद्धिकर्मणोऽर्थानुगमात्,

4.20. Therefore (since the distinctive sense can be ascertained on the basis of nigama discarding the conventional sense) when we trace to the root, the word Brahman (occurring in the Sūtra and Vedānta, i.e., when the derivation of the word is taken into account) we find that the meaning of the root ‘Bṛh’ – ‘to be great’ is connected with (Brahman).

प्रयोगानुगमे चासति विशिष्टार्थविषयस्यापेक्षिकमहत्त्वस्यापरिग्रहात् सर्वतो निरवग्रहमहत्त्वसम्पन्नं वस्तु वाक्यार्थान्वयि ब्रह्मपदादनुगम्यते।

Because of the absence of relation with (a special meaning indicated), and because if the word ‘Brahman’ should have some other significance (say, ākāśa) – cosmic space, it would denote relative greatness which as such is unacceptable, we infer that from the word Brahman an entity possessed of unexcelled magnitude (alone) is fit to be associated with the (sense of the) other members of the sentence (Satyam, Jñānam, Anantam – absolute existence, consciousness, infinite).

ततश्च कालकृतावच्छेदनिमित्तस्याल्पत्वस्याभावात् सदा सत्त्वान्नित्यं किञ्चिद्वस्तु ब्रह्मपदात् प्रतीयते।

Hence, because of the absence of alpatva (smallness – restrictedness) due to the delimitation caused by time, some entity that is constant and therefore eternal is intimated by the term Brahman.

तथा रूपान्तरसद्भावे तद्रूपविकलत्वात् तदवच्छेदकृतमल्पत्वं स्यात्, तच्च ब्रह्मपदादेवापास्यते।

Even so, if an entity distinct (from Brahman) did exist restrictedness would result due to its absence in Brahman. And that (contingency) is avoided by the very word Brahman.

तस्मादेकरसमद्वैतं वस्तु ब्रह्मपदात् प्रतीयते।

Hence the knowledge of a homogeneous, non-dualistic entity is conveyed by the word ‘Brahman’.

एतेन देशकृतोऽपि परिच्छेदो निराकृतोवेदितव्यः॥

From this (very fact, viz., absence of limitation caused by time and object) it must be understood that the limitation caused by space also is negatived.

वस्त्वन्तरसद्भावे हि तदपेक्षयैतावति सद्भावः, नातः परमस्ति, इति स्यात् एतस्माद् व्यावृत्त इति, तदभावे न परिच्छिन्नबुद्धिर्भवति।

It is only when another entity exists we could say that this entity as distinguished from the other has its existence limited only to thus much space and does not extend beyond, being excluded by that other. That being absent there arises no idea of circumscription.

4.21 ✅

बुद्धत्वं च बृहत्यर्थान्वयादेव कथम्?

4.21. That Brahman is (pure) consciousness also results from the connection of the root-meaning only (with Brahman). How?

अबोधात्मकं हि वस्तु भोग्यम्, अतो भोक्तारं प्रति शेषत्वान्निकृष्टम्।

All that is other than consciousness falls under the category of the experienced. Hence as compared with the experiment it is inferior, being subordinate to him.

चेतनः पुनर्न कस्यचिद्गुणभावमेति।

Consciousness on the other hand is subordinate to none.

तेनोत्कृष्टं सर्वस्माद् बुद्धस्वरूपं किञ्चित्, इति बृहत्त्यर्थान्वयमेवानुसृत्य गम्यते।

Hence from its connection with the meaning of Bṛh only, we arrive at the notion of some entity which is the most excellent of all and is of the nature of consciousness.

’मुक्तमिति’ चाविद्याकामकर्मपरतन्त्रस्तैरितश्चामुतश्च पशुवन्नीयमानो निकृष्टो भवति।

‘Freedom’ also (is ascertained from the same root-meaning). The person who is under the sway of nescience (avidyā), lust (kāma) and karma (rites) being pulled this way and that by them like an animal (in his case driven from earth to svarga and back again and so on indefinitely) becomes a despised being.

ब्रह्मशब्दस्तु स्वार्थप्रक्षेपेण वाच्यं किञ्चिद्गमयन् सदैवाविद्यादिसंसारबीजानाकलिततया तस्योत्कृष्टमहत्त्वमावेदयति।

The word ‘Brahman’ on the other hand by investing some entity with its sense (i.e., the root-meaning, viz., mahatva (mahat-tva) or greatness) makes us cognisant of its transcendental greatness, and freedom for ever from avidyā, etc., which constitute the seed of the world-cycle.

4.20 ✅

‘सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितं च तदि’ति ब्रह्मशब्दादेवावगम्यते। कथम्?

4.22. That [“that entity is endowed with omniscience and omnipotence”] is known from the word ‘Brahman’ alone It may be asked ‘how’!

यदि किञ्चिदविदितं तेन, कुतश्चिद्वा कार्याद् व्यावर्तते शक्तिः, आपेक्षिकस्तदोत्कर्षः स्यात्।

If there should be something unknown to it (entity), or if its potency were to turn back frustrated from any act then its excellence would be relative (and not absolute).

न तद्युक्तमन्यतोऽसिद्धस्य वस्तुनः पदप्रयोगादेव प्रतिपत्तौ।

But that (relative excellence) is inappropriate in relation to an entity not established by any other (pramāṇa) but whose nature is vouched for by the very use of the word (viz., Brahman).

सिद्धे हि वस्तुनि प्रयोगे तस्य यथासिद्धमेव महत्त्वं निरुच्यते।

If the word Brahman is applied to a thing previously given in other pramāṇas (like perception, etc.), the greatness (mahatva) of that thing is perceived only to the extent that is warranted by the pramāṇa which has avouched it.

शब्दादेव तदर्थान्वयप्रतीतौ निरङ्कुश एवार्थोऽभ्युपेतव्यः।

If from the word only we cognise the relation of its meaning (with the rest of the vākya in which it occurs) we have to admit that its meaning is unfettered (suffers no limitation).

4.23 ✅

एवं च बृंहतेरर्थः परिपूर्णो भवति, यदि सर्वमस्य साक्षादेव संविद्गोचरे वशे च वर्तेत,

4.23. To conclude, the meaning of the root (‘bṛh’ will be complete if the whole of the universe lies directly in the path of (Brahman’s) consciousness (sarva-jñatva) and is under (Brahman’s) control (sarva-śaktitva).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.49]

तदेतदाह – अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्। ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते; बृंहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमादिति॥ [BrS.1.1.1 L.49–50]

What has been demonstrated so far is thus expressed (by Śaṅkara) – [“There certainly exists Brahman characterised by eternal purity, consciousness, and freedom and endowed with omniscience and omnipotence; if indeed we consider the etymological sense of the word Brahman, we come to know that eternal purity, etc., are the attributes of Brahman since the meaning of ‘Bṛh’ is in consonance thereof”].

4.24 ✅

ननु एवमपि व्युत्पत्त्यनुसरणेन भवत्येवमात्मके वस्तुनि प्रतीतिः, न पुनरेतावता तस्य सिद्धिः, पदमात्रस्याप्रमाणत्वात्,

4.24. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, even on this (procedure), that is, by keeping close to the derivative sense there is just the possibility of getting an idea of the existence of an entity possessing such qualities (as eternal purity, etc.); but from this alone Brahman is not indubitably established for the mere word (viz., Brahman) is not a valid means of knowledge.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.51]

सत्यमेवम्; अत एव जिज्ञासा धर्मस्येव लोकाख्यप्रमाणाभाससिद्धस्य। इदमपरं ब्रह्मशब्दार्थस्य सिद्धत्वे कारणमुच्यते साध्यत्वसिध्यर्थम् – सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिरिति॥

Siddhāntin. – It is just so. But it is for that very reason (namely) that as regards the knowledge of Brahman endowed with such qualities as purity, wisdom, freedom, etc., there is only probability and not certainty, there is room for inquiry as in the case of Dharma whose existence is vouched for by empirical judgment which has the semblance of pramāṇa. What follows is the statement of another reason to prove the existence of the entity denoted by the term ‘Brahman’.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.52–54]

4.25 ✅

तदेव दर्शयति – सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न नाहमस्मीति॥ यदि नात्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात् सर्वो लोको नाहमस्मीति प्रतीयात्। आत्मा च ब्रह्मेति॥

4.25. (And that is rendered explicit in the Bhāṣya) – [“Every one is aware of the existence of ātman (i.e., his own self) and no one says ‘I am not (existing)’; if the existence of ātman were unknown everyone (without exception) would think ‘I am not’ (existing). And Ātman is Brahman”].

कथं पुनरात्मा ब्रह्म?

Pūrvapakṣin. – But how (do you maintain that) ātman is (identical with) Brahman?

वेदान्तेष्वात्मनि ब्रह्मशब्दप्रयोगात्। आत्मानमेव च लोकः अहमिति व्यपदिशति।

Siddhāntin. – Because of the fact that in the Vedānta texts the word Brahman is used to denote ātman. And it is that ātman only (of which the Veda speaks) which is designated the ego (aham) in the world.

तदेवमहंप्रत्यय एव ब्रह्मणः प्रसिद्धत्वाद् नाप्रसिद्धिशङ्का॥

Hence as the idea conveyed by the ‘ego’ is known to be Brahman only there is no room for the doubt whether Brahman is known.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.55]

4.26 ✅

यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्मात्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नमिति

4.26. Pūrvapakṣin. – [“But if Brahman is understood by all as the self then the same objection holds good that because it is known there is no occasion for inquiry.”]

विषयमाक्षिपति। असिद्धं हि वस्तु साध्यमानं विषयः, सिद्धं तु न पुनः साध्यते, इति न शास्त्रस्य विषयः॥

Thus he argues against there being any object (viṣaya) of inquiry (at all). It is only an unknown thing whose nature has to be ascertained that constitutes an object (of inquiry). But if already ascertained it is not again (attempted to be) ascertained, so that there exists no viṣaya for this (Uttara-mīmāṃsā) Śāstra.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.56]

4.27 ✅

न तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः इति विषयसम्बन्धौ समर्थ्येते।

4.27. Siddhāntin – [It is not so; (though all are aware of the existence of ātman) differences of opinion exist as regards its specific nature]. As such, viṣaya and sambandha are established –

सत्यमहमित्यात्मनि प्रत्ययः, आत्मा च ब्रह्म, किन्तु तस्मिन्नेव विप्रतिपत्तयः अयमसौ, अयमसाविति।

(to explain) – it is true that the notion of ego points to ātman and ātman is (no other than) Brahman, but it is there only that a conflict of opinions arises (some averring that) it is this (i.e., of this description; some again averring that) it is this (i.e., of a different description).

ताश्च वस्तुतो ब्रह्मपदार्थविषया एव; तदेकार्थत्वाद् ब्रह्मशब्दस्य।

Those (conflicting views) in reality are with reference to the meaning of the word ‘Brahman’ only because both Brahman and ātman denote identically the same thing.

ततः सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धमपि विशेषतोऽसिद्धेरसिद्धकल्पमेव, इति भवत्यस्य विशेषसिद्धिहेतोर्विषयः;

Hence though a matter of universal experience (that which is the content of the ego-notion) its specific nature is not indubitably established; as such, it is as good as not established so that the viṣaya (of the Śāstra) is secured for the reason the specific nature (of ātman) has to be determined.

सामान्यतः सिद्धत्वाच्च शक्यते विशेषतः प्रतिपादयितुम्, इति भवति तस्य शास्त्रं साधनम्, इति सम्बन्धोऽपि समर्थितः।

Because it is known in a general way it is possible to investigate into its specific nature. Hence the śāstra becomes the means of ascertaining its specific nature; the relation (between the śāstra and Brahman or viz., one of exponent and expounded, pratipādaka-pratipādya) is also thereby proved to exist.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.57]

4.28 ✅

विप्रतिपत्तिं दर्शयति – देहमात्रमित्यादि॥

4.28. How opinions conflict is shown in [“mere body, etc.”].

तद्यथा गोशब्दस्य व्यक्त्याकृतिजातिक्रियागुणसास्नाद्यनेकार्थसन्निधौ प्रयुज्यमानस्य कैश्चिज्जातिः, अन्यैर्व्यक्तिः, इत्याद्यभिधेयं प्रतिपन्नम्,

As when the word ‘go – cow’ is used amidst a variety of notions suggested such as the individual configuration (ākṛti), class (jāti) movement (kriyā), quality (guṇa), dewlap, etc.; jāti as the primary sense (of the word cow) is admitted by some, individual (vyakti) by others, and so on;

एवं सचैतन्यकार्यकारणसङ्घातसन्निधावहंप्रत्ययस्योत्पद्यमानस्य कैश्चित् किञ्चिदालम्बनं प्रतिपन्नं,

similarly when the ego-notion arises in the presence of the aggregate of the body and the senses endowed with intelligence, its content (i.e., what it stands for) is taken to be something by some (and something else by others or in other words the import of the ego-notion, aham-pratyaya is variously understood).

तदाह – देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्ना इति।

And this is expressed in the Bhāṣya – [“The ignorant as well as the materialists consider that the body only endowed with intelligence is ātman”].

4.29 ✅

तथाहि – ‘मनुष्योऽहमि’त्यात्मनि मनुष्यत्वाभिमानो ‘गच्छामी’ति च गन्तृत्वाभिमानो देहविषयत्व उपपद्यते।

4.29. To illustrate – In “I am a man” the characteristic of man is attributed to ātman; in ‘I go’ movement is attributed (to ātman). Such attribution will be appropriate (only) if the ego-notion has the body as its content.

‘देहमात्रमि’ति सशिरस्कपिण्डाभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्।

By the phrase ‘the mere body – ‘deha-mātram’ what is to be understood is the bodily aggregate including the head is meant.

मात्रशब्देन न देहातिरिक्तं स्वतन्त्रं चैतन्यमन्यविशेषणं वा, किन्तु देहाकारपरिणतभूतचतुष्टयान्तर्भूतमेवेति दर्शयति।

By the word ‘mere – mātra’ what is pointed out is that there is no independent intelligence distinct from the body nor is intelligence (caitanya) attributive to something other (than the body) but that intelligence is no other than what is comprised in the four elements which have evolved into the contexture of the body.

आत्मेति अहंप्रत्ययालम्बनमित्यर्थः।

By the word ‘ātman’ is meant that which is denoted by the ego-notion – aham-pratyaya;

प्राकृता इति॥ शास्त्रोपदेशासंस्कृतमतयो दृष्टमात्राविकल्पितव्यवहारिण इत्यर्थः।

by the word ‘prākṛtaḥ’ is meant those whose minds are untutored for lack of śāstra instruction, that is, those who without deliberation act merely on what appeals to their senses.

लोकायतिका इति भूतचतुष्टयतत्त्ववादिनः प्रसिद्धाः॥

The Lokāyatikas (materialists) are well known, as the upholders of the reality of (only) four elements.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.58]

4.30 ✅

एवम् इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे॥

4.30. [Likewise others (think) that the sense-organs only endowed with intelligence constitute ātman].

इन्द्रियाणां चक्षुरादिमनःपर्यन्तानामेकैकस्मिन्नसत्यपि शरीरे रूपादिज्ञानानामभावात् तेषामेव व्यस्तानां चेतनत्वमहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वं च मन्यन्ते,

On the ground that there arises no knowledge of colour, etc., in the absence of the sense-organs ranging from the eye to the mind even though the body exists they believe that to them (i.e., the senses) only in their individual capacity is intelligence attributable and also that they are the content of the ego-notion.

क्रमेण वरगोष्ठीवदितरेतरगुणभावम्। तथा चेन्द्रियधर्मसामानाधिकरण्यमहंप्रत्ययस्य दृश्यते ‘काणोऽहं मूकोऽहमि’त्यादि॥

Further (they are of the view that each sense) in turn subserves the other on the analogy of a number of suitors. As such the ego-notion is perceived as the substratum of the qualities pertaining to the senses, for instance (we say) ‘I am deaf’, ‘I am dumb’ etc.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.59]

4.31 ✅

मनः एव चेतनमहंप्रत्ययस्य विषयमन्ये मन्यन्ते।

4.31. [Others are of opinion that the ‘mind’ alone is ātman] and is the content of the ego-notion.

दृश्यते हि स्वप्न इन्द्रियदशकोपरमेऽपि मनस एव ‘अहमि’ति सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वमिति वदन्तः॥

And pointing to the fact that in the state of dream though the ten senses are quiescent the mind by itself in the place of the ego (aham) generates all activities they assert (that what is denoted by ‘aham’ is the mind).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.60]

4.32 ✅

विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येक इति मात्रग्रहणेन नाहमित्याकारादिवर्णत्रयातिरिक्तं किञ्चिदवभासते, यदहंप्रत्ययस्य विषयः कल्प्येत।

4.32. [Others maintain that the self is a mere momentary idea – vijñāna]. The word ‘mātra – mere’ is intended to denote that apart from what the three letters, ‘a, h, m (in aham)’ express (viz., vijñāna) nothing else is manifest as otherwise, i.e., if anything else were manifest it could have been conceived as the object denoted by the ego-notion.

तेन विज्ञानमेव स्वरसभङ्गुरमविरतोदयमखिललोकयात्रानिलयमनुभवभग्नपक्षान्तरमहमित्युत्पद्यत इत्यन्ये मन्यन्ते॥

Hence these others hold the view that vijñāna itself which is liable to destruction by its very nature, which arises in ceaseless succession, which is the abode of all life’s activities (lit. all that constitutes life’s journey), and with reference to which the other theory, as contradicting experience, stands condemned, rightly constitutes the ego (aham – self).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.61]

4.33 ✅

शून्यमित्यपर इति॥ सुषुप्ते विज्ञानलेशस्याप्यभावादकस्मादेवाहमिति समुदयदर्शनादकारणस्य कादाचित्कस्य परमार्थवस्तुत्वाभावादसदवभास एवाहङ्कार इत्यपरे सङ्गिरन्ते॥

4.33 [Others maintain that the ego-notion is the void (śūnya)]. In the state of deep slumber there is not the least trace of vijñāna (consciousness); the ego-notion is perceived to arise (immediately after waking) from sheer accident, and absolute reality cannot be asserted of that which has arisen without a cause and is (therefore) accidental so that these others declare that the ego manifests only non-existence or the void.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.62]

4.34 ✅

अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपर इति॥ अहमुल्लेखशून्यस्य भोक्तृत्वस्यादर्शनात्, तस्य च प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् स्थिरत्वसिद्धेः, स्थिरस्य चावधिहेत्वनुपलब्धेर्नित्यत्वम्।

4.34. [Others hold that there exists one who is distinct from the body, who is the migratory soul, agent and enjoyer (of the fruit of action)]. Nowhere (they urge) is the capacity for enjoyment perceived in a thing that is not denoted by the ego; that which is the enjoyer (bhoktā, i.e., aham) must be of a permanent nature because of its being the object of recognition and no cause is known marking the limit of what is permanent; hence (ātman is) an enduring entity.

निर्विकारस्य च भोगासम्भवात्, विकारस्य च क्रियाफलत्वात्, क्रियावेशात्मकत्वाच्च कर्तृत्वस्य, एवमात्मकत्वाच्च संसारित्वस्य, देहादेश्च बुद्धिपर्यन्तस्य भोक्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः, तद्व्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्ताऽहंप्रत्ययविषय इत्यपरे प्रतिजानते।

Because enjoyment is incompatible with what does not suffer change, because change is the result of action, and agency (kartṛtva) can be attributed only to that with which action is in intimate relation, because a transmigratory life, is possible only in the case of one who corresponds to this description, and (finally) since capacity for enjoyment cannot in reason be predicated of the body, etc., ranging up to the mind, (therefore) one different from them, who is a transmigratory being, agent, and enjoyer (must be admitted) to be the viṣaya (object) denoted by the ego-notion (aham-pratyaya). This is what others think.

कथं पुनस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वं मन्यन्ते।

How do they entertain the view that a being exists who is different from it (viz., body)?

तस्य भोक्तृत्वानुपपत्तेरित्युक्तम्॥

It has been stated that it is because (capacity for) enjoyment is incompatible with it.

4.35 ✅

कथं तस्य भोक्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरिति?

4.35. How again is enjoyment incompatible?

उच्यते – भूतसङ्घातस्तावत् शरीरम्।

Well, it is thus – the aggregate of the elements constitutes the body.

तत्र व्यस्तानां समस्तानां वा युगपत् क्रमेण वा भोगः परिकल्प्येत, सर्वथाप्यसम्भवः।

Now, enjoyment (bhokṛtva) might be conceived to belong to the elements taken either disjointedly or conjointly, simultaneously or seriatim. Anyway, such ascription (of enjoyment) is impossible.

यदि तावत् व्यस्तानां युगपत् परिकल्प्येत, ततः स्वार्थप्रयुक्तत्वात् प्रवृत्तेरङ्गाङ्गिभावो नावकल्पेत।

If the disjointed are supposed to possess the capacity for enjoyment simultaneously, then each would be functioning for its sake and as such the relation of principal and subordinate (aṅgāṅgi-bhāva) could not be thought of.

न चाङ्गाङ्गिभावमन्तरेण सङ्घात उपपद्यते। तस्मान्न व्यस्तेषु युगपद् भोगः।

And without the relation of principal and subordinate the conception of the ‘aggregate’ is untenable. Hence there could be no simultaneous enjoyment in the case of disparate elements.

अस्ति तर्हि क्रमेण विरोधाद्वरगोष्ठीवदिति,

Let there then be enjoyment in succession on the analogy of a group of suitors (for a maiden’s hand) since simultaneity is ruled out.

नैतदेवं युक्तम्; तत्र भोग्यस्यासाधारणत्वात्, असाधारणत्वञ्च प्रतिपुरुषनियमात्,

Even this is untenable, for there the object of enjoyment belongs exclusively to one (asādhāraṇa); and asādhāraṇatva means the restriction of (marriage) to this or that person individually.

इह पुनर्विपरीतम्; बहूनां सन्निधौ साधारणे च भोग्ये प्रतिनियतभोगव्यवस्थाहेत्वसम्भवात्।

Here on the other hand it is exactly the opposite (i.e., common, not restricted to one or the other); when in the presence of several (enjoyers) objects of common enjoyment exist and there is nothing to indicate precedence, (there is no ground to suppose that enjoyment takes place in succession).

4.36 ✅

अस्तु तर्हि समूहस्य; तिलज्वालावच्चेतनासमन्वयोपपत्तेः, मा भूत् प्रत्येकं युगपत् क्रमेण वा,

4.36. Let then (bhoktṛtva – gratification) belong to the aggregate (samūha); sentience-contact becomes manifest (in the aggregate) as does the flame in a quantity of sesamum (and not in single seeds). Let bhoktṛtva be denied to disjointed elements either taken simultaneously or seriatim.

नैतदेवम्; भोगेषु समूहासम्भवात्।

It is not as you suppose. Aggregation is not possible on the basis of enjoyable objects.

कथमसम्भवः?

How impossible?

भोक्तुर्भोगं प्रति प्राधान्यात्।

Primary – prādhānya, should be ascribed to the enjoyer as against the object of enjoyment.

ननु भोगेऽपि समूहो दृष्टः, यथा स्त्रीपुंसयोः,

Well, even in enjoyment aggregation is perceived as in the case of man and wife.

नैतत् सारम्; सन्दिग्धत्वात्, समूहस्य? उत तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्येति। तिलज्वालायान्तु विपरीतम्; समूहकार्ये समूहिनां गुणभावोपपत्तेः।

The reasoning is vapid, because it is a matter of doubt if here the gratification is of the saṅghāta or of something distinct from it (viz., the self). As regards the flame caused by the sesamum it is just the opposite; in an act produced by the aggregate it is right that the individuals composing the aggregate should take a subordinate place (guṇa-bhāvitva).

4.37 ✅

अस्त्वेकस्य तर्हि नियतो भोगः,

4.37. Then let enjoyment be specifically of one (only among the elements).

न; तत्रापि कस्यैकस्येत्यनवधारणात्।

No, (that is not possible), for there again it remains undetermined as to which one among them enjoyment belongs.

किमवधारणेन? विनाऽपि तेन विवक्षितार्थोपपत्तेः?

What need for such determination? Even without it the intended object (namely, the negation of the enjoyer distinct from the body) is secured.

यद्येवं, समेषु केषाञ्चिद्गुणभावानुपपत्तेरयुक्तः कार्यात्मकेषु।

If that be so, it being untenable that any one of them (viz., the elements) could be secondary to the rest since all of them are on a par, (aggregation) is out of the question as between these elements which are of the nature of kārya; (the four elements are regarded by the materialists as produced naturally).

एवं कारणात्मकेष्वपि समानश्चर्चः; भूतस्वाभाव्याविशेषात्। तथोभयात्मके समूहे।

The same argument holds good against the view that the senses (karaṇa) constitute the self since the elemental nature (bhūtatva) is common to both (viz., the senses on the one hand and earth, water, light and air on the other). If again it be held (as some Cārvākas do), that the aggregate constituted by both (kārya and kāraṇa, i.e., the gross body and the senses) is the self, the argument is similar, (i.e., the same defects as pointed out in the other cases apply here also).

तस्माद् देहादिव्यतिरिक्तमहंप्रत्ययविषयं मन्यन्ते॥

Therefore (the Naiyāyikas) conclude that there exists an entity which is distinct from the body and which is the object of the ego-notion.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.63]

4.38 ✅

भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्येक इति॥ पूर्वोक्तस्यैव देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्तृत्वमतत्स्वभावं मन्वाना भोक्तैव केवलोऽहंप्रत्ययविषय इत्येके प्रस्थिताः।

4.38. Sāṅkhya view. – [‘He is enjoying only and not acting]. This Bhāṣya means that the object of the ego-notion is only the enjoyer; with this (assertion) some come to the fore-holding that action is incompatible with the nature of that same entity described above as being distinct from the body, etc.;

करोमि, जानामि, भुञ्जे चेति न सर्वदाऽहंप्रत्ययेनानुषङ्गः, तेन नायं तद्विषयः।

not always is the ego-notion (aham-pratyaya) in association with action and expressed as ‘I act’ ‘I know’ and ‘I enjoy’. Hence this is not denotative of it.

यदि स्यात्, न तदुल्लेखविकल उदियात्।

If however the ego-notion did denote it then that notion would not arise dissociated from them (viz., action, etc.).

ननु भोक्तापि तर्हि नासौ; तदुल्लेखाभावात्,

Well then, He is not the enjoyer even, since such (enjoyment) is not manifest (when the ego is manifest).

नैतदेवम्; अहमिति चेतनत्वसमुल्लेखात्, तदर्थत्वात्सर्वस्य, तदात्मकमेव भोक्तृत्वम्, इति भोक्तैव केवलमिति युक्तं मन्यन्ते।

It is not so, because the ego manifests itself as consciousness (cetana); and because all things are for its sake, enjoyership (bhoktṛtva) is of the nature of cetana (intelligence). Hence they maintain that it is but right to regard ātman as enjoyer only.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.64]

4.39 ✅

अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचिदिति॥

4.39. [Some maintain that there exists a Being who is distinct from that (the individual soul), who is the Lord, omniscient and omnipotent].

तस्मादपि देहादिव्यतिरिक्तादहंप्रत्ययविषयादन्यः सर्वस्येशिता, ततश्चेशितव्यस्य सर्वात्मना वेत्ता, नियमनशक्तिसम्पन्नश्च शरीरिणां

Different from that, i.e., from that which is distinct from the body, etc., and is the object of the ego-notion (viz., the Jīva), is the One who is the Ruler of all and as such is cognizant of the entire being of everything under His sway and who is endowed with powers of control (over all).

मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरूपात् तनुभुवनविरचनकार्यात् प्रेक्षावत्कर्तृकत्वमन्तरेणासम्भाव्यमानात्, कुलालादिरिव घटादिकार्यात्प्रतिपन्नः सातिशयानां काष्ठाप्राप्तिः परिणामानामुपलब्धा।

Because of the variegated forms inconceivable even by the mind of human beings, because it is a creative act embracing (manifold) bodily organisms and worlds, and because such a universe is impossible unless it be the handiwork of a mighty thinker, (the existence of Īśvara) is patent, very like the existence of a potter inferred from a pot which is an effect. That object, of relative magnitude reach an ultimate limit is well known.

सातिशयञ्च ज्ञानम्, अतः क्वचित् काष्ठां प्राप्तं सर्वविषयमिति सर्ववित्, सर्वदा सिद्धः, ईश्वरः प्रतिपन्नो ब्रह्मशब्दार्थ इति केचित् प्रतिपेदिरे।

And knowledge (we know) admits of degrees. Hence when it has reached its ne plus ultra somewhere, it comprehends everything; as such Īśvara being the locus of jñāna becomes the all-knower and eternally existing. That such Īśvara is what is meant by the word Brahman is maintained by some (Yogins).

ननु ‘अहमिति सर्वो लोक आत्मानं प्रत्येति। आत्मा च ब्रह्मे’त्यहंप्रत्ययविषयस्यात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वेन तद्विप्रतिपत्तौ ब्रह्मविप्रतिपत्तिं दर्शयितुं प्रक्रान्तं, तत् कथमनहंप्रत्ययविषयेऽनात्मनीश्वरे ब्रह्मत्वविप्रतिपत्तिः प्रदर्श्यते?

Now, everyone understands the ego (aham) to mean ātman; and ātman is Brahman; so that when dispute arose as to the nature of ātman, which as the content of the ego-notion is of the nature of Brahman it was undertaken to show the conflicting opinions held in regard to it (ātman which is the same as Brahman). Then why should any controversy be introduced as to whether Brahman means Īśvara who is not the content of the ego-notion and is not ātman?

उच्यते – ब्रह्मणि विप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनस्य प्रक्रान्तत्वादहंप्रत्ययविषयविप्रतपत्त्यापि प्रणाड्या ब्रह्मविप्रतिपत्तिरेव निर्दिश्यते।

This is the reply – Since what is undertaken to show is the differing connotations of Brahman (it is found necessary to determine the nature of Brahman – whether it is identical with pratyag-ātman which is what the ego-notion denotes, and in this connection the view held by some that Īśvara is distinct from pratyag-ātman has to be stated, for they hold that Brahman is Īśvara). Even though the opposing views regarding the ego-notion are pointed out it is as good as showing the opposing views regarding the nature of Brahman, indirectly.

यतो नाहंविषयविप्रतिपत्तिप्रदर्शनेन किञ्चित् कृत्यमस्ति। तस्मात् साध्वेतत्॥

The reason is this, that no purpose is served by (merely) directing attention to the differing views held regarding the object denoted by the ego. Hence the appropriateness of that (viz., the Bhāṣya statement – ‘asti tad-vyatirikta Īśvaraḥ, etc.).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.65]

4.40 ✅

आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपर इति॥ योऽयमहमित्युल्लिख्यमानश्चेतनो भोक्ता, स ब्रह्मेति कैश्चित्प्रतिपन्नः,

4.40. Vedāntin. – [Others are of opinion that, the Lord is the ātman or the self of the enjoyer (viz., the individual soul)]. To explain – that conscious being which becomes manifest as the ego is the enjoyer (experiencer) and he is Brahman – this is how it is understood by some (the Vedāntins).

तस्याहंप्रत्ययसिद्धो भोक्तृत्वावभासः। स मिथ्यैवानिर्वचनीयानाद्यविद्याविलसितः।

Of the individual soul (tasya) the bhoktṛtvāvabhāsa (i.e., the manifestation as the experient) is evident from the ego-notion; it is illusory only and is the play of the primal nescience which is indefinable and beginningless.

परमार्थतस्तु यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरोऽहंप्रत्ययेऽनन्तर्भूतः प्रमाणान्तरानवसितः, सोऽस्यात्मा स्वरूपम्।

In reality however, He who is omniscient, the Supreme Ruler (Īśvara), who is not implicit in the ego-notion (like the body and the senses) and who is not determined by any other pramāṇa (except Vedānta) is his (bhoktā’s) very self (svarūpa).

एवमसौ बृंहत्यर्थान्वयाद् ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधानीयतां लभते; इतरथा तद्रूपविकलस्य न निरङ्कुशं बृहत्त्वम्, इति न ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधेयः स्यात्।

On this (hypothesis only, viz., the identity of jīva and Īśvara) does Īśvara acquire the etymological significance of the word Brahman, being related to the meaning of the root Bṛh. Otherwise (i.e., if jīva is a distinct entity) not being one with the individual soul (lit. deprived of the relation of non-distinctness from jīva) Īśvara’s greatness will not be unrestricted so that no longer will the primary sense of (the word) Brahman be Īśvara.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.66]

4.41 ✅

एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभाससमाश्रयाः सन्तः इत्युपसंहरति।

4.41. [Thus are there many disputants relying (for maintaining their individual doctrines) upon reason partly, verbal (i.e., scriptural) statements partly and often on what are but semblances of these] – thus the commentator (Śaṅkara) concludes (this topic).

एवम् उक्तेन प्रकारेण केचित् किञ्चिद् ब्रह्मेति प्रतिपन्नाः। किमेवमेव मनोरथमात्रेण?

Thus in the manner aforesaid some understand by Brahman some one entity (say body, senses, consciousness, blank, etc.). Does it all emanate from a mere pet wish of theirs?

नेत्याह – युक्तिं प्रमाणानां स्वविषयनिश्चयेऽनुग्राहिकां तर्कशब्दपर्यायां, वाक्यञ्च प्रतिवेदान्तं यथावद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरमालोचयन्तः।

No, (says Śaṅkara). By careful reasoning which supports the pramāṇas in determining the correctness of what they denote, and which is synonymous with the word ‘tarka’ and also (by carefully considering) the vākya (the Scripture) which corroborates the view that every Vedānta text is devoted to a just exposition of the nature of Brahman, (they contend that Brahman is a particular entity).

‘आत्मा स भोक्तुरि’ति युक्तिवाक्याभ्यामन्त्यं पक्षं निश्चितवन्तः सम्यग्दर्शिनः।

It is the discerners of truth who with (he aid of reasoning and verbal testimony decide in favour of the last alternative, viz., that Īśvara is the very self of the ‘bhoktā’ (individual soul).

इतरे तु – युक्तय इवावभासन्त इति युक्त्याभासाः, न परमार्थतो युक्तयः, ताः समाश्रित्य, वाक्यानीवावभासन्ते, न तानि वाक्यानि; अतत्परत्वात्; तानि वाक्याभासानि परिगृह्य, पक्षान्तरेषु विप्रतिपन्नाः।

The rest (of the contestants) on the other hand depending upon reasons, which are but semblances of reason and not reasons in reality and accepting verbal statements which are but semblances of verbal statements, and which are not valid pronouncements since they do not support (these opposing) views, hold contrary doctrines.

युक्त्याभासत्वं लेशतो दर्शितमेव देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मपक्षं दर्शयद्भिः। इतरेषां युक्त्याभाससिद्धत्वं स्वावसरे दर्शयिष्यामः।

That the reasoning pursued is spurious was indeed to some extent pointed out by those who argued the existence of ātman as distinct from the body, etc. And that the other reasons are also spurious in their character, we will point out in their proper context.

दर्शितं च लेशत उत्तरोत्तरपक्षग्रहणकारणप्रदर्शनेन, वाक्याभासतां तु तत्र तत्राधिकरणे सिद्धान्तयिष्यन्तः प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।

And this has been to some extent already shown when the reason was assigned why of the several views the succeeding one was to be preferred to the preceding one. Concerning the misinterpreted (lit. the specious statements – vākyābhāṣa) sentences however we will point them out when expounding the true doctrine as each section is taken up.

[BrS.1.1.1 L.67]

4.42 ✅

तत्राविचार्य यत् किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येतानर्थञ्चेयादिति॥

4.42. [In these circumstances if a person should, without due investigation, accept someone (among the contending doctrines) he will be debarred from the highest bliss (liberation), nay, he will court disaster].

तत्रैवं स्थिते मुमुक्षुर्ब्रह्मज्ञानेन परं निःश्रेयसमाप्तुकामोऽविचार्य एतच्छास्त्रमश्रुत्वा प्रवर्तमानोऽन्त्यपक्षादर्वाचीनं कञ्चित् पक्षं परिगृह्णीयात्, तदा मोक्षस्य सम्यग् ज्ञानफलत्वात्, तस्य चातथाभावान्निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येत मोक्षफलं न प्राप्नुयात्। अनर्थञ्च प्रतिपद्येत;

(The Pañcapādikā proceeds to explain this bhāṣya passage) – tatra, – (when there exist such diverse views), evam sthite – (it being so), mumukṣuḥ – (one desirous of the highest beatitude through the knowledge of Brahman), avicārya – (neglecting the study of this Śāstra, the Vedānta), pravartate – (if he should follow anyone of the doctrines that precede the last one), tadā – (then), mokṣasya samyak jñāna-phalatvāt – (since Freedom is the outcome of true knowledge), tasya ca a-tathābhāvāt, – (since the knowledge embraced in the opposing views is not the right one), niśreyasāt pratihanyeta – (he will be debarred from obtaining the fruit of mokṣa – Freedom), anarthañca pratipadyeta – (and not only that, he will also meet with spiritual ruin).

‘अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति ये के चात्महनो जनाः’ इति श्रुतेः। अनात्मदर्शनेनात्मनोऽसत्कल्पत्वापादनमात्महननम्।

The Śruti corroborates this view – “Those among men who have slain their souls enter into the boundless tracts of gloom” (IsU.3, 9). It is the belief in what is not really ātman, thereby rendering the existence of ātman almost nugatory that constitutes the slaying of the soul (ātma-hanana).

एवंरूपस्यात्महननस्य कृतत्वात्, अन्यथाऽऽत्मनो हननासम्भवात्, प्राणत्यागस्य प्रकृतानुपयोगादिति॥

Because killing of the soul is effected in this manner (spiritual ruin will be the lot of one who misconceives the self). In no other way is ‘self-murder’ possible. Physical death is not to the present purpose (i.e., everyone that dies – he may be a yogin – does not go to the region of darkness).

[BrS.1.1.1 L.68]

4.43 ✅

तस्माद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयत इति॥

4.43. [Hence prefacing with a discussion on Brahma-jijñāsā, the disquisition of the Vedānta texts having as its aid conformable logic (lit. reasoning not conflicting with it) and having as its end liberation (from recurring births) is begun].

ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासव्याजेन जिज्ञासापदेनान्तर्णीतमीमांसावेदान्तवाक्यानामारभ्यते।

(The Pañcapādikā explains the passage thus) – The discussion on the meaning of the Vedānta passages implied as it is in the word jijñāsā, is begun on the plea of expounding Brahma-jijñāsā.

अथवा ब्रह्मज्ञाने कर्तव्यतयोपदिष्टे तज्ज्ञानाय प्रवृत्तेभ्योऽर्थादेव तत्प्रतिपादनं प्रतिज्ञातम्, इति तदर्थं वेदान्तमीमांसाऽऽरभ्यते।

Or (to interpret the passage differently), when the (acquisition of the) desired knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a duty, it is per force implied from the sūtra that the Vedānta proposes to explain the nature of such knowledge for the sake of those who are engaged (in the pursuit of Brahma-jñāna); and for that purpose the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta-texts is begun.

किम्प्रयोजना? किमुपकरणा चेति? उच्यते – तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना चेति॥ तैः वेदान्तैः, अविरोधी तर्कः; युक्तिः, उपकरणम् इतिकर्तव्यता, सहकारिकारणमिति यावत्।

With what end in view and with what means (is this inquiry associated)? Here is the answer – it has as its auxiliary, logic that is not hostile to it (Vedānta) and the highest beatitude (mokṣa or freedom) is its end (prayojana). To explain – tad-virodhi, etc., taiḥ – to the Vedānta texts, a-virodhi – not hostile, tarkaḥ – reason, upakaraṇam – aids, auxiliaries or iti-kartavyatā (like the fore-yāgas which are aids to the principle or pradhāna yāga) or in other words – auxiliary means (saha-kārikāraṇam).

अथवा तर्कः अनुमानं, वेदान्तैरविरुद्धम्; तदर्थप्रतीतेरेव दृढत्वहेतुतयोपकरणमस्या इत्यर्थः॥१॥

Or ‘tarka’ anumāna (inference) which is not in conflict with Vedānta and which in reality serves as a corroborative evidence by strengthening the conviction got from the (study of) the Vedānta – this is what it means.

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां विषय - प्रयोजनाक्षेपपरिहारवर्णनं नाम तुरीयवर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Fourth Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

अथ पञ्चमं वर्णकम्

VARṆAKA V
DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

[BrS.1.1.2 L.1]

5.1 ✅

‘ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमि’त्युक्तमिति ब्रह्मज्ञानकामेनेदं शास्त्रं श्रोतव्यमित्युक्तमित्यर्थः।

5.1. [It has been stated that the knowledge of Brahman is to be desired]. The meaning of this Bhāṣya is, “This śāstra is to be studied by one who is desirous of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman” –

यदैवेदमित्युक्तं तदैव ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं प्रमाणं युक्तिः साधनं प्रयोजनमिति सर्वं व्याख्येयत्वेन प्रतिज्ञातम्। तत्र स्वरूपस्याभ्यर्हितत्वात् तत् प्रथमं वक्तव्यम्।

so it is said. When this statement was made then only lakṣaṇa – definition of Brahman, pramāṇa – valid means of knowledge, yuktiḥ – conformable logic, sādhana – aids to realisation and prayojana – fruit, all these (it must be understood) the Bhāṣyakāra proposed to expound. Amongst these (tatra), the nature of Brahman (lakṣaṇa) has to be first indicated because of its primary importance.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.2]

किं लक्षणं पुनस्तद् ब्रह्मेति? अत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः – जन्माद्यस्य यत इति॥

[Of what nature then is that Brahman? Such a question arising (iti), answering that (ataḥ) the revered aphorist propounds (the following second sūtra) – “From whom the origination, etc., (i.e., the origin, subsistence and destruction) of this (world are effected)?”]

जन्माद्यधिकरणविषयाः

5.2 ✅

युक्तिरपि लक्षणनिर्णयेऽर्थात् सूत्रितैव।

5.2. Yukti also it may be presumed to have been indicated for validating the definition.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.3]

जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदिरस्येति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिरिति

(In the sūtra – ‘Janmādyasya yataḥ’), [janma means origin and of the three (viz., origin, subsistence and destruction) it (janma) is the beginning – this is the meaning of the dissolved compound of the class of tad-guṇa-saṃvijñāna].

पदच्छेदः पदार्थः पदविग्रह इत्येतत् त्रितयमपि व्याख्यानाङ्गं सम्पादयति।

The resolution of the sentence into its constituent parts (padaccheda), the meaning of the words, and the resolution of the compound into its components – all these three which are; indispensable in comment have been secured, i.e., rendered explicit (by the Bhāṣyakāra).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.4]

तद्गुणसंविज्ञाने प्रयोजनमाह – जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थ इति॥

The object of taking the compound ‘janmādi’ as tad-guṇa-saṃvijñāna is explained as [‘janma, sthiti, bhaṅgam and samāsārthaḥ’ i.e., the three should be taken in the aggregate, (otherwise janma or origin would be left out)].

तृतीयलिङ्गनिर्देशात् संहतिप्रधानं समासार्थः।

The use of the third gender (i.e. the neuter) is to show that the meaning of the aggregate stands prominent in the compound (janma-sthiti-bhaṅgam).

5.3 ✅

ननु आदिः पूर्वकालकोटिमतो भवति, तदभावे प्रपञ्चस्य को नामाऽऽदिः? इत्याशङ्क्याह –

5.3. The word ‘ādi’ (beginning) implies that it is associated with the antecedent non-existence (pūrva-kāla-koṭimat) but that (prāg-abhāva or antecedent non-existence) being absent in the case of the world (for the world is beginningless though having an end) how can one speak of ‘ādi’? A doubt such as this arising, the Bhāṣyakāra says

[BrS.1.1.2 L.5]

जन्मनश्चादित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं चेति॥

[“That the origination (of the world) as being the first in the series is based on the authority of the Veda text and also on the way a thing develops”].

यदनेन सूत्रेण लक्षितं ब्रह्म, तत्स्वरूपकथनपरं वाक्यम्। तत्रादौ जन्म निर्दिष्टमिति तस्यादित्वम्।

The Veda text which proceeds to describe that very Brahman which has been defined in this sūtra has therein, origination as first mentioned; hence its primacy (in the sūtra).

वस्तुस्वभावापेक्षमपि। न हि वस्तु प्रलीय तिष्ठति। स्थित्वा वा जायते। नापि जनित्वैव प्रलीयते; क्षणिकत्वनिराकरणात्।

This is evident from the nature of things also – no object exists after having come to an end, nor existing is it born; nor does it suffer destruction with its very origination for the doctrine of the momentariness has already been refuted.

अतो जनित्वा स्थित्वा प्रलीयते। एवमनादिरयं प्रपञ्चः।

Hence having originated, and having existed it comes to an end – thus has this world (of perception) origination to begin with (and then follow existence and destruction).

5.4 ✅

‘अस्य’ इति भाष्येण पदभागस्येदमः प्रकृतिमात्रस्यार्थनिर्देशः।

5.4. In the bhāṣya beginning with [‘asya, etc.’], what is shown is the meaning of ‘idam’ (this) which is a part of the word (asya) and is a mere prātipadika (i.e., its uninflected form).

तथाहि सर्वत्र सर्वनामप्रक्रमादिकारणान्तरबलेन कतिपयाभिधेयपरं, तदभावे स्वमहिम्ना प्रमाणविषयमात्राभिधायकं,

To explain: – Everywhere the pronoun on the strength of (external causes such as) the context, etc., and (of juxtaposed words) stands for a certain limited number of objects. But in their absence it stands by its very nature for everything that is in any way the object of a pramāṇa.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.8]

तेनाह – प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमा निर्देश इति॥

Hence says (the Bhāṣyakāra), [“By the word ‘idam’ is meant the dharmin (i.e., the world which is the substrate of qualities) revealed in perception, etc.”]

[BrS.1.1.2 L.9]

षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसम्बन्धार्थेति। सर्व एवेह सम्बन्धः सम्भवति, न तद्विशेष आदरणीय इति कथयति।

The use of the genitive case (asya) is to show the relation that the world has to the attributes, origination, etc., and it is meant here to denote relation in general and is not to be regarded as restricted to any one relation in particular.

यत इति कारणनिर्देश इति प्रकृतित्वनिबन्धना हि पञ्चमी, नान्यनिबन्धनेति दर्शयति॥

[“Yataḥ – (from which) points to the cause of (the Universe”)], showing thereby that the ablative is significative of the causal sense and none other.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.11]

5.5 ✅

अस्य जगतः इत्यादिना भाष्येण लक्ष्यस्य ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपलक्षणं कथयितुमुपक्रमते।

5.5. The bhāṣya beginning with the words [‘of this world’] proceeds to expound the svarūpa-lakṣaṇa of Brahman which is the lakṣya or the subject of the definition.

द्विविधं हि लक्षणम् उपलक्षणं विशेषलक्षणं च। तत्रेदं लक्षणं प्रपञ्चधर्मत्वात् पृथग्भूतमेव कारणमुपलक्षयति न विशेषणत्वेन।

Definition is of two kinds – ‘upalakṣaṇa’ or indicative definition and ‘viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa’ or descriptive definition. Of these the lakṣaṇa here pointing as it does to the attributive adjuncts of the world stands outside only, of (Brahman) and yet denotes Brahman by indirect characterisation (upalakṣayati) and not by the description (of its nature) (viśeṣaṇatvena).

अतः पृथक् स्वलक्षणकथनम्।

Hence as distinct (from its characterisation as the source of the origination, subsistence, and dissolution of the world) Brahman’s descriptive definition has to be stated. (This svarūpa-lakṣaṇa is that Brahman is of the nature of Existence, Knowledge and Bliss, and it will be expounded later on.)

5.6 ✅

नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्येति॥ कार्यप्रपञ्चं केचित् स्वप्रक्रियानुसारेण विभजन्ति,

5.6. [Of the world differentiated by names and forms]; – Some philosophers in some way conceive the objective world (lit. the world which is a product) under certain categories each according to his own technique.

तद्व्युदासाय प्रसिद्धार्थानुवादश्रुतिबलेन द्वैराश्यं कृत्वाऽऽह – नामरूपाभ्यामिति॥ इत्थम्भावे तृतीया॥

As against such classifications, the Bhāṣyakāra on the strength of the Śruti which restates (and confirms) the generally accepted view, dichotomizes the world and accordingly uses the expression, ‘differentiated by names and forms’. The instrumental case (nāma-rūpābhyām) is used adverbially (ittham-bhāve – in this manner, i.e., as names and forms).

व्याक्रियमाणं हि वस्त्वभिधेयरूपं स्वनामगर्भं विकल्पपूर्वमेव व्याक्रियत इति स्वसंवेद्यमेतत्।

It is indeed self-evident that an individuated object is brought into existence only after one has previously thought of what constitutes its form and the name involved in it.

5.7 ✅

अनेककर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्येति॥ कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वमपि नामरूपात्मकत्वात्प्रपञ्चानुयायीति दर्शयति –

5.7. [“Having many agents and enjoyers”] – this phrase points out that agency and enjoyment also being of the nature of names and forms are comprised in the world (i.e., come within the world-order).

प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्येति॥ प्रतिकर्मफलोपभोगे नियतो देशः स्वर्गफलस्य मेरुपृष्ठं, ग्रामादिफलस्य भूमण्डलम्।

[Which is the abode of the rewards of one’s action, which rewards will eventuate in specific places and time and on specific causes being fulfilled] – that is, for the enjoyment of the fruit of every action, a place is defined, for instance for the reward of svarga (to result), the top of mount Meru and this mundane globe for the reward of a village.

कालोऽपि स्वर्गफलस्य देहपातादूर्ध्वं, पुत्रफलस्य बालभावात्। निमित्तमपि उत्तरायणादिमरणस्य।

As to time also, it is after the fall of the body that the reward of Svarga and it is after the boyhood stage is passed that the reward of a son, will come to pass and as to the fulfilment of a specific cause, one’s death during the summer-solstice.

5.8 ✅

मनसाऽप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्येति॥ न ह्यर्वाग्दर्शी क्वचिद्बहिर्लोकसन्निवेशप्रकारमध्यात्मं च प्रतिनियतार्थक्रियासमर्थावयवशिराजालसन्निवेशं निरूपयितुमपि समर्थः,

5.8. [The structure of whose constituent parts cannot even be mentally conceived]. – One of limited vision cannot even conceive of the manner in which the external world is designed as also of the bodily organism constituted as it is of limbs and nervous filaments each of which performing its defined function.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.12]

किं पुनर्विरचयितुम्॥ जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति, तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेष इति

How then is it possible for him to create such world? [The omniscient, omnipotent cause from which the origin, subsistence and dissolution (of the world) take place – that is Brahman – these (last two words) have to be understood as completing the sentence]. –

साकाङ्क्षस्य सूत्रवाक्यस्याकाङ्क्षितपदपूरणम्, उपलक्षितब्रह्मस्वरूपं लक्षणं च दर्शयति॥

By thus commenting (the Bhāṣyakāra) shows that the words desiderated in the sūtra-statement have been added and also points to the descriptive definition of Brahman indicated (in this definition, viz., that from which, etc.).

5.9 ✅

ननु अन्येऽपि परिणामादयो भावविकाराः सन्ति, ते किमिति न सङ्गृह्यन्ते?

5.9. Well, there are other states of existence such as modification, etc. Why are they not included (in the sūtra)?

[BrS.1.1.2 L.13]

इत्याशङ्क्याह – अन्येषामपीति॥

Raising this objection the Bhāṣyakāra says, “[anyeṣām api, etc.,] of other forms of existence”.

न क्वचिद्वस्तुनो ह्यवस्थाविशेषो विनाशरहितः, नाप्यनिर्वृत्तजन्मनोऽस्थित स्वभावस्य विनाशः।

Nowhere is the particular state (viz., growth and modification) of an object possible without its undergoing destruction nor even destruction possible, of a thing which has not taken its birth and is not existing.

अतस्त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भावान्न पृथगुपन्यासस्तेषाम्।

Hence, since they are subsumed under these three only, they are not separately mentioned (Buddhi and pariṇāma come under janma, and apakṣaya under vināśa).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.14]

5.10-11 ✅

ननु षड् भावविकारा इति नैरुक्ताः। तेषां ग्रहणेऽन्तर्भावोक्तिप्रयासोऽपि परिहृतः स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह – यास्कपरिपठितानां तु जायतेऽस्तीत्यादीनामिति॥

5.10. Well, the Nairuktas speak of six stages of existence (lit. the changes that things undergo – bhāva-vikāras) and if they are accepted there need be no effort to point out the subsumption (of other vikāras under origination and dissolution). Presuming this objection the Bhāṣyakāra says – [“As regards the six states enumerated by Yāska, viz., origination, subsistence, etc”].

पृथिव्यप्तेजःसु जगद्रचनारूपस्थितेषु तन्मयानामेव ते सम्भाव्यन्ते।

When earth, water and light (i.e., the three subtle elemental forms – sūkṣma-bhūtas) have evolved into the organised world, they (the six states as enumerated by Yāska) hold good only in regard to the objects constituted by the elements.

ततस्तद्ग्रहणे तेषामेव ब्रह्मत्वेन लक्षितत्वाशङ्का स्यात्, न च तद्युक्तम्;

Hence if that (viz., Yāska’s division) is accepted the doubt would arise that they would alone (viz., the three subtle elements from which the world has evolved) are defined here and not Brahman and that is indefensible.

अतः सूत्रार्थवत्त्वाय श्रुतिनिर्दिष्टा एवोत्पत्त्यादयो गृह्यन्ते; तदर्थनिर्णयार्थत्वात्सूत्राणाम्।

Hence in order that the sūtra (janmādi, etc.), may become truly significant the origination, etc., as pointed out in the Śruti (cf. yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, etc., TaitU.3.1.1) alone, we admit, for the object of the sūtras is to determine its (Śruti) meaning.

अतो यदवष्टम्भो विश्वो विवर्तते प्रपञ्चः, तदेव मूलकारणं ब्रह्मेति सूत्रार्थः॥

Hence that entity depending on which the entire world manifests itself is alone the prime cause, namely, Brahman – this is the meaning of the Sūtra.

ननु श्रुतिनिर्दिष्टग्रहणे सूत्रमर्थशून्यं स्यात्;

Well, the sūtra would be emptied of its meaning if what the Śruti points out (viz., that the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world proceed from Brahman), is accepted.

न हीमां पृथिवीं जायमानां पश्यामः, नापो न तेजः, कथं सिद्धवल्लक्षणत्वोनोपादीयेतेति?

We indeed do not see this earth coming into existence, nor water, nor light; then how can the sūtra presume that they are existing things (effects) and define Brahman as their origin, etc.?

उच्यते, तेजसस्तावदरणिनिर्मथनादिषु दृश्यते जन्म, इन्धनापाये विनाशः। अपामपि चन्द्रकान्तादिषु जन्म, क्रमेण च शोषः। पृथिव्या अप्यवयवसंयोगविभागदर्शनात् तन्निमित्तौ जन्मविनाशावनुमीयेते।

Here is the answer; – As for light its origin is seen when fire is kindled by rubbing one stick against another and its extinction with the extinction of the faggots; the origin of water also in the moonstone, etc., and its gradual desiccation; as regards the earth even, we infer its origin and dissolution because we see its parts being joined and parted – samyoga and vibhāga which point to their (origin and dissolution).

दृश्येत चाद्याऽप्यवयवसंयोगविभागकृतौ पृथिव्येकदेशस्य जन्मविनाशौ।

Even now it is perceived in particular instances (say lumps of clay) that their origin and destruction are due to samyoga and vibhāga (conjunction and disjunction).

वाय्वाकाशकालदिशामपि ‘यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवदि’ति वक्ष्यमाणेन न्यायेन स्त एव जन्मविनाशौ।

And the origin and destruction of air, ether, time, quarter (‘diś’) must be admitted on the principle to be enunciated in the sūtra – “yāvad vikāram tu vibhāgo lokavat” (– as is seen in the world, things which are disparate, like pot, dish, etc., are the vikāras of, i.e., produced from something, say – clay. So also vāyu, ākāśa, etc., being disparate, distinct from one another must necessarily have originated from a single being).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.16]

5.12 ✅

न यथोक्तविशेषणस्येत्यादिना भाष्येण युक्तिरपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिर्णयायानेनैव सूत्रेण तन्त्रेणावृत्त्या वा ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः सम्भवतीति सूत्रितेति दर्शयति।

5.12. The Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) in the bhāṣya – [“na yathokta-viśeṣaṇasya – of the origin of a world possessing such attributes as have been stated cannot, etc.,”] points out that this very sūtra – “From which the origin, etc., of this” contains also the ground for determining the nature of Brahman – that ground being furnished either by ‘tantra’ or ‘āvṛtti’.

अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्येत्याद्यभिहितविशेषणचतुष्टयस्य, यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वेति सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिं विहाय नान्यतः परपरिकल्पितात् प्रधानादेरचेतनात्, चेतनादपि परिच्छिन्नज्ञानक्रियाशक्तेः संसारिणो हिरण्यगर्भात् उत्पत्त्यादि सम्भावयितुमपि शक्यम्॥

‘Of the world with its fourfold qualification’ viz., differentiated by names and forms, having many agents and enjoyers, the home of fruition of actions performed in prescribed places, times and occasions, and the nature of whose design (i.e., disposition of its contents) is beyond even mental conception – of such a world, the origin, etc., cannot possibly be ascribed ‘leaving out Īśvara possessing the enumerated qualities’ i.e., having set aside the Lord Who is omniscient and omnipotent, to any other source imagined by the opposite schools, such as the insentient Pradhāna or the sentient Hiraṇya-garbha whose knowledge and activity are of restricted scope and who is subject to transmigration.

5.13 ✅

अचेतनात्तावदचेतनत्वादेवानुपपन्नम्। चेतनादपि; परिच्छिन्नज्ञानक्रियाशक्तित्वात्।

5.13. As for the origin of the world from an insentient thing, it is out of the question because of the very fact of insentiency. Even a sentient source (Hiraṇya-garbha) is untenable because of limited cognitional and cognitive potency.

अभावात् पुनर्नाचेतनत्वादेव केवलादनुपपत्तिः,

As for the view that non-existence – abhāva, (is the cause of the origination of the world), not only on the ground of insentiency is it untenable but on the ground also of its incompetency to be the viṣaya (content) of the notion of ‘existence – asti’.

अपि तु निरुपाख्यत्वादतीतकल्पसंस्काराभावात्, पूर्वकल्पैकरूपो वर्तमानोऽपि कल्प इति प्रमाणाभावात्, सर्व एव व्यवहारो यादृच्छिक इति न क्वचित् कश्चिन्नियमोऽभविष्यत्।

(Again) since (according to the śūnyavāda) not even the residual impressions of past creation are left, no valid means of knowledge could support the position that the present creation also is exactly similar to the past. If it be held that all the events of life (vyavahāra) are accidental then no law or order would prevail anywhere.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.17]

5.14 ✅

न च स्वभावतः विशिष्टदेशकालनिमित्तोपादानादिति॥

5.14. Nor is the creation self-posited (i.e. without an external cause) since it is perceived that specific places, times and causes are utilised (for producing the things needed).

स्वभावो नामान्यानपेक्षः।

What the term ‘svabhāva’ means is the non-requirement of any other, (i.e. the repudiation of any external principle governing the occurrences in the world);

तेनापेक्षैवानुपपन्ना, कुतो नियमसम्भवः?

as such the requirement of an external cause (in the origination of an object is unjustified); then where is there any possibility of determining the order of things?

अतो युक्त्याऽपि वस्त्वन्तरस्य कारणत्वसम्भावनानिराकरणेन पारिशेष्यात्पूर्वोक्तविशेषण ईश्वर एव कारणमिति सिद्धम्॥

Hence, i.e., since we have rebutted even on the basis of reasoning, the possibilities of other entities (like Pradhāna, atoms, etc.), serving as the cause (of the origination, etc., of the world) it is established residually that Īśvara, whose attributes have been already stated, is alone the cause (of the universe).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.18]

5.15 ✅

एतदेवानुमानमिति॥ येयं युक्तिरभिहिता यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा नान्यतो जगतो जन्मादि सम्भवतीति, एतदेव स्वतन्त्रमनुमानमीश्वरसिद्धौ सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वसिद्धौ च तस्य प्रमाणम्,

5.15. [This very argument] – The argument (yukti) just now advanced, viz., that the origination, etc., of the world cannot possibly take place from any entity other than Īśvara possessing such attributes as have been stated, they say, is the anumāna (inference) which independently (without the aid of the Śruti, serves as the valid means of establishing a Lord and also of establishing His Omniscience and Omnipotence;

किं वेदवाक्यैः? इतीश्वरकारणिनः कणादप्रभृतयो मन्यन्ते।

where then therefore is the use of the Vedānta texts? – thus think Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika) and others who maintain that Īśvara is the cause of the world,

जन्मादिसूत्रलक्षितान्यपि वाक्यानि ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (तै. उ. ३-१-१) इत्यादीनि परार्थानुमानवाक्यसमानि दृश्यन्त इति वदन्तः।

and who assert the statements – “That from which these beings are born, (that by which when born they live, that into which they enter after death – that, be desirous of knowing; that is Brahman” – TaitU.3.1.1) – the meaning of which is implied in the aphorism “That from which the origination, etc..” amount to the formal syllogistic reasoning (parārthānumāna).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.19]

5.16 ✅

नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तमिति॥ यथा धूमविशेषस्यागरुसम्भवत्वं, तथा प्रपञ्चसन्निवेशविशेषस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणकारणकत्वमिति।

5.16. [Well, even here (i.e., the second sūtra) the same anumāna as leading independently to the correct sense of the Upaniṣad passage referred to) is expressed], just as a particular kind of smoke has its origin in fire lit up with ‘agaru’ (fragrant aloe-wood) so has this world of unique (variety and) design, as its originating cause, an entity endowed with the attributes of omniscience, etc.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.20]

न वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणामिति॥ सत्यं तदेवोपन्यस्तमुपकरणत्वेन, न तत्र तात्पर्यं, तात्पर्यन्तु वेदवाक्यग्रथने।

Siddhāntin. – [No the object of the aphorisms (sūtras) is merely to string together the meanings (the flowers) of the Vedānta passages]. It is true that that very argument (which is taken as inference by you but as ‘yukti’ by us) is stated because it serves as an aid and not because it leads to the knowledge of the real purport (of the Vedānta). The real object of the aphorisms however is to connect together the meanings of the Veda passages (i.e., Vedānta).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.21]

तदेव प्रपञ्चयति – वेदान्तवाक्यानीति॥

The same idea is expanded (by the Bhāṣyakāra) – [(as a matter of fact) the Vedānta texts (are referred to in the aphorisms and discussed)].

समन्वयसूत्रप्रमुखोपात्तैः शब्दशक्त्यनुसारिभिर्न्यायैर्वाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्याध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता ब्रह्मावगतिः।

It is with the aid of the nyāyas (syllogisms) arrived at, from a due consideration of the aphorisms commencing from the samanvaya sūtra (BrS.s1.1.4) and by closely adhering to the significative potency of words, that the knowledge of Brahman (sākṣāt-kāra) as the purport of (all) the Vedānta texts, is effected,

[BrS.1.1.2 L.22]

नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता।

and it is not brought about by other pramāṇas such as inference, etc.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.23]

5.17 ✅

सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु तदविरोध्यनुमानमपि प्रमाणं भवन्न निवार्यते; श्रुत्यैव सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याप्यभ्युपेतत्वात्॥

5.17. [“While there are Vedānta passages (declaring the source of the origin, etc., of the world”)] inference also as long as it does not contradict the scriptural texts becomes the right means of knowledge and as such is not discarded, because scripture itself approves of argumentation as an (indispensable) aid.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.24]

तथा हि ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ इति। श्रुत्या यथा श्रवणं ब्रह्मावगतिहेतुरनूद्यते, तथा मननस्यापि सिद्धवदनूद्यमानत्वात्।

To explain: – ‘Ātman is to be heard and thought on (B.h., II. iv-5)’ – just as from this Śruti, śravaṇa (inquiry into the texts) is stated to be the means in the acquisition of Brahma-knowledge, even so is manana or yukti restated premising it to be the indubitable means of the cognition of Brahman.

तथाऽपरा श्रुतिः ‘पण्डितो मेधावी’त्यादिः ‘आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेदे’ति पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यमात्मनो दर्शयति।

Likewise another Śruti – “One learned and reflecting, etc.”, “A person having a teacher to instruct him obtains knowledge” – (ChanU.6.14.2) declares that human reasoning aids Scripture.

यदाचार्येण श्रुत्यनुसारिणा स्फटिकादिनिदर्शनेन शिष्येभ्यः प्रत्ययदार्ढ्यापादनं, तदाचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेदेत्यनूद्यते।

When the confirmation of the knowledge obtained (from Vedānta) is secured for his pupils by the teacher’s adducing instances from ‘the crystal, etc.,’ which are in conformity with Śruti, then that is restated in the text – ‘the person having a teacher obtains knowledge.’

[BrS.1.1.2 L.26]

5.18 ✅

न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिवेत्यादिना युक्तिसाहाय्यापेक्षणे कारणमाह। श्रुत्यादय इति॥ श्रुतिः पदान्तरनिरपेक्षः शब्दः। आदिशब्देन लिङ्गवाक्यादयः शब्दप्रकारा गृह्यन्ते।

5.18. [“Not as in the case of inquiry into the nature of Dharma (religious duty)”] – from this, the reason for the employment of argumentation is stated. Śruti (in ‘Śrutyādayaḥ’) is the word (śabda) which (in the elucidation of meaning) requires no other word. From the word ‘ādi’, are to be understood liṅga, vākya, etc., being the different forms of the word (śabda-prakāras).

न त एव ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणं, किन्त्वनुभवादयोऽपि।

It is not that they only (viz., the six pramāṇas) are the right means in the cognition of Brahman, but on the contrary also experience, etc.,

[BrS.1.1.2 L.27]

तत्र हेतुमाह – अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्येति॥ सिद्धे वस्तुनि सम्भवत्यनुभवः, तदवसाना आकाङ्क्षा निवृत्तिर्यतः।

in corroboration of which the bhāṣya says – [“Because anubhava (intuitive perception or sākṣāt-kāra) is the culmination of the knowledge regarding Brahman, and because that knowledge has as its object an accomplished (existing) entity”]. (To explain) because experience is possible of a thing that already exists and because the annulment of the desire for Brahma-knowledge has experience as its terminus, (i.e., it is sākṣāt-kāra or intuitive perception that satisfies one’s longing to know Brahman).

5.19 ✅

ननु धर्मजिज्ञासायां विनाऽप्यनुभवेन शब्दशक्त्यनुसरणमात्रेणैव निराकाङ्क्षं फलपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं भवति, न तर्कगन्धमप्यपेक्षते,

5.19. Well, in the inquiry into Dharma, even without the need of experience, the knowledge obtained by strictly adhering to the significative potency of words (composing, say a mandatory statement like ‘Jyotiṣṭomena svarga-kāmo yajeta’ – one who desires heaven should perform Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice) desiderates no other aid and also brings about the final result and does not require even an iota of argumentation.

तथेहापि स्यात्; प्रमाणत्वाविशेषाद्वेदान्तवाक्यानाम्,

Let it be so even here since there exists no difference between the Vedānta texts and those of Pūrvamīmāṃsā in regard to their validity as means of knowledge.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.28]

इत्याशङ्क्य विशेषमाह – कर्तव्ये हि विषय इत्यादिना ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव भूतवस्तुविषयत्वादित्यन्तेन भाष्येण॥ [BrS.1.1.2 L.39]

The question thus arising the distinction is pointed out in the bhāṣya beginning with [“If it were a thing to be accomplished – kartavyatve hi viṣaye, etc.,” and ending with “the knowledge of Brahman is altogether dependent on the thing because its object is an accomplished entity (viz., Brahman) – Brahma-jñānam api vastu-tantram eva bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāt”].

5.20 ✅

कथम्?

5.20. How? (It may be asked where the distinction lies).

कर्तव्यं हि कर्तव्यत्वादेवासिद्धस्वभावं नानुभवितुं शक्यमिति न तदाकाङ्क्षा,

Indeed a thing that is enjoined as a duty to be accomplished is of the nature of an unaccomplished (unoriginated) object because of the very fact that it is yet to be accomplished and (as such) it cannot be an object of direct experience. It follows therefore that no desire (for anubhava – realisation) arises.

इह तु सिद्धस्य साक्षाद्रूपेण विपर्यासगृहीतस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानेन साक्षात्करणमन्तरेण न मिथ्याज्ञानोदयनिवृत्तिः; द्विचन्द्रादिषु तथा दर्शनात्।

Here, on the other hand, the accomplished entity (viz., Brahman) is taken as the object of immediate illusory cognition (cf. aham paśyāmi – I see; it is pratyakṣa-bhrama where the act of seeing is attributed to the self; i.e., illegitimately transferred from the intellect – buddhi, to the self – ātman) and the rise of such illusory cognition cannot be prevented except by valid immediate perception; such is our experience as regards the perception of the ‘double Moon’.

न हि कर्तव्यसिद्धार्थनिष्ठयोः प्रमाणत्वसाम्यादवबोधनप्रकारेऽपि साम्यम्।

Merely because the two portions of the Veda (the ritualistic where something is enjoined to be accomplished, and the Vedānta where an existing entity is the viṣaya) resemble each other in so far as their inherent validity is concerned it cannot be supposed that there is resemblance even as regards their method of exposition (avabodhana).

यदि स्यात्, पुरुषेच्छावशनिष्पाद्यमपि स्यात्।

If there should be (such resemblance) then Brahman would be an entity to be brought into existence also by man’s wish (i.e., it would be at one’s option to bring it into being or not).

ततो विधिप्रतिषेधविकल्पसमुच्चयोत्सर्गापवादबाधाभ्युच्चयव्यवस्थितविकल्पादयोऽपि प्रसज्येरन्।

As such injunction and prohibition – vidhi, pratiṣedha, alternative and combination – vikalpa-samuccaya, general rule and exception utsarga, apavāda, annulment and augmentation – bādha, abhyuccaya, settled and unsettled – vyavasthita and vikalpa; all these would have their place (in the case of Brahman as in that of Dharma).

5.21 ✅

न वस्तुनि युक्तमेतत्; निःस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

5.21. This is inappropriate in regard to an existing entity since it would result in the negation of its very nature.

तथा चैकस्मिन् वस्तुनि स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति विकल्पः, न वैकल्पिकद्रव्यत्यागवद् सम्यग्ज्ञानं भवति स्थाणुरेवेति निश्चितैकार्थता परमार्थे। यतो वस्तुस्वभावपरतन्त्रं सिद्धवस्तुज्ञानं, न ज्ञानपरतन्त्रं वस्तु।

For instance, the alternative notion that arises in a single object, viz., whether it is a stump or a man will not be a valid cognition as is that of the oblation of an alternative ingredient (in a sacrifice); as regards the final truth it is the single notion – this is a stump only (that can stand the test) because the knowledge of an accomplished thing (siddha-vastu) is dependent on the nature of the thing and it is not that the thing is dependent on the knowledge.

यदि स्यात्, शुक्तिरजतमपि तथा स्यात्। कर्तव्यज्ञानं पुनर्वैपरीत्येऽपि सम्यगेव;

If it were so, even the notion of shell-silver would be like that (i.e., would be samyag-jñāna or valid cognition). But as regards the knowledge of a thing (yet) to be accomplished it is right knowledge only even when it relates to something other than itself.

‘योषा वाव गौतम अग्निरि’त्यादिषु दर्शनात्।

This is pointed out in (ChanU.5.8.1): ‘Woman, O ! Gautama is the sacrificial fire, etc.’ (‘The sentence denotes meditation on woman as fire – this is meditation on what is other than itself, viz., woman and yet the knowledge of that meditation is right knowledge).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.39]

तत्रेवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात्।

[Because it is so (i.e., since the knowledge of all things depends on the nature of the things themselves) the knowledge of Brahman also is dependent on the thing itself since its viṣaya (content) is an accomplished thing (viz., Brahman itself].

अतो युक्तो युक्तेरनुप्रवेशः, अनुभवापेक्षा च नेतरत्र॥

To conclude, it is appropriate that in the inquiry into Brahman, reasoning should find a place as well as the need of experience and not elsewhere (namely, in the inquiry regarding karma or active religious duty).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.40]

5.22 ✅

अपरः परिचोदयति – ननु भूतवस्तुविषयत्व इत्यादिना॥ अयमभिप्रायः – भूतत्वात् युक्तेरपि चेदनुप्रवेशः, तथा सति किं वेदवाक्यैर्विचारितैः?

5.22. Some one objects thus: [since (Brahman) is of the nature of an existing object, etc]. – this is what it (the Bhāṣya of which a portion is quoted here) means: – If reasoning should find a place here, as the matter relates to an existing thing, then what is the purpose served by investigation into the meaning of the Vedānta texts?

यथाहुरीश्वरकारणिनः, तथा भवतु पूर्वसूत्रेण प्रतिज्ञानिर्देशोऽनेन च हेत्वभिधानमिति।

Let the argument of those who by inference deduce Īśvara’s agency (in the origination of the world) hold good so that let the first sūtra (viz., ‘athāto Brahma-jijñāsā’) set forth the thesis (pratijñā) and this (viz., ‘janmādyasya yataḥ’), the reason (hetu).

[BrS.1.1.2 L.41]

5.23 ✅

उत्तरमाह – नेन्द्रियादिविषयत्वेन सम्बन्धग्रहणादित्यादिना॥

5.23. The answer is given (in the bhāṣya): – [“No, (i.e., what you say is not tenable); since (Brahman) is not the object of the senses, no relation can be perceived, etc. (i.e., between the sādhya – Brahman and hetu – kāryatva)”].

इन्द्रियाणि प्रपञ्चमात्रं गृह्णन्ति, न तत्कारणम्।

The senses have the world alone as their object and not its cause (Brahman).

यदि तद्ग्रहणमपि स्यात्, नानुमानोपन्यासेन कृत्यमस्ति। सामान्यतोदृष्टमपि न प्रमाणमतीन्द्रिये ब्रह्मणि,

If they could bring that also (viz., the cause of the universe) within their purview then there would be no use in your setting out the inferential argument. Even the inference known as ‘sāmānyato dṛṣṭa’ cannot serve as a valid means of knowledge in regard to Brahman which transcends the scope of the senses.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.45]

अत उपसंहरति – तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थं, किं तर्हि? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थमिति॥ [BrS.1.1.2 L.46]

Hence concludes (the Bhāṣyakāra) – [“Therefore the sūtra – ‘That from which the origination, etc.,’ is not intended to set forth an inference (as the means of understanding the nature of Brahman) but on the other hand it is to make known a Vedānta text].

युक्तिमपि तदुपकरणां तदर्थानुभवप्रयोजनां सूचयतीत्युक्तम्॥

And it has already been said that the sūtra indicates that reasoning is an auxiliary to the Vedānta as helping in the realisation of what it imports (viz., Brahman).

5.24 ✅

नन्वेवं सति कथं युक्तिरब्रह्मविषया सती तद्विषयाणां वाक्यानामुपकरणं भवति?

5.24. Well, if that be so, how can reasoning incompetent as it is to have Brahman as its object serve as an auxiliary to Vedānta statements dealing with (the nature of) Brahman?

उच्यते, ब्रह्मपरेषु मृदादिदृष्टान्तेर्युक्तस्य उपन्यस्यन्ते।

Here is the answer – In elucidating the nature of Brahman reasons are adduced on the analogy of clay, etc. (ChanU.6.1.4).

ताश्च विधिप्रतिषेधवाक्ययोः प्रवर्तकत्वनिवर्तकत्वाकाङ्क्षितस्तुतिनिन्दार्थवादवत् स्वरूपवाक्यस्य फलपर्यन्तापेक्षितसम्भावनार्थवादतां प्रतिपद्यमानास्तत्र श्रुतिसाहाय्ये वर्तन्त इत्युच्यते।

And just as the laudatory and condemnatory passages (arthavādas) are desiderated by the statements of injunction and prohibition to prompt one to action or dissuade one from it, those (reasons) assuming the position of arthavāda importing probability are desiderated by the Vedānta passages describing the essential nature (of Brahman) till fruition, i.e., liberation is attained. It is therefore said that they (reasons) fulfil their part by serving as auxiliaries to the scriptural statement.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.47]

5.25 ✅

किम्पुनस्तद् वेदवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेणेह लिलक्षयिषितमिति॥

5.25. [“Which then is the Vedānta text which the sūtra indicates as having to be expounded (in order to determine the nature of Brahman)?”]

सर्वत्र वेदान्तवाक्ये ब्रह्मपदस्याप्रसिद्धत्वान्न स्वार्थं विशेष्यत्वेन विशेषणत्वेन वा वाक्यार्थे समर्पयितुमलमित्याक्षिपति।

Now, since the word ‘Brahman’ occurring in whichever Vedānta passage is not significative (because Brahman is an unknown entity), it is not possible to fit in, its meaning either as a substantive or as an attributive in the import of a proposition (vākyārtha) – such is the objection.

येषां वेदान्तवाक्यानां येन सन्निवेशक्रमेण ब्रह्मप्रतिपादने समन्वयः स्वाध्यायपदे स्थितः, तल्लक्षणार्थं सूत्रद्वयमिति।

In that section of the Veda which one has to commit to memory, in whatever order the Vedānta texts are found juxtaposed, for the elucidation of Brahman, in that very order the first two sūtras are intended to bring out the nature of Brahman. With this object is given, the illustration – “Bhṛgurvai Vāruṇiḥ”.

[BrS.1.1.2 L.48]

5.26 ✅

तथैवोदाहणमाह – भृगुर्वै वारुणिरिति। अथशब्दोपात्तन्यायेन प्रथमसूत्रस्योदाहरणं – ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानी’ति जन्मादिसूत्रस्य।

5.26. From the reasoning pointed out when explaining the word ‘atha’ (in the first sūtra), the text (viz., ‘Bhṛgurvai Vāruṇiḥ – Bhṛgu the son of Varuṇa’) should be taken to illustrate the first sūtra, and the text ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni’ ‘from which these beings’, to illustrate the sūtra beginning with ‘Janma’ origination, etc.

कथम्?

How (can it be argued that the Entity from which these beings are born is Brahman)?

पूर्वोक्तेन न्यायेन पृथिव्यादीनां जन्मादिदर्शनात् तत्कारण एकत्वनानात्वयोरन्यतरावगमे प्रमाणाभावाद् बुद्धिमत्कारणपूर्वतामात्रे प्रतिपन्ने ‘यतो वा इमानी’ति

Since the origin, etc., of the earth, etc., is, from the proofs adduced already, a matter of experience and since in the determination of its cause, evidence is lacking by which to ascertain which of the two, viz., unitary causation or plural causation is to be apprehended and when all that is known is only that the precedent causal entity is some intelligent Being, the singleness of cause is rendered explicit by the text ‘From whence (yataḥ) proceed these beings’;

कारणस्यैकवचननिर्देशात्तदर्थमात्रस्यैव विधित्सितत्वादर्थात्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिजगत्कारणमिति कारणविशेषो वाक्यादवगम्यते।

because the word denoting the cause (yataḥ) is in the singular number and because the purpose (of the text – Yato vā imāni) is to denote only that (viz., ekatva), the distinctive cause, viz., that the Being whence the world originated is all-knowing and all-potent, is by presumption (arthāpatti) understood from the text itself (viz., yato vā, etc.).

पुनस्तद्विजिज्ञासस्वेत्यनूद्य तद् ब्रह्मेति

Again (we have) the text “That, have the desire to understand,” (TaitU.3.1.1) – this is a restatement – anuvāda having reference to what has gone before. (It is followed by the statement), “That is Brahman”;

तत्र ब्रह्मशब्दप्रयोगाद् बृहत्यर्थान्वयेन सर्वतोऽनवच्छिन्नस्वभावं जगत्कारणं ब्रह्मपदार्थ इति गम्यते।

because here the word ‘Brahman’ is used, what is ascertained by taking it in its (literal) sense of vastness, is that the Being which is the cause of the world is characterised by freedom from all limitations.

5.27 ✅

तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यमानन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विति॥

5.27. The determinative sentence of that (world-cause) is, “For indeed from bliss only (beings are here born, when born they live by bliss and on death they enter into bliss”. – (TaitU.1.1.1).

प्रसिद्धावद्योतकेन हिशब्देन संयुक्तमानन्दावद्योतकमुपपद्यते।

Since it is associated with the particle ‘hi’ which points to something well known it is right to suppose that it points to bliss as the essence (of Brahman).

अनानन्दात्मके हि जगत्कारणे ब्रह्मशब्दप्रयोगो न युज्यते। न हि तस्योपेक्षणीये विषये स्वार्थप्रक्षेपेण वृत्तिः समञ्जसा।

If indeed a thing that is of the nature of non-bliss be the world-cause the word ‘Brahman’ will not be applicable to it. By the application of its meaning (viz., bṛhatva [bṛhattva] or vastness) to what deserves (only) neglect, it will cease to be truly significant.

तस्माद् ब्रह्मपरे वाक्ये जन्मादिधर्मजातस्योपलक्षणत्वाद् ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शाभावात् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितं परमानन्दं ब्रह्मेति

Hence in the text relating to Brahman, (viz., “Whence these beings are born, etc.”), since the aggregate of the attributes beginning with ‘origination, etc.,’ defines Brahman only by indirect indication and (as such) does not establish its contact with Brahman (it is evident that), Brahman is Omniscient, Omnipotent and Supreme Bliss.

जन्मादिसूत्रेण ब्रह्मस्वरूपं लक्षितमिति सिद्धम्॥

It is thus established that the real nature of Brahman is what is defined in the sūtra beginning with ‘origination, etc.’

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां जन्माद्यधिकरणं नाम पञ्चमवर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Fifth Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

अथ षष्ठं वर्णकम्

VARṆAKA VI
THE OMNISCIENCE OF BRAHMAN

[BrS.1.1.3]

6.1 ✅

शास्त्रयोनित्वात्॥ अयमपरः प्रपञ्चकारणस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वे हेतुः।

6.1. [“From its being the source of Scripture”]. This sūtra lays down another reason in support of the omniscience of Brahman which is the cause of the world.

अनेकनानाविधविषयविद्यास्थानोपबृंहितस्य वेदाख्यस्यापि शास्त्रस्य प्रपञ्चान्तःपातित्वात् तत एव जन्म।

Since the Śāstra, termed the Veda (whose study demands) the aid of several branches of knowledge, dealing with innumerable and varied topics, falls within the world-order, its source is from Brahman only (tataḥ eva).

न च तेनाविषयीकृतस्य सद्भावे प्रमाणमस्ति। अतः सर्वविषयत्वात्सर्वज्ञं तत्।

And there is no proof for the existence of any thing that is not its (Veda) content. Hence because it embraces everything it is omniscient.

कल्पप्रत्ययप्रयोगो भाष्ये बोद्धृत्वाभावादीषदपरिसमाप्त्या। ततश्च कारणं तद्विषयादप्यधिकतरग्रहणसमर्थं गम्यते।

The use of the termination ‘Kalpa’ in the Bhāṣya (sarvajña-kalpasya) is to indicate that Scripture, because it lacks consciousness, falls a little short of perfection (in the matter of omniscience). As such, its cause (viz., Brahman) is understood to be able to comprehend much more than what forms its subject-matter.

दृश्यते ह्यद्यापि शास्त्रकाराणां तथाभावः।

It is common knowledge that authors of Śāstras are so even now (i.e., their knowledge is of wider range than that covered by their works).

6.2 ✅

ननु एवं सति बुद्धिपूर्वत्वात्सापेक्षं स्यात्।

6.2. Pūrvapakṣin. – If it be so the Veda would be dependent upon human authorship since its composition presupposes an intelligent understanding (of its purport with the aid of other pramāṇas).

न स्यात्; ब्रह्मवदनादित्वात्। कूटस्थनित्यत्वाच्च॥

Siddhāntin. – No, it would not, since like Brahman it is without a beginning and unalterably constant; (lit. unchanging like the anvil).

कथं पुनस्ततो जन्म?

Pūrvapakṣin. – How then (could it be maintained) that its origin is from Brahman (seeing that the Veda is unalterable and beginningless)?

तत्परतन्त्रत्वात्, रज्जुसर्पवत्। तथा च श्रुतिः ‘निःश्वसितमेतदि’ति। यथाऽपेक्षारहितैव लोके निःश्वासप्रवृत्तिः, तथाऽस्यापीति न सापेक्षतादोषः॥

Siddhāntin. – Because it (Veda) is dependent upon that (viz., Brahman), like the rope-serpent. Even thus is the śruti – ‘This (Veda) is breathed by Him’. Just as among men the act of breathing is spontaneous, even so in regard to the Veda and as such that (supposed) defect, viz., that it is dependent on other pramāṇas does not exist.

ननु एवं सति कथं सर्वज्ञता?

Pūrvapakṣin. – If it be so, (i.e., if it is not admitted that it is composed after due thought) how do you maintain the omniscience of Brahman?

तस्यैव ज्ञानशक्तिविवर्तात्मकत्वाद् नामप्रपञ्चस्य। रूपप्रपञ्चस्यापि तदाश्रित्य विवर्तनात् तज्जन्मता; नासतः प्रादुर्भावात्॥

Siddhāntin. – The world of names is constituted by the manifestation of the knowledge-giving power of that (Brahman) only. Even of the world of forms the manifestation is dependent upon that (Brahman) and as such it has its origin in it (Brahman). There is no origination of a non-existent entity.

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वनिरूपणं नाम षष्ठं वर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Sixth Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

शास्त्रयोनित्वाधिकरणविषयाः
अथ सप्तमं वर्णकम्

BRAHMAN – ESTABLISHED ON THE AUTHORITY OF VEDĀNTA
VARṆAKA VII

[BrS.1.1.3 L.7]

7.1 ✅

अथ वा यथोक्तमृग्वेदादीत्यादिना सूत्रस्य प्रमाणप्रतिज्ञामर्थान्तरमाह - अपेक्षितत्वात्॥

7.1. [‘Or else Ṛgveda, etc., as stated above’] – commencing with this Bhāṣya the Bhāṣyakāra says that the (third) sūtra bears another meaning, viz., the enunciation of the pramāṇa (or the valid means of knowing the real nature of Brahman), inasmuch as this second interpretation is a necessity.

कथं पुनरेकस्य सूत्रस्यार्थद्वयम्?

Query. – How could a single aphorism bear a double sense?

सूत्रत्वादेव। तथा च पौराणिकाः – ‘अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम्। अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः’॥ इति॥

Answer. – Only because it is a sūtra, as witness the Paurāṇikas – “what the knowers of the meaning of ‘Sūtra’ say is that a sūtra should consist of a minimum number of letters, be free from doubt, should contain the quintessence of the thing, should admit of more than one sense, contain no unnecessary letter, and be free from erroneous terminology”.

विश्वतोमुखमिति नानार्थतामाह - अतोऽलङ्कार एव सूत्राणां यदनेकार्थता नाम॥

By the word ‘Viśvatomukha’ is meant that it bears more than one sense. Hence it is indeed an embellishment to the sūtra that it yields diverse meanings.

ननु पूर्वसूत्रे शास्त्रमुदाहरता ब्रह्मावगमे शास्त्रं प्रमाणं प्रतिज्ञातमेव।

Query. – Well, in explaining the previous aphorism (second sūtra) the Bhāṣyakāra adduced as illustration the pertinent Scriptural passage – “From whence all these beings are born, etc.,” and as such purposed to show that the Śāstra itself points to Scripture as the valid means of knowing the nature of Brahman.

सत्यमेतत्सूत्रबलेन तदुदाहृतम्;

Answer. – It is true; on the strength of this (third sūtra) that (Śruti – ‘yato vā, etc.,) was adduced in illustration.

अन्यथा सूत्रे शास्त्रोपादानाभावादनुमानाशङ्कायां

Otherwise owing to the absence of any reference to the Veda text (in the second sūtra) it would lead to the supposition that inference only was intimated for establishing the nature of Brahman.

‘यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाज्जगतो जन्मादि भवति, तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः’ इत्यस्योपस्कारस्याप्रमाणत्वप्रसङ्गः।

Such contingency arising the Bhāṣyakāra has stated that the omniscient, and omnipotent cause from which the origination, etc., of the world take place, is Brahman – and that this is complementary (to the aphorism)’]; and this statement which reinforces (the Brahman’s being the world-cause, denoted by ‘yataḥ’) would be without any valid ground (if there were no sūtra to indicate that the śāstra alone is the valid means of knowing Brahman).

प्रतिप्रपञ्चं पृथक्कारणजन्मताया अपि सम्भवात् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वासिद्धेः, लोके च जगत्कारणे ब्रह्मशब्दप्रयोगादर्शनात्।

Since it is also possible that separate entities in the objective-world may be produced from separate causes, omniscience and omnipotence of the world-cause will not eventuate; and since in the empirical world it is not seen that the word ‘Brahman’ is used to denote the cause of the world (the Bhāṣya, ‘omnipotence, etc.,’ would be groundless).

अतो ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’ ‘शास्त्रप्रमाणकमि’त्येतावदिदं सूत्रं सदसन्दिग्धमनुमानशङ्कानिवृत्तेः

Hence in order to remove the supposition that by inference alone Brahman could be understood the second sūtra might take this from – ‘That from which there is the origination, etc., of the world is known from Veda testimony’. (That Brahman has Śāstra as its pramāṇa no doubt results from the Sūtra when expanded thus, but ‘that Brahman is omniscient because it is the cause of the Veda’ does not result from the single Sūtra as framed above. Hence the need of a separate sūtra).

पृथक्करणं प्रपञ्चान्तःपातिनः शास्त्रस्यापि हेतुत्वेन सर्वज्ञत्वं सुसम्पादमिति व्याख्यानान्तरेण कथयितुम्॥

The framing of the separate sūtra is for denoting by means of an alternative interpretation (vyākhyāntara) that the omniscience of Brahman could be easily established since Brahman is the cause of the Śāstra also, which Śāstra comes under the same category as the world (i.e., it is a kārya, not nitya as held by the Mīmāṃsaka).

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं नाम सप्तमं वर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Seventh Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

अथाष्टमं वर्णकम्

VARṆAKA VIII
VEDĀNTA – INTIMATES AN EXISTENT ENTITY

[BrS.1.1.4 L.1]

8.1 ✅

कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते? यावताऽऽम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानामिति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम्। अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यमक्रियार्थत्वात्॥

8.1. Pūrvapakṣin. – [How can it be maintained that the Śāstra (Vedānta) is the valid means of ascertaining the nature of Brahman since it has been shown that the Śāstra has reference to kriyā or action as borne out by the statement, ‘the Veda is denotative of action and as such what is not so denotative serves no purpose’ (Jai. I. ii – 1)? Hence the Vedānta texts possess no value because of their non-injunctive character].

8.2 ✅

यद्यपि प्रदर्शितानि वाक्यानि सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणकं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं प्रतिपादयन्ति;

8.2. No doubt the texts quoted in the Bhāṣya, viz., “From which all these beings originate, etc.,” declare Brahman characterised by such attributes as omniscience, etc., to be the cause of the universe.

तथाऽपि तत्र परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुनि प्रत्यक्षादीनामपि प्रवृत्तिसम्भवात् तैरसंवादे न प्रामाण्यं प्रतिलभन्ते॥

Still as there is scope also for perception, etc., to reveal an existing object, they (the Vedānta texts) cannot partake of the nature of a pramāṇa in relation to Brahman uncorroborated as they are by them (perception, etc.).

8.3 ✅

ननु अपौरुषेयत्वात् तज्जन्यं स्वार्थपरिच्छेदेऽनपेक्षं कथमप्रमाणम्?

8.3. Siddhāntin. – Well, since the Veda is not the work of man, the knowledge that arises from it desiderates no other pramāṇa in the determination of the object denoted by it, and as such how could it be invalid (i.e., how could its claim to convey valid knowledge regarding an accomplished object be denied)?

सत्यम्; तथाऽपि यथा चाक्षुषं स्पर्शनगोचरचित्रनिम्नोन्नतज्ञानं तेनासंवादादप्रमाणं, तथेहापि स्यात्।

Pūrvapakṣin. – It is true; but still just as the visual cognition of the depression and elevation in a picture that is the object of the sense of touch, is invalid being uncorroborated by it (viz., the tactual sense), even so here also (i.e., in the case of knowledge arising from the Scripture) it would be (invalid).

किं च पुरुषार्थशून्यत्वादप्यप्रामाण्यम्।

Again, the Vedānta texts are invalid also for the reason they signify nothing that is of value to man.

पुरुषार्थो हि नाम सुखावाप्तिर्दुःखपरिहारश्च। तौ च सिद्धत्वाद् हानोपादानविषयौ न सिद्धवस्तुन्यक्रियाशेषे सम्भवतः।

What indeed constitutes human value (puruṣārtha) is the attainment of happiness and riddance of sorrow. And those (happiness and sorrow of which happiness is the object of attainment and sorrow of riddance) will not result in regard to that which is an existing entity and is not related to action, since it (Brahman) is an accomplished being.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.9]

ततो न क्वचिद् वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टोपपन्ना वा॥

Hence (the Bhāṣya) – [‘nowhere has the significance of the Veda statements been seen or found to be intelligible except in so far as they are associated with an injunction (either directly or remotely)].

8.4 ✅

किं च प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषये न शब्दमात्रस्य प्रामाण्यम्।

8.4. Moreover, in regard to an object which is not given in perception, etc., śabda as a whole, (when not injunctive) fails to serve as a pramāṇa.

शास्त्रस्यैष स्वभावो यदनवगतार्थावबोधकत्वम्। शब्दमात्रस्य पुनः प्रमाणान्तरगृहीतार्थप्रकाशन एव सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं, नानवगतार्थप्रकाशने।

The nature of the Śāstra is this, that it is explicative of things which are not cognised (by other pramāṇas). On the other hand, it is only in the manifestation of such objects as are understood by other pramāṇas that the capacity of Śabda is perceived but not in the manifestation of objects not so understood.

तस्मादनर्थका वेदान्ताः; न तेषां ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यमिति। अत एव ‘वेदोषरा वेदान्ताः’ इति केषाञ्चिदुद्गारः॥

Hence the Vedānta portions are purposeless; their validity in the revelation of Brahman is nought. It is, on this ground, therefore, that (we hear) the nauseating utterance of some that the Vedānta portions are the “barren tracts of Veda”.

8.5 ✅

यत्पुनर्भाष्यकारेण कर्तृदेवतास्वरूपप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधिशेषत्वं वेदान्तानां प्रकरणान्तरभयादनभ्युपगम्य स्ववाक्यगतोपासनाकर्मपरत्वमुक्तं,

8.5. Now what the commentator (Śaṅkara) has stated (when adverting to the Mīmāṃsā view), namely, that if for fear of there being difference in the contexts, the Vedānta texts are not accepted as supplementary to the ritualistic injunctions by revealing the nature of the agent (in the ritualistic act) and of the deity (invoked in the ritual), they may denote the act of meditation explicit in their own vākyas (sentences)

तदयुक्तम्; उपासनाविधिशेषत्वेऽपि संवादाभावाद् जगत्कारणे न सर्वज्ञत्वादिसिद्धिः।

– that does not stand to reason. Even though the Vedānta portion is (admitted to be) supplementary to injunctions of meditation, owing to lack of corroborative evidence, a Being endowed with omniscience, etc., as the cause of the world-creation cannot be established.

8.6 ✅

सत्यम्; अनुमानतोऽनिर्दिष्टविशेषे तस्मिन्नवगते समारोपितैर्धर्मैरुपासनानियोगः सेत्स्यति।

8.6. It is true (says the upholder of the latter view); when on the basis of inference is understood some world-cause undifferentiated by any attribute, qualifications are superimposed on it (i.e., the world-cause) and from such (attribution) the injunction of meditation will be found to be justifiable.

एवं चाध्ययनविधिग्राहितानां वेदान्तानामेकान्ततो नानर्थक्यं भविष्यतीत्यभिप्रायः।

In fine what is meant is (says the pūrvapakṣin), “that the Vedānta portions whose study follows from the injunction relating to the recital of one’s branch of the Veda (adhyayana-vidhi) will not by any means be purportless.

फलं च तत्र कल्प्यमार्थवादिकम्।

And the fruit therein should be understood as resulting from the laudatory statements”.

समन्वयाधिकरणविषयाः

[BrS.1.1.4]

8.7 ✅

तत्तु समन्वयात्

8.7. [That, however (viz., Brahman is to be ascertained from the Vedānta Śāstra) since the Vedānta texts are congruent in having it (Brahman) as their purport].

तत् ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणकं वेदान्तशास्त्रात्प्रतीयत इति प्रतिजानीते।

In this aphorism the proposition that Brahman (tat) having the attributes of omniscience, etc., is known from the Vedānta Śāstra as set forth

[BrS.1.1.4 L.2]

हेतुं चाचष्टे – समन्वयादिति। तत्र तात्पर्येण वेदान्तवाक्यानां समन्वयादित्यर्थः॥

and the probans (hetu) is stated in the words ‘because they are congruent’ – ‘samanvaya’ which means that as regards their purport the Vedānta texts are in agreement.

सम्यगन्वयः समन्वयः।

‘Samanvaya’ means intimate connection (samyak anvaya).

अथ केयं सम्यक्ताऽन्वयस्य?

Here the question is ‘What is it that constitutes the intimacy of the connection’?

पदानां परस्परानवच्छिन्नार्थानामनन्याकाङ्क्षाणामव्यतिरिक्तैकरसप्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रान्वयः;

It is the connection of words, which convey no mutually related meanings (i.e., unlike the words which denote the relation of kriyā and kāraka), which desiderate none other (say, niyoga) along with the meaning which is a single unit (conception, unlike ‘blue-lotus’), which is homogeneous and which relates merely to the import of the prātipadika (uninflected substantive).

8.8 ✅

‘सोऽयमि’त्यादि वाक्यस्थपदानामिव।

8.8. It (the connection) is like the one between the words ‘saḥ’ and ‘ayam’ composing the sentence – (soyam Devadattaḥ)

प्रकृष्टप्रकाशशब्दयोरिव चन्द्रपदाभिधेयार्थकथनेन।

and like that between the words ‘prakṛṣṭa’ and ‘prakāśa’, (in the sentence – (prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaś candraḥ) where the meaning conveyed is the same as when designated by the single term ‘candra’.

तथा च व्यक्तिविशेषः, कश्चिच्चन्द्रप्रातिपदिकाभिधेयः केनचित् पृष्टः ‘अस्मिन् ज्योतिर्मण्डले कश्चन्द्रो नाम? ’ इति तस्य प्रतिवचनं ‘प्रकृष्टप्रकाशश्चन्द्रः’ इति। तदेवं प्रतिवचनं भवति यदि यथा चन्द्रपदेनोक्तं, तथाऽऽभ्यामपि पदाभ्यामुच्येत।

To explain – by some one who wishes to know which particular object is known by the (uninflected) word Candra the question is put, ‘which in this luminous firmament is designated Candra?’ The answer to that question is ‘that which shines the brightest is Candra’. Thus only will it be the (right) answer if what is denoted by the word Candra is denoted likewise by these two words (viz., prakṛṣṭa and prakāśa).

एवं च सति नीलोत्पलवदयुतसिद्धपरस्परावच्छिन्नविशेषणविशेष्यभावेनाप्यन्वयो दुर्लभः।

This being so even such relation as exists in ‘blue-lotus’ where the two terms are in inseparable association, mutually delimiting, and connected as adjective and substantive (i.e., attributive and attributed) is not found (in prakṛṣṭa-prakāśa and alike in Satyam jñānam, etc.).

कुतः पृथक्सिद्धः क्रियाकारकलक्षणः सम्बन्धः?

How could then, the relation of the nature of kriyā and kāraka which are distinct (entities) exist in ‘Satyam Jñānam anantam Brahma’.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.18]

8.9 ✅

तथाविधान्युदाहरति – सदेव सोम्येदमग्र इत्यादीनि॥

8.9. (Hence) he (Śaṅkara) adduces as illustrations statements like ‘Existence alone, dear one, this was in the beginning’ (ChanU.6.2.1) which are of that description (i.e., non-relational in character: – cf. above – padānām parasparānavacchinnānām, etc.).

ननु जन्मादिसूत्रोदाहरणेष्वेव प्रामाण्यं दर्शनीयं, किमुदाहरणान्तरेण?

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, validity should be pointed out from those texts only which have been adduced, as illustrations under the aphorism relating to the creation, etc. (of the world); what then (is the purpose of adducing different illustrations)?

बाढम्; अस्त्यत्राभिप्रायो भाष्यकारस्य। तत्र ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं वक्तव्यमिति तटस्थस्यैव ब्रह्मणो निरूपकाणि वाक्यान्युदाहृतानि,

Siddhāntin. – It is true; the commentator however has some object in view. There (in commenting on the second aphorism), the idea being that a definition of Brahman should be given, such sentences as based upon accidental features of Brahman, were adduced in illustration (i.e., definition per accidens );

इह तु ‘तत्त्वमसी’ति जीवस्य ब्रह्मात्मतावगतिपर्यन्तानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि न तटस्थमेव जगत्कारणं प्रतिपाद्य पर्यवस्यन्ति, इत्यतस्तथाभूतान्येव वाक्यान्युदाहृतानि – ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदि’त्येवमादीनि।

here, on the other hand since the Vedānta texts like ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7) find their fulfilment in generating the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with Brahman, and not merely in demonstrating that (Brahman), as the passive agent only, is the cause of the world-origin, sentences of that description only as “existence alone, my dear one, this was in the beginning” are adduced in illustration.

8.10 ✅

यत्पुनः सिद्धे वस्तुनि प्रत्यक्षादिसम्भवात् तदभावे मिथ्यात्वाशङ्कायामप्रामाण्यमिति, तत् रूपाद्यभावाद् नेन्द्रियगोचर इति प्रत्युक्तम्॥

8.10. Again it was argued that an existing entity is cognisable by perception, etc., and that in its (perceptive cognition) absence, suspicion arising that it is unreal, it (Vedānta) loses its title to validity. Such an objection has been met by the statement that since Brahman is devoid of form, etc., it cannot be the object of the senses.

ननु इन्द्रियागोचरत्वादेव प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वान्न शब्दमात्रस्य तत्र प्रामाण्यमित्युक्तम्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, we have said that because of the very fact of its non-apprehension by the senses and in consequence its not being an object of perception, etc., śabda as a whole loses its claim to be a valid means of knowledge in relation to it (Brahman).

8.11 ✅

उच्यते; यद्यपि शब्दमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षादिविषय एव प्रयोगो दृष्टः,

8.11. Siddhāntin. – We will answer: it is no doubt seen that the use of words (i.e., verbal expression) as a whole is only with reference to an object which is the content (viṣaya) of perception, etc.

व्युत्पत्ता तु कथं व्युत्पद्यते? इति वाच्यम्। श्रोतृव्यवहारो हि मूलं बालानां व्युत्पत्तेः।

But we have to consider how a learner of language acquires (the significance of words). Evidently, it is the behaviour of the hearer (of the mandatory statement) that is the basis of children’s acquisition of the significance of words.

स च श्रोतुर्ज्ञानान्तरानिमित्ततापरिशुद्धः शब्दसामर्थ्यावगमहेतुः।

And that behaviour unalloyed from dependence on any other jñāna (pramāṇa) of the hearer serves as the cause in the learner’s understanding of the significative potency of words.

अतो न प्रतिपत्तुर्ज्ञानान्तरासिद्धार्थावबोधकत्वं सामर्थ्यावगमकालेऽवगतम्। तेनानवगम्यैव तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सामर्थ्यावगमः, यथाऽवगमं च विज्ञानोत्पत्तिः।

Hence at the time of understanding the potency of the word (to convey a particular meaning) the learner has no idea of the association of a separate pramāṇa with the cognition of the sense (of the sentence he has heard from his elder). Without at all having the knowledge (of the co-existence of a distinct pramāṇa) the boy comprehends the significative potency of the words. And in the manner in which the meaning is apprehended, in that very manner it comes to be associated in his mind (vijñāna) with the corresponding word.

यदा पुनर्व्युत्पन्नः स स्वयं प्रयुयुक्षते परप्रतिपत्तये, तदा ज्ञानान्तरसन्निधापितं स्वसाक्षिकं विवक्षन् सामर्थ्यावगमकालेऽपि तयोः सत्तां प्रतिपद्यते केवलं, न ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ तयोरुपयोगम्।

But when once he has understood the meanings of words and himself wishes to make a statement for conveying its sense to another, then he does so with the consciousness that the content of that statement has been directly cognised by him with the aid of some other pramāṇa; he (now wrongly) thinks that these two, viz., the fact of having been cognised by some other pramāṇa and the wish to convey the sense, were there when he understood the potency for the first time, but they are of no avail in producing that knowledge (i.e., the potency).

तस्मान्न शब्दस्य प्रमाणान्तरगृहीतार्थप्रकाशने सामर्थ्यं व्युत्पत्तिकालेऽवगतं, किन्तु चक्षुरादिवदन्यनिरपेक्षो यथावगतसामर्थ्यश्च शब्दो विज्ञानं जनयति।

Hence at the time the import of words is being grasped, the potency of śabda as manifesting an object presented by another pramāṇa is not cognised; but like the visual sense, etc., śabda generates cognition without desiderating anything else and in conformity with the acquired significance of the words.

तस्मान्न प्रमेयस्य प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं शब्दस्य विज्ञानजनन उपयुज्यते।

As such the fact of the prameya being the object of perception, etc., serves no purpose (i.e., is irrelevant) in śabda conveying its sense.

8.12 ✅

अपि चापौरुषेये शब्दे चक्षुषीव विज्ञानोत्पत्तावनपेक्षे कथमप्रामाण्यमाशङ्क्येत?

8.12. And further how could any suspicion of non-validity arise as regards śabda (scriptural testimony) which is of non-personal origin and which like the eyes desiderates nothing else in the generation of knowledge?

ननु उक्तमाशङ्काकारणं स्पर्शनगोचरचित्रनिम्नोन्नतविषयस्य चाक्षुषस्य प्रत्ययस्य तत्संवादाभावादप्रमाणत्वं,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, the reason for doubt has been already stated: it is the invalidity of the visual cognition of the height and depressions seen in a picture (say of a landscape) which is apprehended by the tactile sense, because it (the visual cognition) is uncorroborated by it.

न तत्साधूक्तम्; अदुष्टकरणत्वादस्य, तस्य च तदभावात्। तथाहि शब्दस्तावदपौरुषेयत्वाददुष्टः।

Siddhāntin. – That statement of yours is untenable because as an instrument of knowledge this (śabda) is free from defect, and as regards that (viz., the visual organ) there is its absence (i.e., the absence of aduṣṭa-kāraṇatva – non-defective instrumentality). To explain – as for śabda, it is free from defect since it is of impersonal origin.

8.13 ✅

प्रमेयस्य पुनर्ज्ञानहेतुत्वे न प्रमाणमस्ति; शब्दस्यैव तदेकनिष्ठत्वेन तन्नियमात्,

8.13. As regards the prameya (the object of cognition) again, there exists no pramāṇa (anvaya vyatireka) to show that it serves as the cause of jñāna (i.e., the cognition of the propositional import), because, śabda by itself is the cause of the knowledge since its purport is with reference to its own prameya.

चित्रस्य तु चाक्षुषज्ञाने सामग्र्यन्तःपातिनः श्यामादिरेखासन्निवेशविशेषो दोषः; तदभावे तिमिराभाव इव सम्यग्दर्शनोत्पत्तेः।

As for the picture which falls within the aggregate of causal factors (sāmagrī) in perceptive cognition, the juxtaposition of darker (and lighter) lines is the defect (i.e., it causes an illusory vision of the picture). In its absence there arises a correct vision as when the eye is free from timira (i.e., some eye-disease).

अतः प्रवर्तमानमपि प्रमाणं संवादकमेव, इति नाप्रामाण्यमावहति। न च संवादलक्षणं प्रामाण्यम्, अपि तु बोधलक्षणमिति प्रमाणविदां स्थितिः।

Hence (i.e., because of the absence of illusion-producing light and dark lines in the picture) the pramāṇa (viz., the tactile sense) though it should proceed (to test what is given in perception), only corroborates it, and does not render it (the perceptive cognition) invalid. And (it should be noted) that the criterion of validity is not corroboration in the opinion of those who are proficient in the technique of pramāṇa but the revelation of objects (the presumption being that such revelation is valid).

अतो यथैव विधिवाक्यानां स्वार्थमात्रे प्रामाण्यम्, एवं स्वरूपवाक्यानामपि; अनवगतार्थपरिच्छेदसामान्यात्॥

Hence, as in the case of mandatory statements (in karma-kaṇḍa) where their validity is (unquestioned) in regard only to what they denote (viz., action), even so in the case of statements denoting the nature of existing objects, for both (karma-kaṇḍa and Vedānta) have in common the determination of a thing that is previously unknown (and as such each in its sphere is a valid means of knowledge).

8.14 ✅

ननु विधिवाक्यानामेव प्रामाण्यं युक्तम्; क्रियार्थत्वादाम्नायस्य,

8.14. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is but right that validity is only of mandatory statements since the Veda (Āmnāya) has action as its subject-matter.

न; इतरेतराश्रयत्वात्।

Siddhāntin. – No, for it will lead to the fault of ‘mutual dependence’ –

विधिवाक्यानामेव हि प्रामाण्ये सिद्धे क्रियार्थत्वमाम्नायस्य सिद्ध्येत्, क्रियार्थत्वे च सिद्धे तेषामेव प्रामाण्यमितीतरेतराश्रयत्वं स्यात्,

if indeed it be established that mandatory statements alone are the valid means of knowledge, then it could be established that the Veda has action for its subject-matter; again if it be established that the Veda has action for its subject-matter, validity could be of them only (viz., mandatory statements) and as such it would be (a case of) mutual dependence.

न ह्येकमप्यन्यतः सिद्धम्; अतो यदवगमयत्याम्नायस्तदर्थः सः।

Indeed neither of these two can be established by something other. As such what the Veda intimates, that is its meaning.

तस्माद् यथाकार्यमवगमयन्स्तदर्थः, एवमैकात्म्यमप्यवगमयंस्तदर्थो भवितुमर्हति।

Hence just as the mandatory section by intimating kārya, has kārya (action) as its content, the Vedānta section also, by intimating the unity of the self, becomes fit to have that (viz., the unity of the individual self and the absolute) as its content (artha).

प्रतीतिकृतत्वात्प्रामाण्यस्य, प्रतीतिस्तु कार्यैकात्म्ययोस्तुल्या। प्रत्यक्षादिष्वप्येतदेव प्रमाणवृत्तं, यदनवगतमवगम्यते॥

For credibility is the outcome of cognition and as for cognition, it is the same as regards both kārya (action) and the unity of the self. Even in the case of perception, etc., what sets the stamp of authoritativeness is that something not known before is revealed by them.

आह – युक्तं प्रत्यक्षादीनां तावत् प्रामाण्यम्; अपेक्षान्तराभावात्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – (The Pūrvapakṣin) says (as follows): as for perception, etc., their authoritativeness as means of knowledge is intelligible because of the absence of anything else desiderated.

आम्नायस्य त्वध्ययनविधिनोपादापितस्य न पुनः पुरुषार्थमप्राप्य पर्यवसानं लभ्यते; विधानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात्।

But in regard to the Veda the study of which is undertaken in accordance with the mandate (that one should learn one’s branch of the Scriptures), its object will not be fulfilled unless it satisfies some human end (puruṣārtha) as otherwise it will result in the futility of Scriptural injunctions.

तस्मादैकात्म्यवाक्यानां स्वार्थमात्रनिष्ठता न युक्ता;

Hence it is unreasonable to suppose that the statements relating to the unity of the Self have only their own (literal) sense to intimate.

उच्यते, पुरुषो ह्येतावदपेक्षते, इष्टं मे स्यादनिष्टं मे मा भूदिति, न त्वित्थमन्यथा वेति। न चास्य स्वयमीष्टे।

Siddhāntin. – It is thus answered: A person, as is well known, desires only so much – ‘may good come to me, may evil not approach me’; and not thus – (i.e., may the desired object result from action, and the riddance of pain from inaction) or other than thus – (i.e., may the desired object result from inaction, and the riddance of pain from non-inaction). And of this (fruit or phala) he is not the arbiter (e.g., he cannot make the impossible possible).

द्विविधं चेष्टं प्रेप्सति, किञ्चित्प्राप्यम्; यथा ग्रामादि। किञ्चित्प्राप्तमपि; यथा भ्रान्त्या हस्तगतमेव विस्मृतसुवर्णादि।

In two ways does he desire to achieve his good; in regard to something that is possible of accomplishment (sādhya or prāpya), e.g., reaching a village, etc., or through illusion in regard to something though already accomplished (siddha or prāpta), e.g., the forgotten gold (ring) on one’s own finger (lit. gold, etc., kept in one’s hand).

अनिष्टमपि द्विविधं परिजिहीर्षति किञ्चित् परिहार्यं – यथागर्तादि किञ्चित्परिहृतमपि; भ्रान्त्या यथा रज्ज्वादि सर्पादिबुद्धिगृहीतम्।

Evil also he wishes to get rid of in two ways (i.e., under the following circumstances) – where a thing can be actually avoided (sādhya), e.g., (falling into) a pit, etc., or where something though avoided (parihṛta) is attempted to be avoided as when – he attempts through delusion to avoid rope, etc., apprehended as serpent, etc.

तत्र प्राप्यपरिहार्ययोः साधनज्ञानायत्तत्वात्पुरुषार्थस्य विधिप्रतिषेधावर्थवन्तौ।

There (i.e., of these two kinds of puruṣārtha) when a man’s object is of the nature of something that is fit to be achieved or fit to be avoided, injunction and prohibition are of significance since its achievement is dependent on the knowledge of the means (to be adopted).

इतरयोस्तावद् भ्रान्तिमात्रव्यवहितत्वान्न तदपनयादन्यत् पुरुषार्थत्वेनापेक्षते।

As regards the other two (viz., that which is possessed and that from which one is really freed), since it is only the delusion that is the estranging element nothing other than its removal, is desired as one’s highest object.

तदपनयश्च तत्त्वज्ञानाद् भवति नान्यथा। एवमपि लभ्यमानं पुरुषार्थमनुमन्यत एव पुरुषः, सुतरां चाभिनन्दति।

And as for its removal, it is accomplished by the knowledge of Reality and in no other way. Achieved even thus (i.e., by the instrumentality of knowledge) the eradication of delusion, a person regards as puruṣārtha, nay he much applauds it.

सधनायत्तो ह्यायासाल्लभ्येत, ज्ञानायत्ते त्वायासोऽपि परिह्रियते।

Indeed what is dependent upon (action as its) means might be obtained with toil, but in what is dependent on knowledge even toil (miseries that beset man) is eradicated.

तेनानेकानर्थकलुषितमिवात्मानं मन्यमानस्य भ्रान्तस्य सर्वानर्थशून्यात्मतत्त्वप्रतिपादनादेव पुरुषार्थसिद्धेरैकात्म्यवाक्यानां स्वार्थमात्रनिष्ठत्वेऽपि न विध्यानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः।

Hence of him who is deluded, thinking – as though his self is defiled by manifold ills, the highest human end will be attained only when the real nature of ātman which is void of all evils, is unfolded, and as such there arises no contingency that the scriptural injunction will be rendered futile, even if the identity statements end in declaring their own import.

तस्मात् सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वम्॥

Hence is concluded that the Śāstra is the valid means of the knowledge of Brahman as defined.

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयनिरूपणं नामाष्टमं वर्णकं समाप्तम्॥
Here ends the Eighth Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

अथ नवमं वर्णकम्

VARṆAKA IX
IS BRAHMAN THE OBJECT OF THE INJUNCTION OF MEDITATION?

[BrS.1.1.4 L.37]

9.1 ✅

अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते –

9.1. [“Here some others come forward with this objection.”]

यद्यपि शास्त्रेण प्रमीयते ब्रह्म; तथाऽपि विधिसंस्पर्शिना, न तद्रहितेन।

No doubt, from the scriptures (only) is Brahman understood and yet it is in association with an injunction and not without it.

कस्मादेवम्? अन्यथा शब्दप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः।

Why so? (It may be asked). Otherwise communication by speech will be unintelligible.

पुरुषेच्छासमुत्थापितो हि शब्दप्रयोगः। सा चेष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारविषया। न च पारम्पर्येणापि सुखदुःखे विहायेष्टानिष्टे सम्भवतः।

The employment of words is, it is evident, the outcome (i.e., external manifestation) of a man’s will. And that (will) has as its object the acquisition of what is desired and the avoidance of what is undesired. The desired and the undesired will not happen by excluding even their indirect relation with pleasure and pain.

न च विस्मृतसुवर्णारोपितसर्परशनाप्रतिपत्ताविव तदनन्तरं शास्त्रादपि ब्रह्मात्मप्रतिपत्तौ सुखावाप्तिर्दुःखपरिहारश्च दृश्यते; पूर्ववत् संसारित्वोपलब्धेः,

Unlike the attainment of pleasure and the riddance of pain (respectively) after one becomes aware of the forgotten gold and of the rope on which the serpent is superimposed, they are not perceived when similarly from the scriptures the nature of Brahman is understood. Even as before the flux of life appears (to continue).

प्रतीत्युत्तरकालं च ध्यानोपदेशात्।

Also because of the fact that following the acquisition of jñāna by the study of the Vedānta śāstra, contemplation (nididhyāsa) is prescribed.

तस्मात् सन्तु नाम लोके विधिरहितान्यपि पुरुषार्थपर्यन्तानि वाक्यानि, वेदे तु न तद्रहितानां तत्पर्यन्तता।

Hence though it may perhaps be conceded that in empirical usage statements have as their final import some human end (puruṣārtha) even if they do not convey any injunction, in the Veda, when not injunctive in character they cannot have that (viz., puruṣārtha) as their fruit.

9.2 ✅

तस्माद् यद्यपि जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यं धर्मब्रह्मजिज्ञासयोः सिद्धसाध्यविषयत्वेन;

9.2. Hence though in reality between the inquiry into the nature of Dharma and of Brahman there exists difference in what is to be attained, because of the fact that the content of the one (i.e., of the latter) is an accompanied object and that of the other, what is yet to be accomplished,

तथाऽपि ‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः’ (छा. उ. ८-७-१) ‘स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (छा. उ. ८-७-१) इत्यादि विधिषु कोऽसावात्मेत्याकाङ्क्षायां सर्व एव ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरः पदसमन्वयस्तत्समर्पकत्वेनोपयुक्तः,

yet when injunctions, ‘He is to be sought out’, ‘He is to be inquired into’ etc., exist the question ‘who is this ātman?’ (ChanU.8.7.1) arises; and then the whole assemblage of words (pada-samanvayaḥ) relating to the nature of Brahman will be found useful in its delineation;

न स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयितुमलम्।

but (that contexture of words) is not capable of expounding Brahman independently (i.e., except as subsidiary to an injunctive statement).

अतो विधीयमानज्ञानकर्मकारकत्वेनैव ब्रह्म प्रतिपाद्यत इति॥

Hence what is to be understood is that Brahman is revealed as being in the objective relation to the enjoined jñāna.

यः पुनः ‘तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमि’ति भाष्ये पूर्वपक्षोपसंहारः,

Again (what is to be understood) from the bhāṣya [‘Hence it follows that the Śāstra can be accepted as the valid means of knowing. Brahman only in so far as it (Brahman) is the object of an injunction relating to pratipatti’], is that it is the conclusion of the opponent’s view.

तत्र प्रतिपत्तिशब्दः सर्व एव मनोव्यापारः प्रमाणात्मक इतरो वा ब्रह्मसंस्पर्शित्वेन विधेयः कैश्चित् कथञ्चित् कल्पितः, तस्य सर्वस्य सङ्ग्रहार्थो द्रष्टव्यः॥

There, the word ‘pratipatti’ is to be understood as denoting every mental activity whether it is of the nature of pramāṇa (pramā) or otherwise (say a meditative act) which is assumed by some to be enjoined in some manner, with Brahman as its object – (the word ‘pratipatti’ in the concluding bhāṣya) is to be understood as standing in brief for all that (i.e., both pramāṇātmaka and itara).

9.3 ✅

अत्रोच्यते, किमिदं ज्ञानं ब्रह्मकर्मकं विधीयते? न तावच्छब्दजन्यम्। स्वाध्यायपाठादेव तत्सिद्धेः,

9.3. Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer: Of what nature is that knowledge which having Brahman as is object, is enjoined? It is not however what is conveyed by śabda (i.e., it is not verbal knowledge) for that is attained by the mere study of one’s own branch of the Veda.

अथ शब्दजन्यस्यैव ज्ञानस्याभ्यासो विधीयत इति, न तस्य प्रयोजनं पश्यामः॥

It may be said that the continuous recalling to mind of that very knowledge produced by śabda is enjoined, but then we do not perceive any good resulting from it.

ननु इष्टविषयस्य ज्ञानसन्तानस्य सुखसन्तानहेतुत्वं दृश्यते,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is perceived that a continuous thought of a desired object does serve as the cause of an uninterrupted succession of pleasurable sensations (sukha-santāna – here it is happiness of the nature of mokṣa or liberation).

यद्येवं तद्वदेव विध्यानर्थक्यम्।

Siddhāntin. – If it be so, verily as in the other, injunction is purposeless (i.e., even without injunction recollection of a pleasant experience induces happiness).

अथ पुनः साक्षात्करणाय ज्ञानसन्तानविधिरुच्यते,

Pūrvapakṣin. – But now this is our view, that the injunction relating to the knowledge-series (i.e., mandate enjoining continuous recalling of the identity – knowledge arising from śabda) is laid down for ‘sākṣāt-kāra’ (i.e., final psychosis which removes the primal ignorance).

नैतद्युक्तम्; न हि दृष्टाधिकारो विधिरसम्भावितदृष्टफलो भवति। न हि लैङ्गिकोऽर्थो लिङ्गजन्मनैव ज्ञानेन सहस्रशोऽप्यभ्यस्यमानेन साक्षात्क्रियते।

Siddhāntin. – That does not stand to reason. A mandate having a perceivable end will not be such, without the probability at least (of that result being an object) of direct experience. An object of inferential knowledge (say fire whose knowledge is inferred from the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire) will not be the content of immediate perception even though the knowledge arising from the liṅga (middle term or hetu) is repeated a thousand times.

मा भूत् शाब्दज्ञानादेवाभ्यस्यमानात्साक्षाद्भावः, तज्जन्मनो ज्ञानान्तराद्भविष्यति,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Let not sākṣāt-kāra result only from verbal knowledge constantly recalled. It will result from a separate cognition arising from it (viz., from smṛti-santāna – stream of recollections).

नेत्थम्भावे प्रमाणमस्ति॥

Siddhāntin. – There is no evidence that such is the case.

अस्तु तर्हि शब्दात् प्रतिपन्नस्य यथाप्रतिपत्ति ध्यानं नाम मनोव्यापारो विधीयत इति,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, be it admitted then that what is enjoined is the mental act termed ‘dhyāna’ (meditation) on the object cognized from śabda (i.e., verbal testimony) in the very manner in which one has cognized it.

किमर्थं तस्य विधानम्?

Siddhāntin. – With what purpose is it (meditation) enjoined?

ध्येयसाक्षात्काराय चेत्,

Pūrvapakṣin. – It is for the immediate perception (sākṣāt-kāra) of the object of meditation.

न तस्य सम्भवः। न हि परोक्षं ध्यायमानं साक्षाद्भावमापद्यमानं दृष्टम्।

Siddhāntin. – That will not result (i.e., there is no possibility of the intuitive perception of the object of meditation resulting from meditation). An object of contemplation which is beyond the range of perception is not seen to become the content of intuitive perception.

ननु दृष्टं परोक्षमपि ध्यायमानं साक्षाद्भावमापन्नं कामाद्युपप्लवे,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is a matter of experience that when one is assailed by lustful passion, etc., the object of constant thought though beyond the range of perception is seen to come within one’s immediate vision.

मैवम्; न तद् ध्यायमानम्, अपित्वविद्यात्मकम्, अन्यथा बाधो न भवेत्॥

Siddhāntin. – Your reasoning is not valid. What is meditated upon (viz., wife and child – say) does not become (as object of immediate perception). But it is the outcome of nescience (and as such it is illusory knowledge); if it were otherwise it would not be sublated.

9.4 ✅

ननु ‘द्रष्टव्यः’ इति दर्शनमनूद्य ‘निदिध्यासितव्यः’ इति ध्यानं दर्शनफलं विधीयते,

9.4. Pūrvapakṣin. – (In the BrhU.2.4.5, we have the passage – ‘This self is to be seen – draṣṭavyaḥ, – heard about, – śrotavyaḥ, cogitated upon – mantavyaḥ, meditated upon – nididhyāsitavyaḥ). Here from the word ‘draṣṭavyaḥ’ which means ‘with the object of darśana’ (immediate perception – sākṣāt-kāra), meditation which has darśana as its fruit is enjoined as vouched for by the word ‘nididhyāsitavyaḥ’.

उक्तमेतद् न दृष्टाधिकारो विधिरसम्भावितदृष्टफलो भवतीति।

Siddhāntin. – It has already been said that an injunction having a perceivable end will not be such without (at least) having a probable phala (vide, ante).

न हि ध्यानं ध्येयसाक्षाद्भावहेतुः क्वचिद् दृष्टम्। अथापि भवतु नाम ध्यानाद् ध्येयसाक्षाद्भावो ध्येयस्य तथात्वे किं प्रमाणम्?

Nowhere indeed has meditation been found to be the cause of the immediate perception of the object of meditation. Even admitting that the immediate perception of the object of meditation results from meditation, what evidence is there that the object of meditation is real (i.e., of that character, viz., identity of the Jīva with Brahman)? The dhyeya or the object of contemplation may be something imaginary.

शब्दस्तावत्साक्षात्करणोपायोपासनविधाने पर्यवसितो न तत्सद्भावे,

As for śabda (verbal testimony), it stops at decreeing meditation as the means of securing sākṣāt-kāra and does not teach that the dhyeya is an actuality (i.e., it cannot also have the additional function of denoting real identity as the content of meditation. A single sentence cannot bear two meanings).

सत्यम्; तथाऽपि तत्त्वं सिध्यति वक्ष्यमाणेन देवताविग्रहवत्त्वन्यायेन।

Pūrvapakṣin – It is true; but still the truth (i.e., the identity of the individual soul with the supreme spirit) does become evident on the analogy of the principle to be set forth later in (establishing) the embodiment of the deities.

विषम उपन्यासः तत्र हि न तथात्वे साधकं बाधकं वेति प्रतीतिशरणैस्तथाऽभ्युपेयते;

Siddhāntin. – The analogy stated is inappropriate. There (in that context) indeed, because of the absence of a distinct pramāṇa either corroborating, or annulling what it (Śruti) actually imports, it is so understood by those who adhere to what the words actually convey (lit. by those whose refuge is the knowledge as conveyed by the words).

न तथेह सर्वस्यात्मत्वे; प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधात्, आरोपितरूपेणापि ध्यानोपपत्तेः।

But it is not so here; perception, etc., are adverse to the conception that all is ātman. And meditation is intelligible even when the object of meditation is assumptive.

पूर्वोक्तेष्वपि ज्ञानविधिपक्षेष्वनयैव दिशा वस्तुतथात्वसिद्धिर्निराकार्या॥

Even as regards the injunctions of knowledge mentioned before, this very course has to be followed in rebutting (the claim) that the injunction of jñāna is for establishing reality as it is.

9.5 ✅

यत्पुनः कैश्चिदुच्यते – शाब्दज्ञानादन्यदेव ज्ञानान्तरमलौकिकं वेदान्तेषु कर्तव्यत्वेन विधीयत इति,

9.5. Again it is said by others that as distinct from a knowledge of the import of śabda there arises a distinct non-empirical cognition and that is what is enjoined in the Vedānta texts as one’s duty to acquire (vide, ante).

तत्र वदामः, तत्पुनः किंसाधनं किङ्कर्म चेति वक्तव्यम्। न ह्यनवगतकर्मकारकं ज्ञानं विधातुं शक्यम्; अवगते च तस्मिन् विधानानर्थक्यम्।

As regards that (view) we ask, ‘well then, which is the means (i.e., pramāṇa by which such cognition is proved) and which is the content (viṣaya of that cognition)? – these questions have to be answered. No cognition which has not a known content in the objective relation can possibly be enjoined. And when that (viz., the content of immediate perception – aparokṣa-jñāna) is known, the injunction will be purposeless.

9.6 ✅

साधनमपि न विहितम्; तेन विना साकाङ्क्षं वचनमनर्थकं भवेत्।

9.6. Again the means of acquiring it (cognition) is not enjoined and without it the injunctive sentence desiderating (here, lacking in the answer to the question, ‘by what means is that cognition to be acquired?’), would convey no meaning.

‘तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ती’त्यादिना वचनेन साधनं वेदानुवचनादि विहितमेवेति चेत्, प्रमाणान्तरस्य तर्हि प्रमाणं शब्दो नात्मतत्त्वस्य,

If it be averred that, from the text – (BrhU.4.4.22), ‘such a one the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by a recital of the Vedas, etc.,’ the means (for the knowledge of Brahman) constituted by the Veda recital is certainly enjoined, then Upaniṣad testimony becomes the means (of the knowledge) of another pramāṇa (the tertium quid) and not of the true self;

नैतदुपपद्यते; कार्यगम्यं हि प्रामाण्यं न विधिगम्यम्।

and that does not stand to reason. Indeed the validity (of knowledge) is known from Kārya (i.e., pramāṇa-phala) and not from vidhi (injunction);

तदुक्तम् – ‘गुणाद्वाऽप्यभिधानं स्यात्सम्बन्धस्याशास्त्रहेतुत्वादि’ति।

(and in support) this may be cited – “or by secondary implication (at least) the sense of a word would be understood, since the relation (between the word and its meaning) is not brought about by the śāstra – Jai. III. ii-4).”

तदेवमयुक्तमेतत्, विधिसमन्वये शास्त्रप्रमाणत्वं ब्रह्मणः॥

Hence this contention that Brahman is established by Veda testimony only when in association with an injunction (niyoga) is baseless.

9.7 ✅

अथापि ‘अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिरि’ति प्रपञ्चातिरिक्तब्रह्माभ्युपगमे देवताविग्रहवत्त्वन्यायसम्भवात् मोक्षकामस्य ब्रह्मोपासनं विधीयते,

9.7. Pūrvapakṣin. – Thereafter (atha) when on the basis of the text – “now, the light which shines higher than the distant heaven”, Brahman which transcends the universe is admitted, the rule pertaining to the assumption of forms by the deities applies (here also) and as such (we must conclude) that meditation on Brahman is enjoined on one who aspires for liberation.

तथा च श्रुतिः ‘विद्यया तदारोहन्ती’ति,

To this effect is the Veda text – ‘from Vidyā (i.e., meditation) they attain that (i.e., Brahman)’.

न च साध्यत्वेऽप्यन्तवत्त्वम्; शब्दगम्यत्वादनावृत्तेः ‘न च पुनरावर्तते’ (छा. उ. ८-१५-१) इति।

Nor can it be contended that because it (i.e., liberation) is something produced it has termination (i.e., not eternal), for from the verbal testimony, ‘he does not return again’ (ChanU.8.15.1; BrhU.6.2.15) cessation from recurrent births is ascertained.

न ह्येष तर्कगम्यः, येन तर्केणास्य तत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्येत,

It is not to be ascertained from reasoning, for if it had been so (if the nature of liberation were possible of ascertainment from reasoning) its real nature could have been determined by reasoning (tarka or ratiocination).

[BrS.1.1.4 L.68]

शब्दगम्यस्य तु शब्दादेव तत्त्वव्यवस्थेति मन्वानस्योत्तरमाह भाष्यकारः – न कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यादिति॥

As to him who thinks that of what is to be known from śabda its real nature is to be determined from śabda only, the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) replies as follows: – [“No, what you say is not valid, because of the difference in the nature of the benefits to be had from action on the one side and the knowledge of Brahman on the other.”]

9.8 ✅

वस्तुसङ्ग्रहवाक्यमेतत्।

9.8. This is the abridged statement of the topic (under consideration, viz., the difference in the nature of fruits).

[BrS.1.1.4 L.99]

अस्यैव प्रपञ्चः अतो न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्त इत्येतदन्तं भाष्यम्॥

Of this alone the elaboration is contained in the comment ending with, [“therefore the teaching regarding Brahman cannot in reason be supplementary to action (lit. what is enjoined)”].

अस्याममर्थः – सङ्क्षेपतः श्रुतितो न्यायतश्च मोक्षस्य नित्यसिद्धत्वप्रतीतेर्न क्रियासाध्यो मोक्ष इति।

In brief this is what it means – since both on the strength of Veda authority and reasoning it is admitted to be eternal, liberation is not an effect of action.

कथम्? यदि सन्ध्योपासनवन्मानसं ब्रह्मकर्मकमुपासनं नाम धर्मो मोक्षफलः स्वर्गादिफलयागवद्विधीयते,

How? (It may be asked). If like the meditation (on the resplendent deity) at sunrise and sundown, which is mental, the meditative act having Brahman as its content is also mental and enjoined for the fruit of liberation, (then it would be enjoined) like yāga (jyotiṣṭoma) which yields the fruit of svarga (the abode of gods).

तथा सति शरीरवतैव तत्फलं भोक्तव्यम् इति ‘अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः’ (छा. उ. ८-१२-१) इत्यशरीरमोक्षानुवादो योग्यप्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनाभावानुवादश्च निरालम्बनौ स्याताम्।

Then the fruit would be for the enjoyment of an embodied being only, with the result that the enunciations of liberation as disembodiedness and also of the absence of contact with the pleasing and the displeasing appropriate (in an embodied state) as stated in the text ‘neither the pleasing nor the displeasing touches one who is in a disembodied state’ (ChanU.8.12.1) would both be baseless.

न चाशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यम्; स्वाभाविकत्वात्तस्य।

And it cannot be argued that disembodiedness itself is the effect of dharma (i.e., meditative act) for it exists in itself (and is not produced by any other agency; it is eternal – the state of liberation).

तेनानुष्ठेयविलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यमशरीरत्वं स्वभावसिद्धं नित्यमिति सिद्धम्॥

Hence disembodiedness termed mokṣa (liberation), is distinct from the fruit possible of attainment by effort, and is self-established and as such its eternality is indubitable.

9.9 ✅

तथापि कथञ्चित्परिणामि नित्यं स्यात्, स्यादपि कदाचिद्धर्मकार्यम्।

9.9. And even there (even on the supposition that it is nitya), if mokṣa were somehow of the nature of pariṇāminitya (i.e., eternality consistent with transformation like clay which is constant though changed into pot) then perhaps it might possibly have been the effect of dharma (i.e., meditative act).

इदन्तु कूटस्थनित्यं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यत्वेन प्रक्रान्तं, यत्स्वरूपावगमो जीवस्य मोक्षोऽभिप्रेयते।

But this Brahman of the nature of immutable eternality the cognition of whose essence is understood as constituting the jīva’s liberation, is the subject of the present inquiry.

तत्र यदि हस्तगतविस्मृतसुवर्णादिवद् भ्रान्तिमात्रव्यवहितं मोक्षं प्रत्याख्याय,

And now rejecting (the true) mokṣa which, like the forgotten gold kept in one’s own hand, is concealed only by illusion,

ब्रह्मविषयध्यानक्रियातो देवताविषययागादिवत्प्रीतिविशेषो भोग्यो मोक्षः कल्प्येत, ततस्तेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेषु यागफलेष्वयमपि तथाभूतः स्यात्।

if mokṣa of the nature of some specific pleasure capable of being enjoyed, be conceived as resulting from a meditative act having Brahman as its content, very like yāga, etc., performed to propitiate a deity, then this (mokṣa) also would become identically one among those very pleasures which are the fruit of yāga and are subject to gradation (i.e., different degrees of pleasure).

ततः ‘तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते’ (छा. उ. ८-१-६) इति लिङ्गदर्शनोपबृंहितन्यायावगतानित्यत्वो मोक्षः प्रसज्येत।

Then mokṣa would partake of the nature of non-eternality as may be inferred from the maxim (viz., yat kṛtakam tad anityam – whatever is a product, that is inconstant), which has the support of the corroborative text – “as here on earth, objects of enjoyment earned by works are destroyed, even so, there, objects of enjoyment earned by merit are destroyed” – (ChanU.8.1.6).

न च तथाभ्युपगमो मोक्षवादिनाम्। अतो न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्त इत्युपसंहारः॥ [BrS.1.1.4 L.99]

And it is not so admitted by those who advocate mokṣa. Hence the teaching of Brahman cannot reasonably be regarded as auxiliary to duty (i.e, the enjoined meditation) – this is the conclusion.

9.10 ✅

यत्पुनः ‘न च पुनरावर्तते’ (छा. उ. ८-१५-१) इति शास्त्रावगतं नित्यत्वं न तर्केणापनेतुं युक्तमिति, तदयुक्तम्;

9.10. The statement again, that it is not proper to refute by logic the eternality (of mokṣa) apprehended from the text, ‘He does not return to mundane life’ – (ChanU.8.15.1) and BrhU.6.2.15) is wrong.

वर्तमानापदेशत्वेन तथाभावे प्रमाणापेक्षणात्। न च कार्यस्य नित्यत्वे प्रमाणमस्ति;

From the use of the present tense (āvartate) the need for pramāṇa to substantiate its being so (i.e., mokṣa effected by meditation being eternal) is evident; (for ‘na ca punar-āvartate’ is only a laudatory statement and therefore it is no pramāṇa). There is no pramāṇa to validate the eternity of what is an effect.

परमाणूनां पाकजो गुणो नित्यत्वे नोदाहरणम्; प्रक्रियामात्रसिद्धत्वात्।

The analogy that the quality of colour produced by heat in atoms is eternal does not hold good, for it finds support only in the technique (of the Vaiśeṣikas).

9.11 ✅

किं च तेषामिह न पुनरावृत्तिः; ‘इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते’ इति श्रुतिरिहेममिति विशेषणादस्मिन् कल्पेऽनावृत्तिं दर्शयति, नानवधिकामनावृत्तिम्।

9.11. Again (we have) the scriptural texts – “For them there is no return hither” (ChanU.8.15.1). “(They who proceed by it) return not to this world of man caught in saṃsāra (the wheel of life and death)” – (ChanU.4.15.5); here the qualifying words ‘here – iha’ and ‘this – imam’ point to non-reversion in this cycle and not to limitless non-reversion.

अपि च अभ्युपेत्य ब्रह्मणः क्रियानुप्रवेशं मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोष उक्तः, न तु क्रियानुप्रवेशं क्षमते वेदान्तवाक्यगतः पदसमन्वयः।

Again on the supposition (for argument’s sake) that Brahman admits of association with action, it was stated that liberation would be liable to the defect of non-eternality, but the fact is that the congruence of sense yielded by the words composing the Vedānta passages does not tolerate (Brahman’s) association with action.

तथा च ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवती’त्याद्याः श्रुतयो ब्रह्मविद्यानन्तरं मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति; वेदनब्रह्मभवनयोरेककालत्वनिर्देशात्।

Even so scriptural texts such as, ‘The knower of Brahman becomes verily Brahman’ – Muṇḍ., III. 9, which promise liberation immediately after the cognizance of Brahman, repel the interposition of any action, since simultaneity of time as to the cognizance and the attainment of Brahman is specified.

अतो न विदितस्य क्रियायां विनियोगः।

Hence Brahman cognised (from verbal testimony) is not related (as object) to (a meditative) act.

9.12 ✅

तथा ‘तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे’ (बृ. उ. १-४-१०) इति ब्रह्मदर्शन सर्वात्मभावयोरेककालत्वनिर्देशाद् मध्ये क्रियान्तरं वारयति पश्यन्निति शतृप्रत्ययः;

9.12. Likewise (we have the text), “seeing this, indeed the seer (ṛṣi) Vāmadeva obtained (the universal self-hood)” – (BrhU.1.4.10); here since it is pointed out that the knowledge of Brahman is synchronous with the attainment of universal selfhood, the participle affix ‘śatṛ’ (in paśyan) wards off the intervention of a separate act (viz., that of meditation);

‘लक्षणहेत्वोः क्रियायाः’ इति क्रियाया हेतुभूताद्धातोः शतृप्रत्ययस्मरणात्, क्रियायाश्चाव्यवहिते हेतुमति हेतुत्वात्।

As witness, when one action is the remainder of another action, the root of the verb denoting ‘remainder’ or ‘cause’ takes the ‘śatṛ’ (present participle) – (Pāṇini, III. ii-126) and since kriyā is the cause (hetu) of another kriyā (product or phala) nothing should intervene.

यथा ‘तिष्ठन् गायती’ति तिष्ठतिगायत्योर्मध्ये क्रियान्तराभावः प्रतीयते, तद्वत्। अत्र न स्थितिक्रियासामर्थ्यादेव गीतिक्रियानिर्वृत्तिः, अपि तु प्रयत्नान्तरात्। शब्दतो न तयोर्मध्ये क्रियान्तरप्रतीतिरित्येतावतोदाहरणम्।

Compare the analogous passage ‘standing he sings’ where we find that between the standing and the singing there is no action (of the same agent) intervening; there the act of singing is not accomplished merely on the strength of the action of standing but results from a distinct effort, and the analogy is applicable only in so far as no word in the sentence (standing he sings) denotes the intervention of any action between those two (viz., the standing and the singing).

इह पुनर्न सर्वात्मभावस्य ब्रह्मदर्शनातिरेकेण प्रयत्नान्तरापेक्षा विद्यते॥

Here, on the other hand, for the realization of the universal self-hood, there appears no need of any distinct effort apart from the knowledge of Brahman.

9.13 ✅

किं च ‘तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयती’त्याद्याः श्रुतयस्तमसो मिथ्याज्ञानस्य मोक्षव्यवधायिनोऽपनयनमात्रं दर्शयन्ति, न मोक्षं क्रियासाध्यम्।

9.13. Again, the Śrutis like “To him (Nārada) who is rid of all impurities, he (viz., Sanatkumāra) shows the further shore of darkness” – (ChanU.7.26.2), point merely to the removal of darkness, that is, the illusory knowledge which intercepts liberation; and (they do not point to) liberation as the result of action.

9.14 ✅

इतश्चैतदेवम्, अन्येऽपि न्यायविदो मिथ्याज्ञानापाये तदनन्तरं दुःखाभावं निर्वाणं दर्शयन्ति मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानाद्भवति, न क्रियातः।

9.14. From this also (viz., that the removal of nescience from the knowledge of reality and not from meditation) is confirmed – other rationalistic thinkers (Gautama-Nyāyasūtra, I. i-2) also point out that liberation which is no other than the absence of misery follows immediately on the removal of wrong knowledge. [“And the removal of wrong knowledge results from the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and ātman”]; not from action.

कथं गम्यते?

Pūrvapakṣin. – How is this known?

‘इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते’ (बृ. उ. २-५-१९) इति मिथ्यैव भेदावभासः, तस्य प्रतिपक्षादभेदावभासादपनय इति गम्यते॥

Siddhāntin. – ‘Indra by his māyā powers assumes many forms’ (BrhU.2.5.19), from this text it is only perceived that the apprehension of difference is illusory only, and that it is removed by the apprehension of non-difference which is its opposite.

9.15 ✅

अथापि स्यान्नैकत्वविज्ञानं यथावस्थितवस्तुविषयं, येन मिथ्यारूपं भेदावभासं निवर्तयेत्,

9.15. Let it be what you say; (even then) the knowledge of identity has not as its content the thing as it really is (i.e., it does not denote absolute identity for no such identity exists); if it had such a content, then the apprehension of difference which is illusory in character would have been dispelled by it.

अपि तु सम्पदादिरूपम्; विधितः पुरुषेच्छया कर्तव्यमिति।

On the other hand (it denotes) an imagined form, etc. (sampadādi) enjoined to be meditated upon by one who so desires.

सम्पन्नामाल्पमपि वस्त्वालम्बनीकृत्य केनचित्सामान्येन दर्शनमात्रान्महद्वस्तुसम्पादनम्। ततश्च तत्फलावाप्तिः,

What ‘sampat’ means is meditation on a great object even in a small thing as its substrate by merely perceiving some common characteristic (between the two). And from that (fancied identity, etc.) there results the fruit (sought for).

फलस्यैव वा सम्पादनं; यथा मनसो वृत्त्यनन्तत्वसामान्येनानन्तविश्वदेवसम्पादनं कृत्वाऽनन्तलोकजयः।

The fruit either, may be imagined; to explain: from the common feature of the endless psychoses (mental modifications) meditation on the endless Viśvedevas – the All-gods, is resorted to, which results in the conquest of the endless worlds – (vide, BrhU.3.1.9).

एवं जीवस्य चिद्रूपसामान्येन ब्रह्मरूपसम्पादनं कृत्वा ब्रह्मफलमवाप्यत इति।

Similarly since the individual soul possesses the common feature of intelligence, having imagined Brahman-feature in it (and so meditating, the aspirant) attains the fruit of Brahmahood – (Brahma-phala).

9.16 ✅

अध्यासस्वब्रह्मणि मन आदित्यादौ ब्रह्मदृष्ट्योपासनं, जीवस्यापि ब्रह्मदृष्ट्योपासनम्।

9.16. Meditation on mind, sun, etc., none of which is Brahman, imagining them to be Brahman, is superimposition; similar is the meditation on the individual soul imagined as Brahman.

सम्पाद्य आलम्बनमविद्यमानसमं कृत्वा सम्पाद्यमानस्यैव प्राधान्येन मनसाऽनुचिन्तनम्, अध्यासे त्वालम्बनस्यैव प्राधान्येनानुचिन्तनं,

Making prominent that which is to be meditated upon (i.e., the imagined object) and regarding the ground (say mind) as if non-existing, is what constitutes ‘sampat’ (imaginary identification); in superimposition (adhyāsa) on the other hand it is the constant dwelling of the mind on the locus making that itself prominent.

क्रियायोगो वायोरग्न्यादीनां सम्हरणात्संवर्गगुणत्वेनोपासनम्। एवं जीवस्य स्वगतेन बृंहत्यर्थयोगेन ब्रह्मेत्युपासनम्। कार्यान्तरेण गुणभूतस्य ब्रह्मदृष्टिः संस्कार आज्यस्येवावेक्षणम्॥

Meditation on mind as possessed of the quality of ‘gathering up’ because it gathers up unto itself fire, etc., is (known as) kriyā-yoga. Similar is the meditation of the individual soul identifying it with Brahman since it (jīva) is associated with the meaning of the root ‘bṛh’. It is ceremonial purification to conceive as Brahman the individual self who occupies a subordinate position in some kārya (yāga) much like the act of looking at the clarified butter.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.120]

9.17 ✅

अत्रोत्तरम् – सम्पदादिरूपे हीत्यादि॥

9.17. Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer. (If the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and ātman were admitted) as referring to ‘sampat’ (i.e., fancied combination), etc., (it would be going counter to the texts which purport to intimate identity).

तथा सति तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां निरुपचरितब्रह्मात्मैकत्वावगमपरः पदसमन्वयो विना कारणेन स्वेच्छामात्रेण सम्पदादिपरः परिकल्प्येत।

Then (i.e., if meditation is what is meant), the connected sequence of words in the (Vedānta) texts, ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7) and the like, which denotes in no figurative sense, the knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahman would, without any cause and most arbitrarily, be imagined to refer to sampat, etc.

तदवगमनिमित्तं च मिथ्याज्ञानापायपूर्विका विस्मृतहस्तगतसुवर्णावाप्तिवद्ब्रह्मावाप्तिः फलमनुभवारूढमपह्नूयेत।

And it would be suppressing one’s own actual experience of the fruit of the nature of the attainment of Brahman resulting from that cognition (viz., of identity) preceded by the cessation of ignorance and which is similar to the discovery of the forgotten gold that is in (one’s own) hand.

‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चने’ति च भेदाभावश्रुतिरुपरुद्ध्येत।

Also the Śruti, ‘variety here is none’ (BrhU.4.4.19; KathU.2.1.11), which intimates the non-existence of difference, would be contradicted.

9.18 ✅

तस्मान्न सम्पदादिवत्पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या, किन्तु प्रत्यक्षादिजनितज्ञानवदपरामृष्टहानोपादानवस्तुस्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठेत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्॥

9.18. Hence the knowledge of Brahman is, unlike sampat, etc., not dependent on man’s activity, but it should be admitted that like the cognition arising from perception, etc., it has as its content the object (i.e., Brahman) in its mere essence, which is unrelated (as content) either to (the act of) eschewing or possessing.

9.19 ✅

तत्रेवं सति कथं ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्युत्तरकालं कर्मकारकतां नीयेत? तत्तज्ज्ञानं वा तदधिगमफलपर्यन्तं सद् विधिविषयो भवेत्?

9.19. When that is so, how could Brahman, after its knowledge has arisen, be construed as being in the objective relation? How could its cognition (i.e., the knowledge of Brahman from verbal testimony) either, be the content of injunction seeing that it brings on (without any injunction) the fruit of self-realization?

अतो मिथ्यैव भेदावभासः। तस्य प्रतिपक्षादभेदावभासादपनयः। तस्माद् मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिमात्रं मोक्ष इति श्रुतिन्यायाभ्यां सिद्धम्॥

Hence it is illusory only – this cognition of difference (i.e., the multiplex world of sense); and its sublation is from the cognition of non-difference which is its opposite. Therefore it is evident that both on the authority of the Scriptures and reasoning liberation is only the eradication of illusory knowledge.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.128]

9.20 ✅

ननु विधिक्रियाकर्म तावद्भवति ब्रह्म, ततः क्रियासम्बन्धे सम्भाविते भवति विधेरवसर इत्याशङ्क्याह – न च विधिक्रियाकर्मत्वेनेत्यादि॥

9.20. Well, Brahman indeed becomes the object of the verb ‘to know’ so that when its relation with action is feasible, there is room for injunction; anticipating this objection (the Bhāṣyakāra) says: [“Nor, again, as being the object of the act of knowing can Brahman be related to action”?]

आह सोऽयं शान्तिकर्मणि वेतालोदयः ब्रह्मणः क्रियानुप्रवेशं निराकर्तुं ज्ञानक्रियाया अपि विषयत्वं निराकुर्वता

Says (the pūrvapakṣin): And this (viz., the negation of the objective relation of Brahman to the act of meditation) is (on a par with) raising the devil in the act of exorcising it – in repudiating Brahman’s association with action (in general) you have repudiated its association as content of even the act of knowing (i.e., the act of meditation);

[BrS.1.1.4 L.132]

तत एव शास्त्रयोनित्वमपि निराकृतमेव, तदाह – अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेदिति॥

and thereby only, is, for sure, repudiated its (Brahman’s) source also – the śāstra, and this is expressed in the bhāṣya); [“if Brahman is not the content (of speech, mind, etc.), the śāstra cannot possibly be the source of Brahman”].

[BrS.1.1.4 L.133]

9.21 ✅

अत्रोत्तरं – नाविद्याकल्पितेत्यादि॥ शास्त्रं हि सोऽयमित्यादिलौकिकवाक्यवद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणम्।

9.21. Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer: [“No, your contention is baseless, because (the object of the śāstra is to repudiate all distinctions which are) the creation of nescience”]. Indeed the śāstra is the valid means in the knowledge of Brahman as the empirical sentence, ‘This is that’ is (in the recognition, say, of Devadatta).

तथाहि सोऽयमिति देशकालभेधोपाधिप्रविलयेनाभेदोऽवगम्यते।

To explain: In the sentence ‘This is that’, by the removal of the cause of distinction, viz., space and time, non-distinction is cognised.

तथा त्वम्पदार्थोऽप्यात्मानमहंरूपं मन्यमानस्तत्त्वमसिवाक्यात्तत्पदार्थैकतामुपगच्छन् सोऽयमितिवदहमात्मकेदमंशोपाधिकृतवेद्यवेदितवेदनात्मकप्रपञ्चेनार्थात् प्रलीयमानेनावच्छिद्यविच्छिद्यमानानिदम्प्रकाशः प्रमाणफलं दर्शितः।

Similarly (the individual) – the meaning of the word ‘Thou’ also believing himself to be of the nature of the individuated ego, cognises, on (hearing the text) ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7) his oneness with what the word ‘That’ stands for (viz., Brahman), just as (he understands oneness) from the sentence ‘This is that (Devadatta)’; and that (i.e., the import of ‘the that’) is pointed to (by the Mahāvākya) as no other than the luminous ‘not-this’, which is conditioned by the world constituted by the notions of the known, the knower and the knowledge, the result of the ‘This’ aspect of ego-consciousness, which is sublated by the implicit capacity (of that which is the object of the final psychosis, viz., Brahman or the not-this element).

तदप्यवच्छेदकविनाशे तदैव विजहन्निर्विशेषतामापद्यते।

Even that (viz., the conditioned not-this element) when the limiting adjunct (viz., notion of knower, etc.), is destroyed as the result of the destruction of nescience parts at the very moment with its aspect (as the conditioned) and attains (its pristine state) free from all determinations.

तेन प्रमाणादिचतुष्टयस्य युगपत्प्रलयेऽपि तदवच्छेदानुभवफलं वाक्यनिबन्धनम्।

Hence though all at once the quartet of knower, etc., (object of knowledge, act of knowing and means of knowledge) perishes, the fruit of self-realization (anubhava-phala) conditioned by that (viz., the quartet) depends upon verbal testimony.

अतो वेदैकगोचरो निर्वाणमिति वेदविदः प्रतिपेदिरे।

Therefore it is that the learned in the Veda have concluded that the bliss of liberation (or in other words the unqualified Ātman) is known only from the Veda.

तथा चैवंविधस्य प्रमाणव्यापारस्य प्रकाशकामन्त्रब्राह्मणवादा भाष्ये दर्शिताः।

As such, in the bhāṣyas are mentioned ‘Mantra’ and ‘Brāhmaṇa’ statements which reveal the function of the pramāṇa (śabda) of this nature.

एवं च नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपसमर्पणान्न मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोषः।

In the result, [“since (the Mahāvākya) shows that release is of the nature of the eternally liberated ātman it (mokṣa) is not liable to the defect of non-eternality”].

[BrS.1.1.4 L.139]

9.22 ✅

यस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्ष इत्यादिना तस्माद् ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते इत्यन्तेन भाष्येण

9.22. In the bhāṣya beginning with [“For him (Vṛttikāra) to whom liberation is something to be effected”], and ending with (“Therefore here (i.e., as regards mokṣa) not even in the slightest degree is it (liberation) connected with action apart from its sole connection with knowledge”],

अविद्यानिवर्तनेन नित्यमुक्तात्मस्वरूपसमर्पणं मोक्षं विहाय क्रियानुप्रवेशं कल्पयतोऽपि न तस्य तत्र सम्भव इति दर्शितम्।

what is pointed out is that for one who having abandoned the conception of liberation as identical with the eternally liberated ātman which results from the removal of nescience, imagines its (liberation) connection with action – even to him – there can be no such possibility (of release being connected with action).

कथम्? यदि तावदुत्पाद्यो विकार्यो वा मोक्षः? तदा यद्यपि क्रियानुप्रवेशो युक्तः;

‘How?’ (it may be asked). When liberation is regarded as something to be produced or modified, there no doubt it is reasonable to hold that it admits of association with action

तथापि मोक्षस्य ध्रुवमनित्यत्वमित्युक्तं ‘न कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यादि’त्यादि भाष्येण।

but then it was pointed out from the bhāṣya, “No, the fruit of action on the one hand and the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman on the other hand are quite distinct, etc.,” that non-eternality would certainly follow.

9.23 ✅

अथानित्यत्वपरिहाराय स्थितस्यैवाऽऽप्यत्वमुच्यते, तदपि न;

9.23. But, in order to obviate (the contingence of) non-eternality, if it be said that what already exists only (and not the effected or modified) is the thing to be obtained, even that is untenable.

आत्मस्वरूपस्य क्रियापूर्वकाप्यत्वानुपपत्तेः।

It is against reason (to suppose) that what is of the nature of a person’s self is something to be obtained preceded by kriyā (i.e., the act of meditation – jñāna-kriyā serving as its cause).

व्यतिरेकेऽपि सर्वगतत्वेन नित्यप्राप्तत्वदाकाशेनेव न क्रियापेक्षा प्राप्तिः।

Even on the basis of its (liberation or Brahman) being distinct (from one’s self), its attainment is not dependent on action since it is omnipresent and as such is eternally present like (the all-embracing) ether.

अथ विकारावर्तिनोऽपि ‘अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते’ (छा. उ. ३-१३-७) इति श्रूयमाणस्य प्राप्तये क्रियापेक्षेति,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, though not resident in (i.e., unrelated to) the manifested world (vikāra – illusorily transformed world) Brahman (is seated above) as witness the Scriptural text – “Now, the light which is higher than this heaven (svarga), etc.,” (ChanU.3.13.7) and as such there is need for action for its attainment.

न; विकारदेशेऽपि ब्रह्मणो विकारसंस्पर्शाभावादविशेषात्।

Siddhāntin. – No; even in the illusory world, since Brahman’s connection with the manifested world is absent, there is nothing to differentiate (between the state of Brahman in two regions and as such Sarvagatatva or all-pervadingness is not annulled).

अथ विकारावर्त्येव ब्रह्म न विकारदेशेऽस्ति, तेन तत्प्राप्तये क्रियापेक्षेति,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, (we say), that Brahman is by no means connected with the illusorily-manifested world and does not exist in the illusorily-manifested region (but resides in a distinct region). Hence the need for action for its attainment.

सा तर्हि तत्प्राप्तिरात्मनस्तादात्म्यापत्तिः? उत स्वेनैव रूपेण तत्रावस्थानम्?

Siddhāntin. – Well then (we ask), ‘Does that attainment tantamount to the jīva’s becoming identical with it (Brahman) or to its existence there (i.e., in the Brahma-region) in its own state (i.e., without losing its identity)?

यदि पूर्वकल्पः, तदा स्वरूपनाशः। अथ द्वितीयः, संयोगस्य विप्रयोगावसानत्वात् पुनरावृत्तिः।

If the first alternative, then, it (jīva’s) individual nature is destroyed. If on the other hand it is the second, since conjunction must end in disjunction return (from that bourn is inevitable).

न चापुनरावृत्तिश्रुतिर्वर्तमानापदेशिनी; तथाभावे प्रमाणान्तरमपेक्षमाणा स्वयं प्रमाणीभवति।

And the Śruti text, viz., “He does not return hither again”, denoting an action (i.e., returning) relating to the present time desiderates another valid means (pramāṇa) to substantiate that it is so (i.e., that the liberated person does not return) and as such does not itself become pramāṇa in this behalf.

9.24 ✅

संस्कार्यत्वमपि न सम्भवति; गुणदोषयोराधेयापनेययोस्तत्रासम्भवात्।

9.24. Nor is it maintainable that release is something to be purified for neither the addition of any excellence nor the removal of any taint is possible there.

अथ विद्यमानस्याभिव्यक्तिरादर्शस्येव निघर्षणेन, तच्च न; आत्मनः क्रियारहितत्वात्। अन्याश्रयायास्तु न विषयः; प्रत्यग्रूपत्वात्।

It may be urged that the purification is for the manifestation of what exists (viz., Brahma-bhāva) as in the case of a mirror (whose natural brightness becomes manifest by the act of rubbing). This again does not hold good, for the self is void of action. Again it (the self) is not the content of (i.e., related to) action having its abode in something different, since it is the inward being (and is therefore unrelated to anything extraneous).

9.25 ✅

ननु ईश्वराभिध्यानान्मलापगमो भविष्यति दीपप्रभयेव घटावगुण्ठनेन तमोऽपनयः,

9.25. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, there does result the removal of taint from meditation on Īśvara just as darkness, the obscuring veil of a jar, is removed by the light of a lamp.

उच्यते – किमसौ मलः परमार्थः सन्? उताविद्यात्मकः।

Siddhāntin. – We ask, whether this taint existing in reality (is removed) or having (only) an illusory existence?

यदि परमार्थः सन्, न तर्हि स्वाश्रयविकारमन्तरेणापसारयितुं शक्यः। न हि विकार आत्मनः सम्भवति; अविकारित्वश्रुतेः।

If being existent in reality (it is removed) then it is not possible to remove it without its abode (viz., the self) undergoing change. But the self suffers no change as evidenced from the Śruti intimating the unchangeability (of ātman).

अथाविद्यात्मकः, न तर्ह्यविद्यावद्गतेन सम्यग्ज्ञानेन विना तस्यापनयः; लोके तथा दृष्टत्वात्, अन्यथा चादृष्टत्वात्।

If however the taint is illusorily conceived then its removal is not possible unless it be with the rise of perfect knowledge in one who is under (the sway of) nescience, for such is the common experience (i.e., ignorance as removed only by knowledge), and is not perceived otherwise (i.e., the removal of ignorance is not perceived to result from action).

न च स्नानादिक्रिययेव संस्कार्यत्वसम्भवः; अहङ्कर्तुरिदमंशस्यैव तत्र संस्कार्यत्वात्।

And purification is not possible as (it is) by the act of bathing, etc.; for there the purification is only of the ‘this’ element of the ego – the agent (in all cognitions and actions).

[BrS.1.1.4 L.170-171]

9.26 ✅

तस्मान्न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः इत्युपसंहरति। अथापि त्वन्यदपि क्रियाफलमस्ति, तद्द्वारेण मोक्षस्य क्रियानुप्रवेशः स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह – अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रतीत्यादि॥ [BrS.1.1.4 L.171]

9.26. The (bhāṣya) concludes thus: [“Therefore Release is not something to be purified either”]. And yet anticipating a possible doubt that there exists some other result of action by which means release might be connected with action (the Bhāṣyakāra) says, [“anything other than these, etc.”]

न हि दृष्टमदृष्टं वा क्रियाफलमुत्पत्त्यादिचतुष्टयातिरिक्तं शक्यं केनचिद् दर्शयितुम्।

Indeed it is not possible for any one to show either visible or invisible result of action which is other than the set of four beginning with origination (the others being āpti, vikāra and saṃskāra).

तस्माज्ज्ञानस्यैव मोक्षो गोचरः, न क्रियायाः॥

To conclude, Release is possible of attainment only by knowledge, and not by action.

9.27 ✅

ननु ज्ञानस्यापि न गोचरो ब्रह्मेत्युक्तं ‘न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः’ इति वदता। [BrS.1.1.4 L.128]

9.27. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, by you, (quoting the bhāṣya) “nor again, as being the object of the act of knowing, can Brahman be related to action” (cf., KenU.1.3); it was asserted that Brahman was not the content of knowledge even (vide, ante).

सत्यं कर्मत्वं ज्ञानं प्रति निषिद्धम्; न पुनरनुपयोग एवैकान्ततो ज्ञानस्याभिहितः।

Siddhāntin. – Yes, it is true, (Brahman’s) objective relation to knowledge was condemned, but it was not said that knowledge served absolutely no purpose.

तथा च तत्रैवोपयोगप्रकारो दर्शितः – अविद्यापरिकल्पितभेदनिवृत्तिपरत्वादित्यादिना भाष्येण। [BrS.1.1.4 L.133]

And in fact in that context only the way it fulfils its purpose was pointed out in the bhāṣya: “(No, your contention is baseless), because the object of the śāstra (i.e., of the knowledge arising from the Śāstra) is to repudiate all distinctions which are the creation of nescience, etc.”

9.28 ✅

मा तर्हि वोचः क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यत इति,

9.28. Pūrvapakṣin. – Do not, then, aver, “It is out of the question that here action could have access, even to the slightest extent” (i.e.. Release could have no connection whatsoever with action).

[BrS.1.1.4 L.173]

ननु ज्ञानं मानसी क्रिया,

[“Is not knowledge a mental act?”]

[BrS.1.1.4 L.174]

न वैलक्षण्यादित्युत्तरम्।

Siddhāntin. – [No, is our answer, since the two are of a distinct nature].

कथं वैलक्षण्यम्?

Pūrvapakṣin. – How, of a different nature?

अजन्यफलत्वात्, उक्तमजन्यफलत्वमहङ्कारटीकायाम्।

Siddhāntin. – Because the phala (i.e., the result of knowledge) is not something that originates (afresh). The non-origination-character of the result has been discussed in the comment of egoity (vide 1st Varṇaka).

9.29 ✅

इदमपरं वैलक्षण्यं – ज्ञानं न चोदनाजन्यं, वस्तुजन्यं हि तत्। वस्तु च ज्ञानात्प्रागेव स्वरूपे व्यवस्थितम्।

9.29. Here is another distinction (between knowledge and action). Knowledge is the result not of an injunction but as is well known it is the object that gives rise to it; and as for the object, it exists in its own right even before its knowledge arises.

अतस्तत्तन्त्रं ज्ञानम्। न तद् ज्ञानेनान्यथा कर्तुं शक्यम्।

Hence knowledge is dependent on that and it is not possible for the knowledge to effect any change in that (viz., the object).

अथापि स्यात् भवेत्प्रत्यक्षं वस्तुजन्यम्, अनुमानादिषु कथम्?

Pūrvapakṣin. – Even granting it (the doubt) remains still; it may be that perceptive cognition originates from the object; how in the case of inference, etc.?

तत्रापि लिङ्गादिपरतन्त्रम्, न चोदनायास्तत्रानुप्रवेशः।

Siddhāntin. – Even there the dependence is on the probans, etc., and injunction has not scope there.

किं च न चोदनाजन्यं ज्ञानमेकान्ततो वस्तुपरिच्छेदकम्; योषादिष्वग्न्यादिदृष्टिविधानदर्शनात्।

Moreover knowledge that arises from injunction is not always determinative of the object (as it really is); for we find the injunction laid down for the meditation on woman (ChanU.5.8.1), etc., as fire, etc.

अतो वस्तुविषयस्य ज्ञानस्य क्रियात्वेऽपि न चोदनाजन्यत्वं, न वा पुरुषतन्त्रत्वम्, अपि तु प्रमाणवस्तुपरतन्त्रत्वम्,

Hence knowledge having an (existent) object as its content, though partaking of the nature of action (kriyā) is not the effect of an injunction and is not dependent on man’s effort, but on the other hand it is dependent on pramāṇa and viṣaya.

एवं सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वोपपत्तेरग्नाविवाग्निज्ञानस्य।

Thus is the intelligibility of true knowledge (possible) like the knowledge of fire in the fire (unlike that knowledge in woman).

एवं सति ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानस्यापि यथाभूतवस्तुविषयत्वान्न चोदनाजन्यत्वम्। अतो न विधेरत्रावकाशः॥

This being so, since even the knowledge of the identity of Brahman and the self has for its content an object such as it really is, it does not originate from injunction. As such injunction has no place here (i.e., in Brahma-knowledge).

9.30 ✅

अतः श्रूयमाणा अपि विधयः केवलप्रमाणवस्तुपरतन्त्रे ज्ञानेऽकिञ्चित्करत्वात् कुण्ठीभवन्ति।

9.30. Hence though mandatory statements exist (referring to the knowledge of Brahman) their function is impeded in relation to the knowledge that is dependent entirely on the valid means of proof and the existent object, since they are ineffective.

अतोऽर्थवादतयाऽऽत्मज्ञानस्तावकत्वेन तदुन्मुखीकरणात् सामर्थ्यसिद्धबहिर्मुखतानिरोधाच्च विधिकार्यलेशस्य विद्यमानत्वाद्विधय इव लक्ष्यन्ते॥

Therefore the Veda texts (such as ‘ātman is to be seen, heard about, thought over and meditated upon’) look like injunctions, because as laudatory passages they extol the knowledge of (the identity of) ātman (with the absolute), because they divert the mind towards it (i.e., the knowledge of Brahman), and because by inhibiting one’s outward-bound activities which are prompted by natural propensities they possess something of the nature of action that is enjoined.

9.31 ✅

तथा च श्रवणं नाम आत्मावगतये वेदान्तवाक्यविचारः, शारीरकश्रवणं च।

9.31. Similarly, by the term ‘śravaṇa’ is meant the inquiry into the import of the Vedānta passages for the comprehension of ātman, as also the inquiry into the nature of the self.

मननं वस्तुनिष्ठवाक्यापेक्षितदुन्दुभ्यादिदृष्टान्तजन्मस्थितिलयवाचारम्भणत्वादियुक्तार्थवादानुसन्धानं, वाक्यार्थाविरोध्यनुमानानुसन्धानं च।

By ‘manana’ is meant concentred thought on the illustration of the ‘great drum, etc.,’ (the ‘dundubhi’ drowns every other sound) adduced in support of the scriptural statement (viz., ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7, etc.), importing the reality (viz., identity of the self with Brahman), on the laudatory passages relating to the origination, sustention and destruction (of the world), and on the (Upaniṣad) text that the manifested world is mere verbal distinction; (Manana) also means the consideration of the syllogistic arguments not hostile to the import of the propositional statement (viz., the identity of jīva with Brahman).

निदिध्यासनं मननोपबृंहितवाक्यार्थविषये स्थिरीभावः, विधेयस्योपासनापर्यायस्य निष्फलत्वात्।

By ‘nididhyāsana’ is meant the strengthening of the conviction regarding the meaning of the identity proposition which has been firmly grasped by manana (and not the nididhyāsana of what is enjoined), for nididhyāsana, otherwise termed ‘upāsanā’ which is enjoined (i.e., which is the content of a Veda mandate) yields no fruit.

दर्शनम् अतो वाक्यार्थे स्थैर्यान्निरस्तसमस्तप्रपञ्चावभासविज्ञानघनैकतानुभवः।

‘Darśana’ is the intuitive experience as the result of firm conviction in the vākyārtha of the unity of the homogeneous mass of sentiency rid of the entire world of illusory manifestation.

9.32 ✅

कः पुनरत्रार्थवादः?

9.32. Pūrvapakṣin – Which then is the laudatory passage?

इदमत्र प्रस्तुतं – क्रियाकारकफलात्मकात् संसाराद्विरक्तायै मैत्रेय्यै मुमुक्षवे मोक्षसाधनमात्मज्ञानं प्रतिपिपादयिषन् ‘न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवती’ति पत्यादेरीप्सितत्वं प्रतिषिध्यात्मन ईप्सिततमत्वमाह।

Siddhāntin. – This is what is expressed in the context there – It is for (the benefit) of Maitreyī who had renounced all love of worldly life (constituted as it is) of action, agent and fruit, and who was longing for freedom, that (Yajñavalkya) desirous of expounding the knowledge of the self which is the means of attaining freedom, declares, ‘Lo, not for the love of the husband is the husband loved, etc.,’ – thereby precluding the desire for the husband (as the end in itself) and emphasising that the self is the supreme object of desire (BrhU.4.5.6).

ननु नैवात्मन ईप्सिततमत्वमुच्यते, किन्तु पत्यादीनामेवात्मार्थतयेप्सितत्वमुच्यते – ‘आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवती’ति,

Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, it is not the desire of ātman that is declared as the most coveted object, but it is only the husband, etc., who are as objects of desire, declared for the sake, of ātman (the self) as witness, ‘for the love of ātman does the husband become dear’.

मैवम्; न हि तस्मिन्ननिष्टे तदर्थमिष्टं भवति।

Siddhāntin. – No, your contention is wrong. If that (ātman) is not a thing wished for, we would not covet that which procures it, (viz., love of husband, etc.).

तस्मादनेनोपायेनात्मन एवेप्सितत्वमुक्तम्। ईप्सितश्चेत्, ‘द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः’ इत्येषोऽर्थवादः। एतच्च सर्वं प्रथमसूत्रेणैव सूत्रितं, विवृतं च भाष्ये॥

Hence through this means (i.e., by the example of one’s love for one’s husband) is declared that ātman only is the thing wished for. If that is the object of desire the text ‘to be seen, to be heard about’ is (indeed to be regarded as) a laudatory statement. All this is implied in the first sūtra and expounded also in the bhāṣya.

9.33 ✅

अपि च नैवायं विधौ कृत्यः, किं तर्हि? ‘अर्हे कृत्यतृचश्चे’त्यर्हे कृत्यः।

9.33. Moreover this termination ‘-tavya’ (belonging to the kṛtya group of terminations) does not denote injunction. In what sense then is it used? In accordance with the rule ‘kṛtya’ and tṛc in the sense of ‘worthiness kṛtya (here the ‘-tavya’ termination falling under that order) denotes worthiness.

एतेन ‘आत्मेत्येवोपासीत’ (छा. उ. ८-१२-१) ‘आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीते’त्येवमादीनि (बृ. उ. १-४-१५) विधिच्छायानि वाक्यानि व्याख्यातानि वेदितव्यानि॥

From this it is to be understood that the texts like ‘meditate on ātman only’ (ChanU.8.12.1); ‘meditate only on ātman the blissful’ (lokam) (BrhU.1.4.15), which are but semblances of injunction are (as good as) explained.

अतो हानोपादानशून्यात्मावगमादेव कृतकृत्यता प्रतीयते श्रुतिस्मृतिवादानां च तथा प्रस्थितत्वात्।

Hence it is only by the cognition (intuitive) of Brahman, having nothing to do with either the avoidance or the pursuit of an object that one’s duty is perceived as accomplished. Scripture and traditional treatises also are corroborative in this respect.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.202]

9.34 ✅

तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणमित्युपसंहरति॥

9.34. Hence (the Bhāṣya) concludes with the statement [‘Therefore Brahman is not to be regarded as the object of injunction (of meditation)’].

तस्यायमर्थः – न प्रमाणात्मकेनेतरेण वा ज्ञानव्यापारेण विधीयमानत्वेन कल्पितेन संस्पर्शो ब्रह्मण इति॥

What it signifies is that Brahman has no connection with any cognitive activity relating either to valid knowledge or other, assumed to be injunctive in character.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.203]

9.35 ✅

यदपि केचिदाहुरित्यादि॥ अस्यायमर्थः – यदि स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठोऽपि वेदभागोऽस्ति, तत इदं पूर्वोक्तं प्रतिष्ठां लभते; अन्यथा क्रियानुप्रवेशातिरिक्तमवेदार्थ एव स्यादिति,

9.35. The (Bhāṣya) statement [‘And that which some maintain, etc.,’] (has to be considered). This is its purport: – If there should be any section of the Veda devoted also to the elucidation of mere existent things then this, what has been said before (by the Vedāntin) would gain confirmation. Otherwise (i.e., if no part of the Veda denotes a mere existing entity) what has no connection with action would only denote something unscriptural.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.204--205]

9.36-7 ✅

अस्योत्तरं – तन्न; औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वादिति वस्तुसङ्ग्रहवाक्यम्। अस्यैव प्रपञ्चः योऽसावुपनिषत्स्वेवाधिगत इत्यादिः॥ अस्यायमर्थः –

9.36. Siddhāntin. – Here is the answer: Your view is erroneous. [“The puruṣa – the individual soul, which forms the subject-matter of the Upaniṣads, is not complementary to anything else”:] – this is the brief statement of the subject, and its own elaboration (is contained in the bhāṣya), [“That which is to be understood from the Upaniṣads only, etc.”]. This is what it means –

योऽयमहंप्रत्ययविषयात् क्रियासम्बन्ध्यात्मनोऽतिरिक्तः सम एकः सर्वभूतेष्वहङ्कर्तुरपि साक्षिभूतः,

that which is different from the self which is the object of the ego-notion and is related to works, (this is jīvātman), is uniform and the one amidst all (transitory) things, being the witness of even the ego-notion –

न स केनचित्प्रमाणेन सिद्धः, येन क्रियाशेषतां नीयेत।

that is not established by any pramāṇa (other than the Upaniṣad) as, had it been so established it might have got into relation with action.

न हि प्रमाणान्तरासिद्धः क्रियासम्बन्धितयोपदेष्टुं शक्यः।

It is evident that what is not established by a different means of knowledge (pramāṇa) cannot be pointed to as having any connection with action.

न च स न प्रतीयत इति युक्तं वक्तुं, तत्प्रतिपादकोपनिषत्पदसमन्वयस्य दर्शितत्वात्।

Nor is it right to say that (because the whole of the Veda is concerned with laying down injunctions) that Being is impossible of comprehension, since it has been shown that the Upaniṣad texts are all accordant in the elucidation of that Being (as the one homogeneous unity).

अत एवौपनिषदत्वविशेषणम्; अनन्यविषयत्वात्।

Hence only it is, that the attribute of its being comprehended from the Upaniṣads and not from any other (is appropriate).

तच्च वेदान्तानां तत्परत्वेऽवकल्पते।

And that (viz., the epithet, aupaniṣadatva) is intelligible as denoting that the principal topic of the Vedānta passages is Brahman; (if the Vedānta relates to injunction then the epithet ‘aupaniṣadatva’ will be inappropriate).

नैष प्रतीयमानोऽपि शुक्तिरजतवन्मिथ्येति शक्यं वक्तुम्; बाधाभावात्॥

It cannot be said that though it (Puruṣa or Brahman) is known (from the Upaniṣads) it (i.e., the cognition of that Being) is illusory, like that of the silver in nacre, because of the absence of negation.

इतश्च न शक्यते मिथ्येति विदितुं तस्मिन्नौपनिषदे पुरुषे ‘स एषः’ ‘नेति नेत्या’त्मशब्दप्रयोगात्।

There is an additional reason why it cannot be argued that the knowledge of Brahman is illusory, – in relation to that Puruṣa only there is corroboration from the Upaniṣad text: “That self is not this, is not this” where the word ‘ātman’ is used.

आत्मनश्चानिराकार्यत्वात्, य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वप्रसङ्गात्॥

And of the ātman there is no possibility of negation (as witness the Bhāṣya), [“he who denies the ātman cannot avoid the contingence of himself being the ātman”].

न च तस्य कदाचिदभावः सम्भवति; अभावहेतूनामविषयत्वात्।

At no time does there occur its destruction for it is not the object of the causes which bring on destruction.

न च निर्हेतुको विनाशः चितेरेकरूपावभासेन क्षणभङ्गनिराकरणात्।

And destruction is not without (having something as its antecedent) cause, because the doctrine of flux is discarded owing to the constant homogeneous refulgence of consciousness.

अतोऽवच्छेदत्रयशून्ये तस्मिन् स्वयम्प्रकाशमाने सर्वस्य पुरुषावधिर्विनाशः। सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः॥

Hence in that (ātman) which is void of the three particularising adjuncts (space, time and object-limitations) and is self-luminous everything perishes everything up to (and exclusive of) the Puruṣa, finds its effacement (as borne out by the scriptural text – KathU.1.3.2), “He is the limit, He is the final destination”.

तदेवमसंसार्यात्मनि प्रमाणान्तरागोचरे वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयात् प्रतीयमाने कथं तत्परो वेदभागो न भवेत्? कथं वा प्रतीयमानो निराक्रियेत?

Therefore (this is the conclusion of the topic under consideration) when there are grounds such as these, how can it be maintained that the Veda section (viz., the Vedānta) is not elucidative of the non-transmigratory ātman which is not to be understood from any other means of valid means of knowledge and which is known from the gist of the Vedānta texts? How again can that which is revealed therein be denied?

9.38 ✅

ननु ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यमतदर्थानामि’त्यक्रियार्थानां पदानामर्थशून्यत्वं शास्त्रतात्पर्यविद आहुः।

9.38. Pūrvapakṣin. – Well, ‘Since the Veda has action as its purport, those passages which do not refer to action have no sense to convey’ (Jai., Sut., I. ii – 1); the learned interpreters of the Śāstra say that statements which do not import action are void of sense.

तस्मात्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिव्यतिरिक्तार्थवादिनां निरालम्बनत्वाद् ततो वस्त्ववगमः सामान्यतोदृष्टनिबन्धनो भ्रमः।

Hence (the Vedānta texts) which declare something which neither impels one to action nor dissuades one from it are purportless (nirālambana) and as such there can be no cognition of an existent object from it (i.e., the Vedānta). And what knowledge arises from Veda passages merely on the ground of the universal (vākyatva) is illusory.

तेन प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यनुपयोगि वस्तु न शब्दादवगम्यते, अत एव तन्मिथ्येति शक्यते वक्तुम्; प्रमाणान्तरस्यापि तद्विषयस्यासम्भवात्।

Hence no verbal knowledge is possible of anything that neither helps in the impulsion to action nor desistance from it. For this reason also, viz., that there is not any other means of proof even (apart from verbal testimony) in corroboration of the existence of such an object (i.e., having no connection with action or inaction) it is right to regard that (i.e., the cognition that has arisen somehow) as false.

कथं पुनः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यनुपयोगि वस्तु न शब्दादवगम्यते?

It may however be questioned how verbal knowledge is not possible of an object that (neither helps one to engage in action nor to desist from it).

शब्दस्य तत्र सामर्थ्याग्रहणात्। न चागृहीतसामर्थ्य एव शब्दश्चक्षुरादिवद्विज्ञानं जनयति। सामर्थ्यग्रहणं च ज्ञानकार्योन्नेयम्। ज्ञानं च विशिष्टार्थविषयं तद्विषयप्रवृत्त्याऽवगम्यते।

The answer is that śabda-śakti (i.e., the power of denotation) is not perceived therein. And the mere word when its significative potency remains unknown fails unlike the sense of perception to generate knowledge. And it is from the cognitive act that the existence of śakti (the denotative power) has to be inferred. And knowledge (i.e., sābda-bodha) has for its content a thing associated (with action) and it arises from activity in relation to that something.

तदभावे कुतः सामर्थ्यकल्पना स्यात्? अक्लृप्तसामर्थ्यश्च शब्दोऽक्रियाशेषेऽर्थे कथं विज्ञानं जनयेत्?

When such activity is absent (as in the case of existent objects) whence could the denotative power of śabda be understood? And how could a word whose significance is undetermined generate any knowledge of a thing that is unrelated to action?

9.39 ✅

उच्यते। नैव सूत्रकारभाष्यकारयोरभिप्रायो लौकिको वा न्यायः सम्यगवगतो भवता।

9.39. Siddhāntin. – We will answer: Neither what the aphorist (Jaimini) and the commentator (Śabara) mean, nor the empirical (process of) reasoning (in construing a sentence) has been clearly understood by you (Prābhākara).

पश्यतु भवान् देवदत्त ! ‘गामभ्याज’ ‘शुक्लां दण्डेने’ति प्रवर्तकाभ्याजेतिपदातिरेकिणां देवदत्तादिभूतार्थवादिनामप्रवर्तकानामपि प्रवर्तकादेव वाक्याद्भूतवस्तुविषयमपि सामर्थ्यं प्रतीयते? न वेति?

Now you consider this – whether in the sentence – “Devadatta, drive the white cow with the stick,” the words ‘Devadatta’, etc., which are distinct from action-prompting word ‘drive’ and which are expressive of existent objects and do not therefore prompt action, are known from the very sentence enjoining action to possess the significative potency (śakti) in relation to existing objects also or not.

प्रतीयते चेत्, निष्प्रयोजनत्वमानर्थक्यं, न निरालम्बनत्वम्।

If known (i.e., if from mandatory sentences, the words denoting existing objects are ascertained to possess significative potency), then the word ‘ānarthakya’ (in ‘āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyamatād arthānām’) may be construed as ‘serving no purpose’ but not as lacking in content (śakya).

[BrS.1.1.4 L.220]

तदाह भाष्यकारः – अपि च आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादित्यादिना भाष्येण।

And this is expressed by the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara) [‘again, since action is the purport of the Scripture’, etc].

9.40 ✅

प्रयोजनं चानन्तरं पारम्पर्येण वा सुखावाप्तिर्दुःखपरिहारो वा स्यात्।

9.40. And the fruit (prayojana) consisting either in the acquirement of happiness or the riddance of misery accrues either directly following (action) or indirectly (when adṛṣṭa holds the fruit in store for a distant future).

अतस्तदर्थक्रियानुपयोग्यर्थवाचिनां ‘सोऽरोदीदि’त्यादिपदानां भवत्वानर्थक्यं, ब्रह्मात्मत्वावगतिसमन्वितानां तु परमपुरुषार्थफलानां कथं निष्प्रयोजनत्वम्।

Hence ‘ānarthakya (i.e., fruitlessness) may be admitted in the case of sentences composed of such words as ‘he howled, etc.,’ which do not subserve that object (viz., the fruit, say, securing svarga). But (says the Siddhāntin) how could statements (like ‘that thou art’) which generate the knowledge of the identity of the individual with the supreme self having as their fruit the highest human end, be purposeless?

9.41 ✅

स्यादेतत् यद्यपि प्रवर्तकादेव वाक्याद्भूतार्थविषयमपि सामर्थ्यं प्रतीयते; तथाऽपि नाप्रतिपन्नभूतार्थावगतेः सम्भवः। क्रियार्थतयैव संसर्गावगमात्।

9.41. Prābhākara – Well, this is what we hold as the right view. – It may be that even from a sentence prompting action the significative potency of words expressive of existing things also is known, but still such cognition is not possible from (words relating to) bare existing objects (śuddha), because the cognition (of the meaning) arises only as associated with an action (at the time of first learning its meaning).

न हि गोपदात्तदर्थः सास्नादिमत्पिण्डधर्मत्वेनावगतो व्युत्पत्तिकाले पुनः प्रयोगान्तरेष्वप्रतिष्ठितः केसरादिमत्पिण्डधर्मत्वेन वा प्रतीयते।

From the word ‘go – cow’ what is cognized at the time its primary sense is grasped is the jāti (cowhood) of an animal-with-a-dewlap. If now the word is to be interpreted in another sentence it cannot be regarded as either the unqualified (i.e., unspecific) or as qualified otherwise, say as an animal having a mane.

9.42 ✅

विषम उपन्यासः; गोपदस्याभिधेयसम्बन्धेन नानाविधसामर्थ्यमुपलब्धम्। अतो युक्तैकरूपैव प्रतीतिः।

9.42. Siddhāntin. – Your discourse is irrelevant. A variety of significative potencies of the word ‘go’ is perceived to exist as other words (not importing action only) get unto relation with its meaning (viz., an animal with the characteristic marks of cow). Hence (to avoid indetermination – avyavasthā) it is but right that the cognition (that arises from ‘go’) should be the same throughout (as you have pointed out).

शब्दान्तरार्थान्वये पुनः प्रतिविभक्ति प्रतिपदार्थान्तरं च प्रयोगभेदादन्यथान्यथा च सम्बन्धग्रहणकालएवाऽऽवापोद्वापनिबन्धनः समन्वयो दृश्यते।

When, however, words signifying other things are conjoined with it as a result of divergence in the form of statements due to difference in terminations and difference in the things mentioned the import is seen to be divergent, and as such at the very time the sense of ‘go’ is understood, the import of the proposition (samanvaya) is cognized as determined by the insertion and removal (of the words that are in relation to the word ‘go’.

तेन द्रव्यगुणक्रियाभिधायिभिः पदैः सम्बन्धयोग्यताभिधायिविभक्तिसंयुक्तैः प्रयोगैदम्पर्यवशादनियतः सम्बन्धो व्युत्पत्तिकाले निरूपितः।

Hence with the words expressive of substance, quality and action and associated with such case-terminations as point to their fitness for getting into relation (with each other) propositions are employed each denoting its individual sense and as such it is clear that at the time of cognising the specific significance of the word, relation is not positive (i.e, it may be action or an existing thing that is related).

9.43 ✅

तथा च ‘वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्षः’ ‘तस्मात्पूषा प्रपिष्टभागः’ इत्येवमादौ क्रियाशून्यानां समन्वयो दृश्यते।

9.43. Even so (of the Veda statements), “The first offer of food (viz., soma) is to him (the priest) who utters the formula ‘vaṣat’ in offering an oblation”; “Pūṣā (sun) has the boiled meal as his share”, the import is evident even though they contain no word expressive of action.

यस्तु कर्तव्य इति क्रियासम्बन्धः स समन्वयनिमित्तो न तन्निमित्तः समन्वयः।

As for the contention that its connection with action is secured with the word ‘kartavyaḥ’ understood, it must be noted that the connection is the sequel of śabda-bodha (propositional import) and not that śabda-bodha is its sequel.

यत्तु तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नाय इति सूत्रयामास जैमिनिः, तदपि सिद्धेषु रूपादिष्वर्थेषु वर्तमानानां सामानाधिकरण्याद्यर्थत्वेन समाम्नायः समुच्चारणमिति

(It is true that) Jaimini has framed the sūtra – “The uninterrupted utterance of words which are implied in them (is for the purpose of enjoining action.” But even there (we must understand that) the consecutive expression (lit. utterance) of words (samanvaya) denoting existing objects like colour, etc., is with the object of pointing out that the relation between the words is one of ‘samānādhikaraṇya’ etc. (i.e., relation to an identical object).

यतो दर्शितः समन्वयो विशेषणविशेष्यत्वेनापि क्रियार्थेनेति तु धर्मजिज्ञासोपक्रमात्प्रकृतोपयोगितया सूचितम्।

This is so because it has been shown that verbal knowledge (samanvaya or sābda-bodha) is possible even where the relation is one of substantive and attributive. The mention of the word ‘kriyārthena’ (in the sūtra), however, is accordant with the present context where the discourse on Dharma is begun.

तथा च भाष्यकारोऽपि ‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनमि’त्यर्थसद्भावमात्रे कथनीये कर्मावबोधनमिति प्रकृतोपयोगित्वेनैवोक्तवान्।

As such the Bhāṣyakāra (viz., Śabara) also in his comment, “The meaning of the word (i.e. the assemblage of words of the Scripture including Vedānta) is the direct result, which is instruction in karma”, that is, instead of merely saying that the Veda has a meaning to impart (arthāvabodha) has mentioned ‘instruction in karma as its object’ since it serves the purpose on hand (viz., the inquiry into Dharma).

9.44 ✅

तदेतदाह भाष्यकारः – यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदामनुक्रमणमित्यादिभाष्येण। [BrS.1.1.4 L.219]

9.44. And this same view is expressed by the Bhāṣyakāra (Śaṅkara): [“As regards the passages cited relating to the views of men well conversant with the purport of the Śāstra (it must be supposed that they point to that part of the Śāstra which consists of injunctions and prohibitions)”].

अत एव पूर्वेण तन्त्रेणागतार्थत्वाच्छारीरकारम्भः।

It is because from the preceding ‘tantra’ (i.e., śāstra, viz., Pūrvamīmāṃsā) this matter (viz., the nature of the self, an existent entity) has not been understood (there is justification for) commencing the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā (i.e., the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedānta texts. ‘Śārīraka’ literally means, that concerning the embodied soul whose nature is explained in the Vedānta).

तत्र हि वेदस्य विवक्षितार्थत्वं स्वतःप्रामाण्यं स्वरूपे च विज्ञानोत्पत्तौ शब्दस्य सामर्थ्यमित्येतत्सर्वमवगतम्। क्रियार्थेन समाम्नाय इति तु धर्मजिज्ञासाप्रतिज्ञानुसारेण सूत्रितम्।

Indeed there (i.e., in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā) the credibility of the intended sense of the Veda, its self-evidential character, and (the eternal potency of the word to generate the cognition of its meaning) all this is understood. The juxtaposition of the phrase ‘for instruction in action’, is to indicate that such juxtaposition is in harmony with the declared object of inquiry into Dharma.

9.45 ✅

इह पुनः ‘तत्तु समन्वयादि’ति विशेषणविशेष्यात्कमपि गौणमपि सामानाधिकरण्यं विहायैकस्मिन्निरंशे ‘तत्त्वमसी’ति समन्वयो मुख्यः प्रदर्शितः।

9.45. Here, on the other hand, in the sūtra (T. i. 4): “And that (Brahman is to be known from the Scripture), because it is in harmony (with the Vedānta texts),” discarding the identity-relation of the attribute and the attributed, and also the figurative identity – relation in the text, ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7), the single impartite entity is pointed out.

तथा च भगवान् पाणिनिरव्यतिरिक्ते प्रातिपदिकार्थमात्रे प्रथमां स्मरति, नाऽस्तिक्रियाकर्तर्येवातिरिक्तेऽर्थे। तेन च कात्यायनस्य ‘अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः’ इति मतं नानुमन्यते।

Even so, the revered Pāṇini lays down the rule that the first case suffix (nominative) denotes what is not distinct; that is, its use is confined to the mere stem (uninflicted substantive) and does not extend to (anything) beyond it such as its being the agent of the action ‘asti’ (is). And therefore it is that the view held by Kātyāyana that the root ‘asa’ with the ‘laṭ’ termination (the present tense of ‘is’, is always there even though not expressed) is not admitted.

दृश्यते च ‘फलिता अमी द्रुमाः’ ‘राज्ञोऽयं पुरुषः’ इत्यस्तिक्रियाशून्यः समन्वयः। नात्रापि ये फलिताद्रुमास्ते सन्ति, यो राज्ञः पुरुषः सोऽस्तीति विवक्षितम् अपित्वेते द्रुमाः फलिताः, अयं पुरुषो राज्ञ इति सम्बन्धमात्रावसितं वाक्यम्।

And we come across such sentences as ‘These fruit-yielding trees’, ‘This the king’s man’, where the import is conveyed in the absence of the verb ‘asti’. It is not intended that even here the sentences should be completed as ‘These fruit-yielding trees are’, ‘He, the king’s man is’. But the sentence (as it stands) determines the relation only (between the terms) as may be expressed thus – ‘These trees in fruit’, ‘This man of the king’.

9.46 ✅

एवं सामान्यतः सिद्धस्य जगत्कारणस्य सर्वज्ञत्वादिस्वभावत्वे त्वम्पदार्थस्य च ब्रह्मात्मतायां समन्वयो वेदान्तवाक्यानां सिद्धः, न तत्रास्तिक्रियाया वस्तुस्वरूपान्तर्वर्तिन्या अप्यनुप्रवेशो दूरत एव बाह्यायाः॥

9.46. Similarly it is evident that the sole purport of the Vedānta texts consists in pointing to the relation of the entity which in its universal aspect (as existence) is established as the world-cause with its own nature as omniscience, etc.; and also in pointing to the identity with Brahman of that which is denoted by the word ‘Thou’ (in ‘That thou art’ ChanU.6.8.7). There is no importation here of the verb ‘asti’ (is) even though it forms the integral part of the thing itself; much less scope surely for it (viz., the existential act, in the case of) what is beyond it; as such verb denoting external acts, are far removed.

9.47 ✅

किञ्च ‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इति प्रतिषेधवाक्यसमन्वये न क्रिया क्रियार्थो वाऽवगम्यते, किन्तु क्रियानिवृत्तिरेव नियमेन प्रतीयते।

9.47. Again in construing a negative sentence like, ‘A Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed’, neither action nor means to action is cognised, but it is the abstention from action that is invariably manifest.

व्रतशब्दसमन्वयात्तु प्रजापतिव्रतादिषु ‘नेक्षेतोद्यन्तमादित्यमि’त्यादिष्वनीक्षणं मानसी सङ्कल्पक्रिया प्रतीयते अनीक्षणं कुर्यात्,

In the performance of rites like ‘Prajāpati-vrata’, however, where certain vows are enjoined such as ‘the rising Sun should not be seen’ because of the connection of the word ‘vrata’ (with the other words in this sentence), the mental act of the observance of non-perceiving is manifest.

नेक्षेऽहमिति सङ्कल्पयेदिति, न नञः समन्वयमात्रात्, तस्य समन्वीयमानार्थाभावकरत्वात्।

As such the injunction, ‘observe – non-perceiving’ should be construed as ‘take the resolution thus – I will not look (at the Sun, etc.)’; merely on the ground that the negative particle is juxtaposed in the sentence (there is no apprehension of an act of vow); for its (i.e., of the negative particle) function consists in negating what is denoted by the word with which it is connected.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.230]

9.48 ✅

न च स्वभावप्राप्तहन्त्यर्थानुरागेण इत्यादिभाष्यस्यायमर्थः – स्वभावत एव रागादिनिमित्ताच्छास्त्रमन्तरेणैव हननक्रिया प्राप्ता यदि नञाऽनुरज्यते, विशेष्यते, तदा भवत्यहननमिति।

9.48. The meaning of the bhāṣya [“Nor, again can the act of killing, expressed by the verb ‘is to be killed’, which action is prompted by natural motives, etc.”], is this – ‘by the promptings of one’s nature only’ (svabhāvata eva) under the influence of passion, etc., not depending on any Veda injunction; when the act of murder thus resulting (if the verb) is conjoined with, i.e., is qualified by, the negative particle ‘not’, then it amounts (in sense) to abstention from killing.

ततश्चाहननं कुर्यादिति वाक्यार्थः स्यात्, न ‘हननं न कुर्यादि’ति हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यम्। अतो न हन्यामिति मानसी सङ्कल्पक्रियाऽपूर्वाऽभिहिता स्यात्।

As such the import of the sentence, (‘a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed) will be, ‘make a resolution of not-killing and it is not that the phrase ‘killing is not to be done’ means mere abstention from the act of murder – a passive state. Hence the determination (that a Brāhmaṇa) is not to be killed which is a mental act, not revealed (anywhere else except in the Veda) is intimated.

9.49 ✅

न चैतद्युक्तम्; नञः सम्बन्ध्युपमर्दरूपत्वात्। अनीक्षणे तु व्रतशब्दबलात्तथा समन्वयः, न नञः सामर्थ्यादित्युक्तम्॥

9.49. Siddhāntin. – This does not stand to reason, for the function of ‘not’ is to altogether obliterate what is connected with it. As for (the injunction) of ‘not seeing’ we have said that such import is possible on the strength of the word ‘vow’ (vrata), and not on the strength of ‘not’.

9.50 ✅

ननु नञर्थे नियोगः प्रतिषेधेषु, तेन यागाद्यनुष्ठानादिव नञर्थानुष्ठानान्नियोगः साध्यः, किमुच्यते क्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यं प्रतीयत इति?

9.50. Prābhākara. – Well, in prohibitive sentences (we maintain) that what the negative denotes is connected with niyoga (apūrva or kārya). Hence niyoga is to be effected (sādhya) by performing what is denoted by ‘not’ as in the case of the performance of yāga, etc., (to fulfil niyoga). How can it be said then that cessation from action which is a state of passivity is apprehended (from the negative sentence)?

वार्तमेतत्। नञर्थो हि नाम न क्रिया, नापि साधनम्, अपि तु येन संसृज्यते तस्याभावो न तत्सिद्धिहेतुः।

Siddhāntin. – This is a statement empty of content. It is indeed evident that what the ‘not’ indicates is not action nor is it the means of action, but on the other hand it denotes the negation of that with which it is conjoined, and is not the cause in its (niyoga) production.

एवं प्रतिषेधस्य विधेरन्यत्वं सिध्यति।

As such, it is established as a fact that prohibitive propositions are other than vidhi (injunction).

अन्यथा विधिरेव सर्वं स्यात्। तस्माद् संसृज्यमानाभावमात्रे प्रतिषेधवाक्यं पर्यवस्यति। तत्र न विधिगन्धोऽपि विद्यते।

Otherwise (i.e., if even negative sentences are construed as denoting vidhi), mandatory would be all (sentences in the empirical sphere and there would be the contingence of the absence of all prohibitory statements). Hence the prohibitive proposition points to the negation of that with which the ‘not’ is connected; and not even a trace of injunction exists there.

9.51 ✅

तच्च संसृज्यमानं विधिनिमन्त्रणामन्त्रणाधीष्टसम्प्रश्नाभ्यनुज्ञानानामभावात्प्रतिपाद्यधर्मः। प्रतिषिध्यमानक्रियाफलं प्रार्थना प्रतिषेधवाक्ये लिङाद्यर्थः।

9.51. What is coveted as the fruit of the forbidden act (viz., killing) which is the meaning of liṇ, etc., of the prohibitive sentence is conjoined with the negative particle ‘not’ because the other senses of the termination (‘-tavya’ here) like vidhi, nimantraṇa, āmantraṇa, adhīṣṭa, sampraśna and abhyanujñā are absent (i.e., out of the place) here.

तेन तदभावः प्रतिषेधार्थः, स च प्रागभावः स्वभावसिद्धः।

Hence (i.e., since the ‘not’ goes with iṣṭa-sādhana, i.e., contributoriness to a desired end) the meaning of the negative sentence (viz., ‘a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed’) is its (viz., iṣṭa-sādhana) negation; and that (negation) is antecedent-negation which is self-established, (which amounts to saying that it is not a thing to be brought about by one’s effort).

तस्मात्संस्कारोद्बोधनिमित्तसन्निधावपि तत्प्रतिबन्धे प्रयत्न आस्थेयः।

Therefore, even when the cause (viz., the delusion that the act of killing a Brāhmaṇa is the means to gratify one’s desire) incited by passion is imminent, its obstruction has to be brought about by main effort.

स च यद्यपि साध्यः; तथाऽप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकगम्यो न शब्दार्थः; तत्प्रतिपादकपदाभावाच्च,

And that (viz., obstruction) no doubt is a thing to be accomplished (sādhya); but even then it is known from positive and negative concomitance (i.e., common experience) and not from verbal testimony, because there is no word specifically indicating it (viz., the obstruction of the passion prompting one to murder a Brāhmaṇa).

एकवाक्ये संसृष्टपदार्थव्यतिरेकेणान्यत्र वाक्यार्थत्वाभावाच्च। अतो यश्चार्थादर्थो न स चोदनार्थः।

And further in a single sentence the import of the proposition is constituted only by the meaning of the words in syntactical relation and not as apart from this. Hence whatever import is apprehended from arthāpatti-pramāṇa (i.e., implication or it may be inference as here), that is not the import derived from śabda (Veda injunction).

वाक्यन्तु क्रियाशून्यमेवावसितम्। न साध्यं किञ्चित्तेन विषयीकृतम्; औदासीन्यमात्रावसितत्वात्तस्य॥

As for the negative sentence it is plain that it denotes a sense involving no action, and nothing to be accomplished does stand in the objective relation to it for its function is fulfilled in remaining passive only (after denoting the negation of contributoriness to happiness by the act of killing).

9.52 ✅

अथ पुनर्नञर्थविषयो नियोग एव प्रतिषेधेऽपि वाक्यार्थ इत्यभिनिवेशः,

9.52. But still you (referring to Prābhākara) may persist in urging that even in a negative sentence that which is related to the denotation of the negative particle, viz., niyoga is what the sentence imports.

भवतु; तथाऽपि प्रतिषिध्यमानक्रियानिवृत्त्या स सिध्यति, क्रियोपादाने च तत्फलप्रार्थनैव हेतुरिति तत्कारणप्रतिबन्धे प्रयत्नास्थानान्नियोगसिद्धिः।

Granted; even then that (i.e., niyoga) is established as the result of the abandonment of the forbidden act and the motive for undertaking the act (of killing) is only the longing to reap its fruit (i.e., the notion that killing is contributory to the desired end), so that when its cause is baulked (as when the ‘not’ is taken with iṣṭa-sādhanatva), the effort (which is prompted by passion) ceases and niyoga results.

तच्चान्वयव्यतिरेकावसेयमिति पूर्वोक्तान्मार्गान्न विशिष्यते।

And that (viz., the niyoga-relating to the negation of killing) is determined by the law of positive and negative concomitance and as such it (viz., the meaning of the negative particle) does not deviate from the way it has been explained before.

तदेवं वृद्धव्यवहारानुसारेणैव समन्वयानुसरणे सति तद्गम्यं ब्रह्म न धर्मवच्चोदनागम्यम्।

Such being the case even though it is understood that the usage of elders should alone be followed in construing a sentence, Brahman known from the (Vedānta) texts is not like Dharma, known from ‘codanā’ (i.e., a mandatory statement).

दर्शितानि च वेदान्तवाक्यानि कारणसामान्ये सिद्धे तद्विशेषावगमाय समन्वितानि ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (तै. उ. ३-१-१) इत्यादीनि तत्त्वमसीत्यादीनि च।

When in a general way (Brahman) is established as the world-cause, Vedānta texts such as ‘From which these beings are born, etc.’ (TaitU.3.1.1), and ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7) which cohere therein (i.e., in manifesting Brahman’s special nature) are also adduced for enabling one to understand its (Brahman) specific nature.

9.53 ✅

यत् पुनरुक्तं – प्रतिपन्नब्रह्मात्मभावस्यापि पूर्ववत्संसारित्वदर्शनान्न रज्जुस्वरूपकथनवदर्थवत्त्वमस्य समन्वयस्य, ततो न तन्मात्रे तस्य पर्यवसानमिति,

9.53. Again it has been alleged that since even the person who has the knowledge of the identity of the self with Brahman is perceived to belong to the transmigratory world as before (i.e., before his acquiring the knowledge of identity, no purpose is served (by its describing the nature of Brahman) as (witness to the contrary) when information about the rope is given (when under illusion the rope is mistaken for a serpent); and that as such the sentence (‘That thou art’, etc., ChanU.6.8.7) cannot be said to end by merely referring to (the pure and unrelated Brahman).

[BrS.1.1.4 L.239]

अत्रोत्तरम् – नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्येत्यादि॥

Here is the answer: – [“Not of the person who has understood that Brahman is the self, etc.”].

अस्यायमर्थः – न कर्मनिमित्तस्तावच्छरीरसम्बन्धः; इतरेतराश्रयदोषात्क्रियादिरहितत्वाच्च चैतन्यस्य।

This is its meaning – the connection of the self with the body is not due to karma, for otherwise it would lead the logical fault of mutual dependence and there is the additional reason that ātman itself (caitanya) is devoid of (any connection with) action, etc.

अनादित्वेऽप्यन्धपरम्परावदप्रतिष्ठितत्वात्।

If it be held that (this mutual dependence) is retrogressively beginningless, we say that based as it is on no valid ground it is on a par with an endless succession of blind men (one trying to lead the other).

तन्निमित्तत्वे च पुत्रादिशरीरेष्विव गौणत्वप्रसङ्गात्,

And even if the relation of the self with the body be accepted as due to karma then one’s love of one’s body could only be figurative as it is in the case of the bodies of one’s sons, etc.

तथानुभवाभावात्, प्रसिद्धगौणत्वप्रकारासम्भवात्, पुत्रादिशरीरेणेव स्वशरीरेणापि प्रमातृत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्। पारिशेष्यादविद्यानिमित्तः शरीरसम्बन्धः।

Because experience contradicts it, because of the absence of similarity with any well-known case of figurative usage, and because of the contingency of even one’s own body ceasing to be a factor when one is an agent in the act of knowing, just as one (is not the agent in the act of knowing) with the body of one’s sons, etc. (i.e., the father is not the knower in the act of the son’s knowing), residually, we must conclude that the relation of the body with the self is due to avidyā.

तस्यां च निवृत्तायां तत्सम्बन्धनिवृत्तौ कथं पूर्ववत्त्वनिमित्तः सुखदुःखानुभवः?

And when that (viz., avidyā) is sublated and as a consequence its connection (i.e.. of the body with the self) is sublated how could there be causelessly, the experience of pleasure and pain as before? (There could be none.)

9.54 ✅

तथाच श्रुतिस्मृतिवादा ब्रह्मविदः सर्वसंसारप्रवृत्त्यभावं दर्शयन्त उदाहृता भाष्ये।

9.54. To this effect Śruti and Smṛti statements which denote that for a knower of Brahman there is the total riddance of all connection with mundane existence are given in illustration in the bhāṣya.

तस्मान्न ब्रह्मात्माभिमानिनः पूर्ववत्संसारित्वम्; तदभिमानविरोधात्।

Hence there is no transmigratory existence as before, to one who has the consciousness of his identity with Brahman since it (viz., ātman-realization) is subversive of all attachments to it (migratory life).

वैषयिकस्तु साक्षादनुभवाभिमानः संसारविषय आरब्धकर्मशेषनिमित्तः तिमिरनिमित्तद्विचन्द्रवत्।

As for the apparent consciousness of the objects of sense which present themselves to one’s experience in so far as one continues in life, it must be regarded as due to a small fraction of the residual karma operating in the present life; it is just like the appearance of the double moon when one is affected by an eye-defect (timira).

मनननिदिध्यासनयोर्न ब्रह्मावगत्युत्तरकालीनता, किन्तु श्रवणवदवगत्युपायतया पूर्वकालतैवेत्युक्तम्॥

Reflection and meditation, as has been already said, are not posterior to the knowledge of Brahman but like Vedānta study (śravaṇa) they pre-exist as the means of knowledge.

9.55 ✅

तदेवं सिद्धस्य वस्तुनः स्वरूपसत्तामात्रेणाप्रतिपन्नस्य प्रमाणविषयतया प्रमेयत्वाद्

9.55. To sum up – (Brahman), an accomplished entity because it is unknown in its real nature becomes (necessarily) the object of a pramāṇa (other than the Veda), it stands in need of such a pramāṇa being known and as such it is the prameya (or object of knowledge other than Veda testimony).

विधीयमानक्रियाकर्मत्वे तु कारकत्वस्य प्रमाणान्तरसिद्ध्यपेक्षत्वात्

If however (Brahman) is admitted to be in the objective relation to an action that is enjoined, then since a casual correlate has to be established by some other evidence (say perception), its (i.e., Brahman’s) attainment through it (Vedānta) becomes unintelligible.

ततः सिद्ध्यनुपपत्तेर्वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधे

The contingency of sentence-split will arise (if it be based on the very sentence enjoining meditation), and the analogy of the ‘devatādhikaraṇa’ does not hold good as going counter to perception, etc.

देवताधिकरणन्यायासिद्धेर्वाक्यान्तरसिद्धस्य कर्मकारकत्वे चतुर्विधस्यापि कर्मकार्यस्य तत्रासम्भवात्,

Even granting that the entity (viz., Brahman) having been previously established by a different text, becomes the object of an action, it should be pointed out that none of the four kinds of effects admitted to be produced in what serves as the object of an action, is possible there (i.e., in Brahman).

तत्कर्मकोपासनाद्देवताकर्मयागादिवत्स्वर्गोपमो मोक्षः फलं कल्प्येत; तस्य तद्वदेवानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्,

If liberation resembling svarga as the fruit of meditation with (Brahman) as its object be premised (by you, referring to the Mīmāṃsakas) on the analogy of sacrifices offered to a deity then there arises the contingency of its (liberation) impermanence very like that (viz., Svarga).

‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवती’त्यादिभ्यो ब्रह्मवेदनमोक्षफलयोः निरन्तरत्वप्रतिपादकेभ्यो वाक्येभ्योऽर्थादन्तराले क्रियानुप्रवेशनिराकरणात्,

From statements like ‘who knows Brahman becomes Brahman only, etc.,’ which demonstrate the absence of interval between the knowledge of Brahman and the fruit of liberation, the interposition of action betwixt (knowledge and liberation) is implicitly negated.

‘तरति शोकमात्मविदि’त्यादिश्रुतिभ्यो मोक्षप्रतिबन्धनिवृत्तिमात्रस्यैवात्मज्ञानफलस्य दर्शितत्वात्,

From a consideration of texts like ‘The knower of ātman crosses (the bounds of) sorrow’ it is evident that the fruit of ātman-knowledge is only the removal of the obstacle to liberation,

साध्यान्तराभावे क्रियानुपपत्तेर्ब्रह्मात्मावगमस्य च मुख्यैक्याधिकरणस्य सम्पदादिवद्विकल्पनानुपपत्तेः,

and as such there being nothing else to be effected, the interposing of action does not stand to reason. The knowledge of ātman as Brahman (taught) in the context of absolute identity does not admit of (being explained) as involving an assumption (conceit) as in the case of sampat.

प्रमाणजन्याया अपि विदिक्रियायः कर्मत्वनिषेधाद्विधीयमानोपास्तिक्रियाविषयत्वस्य दूरनिरस्तत्वाद्

Since Brahman is not regarded as being in the objective relation to jñāna though it has arisen from a valid source (viz., the Veda), far removed is the possibility of its (i.e., Brahman’s) being the object of an enjoined meditative act.

विदिक्रियाविषयत्वेऽपि समारोपितनिवर्तनमुखेन नित्यसिद्धचैतन्यस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपतासमर्पणाद् वाक्यविषयत्वोपपत्तेः,

Though (Brahman) is not in the objective relation to the act of knowing, its being the import (viṣaya) of the sentence (say, ‘tatvam asi’) is intelligible on the ground that the sentence (i.e., its knowledge) serves to dispel the illusory ascriptions and by that means reveals that the eternally-existent consciousness (ātman) is of the real nature of Brahman.

सत्यपि वा विधिक्रियाकर्मत्वे तस्य च विध्यनायत्तत्वाद्विधिच्छायानां संस्तावकत्वेनाहार्यत्वात्

Even granting that Brahman is the content, (viṣaya) of the act of knowing, it (viz., vedanā – knowledge) is not dependent on injunction. The passages which appear as if injunctive in character since they are understood as laudatory are extrinsic to it.

संसारनिवृत्तेश्च ज्ञानफलस्य दृष्टत्वात्।

And (lastly) the liberation from the transmigratory existence as the result of Brahma-knowledge is a matter of actual experience.

अतो विधिनिरपेक्षं स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकं वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम्॥

(For these reasons) we conclude that Brahman independently, without depending upon any injunction, is indubitably propounded in the śāstra, for all the Vedānta texts are concordant in this respect.

9.56 ✅

एवं च सति पदानां परस्परसमन्वयजनितविज्ञानातिरेकेण चक्षुरादिवत्प्रवर्तकत्वस्याभावात् तद्विषयः शास्त्रारम्भः पृथगुपपद्यते।

9.56. Such being the case, since apart from the knowledge that is produced from the mutual connection of words (constituting the Vedānta texts, ‘That thou art’ (ChanU.6.8.7), ‘Existence, knowledge’ (TaitU.2.1.1), ‘Eternal is Brahman’, etc.), no prompting to action is intimated, very like the eye, etc., which reveal the object but do not prompt action, it is appropriate that a different śāstra having that (viz., inquiry into the Vedānta) as its subject should be begun.

अन्यथाऽत्रापि बोधकत्वातिरेकेण प्रवर्तकत्वमपि चेत्, ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासे’त्येवारब्धत्वान्न पृथगारभ्येत।

Otherwise, that is, if even here it be admitted that over and above the imparting of knowledge, it (the Uttara-mīmāṃsā) prompts action, then a different śāstra would not be commenced, since the śāstra concerned with injunctions has already been commenced with (the Jaiminīya first sūtra) – “Then, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma.”

अथाप्यबहिःसाधनत्वात्ततः परिशेषितमिति,

But still it may be urged that since it (Brahman) is to be achieved by non-external means, supplementation to that (viz., the Śāstra dealing with rituals) is necessary.

तथाप्यथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासेति प्रतिज्ञा स्यात्; प्रवर्तकविशेषजिज्ञासनात्।

Then, in that case (the Sūtrakāra) would have taken the resolve to begin the new śāstra with the first aphorism worded thus: ‘Then therefore inquiry into the remaining part of Dharma’; for the inquiry relates to a distinct injunction (i.e., that which is connected with meditation).

9.57 ✅

तदेवं ब्रह्मावगमात् प्रागेव विधिविधेयप्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः।

9.57. Therefore, since (the knowledge of the identity arises in the manner aforesaid), all talk of injunctions, objects of injunction, valid means of knowledge, and the objects of knowledge is (appropriate) only prior to the knowledge of Brahman.

परतस्तु प्रमातुर्विधिविषयस्य चाभावान्न तत्सद्भाव इति।

But after that, owing to the absence of the knowing subject and also of any object of injunction, their (i.e., of the knower, means of knowledge, etc.), existence has no significance. [To this effect they have made the declaration].

[BrS.1.1.4 L.287--288]

अपिचाहुरिति। प्रसिद्धमेतद् ब्रह्मविदामिति पूर्वोक्तं न्यायं सङ्क्षेपतः श्लोकैः सङ्गृह्णाति गौणमिथ्यात्मन इति॥

(To explain) – Because it is universally held by the knowers of Brahman, they have summarised the view set forth above in the stanzas beginning with, [“Figurative, illusory, etc.”]

गौणोऽहंमानो ममत्वेन सम्बन्धात्पुत्रदारादौ। अतः स गौण आत्मा।

The transference of the ego-conception to children, wife, etc., is to be taken in a figurative sense because the relation is one of possession (i.e., the relation between the self on the one hand and wife and children, etc., on the other can be denoted by ‘mine’). Hence that is the figurative self (gauṇātmā).

मिथ्यादेहादारभ्याहङ्कर्तुरिदमंशपर्यन्तोऽहंमानो नात्मन्यात्माभिमानात्; अतः स मिथ्यात्मा।

The transference of the ego conception (aham kartā) to (objects) commencing with the body up to (and including) the ‘this’ aspect (or the objective counterpart) of the ego-notion is to be regarded as due to error, because of the superimposition of the (real) self on the non-self. Hence that is the illusory self (mithyātmā).

तस्योभयस्याप्यात्मनो मुख्यपरमार्थब्रह्मात्मावगमेन तदाधारपुत्रदेहादिबाधनादसत्त्वं तन्निमित्तं शास्त्रीयं नियोज्यत्वं शारीरं च भोक्तृत्वं निमित्ताभावान्न कथञ्चिदुद्भवेदित्यर्थः।

But when both of them are eliminated by the knowledge of the primary (mukhya) and eternal (paramārtha) self and the sublation of the notions of children and body, etc., grounded therein (i.e., having the real self as their substratum) following, scriptural injunctions enjoining action and bodily enjoyments (both) depending as they do upon their postulation (viz., of the figurative and the illusory self) would at no time (thereafter) arise, because of the disappearance of the cause.

[BrS.1.1.4 L.2]

9.58 ✅

तदेतद्द्रढयन्नाह – अन्वेष्टव्यात्मेति॥

9.58. Emphasizing this very point it is stated that [‘the ātman is to be sought after’].

‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः’ (छा. उ. ८-७-१) इत्याद्युपक्रमेणोपदिष्टापास्ताशेषसंसाररूपब्रह्मात्मावगमात्प्रागेव प्रमातृत्वाभिमानः प्रत्यक्चितेर्

It is only before the rise of the knowledge of the oneness of the self with Brahman which is characterised by the total riddance of transmigratory existence and which is expounded in the text beginning with (the phrase) ‘That is to be sought after’ (ChanU.8.7.1), that the inner consciousness is misconceived to be the cogniser.

यदा पुनस्तद्रूपं विस्मृतसुवर्णवदवाप्तं, तदा स एव प्रमातृत्वाभिमतो निरस्तसंसारदोषः सम्पन्नः।

But when the knowledge of its real nature is restored like the forgotten gold (necklace), then that very self which had been (falsely) regarded as the agent in (the act of) cognition attains freedom from the evils of transmigratory life.

कुतस्तस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वे भवतः।

Hence whence could there be agency and enjoyment for the self?

यद्ययमहमुल्लेखप्रमुखप्रमातृत्वादिव्यवहारः कल्पितः, कथमिदानीमस्य प्रामाण्यम्?

If the ordinary usage of expressions like ‘I am the knowing subject,’ etc., beginning with the ‘I’ is based on mere assumption, the question is how can any validity be ascribed to it at present (i.e., in the empirical sphere)?

[BrS.1.1.4 L.290]

इत्याशङ्क्याह – देहात्मप्रत्यय इति।

Meeting this objection it is said “As the notion of ātman” being the body (is assumed by you to be valid in the empirical sphere).

यथा देहे विशिष्टजातीये तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्याहङ्कर्तुरहंमानसम्बन्धः कल्पितोऽपि स्वनिबन्धने लोकशास्त्रव्यवहारे यथाऽवगतितत्त्वहेतुः,

To explain: – just as in the body the relation of the ego-notion of the individual self, which is quite distinct from it (viz., the body) is, though fancied the cause of the knowledge as it appears in so for as the activities pertaining to ordinary worldly transactions, and also of scriptural injunctions depending as they do on its connection (i.e., of the fancied identity-relation of the self with the body)

तथाऽयं कल्पितोऽप्यलौकिकात्मस्वरूपप्रतिपत्तेः प्राक् प्रमाणम्;

so also this (i.e., the ordinary source of knowledge like perception, inference, etc.) though assumed, must be held valid until the real nature of the transcendental self is apprehended

निश्चितप्रत्ययोत्पादनाद्बाधानुपलब्धेश्चेति॥

because it gives rise to indubitable knowledge and there is not the perception of its sublation.

इति परमहंसपरिव्राजकादि - श्रीशङ्करभगवत्पादान्तेवासिवर - श्रीपद्मपादाचार्यकृतौ पञ्चपादिकायां वेदान्तानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयनिरूपणं नाम नवमं वर्णकं समाप्तम्॥

Here ends the Ninth Varṇaka of the Pañcapādikā

Thus is concluded Śrī Padmapādācārya’s Pañcapādikā on the Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, comprising Vedānta Sūtras I-IV

~Pañcapādikā~