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Brahma Sūtra Catus-Sūtrī
translated by V. M. Apte (1960)

(Upaniṣad Śānti Mantras)

Samanvaya Adhyāya (Chapter):

Adhikaraṇas (Topics):
Bhāṣya Introduction 1. Jijñāsā (1.1.1) 2. Janma-ādi (1.1.2) 3. Śāstra-yonitva (1.1.3) 4. Samanvaya (1.1.4)

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The commentary of Ādi-Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyam covering the introduction and the first four Sūtras is called the Catus-Sūtrī. It comprises for the students of the Upaniṣads an excellent introduction and summary of the main purport of the Upaniṣads.

by A.K. Aruna
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1. L.1 युष्मद्-अस्मत्-प्रत्यय-गोचरयोर् विषय-विषयिणोस्
तमः-प्रकाशवद् विरुद्ध-स्व-भावयोर्
इतरेतर-भाव-अनुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्,
yuṣmad-asmat-pratyaya-gocarayor viṣaya-viṣayiṇos
tamaḥ-prakāśavad viruddha-sva-bhāvayor
itaretara-bhāva-anupapattau siddhāyām,—

That the sense-object (Viṣaya) and the subject of sense-objects (Viṣayin) which are within the range of the denotative power of the words ‘Yuṣmat’ (‘You’, including the Lord as an object of my prayers) and ‘Asmat’ (‘I’) respectively,
And have natures as opposed to each other as darkness and light,
Cannot transform themselves into each other, being (a matter) firmly established,

1. L.2 तद्-धर्माणाम् अपि सुतराम् इतरेतर-भाव-अनुपपत्तिः।
tad-dharmāṇām api sutarām itaretara-bhāva-anupapattiḥ—
The attributes of these two also, with a greater reason therefore, cannot transform themselves into the nature of each other.

1. L.3 इत्य् अतः अस्मत्-प्रत्यय-गोचरे विषयिणि चिद्-आत्मके युष्मत्-प्रत्यय-गोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्-धर्माणां च अध्यासः, तद्-विपर्ययेण विषयिणस् तद्-धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासो,
मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्।
ity ataḥ asmat-pratyaya-gocare viṣayiṇi cid-ātmake yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocarasya viṣayasya tad-dharmāṇāṃ ca adhyāsaḥ, tad-viparyayeṇa viṣayiṇas tad-dharmāṇāṃ ca viṣaye'dhyāso,
mithyeti bhavituṃ yuktam—

And therefore, the mutual superimposition of the sense-objects which are within the range of the denotative power of the word ‘Yuṣmat’ and its attributes, on the subject of sense-objects which is within the range of the denotative power of the word ‘Asmat’ and has pure intelligence as its self, and its attributes,
Is necessarily unreal (Mithyā).

1. L.4 तथापि (or तथाहि) अन्योऽन्यस्मिन्न् अन्योऽन्य-आत्मकताम् अन्योऽन्य-धर्मांश् च अध्यस्य इतरेतर-अविवेकेन अत्य्-अन्त-विविक्तयोर् धर्म-धर्मिणोः, मिथ्या-ज्ञान-निमित्तः, सत्य-अनृते मिथुनी-कृत्य, ‘अहम् इदम्, ममेदम्’ इति नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोक-व्यवहारः।
tathāpi (or tathāhi) anyo'nyasminn anyo'nya-ātmakatām anyo'nya-dharmāṃś ca adhyasya itaretara-avivekena aty-anta-viviktayor dharma-dharmiṇoḥ, mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ, satya-anṛte mithunī-kṛtya, ‘aham idam, mamedam’ iti naisargiko'yaṃ loka-vyavahāraḥ—
All the same, it is a natural course of worldly conduct resulting from false-ignorance (i.e. false-knowledge, Mithyā-jñāna) (in a person), to superimpose the sense-objects and the subject of sense-objects which are absolutely different from each other, and their respective attributes, mutually on each other, through failure to discriminate or distinguish either of them from each other, and by coupling truth and untruth together and to imagine thus — ‘I am this’, ‘This is mine’
[Note: Apte consistently applies this translation of ‘Mithyājñāna’ as being ‘Mithyā-ajñāna false-ignorance’, instead of the usual and more traditional ‘Mithyā-jñāna false-knowledge’, but ‘false-ignorance’ seems to be a confusing double negative, like ‘false lack of knowledge, or false misunderstanding’. As with the word ‘Ākāsa’ rendered as ‘space’ instead of ‘ether’, we choose in the following translation to change the rendering of this word to be the less confusing expressionn ‘false-knowledge’ instead].

अथ अध्यास-लक्षण-भाष्यम्

1. L.5 आह, कोऽयम् अध्यासो नामेति।
āha, ko'yam adhyāso nāmeti—
(The opponent asks — ) What indeed then, is this superimposition any way?

1. L.6 उच्यते, स्मृति-रूपः परत्र पूर्व-दृष्ट-अवभासः।
ucyate, smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭa-avabhāsaḥ—
We reply — It is the unreal manifestation of some thing previously perceived and which is of the nature of remembrance, on some thing else.

1. L.7 तं केचिद्, ‘अन्यत्र अन्य-धर्म-अध्यासः’ इति वदन्ति।
taṃ kecid, ‘anyatra anya-dharma-adhyāsaḥ’ iti vadanti—
Some describe it as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing, on some other thing.

1. L.8 केचित् तु, ‘यत्र यद्-अध्यासः, तद्-विवेक-अग्रह-निबन्धनो भ्रमः’ इति।
kecit tu, ‘yatra yad-adhyāsaḥ, tad-viveka-agraha-nibandhano bhramaḥ’ iti—
(Some describe it) as the confusion based on the inability to discriminate between that which is superimposed on some thing else, and that some thing else on which it is superimposed.

1. L.9 अन्ये तु, ‘यत्र यद्-अध्यासः, तस्यैव विपरीत-धर्मत्व-कल्पनाम् आचक्षत’ इति।
anye tu, ‘yatra yad-adhyāsaḥ, tasyaiva viparīta-dharmatva-kalpanām ācakṣata’ iti—
Others again describe it as the fictitious assumption in a thing, of attributes contrary to the attributes of that thing on which some thing else is superimposed.

1. L.10 सर्वथा अपि त्व् अन्यस्य अन्य-धर्म-अवभासतां न व्यभिचरति।
sarvathā api tv anyasya anya-dharma-avabhāsatāṃ na vyabhicarati—
All the same, none of these definitions differ in any way as to the generally unreal assumption about the attributes of one thing as being the attributes of some other thing.

1. L.11 तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः, ‘शुक्तिका हि रजतवद् अवभासते, एकश् चन्द्रः स-द्वितीयवद्’ इति।
tathā ca loke'nubhavaḥ, ‘śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate, ekaś candraḥ sa-dvitīyavad’ iti—
Even so is our experience in the ordinary world. A mother-of-pearl appears as if it is silver. The moon, one as she is, appears as if she is two moons.

अथ अध्यास-सम्भावना-भाष्यम्

1. L.12 कथं पुनः प्रत्यग्-आत्मन्य् अविषयेऽध्यासो विषय-तद्-धर्माणाम्।
kathaṃ punaḥ pratyag-ātmany aviṣaye'dhyāso viṣaya-tad-dharmāṇām—
(Says the opponent — ) How can there be a superimposition of a sense-object and its attributes on the Universal Self (Pratyag-ātmā) which is not an object?

1. L.13 सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थिते विषये विषय-अन्तरम् अध्यस्यति। युष्मत्-प्रत्यय-अपेतस्य च प्रत्यग्-आत्मनोऽविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि।
sarvo hi puro'vasthite viṣaye viṣaya-antaram adhyasyati। yuṣmat-pratyaya-apetasya ca pratyag-ātmano'viṣayatvaṃ bravīṣi—
Everybody superimposes one sense-object on another which is right before one’s eyes, while you have mentioned (earlier), that the Universal Self to which the word ‘Yuṣmat’ is not applicable, is not a sense-object.


1. L.14 उच्यते, न तावद् अयम् एक-अन्तेन अविषयः, अस्मत्-प्रत्यय-विषयत्वात्। अपरोक्षत्वाच् च प्रत्यग्-आत्म-प्रसिद्धेः।
ucyate, na tāvad ayam eka-antena aviṣayaḥ, asmat-pratyaya-viṣayatvāt। aparokṣatvāc ca pratyag-ātma-prasiddheḥ—
We reply — The Universal Self is not a non-object in the extreme sense, because it is an object denoted by the word ‘Asmat’, and it is also well-known that the Universal Self can be directly and intuitively perceived.

1. L.15 न च अयम् अस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषय-अन्तरम् अध्यसितव्यम् इति।
na ca ayam asti niyamaḥ puro'vasthita eva viṣaye viṣaya-antaram adhyasitavyam iti—
There is no such hard and fast rule, that it is only on an object right before one’s eyes that another object should be superimposed.

1. L.16 अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्य् आकाशे बालास् तल-मलिनता-आद्य् अध्यस्यन्ति।
apratyakṣe'pi hy ākāśe bālās tala-malinatā-ādy adhyasyanti—
Ignorant people superimpose the attributes of concavity (Tala) and dustiness etc. on the Ākāśa (Space) which is not directly visible.

1. L.17 एवम् अविरुद्धः प्रत्यग्-आत्मन्य् अप्य् अनात्म-अध्यासः।
evam aviruddhaḥ pratyag-ātmany apy anātma-adhyāsaḥ—
Therefore to superimpose the non-self on the Universal Self is not inconsistent.

अथ विद्या-अविद्या-विवेक-भाष्यम्

1. L.18 तम् एतम् एवं-लक्षणम् अध्यासं पण्डिता ‘अविद्या’ इति मन्यन्ते,
तद्-विवेकेन च वस्तु-स्व-रूप-अवधारणं विद्याम् आहुः।
tam etam evaṃ-lakṣaṇam adhyāsaṃ paṇḍitā ‘avidyā’ iti manyante,
tad-vivekena ca vastu-sva-rūpa-avadhāraṇaṃ vidyām āhuḥ—

Learned men consider superimposition of this nature as Nescience (Avidyā)
And they (further) say that knowledge (Vidyā) is the determination of the real nature of a thing by discrimination.

1. L.19 तत्रैवं सति यत्र यद्-अध्यासस् तत्-कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेण अपि स न संबध्यते।
tatraivaṃ sati yatra yad-adhyāsas tat-kṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇa api sa na saṃbadhyate—
This being so, that on which some other thing is superimposed is not in the least affected by the faults and merits of the thing superimposed.

अथ व्यवहारमात्रस्य-अविद्यकत्व-प्रतिपादकं भाष्यम्

1. L.20 तम् एतम् अविद्या-आख्यम् आत्म-अनात्मनोर् इतरेतर-अध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाण-प्रमेय-व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश् च प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधि-प्रतिषेध-मोक्ष-पराणि।
tam etam avidyā-ākhyam ātma-anātmanor itaretara-adhyāsaṃ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ, sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhi-pratiṣedha-mokṣa-parāṇi—
And it is by entertaining i.e. adopting this reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the non-self, that all worldly conduct and Vedic actions depending on the means-of-proof (Pramāṇa) and the objects of knowledge, and all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, known as Nescience, are promoted.


1. L.21 कथं पुनर् अविद्यावद् विषयाणि प्रत्यक्ष-आदीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति।
kathaṃ punar avidyāvad viṣayāṇi pratyakṣa-ādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti—
How again (says the opponent) are the means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc. and the Scriptures, concerned with that which is the object of Nescience?


1. L.22 उच्यते, देहेन्द्रिय-आदिष्व् अहं-मम-अभिमान-रहितस्य प्रमातृत्व-अनुपपत्तौ प्रमाण-प्रवृत्त्य्-अनुपपत्तेः।
ucyate, dehendriya-ādiṣv ahaṃ-mama-abhimāna-rahitasya pramātṛtva-anupapattau pramāṇa-pravṛtty-anupapatteḥ—
We reply — Because in the case of a person who has no such false sense of ‘I’ or ‘Mine’ with regard to the body and the sense-organs, there is no possibility of his being desirous of knowledge, as there is no possibility of the operation of the means of right knowledge.

1. L.23 न हि इन्द्रियाण्य् अनुपादाय प्रत्यक्ष-आदि-व्यवहारः संभवति। न च अधिष्ठानम् अन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः संभवति।
न च अनध्यस्त-आत्म-भावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते।
na hi indriyāṇy anupādāya pratyakṣa-ādi-vyavahāraḥ saṃbhavati। na ca adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa indriyāṇāṃ vyavahāraḥ saṃbhavati।
na ca anadhyasta-ātma-bhāvena dehena kaścid vyāpriyate—

Without the employment of the sense-organs, perception is not possible, and without a basis (such as a body) the operation of senses organs is not possible,
And nobody ever acts or is concerned with a mere body which is not superimposed by the notion of the Self.

1. L.24 न चैतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन्न् असत्य् असङ्गस्य आत्मनः प्रमातृत्वम् उपपद्यते।
न च प्रमातृत्वम् अन्तरेण प्रमाण-प्रवृत्तिर् अस्ति।
na caitasmin sarvasminn asaty asaṅgasya ātmanaḥ pramātṛtvam upapadyate।
na ca pramātṛtvam antareṇa pramāṇa-pravṛttir asti—

Neither in the absence of all this (i.e. mutual superimposition), is it possible either for the Self which is free from all contact, to be a knowing agent,
Nor in the absence of the condition of a knowing agent is any operation of the means of right knowledge possible.

1. L.25 तस्माद् अविद्यावद् विषयाण्य् एव प्रत्य्-अक्ष-आदीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति।
tasmād avidyāvad viṣayāṇy eva praty-akṣa-ādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti—
Therefore, means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc., and the Śāstras have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience.

1. L.26 पश्व्-आदिभिश् च अविशेषात्।
paśv-ādibhiś ca aviśeṣāt—
This a person has in common with the animals etc.

1. L.27 यथा हि पश्व्-आदयः शब्द-आदिभिः श्रोत्र-आदीनां संबन्धे सति, शब्ध-आदि-विज्ञाने प्रति-कूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनु-कूले च प्रवर्तन्ते,
यथा दण्डोद्यत-करं पुरुषम् अभिमुखम् उपलभ्य ‘मां हन्तुम् अयम् इच्छति’ इति पलायितुम् आरभन्ते, हरित-तृण-पूर्ण-पाणिम् उपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखी-भवन्ति।
yathā hi paśv-ādayaḥ śabda-ādibhiḥ śrotra-ādīnāṃ saṃbandhe sati, śabdha-ādi-vijñāne prati-kūle jāte tato nivartante, anu-kūle ca pravartante,
yathā daṇḍodyata-karaṃ puruṣam abhimukham upalabhya ‘māṃ hantum ayam icchati’ iti palāyitum ārabhante, harita-tṛṇa-pūrṇa-pāṇim upalabhya taṃ prati abhimukhī-bhavanti—

Just as animals etc., when sounds are in contact with the ear etc., and the knowledge of the same is not favourable, go away from them, and when it is favourable, are attracted towards them,
As for instance, finding in front of themselves a man holding up a stick, they begin to run away from him, thinking that he wishes to strike them, but when they find him in front of themselves with his hands full of green grass, approach him;

1. L.28 एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्न-चित्ताः क्रूर-दृष्टीन् आक्रोशतः खङ्गोद्यत-करान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्-विपरीतान् प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते।
evaṃ puruṣā api vyutpanna-cittāḥ krūra-dṛṣṭīn ākrośataḥ khaṅgodyata-karān balavata upalabhya tato nivartante, tad-viparītān prati pravartante—
Similarly men even when they are able to discriminate properly, (finding before them) strong men who have swords in their upraised hands and who have a fierce aspect, and who are shouting wildly, go away from them, and approach those who are of an opposite nature,

1. L.29 अतः समानः पश्व्-आदिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाण-प्रमेय-व्यवहारः।
ataḥ samānaḥ paśv-ādibhiḥ puruṣāṇāṃ pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāraḥ—
And thus, the employment of the means of right knowledge and the objects of knowledge is common both to animals and men.

1. L.30 पश्व्-आदीनां च प्रसिद्ध एव अविवेक-पुरःसरः प्रत्य्-अक्ष-आदि-व्यवहारः।
paśv-ādīnāṃ ca prasiddha eva aviveka-puraḥsaraḥ praty-akṣa-ādi-vyavahāraḥ—
Now, the employment of the means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc. by animals is well-known as being due to their failure to discriminate properly.

1. L.31 तत्-सामान्य-दर्शनाद् व्युत्पत्तिमताम् अपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्ष-आदि-व्यवहारस् तत्-कालः समान इति निश्चीयते।
tat-sāmānya-darśanād vyutpattimatām api puruṣāṇāṃ pratyakṣa-ādi-vyavahāras tat-kālaḥ samāna iti niścīyate—
Similarly, it is thus determined, that even in the case of properly discriminating persons their employment of the means of right knowledge such as direct perception, which is seen to be common to them with animals, is at similar times, also similar.

शास्त्र-व्यवहारस्य अप्य् अविद्या-पुरस्सरत्व-प्रदर्शन-भाष्यम्

1. L.32 शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्य् अपि बुद्धि-पूर्व-कारी न अविदित्वा आत्मनः पर-लोक-संबन्धम् अधिक्रियते,
तथा अपि न वेदान्त-वेद्यम् अशनाय-आद्य्-अतीतम् अपेत-ब्रह्म-क्षत्र-आदि-भेदम् असंसार्य्-आत्म-तत्त्वम् अधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते,
अनुपयोगात् अधिकार-विरोधाच् च।
śāstrīye tu vyavahāre yady api buddhi-pūrva-kārī na aviditvā ātmanaḥ para-loka-saṃbandham adhikriyate,
tathā api na vedānta-vedyam aśanāya-ādy-atītam apeta-brahma-kṣatra-ādi-bhedam asaṃsāry-ātma-tattvam adhikāre'pekṣyate,
anupayogāt adhikāra-virodhāc ca—

In the case of activities based on the Scriptures (such as sacrifices etc.) though a man motivated by intelligence is not competent to act without the knowledge of the relation of the Self with the world beyond (Para-loka),
Yet the knowledge of the Self which can only be acquired from Vedānta, and is beyond the physical necessities of eating etc., and is beyond the distinctions of Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya and which is not of the nature of transmigratory existence, is not necessary for a man for attaining that competency,
Because it is useless and even opposed to such competency (for performing religious acts).

1. L.33 प्राक् च तथा-भूत-आत्म-विज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रम् अविद्यावद् विषयत्वं न अतिवर्तते।
prāk ca tathā-bhūta-ātma-vijñānāt pravartamānaṃ śāstram avidyāvad viṣayatvaṃ na ativartate—
The Śāstra which comes into operation before the realization of such nature of the Self does not exceed its jurisdiction of being concerned only with that which is affected by Nescience.

1. L.34 तथा हि, ‘ब्राह्मणो यजेत’ इत्य्-आदीनि शास्त्राण्य् आत्मनि वर्ण-आश्रम-वयोऽवस्था-आदि-विशेष-अध्यासम् आश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते।
tathā hi, ‘brāhmaṇo yajeta’ ity-ādīni śāstrāṇy ātmani varṇa-āśrama-vayo'vasthā-ādi-viśeṣa-adhyāsam āśritya pravartante—
Thus Scriptural injunctions such as “a Brāhmaṇa should sacrifice” operate by depending on this superimposition on the Self, of caste, stage of life (Āśrama), age and special conditions.

अथ अध्यास-प्रकार-प्रदर्शन-भाष्यम्

1. L.35 ‘अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस् तद्-बुद्धिः’ इत्य् अवोचाम।
‘adhyāso nāma atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ’ ity avocāma—
We have already said that superimposition is the notion of that in something which is not that.

1. L.36 तद् यथा पुत्र-भार्या-आदिषु वि-कलेषु स-कलेषु वा ‘अहम् एव वि-कलः, स-कलो वा’ इति बाह्य-धर्मान् आत्मनि अध्यस्यति,
तथा देह-धर्मान् ‘स्थूलोऽहम् कृशोऽहम् गौरोऽहम् तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लङ्घयामि च’ इति,
tad yathā putra-bhāryā-ādiṣu vi-kaleṣu sa-kaleṣu vā ‘aham eva vi-kalaḥ, sa-kalo vā’ iti bāhya-dharmān ātmani adhyasyati,
tathā deha-dharmān ‘sthūlo'ham kṛśo'ham gauro'ham tiṣṭhāmi gacchāmi laṅghayāmi ca’ iti,—

Just as it is, for instance, when a person superimposes on his Self attributes external to his own Self, i.e. when his son or wife etc., are in sound health or otherwise, he considers himself to be similarly sound in health or otherwise,
Or when he superimposes the attributes of his body on his Self, thus — “I am Stout or lean or fair, or I am standing or going or crossing over”,

1. L.37 तथेन्द्रिय-धर्मान् ‘मूकः काणः क्लीबो बधिरोऽन्धोऽहम्’ इति,
तथा अन्तःकरण-धर्मान् काम-संकल्प-विचिकित्सा-अध्यवसाय-आदीन्।
tathendriya-dharmān ‘mūkaḥ kāṇaḥ klībo badhiro'ndho'ham’ iti,
tathā antaḥkaraṇa-dharmān kāma-saṃkalpa-vicikitsā-adhyavasāya-ādīn—

Or when he superimposes the attributes of his sense-organs on his Self, thus — “I am dumb or squint-eyed or impotent or deaf or blind”,
Or when he superimposes on his own Self the attributes of his internal sense-organ (Antaḥ-karaṇa) i.e. the mind, viz., desire, intention, doubt,' determination etc.

1. L.38 एवम् अहं-प्रत्ययिनम् अशेष-स्व-प्रचार-साक्षिणि प्रत्यग्-आत्मन्य् अध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यग्-आत्मानं सर्व-साक्षिणं
तद्-विपर्ययेण अन्तःकरण-आदिष्व् अध्यस्यति।
evam ahaṃ-pratyayinam aśeṣa-sva-pracāra-sākṣiṇi pratyag-ātmany adhyasya taṃ ca pratyag-ātmānaṃ sarva-sākṣiṇaṃ
tad-viparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇa-ādiṣv adhyasyati—

In this manner he Superimposes that which experiences the ‘I’ or ‘Ego’ viz., the minds on the Universal Self which is a witness of all the processes of the mind,
And conversely superimposes the Universal Self on the internal sense-organ i.e. the mind.

अथ अध्यास-विचारोपसंहार-भाष्यम्

1. L.39 एवम् अयम् अनादिर् अनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्या-प्रत्यय-रूपः कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व-प्रवर्तकः सर्व-लोक-प्रत्यक्षः।
evam ayam anādir ananto naisargiko'dhyāso mithyā-pratyaya-rūpaḥ kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-pravartakaḥ sarva-loka-pratyakṣaḥ—
It is in this manner, that there is this beginningless and endless natural process of superimposition, which is of the nature of erroneous conception and which promotes the notion of the Self as being an agent and experiencer, which is perceived by all.’

अथ मीमांसा-अवकरणिका-भाष्यम्

1. L.40 अस्य अनर्थ-हेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्व-विद्या-प्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते।
asya anartha-hetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante—
It is with a view to destroy this cause of all evil, and for acquiring the knowledge of the unity of the Self, that all Vedānta is begun.

1. L.41 यथा च अयम् अर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां, तथा वयम् अस्यां शारिरक-मीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।
yathā ca ayam arthaḥ sarveṣāṃ vedāntānāṃ, tathā vayam asyāṃ śāriraka-mīmāṃsāyāṃ pradarśayiṣyāmaḥ—
How this is the meaning of all Vedānta (texts) we will endeavour to show in this present Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā.

– Bhāṣya Introduction.

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1.1.1 L.1 वेदान्त-मीमांसा-शास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदम् आदिमं सूत्रम्।
vedānta-mīmāṃsā-śāstrasya vyācikhyāsitasyedam ādimaṃ sūtram—
This is the first Sūtra of the Śāstra of the consideration of Vedānta which is desired to be explained.

अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा॥१.१.१॥
Athāto brahma-jijñāsā.

Atha: now, then, afterwards; Ataḥ: therefore; Brahma-jijñāsā: a desire for the knowledge of Brahman (the enquiry into the real nature of Brahman).

🔗 Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman (should be taken up). — 1.1.1.

1.1.1 L.2 तत्र अथ-शब्दः आनन्तर्य-अर्थः परिगृह्यते, न अधिकार-अर्थः,
ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्।
tatra atha-śabdaḥ ānantarya-arthaḥ parigṛhyate, na adhikāra-arthaḥ,
brahma-jijñāsāyā anadhikāryatvāt—

The word ‘Now’ is to be understood as meaning something which follows (after the attainment of the requisite spiritual qualities) and not as something which introduces a subject,
Because the desire to know Brahman is not something which is possible to be introduced as a subject,

1.1.1 L.3 मङ्गलस्य च वाक्य-अर्थे समन्वय-अभावात्।
maṅgalasya ca vākya-arthe samanvaya-abhāvāt—
Nor can the word mean an auspicious recitation (Maṅgala), as it cannot be properly construed in the meaning of the sentence.

1.1.1 L.4 अर्थ-अन्तर-प्रयुक्त एव ह्य् अथ-शब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गल-प्रयोजनो भवति।
artha-antara-prayukta eva hy atha-śabdaḥ śrutyā maṅgala-prayojano bhavati—
The word ‘Now’ which is used in a different meaning, has still the effect of an auspicious recitation by its being merely heard.

1.1.1 L.5 पूर्व-प्रकृत-अपेक्षायाश् च फलत आनन्तर्य-अव्यतिरेकात्।
pūrva-prakṛta-apekṣāyāś ca phalata ānantarya-avyatirekāt—
The expectation of its referring to something relevant to something else which has gone before is virtually not different from a thing’s following after:

1.1.1 L.6 सति च आनन्तर्य-अर्थत्वे, यथा धर्म-जिज्ञासा पूर्व-वृत्तं वेद-अध्ययनं नियमेन अपेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासा अपि यत् पूर्व-वृत्तं नियमेन अपेक्षते, तद् वक्तव्यम्।
sati ca ānantarya-arthatve, yathā dharma-jijñāsā pūrva-vṛttaṃ veda-adhyayanaṃ niyamena apekṣate, evaṃ brahma-jijñāsā api yat pūrva-vṛttaṃ niyamena apekṣate, tad vaktavyam—
The word being understood then, as indicating something which comes after something else, that something else which is expected to have been accomplished, before the desire for the knowledge of Brahman (can be entertained) needs to be mentioned, just as in the case of a desire for the knowledge of duty (Dharma) the study of the Veda is expected to have been accomplished already, before such desire for the knowledge of duty (is entertained).

1.1.1 L.7 स्वाध्याय-आनन्तर्यं तु समानम्।
svādhyāya-ānantaryaṃ tu samānam—
The coming after the study of the Veda, is common (to both).

1.1.1 L.8 नन्व् इह कर्म-अवबोध-आनन्तर्यं विशेषः।
nanv iha karma-avabodha-ānantaryaṃ viśeṣaḥ—
But, (says the opponent) the peculiar difference Here (i.e. in the case of the desire for the knowledge of Brahman) is its coming after the (previous) knowledge of the acts of duty:

1.1.1 L.9 न, धर्म-जिज्ञासायाः प्राग् अपि अधीत-वेदान्तस्य ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासोपपत्तेः।
na, dharma-jijñāsāyāḥ prāg api adhīta-vedāntasya brahma-jijñāsopapatteḥ—
No (we reply). In the case of a person who has studied the Vedānta, it is reasonably sustainable, that the desire for the knowledge of Brahman may arise (in him) even before the arising of the desire for the knowledge of duty.

1.1.1 L.10 यथा च हृदय-आद्य्-अवदानानाम् आनन्तर्य-नियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः।
yathā ca hṛdaya-ādy-avadānānām ānantarya-niyamaḥ, kramasya vivakṣitatvāt, na tatheha kramo vivakṣitaḥ—
Here (i.e. in the case of the desire to know Brahman) no particular serial order is intended to be prescribed (by the Scriptures), just as in the case of the desire for the knowledge of duty, a serial order is intended to be prescribed, in as much as there is a rule about (a particular thing) coming after (another particular thing) such as in the cutting off of the heart (of the animal sacrificed) etc.,

1.1.1 L.11 शेष-शेषित्वे अधिकृत-अधिकारे वा प्रमाण-अभावात्, धर्म-ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासयोः फल-जिज्ञास्य-भेदाच् च।
śeṣa-śeṣitve adhikṛta-adhikāre vā pramāṇa-abhāvāt, dharma-brahma-jijñāsayoḥ phala-jijñāsya-bhedāc ca—
Or as there is no proof to hold, that as between the desire for the knowledge of duty and the desire for the knowledge of Brahman, there is a relation of one thing being the principal thing and another a subsidiary thing, or as there is no proof of any similar relation as between competency (Adhikāra) and a person who has such competency (Adhikṛta), and, as there is a difference between the desire to know ‘duty’ and the desire to know ‘Brahman’, and also a difference in their results and the things to be known.

1.1.1 L.12 अभ्युदय-फलं धर्म-ज्ञानं तच् च अनुष्ठान-अपेक्षम्,
निःश्रेयस-फलं तु ब्रह्म-विज्ञानम्, न च अनुष्ठान-अन्तर-अपेक्षम्।
abhyudaya-phalaṃ dharma-jñānaṃ tac ca anuṣṭhāna-apekṣam,
niḥśreyasa-phalaṃ tu brahma-vijñānam, na ca anuṣṭhāna-antara-apekṣam—

Knowledge of duty has for its result secular prosperity (Abhyudaya) and it expects the performance of certain actions (such as sacrifices etc.).
The knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, has for its result eternal bliss (Niḥśreyasa) and it does not expect the performance of any act.

1.1.1 L.13 भव्यश् च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञान-कालेऽस्ति, पुरुष-व्यापार-तन्त्रत्वात्।
bhavyaś ca dharmo jijñāsyo na jñāna-kāle'sti, puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantratvāt—
Religious duty is something which is to be done at some future time and it does not exist at the time of the acquirement of its knowledge and it depends upon the activity of a man.

1.1.1 L.14 इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यत्वान् न पुरुष-व्यापार-तन्त्रम्।
iha tu bhūtaṃ brahma jijñāsyaṃ nityatvān na puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantram—
Here on the other hand it is Brahman which is actually eternally in existence, that is desired to be known, and being thus eternal does not depend upon any action on the part of a man.

1.1.1 L.15 चोदना-प्रवृत्ति-भेदाच् च।
codanā-pravṛtti-bhedāc ca—
Also as between the two there is a difference in the operation of the scriptural injunction.

1.1.1 L.16 या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम्, सा स्व-विषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषम् अवबोधयति।
yā hi codanā dharmasya lakṣaṇam, sā sva-viṣaye niyuñjānaiva puruṣam avabodhayati—
Injunction which is a characteristic of religious duty instructs a person and at the same time enjoins him to the performance of the same.

1.1.1 L.17 ब्रह्म-चोदना तु पुरुषम् अवबोधयत्य् एव केवलम्, अवबोधस्य चोदना-जन्यत्वान् न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते।
brahma-codanā tu puruṣam avabodhayaty eva kevalam, avabodhasya codanā-janyatvān na puruṣo'vabodhe niyujyate—
The science of Brahman however merely instructs a person about Brahman, but it does not enjoin a man to any act of acquiring knowledge.

1.1.1 L.18 यथा अक्ष-अर्थ-संनिकर्षेण अर्थ-अवबोधे, तद्वत्।
yathā akṣa-artha-saṃnikarṣeṇa artha-avabodhe, tadvat—
The case is similar to the perception of a sense-object merely by the connection of a sense-organ with its object.

1.1.1 L.19 तस्मात् किम् अपि वक्तव्यं, यद् अनन्तरं ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति।
tasmāt kim api vaktavyaṃ, yad anantaraṃ brahma-jijñāsopadiśyata iti—
Therefore it is necessary to mention something, after (the accomplishment of) which the inquiry into Brahman is advised.

1.1.1 L.20 उच्यते, नित्य-अनित्य-वस्तु-विवेकः इह-अमुत्र-अर्थ-भोग-विरागः शम-दम-आदि-साधन-संपत् मुमुक्षुत्वं च।
ucyate, nitya-anitya-vastu-vivekaḥ iha-amutra-artha-bhoga-virāgaḥ śama-dama-ādi-sādhana-saṃpat mumukṣutvaṃ ca—
We reply — Discrimination between the eternal thing and a transitory thing, distaste for the enjoyment of things here in this world as well as in the world beyond, equipment of oneself with tranquillity, self-restraint, and such other similar means, and the desire for Final Release.

1.1.1 L.21 तेषु हि सत्सु, प्राग् अपि धर्म-जिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च, न विपर्यये।
teṣu hi satsu, prāg api dharma-jijñāsāyā ūrdhvaṃ ca śakyate brahma jijñāsituṃ jñātuṃ ca, na viparyaye—
When these are present, it is possible to desire the knowledge of Brahman and to realize it actually, even before the desire for the knowledge of duty or after it, just as you please.

1.1.1 L.22 तस्मात् अथ-शब्देन यथोक्त-साधन-संपत्त्य्-आनन्तर्यम् उपदिश्यते॥
tasmāt atha-śabdena yathokta-sādhana-saṃpatty-ānantaryam upadiśyate—
The word ‘Now’ indicates — following after the acquisition of the means as mentioned (above).

1.1.1 L.23 अतः-शब्दो हेत्व्-अर्थः। यस्माद् वेद एव अग्नि-होत्र-आदीनां श्रेयः-साधनानाम् अनित्य-फलतां दर्शयति,
ataḥ-śabdo hetv-arthaḥ। yasmād veda eva agni-hotra-ādīnāṃ śreyaḥ-sādhanānām anitya-phalatāṃ darśayati,—
The word ‘Therefore’ (Ataḥ, in the Sūtra) is indicative of the reason, in as much as the Scriptures themselves disclose the transitory nature of the fruit of such means of acquiring secular prosperity as the Agni-hotra etc., thus —

1.1.1 L.24 ‘तद् यथेह कर्म-चितो लोकः क्षीयते, एवम् एव अमुत्र पुण्य-चितो लोकः क्षीयते’ (ChanU.8.1.6) इत्य्-आदिः,
‘tad yatheha karma-cito lokaḥ kṣīyate, evam eva amutra puṇya-cito lokaḥ kṣīyate’ ity-ādiḥ,—
“As here on earth whatever has been acquired by religious actions perishes, even so, in the next world also whatever is acquired by merit, perishes” (ChanU.8.1.6) etc.

1.1.1 L.25 तथा ब्रह्म-विज्ञानाद् अपि परं पुरुष-अर्थं दर्शयति ‘ब्रह्म-विद् आप्नोति परम्’ (TaitU.2.1) इत्य्-आदिः,
tathā brahma-vijñānād api paraṃ puruṣa-arthaṃ darśayati ‘brahma-vid āpnoti param’ ity-ādiḥ,—
Similarly the Scriptures also show that by realizing Brahman the highest aim of man is attained, thus — “One who realizes Brahman attains Final Release.” (TaitU.2.1).

1.1.1 L.26 तस्मात् यथोक्त-साधन-संपत्त्य्-अनन्तरं ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासा कर्तव्या।
tasmāt yathokta-sādhana-saṃpatty-anantaraṃ brahma-jijñāsā kartavyā—
Therefore the desire for the knowledge of Brahman should be entertained after the acquisition of the four means referred to above.

1.1.1 L.27 ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासा।
brahmaṇo jijñāsā brahma-jijñāsā—
Brahma-jijñāsā’ is the desire to know Brahman.

1.1.1 L.28 ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाण-लक्षणम् ‘जन्म-आद्य् अस्य यतः’ इति।
brahma ca vakṣyamāṇa-lakṣaṇam ‘janma-ādy asya yataḥ’ iti—
Brahman is that whose definition will be stated presently in the subsequent Sūtra, viz., “From which the origination of creation etc., (comes about).”

1.1.1 L.29 अत एव न ब्रह्म-शब्दस्य जात्य्-आद्य्-अर्थ-अन्तरम् आशङ्कितव्यम्।
ata eva na brahma-śabdasya jāty-ādy-artha-antaram āśaṅkitavyam—
One should not therefore think that the word ‘Brahman’ may mean the Brāhmaṇa caste.

1.1.1 L.30 ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी, न शेषे,
जिज्ञास्य-अपेक्षत्वाज् जिज्ञासायाः, जिज्ञास्य-अन्तर-अनिर्देशाच् च।
brahmaṇa iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī, na śeṣe,
jijñāsya-apekṣatvāj jijñāsāyāḥ, jijñāsya-antara-anirdeśāc ca—

The form ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is in grammar the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive of Brahman and not the ‘Śeṣe’ genitive,
Because the desire for the knowledge of Brahman presupposes an object such as Brahman, of which knowledge is to be desired, and because no other such object is here indicated.

1.1.1 L.31 ननु शेष-षष्ठी-परिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा-कर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते, संबन्ध-सामान्यस्य विशेष-निष्ठत्वात्।
nanu śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī-parigrahe'pi brahmaṇo jijñāsā-karmatvaṃ na virudhyate, saṃbandha-sāmānyasya viśeṣa-niṣṭhatvāt—
But (says the opponent) even if we understand ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ as a ‘Śeṣe’ genitive, the fact that Brahman is the object of the desire to know is not contradicted, for the general relation (indicated by the genitive case) may base itself on the particular relation (indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive).

1.1.1 L.32 एवम् अपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वम् उत्सृज्य, सामान्य-द्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो, व्य्-अर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्।
evam api pratyakṣaṃ brahmaṇaḥ karmatvam utsṛjya, sāmānya-dvāreṇa parokṣaṃ karmatvaṃ kalpayato, vy-arthaḥ prayāsaḥ syāt—
We reply — In giving up Brahman as the object directly indicated (by understanding ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ as the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive) and then by accepting it as the object indicated, in an indirect way (as indicated by the ‘Śeṣe’ genitive) you will be taking needless trouble.

1.1.1 L.33 न व्य्-अर्थः, ब्रह्म-आश्रित-अशेष-विचार-प्रतिज्ञान-अर्थत्वाद्
na vy-arthaḥ, brahma-āśrita-aśeṣa-vicāra-pratijñāna-arthatvād—
If the opponent were to say that it would not be undertaking needless trouble (in understanding ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ as the ‘Śeṣe’ genitive) as it would mean the desire to know all that which is dependent on the word Brahman,

1.1.1 L.34 इति चेत्, न, प्रधान-परिग्रहे तद्-अपेक्षितानाम् अर्थ-आक्षिप्तत्वात्।
iti cet, na, pradhāna-parigrahe tad-apekṣitānām artha-ākṣiptatvāt—
We reply — no, because when we accept the principal thing (as indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive) it also necessarily implies that all those secondary things meant by the word Brahman, are included in the principal thing.

1.1.1 L.35 ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेन आप्तुम् इष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्।
brahma hi jñānena āptum iṣṭatamatvāt pradhānam—
Brahman being the most desirable thing to be realized by knowledge, is of course the principal thing.

1.1.1 L.36 तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासा-कर्मणि परिगृहीते, यैर् जिज्ञासितैर् विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्य् अर्थ-आक्षिप्तान्य् एवेति न पृथक्-सूत्रयितव्यानि।
tasmin pradhāne jijñāsā-karmaṇi parigṛhīte, yair jijñāsitair vinā brahma jijñāsitaṃ na bhavati, tāny artha-ākṣiptāny eveti na pṛthak-sūtrayitavyāni—
When that principal thing is once accepted as the object of the desire to know, all those other (secondary) things, without desiring to know which Brahman cannot be properly desired to be known, are necessarily implied, and need not be separately mentioned in the Sūtra.

1.1.1 L.37 यथा ‘राजा असौ गच्छति’ इत्य् उक्ते स-परिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनम् उक्तं भवति, तद्वत्।
yathā ‘rājā asau gacchati’ ity ukte sa-parivārasya rājño gamanam uktaṃ bhavati, tadvat—
For when we say ‘The king is passing by’, it implies that the passing by of the king along with his retinue is meant.

1.1.1 L.38 श्रुत्य्-अनुगमाच् च।
śruty-anugamāc ca—
It (i.e. that Brahman is the object as indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive) is in consonance with the Scriptures.

1.1.1 L.39 ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (TaitU.3.1) इत्य्-आद्याः श्रुतयः
‘तद् विजिज्ञासस्व तद् ब्रह्म’
इति प्रत्यक्षम् एव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा-कर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति। तच् च कर्मणि षष्ठी-परिग्रहे सूत्रेण अनुगतं भवति।
‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ ity-ādyāḥ śrutayaḥ
‘tad vijijñāsasva tad brahma’ iti
pratyakṣam eva brahmaṇo jijñāsā-karmatvaṃ darśayanti। tac ca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī-parigrahe sūtreṇa anugataṃ bhavati—

The Scriptural passages “That from which all these things are born” (TaitU.3.1) etc.
And “Desire to know that, that is Brahman” (TaitU.3.1)
Actually indicate that Brahman is the object indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive and that alone will be in consonance with the Sūtra.

1.1.1 L.40 तस्माद् ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी।
tasmād brahmaṇa iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī—
Therefore the form ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive.

1.1.1 L.41 ज्ञातुम् इच्छा जिज्ञासा।
jñātum icchā jijñāsā—
Jijñāsā’ means the desire to know.

1.1.1 L.42 अवगति-पर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्-वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म, फल-विषयत्वाद् इच्छायाः।
avagati-paryantaṃ jñānaṃ san-vācyāyā icchāyāḥ karma, phala-viṣayatvād icchāyāḥ—
Complete comprehension is the object of the suffix ‘San’ which means desire, because desire has for its object the result of action.

1.1.1 L.43 ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेन अवगन्तुम् इष्टं ब्रह्म।
jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantum iṣṭaṃ brahma—
Knowledge is the only means of comprehending Brahman,

1.1.1 L.44 ब्रह्म-अवगतिर् हि पुरुष-अर्थः, निः-शेष-संसार-बीज-अविद्या-आद्य्-अनर्थ-निबर्हणात्।
brahma-avagatir hi puruṣa-arthaḥ, niḥ-śeṣa-saṃsāra-bīja-avidyā-ādy-anartha-nibarhaṇāt—
And the complete knowledge of Brahman is the highest aim (of man) through the destruction of the evil of Nescience which is the root-cause (lit., the seed) of all transmigratory existence.

1.1.1 L.45 तस्माद् ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम्॥
tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam—
Therefore the knowledge of Brahman should be desired.

1.1.1 L.46 तत् पुनर् ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धम् अप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्,
tat punar brahma prasiddham aprasiddhaṃ vā syāt,—
But again (says the opponent), that Brahman must either be well-known or not known at all.

1.1.1 L.47 यदि प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यम्,
yadi prasiddhaṃ na jijñāsitavyam,—
If it is well-known, it need not be desired to be known.

1.1.1 L.48 अथ अप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुम् इति।
atha aprasiddhaṃ naiva śakyaṃ jijñāsitum iti—
If it is not known at all, it would not be possible to desire to know it.

1.1.1 L.49 उच्यते, अस्ति तावद् ब्रह्म नित्य-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्व-भावं सर्वज्ञं सर्व-शक्ति-समन्वितम्।
ucyate, asti tāvad brahma nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sva-bhāvaṃ sarvajñaṃ sarva-śakti-samanvitam—
We reply — Brahman which is omniscient, all-powerful, and of the nature of eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, exists of course.

1.1.1 L.50 ब्रह्म-शब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्य-शुद्धत्व-आदयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते, बृहतेर् धातोर् अर्थ-अनुगमात्।
brahma-śabdasya hi vyutpādyamānasya nitya-śuddhatva-ādayo'rthāḥ pratīyante, bṛhater dhātor artha-anugamāt—
Etymologically, from the root ‘Bṛha’ we understand such things as eternal purity, etc.

1.1.1 L.51 सर्वस्य आत्मत्वाच् च ब्रह्म-अस्तित्व-प्रसिद्धिः।
sarvasya ātmatvāc ca brahma-astitva-prasiddhiḥ—
The existence of Brahman is moreover well-known, because of its being the Self of every one.

1.1.1 L.52 सर्वो ह्य् आत्म-अस्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न ‘न अहम् अस्मि’ इति।
sarvo hy ātma-astitvaṃ pratyeti, na ‘na aham asmi’ iti—
Every one experiences the existence of the Self, and does not experience that he is not.

1.1.1 L.53 यदि हि न आत्म-अस्तित्व-प्रसिद्धिः स्यात्, सर्वो लोकः ‘न अहम् अस्मि’ इति प्रतीयात्।
yadi hi na ātma-astitva-prasiddhiḥ syāt, sarvo lokaḥ ‘na aham asmi’ iti pratīyāt—
If the well-known existence of the Self were not to be so in fact, every one would experience that he does not exist.

1.1.1 L.54 आत्मा च ब्रह्म॥
ātmā ca brahma—
The Self of course is Brahman.

1.1.1 L.55 यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धम् अस्ति, ततो ज्ञातम् एवेत्य् अजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनर् आपन्नम्।
yadi tarhi loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddham asti, tato jñātam evety ajijñāsyatvaṃ punar āpannam—
But (says the opponent), if Brahman is known to everybody as the Self, then being already so known, it comes to this, that in that case there could not be any desire to know it.

1.1.1 L.56 न, तद्-विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः।
na, tad-viśeṣaṃ prati vipratipatteḥ—
No (we reply), because there is a conflict of opinion as to its special nature.

1.1.1 L.57 देह-मात्रं चैतन्य-विशिष्टम् आत्मेति प्राकृता जना लौकायतिकाश् च प्रतिपन्नाः।
deha-mātraṃ caitanya-viśiṣṭam ātmeti prākṛtā janā laukāyatikāś ca pratipannāḥ—
Unsophisticated persons and the Lokāyatikas understand that the mere body as such endowed with intelligence is the Self.

1.1.1 L.58 इन्द्रियाण्य् एव चेतनान्य् आत्मेत्य् अपरे।
indriyāṇy eva cetanāny ātmety apare—
Others that the sense-organs which are intelligent are the Self.

1.1.1 L.59 मन इत्य् अन्ये।
mana ity anye—
Some say that the mind is Ātmā,

1.1.1 L.60 विज्ञान-मात्रं क्षणिकम् इत्य् एके।
vijñāna-mātraṃ kṣaṇikam ity eke—
Some say that it is merely momentary knowledge.

1.1.1 L.61 शून्यम् इत्य् अपरे।
śūnyam ity apare—
Some others say that the Self is merely a vacuum (Śūnya).

1.1.1 L.62 अस्ति देह-आदि-व्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्य् अपरे।
asti deha-ādi-vyatiriktaḥ saṃsārī kartā bhoktety apare—
Others again say that an entity different from the body which is an agent, an experiencer, and a transmigratory being is in fact in existence.

1.1.1 L.63 भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्य् एके।
bhoktaiva kevalaṃ na kartety eke—
Some others say that the Self is an experiencer only but not an agent.

1.1.1 L.64 अस्ति तद्-व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्व-शक्तिर् इति केचित्।
asti tad-vyatirikta īśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ sarva-śaktir iti kecit—
Some others think that there is a Lord who is omniscient and all-powerful, and is different from the Self.

1.1.1 L.65 आत्मा स भोक्तुर् इत्य् अपरे।
ātmā sa bhoktur ity apare—
Others that the Ātmā is the Self of the experiencing Jīva.

1.1.1 L.66 एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्ति-वाक्य-तद्-आभास-समाश्रयाः सन्तः।
evaṃ bahavo vipratipannā yukti-vākya-tad-ābhāsa-samāśrayāḥ santaḥ—
In this manner there are many who have resorted to fallacious reasoning or the Scriptures as an authority and have differed amongst themselves in their view (as to what the Self i.e. Brahman is).

1.1.1 L.67 तत्र अविचार्य यत् किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं च इयात्।
tatra avicārya yat kiñcit pratipadyamāno niḥśreyasāt pratihanyeta, anarthaṃ ca iyāt—
Under these circumstances if one were to conclude recklessly and to understand something else (as the Self), one may miss Final Beatitude and may be ruined.

1.1.1 L.68 तस्माद् ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासोपन्यास-मुखेन वेदान्त-वाक्य-मीमांसा तद्-अविरोधि-तर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयस-प्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते॥१॥
tasmād brahma-jijñāsopanyāsa-mukhena vedānta-vākya-mīmāṃsā tad-avirodhi-tarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasa-prayojanā prastūyate—
Hence now begins, under the designation of ‘an inquiry into Brahman’, an analysis of the Vedānta texts with the help of Logic (Tarka) conformable to the Scriptures, having the highest Beatitude as its reward. — 1.

– 1. Jijñāsā-Adhikaraṇam.

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1.1.2 L.1 ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम् इत्य् उक्तम्।
brahma jijñāsitavyam ity uktam—
We have said so far that one should desire to know Brahman.

1.1.2 L.2 किं लक्षणं पुनस् तद् ब्रह्म इत्य् अत आह भगवान् सूत्रकारः।
kiṃ lakṣaṇaṃ punas tad brahma ity ata āha bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ—
The question arises — What are the characteristics of that Brahman? Therefore Bhagavān Sūtra-kāra has said:

जन्माद्यस्य यतः॥१.१.२॥
Janmādy asya yahaḥ.

Janma-ādi: origin etc.; Asya: of this (world); Yataḥ: from which.

🔗 (Brahman is that) from which the origin etc. of this (world, proceed). — 1.1.2.

1.1.2 L.3 जन्म उत्पत्तिर् आदिर् अस्य, इति तद्-गुण-संविज्ञानो बहु-व्रीहिः।
janma utpattir ādir asya, iti tad-guṇa-saṃvijñāno bahu-vrīhiḥ—
The compound word ‘Janmādi’ is a Bahu-vrīhi compound of the ‘Tat-guṇa-saṃvijñāna’ type, and it is dissolved as follows: — ‘That of which origin is the first’.

1.1.2 L.4 जन्म-स्थिति-भङ्गं समास-अर्थः।
janma-sthiti-bhaṅgaṃ samāsa-arthaḥ—
The meaning of the compound word is — origin, preservation and dissolution.

1.1.2 L.5 जन्मनश् च आदित्वं श्रुति-निर्देश-अपेक्षं वस्तु-वृत्त-अपेक्षं च।
janmanaś ca āditvaṃ śruti-nirdeśa-apekṣaṃ vastu-vṛtta-apekṣaṃ ca—
Origin comes first in order, because it is so indicated in the Scriptures and also because it is so in fact.

1.1.2 L.6 श्रुति-निर्देशस् तावत्, ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (TaitU.3.1) इति,
śruti-nirdeśas tāvat, ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ iti,—
The indication of the Scriptures is “From whence these beings are born” etc. (TaitU.3.1) in which origin, preservation and dissolution are mentioned in their order.

1.1.2 L.7 अस्मिन् वाक्ये जन्म-स्थिति-प्रलयानां क्रम-दर्शनात्। वस्तु-वृत्तम् अपि जन्मना लब्ध-सत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थिति-प्रलय-संभवात्।
asmin vākye janma-sthiti-pralayānāṃ krama-darśanāt। vastu-vṛttam api janmanā labdha-sattākasya dharmiṇaḥ sthiti-pralaya-saṃbhavāt—
The fact as it is, is that it is only when a thing possessing attributes has attained the condition of existence, that preservation and dissolution of the same are possible.

1.1.2 L.8 अस्येति प्रत्यक्ष-आदि-संनिधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमा निर्देशः।
asyeti pratyakṣa-ādi-saṃnidhāpitasya dharmiṇa idamā nirdeśaḥ—
The word ‘Asya’ (in the Sūtra) indicates the thing possessing attributes, which is established by direct means of knowledge etc. as — this is it.

1.1.2 L.9 षष्टी जन्म-आदि-धर्म-संबन्ध-अर्था।
ṣaṣṭī janma-ādi-dharma-saṃbandha-arthā—
The genitive case (of Asya) is for showing the relation with the origin etc.

1.1.2 L.10 यत इति कारण-निर्देशः।
yata iti kāraṇa-nirdeśaḥ—
The word ‘Yataḥ’ indicates by the ablative case the cause (of the origin).

1.1.2 L.11 अस्य जगतो नाम-रूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेक-कर्तृ-भोक्तृ-संयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियत-देश-काल-निमित्त-क्रिया-फल-आश्रयस्य मनसा अप्य् अचिन्त्य-रचना-रूपस्य जन्म-स्थिति-भङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्व-शक्तेः कारणाद् भवति,
asya jagato nāma-rūpābhyāṃ vyākṛtasya aneka-kartṛ-bhoktṛ-saṃyuktasya pratiniyata-deśa-kāla-nimitta-kriyā-phala-āśrayasya manasā apy acintya-racanā-rūpasya janma-sthiti-bhaṅgaṃ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarva-śakteḥ kāraṇād bhavati,—
The omniscient and all-powerful cause from which (Yataḥ), the origin, preservation and dissolution of this transient world, which is distinguished by names and forms, and which is connected with diverse agents and enjoyers, springs, and which is the basis of the fruit of actions depending upon a particular environment, time, and cause, and in even the mere thinking about which, imagination boggles and is unable to comprehend the arrangement,

1.1.2 L.12 ‘तद् ब्रह्म’ इति वाक्य-शेषः।
‘tad brahma’ iti vākya-śeṣaḥ—
That is Brahman which is to be understood as the complementary portion of the Sūtra.

1.1.2 L.13 अन्येषाम् अपि भाव-विकाराणां त्रिष्व् एव अन्तर्-भाव इति जन्म-स्थिति-नाशानाम् इह ग्रहणम्।
anyeṣām api bhāva-vikārāṇāṃ triṣv eva antar-bhāva iti janma-sthiti-nāśānām iha grahaṇam—
These three only viz. the origin, preservation and dissolution, are to be understood here, as the other modifications of existence are covered by these three.

1.1.2 L.14 यास्क-परिपठितानां तु ‘जायतेऽस्ति’ इत्य्-आदीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थिति-काले संभाव्यमानत्वान् मूल-कारणाद् उत्पत्ति-स्थिति-नाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युर् इत्य् आशङ्क्येत,
yāska-paripaṭhitānāṃ tu ‘jāyate'sti’ ity-ādīnāṃ grahaṇe teṣāṃ jagataḥ sthiti-kāle saṃbhāvyamānatvān mūla-kāraṇād utpatti-sthiti-nāśā jagato na gṛhītāḥ syur ity āśaṅkyeta,—
If we include the other modifications of existence enumerated by Yāska, we may be tempted to doubt the origin, preservation and dissolution as originating from the root-cause, as they (i.e. other modifications) are possible only when the transient world is in existence.

1.1.2 L.15 तन् मा शङ्की इति या उत्पत्तिर् ब्रह्मणः, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश् च, त एव गृह्यन्ते।
tan mā śaṅkī iti yā utpattir brahmaṇaḥ, tatraiva sthitiḥ pralayaś ca, ta eva gṛhyante—
In order that we should not doubt that the preservation and dissolution is of that only which is created, we should understand only these three (by the word Janmādi).

1.1.2 L.16 न यथोक्त-विशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्त-विशेषणम् ईश्वरं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः प्रधानाद् अचेतनात् अणुभ्यो अभावाद् संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्य्-आदि संभावयितुं शक्यम्।
na yathokta-viśeṣaṇasya jagato yathokta-viśeṣaṇam īśvaraṃ muktvā anyataḥ pradhānād acetanāt aṇubhyo abhāvād saṃsāriṇo vā utpatty-ādi saṃbhāvayituṃ śakyam—
It is not possible to conceive the origin etc. of this transient world of the type described (above) to be from any cause other than the Lord described as above, viz. from the non-sentient Pradhāna (of the Sāṅkhyas) or from the atoms (of the Vaiśeṣikas), or from mere non-existence (as held by the followers of Buddha), or from a transmigratory being (such as Hiraṇya-garbha).

1.1.2 L.17 न च स्व-भावतः, विशिष्ट-देश-काल-निमित्तानाम् इहोपादानात्।
na ca sva-bhāvataḥ, viśiṣṭa-deśa-kāla-nimittānām ihopādānāt—
Nor can it ever evolve from its own nature (without any cause), for in such a matter, particular environment, time and cause have to be considered to be necessary.

1.1.2 L.18 एतद् एव अनुमानं संसारि-व्यतिरिक्तेश्वर-अस्तित्व-आदि-साधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वर-कारणिनः।
etad eva anumānaṃ saṃsāri-vyatirikteśvara-astitva-ādi-sādhanaṃ manyante īśvara-kāraṇinaḥ—
Those who maintain the Lord as the cause of this transient world (such as the Logicians) think that the same inference (as is stated just above) also supplies the means for holding the existence of the Lord as distinguished from the transmigratory Self etc., as being the cause (of this transmigratory world).

1.1.2 L.19 नन्व् इह अपि तद् एवोपन्यस्तं जन्म-आदि-सूत्रे।
nanv iha api tad evopanyastaṃ janma-ādi-sūtre—
But (says the opponent) the same argument (by inference) is also adopted in this ‘JanmādiSūtra.

1.1.2 L.20 न, वेदान्त-वाक्य-कुसुम-ग्रथन-अर्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्।
na, vedānta-vākya-kusuma-grathana-arthatvāt sūtrāṇām—
No (we reply), for the Sūtras are meant only for the purpose of stringing together the flower-like Vedānta passages.

1.1.2 L.21 वेदान्त-वाक्यानि हि सूत्रैर् उदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते।
vedānta-vākyāni hi sūtrair udāhṛtya vicāryante—
The Sūtras refer to the Vedānta passages which are considered therein.

1.1.2 L.22 वाक्य-अर्थ-विचारण-अध्यवसान-निर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्म-अवगतिः, न अनुमान-आदि-प्रमाण-अन्तर-निर्वृत्ता।
vākya-artha-vicāraṇa-adhyavasāna-nirvṛttā hi brahma-avagatiḥ, na anumāna-ādi-pramāṇa-antara-nirvṛttā—
For the knowledge of Brahman is effected by the determination (brought about) by the consideration of the meaning of the Vedānta passages, and not by the other means of right knowledge such as inference etc.

1.1.2 L.23 सत्सु तु वेदान्त-वाक्येषु जगतो जन्म-आदि-कारण-वादिषु,
तद्-अर्थ-ग्रहण-दार्ढ्याय अनुमानम् अपि वेदान्त-वाक्य-अविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् न निवार्यते,
श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्य अप्य् अभ्युपेतत्वात्।
satsu tu vedānta-vākyeṣu jagato janma-ādi-kāraṇa-vādiṣu,
tad-artha-grahaṇa-dārḍhyāya anumānam api vedānta-vākya-avirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavat na nivāryate,
śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya apy abhyupetatvāt—

Such Vedānta passages dealing with the cause of the creation etc. of the transitory world being there (for that purpose),
Inference also, which is not antagonistic (to such passages) and furnishes a means of right knowledge, for the strengthening of the understanding of the meaning of these passages, is not rejected,
Because the Scriptures themselves accept the aid of Logic as an auxiliary.

1.1.2 L.24 तथा हि, ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति श्रुतिः,
tathā hi, ‘śrotavyo mantavyaḥ’ iti śrutiḥ,—
For Scriptural passages such as “The Self is to be heard and cogitated upon” (BrhU.2.4.5),

1.1.2 L.25 ‘पण्डितो मेधावी गन्धारान् एवोपसंपद्येतैवम् एवेह आचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद’ (ChanU.6.14.2) इति च पुरुष-बुद्धि-साहाय्यम् आत्मनो दर्शयति।
‘paṇḍito medhāvī gandhārān evopasaṃpadyetaivam eveha ācāryavān puruṣo veda’ iti ca puruṣa-buddhi-sāhāyyam ātmano darśayati—
And “A learned and intelligent person does of course reach Gāndhāra, and similarly, a man who has a teacher acquires knowledge (of Brahman)” (ChanU.6.14.2), show that a man’s intelligence is helpful to the Scriptures.

1.1.2 L.26 न, धर्म-जिज्ञासायाम् इव श्रुत्य्-आदय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासायाम्,
na, dharma-jijñāsāyām iva śruty-ādaya eva pramāṇaṃ brahma-jijñāsāyām,—
It is not that the Scriptures alone are the means of the right knowledge of Brahman, as is the case about the right knowledge of religious duty,

1.1.2 L.27 किन् तु श्रुत्य्-आदयोऽनुभाव-आदयश् च यथा-संभवम् इह प्रमाणम्,
अनुभव-अवसानत्वाद् भूत-वस्तु-विषयत्वाच् च ब्रह्म-ज्ञानस्य।
kin tu śruty-ādayo'nubhāva-ādayaś ca yathā-saṃbhavam iha pramāṇam,
anubhava-avasānatvād bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāc ca brahma-jñānasya—

But the Scriptures, as also intuitional experience, so far as is possible, constitute the authoritative or valid means of right knowledge,
Because the knowledge of Brahman culminates in the realization (Anubhava) of Brahman, and has an already existing entity as its object.

1.1.2 L.28 कर्तव्ये हि विषये न अनुभव-अपेक्षा अस्ति इति श्रुत्य्-आदीनाम् एव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, पुरुष-अधीन-आत्म-लाभत्वाच् च कर्तव्यस्य।
kartavye hi viṣaye na anubhava-apekṣā asti iti śruty-ādīnām eva prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, puruṣa-adhīna-ātma-lābhatvāc ca kartavyasya—
In the case of religious action there is no expectation of intuitional experience (Anubhava, i.e. direct experience) and the Scriptures alone are the authoritative means of its right knowledge, and action is dependent upon man for its origination.

1.1.2 L.29 कर्तुम् अकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म,
kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ śakyaṃ laukikaṃ vaidikaṃ ca karma,—
In the case of action in ordinary life, or action according to the Vedas, it is possible that it may either be done or not done or done in a different way.

1.1.2 L.30 यथा ‘अश्वेन गच्छति पद्भ्याम् अन्यथा वा न वा गच्छति’ इति,
yathā ‘aśvena gacchati padbhyām anyathā vā na vā gacchati’ iti,—
For instance a man may use a horse for going (from one place to another) or he may go on foot or in some other way or he may not go at all.

1.1.2 L.31 तथा ‘अति-रात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’, ‘न अति-रात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’, ‘उदिते जुहोति’, ‘अनुदिते जुहोति’ इति।
tathā ‘ati-rātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇāti’, ‘na ati-rātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇāti’, ‘udite juhoti’, ‘anudite juhoti’ iti—
Similarly, in an Atirātra sacrifice he may optionally use (take up) or may not use (take up) the ‘Ṣo-ḍaśi’ (a particular sacrificial cup) or he may sacrifice either before or after sun-rise,

1.1.2 L.32 विधि-प्रतिषेधाश् च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः, विकल्पोत्सर्ग-अपवादाश् च।
vidhi-pratiṣedhāś ca atra arthavantaḥ syuḥ, vikalpotsarga-apavādāś ca—
And in this manner injunctions and prohibitions, options, and rules and their exceptions, have a proper raison d’etre.

1.1.2 L.33 न तु वस्तु ‘एवम् नैवम्’, ‘अस्ति न अस्ति’ इति वा विकल्प्यते।
na tu vastu ‘evam naivam’, ‘asti na asti’ iti vā vikalpyate—
But there is no such scope for exercising an option in the case of an existing entity, such as that it is like this or not like this or that it does not exist.

1.1.2 L.34 विकल्पनास् तु पुरुष-बुद्ध्य्-अपेक्षाः।
vikalpanās tu puruṣa-buddhy-apekṣāḥte—
Options again depend upon the notions of a person,

1.1.2 L.35 न वस्तु-याथा-आत्म्य-ज्ञानं पुरुष-बुद्ध्य्-अपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि? वस्तु-तन्त्रम् एव तत्।
na vastu-yāthā-ātmya-jñānaṃ puruṣa-buddhy-apekṣam। kiṃ tarhi? vastu-tantram eva tat—
While the knowledge of an entity as it actually is, depends upon the thing itself, and not upon the notions of a man.

1.1.2 L.36 न हि स्थाणाव् एकस्मिन् ‘स्थाणुर् वा पुरुषोऽन्यो वा’ इति तत्त्व-ज्ञानं भवति। तत्र ‘पुरुषोऽन्यो वा’ इति मिथ्या-ज्ञानम्, ‘स्थाणुर् एव’ इति तत्त्व-ज्ञानम्, वस्तु-तन्त्रत्वात्।
na hi sthāṇāv ekasmin ‘sthāṇur vā puruṣo'nyo vā’ iti tattva-jñānaṃ bhavati। tatra ‘puruṣo'nyo vā’ iti mithyā-jñānam, ‘sthāṇur eva’ iti tattva-jñānam, vastu-tantratvāt—
In the case of a pillar, for instance, that it is either a pillar or a man or something else cannot (each) be correct knowledge, because the knowledge that it is a pillar depends upon the pillar itself. In this manner, the authoritativeness or validity of the knowledge of an entity actually in existence depends upon the entity itself.

1.1.2 L.37 तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्म-ज्ञानम् अपि वस्तु-तन्त्रम् एव, भूत-वस्तु-विषयत्वात्।
tatraivaṃ sati brahma-jñānam api vastu-tantram eva, bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāt—
That being so, the knowledge of Brahman also, is knowledge depending upon the entity itself, in as much as it concerns the actually existing entity itself.

1.1.2 L.38 ननु भूत-वस्तु-विषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाण-अन्तर-विषयत्वम् एवेति वेदान्त-वाक्य-विचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता।
nanu bhūta-vastu-viṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ pramāṇa-antara-viṣayatvam eveti vedānta-vākya-vicāraṇā anarthikaiva prāptā—
But (says the opponent) Brahman being an existing entity, it is the province of other means of right knowledge also, and thus it comes to this that the consideration of the Scriptural passages is therefore purposeless.

1.1.2 L.39 न, इन्द्रिय-अविषयत्वेन संबन्ध-अग्रहणात्।
na, indriya-aviṣayatvena saṃbandha-agrahaṇāt—
No (we say), Brahman not being an object of sense, it has no relation with the sense-organs.

1.1.2 L.40 स्व-भावतो विषय-विषयाणि इन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्म-विषयाणि।
sva-bhāvato viṣaya-viṣayāṇi indriyāṇi, na brahma-viṣayāṇi—
Sense-organs by their very nature have sense-objects for their province while Brahman is not their province.

1.1.2 L.41 सति हि इन्द्रिय-विषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः, इदं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धं कार्यम् इति गृह्येत।
sati hi indriya-viṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ, idaṃ brahmaṇā saṃbaddhaṃ kāryam iti gṛhyeta—
Were Brahman to be an object of sense-organs, we would be able to know that this world (the effect of Brahman) is connected with Brahman.

1.1.2 L.42 कार्यमात्रम् एव तु गृह्यमाणं, किं ब्रह्मणा संबद्धम्? किम् अन्येन केनचिद् वा संबद्धम्? इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्।
kāryamātram eva tu gṛhyamāṇaṃ, kiṃ brahmaṇā saṃbaddham? kim anyena kenacid vā saṃbaddham? iti na śakyaṃ niścetum—
But we are unable to determine whether the world, which alone we are able to perceive, is connected with Brahman or something else.

1.1.2 L.43 तस्माज् जन्म-आदि-सूत्रं न अनुमाणोपन्यास-अर्थम्।
tasmāj janma-ādi-sūtraṃ na anumāṇopanyāsa-artham—
Therefore, the SūtraJanmādi etc.’ is not meant for the statement of an inference.

1.1.2 L.44 किं तर्हि? वेदान-वाक्य-प्रदर्शन-अर्थम्।
kiṃ tarhi? vedāna-vākya-pradarśana-artham—
What is it for, then? It is for commending the Vedānta passage to the notice (of the student).

1.1.2 L.45 किं पुनस् तद् वेदान्त-वाक्यं यत् सूत्रेणेह लिलक्षयिषितम्?
kiṃ punas tad vedānta-vākyaṃ yat sūtreṇeha lilakṣayiṣitam?—
Now what precisely is the Vedānta passage to which the Sūtra is meant to draw attention?

1.1.2 L.46 ‘भृगुर् वै वारुणिः। वरुणं पितरम् उपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति’ इत्य् उपक्रम्य
आह, ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत् प्रयन्त्य् अभिसंविशन्ति। तद् विजिज्ञासस्व। तद् ब्रह्मेति।’ (TaitU.3.1)
‘bhṛgur vai vāruṇiḥ। varuṇaṃ pitaram upasasāra। adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti’ ity upakramya
āha, ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante। yena jātāni jīvanti। yat prayanty abhisaṃviśanti। tad vijijñāsasva। tad brahmeti।’—

The scriptures beginning thus — “Bhṛgu the son of Varuṇa approached his father Varuṇa (and said) — ‘Oh Bhagavān, teach me what Brahman is’”,
Go on further and say — “That from which all these beings are born, that by which, after being born, they live, and that to which they go and in which they are absorbed, that (you should) try to know, that is Brahman” (TaitU.3.1).

1.1.2 L.47 तस्य च निर्णय-वाक्यम्, ‘आनन्दाद् ध्य् एव खल्व् इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्य् अभिसंविशन्ति।’ (TaitU.3.6) इति।
tasya ca nirṇaya-vākyam, ‘ānandād dhy eva khalv imāni bhūtāni jāyante। ānandena jātāni jīvanti। ānandaṃ prayanty abhisaṃviśanti।’ iti—
And of that the conclusive passage is — “From Bliss (Ānanda) these things are born, by Bliss, after they are born they live, and into Bliss, at death they enter” (TaitU.3.6).

1.1.2 L.48 अन्यान्य् अप्य् एवं जातीयकानि वाक्यानि निय-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्व-भाव-सर्वज्ञ-स्व-रूप-कारण-विषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि॥२॥
anyāny apy evaṃ jātīyakāni vākyāni niya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sva-bhāva-sarvajña-sva-rūpa-kāraṇa-viṣayāṇi udāhartavyāni—
Other similar passages also, having reference to the cause (Brahman) which has eternal purity, intelligence, freedom and omniscience as its nature, should be adduced in illustration. — 2.

– 2. Janma-ādy-Adhikaraṇam.

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1.1.3 L.1 जगत्-कारणत्व-प्रदर्शनेन सर्व-ज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्य् उपक्षिप्तम्, तद् एव द्रढयन्न् आह।
jagat-kāraṇatva-pradarśanena sarva-jñaṃ brahmety upakṣiptam, tad eva draḍhayann āha—
We have stated, by indicating that Brahman is the cause of the transitory world, that it is omniscient. Now wishing to make that statement firmer (the Sūtra-kāra) says: —


Śāstra: the scripture; Yonitvāt: being the source of or the means of the right knowledge.

🔗 (The omniscience of Brahman) follows from its being the source of the Śāstra i.e. the Scriptures. — 1.1.3.

1.1.3 L.2 महत ऋग्-वेद-आदेः शास्त्रस्य अनेक-विद्या-स्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत् सर्व-अर्थ-अवद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञ-कल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म।
mahata ṛg-veda-ādeḥ śāstrasya aneka-vidyā-sthānopabṛṃhitasya pradīpavat sarva-artha-avadyotinaḥ sarvajña-kalpasya yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ brahma—
Brahman is the source of i.e. the cause of the Śāstra comprising of the great Ṛg and other Vedas, the Śāstra which is supplemented by many Vidyās and which like a flambeau illuminates all objects and which is almost all-knowing.

1.1.3 L.3 न हि ईदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्-वेद-आदि-लक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञ-गुण-अन्वितस्य सर्वज्ञाद् अन्यतः संभवोऽस्ति।
na hi īdṛśasya śāstrasya ṛg-veda-ādi-lakṣaṇasya sarvajña-guṇa-anvitasya sarvajñād anyataḥ saṃbhavo'sti—
It is not possible, that such Śāstra of the nature of the Ṛg and the other Vedas, which is endowed with the quality of omniscience can have its origination from any thing other than what is omniscient.

1.1.3 L.4 यद्यद् विस्तर-अर्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुष-विशेषात् संभवति, यथा व्याकरण-आदि पाणिन्य्-आदेः, ज्ञेयैक-देश-अर्थम् अपि, स ततोऽप्य् अधिकतर-विज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके।
yadyad vistara-arthaṃ śāstraṃ yasmāt puruṣa-viśeṣāt saṃbhavati, yathā vyākaraṇa-ādi pāṇiny-ādeḥ, jñeyaika-deśa-artham api, sa tato'py adhikatara-vijñāna iti prasiddhaṃ loke—
It is well-known in the world that any author from whom any special body of Śāstra emanates — as, for instance, Grammar from Pāṇini — , and refers to only a branch of knowledge, possesses more knowledge than that Śāstra.

1.1.3 L.5 किम् उ वक्तव्यम्, अनेक-शाखा-भेद-भिन्नस्य देव-तिर्यङ्-मनुष्य-वर्ण-आश्रम-आदि-प्रविभाग-हेतोः ऋग्-वेद-आद्य्-आख्यस्य सर्वज्ञान-आकरस्य अप्रयत्नेनैव लीला-न्यायेन पुरुष-निःश्वासवत् यस्मान् महतो भूतात् योनेः संभवः,
kim u vaktavyam, aneka-śākhā-bheda-bhinnasya deva-tiryaṅ-manuṣya-varṇa-āśrama-ādi-pravibhāga-hetoḥ ṛg-veda-ādy-ākhyasya sarvajñāna-ākarasya aprayatnenaiva līlā-nyāyena puruṣa-niḥśvāsavat yasmān mahato bhūtāt yoneḥ saṃbhavaḥ,—
How can anything (more) be said about that great Being who is the source (Yoni), i.e. from whom, as if without any special effort and as if in sport and as naturally as its own breathings, is born the Ṛg-Veda, which is the ocean of all knowledge, the cause of the distinction as between all the different classes and conditions of the Devas, animals and men, and which is divided into many different branches,

1.1.3 L.6 ‘अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितम् एतद् यद् ऋग्-वेदः’ (BrhU.2.4.10) इत्य्-आदि-श्रुतेः, तस्य महतो भूतस्य निर्-अतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्व-शक्तिमत्त्वं चेति।
‘asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad ṛg-vedaḥ’ ity-ādi-śruteḥ, tasya mahato bhūtasya nir-atiśayaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ sarva-śaktimattvaṃ ceti—
According to the Scriptural passage — “That which is the Ṛg-Veda is but merely the breathing (the Divine Afflatus) of that great divine Being” (BrhU.2.4.10), and also that the great Being possesses unsurpassed omniscience and is all-powerful?

1.1.3 L.7 अथवा यथोक्तम् ऋग्-वेद-आदि-शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणम् अस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्-स्व-रूप-अधिगमेz।
athavā yathoktam ṛg-veda-ādi-śāstraṃ yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ pramāṇam asya brahmaṇo yathāvat-sva-rūpa-adhigame—
Or (we may construe the Sūtra in this way) — the Śāstra, Ṛg-Veda etc. described above, is the source, the cause, and the authoritative means of the understanding of the right knowledge of Brahman as it is.

1.1.3 L.8 शास्त्राद् एव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्म-आदि-कारणं ब्रह्म अधिगम्यत इत्य् अभिप्रायः।
śāstrād eva pramāṇāt jagato janma-ādi-kāraṇaṃ brahma adhigamyata ity abhiprāyaḥ—
What is meant to be conveyed is that Brahman which is the cause and origin etc. of this transitory world, is understood from the Śāstra (such as the Scriptures) which is the only means of right knowledge.

1.1.3 L.9 शास्त्रम् उदाहृतं पूर्व-सूत्रे, ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (TaitU.3.1) इत्य्-आदि।
śāstram udāhṛtaṃ pūrva-sūtre, ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ ity-ādi—
The Scriptural passage in point is quoted in the former Sūtra — “From which all beings are born” etc.

1.1.3 L.10 किम् अर्थं तर्हि इदं सूत्रम्, यावता पूर्व-सूत्रेणैव एवं-जातीयकं शास्त्रम् उदाहरता शास्त्र-योनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम्।
kim arthaṃ tarhi idaṃ sūtram, yāvatā pūrva-sūtreṇaiva evaṃ-jātīyakaṃ śāstram udāharatā śāstra-yonitvaṃ brahmaṇo darśitam—
(The opponent asks) — in that case what is the occasion for this Sūtra, when by quoting the Scriptures you have indicated that Brahman has this Śāstra as its source?

1.1.3 L.11 उच्यते तत्र पूर्व-सूत्र-अक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्य अनुपादानाज् जन्म-आदि केवलम् अनुमानम् उपन्यस्तम् इत्य् आशङ्कयेत,
ucyate tatra pūrva-sūtra-akṣareṇa spaṣṭaṃ śāstrasya anupādānāj janma-ādi kevalam anumānam upanyastam ity āśaṅkayeta,—
We reply — The words of the previous Sūtra did not clearly indicate the Śāstra, and hence one may feel a doubt that by the word ‘Janmādi’ only an inference is stated.

1.1.3 L.12 ताम् आशङ्कां निवर्तयितुम् इदं सूत्रं प्रववृते ‘शास्त्र-योनित्वात्’ इति॥३॥
tām āśaṅkāṃ nivartayitum idaṃ sūtraṃ pravavṛte ‘śāstra-yonitvāt’ iti—
And now, this Sūtra endeavours to remove this doubt, (by stating) ‘From its being the source” etc. — 3.

– 3. Śāstra-yonitva-Adhikaraṇam.

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1.1.4 L.1 कथं पुनर् ब्रह्मणः शास्त्र-प्रमाणकत्वम् उच्यते, यावता ‘आम्नायस्य क्रिया-अर्थत्वाद् आनर्थक्यम् अतद्-अर्थानाम्’ (जै॰सू॰ १.२.१) इति क्रिया-परत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम्।
kathaṃ punar brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-pramāṇakatvam ucyate, yāvatā ‘āmnāyasya kriyā-arthatvād ānarthakyam atad-arthānām’ (jai॰sū॰ 1.2.1) iti kriyā-paratvaṃ śāstrasya pradarśitam—
But (it is again objected) how can it be said that Brahman has the Śāstra (the Scriptures) as its authority, since it has been shown (by me) on the authority — “The Vedas having action (Kriyā) as their purpose, those portions of it which do not indicate any action, are purposeless” (Jai. Sū. 1.2.1), that the Scriptures indicate action.

1.1.4 L.2 अतो वेदान्तानाम् आनर्थक्यम्, अक्रिया-अर्थत्वात्।
ato vedāntānām ānarthakyam, akriyā-arthatvāt—
Those portions of the Scriptures which are known by the name of Vedānta, are therefore purposeless, because they do not indicate that any action is meant (by them).

1.1.4 L.3 कर्तृ-देवता-आदि-प्रकाशन-अर्थत्वेन वा क्रिया-विधि-शेषत्वम्, उपासना-आदि-क्रिया-अन्तर-विधान-अर्थत्वं वा।
kartṛ-devatā-ādi-prakāśana-arthatvena vā kriyā-vidhi-śeṣatvam, upāsanā-ādi-kriyā-antara-vidhāna-arthatvaṃ vā—
Or else (it may be said) that by way of indicating an agent or a deity etc., or by way of indicating an injunction to action such as devout meditation, they are but supplementary to an injunction to action.

1.1.4 L.4 न हि परिनिष्ठित-वस्तु-प्रतिपादनं संभवति, प्रत्यक्ष-आदि-विषयत्वात् परिनिष्ठ-वस्तुनः,
na hi pariniṣṭhita-vastu-pratipādanaṃ saṃbhavati, pratyakṣa-ādi-viṣayatvāt pariniṣṭha-vastunaḥ,—
But it is not at all possible that they are for the purpose of propounding an entity firmly established as an entity, because an established entity is an object of direct perception etc.,

1.1.4 L.5 तत्-प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेय-रहिते पुरुष-अर्थ-अभावात्।
tat-pratipādane ca heyopādeya-rahite puruṣa-artha-abhāvāt—
And also because there is absence of any aim of man being served by propounding anything which is not connected with something which has to be given up (Heya) or accepted (Upadeya).

1.1.4 L.6 अत एव ‘सोऽरोदीत्’ इत्य् एवम्-आदीनाम् आनर्थक्यं मा भूद् इति
ata eva ‘so'rodīt’ ity evam-ādīnām ānarthakyaṃ mā bhūd iti—
It is precisely because of this, viz. that sentences like “He wept” should not be rendered purposeless,

1.1.4 L.7 ‘विधिना त्व् एक-वाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्य्-अर्थेन विधीनां स्युः’ (जै॰सू॰ १.२.७) इति स्तावकत्वेन अर्थवत्त्वम् उक्तम्।
‘vidhinā tv eka-vākyatvāt stuty-arthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ’ (jai॰sū॰ 1.2.7) iti stāvakatvena arthavattvam uktam।—
That they are said to be useful by way of glorification (of the passage with which they are connected) on the authority of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Jai. Sū. 1.2.7), thus — “These sentences being in syntactical relation with an injunctional passage, they are for the glorification of that injunction.”

1.1.4 L.8 मन्त्राणां च ‘इषे त्वा’ (यजुर्-वेद १.१.१) इत्य्-आदीनां क्रिया-तत्-साधन-अभिधायित्वेन कर्म-समवायित्वम् उक्तम्।
mantrāṇāṃ ca ‘iṣe tvā’ (yajur-veda 1.1.1) ity-ādīnāṃ kriyā-tat-sādhana-abhidhāyitvena karma-samavāyitvam uktam—
In the same way Mantras like “For strength I cut thee (Oh blade of grass)” (recited when Darbhas are being cut for the Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa sacrifice) are said to be in a relation of invariable concomittance to action, by indicating action and the means to accomplish the same.

1.1.4 L.9 न क्वचिद् अपि वेद-वाक्यानां विधि-संस्पर्शम् अन्तरेण अर्थवत्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा।
na kvacid api veda-vākyānāṃ vidhi-saṃsparśam antareṇa arthavattā dṛṣṭā upapannā vā—
It is nowhere observed nor is it reasonably understandable from the Scriptural passages, that they are purposeful as apart from their being connected with an injunction in some way.

1.1.4 L.10 न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तु-स्व-रूपे विधिः संभवति, क्रिया-विषयत्वाद् विधेः।
na ca pariniṣṭhite vastu-sva-rūpe vidhiḥ saṃbhavati, kriyā-viṣayatvād vidheḥ—
In the case of an entity established as such, an injunction is not possible, because an injunction has action for its province.

1.1.4 L.11 तस्मात् कर्म-अपेक्षित-कर्तृ-स्व-रूप-देवता-आदि-प्रकाशनेन क्रिया-विधि-शेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम्।
tasmāt karma-apekṣita-kartṛ-sva-rūpa-devatā-ādi-prakāśanena kriyā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ vedāntānām—
Therefore (the opponent concludes) the Vedāntas are merely supplementary to injunctions for action, by way of making the nature of the agent and the deities necessary for such action, manifest.

1.1.4 L.12 अथ प्रकरण-अन्तर-भयान् न एतद् अभ्युपगम्यते, तथा अपि स्व-वाक्य-गतोपासना-आदि-कर्म-परत्वम्।
atha prakaraṇa-antara-bhayān na etad abhyupagamyate, tathā api sva-vākya-gatopāsanā-ādi-karma-paratvam—
If it be said that they cannot be so understood because it is feared that that would necessarily imply a different chapter (Prakaraṇa), then they may be understood as indicating actions such as devout meditation etc. referred to in their passages.

1.1.4 L.13 तस्मान् न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्र-योनित्वम् इति प्राप्ते, उच्यते,
tasmān na brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-yonitvam iti prāpte, ucyate,—
The conclusion of the opponent, then, being that Brahman has not the Scriptures as its origin, the reply given is: —

तत्तु समन्वयात्॥१.१.४॥
Tat tu samanvayāt.

Tat: that; Tu: but; Samanvayāt: on account of agreement or harmony, because it is the main purpose.

🔗 But it is so (i.e. Brahman is so known from the Scriptures), because they (i.e. all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence. — 1.1.4.

1.1.4 L.14 तु-शब्दः पूर्व-पक्ष-व्यावृत्त्य्-अर्थः।
tu-śabdaḥ pūrva-pakṣa-vyāvṛtty-arthaḥ—
The word ‘Tu’ (but) in the Sūtra means the rebuttal of the objections (of the opponent).

1.1.4 L.15 तद् ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्व-शक्ति जगद्-उत्पत्ति-स्थिति-लय-कारणं वेदान्त-शास्त्राद् एव अवगम्यते।
tad brahma sarvajñaṃ sarva-śakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-laya-kāraṇaṃ vedānta-śāstrād eva avagamyate—
That the all-powerful cause of the origin, preservation and dissolution of the transient world is the omniscient Brahman, is understood from the Vedānta Śāstra itself.

1.1.4 L.16 कथम्? समन्वयात्।
katham? samanvayāt—
How so? Because that is the connected sequence (Samanvaya).

1.1.4 L.17 सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्-पर्येणैतस्य अर्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि
sarveṣu hi vedānteṣu vākyāni tāt-paryeṇaitasya arthasya pratipādakatvena samanugatāni—
In all the Vedānta texts the sentences construe properly by intimating that to be the meaning.

1.1.4 L.18 ‘सद् एव सोम्येदम् अग्र आसीत् एकम् एव अद्वितीयम्’ (ChanU.6.2.1),
‘sad eva somyedam agra āsīt ekam eva advitīyam’,—
For instance (the following texts) — “In the beginning, Oh Saumya, this world was just Being (Sat), the one only without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1),

1.1.4 L.19 ‘आत्मा वा इदम् एक एव अग्र आसीत्’ (AitU.1.1.1),
‘ātmā vā idam eka eva agra āsīt’,—
And “This Self alone was in existence in the beginning” (AitU.1.1.1),

1.1.4 L.20 ‘तद् एतद् ब्रह्म अपूर्वम् अनपरम् अनन्तरम् अबाह्यम्।
अयम् आत्मा ब्रह्म सर्व-अनुभूः’ (BrhU.2.5.19),
‘tad etad brahma apūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam।
ayam ātmā brahma sarva-anubhūḥ’,—

And “That precisely is this Brahman, without itself being the cause, without itself being an effect, having nothing inside or outside of it.
This is the Self, the Brahman which perceives everything” (BrhU.2.5.19),

1.1.4 L.21 ‘ब्रह्मैवेदम् अमृतं पुरस्तात्’ (MunU.2.2.11) इत्य्-आदीनि।
‘brahmaivedam amṛtaṃ purastāt’ ity-ādīni—
And “It is that immortal Brahman right in front” (MunU.2.2.11) etc.

1.1.4 L.22 न च तद्-गतानां पदानां ब्रह्म-स्व-रूप-विषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमाने अर्थ-अन्तर-कल्पना युक्ता,
na ca tad-gatānāṃ padānāṃ brahma-sva-rūpa-viṣaye niścite samanvaye'vagamyamāne artha-antara-kalpanā yuktā, —
It is not proper to attribute any other meaning to these passages when their connected sequence is determined to be with regard to the nature of Brahman,

1.1.4 L.23 श्रुत-हान्य्-अश्रुत-कल्पना-प्रसङ्गात्।
Because, otherwise there would be the predicament of the abandonment of what is stated in the Scriptures and the acceptance of something which is not so stated.

1.1.4 L.24 न च तेषां कर्तृ-देवता-आदि-स्व-रूप-प्रतिपादन-परता अवसीयते, ‘तत् केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.2.4.14) इत्य्-आदि-क्रिया-कारक-फल-निराकरण-श्रुतेः।
na ca teṣāṃ kartṛ-devatā-ādi-sva-rūpa-pratipādana-paratā avasīyate, ‘tat kena kaṃ paśyet’ ity-ādi-kriyā-kāraka-phala-nirākaraṇa-śruteḥ—
It cannot be understood that they propound the nature of the agent, because of the Scriptural statement “Then by what should one see and whom?” (BrhU.2.4.14) which in effect rejects all actions, agents and fruits.

1.1.4 L.25 न च परिनिष्ठित-वस्तु-स्व-रूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्ष-आदि-विषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः,
na ca pariniṣṭhita-vastu-sva-rūpatve'pi pratyakṣa-ādi-viṣayatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ,—
Nor can Brahman, though it is determined to be of the nature of an already established entity, be an object of direct perception,

1.1.4 L.26 ‘तत् त्वम् असि’ (ChanU.6.8.7…) इति ब्रह्म-आत्म-भावस्य शास्त्रम् अन्तरेण अनवगम्यमानत्वात्।
‘tat tvam asi’ iti brahma-ātma-bhāvasya śāstram antareṇa anavagamyamānatvāt—
Because it is not possible to comprehend, except by means of the Śāstra, that the Self is Brahman, as conveyed by the Scriptural passage — “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7).

1.1.4 L.27 यत् तु हेयोपादेय-रहितत्वाद् उपदेश-आनर्थक्यम् इति,
yat tu heyopādeya-rahitatvād upadeśa-ānarthakyam iti,—
As regards the objection (of the opponent) that any instruction which does not require the giving up or the accepting of anything, is purposeless,

1.1.4 L.28 नैष दोषः, हेयोपादेय-शून्य-ब्रह्म-आत्मता-अवगमाद् एव सर्व-क्लेश-प्रहाणात् पुरुष-अर्थ-सिद्धेः।
naiṣa doṣaḥ, heyopādeya-śūnya-brahma-ātmatā-avagamād eva sarva-kleśa-prahāṇāt puruṣa-artha-siddheḥ—
(We say) this is no fault, because the highest aim of man is accomplished by knowing, that Brahman, from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added, is the Self, and that it destroys all misery.

1.1.4 L.29 देवता-आदि-प्रतिपादनस्य तु स्व-वाक्य-गतोपासना-अर्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद् विरोधः।
devatā-ādi-pratipādanasya tu sva-vākya-gatopāsanā-arthatve'pi na kaścid virodhaḥ—
There is no contradiction even if it be understood that it has the purpose of propounding the deities etc. connected with the devout meditation referred to in its own passages (in Vedānta).

1.1.4 L.30 न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासना-विधि-शेषत्वं संभवति,
na tu tathā brahmaṇa upāsanā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ saṃbhavati,—
Understanding it even in that manner would not render Brahman as being supplementary to an injunction for devout meditation,

1.1.4 L.31 एकत्वे हेयोपादेय-शून्यतया क्रिया-कारक-आदि-द्वैत-विज्ञानोपमर्दोपपत्तेः।
ekatve heyopādeya-śūnyatayā kriyā-kāraka-ādi-dvaita-vijñānopamardopapatteḥ—
For it can be reasonably sustainable that when the unity of Brahman and the Self is understood, there is destruction of all notions of duality, of actions, agents etc., there being then nothing to give up or to accept.

1.1.4 L.32 न हि एकत्व-विज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैत-विज्ञानस्य पुनः संभवोऽस्ति,
येनोपासना-विधि-शेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्येत।
na hi ekatva-vijñānenonmathitasya dvaita-vijñānasya punaḥ saṃbhavo'sti, yenopāsanā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ pratipādyeta—
There is no possibility of the revival of the notion of duality which has once been uprooted by the knowledge of absolute unity,
Because of which we would again arrive at the conclusion about Brahman being supplementary to an injunction for devout meditation.

1.1.4 L.33 यद्य् अपि अन्यत्र वेद-वाक्यानां विधि-संस्पर्शम् अन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्,
yady api anyatra veda-vākyānāṃ vidhi-saṃsparśam antareṇa pramāṇatvaṃ na dṛṣṭam,—
Though elsewhere (i.e. in the Karma-kāṇḍa) we do not accept the validity or authoritativeness of Vedic passages except when they are connected with injunctions,

1.1.4 L.34 तथा अप्य् आत्म-विज्ञानस्य फल-पर्यन्तत्वान् न तद्-विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्।
tathā apy ātma-vijñānasya phala-paryantatvān na tad-viṣayasya śāstrasya prāmāṇyaṃ śakyaṃ pratyākhyātum—
Still as the knowledge of the Self results in its own fruit, it would not be possible to impugn the validity or authoritativeness of the Śāstra dealing with the subject of the Self.

1.1.4 L.35 न च अनुमान-गम्यं शास्त्र-प्रामाण्यम्, येन अन्यत्र दृष्टं निदर्शनम् अपेक्षेत।
na ca anumāna-gamyaṃ śāstra-prāmāṇyam, yena anyatra dṛṣṭaṃ nidarśanam apekṣeta—
It is not that the validity or authoritativeness of this Śāstra is inferable, so that it may expect instances observed elsewhere (to be cited).

1.1.4 L.36 तस्मात् सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्र-प्रमाणकत्वम्॥
tasmāt siddhaṃ brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-pramāṇakatvam—
Therefore it is proved that Brahman has the Scriptures as its valid authority.

1.1.4 L.37 अत्र अपरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते, यद्य् अपि शास्त्र-प्रमाणकं ब्रह्म,
तथा अपि प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-विषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते,
atra apare pratyavatiṣṭhante, yady api śāstra-pramāṇakaṃ brahma,
tathā api pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayaiva śāstreṇa brahma samarpyate,—

Here some others come forward with the objection thus — Even though Brahman has the Śāstra as the only means to its right knowledge,
Still the Śāstra culminates in making Brahman an object of an injunction for Upāsanā i.e. meditation (Pratipatti),

1.1.4 L.38 यथा यूप-आहवनीय-आदीन्य् अलौकिकान्य् अपि विधि-शेषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यन्ते, तद्वत्।
yathā yūpa-āhavanīya-ādīny alaukikāny api vidhi-śeṣatayā śāstreṇa samarpyante, tadvat—
Just as the Śāstra culminates in making the sacrificial post (Yūpa) and the Āhavanīya Agni etc., though they are not familiar in ordinary life, as being supplementary to an injunction.

1.1.4 L.39 कुत एतत्? प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ति-प्रयोजन-परत्वाच् छास्त्रस्य।
kuta etat? pravṛtti-nivṛtti-prayojana-paratvāc chāstrasya—
Whence do you get that? Because the Śāstra has the purport of either promoting or discouraging (action).

1.1.4 L.40 तथा हि शास्त्र-तात्-पर्यविदाम् आहुः, ‘दृष्टो हि तस्य अर्थः कर्म-अवबोधनम्’ (शा॰भा॰ १.१.१) इति।
tathā hi śāstra-tāt-paryavidām āhuḥ, ‘dṛṣṭo hi tasya arthaḥ karma-avabodhanam’ (śā॰bhā॰ 1.1.1) iti—
For, those who know the Śāstra have said so, thus — “The obvious meaning of it (i.e. the Veda) is seen to be an instruction to do something” (Jai. Sū. 1.1.1),

1.1.4 L.41 ‘चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्’ (शा॰भा॰ १.१.२), ‘तस्य ज्ञानम् उपदेशः’ (जै॰सू॰ १.१.५),
‘codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam’ (śā॰bhā॰ 1.1.2), ‘tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ’ (jai॰sū॰ 1.1.5),—
“Injunction is a statement which stimulates action, and instruction is the knowledge of that” (Jai. Sū. 1.1.5),

1.1.4 L.42 ‘तद्-भूतानां क्रिया-अर्थेन समाम्नायः’ (जै॰सू॰ १.१.२५),
‘tad-bhūtānāṃ kriyā-arthena samāmnāyaḥ’ (jai॰sū॰ 1.1.25),—
“Words in a sentence should be construed as having relation to a word signifying action” (Jai. Sū. 1.1.25),

1.1.4 L.43 ‘आम्नायस्य क्रिया-अर्थत्वाद् आनर्थक्यम् अतद्-अर्थानाम्’ (जै॰सू॰ १.२.१) इति च।
‘āmnāyasya kriyā-arthatvād ānarthakyam atad-arthānām’ (jai॰sū॰ 1.2.1) iti ca—
“As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is without a purpose” (Jai. Sū. 1.2.1).

1.1.4 L.44 अतः पुरुषं क्वचिद् विषय-विशेषे प्रवर्तयत् कुतश्चिद् विषय-विशेषान् निवर्तयच् च अर्थवच् छास्त्रम्।
ataḥ puruṣaṃ kvacid viṣaya-viśeṣe pravartayat kutaścid viṣaya-viśeṣān nivartayac ca arthavac chāstram—
Hence it is in stimulating a person to activity with regard to some particular object, or by making him averse to act with regard to some other object, that the Scriptures have a purpose,

1.1.4 L.45 तच्-छेषतया च अन्यद् उपयुक्तम्।
tac-cheṣatayā ca anyad upayuktam—
And that (part of it) which does not do so is utilized as being supplementary to action.

1.1.4 L.46 तद्-सामान्याद् वेदान्तानाम् अपि तथैव अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात्।
tad-sāmānyād vedāntānām api tathaiva arthavattvaṃ syāt—
In common with it, Vedānta passages likewise, will have a purpose only in the same way.

1.1.4 L.47 सति च विधि-परत्वे, यथा स्वर्ग-आदि-कामस्य अग्नि-होत्र-आदि-साधनं विधीयते,
sati ca vidhi-paratve, yathā svarga-ādi-kāmasya agni-hotra-ādi-sādhanaṃ vidhīyate,—
The Scriptures being of the nature of injunctions, it stands to reason that just as Agni-hotra and other means are enjoined on one who is desirous of heaven etc.,

1.1.4 L.48 एवम् अमृतत्व-कामस्य ब्रह्म-ज्ञानं विधीयत इति युक्तम्।
evam amṛtatva-kāmasya brahma-jñānaṃ vidhīyata iti yuktam—
Similarly acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on one who is desirous of immortality.

1.1.4 L.49 नन्व् इह जिज्ञास्य-वैलक्षण्यम् उक्तम्,
nanv iha jijñāsya-vailakṣaṇyam uktam,—
But (says the Bhāṣya-kāra) a difference in the nature of what is desired to be known is mentioned here.

1.1.4 L.50 कर्म-काण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः,
इह तु भूतं नित्य-निर्वृत्तं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यम् इति।
karma-kāṇḍe bhavyo dharmo jijñāsyaḥ,
iha tu bhūtaṃ nitya-nirvṛttaṃ brahma jijñāsyam iti—

In the Karma-kāṇḍa what is indicated as desired to be known is Duty (Dharma), which is performed some time in the future,
But here on the contrary the already existing and eternally established Brahman is indicated as that which is desired to be known.

1.1.4 L.51 तत्र धर्म-ज्ञान-फलाद् अनुष्ठान-अपेक्षाद् वि-लक्षणं ब्रह्म-ज्ञान-फलं भवितुम् अर्हति।
tatra dharma-jñāna-phalād anuṣṭhāna-apekṣād vi-lakṣaṇaṃ brahma-jñāna-phalaṃ bhavitum arhati—
Therefore the fruit in the form of the knowledge of Brahman is different from the fruit in the form of the knowledge of Duty which expects the doing of some particular act.

1.1.4 L.52 न अर्हत्य् एवं भवितुम्, कार्य-विधि-प्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात्।
na arhaty evaṃ bhavitum, kārya-vidhi-prayuktasyaiva brahmaṇaḥ pratipādyamānatvāt—
(The Vṛtti-kāra says — ) It does not deserve to be so, because what is intended to be propounded is Brahman, which is connected with an injunction for something to be done,

1.1.4 L.53 ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5–6),
‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ’,—
As for instance — “Verily the Self is to be seen (BrhU.2.4.5).

1.1.4 L.54 ‘य आत्मा अपहत-पाप्मा … सोऽन्वेष्ठव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (ChanU.8.7.1),
‘ya ātmā apahata-pāpmā … so'nveṣṭhavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ’,—
When the following injunctional statements are there, viz. “That Ātmā (Self), which is sinless — he is to be looked for, he is to be understood” (ChanU.8.7.1),

1.1.4 L.55 ‘आत्मेत्य् एवोपासीत’ (BrhU.1.4.7), ‘आत्मानम् एव लोकम् उपासीत’ (BrhU.1.4.15),
‘ātmety evopāsīta’, ‘ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta’,—
“Let (a man) meditate devoutly on the Self only, as his true state” (BrhU.1.4.15),

1.1.4 L.56 ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (MunU.3.2.9) इत्य्-आदि-विधानेषु सत्सु,
‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’ ity-ādi-vidhāneṣu satsu,—
“He who knows Brahman, himself becomes Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9), etc.,

1.1.4 L.57 ‘कोऽसाव् आत्मा?’ ‘किं तद् ब्रह्म?’ इत्य् आकाङ्क्षायां तत्-स्व-रूप-समर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः,
‘ko'sāv ātmā?’ ‘kiṃ tad brahma?’ ity ākāṅkṣāyāṃ tat-sva-rūpa-samarpaṇena sarve vedāntā upayuktāḥ,—
And when there is a desire to know what that Brahman is and what that Self is, all the Vedānta passages are employed in intimating the nature of Brahman, thus: —

1.1.4 L.58 ‘नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्व-गतो नित्य-तृप्तो नित्य-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्व-भावो विज्ञानम् आनन्दं ब्रह्म’ इत्य् एवम्-आदयः।
‘nityaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarva-gato nitya-tṛpto nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sva-bhāvo vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma’ ity evam-ādayaḥ—
(Brahman) is eternal, omniscient, all-pervading, absolutely eternally satisfied, and is of the nature of being eternally pure, intelligent, and free, and is knowledge and Bliss etc.

1.1.4 L.59 तद्-उपासनाच् च शास्त्र-दृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं भविष्यति इति।
tad-upāsanāc ca śāstra-dṛṣṭo'dṛṣṭo mokṣaḥ phalaṃ bhaviṣyati iti—
It is through devout meditation that the fruit viz. Final Release which is not capable of being seen, but is envisaged by the Śāstra, will accrue.

1.1.4 L.60 कर्तव्य-विध्य्-अननुप्रवेशे वस्तुमात्र-कथने हानोपादान-असंभवात्
kartavya-vidhy-ananupraveśe vastumātra-kathane hānopādāna-asaṃbhavāt—
If the Vedānta passages were not to lead towards an injunction to some action, and were to be statements of mere things only, then by reason of the impossibility (in such a case) of knowing what is to be given up or what is to be accepted,

1.1.4 L.61 ‘सप्त-द्वीपा वसुमती’, ‘राजा असौ गच्छति’ इत्य्-आदि-वाक्यवद्-वेदान्त-वाक्यानाम् आनर्थक्यम् एव स्यात्।
‘sapta-dvīpā vasumatī’, ‘rājā asau gacchati’ ity-ādi-vākyavad-vedānta-vākyānām ānarthakyam eva syāt—
The Vedānta passages would be as purposeless as the sentences ‘The Earth consists of seven islands’, ‘Here goes the king’ etc.

1.1.4 L.62 ननु वस्तुमात्र-कथनेऽपि ‘रज्जुर् इयं, न अयं सर्पः’ इत्य्-आदौ भ्रान्ति-जनित-भीति-निवर्तनेन अर्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम्।
nanu vastumātra-kathane'pi ‘rajjur iyaṃ, na ayaṃ sarpaḥ’ ity-ādau bhrānti-janita-bhīti-nivartanena arthavattvaṃ dṛṣṭam—
But (says the Bhāṣya-kāra) just as even the mere mention of a fact viz. that this is a rope and not a snake, has meaning by way of removing the fear caused by the erroneous opinion (that it is a snake),

1.1.4 L.63 तथेह अप्य् असंसार्य्-आत्म-वस्तु-कथनेन संसारित्व-भ्रान्ति-निवर्तनेन अर्थवत्त्वं स्यात्।
tatheha apy asaṃsāry-ātma-vastu-kathanena saṃsāritva-bhrānti-nivartanena arthavattvaṃ syāt—
So also here, the mere mention of the entity i.e. the Self which is not of a transmigratory nature, would have a meaning by way of removing the erroneous opinion about its being of a transmigratory nature.

1.1.4 L.64 स्याद् एतद् एवम्, यदि रज्जु-स्व-रूप-श्रवण इव सर्प-भ्रान्तिः, संसारित्व-भ्रान्तिर् ब्रह्म-स्व-रूप-श्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत।
syād etad evam, yadi rajju-sva-rūpa-śravaṇa iva sarpa-bhrāntiḥ, saṃsāritva-bhrāntir brahma-sva-rūpa-śravaṇamātreṇa nivarteta—
(The Vṛtti-kāra replies —) This would be so, provided the erroneous opinion about the Self being of a transmigratory nature were to be removed by merely hearing about the nature of Brahman, even as the erroneous opinion about a rope being a snake is removed by hearing about the nature of the rope as being a rope only.

1.1.4 L.65 न तु निवर्तते, श्रुत-ब्रह्मणोऽपि यथा पूर्वं सुख-दुःख-आदि-संसारि-धर्म-दर्शनात्,
na tu nivartate, śruta-brahmaṇo'pi yathā pūrvaṃ sukha-duḥkha-ādi-saṃsāri-dharma-darśanāt,—
But it is not so removed, because even in the case of a person who has heard what Brahman is, he is still seen to be affected by pleasure, pain and such other attributes of a transmigratory being,

1.1.4 L.66 ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5, 4.5.6) इति च
श्रवणोत्तर-कालयोर् मनन-निदिध्यासनयोर् विधि-दर्शनात्।
‘śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ’ iti ca
śravaṇottara-kālayor manana-nididhyāsanayor vidhi-darśanāt—

And because we see that there are such injunctions (in the Scriptures) about hearing and cogitating upon the Self, thus —
“The Self should be heard and cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon” (BrhU.2.4.5).

1.1.4 L.67 तस्मात् प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-विषयतयैव शास्त्र-प्रमाणकं ब्रह्म अभ्युपगन्तव्यम् इति॥
tasmāt pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayaiva śāstra-pramāṇakaṃ brahma abhyupagantavyam iti—
Therefore Brahman should be understood as having the Śāstra as the right means of its knowledge, by way of its being an object of an injunction for meditation (i.e. Upāsanā).

1.1.4 L.68 अत्र अभिधीयते, न, कर्म-ब्रह्म-विद्या-फलयोर् वैलक्षण्यात्।
atra abhidhīyate, na, karma-brahma-vidyā-phalayor vailakṣaṇyāt—
To all this (The Bhāṣya-kāra replies) — No, because of the dissimilarity between the fruits of actions and the fruits of the knowledge of Brahman.

1.1.4 L.69 शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुति-स्मृति-सिद्धं धर्म-आख्यम्,
यद्-विषया जिज्ञासा ‘अथ अतो धर्म-जिज्ञासा’ (जै॰सू॰ १.१.१) इति सूत्रिता।
śārīraṃ vācikaṃ mānasaṃ ca karma śruti-smṛti-siddhaṃ dharma-ākhyam,
yad-viṣayā jijñāsā ‘atha ato dharma-jijñāsā’ (jai॰sū॰ 1.1.1) iti sūtritā—

Action, known by the name of ‘duty’ from the Scriptures and Smṛtis, is the activity of the body, speech and the mind,
The desire to know which is expressed in the Sūtra — “Now therefore the inquiry into Duty”,

1.1.4 L.70 अधर्मोऽपि हिंसा-आदिः प्रतिषेध-चोदना-लक्षणत्वाज् जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय।
adharmo'pi hiṃsā-ādiḥ pratiṣedha-codanā-lakṣaṇatvāj jijñāsyaḥ parihārāya—
And that which is non-Duty, such as killing etc., which is of the nature of a prohibition has to be inquired into with a view to avoid the doing of it.

1.1.4 L.71 तयोश् चोदना-लक्षणयोर् अर्थ-अनर्थयोर् धर्म-अधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुख-दुःखे शरीर-वाङ्-मनोभिर् एवोपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रिय-संयोग-जन्ये ब्रह्म-आदिषु (देहवत्सु) स्थावर-अन्तेषु प्रसिद्धे।
tayoś codanā-lakṣaṇayor artha-anarthayor dharma-adharmayoḥ phale pratyakṣe sukha-duḥkhe śarīra-vāṅ-manobhir evopabhujyamāne viṣayendriya-saṃyoga-janye brahma-ādiṣu (dehavatsu) sthāvara-anteṣu prasiddhe—
The fruits of these good and evil things such as duties and non-duties which are of the nature of an injunction, which actually are pleasure and pain respectively and which arise out of the union of the sense-organs and sense-objects and are experienced only by the body, speech and the mind, are generally known by all, right from the Brahman (Hiraṇya-garbha) down to the inanimate things.

1.1.4 L.72 मनुष्यत्वाद् आरभ्य ब्रह्म-अन्तेषु देहवत्सु सुख-तारतम्यम् अनुश्रूयते।
manuṣyatvād ārabhya brahma-anteṣu dehavatsu sukha-tāratamyam anuśrūyate—
The Scriptures declare that there are different degrees of pleasure as experienced by all embodied beings, from men right up to the Brahman (Hiraṇya-garbha).

1.1.4 L.73 ततश् च तद्-धेतोर् धर्मस्य तारतम्यं गम्यते। धर्म-तारतम्याद् अधिकारि-तारतम्यम्।
tataś ca tad-dhetor dharmasya tāratamyaṃ gamyate। dharma-tāratamyād adhikāri-tāratamyam—
Hence from them we understand that there are comparative degrees of Duty which is their cause and from these comparative degrees of Duty, the comparative degrees of the competency of persons who perform such Duties (is understood).

1.1.4 L.74 प्रसिद्धं च अर्थित्व-सामर्थ्य-आदि-कृतम् अधिकारि-तारतम्यम्।
prasiddhaṃ ca arthitva-sāmarthya-ādi-kṛtam adhikāri-tāratamyam—
The comparative degrees of the competency of persons performing such Duties is well-known as being caused by their ability for actions and their desire for certain results.

1.1.4 L.75 तथा च याग-आद्य्-अनुष्ठायिनाम् एव विद्या-समाधि-विशेषाद् उत्तरेण पथा गमनम्,
tathā ca yāga-ādy-anuṣṭhāyinām eva vidyā-samādhi-viśeṣād uttareṇa pathā gamanam,—
Thus we learn that only those who perform Sacrifices and have special ability for meditation (Upāsanā) and concentration on Deities etc., proceed by the Northern Path (Devāyana)

1.1.4 L.76 केवलैर् इष्टा-पूर्त-दत्त-साधनैर् धूम-आदि-क्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा गमनम्
kevalair iṣṭā-pūrta-datta-sādhanair dhūma-ādi-krameṇa dakṣiṇena pathā gamanam—
And those who perform only minor Sacrifices and works of charity and public utility, proceed by the Southern Path (Pitṛ-yāṇa),

1.1.4 L.77 तत्र अपि सुख-तारतम्यम्, तत्-साधन-तारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् ‘यावत् संपातम् उषित्वा’ (ChanU.5.10.5) इत्य् अस्माद् गम्यते।
tatra api sukha-tāratamyam, tat-sādhana-tāratamyaṃ ca śāstrāt ‘yāvat saṃpātam uṣitvā’ ity asmād gamyate—
And we also know from the Śāstra, such as the Scriptural passage “Having dwelt there till their action is worked out or consumed” (ChanU.5.10.5), that even there such comparative degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure are understood (as existing).

1.1.4 L.78 तथा मनुष्य-आदिषु नारक-स्थावर-अन्तेषु सुख-लवश् चोदना-लक्षण-धर्म-साध्य एवेति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः।
tathā manuṣya-ādiṣu nāraka-sthāvara-anteṣu sukha-lavaś codanā-lakṣaṇa-dharma-sādhya eveti gamyate tāratamyena vartamānaḥ—
We also know that beginning from man down to those who reside in hell, and all the inanimate things, there exists a comparative modicum of pleasure attainable by ‘Duty’ (Dharma) which is of the nature of an injunction.

1.1.4 L.79 तथोर्ध्व-गतेष्व् अधो-गतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःख-तारतम्य-दर्शनात् तद्-धेतोर् अधर्मस्य प्रतिषेध-चोदना-लक्षणस्य तद्-अनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते।
tathordhva-gateṣv adho-gateṣu ca dehavatsu duḥkha-tāratamya-darśanāt tad-dhetor adharmasya pratiṣedha-codanā-lakṣaṇasya tad-anuṣṭhāyināṃ ca tāratamyaṃ gamyate—
So also in the case of those who possess a body and who have either gone down (the abyss) or gone up (to heaven), in as much as comparative degrees of pain are to be seen, it is understood, that its cause viz. religious demerit (Adharma), which is known from prohibitory injunctions, as well as those who perpetrate such non-meritorious actions, also have such comparative degrees.

1.1.4 L.80 एवम् अविद्या-आदि-दोषवतां धर्म-अधर्म-तारतम्य-निमित्तं शरीरोपादान-पूर्वकं सुख-दुःख-तारतम्यम् अनित्यं संसार-रूपं श्रुति-स्मृति-न्याय-प्रसिद्धम्।
evam avidyā-ādi-doṣavatāṃ dharma-adharma-tāratamya-nimittaṃ śarīropādāna-pūrvakaṃ sukha-duḥkha-tāratamyam anityaṃ saṃsāra-rūpaṃ śruti-smṛti-nyāya-prasiddham—
In this manner, in the case of those who are affected by the fault of the nature of Nescience etc., that there are differences in the comparative degrees of pleasure and pain which are of the transitory nature of a transmigratory existence and which are caused by their merit or demerit and which are preceded by a prior assumption of a body, is well-known from the Scriptures, Smṛtis and Nyāya (Logic).

1.1.4 L.81 तथा च श्रुतिः ‘न ह वै स-शरीरस्य सतः प्रिय-अप्रिययोर् अपहतिर् अस्ति’ इति यथा-वर्णितं संसार-रूपम् अनुवदति।
tathā ca śrutiḥ ‘na ha vai sa-śarīrasya sataḥ priya-apriyayor apahatir asti’ iti yathā-varṇitaṃ saṃsāra-rūpam anuvadati—
The Scriptural passage “As long as he continues to possess a body, there is no freedom for him from pleasure and pain” refers to the transmigratory nature as described above.

1.1.4 L.82 ‘अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रिय-अप्रिये स्पृशतः’ (ChanU.8.12.1) इति प्रिय-अ-प्रिय-स्पर्शन-प्रतिषेधाच् चोदना-लक्षण-धर्म-कार्यत्वं मोक्ष-आख्यस्य अशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यत इति गम्यते।
‘aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priya-apriye spṛśataḥ’ iti priya-a-priya-sparśana-pratiṣedhāc codanā-lakṣaṇa-dharma-kāryatvaṃ mokṣa-ākhyasya aśarīratvasya pratiṣidhyata iti gamyate—
So also we learn from the Scriptural passage “When he is once rid of this body neither pleasure nor pain affect him” (ChanU.8.12.1), which denies any touch of either pleasure or pain, that the disembodied condition called Final Release is not the result of religious Duty (Dharma) which is of the nature of an injunction.

1.1.4 L.83 धर्म-कार्यत्वे हि प्रिय-अप्रिय-स्पर्शन-प्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते।
dharma-kāryatve hi priya-apriya-sparśana-pratiṣedho nopapadyate—
Were it to be the result of religious duty, such denial of being touched either by pleasure or pain would not be reasonably sustainable.

1.1.4 L.84 अशरीरत्वम् एव धर्म-कार्यम् इति चेत्, न, तस्य स्वा-भाविकत्वात्,
aśarīratvam eva dharma-kāryam iti cet, na, tasya svā-bhāvikatvāt,—
If it be said (by the opponent) that the disembodied condition is itself the result of Duty, (we reply that) it is not so, because the condition of being unembodied is natural to the Ātmā

1.1.4 L.85 ‘अशरीरग्ँ शरीरेषु अनवस्थेष्व् अवस्थितम्। महान्तं विभुम् आत्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति’ (KathU.1.2.22),
‘aśarīragm̐ śarīreṣu anavastheṣv avasthitam। mahāntaṃ vibhum ātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati’,—
As illustrated by the following Scriptural passages — “The wise one, knowing the Self to be bodiless amongst the embodied, unchanging amongst the changeable, great and omni-present, does not grieve” (KathU.1.2.22),

1.1.4 L.86 ‘अप्राणो ह्य् अमनाः शुभ्रः’ (MunU.2.1.2),
‘aprāṇo hy amanāḥ śubhraḥ’,—
“He is without vital breath (Prāṇa), without mind and is pure” (MunU.2.1.2),

1.1.4 L.87 ‘असङ्गो ह्य् अयं पुरुषः’ (BrhU.4.3.15) इत्य्-आदि-श्रुतिभ्यः।
‘asaṅgo hy ayaṃ puruṣaḥ’ (BrhU.4.3.15) ity-ādi-śrutibhyaḥ—
“That Puruṣa is without any attachment” (BrhU.4.3.15).

1.1.4 L.88 अत एव अनुष्ठेय-कर्म-फल-वि-लक्षणं मोक्ष-आख्यम् अशरिरत्वं नित्यम् इति सिद्धम्।
ata eva anuṣṭheya-karma-phala-vi-lakṣaṇaṃ mokṣa-ākhyam aśariratvaṃ nityam iti siddham—
It is proved therefore that the eternal unembodied condition called ‘Final Release’ is dissimilar to the fruit of action which has to be performed.

1.1.4 L.89 तत्र किंचित् परिणामि-नित्यं यस्मिन् विक्रियमाणेऽपि ‘तद् एवेदम्’ इति बुद्धिर् न विहन्यते,
tatra kiṃcit pariṇāmi-nityaṃ yasmin vikriyamāṇe'pi ‘tad evedam’ iti buddhir na vihanyate,—
Amongst these eternal things there are some which are eternal but subject to modification, and though they undergo such modification, the notion of their being the same eternal things is not destroyed,

1.1.4 L.90 यथा पृथिव्य्-आदि जगन्-नित्यत्व-वादिनाम्, यथा च सांख्यानां गुणाः।
yathā pṛthivy-ādi jagan-nityatva-vādinām, yathā ca sāṃkhyānāṃ guṇāḥ—
As for instance, the Earth, as understood by those who hold the view that this transitory world is eternal, or the Attributes (Guṇas) according to the Sāṅkhyas.

1.1.4 L.91 इदं तु पारम-अर्थिकं कूटस्थ-नित्यं व्योमवत् सर्व-व्यापि सर्व-विक्रिया-रहितं नित्य-तृप्तं निर्-अवयवं स्वयं-ज्योतिः-स्व-भावम्,
idaṃ tu pārama-arthikaṃ kūṭastha-nityaṃ vyomavat sarva-vyāpi sarva-vikriyā-rahitaṃ nitya-tṛptaṃ nir-avayavaṃ svayaṃ-jyotiḥ-sva-bhāvam,—
This (Self or Brahman) however is eternal in the highest sense, eternally unchanging, all-pervading like the sky (Ākāśa), free from all modifications, eternally contented, without any parts, and is of the nature of a self-luminant entity,

1.1.4 L.92 यत्र धर्म-अधर्मौ सह कार्येण काल-त्रयं च नोपावर्तेते।
yatra dharma-adharmau saha kāryeṇa kāla-trayaṃ ca nopāvartete—
In whose case meritorious or unmeritorious religious duty or actions along with their effects, in the past, present or future, do not apply.

1.1.4 L.93 तद् एतद् अशरीरत्वं मोक्ष-आख्यम् ‘अन्यत्र धर्माद्, अन्यत्र अधर्माद्, अन्यत्र अस्मात् कृत-अकृतात्।
अन्यत्र भूताच् च भव्याच् च’ (KathU.1.2.24) इत्य्-आदि-श्रुतिभ्यः।
tad etad aśarīratvaṃ mokṣa-ākhyam ‘anyatra dharmād,
anyatra adharmād, anyatra asmāt kṛta-akṛtāt। anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca’ ity-ādi-śrutibhyaḥ—

And this precisely is that unembodied condition called Final Release, according to such Scriptural passages as “Different from duty (Dharma) and non-duty (Adharma), different from every effect and cause,
And different from past and the future also” (KathU.1.2.24) etc.

1.1.4 L.94 अतस् तद् ब्रह्म, यस्येयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता। तद् यदि कर्तव्य-शेषत्वेनोपदिश्येत,
atas tad brahma, yasyeyaṃ jijñāsā prastutā। tad yadi kartavya-śeṣatvenopadiśyeta,—
Hence if this Brahman, an inquiry about which is proposed here, were to be propounded (by the Scriptures) as being supplementary to action (Karma)

1.1.4 L.95 तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश् चेन् मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत,
अनित्य एव स्यात्।
tena ca kartavyena sādhyaś cen mokṣo'bhyupagamyeta,
anitya eva syāt—

And were Final Release (Mokṣa) to be understood as obtainable through action,
It would necessarily be of a transitory nature,

1.1.4 L.96 तत्रैवं सति यथोक्त-कर्म-फलेष्व् एव तारतम्य-अवस्थितेष्व् अनित्येषु कश्चिद् अतिशयो मोक्ष इति प्रसज्येत।
tatraivaṃ sati yathokta-karma-phaleṣv eva tāratamya-avasthiteṣv anityeṣu kaścid atiśayo mokṣa iti prasajyeta—
And it would then come to this, that Final Release is but only a superior type of a transitory fruit of actions as amongst those described above, and which stand to each other in the comparative degrees (of greatness or smallness).

1.1.4 L.97 नित्यश् च मोक्षः सर्वैर् मोक्ष-वादिभिर् अभ्युपगम्यते।
nityaś ca mokṣaḥ sarvair mokṣa-vādibhir abhyupagamyate—
All those who regard Final Release as a creed, understand it as being eternal,

1.1.4 L.98 अतो न कर्तव्य-शेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः।
ato na kartavya-śeṣatvena brahmopadeśo yuktaḥ—
And therefore it would not be proper to propound Brahman as being supplementary to action.

1.1.4 L.99 अपि च ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (MunU.3.2.9),
api ca ‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’,—
Besides the following passages from the Scriptures “He who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9),

1.1.4 L.100 ‘क्षीयन्ते च अस्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे पर-अवरे’ (MunU.2.2.8),
‘kṣīyante ca asya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe para-avare’,—
“All the sum total of his actions perishes when he who is both the higher and the lower is beheld” (MunU.2.2.8),

1.1.4 L.101 ‘आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न बिभेति कुतश्चन’ (TaitU.2.9)।
‘ānandaṃ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kutaścana’—
“He who knows the joy of Brahman is never afraid” (TaitU.2.9).

1.1.4 L.102 ‘अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि’ (BrhU.4.2.4),
‘abhayaṃ vai janaka prāpto'si’,—
“O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness” (BrhU.4.2.4),

1.1.4 L.103 ‘तद् आत्मानम् एव अवेद् अहं ब्रह्म अस्मि इति,
तस्मात् तत् सर्वम् अभवत्’ (BrhU.1.4.10, वाज्॰ब्रा॰उ॰ १.४.१०),
‘tad ātmānam eva aved ahaṃ brahma asmi iti,
tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat’,—

“That Brahman knew itself, only as itself being Brahman,
Therefore it became all that” (BrhU.1.4.10),

1.1.4 L.104 ‘तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वम् अनुपश्यतः’ (IsU.7) इत्य्
एवम्-आद्याः श्रुतयो ब्रह्म-विद्या-अनन्तरम् मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्य-अन्तरं वारयन्ति।
‘tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ’ ity
evam-ādyāḥ śrutayo brahma-vidyā-anantaram mokṣaṃ darśayantyo madhye kārya-antaraṃ vārayanti—

“To him who realizes the unity of all, whence can there be any infatuation or bewailing” (IsU.7) etc., —
Which show that Final Release comes about simultaneously with the knowledge of Brahman, preclude the possibility of any action in between the two.

1.1.4 L.105 तथा ‘तद्धैतत् पश्यन्न् ऋषिर् वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुर् अभवं सूर्यश् च’ (BrhU.1.4.10) इति
ब्रह्म-दर्शन-सर्व-आत्म-भावयोर् मध्ये कर्तव्य-अन्तर-वारणायोदाहार्यम्,
tathā ‘taddhaitat paśyann ṛṣir vāmadevaḥ pratipede'haṃ manur abhavaṃ sūryaś ca’ iti
brahma-darśana-sarva-ātma-bhāvayor madhye kartavya-antara-vāraṇāyodāhāryam,—

We can similarly quote as an illustration the Scriptural passage “Seeing this the sage Vāma-deva understood, I was Manu, I am the sun” (BrhU.1.4.10),
To show, that in between the realization of Brahman and becoming one with the Universal Self there is no other action in between,

1.1.4 L.106 यथा ‘तिष्ठन् गायति’ इति तिष्ठति-गायत्योर् मध्ये तत्-कर्तृकं कार्य-अन्तरं न अस्ति इति गम्यते।
yathā ‘tiṣṭhan gāyati’ iti tiṣṭhati-gāyatyor madhye tat-kartṛkaṃ kārya-antaraṃ na asti iti gamyate—
Just as in the sentence “He sings standing” we understand that there is no other action intervening between his singing and standing.

1.1.4 L.107 ‘त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकम् अविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि’ (PrasU.6.8),
‘tvaṃ hi naḥ pitā yo'smākam avidyāyāḥ paraṃ pāraṃ tārayasi’,—
Passages from the Scriptures such as “You indeed are our father, you who carry us from ignorance to the other shore beyond” (PrasU.6.8),

1.1.4 L.108 ‘श्रुतं ह्य् एव मे भगवद्-दृशेभ्यस् तरति शोकम् आत्मविद् इति,
सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि, तं मा भगवाञ् छोकस्य पारं तारयतु’ (ChanU.7.1.3),
‘śrutaṃ hy eva me bhagavad-dṛśebhyas tarati śokam ātmavid iti,
so'haṃ bhagavaḥ śocāmi, taṃ mā bhagavāñ chokasya pāraṃ tārayatu’,—

“I have heard from men like you, that one who knows the Self overcomes grief,
I myself am in similar grief, the Bhagavān should help me to tide over the grief” (ChanU.7.1.3),

1.1.4 L.109 ‘तस्मै मृदित-कषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान् सनत्कुमारः’ (ChanU.7.26.2) इति चैवम्-आद्याः श्रुतयो
मोक्ष-प्रतिबन्ध-निवृत्तिमात्रम् एव आत्म-ज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति।
‘tasmai mṛdita-kaṣāyāya tamasaḥ pāraṃ darśayati bhagavān sanatkumāraḥ’ iti caivam-ādyāḥ śrutayo
mokṣa-pratibandha-nivṛttimātram eva ātma-jñānasya phalaṃ darśayanti—

“To him whose faults had been washed off, Bhagavān Sanat-kumāra showed the other side beyond the darkness” (ChanU.7.26.2),
Show that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman consists in merely the removal of the obstacle to Final Release.

1.1.4 L.110 तथा च आचार्य-प्रणीतं न्यायोपबृंहितं सूत्रम्,
‘दुःख-जन्म-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-मिथ्या-ज्ञानानाम् उत्तरोत्तर-अपाये तद्-अनन्तर-अपायाद् अपवर्गः’ (न्या॰सू॰ १.१.२) इति।
tathā ca ācārya-praṇītaṃ nyāyopabṛṃhitaṃ sūtram,
‘duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñānānām uttarottara-apāye tad-anantara-apāyād apavargaḥ’ (nyā॰sū॰ 1.1.2) iti—

Similar is the Sūtra of the great teacher (Gautama) supplemented by reasoning, thus —
Final Release (results) from the successive removal of erroneous ignorance, faults, activity, birth and pain, the removal of each succeeding member of the series serving to cause the removal of the one coming earlier (Nyāya Su. 1.1.2).

1.1.4 L.111 मिथ्या-ज्ञान-अपायश् च ब्रह्म-आत्मैकत्व-विज्ञानाद् भवति।
mithyā-jñāna-apāyaś ca brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñānād bhavati—
This removal of the erroneous ignorance moreover results from the knowledge of the unity of one’s own Self with Brahman.

1.1.4 L.112 न चेदं ब्रह्म-आत्मैकत्व-विज्ञानं संपद्-रूपम्,
na cedaṃ brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñānaṃ saṃpad-rūpam,—
This knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing (Sampad-rūpa),

1.1.4 L.113 यथा ‘अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वे देवा अनन्तम् एव स तेन लोकं जयति’ (BrhU.3.1.9) इति।
yathā ‘anantaṃ vai mano'nantā viśve devā anantam eva sa tena lokaṃ jayati’ iti—
As for instance in the passage “The mind is infinite, the Viśve-devas are infinite: he thereby conquers the infinite world” (BrhU.3.1.9).

1.1.4 L.114 न च अध्यास-रूपम्,
na ca adhyāsa-rūpam,—
Nor is it of the nature of a superimposition,

1.1.4 L.115 यथा ‘मनो ब्रह्मेत्य् उपासीत’ (ChanU.3.18.1),
yathā ‘mano brahmety upāsīta’,—
As for instance in the passages “Contemplate devoutly on the mind as Brahman” (ChanU.3.18.1),

1.1.4 L.116 ‘आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्य् आदेशः’ (ChanU.3.19.1) इति च
मन-आदित्य-आदिषु ब्रह्म-दृष्ट्य्-अध्यासः।
‘ādityo brahmety ādeśaḥ’ iti ca
mana-āditya-ādiṣu brahma-dṛṣṭy-adhyāsaḥ—

“The advice is that the sun is Brahman” (ChanU.3.19.1) etc.,
Where there is a superimposition by way of looking upon the mind and the sun respectively as Brahman.

1.1.4 L.117 न अपि विशिष्ट-क्रिया-योग-निमित्तम्
‘वायुर् वाव संवर्गः … प्राणो वाव संवर्गः’ (ChanU.4.3.1–3) इतिवत्।
na api viśiṣṭa-kriyā-yoga-nimittam
‘vāyur vāva saṃvargaḥ … prāṇo vāva saṃvargaḥ’ itivat—

Nor is it something caused by any special action,
As for instance “Vāyu indeed is the absorber” (ChanU.4.3.1), “The Vital Breath (Prāṇa) indeed is the absorber” (ChanU.4.3.3).

1.1.4 L.118 न अप्य् आज्य-अवेक्षण-आदि-कर्मवत् कर्म-अङ्ग-संस्कार-रूपम्।
na apy ājya-avekṣaṇa-ādi-karmavat karma-aṅga-saṃskāra-rūpam—
Nor is it of the nature of any special process of the refinement (Saṃskāra) of any thing supplementary to action, such as the act of looking upon the sacrificial ghee etc. (Ājyāvekṣaṇa).

1.1.4 L.119 संपद्-आदि-रूपे हि ब्रह्म-आत्मैकत्व-विज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने
saṃpad-ādi-rūpe hi brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñāne'bhyupagamyamāne—
If we were to understand the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman, to be of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing,

1.1.4 L.120 ‘तत् त्वम् असि’ (ChanU.6.8.7), ‘अहं ब्रह्म अस्मि’ (BrhU.1.4.10), ‘अयम् आत्मा ब्रह्म’ (BrhU.2.5.19) इत्य् एवम्-आदीनां वाक्यानां ब्रह्म-आत्मैकत्व-वस्तु-प्रतिपादन-परः पद-समन्वयः पीड्येत।
‘tat tvam asi’, ‘ahaṃ brahma asmi’, ‘ayam ātmā brahma’ ity evam-ādīnāṃ vākyānāṃ brahma-ātmaikatva-vastu-pratipādana-paraḥ pada-samanvayaḥ pīḍyeta—
Then the co-ordinated meaning of the sentences such as “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7) and “I am Brahman” (BrhU.1.4.10) and “This Self is Brahman” (BrhU.2.5.19) which have the purport of propounding the unity of the Self and Brahman, would be done violence to,

1.1.4 L.121 ‘भिद्यते हृदय-ग्रन्थिश् छिद्यन्ते सर्व-संशयाः’ (MunU.2.2.8) इति चैवम्-आदीन्य्
अविद्या-निवृत्ति-फल-श्रवणान्य् उपरुध्येरन्।
‘bhidyate hṛdaya-granthiś chidyante sarva-saṃśayāḥ’ iti caivam-ādīny avidyā-nivṛtti-phala-śravaṇāny uparudhyeranv—
And would contradict Scriptural passages about the fruit in the form of the removal of Nescience
Such as “The knots of the Hṛdaya are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved” (MunU.2.2.8),

1.1.4 L.122 ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (MunU.3.2.9) इति चैवम्-आदीनि तद्-भाव-आपत्ति-वचनानि संपद्-आदि-पक्षे न सामञ्जस्येनोपपद्येरन्।
‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’ iti caivam-ādīni tad-bhāva-āpatti-vacanāni saṃpad-ādi-pakṣe na sāmañjasyenopapadyeran—
And passages like “knowing Brahman, he became Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9) which speak about the Self attaining the condition of Brahman, cannot be properly understood.

1.1.4 L.123 तस्मान् न संपद्-आदि-रूपं ब्रह्म-आत्मैकत्व-विज्ञानम्।
tasmān na saṃpad-ādi-rūpaṃ brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñānam—
Therefore the knowledge of the unity of the Self and Brahman is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a small thing etc.;

1.1.4 L.124 अतो न पुरुष-व्यापार-तन्त्रा ब्रह्म-विद्या।
ato na puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantrā brahma-vidyā—
Hence also, the science of the knowledge of Brahman does not depend upon some sort of operation by man.

1.1.4 L.125 किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्ष-आदि-प्रमाण-विषय-वस्तु-ज्ञानवद् वस्तु-तन्त्रैव।
kiṃ tarhi? pratyakṣa-ādi-pramāṇa-viṣaya-vastu-jñānavad vastu-tantraiva—
What is it then? It is that it depends upon the thing itself, even as is the knowledge of a thing which is the object of the right means of knowledge such as direct perception.

1.1.4 L.126 एवं-भूतस्य ब्रह्मणस् तज्-ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचिद् युक्त्या शक्यः कार्य-अनुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम्।
evaṃ-bhūtasya brahmaṇas taj-jñānasya ca na kayācid yuktyā śakyaḥ kārya-anupraveśaḥ kalpayitum—
It is not possible to imagine by any method of reasoning, that Brahman or the knowledge of Brahman which happens to be of such a nature, is supplementary to action.

1.1.4 L.127 न च विदि-क्रिया-कर्मत्वेन कार्य-अनुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः,
‘अन्यद् एव तद् विदिताद् अथो अविदिताद् अधि’ (KenU.1.3) इति
na ca vidi-kriyā-karmatvena kārya-anupraveśo brahmaṇaḥ,
‘anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi’ iti

Nor can Brahman be said to be supplementary to action, as being an object of the act of knowing,
Because, the Scriptural passage — “It is different from the known as well as the unknown” (KenU.1.3) —
Denies that it is the object of the act of knowing,

1.1.4 L.128 ‘येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्?’ (BrhU.2.4.13) इति च।
‘yenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijānāti taṃ kena vijānīyāt?’ iti ca—
As also the Scriptural passage — “How should one know him, by whose help one knows all this?” (BrhU.2.4.13).

1.1.4 L.129 तथोपास्ति-क्रिया-कर्मत्व-प्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति,
यद् वाचा अनभ्युदितं येन वाग् अभ्युद्यते’ (KenU.1.4) इत्य् अविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य,
tathopāsti-kriyā-karmatva-pratiṣedho'pi bhavati,
‘yad vācā anabhyuditaṃ yena vāg abhyudyate’ ity aviṣayatvaṃ brahmaṇa upanyasya,—

Similarly there is a denial of Brahman being the object of the act of devout meditation,
Because, after having declared Brahman as not being an object (of sense), by the Scriptural passage — “That which is not proclaimed by speech, but by which speech is made manifest” —

1.1.4 L.130 ‘तद् एव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि, नेदं यद् इदम् उपासते’ (KenU.1.8) इति।
‘tad eva brahma tvaṃ viddhi, nedaṃ yad idam upāsate’ iti—
It is said — “you should know that alone as Brahman, and not this on which you are devoutly meditating” (KenU.1.4).

1.1.4 L.131 अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्र-योनित्व-अनुपपत्तिर् इति चेत्।
aviṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-yonitva-anupapattir iti cet—
If there is an objection (by the opponent) that in case Brahman is not an object (of sense), the Śāstra could not possibly be its source (as is said in Sūtra 2),

1.1.4 L.132 न, अविद्या-कल्पित-भेद-निवृत्ति-परत्वाच् छास्त्रस्य।
na, avidyā-kalpita-bheda-nivṛtti-paratvāc chāstrasya—
We reply — No, because the Śāstra has concern merely for the removal of difference imagined through Nescience

1.1.4 L.133 न हि शास्त्रम् इदंतया विषय-भूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति।
na hi śāstram idaṃtayā viṣaya-bhūtaṃ brahma pratipipādayiṣati—
And it does not purport to propound Brahman as being an object objectively, thus — This is Brahman.

1.1.4 L.134 किं तर्हि? प्रत्यग्-आत्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयत्
अविद्या-कल्पितं वेद्य-वेदितृ-वेदन-आदि-भेदम् अपनयति।
kiṃ tarhi? pratyag-ātmatvena aviṣayatayā pratipādayat
avidyā-kalpitaṃ vedya-veditṛ-vedana-ādi-bhedam apanayati—

What then does it propound? It propounds Brahman as not being an object (of sense), but as being the Universal Self
And thereby removes the distinction between objects to be known, the knower, and the act of knowing etc., as imagined through Nescience.

1.1.4 L.135 तथा च शास्त्रम्, ‘यस्य अमतं तस्य मतं, मतं यस्य न वेद सः।
अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातम् अविजानताम्’ (KenU.2.3),
tathā ca śāstram, ‘yasya amataṃ tasya mataṃ, mataṃ yasya na veda saḥ।
avijñātaṃ vijānatāṃ vijñātam avijānatām’,—

Similarly the Scriptures say — “It is conceived by him by whom it is not conceived. He by whom it is conceived, knows it not,
It is not understood by those who say they understand it, and it is understood by those who say that they understand it not” (KenU.2.3),

1.1.4 L.136 ‘न दृष्टेर् द्रष्टारं पश्येर्, … न विज्ञातेर् विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः’ (BrhU.3.4.2) इति चैवम्-आदि।
‘na dṛṣṭer draṣṭāraṃ paśyer, … na vijñāter vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāḥ’ iti caivam-ādi—
“You cannot see the seer of sight, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot perceive the perceiver of perception, you cannot know the knower of knowledge” (BrhU.3.4.2) etc.

1.1.4 L.137 अतोऽविद्या-कल्पित-संसारित्व-निवर्तनेन नित्य-मुक्त-आत्म-स्व-रूप-समर्पणान् न मोक्षस्य अनित्यत्व-दोषः।
ato'vidyā-kalpita-saṃsāritva-nivartanena nitya-mukta-ātma-sva-rūpa-samarpaṇān na mokṣasya anityatva-doṣaḥ—
Hence, Final Release is not open to the fault of being transitory, because the removal of the notion of the transitory condition, imagined through Nescience, culminates in indicating Final Release to be of the nature of the eternally free Self.

1.1.4 L.138 यस्य तु उत्पाद्यो मोक्षः, तस्य
मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यम् अपेक्षत इति युक्तम्।
yasya tu utpādyo mokṣaḥ, tasya
mānasaṃ vācikaṃ kāyikaṃ vā kāryam apekṣata iti yuktam—

For him however, who holds Final Release as something to be effected (by action),
It would be logical to say that it depends upon the mental, vocal or bodily action.

1.1.4 L.139 तथा विकार्यत्वे च। तयोः पक्षयोर् मोक्षस्य ध्रुवम् अनित्यत्वम्।
tathā vikāryatve ca। tayoḥ pakṣayor mokṣasya dhruvam anityatvam—
Final Release would certainly be transitory also in the case of those who consider it as being something which undergoes modification.

1.1.4 L.140 न हि दध्य्-आदि विकार्यम् उत्पाद्यं वा घट-आदि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके।
na hi dadhy-ādi vikāryam utpādyaṃ vā ghaṭa-ādi nityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ loke—
In the ordinary worldly life, things like curds which result by modification (of milk) and things like an earthen pot which are the result of manufacture (from earth), are not observed to be everlasting.

1.1.4 L.141 न च आप्यत्वेन अपि कार्य-अपेक्षा, स्व-आत्म-रूपत्वे सत्य् अनाप्यत्वात्,
na ca āpyatvena api kārya-apekṣā, sva-ātma-rūpatve saty anāpyatvāt,—
Nor can there be any expectation of some sort of action, by considering Final Release as something to be obtained, for, as Brahman is of the nature of one’s own Self, it is not capable of being obtained (from outside).

1.1.4 L.142 स्व-रूप-व्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो न आप्यत्वम्,
सर्व-गतत्वेन नित्य-आप्त-स्व-रूपत्वात् सर्वेण ब्रह्मण आकाशस्येव।
sva-rūpa-vyatiriktatve'pi brahmaṇo na āpyatvam,
sarva-gatatvena nitya-āpta-sva-rūpatvāt sarveṇa brahmaṇa ākāśasyeva—

Even if Brahman is considered to be something different from one’s own self, it is not capable of being obtained,
Because of its being all-pervading like the Ākāśa, and as all persons always happen to possess it in themselves as their own nature.

1.1.4 L.143 न अपि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः, येन व्यापारम् अपेक्षेत।
na api saṃskāryo mokṣaḥ, yena vyāpāram apekṣeta—
Nor is Final Release something which admits of being subjected to a process of refinement, so that it should expect some sort of operation.

1.1.4 L.144 संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुण-आधानेन वा स्यात्, दोष-अपनयनेन वा।
saṃskāro hi nāma saṃskāryasya guṇa-ādhānena vā syāt, doṣa-apanayanena vā—
Refinement can be effected either by the addition of some attribute (to a thing), or by the removal of some blemish (in it).

1.1.4 L.145 न तावद् गुण-आधानेन संभवति,
अनाधेय-अतिशय-ब्रह्म-स्व-रूपत्वान् मोक्षस्य,
na tāvad guṇa-ādhānena saṃbhavati,
anādheya-atiśaya-brahma-sva-rūpatvān mokṣasya,—

It is not possible to refine Final Release by the addition to it of some attribute,
Because Final Release is of the nature of Brahman to which nothing can possibly be added.

1.1.4 L.146 न अपि दोष-अपनयनेन, नित्य-शुद्ध-ब्रह्म-स्व-रूपत्वान् मोक्षस्य।
na api doṣa-apanayanena, nitya-śuddha-brahma-sva-rūpatvān mokṣasya—
Nor is it possible to refine it by the removal of some blemish, because Final Release is of the nature of Brahman which is eternally pure.

1.1.4 L.147 स्व-आत्म-धर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रियया आत्मनि संस्क्रियमाणेऽभिव्यज्यते,
यथा आदर्शे निघर्षण-क्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्म इति चेत्,
sva-ātma-dharma eva san tirobhūto mokṣaḥ kriyayā ātmani saṃskriyamāṇe'bhivyajyate,
yathā ādarśe nigharṣaṇa-kriyayā saṃskriyamāṇe bhāsvaratvaṃ dharma iti cet,—

If it be argued by the opponent, that just as a mirror which is subjected to a process of polishing becomes bright and shining,
Similarly Final Release being an attribute of the Self which for the time being happens to be obscured, becomes manifest when it is subjected to a process of refinement by some sort of action,

1.1.4 L.148 न, क्रिया-आश्रयत्व-अनुपपत्तेर् आत्मनः।
na, kriyā-āśrayatva-anupapatter ātmanaḥ—
We reply — No, because it cannot be reasonably understood that the Self can ever be an object of any sort of action on it,

1.1.4 L.149 यद्-आश्रया हि क्रिया, तम् अविकुर्वती नैव आत्मानं लभते।
yad-āśrayā hi kriyā, tam avikurvatī naiva ātmānaṃ labhate—
Because action can never come into being without causing any modification into that in which it abides.

1.1.4 L.150 यद्य् आत्मा क्रियया विक्रियेत अनित्यत्वम् आत्मनः प्रसज्येत।
yady ātmā kriyayā vikriyeta anityatvam ātmanaḥ prasajyeta—
If the Self were to be liable to modification by action on itself, it would mean that it is not eternal,

1.1.4 L.151 ‘अविकार्योऽयम् उच्यते’ इति चैवम्-आदीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन्। तच् च अनिष्टम्।
‘avikāryo'yam ucyate’ iti caivam-ādīni vākyāni bādhyeran। tac ca aniṣṭam—
And in that case Scriptural passages such as “It is said to be unmodifiable” would be contradicted, which is not desirable.

1.1.4 L.152 तस्मान् न स्व-आश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः संभवति।
tasmān na sva-āśrayā kriyā ātmanaḥ saṃbhavati—
Therefore there is no possibility of the Self ever acting on itself,

1.1.4 L.153 अन्य-आश्रयायास् तु क्रियाया अविषयत्वान् न तया आत्मा संस्क्रियते।
anya-āśrayāyās tu kriyāyā aviṣayatvān na tayā ātmā saṃskriyate—
And as the Self is not the object of any action which has another object as the sphere of its activity, the Self is in no way modified by any such action.

1.1.4 L.154 ननु देह-आश्रयया स्नान-आचमन-यज्ञोपवीत-आदिकया क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः।
nanu deha-āśrayayā snāna-ācamana-yajñopavīta-ādikayā kriyayā dehī saṃskriyamāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ—
But says the opponent, the Jīva-self (i.e. the individual embodied Self) is observed to acquire refinement by such actions as bathing, performing Ācamana (sipping water) and wearing the sacred thread, which depend upon there being a body.

1.1.4 L.155 न, देह-आदि-संहतस्यैव अविद्या-गृहीतस्य आत्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात्।
na, deha-ādi-saṃhatasyaiva avidyā-gṛhītasya ātmanaḥ saṃskriyamāṇatvāt—
No, we reply, the one that acquires this refinement is the Jīva-Self, which under the influence of Nescience, has for the time being connection with a body.

1.1.4 L.156 प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नान-आचमन-आदेर् देह-समवायित्वम्।
pratyakṣaṃ hi snāna-ācamana-āder deha-samavāyitvam—
For it is a matter of direct perception that such bathing and Ācamana is in direct relation with the body,

1.1.4 L.157 तया देह-आश्रयया तत्-संहत एव कश्चिद् अविद्यया आत्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम्।
tayā deha-āśrayayā tat-saṃhata eva kaścid avidyayā ātmatvena parigṛhītaḥ saṃskriyata iti yuktam—
And therefore it is proper to hold, that by that action of which the body is the sphere, it is only that particular Jīva-Self which under the influence of Nescience, is (for the time being) the Self of that body, that acquires the refinement.

1.1.4 L.158 यथा देह-आश्रय-चिकित्सा-निमित्तेन धानु-साम्येन तत्-संहतस्य तद्-अभिमानिन आरोग्य-फलम्,
yathā deha-āśraya-cikitsā-nimittena dhānu-sāmyena tat-saṃhatasya tad-abhimānina ārogya-phalam,—
Just as by the re-establishment of the humoral balance (of a body) by means of medical treatment, it is that embodied Jīva-Self which is in connection with such a body which it considers to be its, that gets the fruit in the form of perfect health,

1.1.4 L.159 ‘अहम् अरोगः’ इति यत्र बुद्धिर् उत्पद्यते,
‘aham arogaḥ’ iti yatra buddhir utpadyate,—
And it is that embodied Jīva-Self in which this consciousness of the absence of any such malaise arises.

1.1.4 L.160 एवं स्नान-आचमन-यज्ञोपवीत-आदिकना ‘अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः’ इति यत्र बुद्धिर् उत्पद्यते, स संस्क्रियते।
evaṃ snāna-ācamana-yajñopavīta-ādikanā ‘ahaṃ śuddhaḥ saṃskṛtaḥ’ iti yatra buddhir utpadyate, sa saṃskriyate—
In a similar way it is that embodied Jīva-Self in which there arises the consciousness of such refinement by such bathing and Ācamana and the wearing of the sacred thread thus — I have been purified and refined — that happens to acquire such refinement.

1.1.4 L.161 स च देहेन संहत एव।
sa ca dehena saṃhata eva—
He is of course in contact with that body,

1.1.4 L.162 तेनैव अहं-कर्त्रा अहं-प्रत्यय-विषयेन प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते।
tenaiva ahaṃ-kartrā ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣayena pratyayinā sarvāḥ kriyā nirvartyante—
And all actions performed by him, who — as being the object of the terms ‘I’ and ‘agent’ — is the experiencer,

1.1.4 L.163 तत्-फलं च स एव अश्नाति, ‘तयोर् अन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्व् अत्ति अनश्नन्न् अन्योऽभिचाकशीति’ (MunU.3.1.1) इति मन्त्र-वर्णात्
tat-phalaṃ ca sa eva aśnāti, ‘tayor anyaḥ pippalaṃ svādv atti anaśnann anyo'bhicākaśīti’ iti mantra-varṇāt—
And it is he alone that enjoys the fruit, according to the following Scriptural Mantras viz. “One of the two enjoys the delectable Pippala (fruit), and the other one (the Universal Self) refrains from enjoying and merely keeps looking on” (MunU.3.1.1),

1.1.4 L.164 ‘आत्मेन्द्रिय-मनो-युक्तं भोक्तेत्य् आहुर् मनीषिणः’ (KathU.1.3.4) इति च।
‘ātmendriya-mano-yuktaṃ bhoktety āhur manīṣiṇaḥ’ iti ca।—
“When he is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, the wise people say that he is the experiencer” (KathU.1.3.4).

1.1.4 L.165 तथा च ‘एको देवः सर्व-भूतेषु गूढः सर्व-व्यापी सर्व-भूत-अन्तर्-आत्मा।
कर्म-अध्यक्षः सर्व-भूत-अधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्-गुणश् च’ (SvetU.6.11) इति,
tathā ca ‘eko devaḥ sarva-bhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ sarva-vyāpī sarva-bhūta-antar-ātmā।
karma-adhyakṣaḥ sarva-bhūta-adhivāsaḥ sākṣī cetā kevalo nir-guṇaś ca’ iti,—

Also “He is the one God hidden in all beings, who is all-pervading, the Universal Self of all beings,
The director of all actions, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the vitalizer, the one and the only one, and the one free from all attributes” (SvetU.6.11).

1.1.4 L.166 ‘स पर्यगाच् छुक्रम् अकायम् अव्रणम् अस्नाविरं शुद्धम् अपाप-विद्धम्’ (IsU.8) इति च,
‘sa paryagāc chukram akāyam avraṇam asnāviraṃ śuddham apāpa-viddham’ iti ca,—
And “He pervades all and is bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, (and is) pure and untouched by sin” (IsU.8).

1.1.4 L.167 एतौ मन्त्राव् अनाधेय-अतिशयतां नित्य-शुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः।
etau mantrāv anādheya-atiśayatāṃ nitya-śuddhatāṃ ca brahmaṇo darśayataḥ—
These two Mantras show the eternal purity of Brahman, and that it is not possible to improve upon it in any way.

1.1.4 L.168 ब्रह्म-भावश् च मोक्षः।
brahma-bhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ—
Final Release is nothing but becoming Brahman,

1.1.4 L.169 तस्मान् न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः।
tasmān na saṃskāryo'pi mokṣaḥ—
Therefore Final Release is also not something which admits of any refinement.

1.1.4 L.170 अतोऽन्यन् मोक्षं प्रति क्रिया-अनुप्रवेश-द्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद् दर्शयितुम्।
ato'nyan mokṣaṃ prati kriyā-anupraveśa-dvāraṃ na śakyaṃ kenacid darśayitum—
Therefore, it is not possible for anybody to show any other way by which Final Release could be connected with action.

1.1.4 L.171 तस्माज् ज्ञानम् एकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्य अप्य् अनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते।
tasmāj jñānam ekaṃ muktvā kriyāyā gandhamātrasya apy anupraveśa iha nopapadyate—
Therefore barring knowledge and knowledge alone, action cannot have any the slightest relation to it.

1.1.4 L.172 ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया।
nanu jñānaṃ nāma mānasī kriyā—
But (says the opponent) knowledge of course is a mental act.

1.1.4 L.173 न, वैलक्षण्यात्।
na, vailakṣaṇyāt—
No (we reply), because there is dissimilarity (between the two).

1.1.4 L.174 क्रिया हि नाम सा यत्र वस्तु-स्व-रूप-निर्-अपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुष-चित्त-व्यापार-अधीना च।
kriyā hi nāma sā yatra vastu-sva-rūpa-nir-apekṣaiva codyate, puruṣa-citta-vyāpāra-adhīnā ca—
Action is of course that which is enjoined, independently of the nature of anything, and is dependent on the operation of the mind of a man,

1.1.4 L.175 यथा ‘यस्यै देवतायै हविर् गृहीतं स्यात् तां मनसा ध्यायेद् वषट्-करिष्यन्’ इति ‘… संध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्’ (ऐत्॰ब्रा॰ ३.८.१) इति चैवम्-आदिषु।
yathā ‘yasyai devatāyai havir gṛhītaṃ syāt tāṃ manasā dhyāyed vaṣaṭ-kariṣyan’ iti ‘… saṃdhyāṃ manasā dhyāyet’ (ait॰brā॰ 3.8.1) iti caivam-ādiṣu—
For instance as in the following passages viz., “For whatever Divinity an oblation is taken up (by the Adhvaryu priest) one (the Hotṛ) should meditate on that Divinity while. reciting ‘Vaṣaṭ’. “Let him meditate on Sandhyā” (Ait. Bra. 3.8.1) etc.

1.1.4 L.176 ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्य् अपि मानसम्,
तथा अपि पुरुषेण कर्तुम् अकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम्, पुरुष-तन्त्रत्वात्।
dhyānaṃ cintanaṃ yady api mānasam,
tathā api puruṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ śakyam, puruṣa-tantratvāt—

Though meditation or reflection is mental,
It is yet possible for a man to do it or not to do it or to do it in some other way, because it solely depends upon a man.

1.1.4 L.177 ज्ञानं तु प्रमाण-जन्यम्।
jñānaṃ tu pramāṇa-janyam—
Knowledge however is generated by the right means of knowledge.

1.1.4 L.178 प्रमाणं च यथा-भूत-वस्तु-विषयम्।
pramāṇaṃ ca yathā-bhūta-vastu-viṣayam—
The right means of knowledge has concern with things as they actually exist,

1.1.4 L.179 अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुम् अकर्तुम् अन्यथा वा कर्तुं अशक्यम्।
ato jñānaṃ kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ aśakyam—
And it is impossible to generate knowledge or not to generate it or to generate it in some other way (optionally),

1.1.4 L.180 केवलं वस्तु-तन्त्रम् एव तत्, न चोदना-तन्त्रम्, न अपि पुरुष-तन्त्रम्।
kevalaṃ vastu-tantram eva tat, na codanā-tantram, na api puruṣa-tantram—
Because knowledge depends upon the existing thing itself, and not upon any injunction or upon a man.

1.1.4 L.181 तस्मान् मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद् वैलक्षण्यम्।
tasmān mānasatve'pi jñānasya mahad vailakṣaṇyam—
Therefore, knowledge though mental is greatly dissimilar (to meditation).

1.1.4 L.182 यथा च ‘पुरुषो वाव गौतम अग्निः’ (ChanU.5.7.1), ‘योषा वाव गौतम अग्निः’ (5.8.1) इत्य् अत्र
योषित्-पुरुषयोर् अग्नि-बुद्धिर् मानसी भवति।
yathā ca ‘puruṣo vāva gautama agniḥ’, ‘yoṣā vāva gautama agniḥ’ ity atra
yoṣit-puruṣayor agni-buddhir mānasī bhavati—

Just as in the Scriptural passage “A man, verily Oh Gautama, is Agni”, “the woman, verily O Gautama, is Agni” (ChanU.5.7.1, 5.8.1)
The conception that a man or a woman is Agni is mental,

1.1.4 L.183 केवल-चोदना-जन्यत्वात् क्रियैव सा पुरुष-तन्त्रा च।
kevala-codanā-janyatvāt kriyaiva sā puruṣa-tantrā ca—
And as resulting from an injunction, is action pure and simple and it depends on a man.

1.1.4 L.184 या तु प्रसिद्धेऽग्नाव् अग्नि-बुद्धिः, न सा चोदना-तन्त्रा, न अपि पुरुष-तन्त्रा।
yā tu prasiddhe'gnāv agni-buddhiḥ, na sā codanā-tantrā, na api puruṣa-tantrā—
But the conception of the ordinary fire as Agni is neither any thing which depends upon an injunction or on a man,

1.1.4 L.185 किं तर्हि? प्रत्य्-अक्ष-विषय-वस्तु-तन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानम् एवैतत्, न क्रिया।
kiṃ tarhi? praty-akṣa-viṣaya-vastu-tantraiveti jñānam evaitat, na kriyā—
But something which depends on the thing (the fire) itself, and it is knowledge pure and simple and not action.

1.1.4 L.186 एवं सर्व-प्रमाण-विषय-वस्तुषु वेदितव्यम्।
evaṃ sarva-pramāṇa-viṣaya-vastuṣu veditavyam—
In the case of all things which are objects of the right means of knowledge, one should understand similarly.

1.1.4 L.187 तत्रैवं सति यथा-भूत-ब्रह्म-आत्म-विषयम् अपि ज्ञानं न चोदना-तन्त्रम्।
tatraivaṃ sati yathā-bhūta-brahma-ātma-viṣayam api jñānaṃ na codanā-tantram—
This being so, the knowledge that the eternally existing Brahman is the Self, is not something which depends upon an injunction.

1.1.4 L.188 तद्-विषये लिङ्-आदयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्य-विषयत्वात् कुण्ठी-भवन्ति उपल-आदिषु प्रयुक्त-क्षुर-तैक्ष्ण्य-आदिवत्, अहेय-अनुपादेय-वस्तु-विषयत्वात्।
tad-viṣaye liṅ-ādayaḥ śrūyamāṇā api aniyojya-viṣayatvāt kuṇṭhī-bhavanti upala-ādiṣu prayukta-kṣura-taikṣṇya-ādivat, aheya-anupādeya-vastu-viṣayatvāt—
So Brahman not being the object of an injunction, or not being an entity from which any thing can be discarded or to which any thing can be added, any imperative forms (of verbs) we see used in the Scriptures, become as ineffective as when the sharp edge of a razor is employed on a stone.

1.1.4 L.189 किम् अर्थानि तर्हि? ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इत्य्-आदीनि विधि-च्छायानि वचनानि।
kim arthāni tarhi? ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ’ ity-ādīni vidhi-cchāyāni vacanāni—
What then is the purport (the opponent asks) of passages like “The Self (Oh Maitreyī) is to be seen, heard etc.” which have an appearance of an injunction?

1.1.4 L.190 स्वा-भाविक-प्रवृत्ति-विषय-विमुखी-करण-अर्थानि इति ब्रूमः।
svā-bhāvika-pravṛtti-viṣaya-vimukhī-karaṇa-arthāni iti brūmaḥ—
We reply — They are for the purpose of making (a man) averse to the objects of his natural tendency.

1.1.4 L.191 यो हि बहिर्-मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः ‘इष्टं मे भूयात्, अन्ष्टिं मा भूत्’ इति,
yo hi bahir-mukhaḥ pravartate puruṣaḥ ‘iṣṭaṃ me bhūyāt, anṣṭiṃ mā bhūt’ iti,—
In the case of a man who is an extrovert and acts with a view to attain the objects of his desire and to avoid things distasteful to him,

1.1.4 L.192 न च तत्र आत्य्-अन्तिकं पुरुष-अर्थं लभते, तम् आत्य्-अन्तिक-पुरुष-अर्थ-वाञ्छिनं
स्वा-भाविक-कार्य-करण-संघात-प्रवृत्ति-गोचराद् वि-मुखी-कृत्य प्रत्यग्-आत्म-स्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ इत्य्-आदीनि।
na ca tatra āty-antikaṃ puruṣa-arthaṃ labhate, tam āty-antika-puruṣa-artha-vāñchinaṃ
svā-bhāvika-kārya-karaṇa-saṃghāta-pravṛtti-gocarād vi-mukhī-kṛtya pratyag-ātma-srotastayā pravartayanti ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ’ ity-ādīni—

He, having failed to attain the highest aim of man, is yet desirous of attaining such aim,
Passages like “The Self, Oh Maitreyī, should be seen” etc. help him to set his face against the aggregate of the objects of the natural tendency of his body and sense-organs, and to direct the stream of his mind towards the Universal Self.

1.1.4 L.193 तस्य आत्म-अन्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्य अहेयम् अनुपादेयं च आत्म-तत्त्वम् उपदिश्यते
tasya ātma-anveṣaṇāya pravṛttasya aheyam anupādeyaṃ ca ātma-tattvam upadiśyate—
To him who has started on the quest of the Self, the Scriptures propound the true nature of the Self from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added, by means of the following passages,

1.1.4 L.194 ‘इदं सर्वं यद् अयम् आत्मा’ BrhU.2.4.6),
‘idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā’,—
Viz. “All this is that which is the Self” (BrhU.2.4.6),

1.1.4 L.195 ‘यत्र त्व् अस्य सर्वम् आत्मैव अभूत् तत् केन कं पश्येत् …
केन कं विजानीयात् … विज्ञातारम् अरे केन विजानीयात्’ (BrhU.4.5.15),
‘yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaiva abhūt tat kena kaṃ paśyet …
kena kaṃ vijānīyāt … vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt’,—

“When the Self only is all this, how should he see another,
How should he know another, how should he know the Knower?” (BrhU.4.5.15),

1.1.4 L.196 ‘अयम् आत्मा ब्रह्म’ (BrhU.2.5.19) इत्य्-आदिभिः।
‘ayam ātmā brahma’ ity-ādibhiḥ—
“This Self is Brahman” (BrhU.2.5.19) etc.

1.1.4 L.197 यद् अप्य् अकर्तव्य-प्रधानम् आत्म-ज्ञानं हानायोपादानाय वा न भवति इति, तत् तथैवेत्य् अभ्युपगम्यते।
yad apy akartavya-pradhānam ātma-jñānaṃ hānāyopādānāya vā na bhavati iti, tat tathaivety abhyupagamyate—
Now we understand, that the knowledge of the Self with respect to which contra-indication of any action as such is the principal thing, and, that it does not admit of the giving up or the taking up of anything, is but too true.

1.1.4 L.198 अलंकारो ह्य् अयम् अस्माकम्, यद् ब्रह्म-आत्म-अवगतौ सत्यां सर्व-कर्तव्यता-हानिः कृत-कृत्यता चेति।
alaṃkāro hy ayam asmākam, yad brahma-ātma-avagatau satyāṃ sarva-kartavyatā-hāniḥ kṛta-kṛtyatā ceti—
The fact that when there is the realization of Brahman, all duties come to an end and there is satisfaction that the aim is achieved, is something which indeed is a feather in our cap (lit., it is our Alaṅ-kāra i.e. an ornament).

1.1.4 L.199 तथा च श्रुतिः ‘आत्मानं चेद् विजानीयाद् अयम् अस्मि इति पूरुषः।
किम् इच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरम् अनुसंज्वरेत्’ (BrhU.4.4.12) इति।
tathā ca śrutiḥ ‘ātmānaṃ ced vijānīyād ayam asmi iti pūruṣaḥ।
kim icchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusaṃjvaret’ iti—

The Scriptures also say similarly thus — “If a man understands the Self as his own Self,
Then wishing for what should he suffer along with his suffering body?” (BrhU.4.4.12),

1.1.4 L.200 ‘एतद् बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान् स्यात् कृत-कृत्यश् च भारत’ (BhG.15.20) इति च स्मृतिः।
‘etad buddhvā buddhimān syāt kṛta-kṛtyaś ca bhārata’ iti ca smṛtiḥ—
And the Smṛti also says thus — “Having understood this, O Bhārata, a man becomes enlightened and one who has achieved his aim.” (BhG.15.20).

1.1.4 L.201 तस्मान् न प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-शेषतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम्।
tasmān na pratipatti-vidhi-śeṣatayā brahmaṇaḥ samarpaṇam—
Therefore the Vedānta Śāstra does not culminate in propounding Brahman as being something which could be an object of an injunction to realize it.

1.1.4 L.202 यद् अपि केचिद् आहुः, प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ति-विधि-तच्-छेष-व्यतिरेकेण केवल-वस्तु-वादी वेद-भागो न अस्ति इति, तन् न,
yad api kecid āhuḥ, pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vidhi-tac-cheṣa-vyatirekeṇa kevala-vastu-vādī veda-bhāgo na asti iti, tan na,—
The objection which some raise, that there is no such portion of the Scriptures which has the purport of merely making a statement about an existing entity (Vastu), as distinguished from an injunction for the doing or for abstaining from doing something, or being supplementary to any such injunction for doing or abstaining from doing something, is not a felicitous statement,

1.1.4 L.203 औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्य अनन्य-शेषत्वात्।
aupaniṣadasya puruṣasya ananya-śeṣatvāt—
Because the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else.

1.1.4 L.204 योऽसाव् उपनिषत्स्व् एव अधिगतः पुरुषोऽसंसारी ब्रह्म-स्व-रूपः उत्पाद्य-आदि-चतुर्-विध-द्रव्य-वि-लक्षणः स्व-प्रकरणस्थोऽनन्य-शेषः, न ‘असौ न अस्ति न अधिगम्यत’ इति वा शक्यं वदितुम्,
yo'sāv upaniṣatsv eva adhigataḥ puruṣo'saṃsārī brahma-sva-rūpaḥ utpādya-ādi-catur-vidha-dravya-vi-lakṣaṇaḥ sva-prakaraṇastho'nanya-śeṣaḥ, na ‘asau na asti na adhigamyata’ iti vā śakyaṃ vaditum,—
It cannot be said about that Puruṣa which can be comprehended only from the Upaniṣads, and which is not of a transmigratory nature, and which in fact is Brahman, and is different from the fourfold materials of things which are liable to be created etc., and which is a topic in itself, and is not subsidiary to any thing else, that it is not, or that it cannot be comprehended,

1.1.4 L.205 ‘स एष नेति नेत्य् आत्मा’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इत्य् आत्म-शब्दात्,
‘sa eṣa neti nety ātmā’ ity ātma-śabdāt,—
Because, in the following Scriptural passage it is described as the Ātmā (the Self) thus — (The Self can only be described negatively as) “Ātmā is, not that, not that”

1.1.4 L.206 आत्मनश् च प्रत्याख्यातुम् अशक्यत्वात्, य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैव आत्मत्वात्।
ātmanaś ca pratyākhyātum aśakyatvāt, ya eva nirākartā tasyaiva ātmatvāt—
And it is not possible to deny the Self, because whosoever endeavours to deny it, is himself the Self (Ātmā).

1.1.4 L.207 नन्व् आत्मा अहं-प्रत्यय-विषयत्वाद् ‘उपनिषत्स्व् एव विज्ञायत’ इत्य् अनुपपन्नम्।
nanv ātmā ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣayatvād ‘upaniṣatsv eva vijñāyata’ ity anupapannam—
To the objection that it is not reasonably sustainable that the Self is to be understood from the Upaniṣads only, because it is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’,

1.1.4 L.208 न, तत्-साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्।
na, tat-sākṣitvena pratyuktatvāt—
(We reply) — No, it is not so, because the Self is the immediate consciousness (Sākṣī) of that Jīva-Self which is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’.

1.1.4 L.209 न ह्य् अहं-प्रत्यय-विषय-कर्तृ-व्यतिरेकेण तत्-साक्षी सर्व-भूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थ-नित्यः पुरुषो विधि-काण्डे तर्क-समये वा केनचद् अधिगतः सर्वस्य आत्मा।
na hy ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣaya-kartṛ-vyatirekeṇa tat-sākṣī sarva-bhūtasthaḥ sama ekaḥ kūṭastha-nityaḥ puruṣo vidhi-kāṇḍe tarka-samaye vā kenacad adhigataḥ sarvasya ātmā—
Now, because this Puruṣa who is the mere immediate consciousness, as distinguished from the agent who is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’, which resides in all beings, is uniform, the only one (without a second), is eternally unchanging, is the Self of all, and is not understood by anybody either from the Vedic chapter on injunctions or from the science of reasoning (Nyāya),

1.1.4 L.210 अतः स न केनचित् प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः, विधि-शेषत्वं वा नेतुम्।
ataḥ sa na kenacit pratyākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ, vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ vā netum—
And it is not therefore possible for anybody to deny it, or reduce it to the status of being supplementary to an injunction.

1.1.4 L.211 आत्मत्वाद् एव च सर्वेषाम्, न हेयो न अप्य् उपादेयः।
ātmatvād eva ca sarveṣām, na heyo na apy upādeyaḥ—
It is precisely because of its being the Self of all that it cannot either be discarded or taken up.

1.1.4 L.212 सर्वं हि विनश्यद्-विकार-जातं पुरुष-अन्तं विनश्यति।
sarvaṃ hi vinaśyad-vikāra-jātaṃ puruṣa-antaṃ vinaśyati—
All things which are the modifications of the root-cause and are perishable, perish only upto the Puruṣa.

1.1.4 L.213 पुरुषो हि विनाश-हेत्व्-अभावाद् अविनाशी,
puruṣo hi vināśa-hetv-abhāvād avināśī,—
The Puruṣa is imperishable because of the absence of any cause for such destruction,

1.1.4 L.214 विक्रिया-हेत्व्-अभावाच् च कूटस्थ-नित्यः,
vikriyā-hetv-abhāvāc ca kūṭastha-nityaḥ,—
Is eternally unchanging because of the absence of any cause for its modification,

1.1.4 L.215 अत एव नित्य-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्व-भावः।
ata eva nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sva-bhāvaḥ—
And is (therefore) of the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened, and free.

1.1.4 L.216 तस्मात् ‘पुरुषान् न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः’ (KathU.1.3.11),
‘तं त्व् औपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इति चौपनिषदत्व-विशेषणं
पुरुषस्योपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानत्वे उपपद्यते।
tasmāt ‘puruṣān na paraṃ kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ’,
‘taṃ tv aupaniṣadaṃ puruṣaṃ pṛcchāmi’ iti caupaniṣadatva-viśeṣaṇaṃ
puruṣasyopaniṣatsu prādhānyena prakāśyamānatve upapadyate—

Therefore the particularization of the Puruṣa as the one belonging to the Upaniṣads, in the passages “There is nothing beyond the Puruṣa, he is the final goal and the transcendental condition” (KathU.1.3.11),
And “I ask you about the Puruṣa mentioned in the Upaniṣads” (BrhU.3.9.26)
Can be proper, only if the Puruṣa is principally the subject illustrated in the Upaniṣads.

1.1.4 L.217 अतो भूत-वस्तु-परो वेद-भागो न अस्ति इति वचनं साहसमात्रम्।
ato bhūta-vastu-paro veda-bhāgo na asti iti vacanaṃ sāhasamātram—
Therefore it is but a bold and reckless statement that no portion of the Scriptural texts treats of an existing entity.

1.1.4 L.218 यद् अपि शास्त्र-तात्-पर्यविदाम् अनुक्रमणम्, ‘दृष्टो हि तस्य अर्थः कर्म-अवबोधनम्’ (शा॰भा॰ १.१.१) इत्य्-एवम्-आदि,
तत् धर्म-जिज्ञासा-विषयत्वाद् विधि-प्रतिषेध-शास्त्र-अभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्।
yad api śāstra-tāt-paryavidām anukramaṇam, ‘dṛṣṭo hi tasya arthaḥ karma-avabodhanam’ (śā॰bhā॰ 1.1.1) ity-evam-ādi,
tat dharma-jijñāsā-viṣayatvād vidhi-pratiṣedha-śāstra-abhiprāyaṃ draṣṭavyam—

The statement of those who know the purport of the Śāstras, viz. “We have seen that the meaning of that is the knowledge of action” etc.,
Being with regard to the subject relating to the desire to know ‘Duty’ (Dharma), should be understood as purporting to relate to the Śāstra of injunctions and prohibitions (i.e. the Karma-kāṇḍa of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā).

1.1.4 L.219 अपि च ‘आम्नायस्य क्रिया-अर्थत्वाद् आनर्थक्यम् अतद्-अर्थानाम्’ (शा॰भा॰ १.१.२) इत्य् एतद् एक-अन्तेन अभ्युपगच्छतां
भूतोपदेशानाम् आनर्थक्य-प्रसङ्गः।
api ca ‘āmnāyasya kriyā-arthatvād ānarthakyam atad-arthānām’ (śā॰bhā॰ 1.1.2) ity etad eka-antena abhyupagacchatāṃ
bhūtopadeśānām ānarthakya-prasaṅgaḥ—

Besides if we were to understand that “action is the purport of the Scriptures, and whatever does not refer to it is purposeless” in the extreme sense,
There would occur the predicament of the mention of existing entities (in the Śāstra) being rendered purposeless.

1.1.4 L.220 प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ति-विधि-तच्-छेष-व्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेद् वस्तु उपदिशति भव्य-अर्थत्वेन,
कूटस्थ-नित्यं भूतं नोपदिशति इति को हेतुः?
pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vidhi-tac-cheṣa-vyatirekeṇa bhūtaṃ ced vastu upadiśati bhavya-arthatvena,
kūṭastha-nityaṃ bhūtaṃ nopadiśati iti ko hetuḥ?—

If the Śāstra does in fact propound an existing entity, as apart from an injunction about an action or aversion to it or something supplementary to these, with regard to something (occurring) in the future,
Then where is the reason for maintaining that it does not propound the eternally existing and unchanging entity (such as Brahman)?

1.1.4 L.221 न हि भूतम् उपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति।
na hi bhūtam upadiśyamānaṃ kriyā bhavati—
Merely because an existing entity is propounded (in the Scriptures) it does not thereby become ‘action’.

1.1.4 L.222 अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रिया-साधनत्वात् क्रिया-अर्थ एव भूतोपदेश इति चेत्,
akriyātve'pi bhūtasya kriyā-sādhanatvāt kriyā-artha eva bhūtopadeśa iti cet,—
If it were to be objected that although an existing entity may not be ‘action’ as such, still the propounding of an existing entity (by the Śāstra) is for the purpose of ‘action’, because of its being the means of ‘action’,

1.1.4 L.223 नैष दोषः, क्रिया-अर्थत्वेऽपि क्रिया-निर्वर्तन-शक्तिमद्-वस्तु उपदिष्टम् एव,
naiṣa doṣaḥ, kriyā-arthatve'pi kriyā-nirvartana-śaktimad-vastu upadiṣṭam eva,—
We reply — this is no fault, because even if we understand the mention of an existing entity for the purpose of ‘action’, the existing entity possessing such potentiality for bringing about such ‘action’, would thus happen to have been propounded all the same.

1.1.4 L.224 क्रिया-अर्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य, न चैतावता वस्त्व् अनुपदिष्टं भवति।
kriyā-arthatvaṃ tu prayojanaṃ tasya, na caitāvatā vastv anupadiṣṭaṃ bhavati—
Their aim may very well be to subserve ‘action’, but even if it were to be so, it would not mean that an existing entity is not propounded at all. That it is meant to subserve ‘action’ is its fruit.

1.1.4 L.225 यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्याद् इति।
yadi nāmopadiṣṭaṃ kiṃ tava tena syād iti—
But (says the opponent) supposing it is so propounded, how does it help you?

1.1.4 L.226 उच्यते, अनवगत-आत्म-वस्तु-उपदेशश् च तथैव भवितुम् अर्हति, तद्-अवगत्या मिथ्या-ज्ञानस्य संसार-हेतोर् निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियत इत्य् अविशिष्टम् अर्थवत्त्वं क्रिया-साधन-वस्तु-उपदेशेन।
ucyate, anavagata-ātma-vastu-upadeśaś ca tathaiva bhavitum arhati, tad-avagatyā mithyā-jñānasya saṃsāra-hetor nivṛttiḥ prayojanaṃ kriyata ity aviśiṣṭam arthavattvaṃ kriyā-sādhana-vastu-upadeśena—
We reply — The propounding of an existing entity such as the Self is also of such a nature, and by understanding such existing entity (as the Self or Brahman) which has the result of removing erroneous ignorance, the cause of transmigratory existence, the purpose that an entity has such a meaning, is common between it and the propounding of an entity which is a means for ‘action’.

1.1.4 L.227 अपि च ‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इति च एवम्-आद्या निवृत्तिर् उपदिश्यते।
न च सा क्रिया, न अपि क्रिया-साधनम्।
api ca ‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ iti ca evam-ādyā nivṛttir upadiśyate।
na ca sā kriyā, na api kriyā-sādhanam। —

Moreover the Śāstra is seen to teach ‘abstention’ such as — “A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed”,
Which is neither ‘action’ nor a means for ‘action’.

1.1.4 L.228 अक्रिया-अर्थानाम् उपदेशोऽनर्थकश् चेत्,
‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इत्य्-आदि-निवृत्त्य्-उपदेशानाम् आनर्थक्यं प्राप्तम्। तच् च अनिष्टम्।
akriyā-arthānām upadeśo'narthakaś cet,
‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ ity-ādi-nivṛtty-upadeśānām ānarthakyaṃ prāptam। tac ca aniṣṭam—

Now if instruction about entities not meant for the purpose of ‘action’ were to be purposeless,
Then the inevitable conclusion is, that instruction about such ‘abstention’ as that ‘a Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ would be without a purpose, which would not be desirable.

1.1.4 L.229 न च स्व-भाव-प्राप्त-हन्त्य्-अर्थ-अनुरागेण नञः शक्यम् अप्राप्त-क्रिया-अर्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हनन-क्रिया-निवृत्त्य्-औदासीन्य-व्यतिरेकेण।
na ca sva-bhāva-prāpta-hanty-artha-anurāgeṇa nañaḥ śakyam aprāpta-kriyā-arthatvaṃ kalpayituṃ hanana-kriyā-nivṛtty-audāsīnya-vyatirekeṇa—
From the mere connection of the suffix Nañ (नञ्) with the verb ‘to kill’ (Han) — which means the act of killing which follows naturally from the verb ‘to kill’ — it is not possible to imagine that it expresses some new meaning, and that too ‘an action’ which is different from mere passivity or indifference as to the act of killing.

1.1.4 L.230 नञश् चैष स्व-भावः, यत् स्व-संबन्धिनोऽभावं बोधयति इति।
nañaś caiṣa sva-bhāvaḥ, yat sva-saṃbandhino'bhāvaṃ bodhayati iti—
The nature of Nañ is such that it makes known the non-existence of that in connection with which it is used,

1.1.4 L.231 अभाव-बुद्धिश् चौदासीन्य-कारणम्।
abhāva-buddhiś caudāsīnya-kāraṇam—
And the consciousness of such non-existence is the cause of the (resulting) passive indifference.

1.1.4 L.232 सा च दग्धेन्धन-अग्निवत् स्वयम् एवोपशाम्यति।
sā ca dagdhendhana-agnivat svayam evopaśāmyati—
That consciousness wears off of itself, like fire after the complete combustion of fuel.

1.1.4 L.233 तस्मात् प्रसक्त-क्रिया-निवृत्त्य्-औदासीन्यम् एव ‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इत्य्-आदिषु प्रतिषेध-अर्थं मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजा-पति-व्रत-आदिभ्यः।
tasmāt prasakta-kriyā-nivṛtty-audāsīnyam eva ‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ ity-ādiṣu pratiṣedha-arthaṃ manyāmahe, anyatra prajā-pati-vrata-ādibhyaḥ—
Therefore, we consider that everywhere — except in the case of the Prajā-pati-vrata — in the case of passages like “A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed” the passive indifference resulting from the aversion to the suggested act, is itself to be understood in the sense of a prohibition (of an act).

1.1.4 L.234 तस्मात् पुरुष-अर्थ-अनुपयोग्य्-उपाख्यान-आदि-भूत-अर्थवाद-विषयम् आनर्थक्य-अभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम्।
tasmāt puruṣa-artha-anupayogy-upākhyāna-ādi-bhūta-arthavāda-viṣayam ānarthakya-abhidhānaṃ draṣṭavyam—
Therefore the reference to the purposelessness of passages (which do not imply action according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) should be understood to have reference to Artha-vāda passages, like legends, which are useless so far as the highest aim of man is concerned.

1.1.4 L.235 यद् अप्य् उक्तम्, कर्तव्य-विध्य्-अनुप्रवेशम् अन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रम् उच्यमानम् अनर्थकं स्तात्, ‘सप्त-द्वीपा वसुमती’ इत्य्-आदिवद् इति, तत् परिहृतम्,
yad apy uktam, kartavya-vidhy-anupraveśam antareṇa vastumātram ucyamānam anarthakaṃ stāt, ‘sapta-dvīpā vasumatī’ ity-ādivad iti, tat parihṛtam,—
Then with regard also to what has been said, viz. that the mention of actually existing entities which do not lead up to some sort of injunction to action, is purposeless like such sentences as ‘the world is comprised of seven islands’, it has been refuted,

1.1.4 L.236 ‘रज्जुर् इयम्, न अयं सर्पः’ इति वस्तुमात्र-कथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात्।
‘rajjur iyam, na ayaṃ sarpaḥ’ iti vastumātra-kathane'pi prayojanasya dṛṣṭatvāt—
Because it has been seen that a fruit does accrue by the mere mention of such an entity, thus — ‘This is a rope and not a snake’.

1.1.4 L.237 ननु श्रुत-ब्रह्मणोऽपि यथा-पूर्वं संसारित्व-दर्शनान् न रज्जु-स्व-रूप-कथनवद् अर्थवत्त्वम् इत्य् उक्तम्।
nanu śruta-brahmaṇo'pi yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritva-darśanān na rajju-sva-rūpa-kathanavad arthavattvam ity uktam—
But (retorts the opponent) I have said already that as it is seen that even in the case of a person who has received instruction about Brahman, he is still seen to continue to be in the same transmigratory condition, the Scriptural passages have no such meaning as there is in mentioning that this is a rope and not a snake.

1.1.4 L.238 अत्रोच्यते, न अवगत-ब्रह्म-आत्म-भावस्य यथा-पूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम्,
atrocyate, na avagata-brahma-ātma-bhāvasya yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ śakyaṃ darśayitum,—
To this, we reply — it is not possible to show that he who has once understood the condition of the Self’s unity with Brahman, still continues to be affected by the transmigratory condition,

1.1.4 L.239 वेद-प्रमाण-जनित-ब्रह्म-आत्म-भाव-विरोधात्।
Because it is contradictory to the condition of the unity of the Self with Brahman achieved on Scriptural authority.

1.1.4 L.240 न हि शरीर-आद्य्-आत्म-अभिमानिनो ‘दुःख-भय-आदिमत्त्वं दृष्टम्’ इति तस्यैव वेद-प्रमाण-जनित-ब्रह्म-आत्म-अवगमे तद्-अभिमान-निवृत्तौ तद् एव मिथ्या-ज्ञान-निमित्तं दुःख-भय-आदिमत्त्वं भवति इति शक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
na hi śarīra-ādy-ātma-abhimānino ‘duḥkha-bhaya-ādimattvaṃ dṛṣṭam’ iti tasyaiva veda-pramāṇa-janita-brahma-ātma-avagame tad-abhimāna-nivṛttau tad eva mithyā-jñāna-nimittaṃ duḥkha-bhaya-ādimattvaṃ bhavati iti śakyaṃ kalpayitum—
It is not possible to maintain, that because we see that a man who vainly supposes the Self to be the body is affected by pain or fear, he would continue to be affected by the same condition of pain or fear, which in fact is caused by erroneous-ignorance, when his vanity in supposing the Self to be the body is removed by the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman, generated by such right means of knowledge as the Scriptures.

1.1.4 L.241 न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धन-अभिमानिनो धन-अपहार-निमित्तं ‘दुःखं दृष्टम्’ इति तस्यैव प्रव्रजितस्य धन-अभिमान-रहितस्य तद् एव धन-अपहार-निमित्तं दुःखं भवति।
na hi dhanino gṛhasthasya dhana-abhimānino dhana-apahāra-nimittaṃ ‘duḥkhaṃ dṛṣṭam’ iti tasyaiva pravrajitasya dhana-abhimāna-rahitasya tad eva dhana-apahāra-nimittaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhavati—
It cannot be, that because we see that a rich man who is vain about his wealth, is affected by pain caused by his wealth being taken away from him, is subject to similar pain by his wealth being taken away from him, when he has renounced the world and has become a Sanyāsin and when thereby his vanity about his wealth is removed.

1.1.4 L.242 न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्व-अभिमान-निमित्तं ‘सुखं दृष्टम्’ इति तस्यैव कुण्डल-वियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्व-अभिमान-रहितस्य तद् एव कुण्डलित्व-अभिमान-निमित्तं सुखं भवति।
na ca kuṇḍalinaḥ kuṇḍalitva-abhimāna-nimittaṃ ‘sukhaṃ dṛṣṭam’ iti tasyaiva kuṇḍala-viyuktasya kuṇḍalitva-abhimāna-rahitasya tad eva kuṇḍalitva-abhimāna-nimittaṃ sukhaṃ bhavati—
Nor can it be, that because it is seen that a man who wears a Kuṇḍala (an ear ornament) feels pleasure caused by his vanity about the Kuṇḍala, continues to have similar pleasure caused by the vanity of being adorned with a Kuṇḍala, when he has divested himself of the Kuṇḍala and is free from the vanity of the adornment by it.

1.1.4 L.243 तद् उक्तं श्रुत्या, ‘अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रिय-अप्रिये स्पृशतः’ (ChanU.8.12.1) इति।
tad uktaṃ śrutyā, ‘aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priya-apriye spṛśataḥ’ iti—
This has been expressed by the Scriptures as follows — “Neither pain nor pleasure affect one who is in a disembodied condition” (ChanU.8.12.1).

1.1.4 L.244 शरीरे पतितेऽशरीरत्वं स्यात्, न जीवत इति चेत्,
śarīre patite'śarīratvaṃ syāt, na jīvata iti cet,—
If it be objected, that disembodiedness supervenes after the body falls (i.e. when a person dies), and not while a person continues to live,

1.1.4 L.245 न, स-शरीरत्वस्य मिथ्या-ज्ञान-निमित्तत्वात्।
na, sa-śarīratvasya mithyā-jñāna-nimittatvāt—
We reply — no, because the embodied condition itself is caused by erroneous-ignorance.

1.1.4 L.246 न ह्य् आत्मनः शरीर-आत्म-अभिमान-लक्षणं मिथ्या-ज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः स-शरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
na hy ātmanaḥ śarīra-ātma-abhimāna-lakṣaṇaṃ mithyā-jñānaṃ muktvā anyataḥ sa-śarīratvaṃ śakyaṃ kalpayitum—
In the case of the Self it is not possible to conceive of any corporeality for the Self, otherwise than by the erroneous-ignorance of the nature of the vanity of the Self being possessed of a body.

1.1.4 L.247 नित्यम् अशरीरत्वम्, अकर्म-निमित्तत्वात् इत्य् अवोचाम।
nityam aśarīratvam, akarma-nimittatvāt ity avocāma—
We have already said that the Self is eternally sans-body, because of its not having action as its cause.

1.1.4 L.248 तत्-कृत-धर्म-अधर्म-निमित्तं स-शरीरत्वम् इति चेत्,
tat-kṛta-dharma-adharma-nimittaṃ sa-śarīratvam iti cet,—
If it is urged that corporeality is caused by meritorious and unmeritorious actions,

1.1.4 L.249 न, शरीर-संबन्धस्य असिद्धत्वात्,
na, śarīra-saṃbandhasya asiddhatvāt,—
We reply — no, because in as much as the relation of the Self with a body is not yet properly established,

1.1.4 L.250 धर्म-अधर्मयोर् आत्म-कृतत्व-असिद्धेः,
dharma-adharmayor ātma-kṛtatva-asiddheḥ,—
Any assumption about the Self having performed meritorious or unmeritorious actions is even still less established.

1.1.4 L.251 शरीर-संबन्धस्य धर्म-अधर्मयोस् तत्-कृतत्वस्य चेतरेतर-आश्रयत्व-प्रसङ्गात्।
śarīra-saṃbandhasya dharma-adharmayos tat-kṛtatvasya cetaretara-āśrayatva-prasaṅgāt—
And also because the assumption of corporeality to the Self as depending upon meritorious and unmeritorious actions and of meritorious and unmeritorious actions as depending upon the corporeality of the Self, would, lead (us) towards (the fallacy of) mutual interdependence as cause and effect.

1.1.4 L.252 अन्ध-परम्-परैषा अनादित्व-कल्पना।
andha-param-paraiṣā anāditva-kalpanā—
And this notion about the beginninglessness (of these two) would be like a series of the blind leading the blind (Andha-paramparā).

1.1.4 L.253 क्रिया-समवाय-अभावाच् च आत्मनः कर्तृत्व-अनुपपत्तेः।
kriyā-samavāya-abhāvāc ca ātmanaḥ kartṛtva-anupapatteḥ—
And it is not reasonably sustainable to predicate activity as referring to the Self in as much as it has no relation to action.

1.1.4 L.254 संनिधानमात्रेण राज-प्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वम् इति चेत्,
saṃnidhānamātreṇa rāja-prabhṛtīnāṃ dṛṣṭaṃ kartṛtvam iti cet,—
If it be said that we observe activity on the part of kings etc. (without their being actually physically active) merely by their immediate presence,

1.1.4 L.255 न, धन-दान-आद्य्-उपार्जित-भृत्य-संबन्धित्वात् तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः।
na, dhana-dāna-ādy-upārjita-bhṛtya-saṃbandhitvāt teṣāṃ kartṛtvopapatteḥ—
We reply — no, their apparent activity is understood to be reasonably sustainable because of their relation (as masters) with their servants obtained on wages etc.

1.1.4 L.256 न त्व् आत्मनो धन-दान-आदिवच् छरीर-आदिभिः स्व-स्वामि-संबन्ध-निमित्तं किंचिच् छक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
na tv ātmano dhana-dāna-ādivac charīra-ādibhiḥ sva-svāmi-saṃbandha-nimittaṃ kiṃcic chakyaṃ kalpayitum—
It is not possible to imagine in the case of the Self, any cause such as wages etc. effecting a relation between it and the body, like the relation between a master and a servant,

1.1.4 L.257 मिथ्या-अभिमानस् तु प्रत्यक्षः संबन्ध-हेतुः।
mithyā-abhimānas tu pratyakṣaḥ saṃbandha-hetuḥ—
When erroneous-ignorance is there as a direct cause of its relation to a body.

1.1.4 L.258 एतेन यजमानत्वम् आत्मनो व्याख्यातम्।
etena yajamānatvam ātmano vyākhyātam—
In this way the host-ship (Yajamānatva) of the Self is explained.

1.1.4 L.259 अत्र आहुः, देह-आदि-व्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनः आत्मीये देह-आदाव् अभिमानो गौणः, न मिथ्येति चेत्,
atra āhuḥ, deha-ādi-vyatiriktasya ātmanaḥ ātmīye deha-ādāv abhimāno gauṇaḥ, na mithyeti cet,—
If one were to object here (as does, for instance a follower of Prabhākara’s view) that the identification by the Self with the body, when in fact it is different from the body, is not erroneous, but is in a secondary sense,

1.1.4 L.260 न, प्रसिद्ध-वस्तु-भेदस्य गौणत्व-मुख्यत्व-प्रसिद्धेः।
na, prasiddha-vastu-bhedasya gauṇatva-mukhyatva-prasiddheḥ—
We reply — no, it is well-known that it is only when there is an evident difference between two entities, that the use of a term in a primary and secondary sense is reasonably sustainable.

1.1.4 L.261 यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तु-भेदः, यथा केसर-आदिमान् आकृति-विशेषोऽन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंह-शब्द-प्रत्यय-भाङ् मुख्योऽन्यः प्रसिद्धः,
yasya hi prasiddho vastu-bhedaḥ, yathā kesara-ādimān ākṛti-viśeṣo'nvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ siṃha-śabda-pratyaya-bhāṅ mukhyo'nyaḥ prasiddhaḥ,—
Just when the difference between two entities is patent to a man, as for instance when it is well-known to him that an animal with a mane etc. and a peculiar proud form, which by the method of positive and negative instances, deserves to have a designation, viz., a lion, applied to it, is a distinct and separate entity,

1.1.4 L.262 ततश् च अन्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्य-शौर्य-आदिभिः सिंह-गुणैः संपन्नः सिद्धः,
तस्य पुरुषे सिंह-शब्द-प्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः, न अप्रसिद्ध-वस्तु-भेदस्य।
tataś ca anyaḥ puruṣaḥ prāyikaiḥ kraurya-śaurya-ādibhiḥ siṃha-guṇaiḥ saṃpannaḥ siddhaḥ,
tasya puruṣe siṃha-śabda-pratyayau gauṇau bhavataḥ, na aprasiddha-vastu-bhedasya—

And when there also is another person who is endowed with the usual qualities of a lion such as fierceness and boldness, and who is a different entity altogether and is quite distinct from the former (i.e. the lion),
Then the consciousness (Pratyaya, ‘notion’) in such a man, of the other man’s lioninity, and the use by such a man of the term ‘lion’ for that other man, is in a secondary or figurative sense, and not when the difference between the two is not known to him.

1.1.4 L.263 तस्य त्व् अन्यत्र-अन्य-शब्द-प्रत्ययौ भ्रान्ति-निमित्ताव् एव भवतः, न गौणौ,
tasya tv anyatra-anya-śabda-pratyayau bhrānti-nimittāv eva bhavataḥ, na gauṇau,—
Hence a man’s consciousness and the use by him of one term for another (when he is not conscious of the difference between two entities) are caused by his confusion alone and are not in a secondary or figurative sense.

1.1.4 L.264 यथा मन्द-अन्धकारे स्थाणुर् अयम् इत्य् अगृह्यमाण-विशेषे पुरुष-शब्द-प्रत्ययौ स्थाणु-विषयौ, यथा वा शुक्तिकायाम् अकस्माद् रजतम् इति निश्चितौ शब्द-प्रत्ययौ,
yathā manda-andhakāre sthāṇur ayam ity agṛhyamāṇa-viśeṣe puruṣa-śabda-pratyayau sthāṇu-viṣayau, yathā vā śuktikāyām akasmād rajatam iti niścitau śabda-pratyayau,—
Just as in the twilight, when a pillar is not cognized as such, a man’s consciousness of it and his use of the term ‘man’ for it, or when in the case of a mother-of-pearl his consciousness of it and his use of the term ‘silver’ for it, is prima facie not in a secondary or figurative sense.

1.1.4 L.265 तद्वद् देह-आदि-संघाते अहं इति निर्-उपचारेण शब्द-प्रत्ययाव् आत्म-अनात्म-अविवेकेनोत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम्।
tadvad deha-ādi-saṃghāte ahaṃ iti nir-upacāreṇa śabda-pratyayāv ātma-anātma-avivekenotpadyamānau kathaṃ gauṇau śakyau vaditum—
Similarly, how can the consciousness of and the use by a man of the term ‘I’ with respect to the aggregate of body etc., be said to be in a secondary or figurative sense, when his consciousness and his use of the term ‘I’ for the body are caused by his not being able to discriminate between the Self and that which is not the Self?

1.1.4 L.266 आत्म-अनात्म-विवेकिनाम् अपि पण्डितानाम् अज-अवि-पालानाम् इव अविविक्तौ शब्द-प्रत्ययौ भवतः।
ātma-anātma-vivekinām api paṇḍitānām aja-avi-pālānām iva aviviktau śabda-pratyayau bhavataḥ—
Even in the case of those learned people who are able to discriminate between the Self and the non-Self, their consciousness and use of the term ‘I’ for the body, is, like that of the shepherd’s (Ajāvi-pāla), due to their inability to discriminate between the Self and the non-Self.

1.1.4 L.267 तस्माद् देह-आदि-व्यतिरिक्त-आत्म-अस्तित्व-वादिनां देह-आदाव् अहं-प्रत्ययो मिथ्यैव, न गौणः।
tasmād deha-ādi-vyatirikta-ātma-astitva-vādināṃ deha-ādāv ahaṃ-pratyayo mithyaiva, na gauṇaḥ—
Therefore to those who hold that there is a self distinct from the body, the notion of ‘I’ in the body etc. is simply false, not secondary (–this trans. from Panoli).

1.1.4 L.268 तस्मान् मिथ्या-प्रत्यय-निमित्तत्वात् स-शरीरत्वस्य, सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम्।
tasmān mithyā-pratyaya-nimittatvāt sa-śarīratvasya, siddhaṃ jīvato'pi viduṣo'śarīratvam—
Hence since the conception that the self is embodied is false, it has been proved that even while living the enlightened one can be bodiless (–this trans. from Panoli).

1.1.4 L.269 तथा च ब्रह्मविद्-विषया श्रुतिः, ‘तद् यथा अहि-निर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवम् एवेदग्ँ शरीरग्ँ शेते।
अथ अयम् अशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव’ (BrhU.4.4.7) इति,
tathā ca brahmavid-viṣayā śrutiḥ, ‘tad yathā ahi-nirlvayanī valmīke mṛtā pratyastā śayītaivam evedagṃ śarīragṃ śete।
atha ayam aśarīro'mṛtaḥ prāṇo brahmaiva teja eva’ iti,—

The same is illustrated by the Scriptural passages relating to a person who has realized Brahman, thus — “Just as the slough of a snake lies inert and spread out at length on an ant-hill, even so does this body also.
And this disembodied and immortal vital breath (Prāṇa) is in reality the Brahman, the Tejas” (BrhU.4.4.7).

1.1.4 L.270 ‘स-चक्षुर् अचक्षुर् इव स-कर्णोऽकर्ण इव स-वाग् अवाग् इव स-मना अमना इव स-प्राणोऽप्राण इव’ इति च।
‘sa-cakṣur acakṣur iva sa-karṇo'karṇa iva sa-vāg avāg iva sa-manā amanā iva sa-prāṇo'prāṇa iva’ iti ca—
Similarly — “While endowed with eyes he is sans-eyes, while endowed with the organ of hearing he is without the organ of hearing, and so on in the case of speech, the mind and the vital breath (Prāṇa)”,

1.1.4 L.271 स्मृतिर् अपि च, ‘स्थित-प्रज्ञस्य का भाषा’ (BhG.2.54) इत्य्-आद्या
स्थित-प्रज्ञस्य लक्षणान्य् आचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्व-प्रवृत्त्य्-असंबन्धं दर्शयति।
mṛtir api ca, ‘sthita-prajñasya kā bhāṣā’ ity-ādyā
sthita-prajñasya lakṣaṇāny ācakṣāṇā viduṣaḥ sarva-pravṛtty-asaṃbandhaṃ darśayati—

Smṛti also, in the passage beginning thus — “What is the nature of the language used by one whose intellect is well-poised” (BhG.2.54)? —
And enumerating the characteristics of a man whose intellect is well-poised, describes the total absence of any the least relation with activity.

1.1.4 L.272 तस्मान् न अवगत-ब्रह्म-आत्म-भावस्य यथा-पूर्वं संसारित्वम्,
tasmān na avagata-brahma-ātma-bhāvasya yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritvam,—
Therefore, a man who has realized the unity of the Self and Brahman has no further transmigratory life as before.

1.1.4 L.273 यस्य तु यथा-पूर्वं संसारित्वं न असाव् अवगत-ब्रह्म-आत्म-भाव इत्य् अनवद्यम्।
yasya tu yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ na asāv avagata-brahma-ātma-bhāva ity anavadyam—
Ergo, it is clear that he who continues to have such transmigratory existence has not realized the unity of the Self and Brahman and the Śāstra therefore is absolutely flawless.

1.1.4 L.274 यत् पुनर्-उक्तं श्रवणात् पराचीनयोर् मनन-निदिध्यासनयोर् दर्शनाद् विधि-शेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः न स्व-रूप-पर्यवसायित्वम् इति,
yat punar-uktaṃ śravaṇāt parācīnayor manana-nididhyāsanayor darśanād vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ na sva-rūpa-paryavasāyitvam iti,—
Again with regard to what was said, viz., that because it is observed that further cogitation and meditation should follow the hearing of Brahman, Brahman is merely complementary to an injunction and its knowledge does not culminate in the realization of its own nature,

1.1.4 L.275 न तु तद् अस्ति, मनन-निदिध्यासनयोर् अपि श्रवणवद् अवगत्य्-अर्थत्वात्।
na tu tad asti, manana-nididhyāsanayor api śravaṇavad avagaty-arthatvāt—
We reply — no, because cogitation and meditation are for the purpose of their ultimate culmination in the realization (of Brahman).

1.1.4 L.276 न, अवगत्य्-अर्थत्वान् मनन-निदिध्यासनयोः।
यदि ह्य् अवगतं ब्रह्म अन्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत् तदा विधि-शेषत्वम्,
na, avagaty-arthatvān manana-nididhyāsanayoḥ।
yadi hy avagataṃ brahma anyatra viniyujyeta, bhavet tadā vidhi-śeṣatvam,—

If Brahman after being fully realized were to be employed elsewhere (for some other purpose) then it would very well happen to be complementary to an injunction,
But it is not so, because (as said above) cogitation and meditation also, like hearing, are meant ultimately to culminate in the complete realization (of Brahman).

1.1.4 L.277 तस्मान् न प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-विषयतया शास्त्र-प्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः संभवति इति
tasmān na pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayā śāstra-pramāṇakatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ saṃbhavati iti—
Therefore it is not possible (to say) that Brahman is something, to know which the Śāstra is the right means of knowledge, only in so far as it is the object of an injunction to meditate upon,

1.1.4 L.278 अतः स्व-तन्त्रम् एव ब्रह्म शात्र-प्रमाणकम्,
वेदान्त-वाक्य-समन्वयाद् इति सिद्धम्।
ataḥ sva-tantram eva brahma śātra-pramāṇakam,
vedānta-vākya-samanvayād iti siddham—

And it is conclusively established by the proper co-ordination of the Scriptural passages
That Brahman is independent in itself, having the Śāstra as the right means of its knowledge.

1.1.4 L.279 एवं च सति ‘अथ अतो ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासा’ इति तद्-विषयः पृथक्-शास्त्र-आरम्भ उपपद्यते।
evaṃ ca sati ‘atha ato brahma-jijñāsā’ iti tad-viṣayaḥ pṛthak-śāstra-ārambha upapadyate—
This being so, an altogether separate beginning of the Śāstra, thus — “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman” — is perfectly justified.

1.1.4 L.280 प्रतिपत्ति-विधि-परत्वे हि ‘अथ अतो धर्म-जिज्ञासा’ इत्य् एव आरब्धत्वान् न पृथक्-शास्त्रम् आरभ्येत।
pratipatti-vidhi-paratve hi ‘atha ato dharma-jijñāsā’ ity eva ārabdhatvān na pṛthak-śāstram ārabhyeta—
Were it to be of the nature of an injunction to realize, the Śāstra-kāra would begin it thus — “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma” — and he would not begin a new Śāstra at all.

1.1.4 L.281 आरभ्यमाणं चैवम् आरभ्येत, ‘अथ अतः परिशिष्ट-धर्म-जिज्ञासा’ इति,
ārabhyamāṇaṃ caivam ārabhyeta, ‘atha ataḥ pariśiṣṭa-dharma-jijñāsā’ iti,—
And even if he were to follow the former course, he would begin it like this — “Now, therefore, the inquiry into the supplementary part of Dharma”,

1.1.4 L.282 ‘अथ अतः क्रत्व्-अर्थ-पुरुष-अर्थयोर् जिज्ञासा’ (जै॰सू॰ ४.१.१) इतिवत्।
‘atha ataḥ kratv-artha-puruṣa-arthayor jijñāsā’ (jai॰sū॰ 4.1.1) itivat—
Similar to “Now therefore an inquiry into the aim of a sacrifice (Kratu) or the highest aim of a man” (as in the Jai. Sū. 4.1.1).

1.1.4 L.283 ब्रह्म-आत्मैक्य-अवगतिस् त्व् अप्रतिज्ञातेति,
तद्-अर्थो युक्तः शास्त्र-आरम्भः, ‘अथ अतो ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासा’ इति।
brahma-ātmaikya-avagatis tv apratijñāteti,
tad-artho yuktaḥ śāstra-ārambhaḥ, ‘atha ato brahma-jijñāsā’ iti—

And as the knowledge of the unity of the Self and Brahman is not described to be the scope of the Śāstra of Dharma (i.e. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā),
Īt is quite logical that the beginning in the present case is thus — “Now therefore an inquiry into Brahman”.

1.1.4 L.284 तस्मात् ‘अहं ब्रह्म अस्मि’ इत्य् एतद्-अवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः, सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि।
tasmāt ‘ahaṃ brahma asmi’ ity etad-avasānā eva sarve vidhayaḥ, sarvāṇi cetarāṇi pramāṇāni—
Therefore all injunctions and all other means of knowledge are valid only upto the realization thus — “I am Brahman”.

1.1.4 L.285 न ह्य् अहेय-अनुपादेय-अद्वैत-आत्म-अवगतौ निर्-विषयाण्य् अप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुम् अर्हन्ति इति।
na hy aheya-anupādeya-advaita-ātma-avagatau nir-viṣayāṇy apramātṛkāṇi ca pramāṇāni bhavitum arhanti iti—
For when the knowledge of the Self from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added has supervened, the right means of knowledge no longer continue to be the right means of knowledge.

1.1.4 L.286 अपि च आहुः,
api ca āhuḥ,—
Besides it is said —

1.1.4 L.287
गौण-मिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्र-देहादि-बाधनात्।
सद्-ब्रह्मात्माहम् इत्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत्॥
gauṇa-mithyātmano'sattve putra-dehādi-bādhanāt।
sad-brahmātmāham ityevaṃ bodhe kāryaṃ kathaṃ bhavet॥—

When there has arisen (in a man’s mind) the knowledge viz. “I am the Sat, the Brahman is but myself”, and when owing to the ablation of the conceptions of the son, the body etc. as being one’s own Self, the figurative and false-ignorance about the Self has come to an end, how should then any Kārya i.e. effect (originating in wrong conceptions) exist any longer?

1.1.4 L.288
अन्वेष्टव्यात्म-विज्ञानात् प्राक् प्रमातृत्वम् आत्मनः।
अन्विष्टः स्यात् प्रमातैव पाप्म-दोषादि-वर्जितः॥
anveṣṭavyātma-vijñānāt prāk pramātṛtvam ātmanaḥ।
anviṣṭaḥ syāt pramātaiva pāpma-doṣādi-varjitaḥ॥—

As long as the knowledge of the Self, which the Scriptures want us to endeavour after, has not arisen, so long, the Self is a knowing agent, but the same knowing agent becomes that which is searched after, viz. the Highest Self, which is free from all evil and blemish, when the real nature of the Self is realized.

1.1.4 L.289
देहात्म-प्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः।
लौकिकं तद्वद् एवेदं प्रमाणं त्व् आ आत्म-निश्चयात्॥
dehātma-pratyayo yadvat pramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ।
laukikaṃ tadvad evedaṃ pramāṇaṃ tv ā ātma-niścayāt॥—

Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so also all the Pramāṇas (i.e. the means of right knowledge such as perception etc.) are valid only until the one and the only one Self is properly realized.

1.1.4 L.290 इति॥४॥
– Thus. — 4.

इति श्री-शङ्कर-भगवत्-पाद-कृतौ शारीरक-मीमांसा-भाष्ये चतुर्थं समन्वय-अधिकरणं संपूर्णम्॥
– 4. Samanvaya-Adhikaraṇam.
This ends the Sūtra-quartette (Catus-sūtrī).

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Abbreviation References
Ait. Bra.Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
Ait. Ar.Aitareya Āraṇyaka
Bh. G.Bhagavadgītī
Bra. Su.Brahma-Sūtras
Bra. Su. Bha.Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya
Dha. Su.Dharma-Sūtra
Gaudapada Ka.Gaudapāda Kārikā
Jai. Sū.Jaimini Sūtra
Kaush. Bra.Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa
M. Bh.Mahā-bhārata
Manu. Sam.Manu-Saṃhitā
Ṛg.-Ved. Sam.Ṛg-Veda-Saṃhitā
Śata. Bra.Śata-patha-Brāhmaṇa
Tait. Bra.Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa
Tait. Sam.Taittirīya-Saṃhitā
Tan. Bra.Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa
Vai. Su.Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra

॥इति ब्रह्मसूत्र-शानङ्कर-भाष्यम् Translation॥