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This is V. M. Apte’s 1960 English translation of Ādi-Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyam (commentary) comprising for the students of Vedānta an excellent introduction and summary of the main topics concerning the proper textual understanding of the Upaniṣads.

by A.K. Aruna
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2. L.1 सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो जगतः उत्पत्तिकारणम्, मृत्सुवर्णादय इव घटरुचकादीनाम्;
उत्पन्नस्य जगतो नियन्तृत्वेन स्थितिकारणम्, मायावीव मायायाः;
प्रसारितस्य जगतः पुनः स्वात्मन्येवोपसंहारकारणम्, अवनिरिव चतुर्विधस्य भूतग्रामस्य; स एव च सर्वेषां न आत्मा –
इत्येतद्वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयप्रतिपादनेन प्रतिपादितम्;
In the first Adhyāya,
It has been propounded (Pratipāditam) by co-ordinating the statements in Vedānta, that
The Omniscient Lord of all, is the cause of the origination of the world, even as clay and gold etc. are (the cause of the origination) of a pot and an ornament respectively,
That he is the cause of the preservation of the created world, even as the illusionist is (the cause) of the illusion, That he is again the cause of the absorption into himself of the world spread out (i.e. projected) by himself, even as the Earth (is the cause of the absorption) of the four classes of creatures, and that he is the Self of us all.

2. L.2 प्रधानादिकारणवादाश्चाशब्दत्वेन निराकृताः।
The doctrines that Pradhāna etc. are the cause, have been refuted on the ground of there being no Scriptural authority for the same.

2. L.3 इदानीं स्वपक्षे स्मृतिन्यायविरोधपरिहारः प्रधानादिवादानां च न्यायाभासोपबृंहितत्वं प्रतिवेदान्तं च सृष्ट्यादिप्रक्रियाया अविगीतत्वमित्यस्यार्थजातस्य प्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय आरभ्यते।
Now the second Adhyāya is begun for the purpose of propounding the refutation of the opposition of Smṛti and Nyāya to our own view i.e. to show as to how the doctrines of the Pradhāna etc. (as the cause) are supported by fallacious reasoning, and as to how in every Vedānta the doctrines about the mode of the Genesis of all things in general, are not in conflict with each other.

40. Smṛti (2.1.1–2) 41. Yoga-pratyukti (2.1.3) 42. Vilakṣaṇatva (2.1.4–11) 43. Śiṣṭa-aparigraha (2.1.12) 44. Bhoktr-āpatti (2.1.13) 45. Ārambhaṇa (2.1.14–20) 46. Itara-vyapadeśa (2.1.21–23) 47. Upasaṃhāra-darśana (2.1.24–25) 48. Kṛtsna-prasakti (2.1.26–29) 49. Sarvopeta (2.1.30–31) 50. Prayojanavattva (2.1.32–33) 51. Vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇya (2.1.34–36) 52. Sarva-dharmopapatti (2.1.37)

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Su.2.1.01 Su..02

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2.1.1 L.1 तत्र प्रथमं तावत्स्मृतिविरोधमुपन्यस्य परिहरति –
(The Sūtra-kāra) therefore, now in the first place states the opposition (to the Vedānta view) based on Smṛti, and refutes it, thus: —

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Smṛti: the Sāṅkhya philosophy; An-avakāśa: no room; Doṣa: defect; Prasaṅgaḥ: Result, chance; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Na: not; Anya-smṛti: other Smṛtis; An-avakāśa-doṣa-prasaṅgāt: because there would result the defect of want of room for other Smṛtis.

🔗 If it be said (that Brahman is not the cause of the world) because there would be the predicament of the fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛti, (we reply), no, because, thus, there would be the predicament of a fault of the want of scope for another Smṛti. — 2.1.1.

2.1.1 L.2 यदुक्तं ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणम् इति, तदयुक्तम्।
(Says the opponent) — What you have said, viz. that the Omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world, is not logical.

2.1.1 L.3 कुतः? स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् –
How so? Because thereby occurs the predicament of the fault of the want of scope of a (certain) Smṛti.

2.1.1 L.4 स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता शिष्टपरिगृहीता अन्याश्च तदनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः, ता एवं सत्यनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन्।
Because, in that case the Smṛti known as (Sāṅkhya) Tantra, promulgated by the great sage (Kapila) and accepted by learned people, and the other Smṛtis which follow this (Tantra) Smṛti would be without any scope.

2.1.1 L.5 तासु ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रं जगतः कारणमुपनिबध्यते।
In those Smṛtis the non-sentient Pradhāna is spoken of as the independent cause of the world.

2.1.1 L.6 मन्वादिस्मृतयस्तावच्चोदनालक्षणेनाग्निहोत्रादिना धर्मजातेनापेक्षितमर्थं समर्पयन्त्यः सावकाशा भवन्ति –
On the other hand, the Smṛtis of Manu and others, which purport to mention all matters of religious duties such as Agni-hotra etc. as having the characteristic of an injunction, would be having due scope;

2.1.1 L.7 अस्य वर्णस्यास्मिन्कालेऽनेन विधानेनोपनयनम्, ईदृशश्चाचारः,
As for instance — that (a man of) such and such caste should receive initiation by the investiture of a sacred thread at such and such time and by such and such rite, it has such and such rule of conduct,

2.1.1 L.8 इत्थं वेदाध्ययनम्, इत्थं समावर्तनम्,
Its study of Vedas should be in such and such a way, a pupil’s return home after finishing his course of holy study should be in such and such a way,

2.1.1 L.9 इत्थं सहधर्मचारिणीसंयोग इति;
And in such and such a way should he enter wedlock (i.e., lit., should be joined with a coadjutor in religious duties).

2.1.1 L.10 तथा पुरुषार्थांश्च वर्णाश्रमधर्मान्नानाविधान्विदधति।
They give injunctions about the proper aims of life, and the various religious duties of the castes (Varṇas) and the various types of the orders of life (Āśramas).

2.1.1 L.11 नैवं कापिलादिस्मृतीनामनुष्ठेये विषये अवकाशोऽस्ति।
The Smṛtis of Kapila etc. have no such scope with regard to the subject of the performance of rites,

2.1.1 L.12 मोक्षसाधनमेव हि सम्यग्दर्शनमधिकृत्य ताः प्रणीताः।
As they have been written with special reference to the correct knowledge as a means of bringing about Final Release,

2.1.1 L.13 यदि तत्राप्यनवकाशाः स्युः, आनर्थक्यमेवासां प्रसज्येत।
And if they don’t have scope even for that, then they would be rendered meaningless.

2.1.1 L.14 तस्मात्तदविरोधेन वेदान्ता व्याख्यातव्याः।
Therefore, Vedāntas ought to be explained by avoiding any conflict with them.

2.1.1 L.15 कथं पुनरीक्षत्यादिभ्यो हेतुभ्यो ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणमित्यवधारितः श्रुत्यर्थः स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेन पुनराक्षिप्यते?
But when the meaning of Scriptures is determined thus, viz. that the Omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world, on the grounds of “thinking etc.”, how ever can it be objected to on the ground of any such predicament as that of a fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛti?

2.1.1 L.16 भवेदयमनाक्षेपः स्वतन्त्रप्रज्ञानाम्;
May be, no such objection can arise in the case of those whose intellect is independent,

2.1.1 L.17 परतन्त्रप्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुमशक्नुवन्तः प्रख्यातप्रणेतृकासु स्मृतिष्ववलम्बेरन्;
But in the case of ordinary men who depend upon others for knowledge, and are unable to understand the meaning of the Scriptures independently, and who may well depend upon Smṛtis written by well-known authors (such as Kapila),

2.1.1 L.18 तद्बलेन च श्रुत्यर्थं प्रतिपित्सेरन्;
And who would understand the meaning of Scriptures on the strength of these Smṛtis,

2.1.1 L.19 अस्मत्कृते च व्याख्याने न विश्वस्युः, बहुमानात्स्मृतीनां प्रणेतृषु;
And, as naturally, they would have great respect for the writers (of such Smṛtis), they would not believe in our (i.e. of the Vedāntin’s) explanation.

2.1.1 L.20 कपिलप्रभृतीनां चार्षं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतं स्मर्यते;
Smṛtis speak of the knowledge of Kapila and others, as being Ṛṣi-like and unobstructed.

2.1.1 L.21 श्रुतिश्च भवति ‘ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्’ (SvetU.5.2) इति;
A Scriptural passage moreover says thus — “He, who in the beginning produced out of himself the aureate-complexioned one i.e. Hiraṇya-garbha (Kapila) and sustained him by wisdom.” (SvetU.5.2).

2.1.1 L.22 तस्मान्नैषां मतमयथार्थं शक्यं सम्भावयितुम्;
Therefore, it is not possible to consider the opinion of such as these, as improper.

2.1.1 L.23 तर्कावष्टम्भेन चैतेऽर्थं प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति;
They determine the meaning by having recourse to reasoning.

2.1.1 L.24 तस्मादपि स्मृतिबलेन वेदान्ता व्याख्येया इति पुनराक्षेपः॥
Therefore, the objection again is, that Vedānta texts should be explained on the strength of Smṛtis.

2.1.1 L.25 तस्य समाधिः – ‘नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात्’ इति।
The refutation of this (objection, is by the latter part of the Sūtra) thus: — “(In that case) there would result the predicament of the fault of there being no scope for (these) other Smṛtis”.

2.1.1 L.26 यदि स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेनेश्वरकारणवाद आक्षिप्येत,
If the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, were to be objected to, on the ground of the predicament of a fault of want of scope for some Smṛtis,

2.1.1 L.27 एवमप्यन्या ईश्वरकारणवादिन्यः स्मृतयोऽनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन्;
Then, other Smṛtis which lay down that the Lord is the cause, would have no scope left for them.

2.1.1 L.28 ता उदाहरिष्यामः – ‘यत्तत्सूक्ष्ममविज्ञेयम्’ इति परं ब्रह्म प्रकृत्य, ‘स ह्यन्तरात्मा भूतानां क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेति कथ्यते’ इति चोक्त्वा,
We will cite them by way of illustration: — (The Smṛti) after saying with reference to the Highest Brahman “That this which is subtle and unknowable”, says, “it is said that he is the Universal Self of all beings, and the knower of the Kṣetra (i.e. the body)”.

2.1.1 L.29 ‘तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम’ इत्याह;
It further says — “Oh, the best of the twice-born, from that (i.e. Brahman) was born the undeveloped i.e. unevolved (Avyakta), having the three qualities (Guṇas)”.

2.1.1 L.30 तथान्यत्रापि ‘अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्निर्गुणे सम्प्रलीयते’ इत्याह;
In another place also, it says — “Oh great Brāhmaṇa, the unevolved is absorbed in the Puruṣa (Brahman) which has no qualities.”

2.1.1 L.31 ‘अतश्च संक्षेपमिमं शृणुध्वं नारायणः सर्वमिदं पुराणः।
स सर्गकाले च करोति सर्वं संहारकाले च तदत्ति भूयः’ इति पुराणे;
The Purāṇa also says — “Hence, listen to this conclusion, that the ancient Nārāyaṇa is all this.
He creates everything at the time of creation, and at the time of destruction consumes all this”.

2.1.1 L.32 भगवद्गीतासु च – ‘अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा’ (BhG.7.6) इति;
The Bhagavad-gīta says — “I am both the source (Prabhava), as also the great flood (Pralaya) of the whole world.” (BhG.7.6).

2.1.1 L.33 परमात्मानमेव च प्रकृत्यापस्तम्बः पठति – ‘तस्मात्कायाः प्रभवन्ति सर्वे स मूलं शाश्वतिकः स नित्यः’ (ध. सू. १-८-२३-२) इति।
Āpastamba with reference to the same Highest Self says — “All bodies are born from it, it is the root cause and is everlasting and unchanging” (Dhar. Sū. 1.8.23.2).

2.1.1 L.34 एवमनेकशः स्मृतिष्वपीश्वरः कारणत्वेनोपादानत्वेन च प्रकाश्यते।
In this manner, even in the Smṛtis, often, the Lord is explained as being the material and the accidental cause.

2.1.1 L.35 स्मृतिबलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानस्य स्मृतिबलेनैवोत्तरं वक्ष्यामीत्यतोऽयमन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषोपन्यासः।
This Sūtra, which mentions the fault of the want of scope for some other Smṛtis (in the latter half), is so stated, because it is desired to refute him — who raises an objection on the strength of (the fault about) the want of scope for some Smṛti — by raising a similar objection with regard to some other Smṛtis.

2.1.1 L.36 दर्शितं तु श्रुतीनामीश्वरकारणवादं प्रति तात्पर्यम्;
That the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world is the substance of the Scriptures, has been shown already.

2.1.1 L.37 विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनामवश्यकर्तव्येऽन्यतरपरिग्रहेऽन्यतरपरित्यागे च श्रुत्यनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः प्रमाणम्;
When Smṛtis differ, and when one has necessarily to be accepted and the others rejected, those which follow the Scriptures are an authority and the others are irrelevant.

2.1.1 L.38 अनपेक्ष्या इतराः; तदुक्तं प्रमाणलक्षणे – ‘विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम्’ (जै. सू. १-३-३) इति।
This is mentioned in the Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa (Jai. Su. 1.3.3) — “When a Smṛti conflicts with the Scriptures, it is to be neglected, and where it does not, the inference is (that it follows some original Scriptural text)”.

2.1.1 L.39 न चातीन्द्रियानर्थान् श्रुतिमन्तरेण कश्चिदुपलभत इति शक्यं सम्भावयितुम्, निमित्ताभावात्।
It is not possible to understand, that a person can perceive supersensuous things without (the help of) the Scriptures, as there is no valid reason for that.

2.1.1 L.40 शक्यं कपिलादीनां सिद्धानामप्रतिहतज्ञानत्वादिति चेत्,
If it be said, that it is possible because gifted persons such as Kapila and others have unobstructed knowledge,

2.1.1 L.41 न; सिद्धेरपि सापेक्षत्वात्; धर्मानुष्ठानापेक्षा हि सिद्धिः, स च धर्मश्चोदनालक्षणः;
(We reply) — no, because super-natural faculty itself is dependent upon the performance of religious duty, of which injunction is the characteristic.

2.1.1 L.42 ततश्च पूर्वसिद्धायाश्चोदनाया अर्थो न पश्चिमसिद्धपुरुषवचनवशेनातिशङ्कितुं शक्यते।
Hence the meaning of an injunction which is in existence already, cannot be doubted by reliance on the word of a person who has become so gifted, afterwards.

2.1.1 L.43 सिद्धव्यपाश्रयकल्पनायामपि बहुत्वात्सिद्धानां प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां
Even if we were to accept the idea of resorting to a person who has attained such supernatural faculty, such persons being many, in the case of a conflict of Smṛtis in the manner indicated (above),

2.1.1 L.44 न श्रुतिव्यपाश्रयादन्यन्निर्णयकारणमस्ति।
There is no other means of arriving at a decision except by a resort to the Scriptures.

2.1.1 L.45 परतन्त्रप्रज्ञस्यापि नाकस्मात्स्मृतिविशेषविषयः पक्षपातो युक्तः,
Even in the case of one who is dependent on others for knowledge, his sudden partiality i.e. predilection for a particular Smṛti is not logically justifiable,

2.1.1 L.46 कस्यचित्क्वचित्पक्षपाते सति पुरुषमतिवैश्वरूप्येण तत्त्वाव्यवस्थानप्रसङ्गात्।
Because, if any one has such partiality or predilection, then there would be the predicament of truth remaining unsettled, as men’s intellects are of the nature of the variety of the universe.

2.1.1 L.47 तस्मात्तस्यापि स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्त्युपन्यासेन श्रुत्यनुसाराननुसारविषयविवेचनेन च सन्मार्गे प्रज्ञा सङ्ग्रहणीया।
So, even in his case, his intellect deserves to be focussed or fixed on the right path, by explaining to him the disparity between Smṛtis, and by way of explaining the point as to how some Smṛtis are in accordance with the Scriptures, and that some others are not.

2.1.1 L.48 या तु श्रुतिः कपिलस्य ज्ञानातिशयं प्रदर्शयन्ती प्रदर्शिता न तया श्रुतिविरुद्धमपि कापिलं मतं श्रद्धातुं शक्यम्,
It is not possible to believe in the doctrine of Kapila (the Sāṅkhya sage) contrary as it is to the Scriptures, merely on the authority of a Scriptural passage which has been cited as showing superabundance of his knowledge,

2.1.1 L.49 कपिलमिति श्रुतिसामान्यमात्रत्वात्, अन्यस्य च कपिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतप्तुर्वासुदेवनाम्नः स्मरणात्,
In as much as, it merely mentions the name Kapila, because one Smṛti also refers to another Kapila, called Vāsu-deva, the tormentor of the sons of Sagara.

2.1.1 L.50 अन्यार्थदर्शनस्य च प्राप्तिरहितस्यासाधकत्वात्।
If any thing is stated casually in connection with a passage which purports to indicate an altogether different thing, then that thing stated so casually, is not established by the passage in which it is mentioned so casually.

2.1.1 L.51 भवति चान्या मनोर्माहात्म्यं प्रख्यापयन्ती श्रुतिः – ‘यद्वै किञ्च मनुरवदत्तद्भेषजम्’ (तै. सं. २-२-१०-२) इति;
There is besides another Scriptural passage establishing the greatness of Manu, thus: — “Verily, whatever Manu has said, is medicine” (Tait. Sam. 2.2.10.2).

2.1.1 L.52 मनुना च ‘सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि। सम्पश्यन्नात्मयाजी वै स्वाराज्यमधिगच्छति’ (मनु. स्मृ. १२-९१) इति सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनं प्रशंसता कापिलं मतं निन्द्यत इति गम्यते;
Manu, who extols looking upon everything as the Self, thus — “One who sees the Self in everything, and everything in the Self, and is a sacrificer to the Self, verily attains Final Release — Svā-rājya” (12.91), seems thereby to censure i.e. to disapprove of the doctrine of Kapila,

2.1.1 L.53 कपिलो हि न सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनमनुमन्यते, आत्मभेदाभ्युपगमात्।
Who does not agree with the doctrine of seeing the Self in everything, in as much as he holds that there is difference between Selfs (and that they are many).

2.1.1 L.54 महाभारतेऽपि च – ‘बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मन्नुताहो एक एव तु’ इति विचार्य, ‘बहवः पुरुषा राजन्सांख्ययोगविचारिणाम्’ इति परपक्षमुपन्यस्य तद्व्युदासेन –
In the Mahā-bhārata also, when the question is whether there are many Puruṣas or there is only one, after laying down first the view of the opponent thus — The follower of Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines, consider the Selfs to be many — ,

2.1.1 L.55 ‘बहूनां पुरुषाणां हि यथैका योनिरुच्यते। तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमाख्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम्’ इत्युपक्रम्य
‘ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्ये देहसंस्थिताः। सर्वेषां साक्षिभूतोऽसौ न ग्राह्यः केनचित्क्वचित्॥
विश्वमूर्धा विश्वभुजो विश्वपादाक्षिनासिकः। एकश्चरति भूतेषु स्वैरचारी यथासुखम्’ –
इति सर्वात्मतैव निर्धारिता।
It refutes it, and establishes the doctrine of the Universal Self,
By stating in the beginning — “I shall explain to you that Universal Self which transcends the Guṇas, and also as to how it is said to be the one and the only one origin of all Puruṣas”,
And afterwards by stating — “It is the witness of all, the Self of mine and yours too, and the Self of all embodied beings, and is not comprehensible by anybody.
He is the Universal head-arms-legs-eyes-and-nose, and alone moves as it pleases Him amongst the things.”

2.1.1 L.56 श्रुतिश्च सर्वात्मतायां भवति –
There is a Scriptural passage also, about the Self of all,

2.1.1 L.57 ‘यस्मिन्सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः। तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः’ (IsU.7) इत्येवंविधा।
Thus — “When a person sees that all beings are but the Self only, then, to him who sees such unity, what infatuation, what grief, can possibly affect?” (IsU.7).

2.1.1 L.58 अतश्च सिद्धमात्मभेदकल्पनयापि कापिलस्य तन्त्रस्य वेदविरुद्धत्वं
Hence it is established that because of his doctrine of the plurality of Selfs also, the system of Kapila is against the Scriptures (Vedas),

2.1.1 L.59 वेदानुसारिमनुवचनविरुद्धत्वं च,
And against the statement of Manu who follows the Vedas,

2.1.1 L.60 न केवलं स्वतन्त्रप्रकृतिकल्पनयैवेति।
And not merely because of his imagining the doctrine of Prakṛti (i.e. the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas) in an independent manner.

2.1.1 L.61 वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यम्, रवेरिव रूपविषये;
The authority of the Vedas is direct and independent, with respect to matters which come in their own province, just as that of the Sun in the province of form (Rūpa-viṣaye).

2.1.1 L.62 पुरुषवचसां तु मूलान्तरापेक्षं
The authority of the statements of mere men (i.e. of Smṛti-kāras) depends upon another thing (i.e. the Scriptures)

2.1.1 L.63 वक्तृस्मृतिव्यवहितं चेति विप्रकर्षः।
And is further away from directness (of authority) because of (their having to rely on) the memory of the speaker, and the necessity of their having to have some other source (viz. the Scriptures).

2.1.1 L.64 तस्माद्वेदविरुद्धे विषये स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः॥१॥
Hence, the predicament of a fault of want of scope for a Smṛti, when it occurs in a subject which is opposed to the Vedas, is no fault. — 1.

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2.1.2 L.1 कुतश्च स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः? –
This is how, again, the predicament of want of scope for (a certain) Smṛti, is no fault.

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Itareṣām: of others; Ca: and; An-upalabdheḥ: there being no mention.

🔗 Because some others (i.e. things other than the Pradhāna) are not perceived (in the Vedas). — 2.1.2.

2.1.2 L.2 प्रधानादितराणि यानि प्रधानपरिणामत्वेन स्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि, न तानि वेदे लोके वोपलभ्यन्ते।
Mahat etc. which are different from the Pradhāna, but are conceived by the Smṛti to be the modifications of Pradhāna, are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedas.

2.1.2 L.3 भूतेन्द्रियाणि तावल्लोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वाच्छक्यन्ते स्मर्तुम्।
As for things, such as elements and sense-organs, well-known as they are in the ordinary world and the Vedas, they may well be mentioned in the Smṛti,

2.1.2 L.4 अलोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वात्तु महदादीनां षष्ठस्येवेन्द्रियार्थस्य न स्मृतिरवकल्पते।
But it could not be possible for Smṛtis to refer to Mahat etc. — as they are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedas — any more than they can possibly refer to a sixth sense-organ and a sixth sense-object.

2.1.2 L.5 यदपि क्वचित्तत्परमिव श्रवणमवभासते, तदप्यतत्परं व्याख्यातम् – ‘आनुमानिकमप्येकेषाम्’ (BrS.1.4.1) इत्यत्र।
Even though the Scriptures may occasionally appear to refer to such things (as Mahat etc.), it has been already explained in Brahma-Sūtra (BrS.1.4.1) — “The inferred one (i.e. the Pradhāna) etc.” — that they could not possibly refer to such things (as the Pradhāna and the Mahat).

2.1.2 L.6 कार्यस्मृतेरप्रामाण्यात्कारणस्मृतेरप्यप्रामाण्यं युक्तमित्यभिप्रायः।
What is meant by this is, that as Smṛtis which refer to modifications (of the Pradhāna) such as Mahat etc., are not authoritative, even so, the Smṛtis which refer to their cause (i.e. the Pradhāna) are properly not authoritative.

2.1.2 L.7 तस्मादपि न स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो दोषः।
That is why, want of scope for a certain Smṛti (which refers to the Pradhāna) is no fault.

2.1.2 L.8 तर्कावष्टम्भं तु ‘न विलक्षणत्वात्’ (BrS.2.1.4) इत्यारभ्योन्मथिष्यति॥२॥
The objection (to Brahman as the cause) based on reasoning (Tarka) will be refuted (by the Sūtra-kāra) hereafter, beginning with the Sūtra — “No, because of dissimilarity” (BrS.2.1.4). — 2.

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Etena: by this viz., by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛti; Yogaḥ: the Yoga philosophy; Pratyuktaḥ: is (also) refuted.

🔗 By this (refutation of Sāṅkhya Smṛti) the Yoga Smṛti also is refuted. — 2.1.3.

2.1.3 L.1 एतेन सांख्यस्मृतिप्रत्याख्यानेन, योगस्मृतिरपि प्रत्याख्याता द्रष्टव्येत्यतिदिशति।
The Sūtra-kāra extends the application (of these i.e. the first two Sūtras in refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛti) to Yoga Smṛti, by saying, that the Yoga (Smṛti) also should be looked upon as refuted similarly.

2.1.3 L.2 तत्रापि श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रमेव कारणम्, महदादीनि च कार्याण्यलोकवेदप्रसिद्धानि कल्प्यन्ते।
The Yoga Smṛti also, contrary to the Scriptures, imagines the Pradhāna to be the independent cause and Mahat etc. to be its modifications, though they are not so known both in the ordinary world and in the Vedas.

2.1.3 L.3 नन्वेवं सति समानन्यायत्वात्पूर्वेणैवैतद्गतम्;
(Says the opponent) — If it be so, as this ground is covered already by what has gone before, why is it then indicated again by the Atideśa (i.e. extended application)?

2.1.3 L.4 किमर्थं पुनरतिदिश्यते।
The answer is — well, there is this further doubt.

2.1.3 L.5 अस्ति ह्यत्राभ्यधिकाशङ्का – सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायो हि योगो वेदे विहितः – ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति;
The Scriptural passage “(The Self) should be heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon” (BrhUEng.2.4.5) prescribes Yoga as the means of realizing correct knowledge.

2.1.3 L.6 ‘त्रिरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरम्’ (SvetU.2.8)
इत्यादिना चासनादिकल्पनापुरःसरं बहुप्रपञ्चं योगविधानं श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि दृश्यते;
It is seen that in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad the practice of Yoga, preceded by the taking up of certain postures (i.e. Āsanas) etc., has been enjoined at great length, thus: —
“Keeping the body in perfect poise with the three parts held erect” (SvetU.2.8) etc.

2.1.3 L.7 लिङ्गानि च वैदिकानि योगविषयाणि सहस्रश उपलभ्यन्ते –
There are thousands of Scriptural indicatory marks about Yoga, such as —

2.1.3 L.8 ‘तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम्’ (KathU.2.3.11) इति,
“A steady abstraction of sense-organs, is considered to be Yoga” (KathU.2.6.11)

2.1.3 L.9 ‘विद्यामेतां योगविधिं च कृत्स्नम्’ (KathU.2.3.18) इति चैवमादीनि;
And “(Having obtained) this knowledge (of Brahman) and the whole technique of Yoga” (KathU.2.6.18).

2.1.3 L.10 योगशास्त्रेऽपि – ‘अथ तत्त्वदर्शनोपायो योगः’ इति सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायत्वेनैव योगोऽङ्गीक्रियते;
In the Yoga Śāstra itself, Yoga has been accepted as the means of realizing correct knowledge thus — “Now (is begun) Yoga, the means of realizing the principle of Truth”.
[Notice, this initial sūtra does not occur in the current form of the Yoga Sūtras. It could be that those “offending” sūtras were removed or altered by succeeding teachers of Vedānta to their students, or perhaps they were added or altered by Sāṅkhyans to make the Sūtras to be more like Sāṅkhyā. See this author’s commentary (YogaSutras) regarding the relation or non-relation between the Yoga Sūtras and Sāṅkhyā.]

2.1.3 L.11 अतः सम्प्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेशत्वादष्टकादिस्मृतिवद्योगस्मृतिरप्यनपवदनीया भविष्यतीति –
Hence (it may be maintained) that because of the agreement (of both disputants i.e. the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntin) with regard to the meaning of a part of the Yoga-Smṛti being in conformity with the Scriptures, the Yoga-Smṛti — like the Aṣṭakā Smṛti etc. — may well be rendered unobjectionable.

2.1.3 L.12 इयमभ्यधिका शङ्कातिदेशेन निवर्त्यते, अर्थैकदेशसम्प्रतिपत्तावप्यर्थैकदेशविप्रतिपत्तेः पूर्वोक्ताया दर्शनात्।
Even this further doubt also is removed here by this ‘Atideśa’ (extended application), because even though one part of the Yoga-Smṛti is in conformity with the Scriptures, still, as has already been indicated above, another part of the Yoga-Smṛti is in conflict with the Scriptures.

2.1.3 L.13 सतीष्वप्यध्यात्मविषयासु बह्वीषु स्मृतिषु सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योरेव निराकरणे यत्नः कृतः;
Even though there are many Smṛtis on the subject of Adhyātma (the relation between the Supreme Self and the Jīva-Self i.e. the individual soul) an attempt is made here to refute the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Smṛtis only,

2.1.3 L.14 सांख्ययोगौ हि परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ, शिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपबृंहितौ –
Because, they, as having the reputation of being the means of attaining the highest aim of life, have been accepted by the wise, and have been supported by i.e. bolstered up with indicatory marks in the Scriptures, such as: —

2.1.3 L.15 ‘तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः’ (SvetU.6.13) इति;
“He who has understood that cause (of the world) which can be known from the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, is relieved from all nooses or fetters” (SvetU.6.13).

2.1.3 L.16 निराकरणं तु – न सांख्यज्ञानेन वेदनिरपेक्षेण योगमार्गेण वा निःश्रेयसमधिगम्यत इति;
The refutation (of the above) is, that final beatitude is not attained by the mere knowledge of Sāṅkhya Smṛti or the path of Yoga, without reference to the Veda.

2.1.3 L.17 श्रुतिर्हि वैदिकादात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादन्यन्निःश्रेयससाधनं वारयति –
The Scriptures obviate the possibility of any other means of attaining Final Beatitude, except the knowledge of the unity of the Selfs referred to in the Vedas, thus —

2.1.3 L.18 ‘तमेव विदित्वाति मृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय’ (SvetU.3.8) इति;
“It is by knowing that (Ātmā i.e. Brahman) alone, that a person transcends death, and there is no other path to final emancipation” (SvetU.3.8).

2.1.3 L.19 द्वैतिनो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः।
The followers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines are dualists (i.e. they recognize duality of Ātmās) and do not countenance the unity of the Self.

2.1.3 L.20 यत्तु दर्शनमुक्तम् ‘तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नम्’ इति,
वैदिकमेव तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च सांख्ययोगशब्दाभ्यामभिलप्येते प्रत्यासत्तेरित्यवगन्तव्यम्।
As to the instance quoted — viz. “That cause which is known from the Sāṅkhya and Yoga” — ,
It should be understood that by the words “Sāṅkhya and Yoga”, only knowledge and meditation as understood by the Scriptures is meant, because of their proximity (to the subject).

2.1.3 L.21 येन त्वंशेन न विरुध्येते, तेनेष्टमेव सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योः सावकाशत्वम्;
So far as that portion of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Smṛtis which does not conflict (with the Scriptures) is concerned, we welcome that portion of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as having due scope,

2.1.3 L.22 तद्यथा – ‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ (BrhU.4.3.16)
इत्येवमादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव पुरुषस्य विशुद्धत्वं निर्गुणपुरुषनिरूपणेन सांख्यैरभ्युपगम्यते;
As for instance, when the Sāṅkhyas understand by their definition of quality-less Puruṣa, the purity of the Puruṣas well-known in the Scriptures, thus —
“That this Puruṣa is unattached” (BrhUEng.4.3.16).

2.1.3 L.23 तथा यौगैरपि ‘अथ परिव्राड्विवर्णवासा मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहः’ (जा. उ. ५)
इत्येवमादि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव निवृत्तिनिष्ठत्वं प्रव्रज्याद्युपदेशेनानुगम्यते।
Similarly, when the followers of Yoga, by its injunction with regard to the order of religious mendicants, understand it to be the same, as belief in actionlessness, by instruction about renunciation of the world, well-known in the Scriptures, thus: —
“Then the Parivrājaka (i.e. a Sannyāsin who has renounced the world) who wears colourless dress, is shaven, and is without a wife or other possessions or attendants (attains Final Release).” (Jāb. Up. 5).

2.1.3 L.24 एतेन सर्वाणि तर्कस्मरणानि प्रतिवक्तव्यानि;
By this (refutation), all Smṛtis based on reasoning should be refuted.

2.1.3 L.25 तान्यपि तर्कोपपत्तिभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानायोपकुर्वन्तीति चेत्, उपकुर्वन्तु नाम;
If it be said, that they also are helpful for the attainment of knowledge, by means of inferences by reasoning, well may they indeed be so helpful,

2.1.3 L.26 तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव भवति –
But the knowledge of truth can only be attained by Scriptural passages, such as —

2.1.3 L.27 ‘नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्’ (तै. ब्रा. ३-१२-९-७)
“No one who does not know the Vedas, knows the great one” (Tait. Brā. 3.12.9.7)

2.1.3 L.28 ‘तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इत्येवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः॥३॥
And “I am asking you about the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads”. (BrhUEng.3.9.26). — 3.

Su.2.1.04 Su..05 Su..06 Su..07 Su..08 Su..09 Su..10 Su..11

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Na: not (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world); Vi-lakṣaṇatvāt: because of difference in nature; Asya: its (i.e. of this world); Tathātvam: its being so; Ca: and; Śabdāt: from the word, from the Śruti.

🔗 No (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world), because of this (the world) being dissimilar (to Brahman). That it is so (i.e. it is dissimilar) is known from the Scriptures. — 2.1.4.

2.1.4 L.1 ब्रह्मास्य जगतो निमित्तकारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्य पक्षस्याक्षेपः स्मृतिनिमित्तः परिहृतः;
The objection to the view — that Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world — , based on Smṛti, has been refuted.

2.1.4 L.2 तर्कनिमित्त इदानीमाक्षेपः परिह्रियते।
Now the objection based on reasoning is being refuted.

2.1.4 L.3 कुतः पुनरस्मिन्नवधारिते आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षेपस्यावकाशः?
(Says the Vedāntin) — But whence can there be any scope for a doubt based on reasoning, with regard to the meaning of Scriptures which has already been determined?

2.1.4 L.4 ननु धर्म इव ब्रह्मण्यप्यनपेक्ष आगमो भवितुमर्हति; –
Just as Scriptures are independent of any other thing with regard to matters pertaining to religious duty, even so should they be understood to be independent in the case of Brahman also.

2.1.4 L.5 भवेदयमवष्टम्भो यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्य आगममात्रप्रमेयोऽयमर्थः स्यादनुष्ठेयरूप इव धर्मः;
(The opponent replies) — Well, such determination would be there, provided, like matters of religious duty which have to be performed, and which are to be understood from the Scriptures only, Brahman also were liable to be determined with the help of the Scriptures alone, and were not to be understandable by other means-of-proof.

2.1.4 L.6 परिनिष्पन्नरूपं तु ब्रह्मावगम्यते;
But Brahman is of the nature of an actually established entity

2.1.4 L.7 परिनिष्पन्ने च वस्तुनि प्रमाणान्तराणामस्त्यवकाशो यथा पृथिव्यादिषु;
And with regard to such an established thing, like the earth etc., there is scope for other means-of-proof.

2.1.4 L.8 यथा च श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधे सत्येकवशेनेतरा नीयन्ते,
Just as, when there is a conflict between Scriptural passages, all the rest have necessarily to be coordinated with only one of them,

2.1.4 L.9 एवं प्रमाणान्तरविरोधेऽपि तद्वशेनैव श्रुतिर्नीयेत;
Similarly when there is a conflict of the other means-of-proof with the Scriptures, they i.e. the Scriptures, ought to be coordinated with the other means-of-proof.

2.1.4 L.10 दृष्टसाधर्म्येण चादृष्टमर्थं समर्पयन्ती युक्तिरनुभवस्य सन्निकृष्यते, विप्रकृष्यते तु श्रुतिः, ऐतिह्यमात्रेण स्वार्थाभिधानात्;
Reasoning, which establishes invisible entities, on the ground of their similarity with a thing which is visible, is nearer to experience, than the Scriptures which convey their meaning in a traditional dogmatic manner (like an Ipse dixit) and they are further removed from experience.

2.1.4 L.11 अनुभवावसानं च ब्रह्मविज्ञानमविद्याया निवर्तकं मोक्षसाधनं च दृष्टफलतयेष्यते;
Knowledge of Brahman however culminates in experience, and by removing Nescience becomes the means of Final Beatitude, and only if it is so understood, can it be said to have a fruit which is visible or tangible.

2.1.4 L.12 श्रुतिरपि – ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ इति श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधती तर्कमप्यत्रादर्तव्यं दर्शयति;
The Scriptures by enjoining thus — “(The Ātmā) should be seen and cogitated upon” i.e. by enjoining cogitation in addition to hearing, show that here, reasoning also should be welcomed with respect (as a means).

2.1.4 L.13 अतस्तर्कनिमित्तः पुनराक्षेपः क्रियते ‘न विलक्षणत्वादस्य’ इति॥
That is why an objection based on reasoning is here taken, thus — “No, because of this (the world) being dissimilar”.

2.1.4 L.14 यदुक्तम् चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिः इति, तन्नोपपद्यते।
It is not reasonably sustainable to say — as is said — that sentient Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world.

2.1.4 L.15 कस्मात्? विलक्षणत्वादस्य विकारस्य प्रकृत्याः –
Why so? Because of this alleged modification or effect of Brahman (i.e. this world) being dissimilar to the material cause (Brahman).

2.1.4 L.16 इदं हि ब्रह्मकार्यत्वेनाभिप्रेयमाणं जगद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणमचेतनमशुद्धं च दृश्यते;
This world which is alleged to be a modification of Brahman appears to be non-sentient and impure and therefore dissimilar to Brahman,

2.1.4 L.17 ब्रह्म च जगद्विलक्षणं चेतनं शुद्धं च श्रूयते;
While the Scriptures declare Brahman to be sentient and pure i.e. dissimilar to the world.

2.1.4 L.18 न च विलक्षणत्वे प्रकृतिविकारभावो दृष्टः;
No relationship such as that of a cause to its effect is ever seen where there is dissimilarity (between two things).

2.1.4 L.19 न हि रुचकादयो विकारा मृत्प्रकृतिका भवन्ति, शरावादयो वा सुवर्णप्रकृतिकाः;
Modifications such as ornaments etc. cannot have clay as their material cause, nor can earthen pots etc. have gold as their material cause.

2.1.4 L.20 मृदैव तु मृदन्विता विकाराः क्रियन्ते, सुवर्णेन च सुवर्णान्विताः;
Modifications having the nature of earth are effected from earth alone, and those having the nature of gold from gold alone.

2.1.4 L.21 तथेदमपि जगदचेतनं सुखदुःखमोहान्वितं सत् अचेतनस्यैव सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य कारणस्य कार्यं भवितुमर्हति, न विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः।
Similarly, this world, non-sentient and of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, as it is, deserves to be the modification of a cause which similarly is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, and not (a modification) of Brahman which is dissimilar.

2.1.4 L.22 ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वं चास्य जगतोऽशुद्ध्यचेतनत्वदर्शनादवगन्तव्यम्।
Dissimilarity of this world from Brahman should be understood from the world’s impurity and from its being non-sentient.

2.1.4 L.23 अशुद्धं हीदं जगत्, सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया प्रीतिपरितापविषादादिहेतुत्वात्स्वर्गनरकाद्युच्चावचप्रपञ्चत्वाच्च।
The world after all is impure, because, on account of its nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, it is the cause of happiness, grief and dejection, and because of the diversity of the world with its high and low abodes, such as heaven and hell etc.

2.1.4 L.24 अचेतनं चेदं जगत्, चेतनं प्रति कार्यकरणभावेनोपकरणभावोपगमात्।
This world is non-sentient, again, as it is understood that it constitutes itself as the subservient instrument of the intelligent Self by means of a body and sense-organs.

2.1.4 L.25 न हि साम्ये सत्युपकार्योपकारकभावो भवति;
When there is similarity (between two things), there never is a relationship between them, by way of the one helping and the other receiving such help.

2.1.4 L.26 न हि प्रदीपौ परस्परस्योपकुरुतः।
For instance, two lamps do not help each other.

2.1.4 L.27 ननु चेतनमपि कार्यकरणं स्वामिभृत्यन्यायेन भोक्तुरुपकरिष्यति।
But (says the Vedāntin) even a sentient instrument may subserve the enjoying Self, on the analogy of the maxim of a master and a servant?

2.1.4 L.28 न, स्वामिभृत्ययोरप्यचेतनांशस्यैव चेतनं प्रत्युपकारकत्वात्;
To the foregoing argument, the opponent replies: — No. In the master and servant illustration also, it is only the non-sentient part (of the servant) that serves the sentient (master).

2.1.4 L.29 यो ह्येकस्य चेतनस्य परिग्रहो बुद्ध्यादिरचेतनभागः स एवान्यस्य चेतनस्योपकरोति,
It is the non-sentient property of Buddhi (which is considered to be a sense-organ) of one sentient thing that helps the other sentient thing,

2.1.4 L.30 न तु स्वयमेव चेतनश्चेतनान्तरस्योपकरोत्यपकरोति वा;
And not that one sentient thing itself either helps or causes impediment to another sentient thing.

2.1.4 L.31 निरतिशया ह्यकर्तारश्चेतना इति सांख्या मन्यन्ते;
The Sāṅkhyas hold that sentient things (such as Selfs) are sans-qualities and inert.

2.1.4 L.32 तस्मादचेतनं कार्यकारणम्।
Therefore, the modifications such as a body and sense-organs are non-sentient.

2.1.4 L.33 न च काष्ठलोष्टादीनां चेतनत्वे किञ्चित्प्रमाणमस्ति;
There is no authority to hold that things such as wood or clay are sentient.

2.1.4 L.34 प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनविभागो लोके।
The division of things into sentient and non-sentient is popularly well-known.

2.1.4 L.35 तस्माद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगत्तत्प्रकृतिकम्।
Therefore, since this world is dissimilar to Brahman, it cannot have Brahman as its material cause.

2.1.4 L.36 योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत – श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकताम्,
If somebody were to argue in this connection, thus — As the Scriptures declare that the world has a sentient entity (Brahman) as its material cause,

2.1.4 L.37 तद्बलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि,
I would on the strength of that very statement hold that the whole world is sentient,

2.1.4 L.38 प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारेऽन्वयदर्शनात्;
Because the nature of the cause is invariably seen to inhere in the modification or effect,

2.1.4 L.39 अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद्भविष्यति;
And that the non-manifestation of sentiency (in the modification) may well be due to a peculiarity of the modification.

2.1.4 L.40 यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते,
And just as, even though the sentiency of Selfs is patent, yet it is not manifest during the condition of sleep or swoon,

2.1.4 L.41 एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते;
Even so, the sentiency of a piece of wood or a clod of earth may not be manifest.

2.1.4 L.42 एतस्मादेव च विभावितत्वाविभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्यां च
And it may well be, that, because this peculiarity of the existence of form (Rūpa) etc. or its absence, is due to the manifestation or non-manifestation of sentiency,

2.1.4 L.43 कार्यकरणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते;
That, it is, that even though the quality of sentiency is common both to effects and their causes, i.e. the Selfs, there is no conflict between them, by way of one amongst them being subordinate and the other superior.

2.1.4 L.44 यथा च पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात्परस्परोपकारित्वं भवति, एवमिहापि भविष्यति;
And just as, even though meat, soup, and rice have the common quality of being earthy, they become mutually helpful on account of the peculiarity of each of them in themselves, so may it well be, in the present case,

2.1.4 L.45 प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्यत इति –
And thus there would be no conflict with respect to the well-known division (of things being sentient and nonsentient).

2.1.4 L.46 तेनापि कथञ्चिच्चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिह्रियेत;
But (says the opponent), that may at the most be able to refute the dissimilarity of the nature of things being sentient and non-sentient,

2.1.4 L.47 शुद्ध्यशुद्धित्वलक्षणं तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव परिह्रियते।
But all the same it won’t be able to refute the dissimilarity of the natures of purity or impurity (as between Brahman and the world).

2.1.4 L.48 न चेतरदपि विलक्षणत्वं परिहर्तुं शक्यत इत्याह – तथात्वं च शब्दादिति;
Nor can even dissimilarity of the sort referred to above (i.e. sentient and non-sentient) happen to be really refuted thus, because (as the Sūtra says) — “The Scriptures declare it to be so”.

2.1.4 L.49 अनवगम्यमानमेव हीदं लोके समस्तस्य वस्तुनश्चेतनत्वं
Even if the sentient nature of all things (i.e. effects), though non-discernible in the ordinary world, were to be so predicated of them,

2.1.4 L.50 चेतनप्रकृतिकत्वश्रवणाच्छब्दशरणतया केवलयोत्प्रेक्ष्यते;
And even if all those things were to be so understood, because the Scriptures declare them to have a cause of a sentient nature (i.e. Brahman), by merely considering the Scriptures as the sheet-anchor of authority,

2.1.4 L.51 तच्च शब्देनैव विरुध्यते, यतः शब्दादपि तथात्वमवगम्यते;
Even then, it is contradicted by the Scriptures themselves, because, that they are so dissimilar, is understood even on the authority of the Scriptures themselves.

2.1.4 L.52 तथात्वमिति प्रकृतिविलक्षणत्वं कथयति;
Because, ‘Tathātvam’ here means, being dissimilar to the material cause (i.e. Brahman).

2.1.4 L.53 शब्द एव ‘विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति कस्यचिद्विभागस्याचेतनतां श्रावयंश्चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणमचेतनं जगच्छ्रावयति॥४॥
The Scriptures themselves speak about this non-sentiency of a part, thus — “It became that which is endowed with knowledge (Vijñāna) and that which is devoid of knowledge (Avijñāna)” (TaitUEng.2.6), and they also declare the non-sentient and inert world to be dissimilar to the sentient Brahman. — 4.

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2.1.5 L.1 ननु चेतनत्वमपि क्वचिदचेतनत्वाभिमतानां भूतेन्द्रियाणां श्रूयते – यथा ‘मृदब्रवीत्’ ‘आपोऽब्रुवन्’ (श. ब्रा. ६-१-३-२-४) इति ‘तत्तेज ऐक्षत’ (ChanU.6.2.3)
But — says some other opponent — the Scriptures themselves speak of the sentient nature of the elements and sense-organs which have been understood to be non-sentient, thus — “The Earth spake, the waters spake” (Śat. Brā. 6. 1.3.2. 4).

2.1.5 L.2 ‘ता आप ऐक्षन्त’ (ChanU.6.2.4) इति चैवमाद्या भूतविषया चेतनत्वश्रुतिः;
“That fire thought”, “Water thought” etc., which speak of the sentience of the elements [Trans. from Panoli].

2.1.5 L.3 इन्द्रियविषयापि – ‘ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसे विवदमाना ब्रह्म जग्मुः’ (BrhU.6.1.7) इति,
With regard to the sense-organs the Scriptures say — “Now these Prāṇas (sense-organs) disputing amongst themselves as to which of them was pre-eminent amongst them, approached Brahman” (BrhUEng.6.1.7),

2.1.5 L.4 ‘ते ह वाचमूचुस्त्वं न उद्गायेति’ (BrhU.1.3.2) इत्येवमाद्येन्द्रियविषयेति।
“They said to Speech (Vāk), do thou recite (Sāman) for us” (BrhUEng.1.3.2) etc.

2.1.5 L.5 अत उत्तरं पठति –
To this objection the Sūtra-kāra replies: —

---

Abhimāni: the presiding deity (of the organs and the elements); Vyapadeśaḥ: an expression, an indication, pointing out of, denotation of; Tu: but; Viśeṣa: specific adjunct, on account of distinction, because of so being qualified; Anugatibhyām: the act of pervading; (Viśeṣa-anugatibhyām: from the specific adjunct as well as from the fact of pervading, on account of their entering).

🔗 But, because of special characterization (Viśeṣa) and relation (Sambandha), this reference is to those presiding (deities). — 2.1.5.

2.1.5 L.6 तुशब्द आशङ्कामपनुदति।
The word ‘But’ removes the doubt.

2.1.5 L.7 न खलु ‘मृदब्रवीत्’ इत्येवंजातीयकया श्रुत्या भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वमाशङ्कनीयम्, यतोऽभिमानिव्यपदेश एषः;
Scriptural passages such as “The Earth spake, the waters spake” etc. should not be suspected of referring to the sentient nature of elements and sense-organs, because this reference is to the presiding entities (deities).

2.1.5 L.8 मृदाद्यभिमानिन्यो वागाद्यभिमानिन्यश्च चेतना देवता वदनसंवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते, न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम्।
When with reference to elements and sense-organs, activities such as speaking and discussing — proper only to sentient entities — are attributed to them, it is really the sentient entities (deities) which preside over speech (Vāk) and Earth etc., that are meant, and not the elements and sense-organs themselves.

2.1.5 L.9 कस्मात्? विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् –
Whence is it so? “Because of the special characterization and connection”.

2.1.5 L.10 विशेषो हि भोक्तॄणां भूतेन्द्रियाणां च चेतनाचेतनप्रविभागलक्षणः प्रागभिहितः;
The difference between the enjoying Selfs on the one hand, and the elements and sense-organs on the other, as characterized by a division between those that are sentient and those that are non-sentient, has already been referred to before.

2.1.5 L.11 सर्वचेतनतायां चासौ नोपपद्येत;
Were all to be sentient, reference to such a difference (between them) would not be reasonably sustainable.

2.1.5 L.12 अपि च कौषीतकिनः प्राणसंवादे करणमात्राशङ्काविनिवृत्तयेऽधिष्ठातृचेतनपरिग्रहाय देवताशब्देन विशिंषन्ति –
‘एता ह वै देवता अहंश्रेयसे विवदमानाः’ इति,
‘ता वा एताः सर्वा देवताः प्राणे निःश्रेयसं विदित्वा’ (कौ. उ. २-१४) इति च।
Besides, those who follow the Kauṣītaki branch, distinguish between them by the use of the word ‘deities’ in the dialogue of the Prāṇas, thus: —
“Those deities, each disputatiously claiming to be preeminent (went to Brahma-deva) etc.”
And also thus — “All these deities knowing Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air) to be pre-eminent” (Kauṣ. Brā. 2.14),
In order to remove the suspicion about the sense-organs (being understood to be meant), and to enable the presiding deities (of the sense-organs) to be understood.

2.1.5 L.13 अनुगताश्च सर्वत्राभिमानिन्यश्चेतना देवता मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणादिभ्योऽवगम्यन्ते –
These sentient presiding deities are also understood to have a relation (with the elements and sense-organs) as seen from Mantras, Artha-Vādas, Iti-hāsas and Purāṇas.

2.1.5 L.14 ‘अग्निर्वाग्भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशत्’ (ऐ. आ. २-४-२-४) इत्येवमादिका च श्रुतिः करणेष्वनुग्राहिकां देवतामनुगतां दर्शयति;
The Scriptural passage beginning with “Agni transforming itself into speech (Vāk) entered the mouth” (Ait. Ār. 2.4.2.4) shows that the deity which vouchsafes its favour on the sense-organs is meant.

2.1.5 L.15 प्राणसंवादवाक्यशेषे च – ‘ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः’ (ChanU.5.1.7) इति श्रेष्ठत्वनिर्धारणाय प्रजापतिगमनम्,
In the concluding portion of the dialogue of the Prāṇas also, by the Scriptural passage, “Those Prāṇas approached the original parent, Prajā-pati, and said” (ChanU.5.1.7), which speaks of their approaching Prajā-pati for the determination, as to which amongst them was the highest,

2.1.5 L.16 तद्वचनाच्चैकैकोत्क्रमणेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्राणश्रैष्ठ्यप्रतिपत्तिः,
There is the ultimate realization by the Prāṇas, by each in turn going out (of the body) as instructed by him, and by positive and negative instances (i.e. Anvaya and Vyatireka) of the pre-eminence of the Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air).

2.1.5 L.17 ‘तस्मै बलिहरणम्’ (BrhU.6.1.13) इति चैवंजातीयकोऽस्मदादिष्विव व्यवहारोऽनुगम्यमानोऽभिमानिव्यपदेशं द्रढयति;
And such ordinary activities of the sense-organs, which resemble those of human beings such as ourselves, in the passage “The making of offerings to him (by all the sense-organs)” (BrhUEng.6.1.13), strengthens the view that the reference is to the presiding deities.

2.1.5 L.18 ‘तत्तेज ऐक्षत’ इत्यपि परस्या एव देवताया अधिष्ठात्र्याः स्वविकारेष्वनुगताया इयमीक्षा व्यपदिश्यत इति द्रष्टव्यम्।
In the passage “The Tejas thought” also, it should be understood that this ‘thinking’ is indicated to have been done, only by the presiding deity (viz. the Highest Brahman) which inheres in its own modification.

2.1.5 L.19 तस्माद्विलक्षणमेवेदं ब्रह्मणो जगत्; विलक्षणत्वाच्च न ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम्॥५॥
Therefore, this world is dissimilar to Brahman, and being so, Brahman is not its material cause. — 5.

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2.1.6 L.1 इत्याक्षिप्ते, प्रतिविधत्ते –
This objection (of the opponent) is now being answered.

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Dṛśyate: is seen; Tu: but.

🔗 But it is seen (to be like that). — 2.1.6.

2.1.6 L.2 तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति।
The word ‘But’ refutes the opponent’s view.

2.1.6 L.3 यदुक्तम् विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम् इति, नायमेकान्तः;
The objection taken — viz. that this world being dissimilar (to Brahman), Brahman is not its material cause — is not conclusive.

2.1.6 L.4 दृश्यते हि लोके – चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्यः पुरुषादिभ्यो विलक्षणानां केशनखादीनामुत्पत्तिः,
We find in the ordinary world that from men etc., who are known to be sentient, hair, nails etc. which are dissimilar to them are produced,

2.1.6 L.5 अचेतनत्वेन च प्रसिद्धेभ्यो गोमयादिभ्यो वृश्चिकादीनाम्।
And scorpions etc. are produced from cowdung etc. which are known to be non-sentient.

2.1.6 L.6 नन्वचेतनान्येव पुरुषादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां केशनखादीनां कारणानि,
But (says the opponent) we have said already, that it is the non-sentient bodies of men etc. which are the cause of the non-sentient hair, nails, etc.,

2.1.6 L.7 अचेतनान्येव च वृश्चिकादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां गोमयादीनां कार्याणीति।
And the non-sentient bodies of the scorpions etc. that are the effects of the nonsentient cow-dung etc.

2.1.6 L.8 उच्यते – एवमपि किञ्चिदचेतनं चेतनस्यायतनभावमुपगच्छति किञ्चिन्नेत्यस्त्येव वैलक्षण्यम्।
(We reply) — But even then, dissimilarity does still persist, in as much as some non-sentient things only, constitute the basis for sentient things, while some do not.

2.1.6 L.9 महांश्चायं पारिणामिकः स्वभावविप्रकर्षः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादीनां च स्वरूपादिभेदात्, तथा गोमयादीनां वृश्चिकादीनां च।
Great indeed is this disparity of nature, due to modification (of cause into effect), between men etc., and hair and nails etc., because of dissimilarity of form etc. between them, and similarly also between cowdung and scorpions etc.

2.1.6 L.10 अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत।
Were there to be complete identity of form (between two things) the very relationship between them as cause and effect would be dissolved.

2.1.6 L.11 अथोच्येत – अस्ति कश्चित्पार्थिवत्वादिस्वभावः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादिष्वनुवर्तमानो गोमयादीनां च वृश्चिकादिष्विति।
If it were to be said (by the opponent), that a certain quality of ‘earthiness etc.’ in men etc., continues to inhere at least in the hair and nails, etc., and a similar quality of ‘earthiness etc.' in cowdung etc., at least continues to inhere in scorpions etc.,

2.1.6 L.12 ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते।
(The Vedāntin would retort) that Brahman’s nature of having the characteristic of existence as such (Sattā-lakṣaṇaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ) at least appears to continue to inhere in Ākāśa etc.

2.1.6 L.13 विलक्षणत्वेन च कारणेन ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वं जगतो दूषयता किमशेषस्य ब्रह्मस्वभावस्याननुवर्तनं विलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेयते, उत यस्य कस्यचित्, अथ चैतन्यस्येति वक्तव्यम्।
Now you, who wish to vitiate the doctrine of the world having Brahman as to its material cause, on the ground of dissimilarity, have to say, whether by dissimilarity, you mean the non-appearance of the total comprehensive nature of Brahman (in the effect i.e. the world), or the non-appearance of any particular nature, or the nonappearance of the nature of sentiency.

2.1.6 L.14 प्रथमे विकल्पे समस्तप्रकृतिविकारभावोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः;
न ह्यसत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकार इति भवति।
In the case of the first alternative, there would be the predicament of the complete destruction of the relationship of cause and effect as between them,
Because, in the absence of there being something extra (in an effect), there would be no such thing as cause and effect.

2.1.6 L.15 द्वितीये चासिद्धत्वम्; दृश्यते हि सत्तालक्षणो ब्रह्मस्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्तमान इत्युक्तम्।
As regards the second alternative, it cannot be substantiated, because it has already been said that the nature of ‘existence as such’ (Sattā) inherent in Brahman (the cause) is seen to reappear in Ākāśa etc. (the effects).

2.1.6 L.16 तृतीये तु दृष्टान्ताभावः;
So far as the third alternative is concerned, there is absence of any illustration (to prove it).

2.1.6 L.17 किं हि यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिकं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मकारणवादिनं प्रत्युदाह्रियेत, समस्तस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
To what entity — which is at once non-sentient but which is not seen to have Brahman as its cause — can you possibly refer to (as actually existing), as an illustration (of your alternative), in answer to the doctrine of a follower of Vedānta (i.e. Brahmavādin) who holds that all things have Brahman as their cause?

2.1.6 L.18 आगमविरोधस्तु प्रसिद्ध एव, चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यागमतात्पर्यस्य प्रसाधितत्वात्।
The opposition of the Scriptures (to the view of the opponent) is well-known, because it has already been established, that the conclusion of the Vedas is, that sentient Brahman is both the accidental and the material cause of the world.

2.1.6 L.19 यत्तूक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद्ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि सम्भवेयुरिति,
As regards the objection (of the opponent), viz. that as Brahman is an already established entity, other means-of-proof can come into operation (for establishing Brahman),

2.1.6 L.20 तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्;
(We reply) — that it is mere wishful thinking.

2.1.6 L.21 रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः;
This entity (Brahman) devoid of any form as it is, is neither perceptible by any direct (occular) means-of-proof,

2.1.6 L.22 लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम्;
Nor is it perceptible by inference etc., as there is absence of any indicatory mark about it (i.e. Brahman).

2.1.6 L.23 आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थो धर्मवत्;
Like religious duty, it (i.e. Brahman) is understandable from the Scriptures alone.

2.1.6 L.24 तथा च श्रुतिः – ‘नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ’ (KathU.1.2.9) इति;
So say the Scriptures also — “This knowledge cannot be acquired by reasoning. Oh dear one, it becomes properly understood only when it is taught by another (competent person).” (KathU.1.2.9),

2.1.6 L.25 ‘को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत्’ ‘इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव’ (ऋ. सं. १-३०-६)
इति चैते ऋचौ सिद्धानामपीश्वराणां दुर्बोधतां जगत्कारणस्य दर्शयतः;
“Who indeed knows whence came this creation”, and “From what did it originate” (Ṛg. Sam. 1.30.6).
These Vedic Ṛks show how difficult it is even for Gods who have acquired super-human powers, to understand this cause of the world.

2.1.6 L.26 स्मृतिरपि भवति – ‘अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्’ इति,
The Smṛti also says — “These entities are inscrutable, and one should not try to understand them by reasoning.”

2.1.6 L.27 ‘अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते’ (BhG.2.25) इति च,
Smṛtis also are of the same type, thus: — “He is said to be unmanifest or unevolved, inscrutable and unchangeable” (BhG.2.25).

2.1.6 L.28 ‘न मे विदुः सुरगणाः प्रभवं न महर्षयः। अहमादिर्हि देवानां महर्षीणां च सर्वशः’ (BhG.10.2) इति चैवंजातीयका।
“Not even these hosts of Gods know my origin, as I myself am the comprehensive origin of the Gods and Ṛṣis” (BhG.10.2).

2.1.6 L.29 यदपि श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधच्छब्द एव तर्कमप्यादर्तव्यं दर्शयतीत्युक्तम्,
With regard to the objection, viz. that it has been said that as the Scriptures enjoin cogitation in addition to the hearing of it, it shows that they welcome reasoning also with due respect,

2.1.6 L.30 नानेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्यात्रात्मलाभः सम्भवति;
(Our reply is) — mere empty reasoning cannot justify its own help (to the understanding of Brahman) on some such pretext.

2.1.6 L.31 श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते –
It is only such reasoning as is in consonance with the Scriptures that can be resorted to as a subordinate auxiliary to experience.

2.1.6 L.32 स्वप्नान्तबुद्धान्तयोरुभयोरितरेतरव्यभिचारादात्मनोऽनन्वागतत्वम्,
For instance, — that (1) as the conditions of dreams and wakefulness mutually differ from each other, the Self is not connected with either of these conditions

2.1.6 L.33 सम्प्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना सम्पत्तेर्निष्प्रपञ्चसदात्मत्वम्,
And (2) in as much as in the condition of deep sleep, the Jīva-Self gives up its phenomenal existence and becomes one with the Highest Self, its nature is purely that of ‘Sat’ Self (i.e. Being) and has no phenomenal existence,

2.1.6 L.34 प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात्कार्यकारणानन्यत्वन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकः – इत्येवंजातीयकः;
And (3) as all phenomenal existence originates from Brahman, in accordance with the maxim of the cause and effect not being different from each other, it is not different from Brahman.

2.1.6 L.35 ‘तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादि’(BrS.2.1.11) ति च केवलस्य तर्कस्य विप्रलम्भकत्वं दर्शयिष्यति।
The Sūtra-kāra will hereafter illustrate the fallaciousness of mere reasoning, by the Sūtra — “Because of the inconclusiveness of reasoning” (BrS.2.1.11).

2.1.6 L.36 योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षेत,
He, who, on the strength of the Scriptures that speak of a sentient cause, conjectures that the whole world is sentient,

2.1.6 L.37 तस्यापि ‘विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति चेतनाचेतनविभागश्रवणं
विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम्।
May be able to explain the division into sentient and non-sentient as referred to by the Scriptures in “He becomes knowledge (Vijñāna), and becomes that which is not-knowledge (Avijñāna)”
As being due to the manifestation or the absence of manifestation of sentiency.

2.1.6 L.38 परस्यैव त्विदमपि विभागश्रवणं न युज्यते।
But this division referred to by Scriptures would not be of any help to the other (i.e. our opponent).

2.1.6 L.39 कथम्? परमकारणस्य ह्यत्र समस्तजगदात्मना समवस्थानं श्राव्यते – ‘विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चाभवत्’ इति;
How is that? Because the Scriptures by the passage “(He became) knowledge (Vijñāna) and (became) that which is not-knowledge (Avijñāna)” speak about the Highest cause (i.e. Brahman) as constituting itself as the entire world.

2.1.6 L.40
तत्र यथा चेतनस्याचेतनभावो नोपपद्यते विलक्षणत्वात्,
So, as according to him, by reason of dissimilarity, it is not reasonably possible to consider, that a sentient cause can become a non-sentient effect,

2.1.6 L.41 एवमचेतनस्यापि चेतनभावो नोपपद्यते।
Similarly, a non-sentient cause (such as Pradhāna) also, cannot modify itself into a sentient effect.

2.1.6 L.42 प्रत्युक्तत्वात्तु विलक्षणत्वस्य यथा श्रुत्यैव चेतनं कारणं ग्रहीतव्यं भवति॥६॥
Therefore, as the objection based on dissimilarity thus stands refuted, (the view) that the cause (of the world) is sentient as spoken of by Scriptures, has necessarily to be accepted. — 6.

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असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्॥२.१.७॥
Asad iti cen na pratiṣedha-mātratvāt.

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A-sat: non-existence; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no; Pratiṣedha-mātratvāt: because of denial, as it simply denies.

🔗 (If the opponent were to say) (that before creation) it (i.e. the effect) was nonexistent (Asat), (we reply) No. (To say so) would be but only a mere negation. — 2.1.7.

2.1.7 L.1 यदि चेतनं शुद्धं शब्दादिहीनं च ब्रह्म तद्विपरीतस्याचेतनस्याशुद्धस्य शब्दादिमतश्च कार्यस्य कारणमिष्येत,
(If the opponent were to say) — If you (the Vedāntin) were to have it, that the sentient, pure, and soundless etc. Brahman is the material cause of quite a dissimilar effect, i.e. an effect which is non-sentient, impure, and is endowed with the quality of sound etc.,

2.1.7 L.2 असत्तर्हि कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति प्रसज्येत;
Then it would necessarily be, that before creation, the effect was non-existent,

2.1.7 L.3 अनिष्टं चैतत्सत्कार्यवादिनस्तवेति चेत् –
Which of course would not be acceptable to you, an adherent of ‘the view of the pre-existence of an effect before its origination’ (Sat-kārya-Vāda).

2.1.7 L.4 नैष दोषः, प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्; प्रतिषेधमात्रं हीदम्;
(We would reply) — This is no fault, because it (i.e. what you the opponent have said) would but amount to a mere negation only,

2.1.7 L.5 नास्य प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति।
Having nothing substantial at all of which it can be a negation.

2.1.7 L.6 न ह्ययं प्रतिषेधः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्नोति।
This sort of mere negation cannot possibly be able to deny the pre-existence of the effect prior to its creation.

2.1.7 L.7 कथम्? यथैव हीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मना सत्, एवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपीति गम्यते;
How can it be so? It is understood, that just as even at the present moment the effect having its self as its cause does exist, even so does the effect exist before its creation (in the form of the Self, which is its cause).

2.1.7 L.8 न हीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मानमन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमेवास्ति –
Even at the present moment, the effect does not have existence, independently of the Self of its cause,

2.1.7 L.9 ‘सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद’ (BrhU.2.4.6) इत्यादिश्रवणात्;
Because the Scriptures say thus: — “Everything ousts (i.e. abandons or outlaws) him who looks upon everything as (existing) apart from its Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6).

2.1.7 L.10 कारणात्मना तु सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेरविशिष्टम्।
The existence of the effect before its creation, however, as the Self of its cause, is not different (from the existence of the effect, as an effect having that cause as its Self).

2.1.7 L.11 ननु शब्दादिहीनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणम्।
Oh, but (says the opponent) Brahman which is soundless etc., is the cause of the world (isn’t it what you hold?).

2.1.7 L.12 बाढम् – न तु शब्दादिमत्कार्यं कारणात्मना हीनं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिदानीं वा अस्ति;
(The Vedāntin replies) — Certainly, but an effect which is equipped with the quality of sound etc. is never without its cause ‘the Self’ inhering in it, before its creation, nor is it so now (after the effect is created).

2.1.7 L.13 तेन न शक्यते वक्तुं प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यमिति।
Hence, it cannot be maintained that an effect is non-existent before its creation.

2.1.7 L.14 विस्तरेण चैतत्कार्यकारणानन्यत्ववादे वक्ष्यामः॥७॥
We will speak at greater length about this, when we discuss the subject of the doctrine of the cause and effect not being different from each other. — 7.

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अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्॥२.१.८॥
Apītau tadvat prasaṅgād asamañjasam.

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Apitau: at the time of Pralaya or the great dissolution; Tadvat: like that, like the effect; Prasaṅgāt: on account of the consequences; A-samanjasam: inconsistent, absurd.

🔗 (The doctrine of the Vedāntin) is absurd i.e. incongruous because, during the resorption of the world there would be the predicament (of the cause i.e. Brahman) becoming like the effect (i.e. the world). — 2.1.8.

2.1.8 L.1 अत्राह – यदि स्थौल्यसावयवत्त्वाचेतनत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वाशुद्ध्यादिधर्मकं कार्यं ब्रह्मकारणकमभ्युपगम्येत,
(Says the opponent here) — If you (the Vedāntin) were to understand that this effect (i.e. this world) which has the qualities of grossness, of having parts, of having no sentiency, of being circumscribed i.e. limited, and impure, has Brahman as its cause,

2.1.8 L.2 तदापीतौ प्रलये प्रतिसंसृज्यमानं कार्यं कारणाविभागमापद्यमानं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदिति –
Then during resorption, i.e. during the great flood when the effect is being reabsorbed and is becoming one with its cause, it will contaminate the cause with its own qualities,

2.1.8 L.3 अपीतौ कारणस्यापि ब्रह्मणः कार्यस्येवाशुद्ध्यादिरूपताप्रसङ्गात्
And so during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause (i.e. Brahman) acquiring the nature of the qualities of impurity etc.;

2.1.8 L.4 सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणमित्यसमञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम्।
And thus the Upanishadic doctrine, that the Omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, would appear to be absurd i.e. incongruous.

2.1.8 L.5 अपि च समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियमकारणाभावाद्भोक्तृभोग्यादिविभागेनोत्पत्तिर्न प्राप्नोतीत्यसमञ्जसम्।
It would also appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous, because, after all the effects have once become one with the cause, in the absence of any rule to guide the recreation (of the effects), there would not be any recreation of the experiencing Selfs and the things to be experienced etc., separately.

2.1.8 L.6 अपि च भोक्तॄणां परेण ब्रह्मणा अविभागं गतानां कर्मादिनिमित्तप्रलयेऽपि पुनरुत्पत्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्।
Besides if one were to understand, that after the experiencing Selfs have once become one with Brahman and when Karma (as the cause of recreation) has been destroyed, they are all liable to be recreated, then, there would result the predicament that those who have obtained their Final Release, would also be liable for a rebirth, and thus again, the doctrine would appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous.

2.1.8 L.7 अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेत, एवमप्यपीतिश्च न सम्भवति कारणाव्यतिरिक्तं च कार्यं न सम्भवति
If it were to be maintained again that even after resorption the world would continue to retain its distinctive condition separate from the Highest Brahman, then in that case resorption itself as such, would not be possible, because no effect (according to your doctrine) can possibly exist without its cause being inherent in it.

2.1.8 L.8 इत्यसमञ्जसमेवेति॥८॥
Thus again the doctrine would appear to be absurd. — 8.

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न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्॥२.१.९॥
Na tu dṛṣṭānta-bhāvāt.

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Na: not; Tu: but; Dṛṣṭānta-bhāvāt: on account of illustrations.

🔗 (To this objection of the opponent) the Vedāntin says — It is not so, however, because there are illustrations. — 2.1.9.

2.1.9 L.1 अत्रोच्यते – नैवास्मदीये दर्शने किञ्चिदसामञ्जस्यमस्ति।
There is not the least absurdity or incongruity in our doctrine.

2.1.9 L.2 यत्तावदभिहितम् – कारणमपिगच्छत्कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदिति,
What you (the opponent) have said, viz. that the effect as it becomes one with its cause, would contaminate the cause with its own qualities,

2.1.9 L.3 न तद्दूषणम्।
Is no such fault at all.

2.1.9 L.4 कस्मात्? दृष्टान्तभावात् – सन्ति हि दृष्टान्ताः, यथा कारणमपिगच्छत्कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण न दूषयति;
How is it so? Because, there are illustrations which show, how, when an effect merges into its cause, it does not contaminate the cause with its qualities.

2.1.9 L.5 तद्यथा – शरावादयो मृत्प्रकृतिका विकारा विभागावस्थायामुच्चावचमध्यमप्रभेदाः सन्तः
पुनः प्रकृतिमपिगच्छन्तो न तामात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति;
For instance, earthen troughs etc. which are effects, having earth as their material cause, and which while they exist as effects are individually separate entities having big, small and intermediate dimensions,
Do not contaminate their cause, when they merge back into it (i.e. the earth);

2.1.9 L.6 रुचकादयश्च सुवर्णविकारा अपीतौ न सुवर्णमात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति;
Nor do ornaments etc. which are the effects of gold, contaminate gold with their own qualities when they merge into it.

2.1.9 L.7 पृथिवीविकारश्चतुर्विधो भूतग्रामो न पृथिवीमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजति;
Similarly also, all these beings of the four categories, which are the effects of earth, do not, during resorption, infect the earth with their qualities.

2.1.9 L.8 त्वत्पक्षस्य तु न कश्चिद्दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति;
The followers of your (i.e. the opponent’s) view on the other hand have no such illustration to cite.

2.1.9 L.9 अपीतिरेव हि न सम्भवेत्, यदि कारणे कार्यं स्वधर्मेणैवावतिष्ठेत।
Resorption itself would not take place, were the effect to (try to) retain its distinctive quality while merging with its cause.

2.1.9 L.10 अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः, कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वम्, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम् –
‘आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः’ (BrS.2.1.14) इति वक्ष्यामः।
We will speak hereafter in the Sūtra (BrS.2.1.14)
How, even though cause and effect are not different from each other, it is the effect alone which has the cause as its Self, and it is not as though the cause has the effect as its Self.

2.1.9 L.11 अत्यल्पं चेदमुच्यते – कार्यमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण कारणं संसृजेदिति;
It would be a very jejune statement that during resorption the effect would contaminate the cause with its own qualities,

2.1.9 L.12 स्थितावपि हि समानोऽयं प्रसङ्गः, कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्;
Because, the same predicament would occur while the effect exists as an effect, because it is well understood that there is non-difference between a (material) cause and its effect.

2.1.9 L.13 ‘इदꣳ सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (BrhU.2.4.6)
Scriptural passages, such as “All this is the Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6),

2.1.9 L.14 ‘आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्’ (ChanU.7.25.2)
“The Self is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2),

2.1.9 L.15 ‘ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्’ (MunU.2.2.12)
“Immortal Brahman is this, which is here right in front” (MunU.2.2.12),

2.1.9 L.16 ‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म’ (ChanU.3.14.1)
इत्येवमाद्याभिर्हि श्रुतिभिरविशेषेण त्रिष्वपि कालेषु कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वं श्राव्यते;
“Verily all this is Brahman” (ChanU.3.14.1),
Purport to say, that without exception during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future), the effect is never different from the cause.

2.1.9 L.17 तत्र यः परिहारः कार्यस्य तद्धर्माणां चाविद्याध्यारोपितत्वान्न तैः कारणं संसृज्यत इति, अपीतावपि स समानः।
The refutation in such cases — viz. that as both the effect and its qualities are the result of superimposition through Nescience, the cause is not affected by them — is common to resorption also.

2.1.9 L.18 अस्ति चायमपरो दृष्टान्तः –
There is this other illustration also.

2.1.9 L.19 यथा स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते, अवस्तुत्वात्,
Just as an illusionist is never affected during all the three times, by the illusion projected by himself, in as much as it (i.e. the illusion) is insubstantial,

2.1.9 L.20 एवं परमात्मापि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति;
Even so, the Highest Self is never affected by the illusion of transmigratory existence.

2.1.9 L.21 यथा च स्वप्नदृगेकः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यते,
Also, just as a person who experiences a dream is never affected by the illusory nature of the dream vision,

2.1.9 L.22 प्रबोधसम्प्रसादयोरनन्वागतत्वात्,
In as much as it does not persist during the conditions of deep sleep and wakefulness,

2.1.9 L.23 एवमवस्थात्रयसाक्ष्येकोऽव्यभिचार्यवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते।
Even so, this one unchanging, constant and immediate witness of all the three conditions (viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahman) is not affected by the three changing transmigratory conditions (of creation, preservation, and resorption).

2.1.9 L.24 मायामात्रं ह्येतत्,
यत्परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मनावभासनम्, रज्ज्वा इव सर्पादिभावेनेति।
This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its existing as the Self of these three conditions, is — like the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope —
But a mere illusion.

2.1.9 L.25 अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः –
With regard to this the Ācārya who is fully conversant with the traditional meaning of Vedānta has said —

2.1.9 L.26 ‘अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते।
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा’ (ManKa.1.16) इति।
“When the Jīva-Self that is in deep sleep brought about by the beginningless Māyā, wakes up,
It realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-duality (Brahman)” (ManKa.1.16).

2.1.9 L.27 तत्र यदुक्तमपीतौ कारणस्यापि कार्यस्येव स्थौल्यादिदोषप्रसङ्ग इति, एतदयुक्तम्।
Hence, when it is said that during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause being affected by the fault of grossness etc. quite as much as the effect, it would not at all be proper.

2.1.9 L.28 यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् – समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनर्विभागेनोत्पत्तौ नियमकारणं नोपपद्यत इति,
Again, when it is said, that when all this differentiated world has become one (with Brahman) there is no regular cause for its being recreated in its usual differentiated form,

2.1.9 L.29 अयमप्यदोषः, दृष्टान्तभावादेव –
It would, again, not be a fault, precisely because an illustration is available.

2.1.9 L.30 यथा हि सुषुप्तिसमाध्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभाविक्यामविभागप्राप्तौ
Just as during sleep and meditative trance, even though there naturally is a complete oneness (of the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self),

2.1.9 L.31 मिथ्याज्ञानस्यानपोदितत्वात्पूर्ववत्पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति,
False-knowledge not yet having been eradicated, differentiation (as it was before sleep and the mystic trance) is re-established on the Waking up (of the Jīva-Self),

2.1.9 L.32 एवमिहापि भविष्यति।
Even so would it be, in this condition (of resorption).

2.1.9 L.33 श्रुतिश्चात्र भवति – ‘इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति सम्पद्य न विदुः सति सम्पद्यामह इति,
त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिꣳहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतङ्गो वा दꣳशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदा भवन्ति’ (ChanU.6.9.2,3) इति।
There is this supporting Scriptural passage — “All these beings having become one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman) still do not realize that they have attained this unity with the ‘Sat’,
And they again become what they were here before, viz. whether (they were) a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or a midge, or a gnat or a mosquito” (ChanU.6.9.2,3).

2.1.9 L.34 यथा ह्यविभागेऽपि परमात्मनि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धो विभागव्यवहारः स्वप्नवदव्याहतः स्थितौ दृश्यते,
Just as, even though there is no differentiation in the Highest Self, still, under the binding influence of false-knowledge, such differentiated condition persists continuously, without let or hindrance, as in a dream,

2.1.9 L.35 एवमपीतावपि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धैव विभागशक्तिरनुमास्यते।
Even so, the existence of a potential power of differentiation, due to the binding influence of false-knowledge, may be inferred as still surviving during the condition of resorption also.

2.1.9 L.36 एतेन मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः,
This would effectively answer the objection about the predicament of the likelihood of those who have already obtained Final Release having to be born again,

2.1.9 L.37 सम्यग्ज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानस्यापोदितत्वात्।
Because true knowledge will have by then supplanted false-knowledge.

2.1.9 L.38 यः पुनरयमन्तेऽपरो विकल्प उत्प्रेक्षितः –
अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेतेति,
The last alternative (of the opponent) referred to towards the end,
Viz. that the world would continue to remain differentiated from Brahman even during resorption,

2.1.9 L.39 सोऽप्यनभ्युपगमादेव प्रतिषिद्धः।
Cannot be countenanced, as it never is so understood (by the Vedāntin).

2.1.9 L.40 तस्मात्समञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम्॥९॥
Hence the Upanishadic doctrine, therefore, is perfectly cogent. — 9.

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स्वपक्षदोषाच्च॥२.१.१०॥
Svapakṣa-doṣāc ca.

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Sva-pakṣa-doṣāt: because of the objections, to his own view; Ca: and.

🔗 Also because the faults (pointed out by the Sāṅkhya opponent, against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) will apply to this own doctrine. — 2.1.10.

2.1.10 L.1 स्वपक्षे चैते प्रतिवादिनः साधारणा दोषाः प्रादुःष्युः।
The same faults (which are alleged against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) would be commonly applicable to the doctrine of our opponent also.

2.1.10 L.2 कथमित्युच्यते – यत्तावदभिहितम्, विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति प्रधानप्रकृतिकतायामपि समानमेतत्,
The same allegation, viz. that on account of dissimilarity this world could not have Brahman as its material cause, is equally applicable to the doctrine (of the Sāṅkhyas), as they understand that this world has the Pradhāna as its material cause,

2.1.10 L.3 शब्दादिहीनात्प्रधानाच्छब्दादिमतो जगत उत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात्;
In as much as, in that case also, the world which possesses the quality of sound etc. would have the soundless Pradhāna as its cause.

2.1.10 L.4 अत एव च विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् समानः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गः;
And therefore, in as much as it is understood (by the Sāṅkhyas) that effects dissimilar to the cause come into existence, there is the same predicament of the view of the non-existence of the effect (such as the world), prior to creation, being equally applicable (to the Sāṅkhyas).

2.1.10 L.5 तथापीतौ कार्यस्य कारणाविभागाभ्युपगमात्तद्वत्प्रसङ्गोऽपि समानः;
Similarly, (as understood by the Sāṅkhyas) when the effects have become one with their cause during resorption there would result the same predicament (as in the case of the Vedāntin).

2.1.10 L.6 तथा मृदितसर्वविशेषेषु विकारेष्वपीतावविभागात्मतां गतेषु,
Similarly, when once during resorption all the special characteristics of the effects have been effaced by their becoming one with their cause,

2.1.10 L.7 इदमस्य पुरुषस्योपादानमिदमस्येति
प्राक्प्रलयात्प्रतिपुरुषं ये नियता भेदाः, न ते तथैव पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियन्तुं शक्यन्ते,
It would not be possible at the time of the recreation (of the world) to regulate the identical reproduction of the distinctive special characteristics of every person before resorption,
Such as that this particular thing is the material cause of this man, and this particular thing, of the other,

2.1.10 L.8 कारणाभावात्;
Because of the absence of any such regulating cause.

2.1.10 L.9 विनैव च कारणेन नियमेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कारणाभावसाम्यान्
मुक्तानामपि पुनर्बन्धप्रसङ्गः;
Were we to imagine gratuitously the existence of such a regulating cause, (when there is none), the absence in fact of the existence of such regulating cause being common,
There would result the predicament, in the case of those who have already obtained Final Release, of being again subjected to the bondage (of transmigratory existence).

2.1.10 L.10 अथ केचिद्भेदा अपीतावविभागमापद्यन्ते केचिन्नेति चेत् –
If (it be said), that during resorption, only some distinctive characteristics become one (with the cause) and others do not,

2.1.10 L.11 ये नापद्यन्ते, तेषां प्रधानकार्यत्वं न प्राप्नोति;
Then those that do not attain such oneness, would not be the effects of the Pradhāna,

2.1.10 L.12 इत्येवमेते दोषाः साधारणत्वान्नान्यतरस्मिन्पक्षे चोदयितव्या भवन्तीति अदोषतामेवैषां द्रढयति –
And thus, all these faults being common to both the doctrines, they could not be properly directed (by the Sāṅkhya opponent) against his opponent (the Vedāntin), and hence our view that these faults are no faults at all would be strengthened,

2.1.10 L.13 अवश्याश्रयितव्यत्वात्॥१०॥
As it would necessarily have to be accepted. — 10.

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तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः॥२.१.११॥
Tarkāpratiṣṭhānād apy anyathānumeyam iti ced evam apy avimokṣa-prasaṅgaḥ.

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Tarka: reasoning, argument; A-pratiṣṭhānāt: because of not having any fixity or finality; Api: also; Anyathā: otherwise; Anumeyam: to be inferred, to be ascertained, by arguing; Iti cet: if it be said; Evam api: even thus in this way; A-nirmokṣa: want of release, absence of the way out; Prasaṅgaḥ: consequence.

🔗 If it be said (by the opponent) that reasoning being without any sure basis, (i.e. it being inconclusive), an inference otherwise may be drawn, even then the predicament of the non-attainment of Final Release would occur just the same. — 2.1.11.

2.1.11 L.1 इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम्;
This is just why, in the case of entities which are understood through the traditional teaching of the Scriptures alone, no objection on the strength of mere reasoning should be made,

2.1.11 L.2 यस्मान्निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति,
Because, reasonings, which are not derived from Scriptural traditions and which depend solely on the conjectures of man, happen to be inconclusive,

2.1.11 L.3 उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात्;
In as much as such conjectures are unfettered.

2.1.11 L.4 तथा हि – कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते;
Reasonings or deductions made by some highly competent persons with great effort, are seen to be demonstrated as fallacious by more competent persons,

2.1.11 L.5 तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तस्ततोऽन्यैराभास्यन्त इति
And those made by these latter ones, are also in their turn demonstrated to be equally fallacious by some other persons,

2.1.11 L.6 न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुम्, पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्।
And hence as men’s understanding differs, it is not possible to accept that reasonings have sure basis and that they are conclusive.

2.1.11 L.7 अथ कस्यचित्प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यस्य कपिलस्य अन्यस्य वा सम्मतस्तर्कः प्रतिष्ठित इत्याश्रीयेत –
Even if one were to rely on reasoning, acceptable to men of well-known intellectual eminence such as Kapila and others, as having a sure basis and as being conclusive,

2.1.11 L.8 एवमप्यप्रतिष्ठितत्वमेव,
Even so, inconclusiveness would be there all the same,

2.1.11 L.9 प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्याभिमतानामपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्।
Because it is seen that Tīrtha-karas (i.e. founders of religions or philosophical schools) such as Kapila and Kaṇāda whose intellectual eminence is well-known are seen mutually to differ from each other.

2.1.11 L.10 अथोच्येत – अन्यथा वयमनुमास्यामहे, यथा नाप्रतिष्ठादोषो भविष्यति;
(If the opponent were to say) — we would infer in such other way as would not cause the fault of inconclusiveness,

2.1.11 L.11 न हि प्रतिष्ठितस्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुम्;
Because it cannot possibly be said that there never can be any reasoning which is conclusive,

2.1.11 L.12 एतदपि हि तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते,
We say, that you cannot say so because even this inconclusiveness of reasoning is itself established by reasoning alone,

2.1.11 L.13 केषाञ्चित्तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वदर्शनेनान्येषामपि तज्जातीयकानां तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात्;
Viz. by conjecturing, that because some reasonings are seen to be inconclusive, other reasonings of a similar nature also are inconclusive.

2.1.11 L.14 सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः;
Besides, if all reasoning were to be inconclusive, there would result the predicament of the destruction of all worldly transactions.

2.1.11 L.15 अतीतवर्तमानाध्वसाम्येन ह्यनागतेऽप्यध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानो लोको दृश्यते;
It is seen, that people in general are impelled towards activity in their future course, either for acquiring happiness or avoiding pain, by its similarity to the past or the present course.

2.1.11 L.16 श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते;
When there is contradiction in Scriptural passages, it is only by means of reasoning, which explains the general force or import of sentences, and by refuting their wrong and apparent meaning, that the correct ascertainment of their meaning is accomplished.

2.1.11 L.17 मनुरपि चैवं मन्यते –
Manu also thinks similarly when he says thus: —

2.1.11 L.18 ‘प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम्। त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता’ इति
“Those who desire the purity of Dharma (i.e. the desire to be able to distinguish Dharma — law of religious duties — from Adharma i.e. wrong notions about it), have to know well the triad of direct perception, inference and Śāstra based on different traditional knowledges of various sorts” (Manu. Smṛ. 12. 105),

2.1.11 L.19 ‘आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना। यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः’ (मनु. स्मृ. १२-१०५,१०६) इति च ब्रुवन्।
And “He alone and none other really knows Dharma, who combines the instructions about religious duties by sages, with reasoning which is not opposed to the Vedic Śāstra” (Manu. Smṛ. 12. 106).

2.1.11 L.20 अयमेव च तर्कस्यालङ्कारः – यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम;
That reasoning is by nature inconclusive, is indeed in itself something which constitutes its glory or ornament (Alaṅ-kāra).

2.1.11 L.21 एवं हि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति;
It is exactly because it is so, that faulty reasoning is rejected and faultless reasoning has to be arrived at (just as by refuting the really faulty view of an opponent, the Siddhānta (i.e. final conclusion) is arrived at).

2.1.11 L.22 न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणम्।
There is no justification for a person to be an ignoramus because his ancestor happened to be so.

2.1.11 L.23 तस्मान्न तर्काप्रतिष्ठानं दोष इति चेत् –
Hence, if it be said that, that reasoning is without a firm basis and is inconclusive, is no fault,

2.1.11 L.24 एवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः;
(We reply) — that way also in the case of reasoning there would still be the predicament of the absence of escape from fault just the same.

2.1.11 L.25 यद्यपि क्वचिद्विषये तर्कस्य प्रतिष्ठितत्वमुपलक्ष्यते,
Even though with regard to some particular subject, reasoning is seen to have a firm basis i.e. it is conclusive,

2.1.11 L.26 तथापि प्रकृते तावद्विषये प्रसज्यत एवाप्रतिष्ठितत्वदोषादनिर्मोक्षस्तर्कस्य;
Still so far as the present subject is concerned, the objection that reasoning cannot escape the fault of having no firm basis and being inconclusive, does apply all the same.

2.1.11 L.27 न हीदमतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनमागममन्तरेणोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्;
Barring traditional instruction of the Vedas, it is not possible even to indulge in any conjecture about the very deep nature and positive existence of an entity (Brahman) as such, on which Final Release depends.

2.1.11 L.28 रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनामिति चावोचाम।
Because we have said already, that due to its being formless etc., it is not perceptible directly, and due to its being without any indicatory mark etc., it is not amenable to inference etc.

2.1.11 L.29 अपि च सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामभ्युपगमः;
Besides all those who believe in Final Release, understand, that perfect knowledge (of Brahman) results in Final Release.

2.1.11 L.30 तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपम्, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्;
That perfect knowledge, which is dependent on the thing-in-itself (for its validity), is of a uniform nature.

2.1.11 L.31 एकरूपेण ह्यवस्थितो योऽर्थः स परमार्थः;
That entity which exists uniformly is the highest entity.

2.1.11 L.32 लोके तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानमित्युच्यते – यथाग्निरुष्ण इति;
In the ordinary world, knowledge about it is understood to be perfect knowledge, as for instance the knowledge that ‘fire is hot’.

2.1.11 L.33 तत्रैवं सति सम्यग्ज्ञाने पुरुषाणां विप्रतिपत्तिरनुपपन्ना;
It being so, it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand that men can have differences about perfect knowledge.

2.1.11 L.34 तर्कज्ञानानां त्वन्योन्यविरोधात्प्रसिद्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः;
Mutual differences amongst men, about knowledges as a result of reasoning, are notorious.

2.1.11 L.35 यद्धि केनचित्तार्किकेणेदमेव सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिष्ठापितम्, तदपरेण व्युत्थाप्यते;
That, whatever is expounded by cne logician as perfect knowledge, is upset by another,

2.1.11 L.36 तेनापि प्रतिष्ठापितं ततोऽपरेण व्युत्थाप्यत इति च प्रसिद्धं लोके;
And that established by him, is upset by yet a third, is well-known in the ordinary world.

2.1.11 L.37 कथमेकरूपानवस्थितविषयं तर्कप्रभवं सम्यग्ज्ञानं भवेत्;
How ever, then, can knowledge arrived at by reasoning, which is not of one settled aspect, be correct knowledge?

2.1.11 L.38 न च प्रधानवादी तर्कविदामुत्तम इति सर्वैस्तार्किकैः परिगृहीतः,
It is not as if a follower of the doctrine of the Pradhāna is accepted by all logicians as the best amongst the professors of logic,

2.1.11 L.39 येन तदीयं मतं सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्येमहि;
So that we can understand that, that which is understood by him to be correct knowledge, is in fact so.

2.1.11 L.40 न च शक्यन्तेऽतीतानागतवर्तमानास्तार्किका एकस्मिन्देशे काले च समाहर्तुम्,
It is not possible to get together all the past, present and future logicians at one time and in one place,

2.1.11 L.41 येन तन्मतिरेकरूपैकार्थविषया सम्यङ्मतिरिति स्यात्;
So that the uniform nature of their knowledge about an entity, could be correct knowledge.

2.1.11 L.42 वेदस्य तु नित्यत्वे विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे च सति व्यवस्थितार्थविषयत्वोपपत्तेः,
The Scriptures on the other hand being eternal and being the cause of the attainment of knowledge, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand them to have the ability to possess well-established knowledge of an entity,

2.1.11 L.43 तज्जनितस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यक्त्वमतीतानागतवर्तमानैः सर्वैरपि तार्किकैरपह्नोतुमशक्यम्;
So that, it is not possible for the whole lot of past and future logicians to deny the correctness of the knowledge arising from them (i.e. the Scriptures).

2.1.11 L.44 अतः सिद्धमस्यैवौपनिषदस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वम्;
Hence, the correctness of the Upanishadic knowledge alone is firmly established.

2.1.11 L.45 अतोऽन्यत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वानुपपत्तेः संसाराविमोक्ष एव प्रसज्येत।
In as much as correct knowledge anywhere outside this, is not reasonably sustainable, the predicament of non-release from transmigratory existence would necessarily result.

2.1.11 L.46 अत आगमवशेन आगमानुसारितर्कवशेन च
Hence, on the strength of the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, and with the help of reasoning conformable to such traditional instructions of the Scriptures,

2.1.11 L.47 चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेति स्थितम्॥११॥
It is thus firmly established that the sentient Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world. — 11.

– 42. Vilakṣaṇatva-Adhikaraṇam.

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Etena: by this (by the above reasoning, by what has been said against Sāṅkhya); Śiṣṭa-aparigrahāḥ: not accepted by the wise or competent persons; Api: also; Vyākhyātāḥ: are explained or refuted.

🔗 By this (refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine) others (i.e. other views) also which competent persons have categorically rejected, and also answered. — 2.1.12.

2.1.12 L.1 वैदिकस्य दर्शनस्य प्रत्यासन्नत्वाद्
गुरुतरतर्कबलोपेतत्वाद्
वेदानुसारिभिश्च कैश्चिच्छिष्टैः केनचिदंशेन परिगृहीतत्वात्
प्रधानकारणवादं तावद्व्यपाश्रित्य यस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेपो वेदान्तवाक्येषूद्भावितः, स परिहृतः;
So far objection to the Vedānta passages based on reasoning, by the adherents of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world, is thus refuted,
As it (i.e. Pradhāna doctrine) is nearest to the Vedānta doctrine,
And as it is further reinforced by weighty reasoning,
And as it has been to a certain extent accepted by learned persons who are followers of the Vedas.

2.1.12 L.2 इदानीमण्वादिवादव्यपाश्रयेणापि कैश्चिन्मन्दमतिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्येषु पुनस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेप आशङ्क्यत इति
अतः प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति – परिगृह्यन्त इति परिग्रहाः;
Now, some slow-witted persons taking their stand on the Atomic doctrine have raised doubts based on reasoning about the Vedānta passages,
so (the Sūtra-kāra) extends the application of the foregoing refutation (of the Sāṅkhya doctrine) to the doctrine of the atom, following the maxim of ‘the knocking out of the best (lit., chief) athlete.’

2.1.12 L.3 न परिग्रहाः अपरिग्रहाः; शिष्टानामपरिग्रहाः शिष्टापरिग्रहाः;
(Here the Bhāṣya-kāra explains the word ‘Śiṣṭāparigrahaḥ’ thus: —) What is accepted is ‘Parigraha’, what is not accepted is ‘Aparigraha’, what is not accepted by the learned is ‘Śiṣṭāparigrahaḥ’.

2.1.12 L.4 एतेन प्रकृतेन प्रधानकारणवादनिराकरणकारणेन;
By reason of this refutation of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world,

2.1.12 L.5 शिष्टैर्मनुव्यासप्रभृतिभिः केनचिदप्यंशेनापरिगृहीता येऽण्वादिकारणवादाः,
तेऽपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता निराकृता द्रष्टव्याः;
The Atomic and other doctrines of the cause (of the world) which are not accepted in the least (i.e. are categorically rejected) by learned persons such as Manu and Vyāsa,
Should also he understood as having been explained as rejected, i.e. refuted,

2.1.12 L.6 तुल्यत्वान्निराकरणकारणस्य नात्र पुनराशङ्कितव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति;
because the reasons of refutation are the same, and there is no room for any thing further to be doubted.

2.1.12 L.7 तुल्यमत्रापि परमगम्भीरस्य जगत्कारणस्य तर्कानवगाह्यत्वम्,
तर्कस्य चाप्रतिष्ठितत्वम्,
अन्यथानुमानेऽप्यविमोक्षः,
आगमविरोधश्च – इत्येवंजातीयकं
निराकरणकारणम्॥१२॥
The reasons which constitute the refutation,
Viz. the ineligibility of understanding the very deep i.e. abstruse cause of the world (viz. Brahman) by reasoning,
The inconclusiveness of reasoning which has no firm basis,
And the non-attainment of Final Release even if an inference in another way is drawn,
And conflict with the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, being the same in this case, as they were in the earlier one. — 12.

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Bhoktṛ: one who enjoys and suffers; Āpatteḥ: from the objections, if it be objected; A-vibhāgaḥ: non-distinction; Cet: if it be said; Syāt: may exist; Lokavat: as is experienced in the world.

🔗 If it be said, that (if the thing to be experienced) becomes merged into the experiencer or vice versa, non-separation (between the two) would result, the reply is — that such separate existence may well continue as it is met with in the ordinary world. — 2.1.13.

2.1.13 L.1 अन्यथा पुनर्ब्रह्मकारणवादस्तर्कबलेनैवाक्षिप्यते।
The doctrine of Brahman being the cause, is again objected to in another way on the same ground viz. that of reasoning.

2.1.13 L.2 यद्यपि श्रुतिः प्रमाणं स्वविषये भवति,
Even though the Scriptures are authoritative with regard to their own subject,

2.1.13 L.3 तथापि प्रमाणान्तरेण विषयापहारेऽन्यपरा भवितुमर्हति, यथा मन्त्रार्थवादौ;
Still, when that which is their province is taken out of their own scope by another means-of-proof, they deserve to be construed in a secondary sense, as for instance in the case of the Mantras (Vedic Ṛks) and Artha-Vādas.

2.1.13 L.4 तर्कोऽपि स्वविषयादन्यत्राप्रतिष्ठितः स्यात्, यथा धर्माधर्मयोः।
Even reasoning (applied) beyond Its own particular province, would be inconclusive, as (for instance) in the case of Dharma and Adharma (meritorious and unmeritorious actions).

2.1.13 L.5 किमतः, यद्येवम्?
Supposing it is so — (says the Vedāntin —) so what? —

2.1.13 L.6 अत इदमयुक्तम्, यत्प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धार्थबाधनं श्रुतेः।
(The opponent says) it would be improper if the Scriptures were to deny (the truth of) what has been established by another means-of-proof.

2.1.13 L.7 कथं पुनः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धोऽर्थः श्रुत्या बाध्यत इति।
In what way (it is asked) do the Scriptures purport to deny what has been established by another means-of-proof?

2.1.13 L.8 अत्रोच्यते – प्रसिद्धो ह्ययं भोक्तृभोग्यविभागो लोके –
The reply (of the opponent) is — this distinctive division of the experiencer and the things to be experienced, is well-known in the ordinary world,

2.1.13 L.9 भोक्ता चेतनः शारीरः,
As for instance that the sentient Jīva-Self is the experiencer,

2.1.13 L.10 भोग्याः शब्दादयो विषया इति;
And the objects-of-sense such as Sound etc., are the things to be experienced —

2.1.13 L.11 यथा भोक्ता देवदत्तः, भोग्य ओदन इति;
To wit — that Deva-datta is the experiencer and the boiled rice is the thing to be experienced.

2.1.13 L.12 तस्य च विभागस्याभावः प्रसज्येत,
यदि भोक्ता भोग्यभावमापद्येत
भोग्यं वा भोक्तृभावमापद्येत;
If the experiencer were to attain the condition of the thing to be experienced,
Non-existence of the distinction between them would take place.
It would be so, also if the thing to be experienced were to attain the condition of the experiencer.

2.1.13 L.13 तयोश्चेतरेतरभावापत्तिः परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वात्प्रसज्येत;
So these (i.e. the experiencer and the thing to be experienced) being nondifferent from the Highest cause Brahman (as the Vedāntins claim), attainment by them of each other’s condition would thus result.

2.1.13 L.14 न चास्य प्रसिद्धस्य विभागस्य बाधनं युक्तम्;
But it is not proper that the well-known distinctive division between them should get obliterated.

2.1.13 L.15 यथा त्वद्यत्वे भोक्तृभोग्ययोर्विभागो दृष्टः,
तथातीतानागतयोरपि कल्पयितव्यः;
We have necessarily to assume that this distinctive division between the experiencer and the things to be experienced, which obtains, and is seen to exist to-day,
Must have been so in the past, and will continue to be so in the future.

2.1.13 L.16 तस्मात्प्रसिद्धस्यास्य भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्याभावप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणमिति चेत्कश्चिच्चोदयेत्, तं प्रति ब्रूयात् –
Hence if one were to say, that to understand that Brahman is the cause (of the world) is not proper, as that would lead to the predicament of the absence of any distinctive division between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced, which is well-known,

2.1.13 L.17 स्याल्लोकवदिति।
We would reply — Well may such distinctive division exist, just as it is seen to exist in the ordinary world.

2.1.13 L.18 उपपद्यत एवायमस्मत्पक्षेऽपि विभागः, एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्।
It is reasonably sustainable, that even in our view of the matter (i.e. of the Vedāntin, that effect is non-different from the cause) such distinctive division is seen to exist because it is so observed to exist in the ordinary world.

2.1.13 L.19 तथा हि – समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि
As for instance, even though the sea is not different from water which constitutes its self,

2.1.13 L.20 तद्विकाराणां फेनवीचीतरङ्गबुद्बुदादीनामितरेतरविभाग इतरेतरसंश्लेषादिलक्षणश्च व्यवहार उपलभ्यते;
The foam, waves, and bubbles (of the sea) etc., which are modifications of the sea, and are not different from it, are sometimes seen to display a behaviour characterized by being distinctively different from each other, and at another time being in conjunction with each other.

2.1.13 L.21 न च समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेनतरङ्गादीनामितरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति;
These modifications of the sea, viz. the foam, waves etc., even though they are non-different from their cause, i.e. the sea, which has water as its self, still they (i.e. the modifications) do not attain each other’s condition,

2.1.13 L.22 न च तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्तावपि समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्वं भवति;
And just as even when they do not attain each other’s condition, they are not different from the nature of the sea which is their self,

2.1.13 L.23 एवमिहापि – न भोक्तृभोग्ययोरितरेतरभावापत्तिः,
Similarly in the present case also, the experiencers and the things to be experienced do not attain each other’s condition,

2.1.13 L.24 न च परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्वं भविष्यति।
Nor do they (because of that) become different from the Highest Brahman.

2.1.13 L.25 यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः
Even though the experiencer (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is not (in fact) a modification of Brahman,

2.1.13 L.26 ‘तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति
And as according to the Scriptural passage “Having created it, he entered into it” (TaitUEng.2.6),

2.1.13 L.27 स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात्,
The unevolved Brahman is declared by the Scriptures to be itself the experiencer, as a result of its entering into its own creation,

2.1.13 L.28 तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाद्युपाधिनिमित्तः –
Still by reason of its having so entered, there does come about a distinctive difference, as a result of limiting adjuncts, even as the Ākāśa (has distinctive difference) due to the limiting adjunct in the shape of an earthen pot etc.

2.1.13 L.29 इत्यतः, परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरङ्गादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्॥१३॥
Hence, it is said (by the Sūtra-kāra) that distinctive difference between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced — nondifferent though they are from their cause viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahman — is reasonably sustainable on the analogy of the maxim of the sea and the waves etc. — 13.

Su.2.1.14 Su..15 Su..16 Su..17 Su..18 Su..19 Su..20

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Tat: (its, of the universe): An-anyatvam: non-difference; Ārambhaṇa-śabda-ādibhyaḥ: from words like ‘origin’, etc.

🔗 That cause and its effects are non-different from each other, follows from the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ (making current) etc. (occurring in the Scriptures). — 2.1.14.

2.1.14 L.1 अभ्युपगम्य चेमं व्यावहारिकं भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणं विभागम्
Having provisionally accepted this practical distinctive difference between the experiencer and the things to be experienced,

2.1.14 L.2 ‘स्याल्लोकवत्’ इति परिहारोऽभिहितः;
The Sūtra-kāra has (in the previous Sūtra) rendered the refutation (of that objection on the ground of reasoning) by saying — ‘it may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world’ (the latter part of the previous Sūtra).

2.1.14 L.3 न त्वयं विभागः परमार्थतोऽस्ति,
This distinctive difference, however, does not exist in the real sense,

2.1.14 L.4 यस्मात्तयोः कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वमवगम्यते।
Because it is understood that the cause and its effects are non-different from each other.

2.1.14 L.5 कार्यमाकाशादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत्;
The effects comprise of this diverse world, such as the Ākāśa etc.

2.1.14 L.6 कारणं परं ब्रह्म;
And the cause is the Highest Self i.e. Brahman.

2.1.14 L.7 तस्मात्कारणात्परमार्थतोऽनन्यत्वं
व्यतिरेकेणाभावः कार्यस्यावगम्यते।
It is understood that in a real sense the effect is non-different from the cause i.e. the Highest Self,
I.e. it has no existence as apart from its cause, the Highest Self.

2.1.14 L.8 कुतः? आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः।
Whence is it so? Because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ and others.

2.1.14 L.9 आरम्भणशब्दस्तावदेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाय दृष्टान्तापेक्षायामुच्यते –
As for this word ‘Ārambhaṇa’, the Scriptures, after declaring that by knowing the one (i.e. Brahman) everything else becomes known, and with a desire to cite an illustration, say —

2.1.14 L.10 ‘यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातꣳ स्याद्
वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ (ChanU.6.1.4) इति;
“Oh mild one, just as by knowing one clod of earth, everything that is made of earth becomes known.
The effect (viz. a pot etc.) is merely a name made current by speech, while that it is earth merely, is the truth” (ChanU.6.1.1).

2.1.14 L.11 एतदुक्तं भवति – एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन परमार्थतो मृदात्मना विज्ञातेन
सर्वं मृन्मयं घटशरावोदञ्चनादिकं मृदात्मकत्वाविशेषाद्विज्ञातं भवेत्;
By this is meant that when a clod of earth is understood to be in essence but mere earth only,
All things made of earth such as a jar, a trough and a water-pot, automatically become known, because, having the earth as their Self is common (to them all),

2.1.14 L.12 यतो वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम् – वाचैव केवलमस्तीत्यारभ्यते –
And hence it is (that it is said) that an effect is merely a name made current (Ārabhyate, ‘originated’) by speech, and its existence as an effect is because of speech only.

2.1.14 L.13 विकारः घटः शराव उदञ्चनं चेति;
The effect viz. a jar or a trough or a water-pot

2.1.14 L.14 न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति;
Is not in existence substantially as an effect as such,

2.1.14 L.15 नामधेयमात्रं ह्येतदनृतम्;
But is merely a name, and is false or untrue,

2.1.14 L.16 मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् –
And that it merely is but earth only, is the truth.

2.1.14 L.17 इति एष ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्त आम्नातः;
This is stated as an illustration of Brahman.

2.1.14 L.18 तत्र श्रुताद्वाचारम्भणशब्दाद्दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यजातस्याभाव इति गम्यते।
Therefore, because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ occurring in the Scriptures, it is understood that, in the case of the thing illustrated also, all creation as a class as such, has no existence as apart from Brahman.

2.1.14 L.19 पुनश्च तेजोबन्नानां ब्रह्मकार्यतामुक्त्वा तेजोबन्नकार्याणां तेजोबन्नव्यतिरेकेणाभावं ब्रवीति –
Again, the Scriptures after speaking of Tejas, Water and the Earth as being the effects of Brahman, proceed to speak about the absence of the existence of the effects of Tejas, Water and the Earth also as apart from them, thus: —

2.1.14 L.20 ‘अपागादग्नेरग्नित्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम्’ (ChanU.6.4.1) इत्यादिना।
“(In this way) Agni has lost its property of being Agni as such, and the effect Agni) as such is merely a name made current by speech, and that it is but the three colours (Rūpas, by which the three elements Tejas, Water and Earth are expressed individually by Lakṣaṇa) only, that constitute the real substance”. (ChanU.6.4.1).

2.1.14 L.21 आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्य इत्यादिशब्दात्
By the word ‘etc.’ in the passage “because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ etc.”, The following several Scriptural passages —

2.1.14 L.22 ‘ऐतदात्म्यमिदꣳ सर्वं तत्सत्यꣳ स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि’ (ChanU.6.8.7)
‘इदꣳ सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (BrhU.2.4.6)
‘ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्’ (MunU.2.2.11)
‘आत्मैवेदꣳ सर्वम्’ (ChanU.7.25.2)
‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन’ (BrhU.4.4.19)
इत्येवमाद्यप्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपादनपरं वचनजातमुदाहर्तव्यम्;
Viz. “In that all, this has its self, it is the Truth, this is the Self, that thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7);
“All this, is that which is the Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6);
“All this is Brahman” (MunU.2.2.11);
“The Self is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2);
“There is no diversity here about anything” (BrhUEng.4.4.19) —
Which have the purpose of expounding the unity of the Selfs, should also be understood to have been cited (in illustration).

2.1.14 L.23 न चान्यथा एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं सम्पद्यते।
Otherwise, it would not be possible to uphold in any other way, that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything else is attained.

2.1.14 L.24 तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशादनन्यत्वम्,
यथा च मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वम्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात् स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्;
एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्॥
Therefore it should be seen, that just as Ākāśas circumscribed by jars and water-pots are nondifferent from the great Ākāśa,
Or just as mirages etc., whose nature is that they seem and then again seem not, and whose nature is thus inexplicable, are non-different from the sandy plain etc.,
Even so, this aggregate of transmigratory existences consisting of experiencers and the things to be experienced, have, as apart from Brahman, no real existence.

2.1.14 L.25 नन्वनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म;
But (says the opponent) Brahman is of more than one form

2.1.14 L.26 यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाखः,
And just as a tree has many branches,

2.1.14 L.27 एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म;
Even so Brahman is equipped with various powers and propensities (for creating effects),

2.1.14 L.28 अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव –
So that, (its) oneness and manifoldness are both necessarily equally true,

2.1.14 L.29 यथा वृक्ष इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति च नानात्वम्;
Just as, for instance, a tree as a tree is one, but considered in its aspect as one consisting of branches it is manifold,

2.1.14 L.30 यथा च समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्,
Or just as the sea as sea is one, yet considered in its aspect as foam, waves etc. it is manifold,

2.1.14 L.31 यथा च मृदात्मनैकत्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्;
Or just as the earth is one only, but considered in its aspect as a jar or a trough, it is manifold.

2.1.14 L.32 तत्रैकत्वांशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति;
The circumstances being such, Brahman, considered in its aspect of being one only, may well accomplish the process of Final Release,

2.1.14 L.33 नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति;
And considered in its manifold aspect, may help the accomplishment of worldly transactions and Vedic observances appertaining to the “Karma-kāṇḍa”.

2.1.14 L.34 एवं च मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुरूपा भविष्यन्तीति।
It is only in this way that the illustrations of the earth etc. can be appropriate.

2.1.14 L.35 नैवं स्यात् –
(To this, we reply) — No, it could not be like that.

2.1.14 L.36 ‘मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ इति प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यत्वावधारणात्,
By the passage “That it is but earth merely, is the truth” it is understood that in the illustration it is the material cause alone that is considered to be true,

2.1.14 L.37 वाचारम्भणशब्देन च विकारजातस्यानृतत्वाभिधानात्,
And by the words ‘made current by speech’ the whole aggregate of effects is spoken of as being unreal.

2.1.14 L.38 दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि ‘ऐतदात्म्यमिदꣳ सर्वं तत्सत्यम्’ इति च
In the case of that which is illustrated, also, by the passage “In all that, this has its Self, that is the truth”,

2.1.14 L.39 परमकारणस्यैवैकस्य सत्यत्वावधारणात्,
That one, the highest cause alone, is understood to be true,

2.1.14 L.40 ‘स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो’ इति च शारीरस्य ब्रह्मभावोपदेशात्;
Because in the passage “He is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śveta-ketu” the instruction is, that the embodied Jīva-Self is, in essence, Brahman.

2.1.14 L.41 स्वयं प्रसिद्धं ह्येतच्छारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते,
It is only about this Jīva-Self’s having Brahman, which is an already well-established thing, as its Self, that instruction is here given,

2.1.14 L.42 न यत्नान्तरप्रसाध्यम्;
And also that it (Brahman) is something which cannot be attained with any extraneous effort.

2.1.14 L.43 अतश्चेदं शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्वमवगम्यमानं स्वाभाविकस्य शारीरात्मत्वस्य बाधकं सम्पद्यते,
Hence it is this Brahma-hood of the Jīva-Self, which is understood to be based on the Śāstra, that serves to obliterate the natural notion of a man, about the Jīva-Self being of the nature of the body,

2.1.14 L.44 रज्ज्वादिबुद्धय इव सर्पादिबुद्धीनाम्;
Even as the appreciation of the rope etc., as a rope, obliterates the notion of a snake (which is, till then, entertained about the rope).

2.1.14 L.45 बाधिते च शारीरात्मत्वे
तदाश्रयः समस्तः स्वाभाविको व्यवहारो बाधितो भवति, यत्प्रसिद्धये नानात्वांशोऽपरो ब्रह्मणः कल्प्येत;
All this notion of phenomenal worldly transactions depending upon the Jīva-Self, for substantiating which you (the opponent) would want to hold that Brahman has a manifold aspect also, would itself become obliterated,
When once the notion that the Jīva-Self is of the nature of a body, is itself obliterated.

2.1.14 L.46 दर्शयति च – ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.4.5.15) इत्यादिना
The Scriptures, by the passage “When all this becomes but the Self to him, by what can he see and whom” (BrhUEng.4.5.15) etc.,

2.1.14 L.47 ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शिनं प्रति समस्तस्य क्रियाकारकफललक्षणस्य व्यवहारस्याभावम्;
Would discover to a person who understands Brahman as the Self of all, the non-existence of all phenomenal transactions such as actions, agents and the fruit of actions.

2.1.14 L.48 न चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयते इति युक्तं वक्तुम्,
It would not be proper to say, that this non-existence of all phenomenal transactions is spoken of as confined to any special condition (such as that of Final Release),

2.1.14 L.49 ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात्;
Because the Scriptural words “That thou art” show that the realization (of the fact) that Brahman is the Self of all, as mentioned in these very words, is not confined to any particular specific condition.

2.1.14 L.50 तस्करदृष्टान्तेन चानृताभिसन्धस्य बन्धनं सत्याभिसन्धस्य च मोक्षं दर्शयन्
The Scriptures also show by the ‘illustration of the thief’, that one who banks on falsehood convicts himself i.e. becomes tied down (to phenomenal existence), and one who depends on truth, secures an acquittal i.e. attains Final Release,

2.1.14 L.51 एकत्वमेवैकं पारमार्थिकं दर्शयति,
And they also show further, that the oneness of Brahman is the only one and the highest truth (ChanU.6.16)

2.1.14 L.52 मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितं च नानात्वम्।
And that its (so-called) manifoldness is merely the display of false-knowledge.

2.1.14 L.53 उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्तुरनृताभिसन्ध इत्युच्येत।
For, if both could be true, how could a person observed to be involved in phenomenal worldly existence be said (by the Scriptures) to bank on a falsehood?

2.1.14 L.54 ‘मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति’ (BrhU.4.4.19) इति च
भेददृष्टिमपवदन्नेतदेव दर्शयति।
The Scriptures indicate this very thing, by finding fault with the viewing of things as different, by the passage —
“He who sees differences in things meets with death after death” (BrhU.4.4.19).

2.1.14 L.55 न चास्मिन्दर्शने ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इत्युपपद्यते,
The doctrine (of our opponent) does not recognize Final Release as resulting from knowledge to be reasonably sustainable,

2.1.14 L.56 सम्यग्ज्ञानापनोद्यस्य कस्यचिन्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारकारणत्वेनानभ्युपगमात्;
Because it does not hold (like the Vedānta doctrine) that false-knowledge which is capable of being removed by true knowledge, is the cause of all transmigratory existence.

2.1.14 L.57 उभयसत्यतायां हि कथमेकत्वज्ञानेन नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यत इत्युच्यते।
If both the unitary and the manifold aspects of Brahman were to be true, how ever would the knowledge that Brahman is one and one only, be able to obliterate the knowledge of its manifoldness?

2.1.14 L.58 नन्वेकत्वैकान्ताभ्युपगमे
But (argues some other opponent here), if one were to understand the pure absolute oneness (of Brahman),

2.1.14 L.59 नानात्वाभावात्प्रत्यक्षादीनि लौकिकानि प्रमाणानि व्याहन्येरन्,
Then (in that case) its manifoldness being necessarily nonexistent, all those worldly means-of-proof, such as direct perception etc., would cease to operate as such means-of-proof,

2.1.14 L.60 निर्विषयत्वात्,
Because of the absence of any scope for their operation,

2.1.14 L.61 स्थाण्वादिष्विव पुरुषादिज्ञानानि;
Just as they would cease to operate as means-of-proof, for instance, when in the case of a pillar etc., there is a realization that it is a pillar and not a man.

2.1.14 L.62 तथा विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रमपि भेदापेक्षत्वात्तदभावे व्याहन्येत;
Similarly, a Śāstra which enjoins the doing of something, or inhibits some other thing, would — as it depends on the manifoldness of things — be rendered hors de combat in the absence of such manifoldness,

2.1.14 L.63 मोक्षशास्त्रस्यापि शिष्यशासित्रादि भेदापेक्षत्वात्तदभावे व्याघातः स्यात्;
And equally so would be the Śāstra of Final Release also, which depends (for its validity) on the distinctive difference between the teacher and the taught, in the absence of any such distinction between them.

2.1.14 L.64 कथं चानृतेन मोक्षशास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितस्यात्मैकत्वस्य सत्यत्वमुपपद्येतेति।
How could this truth about the absolute one-ness (of Brahman) as propounded by this (palpably) untrue Śāstra of Final Release, be reasonably sustainable?

2.1.14 L.65 अत्रोच्यते – नैष दोषः,
To this the reply (of the Vedāntin) is — This is no fault.

2.1.14 L.66 सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात्सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः
It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough,

2.1.14 L.67 स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक्प्रबोधात्;
Even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns.

2.1.14 L.68 यावद्धि न सत्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिः
As long as the truth of the one-ness of the Self is not realized,

2.1.14 L.69 तावत्प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु विकारेष्वनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुत्पद्यते;
The knowledge, that all these effects, i.e. modifications, as characterized by the means-of-proof, the thing to be known, and the fruit, are unreal, does not arise in any one,

2.1.14 L.70 विकारानेव तु ‘अहम्’ ‘मम’ इत्यविद्यया आत्मात्मीयेन भावेन सर्वो जन्तुः प्रतिपद्यते स्वाभाविकीं ब्रह्मात्मतां हित्वा;
And on the other hand, people in general under the influence of Nescience, consider these effects or modifications as being their own Selfs, viz., that this body is myself, or that this is mine, by ignoring their own Brahmic nature.

2.1.14 L.71 तस्मात्प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबोधादुपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः –
Therefore, prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all worldly and religious transactions based on the Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e. valid,

2.1.14 L.72 यथा सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य स्वप्ने उच्चावचान्भावान्पश्यतो
निश्चितमेव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं विज्ञानं भवति प्राक्प्रबोधात्,
Even as an ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities,
And definitely considers his experiences quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived,

2.1.14 L.73 न च प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायस्तत्काले भवति, तद्वत्।
And has no notion, then, of their having only an unreal appearance (of direct perception).

2.1.14 L.74 कथं त्वसत्येन वेदान्तवाक्येन सत्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्येत?
But (says the opponent) how ever can the realization of the unity of Brahman as the Self of all, in fact, arise, through such palpably untrue Vedānta passages?

2.1.14 L.75 न हि रज्जुसर्पेण दष्टो म्रियते;
A man who thinks he is bitten, by what in the place of a rope he considers to be a snake, does not die thereby,

2.1.14 L.76 नापि मृगतृष्णिकाम्भसा पानावगाहनादिप्रयोजनं क्रियत इति।
Nor can anybody make use of the water as seen in a mirage, for drinking or bathing etc.

2.1.14 L.77 नैष दोषः, शङ्काविषादिनिमित्तमरणादिकार्योपलब्धेः,
(The reply is) — This is no fault, because we do observe an effect such as death, supervening by reason of even the suspicion of being poisoned (by a snake-bite).

2.1.14 L.78 स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य च सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यदर्शनात्।
And it is also seen that a man experiencing a dream sees actions such as that of his being bitten by a snake or of his having a bath.

2.1.14 L.79 तत्कार्यमप्यनृतमेवेति चेद्ब्रूयात्,
If the opponent were to say, that like the dream itself, even that action in a dream (of a snake-bite or of bathing) is untrue,

2.1.14 L.80 अत्र ब्रूमः – यद्यपि स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यमनृतम्,
We reply that though the action of being bitten by a snake or having a bath, experienced by a person dreaming, is no doubt untrue,

2.1.14 L.81 तथापि तदवगतिः सत्यमेव फलम्, प्रतिबुद्धस्याप्यबाध्यमानत्वात्;
The fruit of that action, viz. his experience of that action, is indeed true enough, because that experience is not effaced or removed even after such person awakens.

2.1.14 L.82 न हि स्वप्नादुत्थितः स्वप्नदृष्टं सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यं मिथ्येति मन्यमानः
तदवगतिमपि मिथ्येति मन्यते कश्चित्।
No man, who after waking up from a dream considers the action of such a snakebite or his own bath as experienced by him in his dream as unreal,
Ever considers his knowledge of the experience of that action also, as unreal.

2.1.14 L.83 एतेन स्वप्नदृशोऽवगत्यबाधनेन देहमात्रात्मवादो दूषितो वेदितव्यः।
This non-effacement of the knowledge of the dream experience of a person, should be understood to invalidate the doctrine (of the Lokāyatikas), that the body as such alone is the Self.

2.1.14 L.84 तथा च श्रुतिः – ‘यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु स्त्रियं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति। समृद्धिं तत्र जानीयात्तस्मिन्स्वप्ननिदर्शने’ (ChanU.5.2.9)
Similarly, a Scriptural passage — “When a man who engages himself in some religious ritual with a desire to gain some end, sees a woman in a dream, he should infer from his dream experience, the certain fulfilment of his desire” (ChanU.5.2.9) —

2.1.14 L.85 इत्यसत्येन स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यायाः समृद्धेः प्राप्तिं दर्शयति,
Which shows that even by his experience of the unreal dream, there is a very real fulfilment (of his desire).

2.1.14 L.86 तथा प्रत्यक्षदर्शनेषु केषुचिदरिष्टेषु जातेषु ‘न चिरमिव जीविष्यतीति विद्यात्’ इत्युक्त्वा
Similarly Scriptures in another place, after saying that “When some ill omens are seen one should know that he would not live long”, indicate further that by the very experiencing of that dream, which (of course) is of an unreal nature, death, which indeed is too real, is suggested,

2.1.14 L.87 ‘अथ स्वप्नाः पुरुषं कृष्णं कृष्णदन्तं पश्यति स एनं हन्ति’ इत्यादिना
By the passage — “Now about dreams — if one sees a dark man with black teeth, he kills him.”

2.1.14 L.88 तेन तेनासत्येनैव स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यमरणं सूच्यत इति दर्शयति;
Which reveals the fact that one is forewarned of real death by an unreal dream [Trans. from Panoli].

2.1.14 L.89 प्रसिद्धं चेदं लोकेऽन्वयव्यतिरेककुशलानामीदृशेन स्वप्नदर्शनेन साध्वागमः सूच्यते, ईदृशेनासाध्वागम इति;
It is well-known, that experts in the interpretation of dreams, by positive and negative instances, interpret how a dream of one sort indicates a good result and a dream of another sort indicates a bad result.

2.1.14 L.90 तथा अकारादिसत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्तिर्दृष्टा रेखानृताक्षरप्रतिपत्तेः।
It is similarly seen, how, by mere letters of the nature of lines which are unreal in themselves (in as much as they are mere conventional symbols), the Akāra (i.e. the letter ‘अ A’) etc., which are very real, are indicated.

2.1.14 L.91 अपि चान्त्यमिदं प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकम् – नातःपरं किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति;
Now what is more is, that this is the final conclusive means-of-proof which declares the oneness of Self, and there is nothing further which is desired to be known.

2.1.14 L.92 यथा हि लोके यजेतेत्युक्ते, किं केन कथम् इत्याकाङ्क्ष्यते;
Just as in the ordinary world, when an injunction to perform a sacrifice is given, it is necessary to know with what (material) and how one should perform the sacrifice,

2.1.14 L.93 नैवं ‘तत्त्वमसि’ ‘अहं ब्रह्मास्मि’ इत्युक्ते, किञ्चिदन्यदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति – सर्वात्मैकत्वविषयत्वावगतेः;
But when it is said “That thou art” or “I am Brahman” and one understands how the Ātmā i.e. Brahman is the Self of all, there is nothing which need be known beyond that,

2.1.14 L.94 सति ह्यन्यस्मिन्नवशिष्यमाणेऽर्थे आकाङ्क्षा स्यात्;
For it is only when there still remains something which ought to be known, that there can be any further desire to know,

2.1.14 L.95 न त्वात्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेणावशिष्यमाणोऽन्योऽर्थोऽस्ति, य आकाङ्क्ष्येत।
And as apart from one’s unity with the Self nothing still remains which one would further want to know.

2.1.14 L.96 न चेयमवगतिर्नोत्पद्यत इति शक्यं वक्तुम्,
It is not possible to say that such realization cannot arise,

2.1.14 L.97 ‘तद्धास्य विजज्ञौ’ (ChanU.6.16.3) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः,
For a Scriptural passage says — “He (i.e. Śveta-ketu) understood that (viz. the oneness of Self) from him (i.e. his father)” (ChanU.6.16.3),

2.1.14 L.98 अवगतिसाधनानां च श्रवणादीनां वेदानुवचनादीनां च विधीयमानत्वात्।
And there is besides instruction (in Scriptures) about listening to the Scriptures and reciting them, as the means of such realization.

2.1.14 L.99 न चेयमवगतिरनर्थिका भ्रान्तिर्वेति शक्यं वक्तुम्;
Nor is it possible to say that such realization is meaningless or is a delusion,

2.1.14 L.100 अविद्यानिवृत्तिफलदर्शनात्, बाधकज्ञानान्तराभावाच्च।
Because it is seen, that it has the result of removing ignorance, and there is absence of any other knowledge, which would invalidate it.

2.1.14 L.101 प्राक्चात्मैकत्वावगतेरव्याहतः सर्वः सत्यानृतव्यवहारो लौकिको वैदिकश्चेत्यवोचाम।
We have already said before, that prior to the realization of one’s identity with the Self, the course of all these falsely-true worldly and religious transactions, runs uninterrupted.

2.1.14 L.102 तस्मादन्त्येन प्रमाणेन प्रतिपादिते आत्मैकत्वे
In this way, therefore, when one’s identity with the Self is duly propounded with the help of this ultimate means-of-proof,

2.1.14 L.103 समस्तस्य प्राचीनस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य बाधितत्वात्
न अनेकात्मकब्रह्मकल्पनावकाशोऽस्ति।
There is no scope for imagining Brahman to be of diverse types,
Because all the earlier consciousness of distinctive differences happens then to be eliminated.

2.1.14 L.104 ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात्परिणामवद्ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतमिति गम्यते;
But (says the opponent), by adducing the illustration of clay etc., the Śāstra seems to accept Brahman to be capable of undergoing modification.

2.1.14 L.105 परिणामिनो हि मृदादयोऽर्था लोके समधिगता इति।
In the ordinary world also things like clay etc. are understood as undergoing modification.

2.1.14 L.106 नेत्युच्यते –
To this we reply — No. The Scriptures by the following passages such as

2.1.14 L.107 ‘स वा एष महानज आत्माजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म’ (BrhU.4.4.25)
“Indeed the great unborn Self i.e. Brahman is undecaying, undying, immortal and fearless” (BrhUEng.4.4.25),

2.1.14 L.108 ‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ (BrhU.3.9.26)
“This Self (which can be only expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’” (BrhUEng.3.9.26),

2.1.14 L.109 ‘अस्थूलमनणु’ (BrhU.3.8.8) इत्याद्याभ्यः
सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधश्रुतिभ्यः ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थत्वावगमात्;
“(The Self) is neither gross nor atomic” (BrhUEng.3.8.8),
Which deny every kind of modification of Brahman, understand Brahman as absolutely unchangeable.

2.1.14 L.110 न ह्येकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्।
The same one and only one Brahman cannot at one and th,e same time be understood, both to possess the quality of modification and yet be unchangeable i.e. without that quality of modification also.

2.1.14 L.111 स्थितिगतिवत्स्यादिति चेत्,
(If the opponent were to suggest) — It may well be (like something which is both) stationary and at the same time have movement,

2.1.14 L.112 न; कूटस्थस्येति विशेषणात्;
We reply — no, because it has been particularized as being absolutely unchangeable.

2.1.14 L.113 न हि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः स्थितिगतिवदनेकधर्माश्रयत्वं सम्भवति;
It is not possible, that one and the same unchangeable Brahman can at one and the same time be the substratum of many (opposite) qualities, such as being fixed and yet capable of movement.

2.1.14 L.114 कूटस्थं च नित्यं ब्रह्म सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधादित्यवोचाम।
We have already said that Brahman is unchangeable and eternal because of the denial (by the Scriptures) of its undergoing any modification.

2.1.14 L.115 न च यथा ब्रह्मण आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनम्,
Nor is it, that just as the realization of the doctrine of Brahman being the only one Self leads to the fruit of Final Release,

2.1.14 L.116 एवं जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित्फलायाभिप्रेयते, प्रमाणाभावात्;
The knowledge that it is capable of modification in the form of this world also leads to some other independent fruit, because there is no authority for it.

2.1.14 L.117 कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादेव हि फलं दर्शयति शास्त्रम् –
It is by the realization of the unchangeable Brahman alone that the Śāstras show that there is a fruit, because the Scriptures after first stating that —

2.1.14 L.118 ‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ इत्युपक्रम्य
“This Self (which can only be expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’”

2.1.14 L.119 ‘अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि’ (BrhU.4.2.4) इत्येवंजातीयकम्। तत्रैतत्सिद्धं भवति –
Indicate by the passage “Oh Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness” (BrhUEng.4.2.4), that there is a fruit of that type (viz. Final Release).

2.1.14 L.120 ब्रह्मप्रकरणे सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव फलसिद्धौ सत्याम्,
So this much is established, that in the chapter dealing with Brahman, when it is stated that the desired result is obtained only by realizing that Brahman is devoid of any special attributes,

2.1.14 L.121 यत्तत्राफलं श्रूयते ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि,
And some other thing having no such fruit is also mentioned along with it — such as, that Brahman has the quality of modification in the form of the world — ,

2.1.14 L.122 तद्ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव विनियुज्यते,
It should be employed only as a means of realizing Brahman,

2.1.14 L.123 फलवत्सन्निधावफलं तदङ्गमितिवत्;
(In accordance with the maxim of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) — viz. “Whenever something which is fruitless is mentioned in proximity with something which has some fruit, the former should be understood as being subordinate to the latter,

2.1.14 L.124 न तु स्वतन्त्रं फलाय कल्प्यत इति।
And also that it has no independent fruit of its own.”

2.1.14 L.125 न हि परिणामवत्त्वविज्ञानात्परिणामवत्त्वमात्मनः फलं स्यादिति वक्तुं युक्तम्, कूटस्थनित्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य।
As Final Release is unchangeable and eternal, it would not be proper to say that the knowledge, that Brahman undergoes modification, is itself the fruit which the Jīva-self acquires by such knowledge.

2.1.14 L.126 ननु कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मवादिन एकत्वैकान्त्यात्
(If it be said by the opponent) that if according to the adherent of the doctrine of the unchangeable Brahman, this eternal oneness (of Brahman) is the only view,

2.1.14 L.127 ईशित्रीशितव्याभावे
It would mean the absence of the relationship of a ruler and the ruled,

2.1.14 L.128 ईश्वरकारणप्रतिज्ञाविरोध इति चेत्,
And it would contradict the declaration that the Lord is the cause,

2.1.14 L.129 न; अविद्यात्मकनामरूपबीजव्याकरणापेक्षत्वात्सर्वज्ञत्वस्य।
(We reply) — No, the omniscience (of Brahman as the Lord) depends upon the evolving of the seed of the nature of names and forms which are the result of Nescience,

2.1.14 L.130 ‘तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः’ (TaitU.2.1.1) इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यः
And on the Scriptural passage — “The Ākāśa was born of this very Self” (TaitUEng.2.1),

2.1.14 L.131 नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वरूपात्सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेरीश्वराज् जगज्जनिस्थितिप्रलयाः,
And that the origin, preservation and resorption of the world proceed from the Lord who is of an eternally pure, wise, and free nature,

2.1.14 L.132 नाचेतनात्प्रधानादन्यस्माद्वा – इत्येषोऽर्थः प्रतिज्ञातः – ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’ (BrS.1.1.2) इति;
And neither from the non-sentient Pradhāna nor from any other things, is what is declared (by the Sūtra-kāra) by the Sūtra — “From whom is the origin etc. of this world” (BrS.1.1.2).

2.1.14 L.133 सा प्रतिज्ञा तदवस्थैव, न तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः पुनरिहोच्यते।
That declaration still holds the ground as before, and nothing contrary to that is here suggested.

2.1.14 L.134 कथं नोच्यते, अत्यन्तमात्मन एकत्वमद्वितीयत्वं च ब्रुवता?
(The opponent says) — How can you say that you do not say so (i.e. you do not contradict the declaration) when you talk of the Self’s eternal one-ness and non-duality?

2.1.14 L.135 शृणु यथा नोच्यते –
(We reply) — Listen, how we do not say so.

2.1.14 L.136 सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे
तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये
संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते
सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च
श्रुतिस्मृत्योरभिलप्येते;
It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smṛtis,
That names and forms which are imagined through Nescience and which are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord,
And about which it is impossible to say, either that they are one with Brahman or that they are different from it,
And which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existence,
Are the illusion-causing power and the nature (Prakṛti) of the Lord.

2.1.14 L.137 ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः, ‘आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म’ (ChanU.8.14.1) इति श्रुतेः,
That the omniscient Lord is different from them is indicated by the Scriptural passage “The Ākāśa is the revealer of the names and forms, and that in which they are contained, is Brahman” (ChanU.8.14.1),

2.1.14 L.138 ‘नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (ChanU.6.3.2)
And also according to the Scriptural passages — “May I evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2);

2.1.14 L.139 ‘सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्यदास्ते’ (तै. आ. ३-१२-७)
“Having created all beings and given them names, the Lord keeps on voicing them” (Tait. Ār. 3.12.7).

2.1.14 L.140 ‘एकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति’ (SvetU.6.12) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च;
“He makes the one seed manifold” (SvetU.6.12) [Trans. from Panoli].

2.1.14 L.141 एवमविद्याकृतनामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधीश्वरो भवति, व्योमेव घटकरकाद्युपाध्यनुरोधि;
It is in this way that the Lord (as the Īśvara) conforms to the limiting adjuncts of names and forms produced by Nescience, just as the Ākāśa conforms to the limiting adjuncts of the jars and pots.

2.1.14 L.142 स च स्वात्मभूतानेव घटाकाशस्थानीयान्
अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसङ्घातानुरोधिनो
जीवाख्यान् विज्ञानात्मनः प्रतीष्टे व्यवहारविषये;
During the condition of phenomenal existence, the Lord rules over the so-called Jīva-Selfs i.e. the cognitional Selfs,
Which are but only his own alter egos and which conform to the multitude of effects and causes brought about by names and forms, which in their turn are brought about by Nescience,
And stands in the same relation to these Jīva-Selfs i.e. cognitional Selfs, as the great Ākāśa stands to the Ākāśa of the jars and pots.

2.1.14 L.143 तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च,
न परमार्थतो विद्यया अपास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यते;
So the Lord’s over-lordship, omniscience and omnipotence, depend upon the determinate distinctions caused by the limiting adjuncts of Nescience,
While in the truest sense, in the case of the Self whose limiting adjuncts have been swept off by knowledge, all such behaviour as that of being the ruler and the ruled or of being an omniscient entity etc., cannot be reasonably sustainable.

2.1.14 L.144 तथा चोक्तम् – ‘यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा’ (ChanU.7.24.1) इति;
The Scriptures also say so, thus — “Where one does not see, hear or know anything, other than its Self, that is the great one” (ChanU.7.24.1);

2.1.14 L.145 ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.4.5.15) इत्यादि च;
“But when the Self alone has become all this, by what can one see, and whom (can one see)?” (BrhUEng.4.5.15).

2.1.14 L.146 एवं परमार्थावस्थायां सर्वव्यवहाराभावं वदन्ति वेदान्ताः सर्वे;
And in this manner, all Vedānta texts declare, that in the condition of the Highest Truth, there is absence of all phenomenal transactions.

2.1.14 L.147 तथेश्वरगीतास्वपि –
‘न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः। न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते॥’ (BhG.5.14)
नादत्ते कस्यचित्पापं न चैव सुकृतं विभुः। अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः’ (BhG.5.15) इति
परमार्थावस्थायामीशित्रीशितव्यादिव्यवहाराभावः प्रदर्श्यते;
In the Īśvara-Gītā also, in the passage
“The Lord does not create in any one, the capacity to act, nor any actions, nor their connection to the fruit, but they tend towards activity by reason of their own nature.
He neither receives the sins nor the merits of any person. Knowledge is enveloped in Nescience and hence creatures become infatuated i.e. confused” (BhG.5.14–5),
It is indicated that there is absence of all behaviour as that of a ruler or the ruled in the condition of perfect knowledge,

2.1.14 L.148 व्यवहारावस्थायां तूक्तः श्रुतावपीश्वरादिव्यवहारः –
While in the condition of phenomenal existence, even the Scriptures do speak of the Selfs behaviour as the Lord, thus —

2.1.14 L.149 ‘एष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपतिरेष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसम्भेदाय’ (BrhU.4.4.22) इति;
“He is the Lord of all, the King and the protector of all beings, and he is the bund which upholds the worlds so that they may not be confounded (by promiscuity)” (BrhUEng.4.4.22).

2.1.14 L.150 तथा चेश्वरगीतास्वपि – ‘ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति। भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया’ (BhG.18.61) इति;
Similarly it is said in the Īśvara-Gītā again — “Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the heart of all beings, and by this power of Māyā makes them go round and round as in a whirligig” (BhG.18.61).

2.1.14 L.151 सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण ‘तदनन्यत्वम्’ इत्याह;
The Sūtra-kāra also speaks of the non-difference of cause and effects, in the real sense only,

2.1.14 L.152 व्यवहाराभिप्रायेण तु ‘स्याल्लोकवत्’ इति महासमुद्रस्थानीयतां ब्रह्मणः कथयति,
And so far as the phenomenal transactions are concerned, he has likened Brahman to the ocean, in the preceding Sūtra thus — “It may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world”.

2.1.14 L.153 अप्रत्याख्यायैव कार्यप्रपञ्चं परिणामप्रक्रियां चाश्रयति सगुणेषूपासनेषूपयोक्ष्यत इति॥१४॥
He (the Sūtra-kāra) accepts and does not refute the view about Brahman being liable to modification, in so far as it can be made use of in meditations on Brahman in its qualified (Sa-guṇa) aspect. — 14.

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Bhāve: on the existence; Ca: and; Upalabdheḥ: is experienced effect (world) is in separable from its material cause, Brahman, is continued.

🔗 (Cause and effect are non-different) because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect exists. — 2.1.15.

2.1.15 L.1 इतश्च कारणादनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य, यत्कारणं भाव एव कारणस्य कार्यमुपलभ्यते, नाभावे;
Again why the effect is non-different from its cause, is, because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect is seen to exist, and not when it does not.

2.1.15 L.2 तद्यथा – सत्यां मृदि घट उपलभ्यते, सत्सु च तन्तुषु पटः;
For instance, it is in the presence of clay only that a pot is seen to exist, and in the presence of yarns only that cloth is seen to exist.

2.1.15 L.3 न च नियमेनान्यभावेऽन्यस्योपलब्धिर्दृष्टा;
It is not, that when one thing exists, that, as a rule, another thing is to be seen to exist.

2.1.15 L.4 न ह्यश्वो गोरन्यः सन्गोर्भाव एवोपलभ्यते;
It is not, that a horse, different as it is from a cow, exists, only when a cow exists.

2.1.15 L.5 न च कुलालभाव एव घट उपलभ्यते, सत्यपि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेऽन्यत्वात्।
Nor is it, that a pot is seen to exist only when a potter exists, even when there subsists a relation of an effect and an accidental cause between them, because the one thing is different from the other (and hence there is no non-difference between them).

2.1.15 L.6 नन्वन्यस्य भावेऽप्यन्यस्योपलब्धिर्नियता दृश्यते, यथाग्निभावे धूमस्येति;
(The opponent says) — But it is seen that when a particular thing exists, as a rule another particular thing is seen to exist, as for instance, smoke necessarily is seen to exist, when fire exists.

2.1.15 L.7 नेत्युच्यते – उद्वापितेऽप्यग्नौ गोपालघुटिकादिधारितस्य धूमस्य दृश्यमानत्वात्।
(To this) we reply — no, because smoke held up in a cowherd’s pot is seen (to exist), even after the fire is put out.

2.1.15 L.8 अथ धूमं कयाचिदवस्थया विशिंष्यात् – ईदृशो धूमो नासत्यग्नौ भवतीति,
If the opponent were to say — if smoke is particularized by a certain condition (such as, smoke which has ascended high up into the sky from something on the ground), then such and such particular smoke does not exist, if fire does not exist — ,

2.1.15 L.9 नैवमपि कश्चिद्दोषः;
Even then (we reply), there is no fault whatever even if it were to be so (understood),

2.1.15 L.10 तद्भावानुरक्तां हि बुद्धिं कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे हेतुं वयं वदामः;
Because we say, that the reason for holding, that there is non-difference between cause and effect, is (not only that an effect is to be seen to exist only when the cause exists) but that intelligence (Buddhi) coloured by (i.e. impressed with) the consciousness, of the cause being always jointly discernible with the effect, also is such a cause [i.e. a Hetu has a mental aspect as much as it has a perceptual aspect],

2.1.15 L.11 न चासावग्निधूमयोर्विद्यते।
And such consciousness does not exist in the case of fire and smoke, (because there never is a consciousness that the smoke which is perceived is Agni).

2.1.15 L.12 ‘भावाच्चोपलब्धेः’ – इति वा सूत्रम्।
There may also be another reading of this Sūtra, thus — “Bhāvāt ca upalabdheḥ”.

2.1.15 L.13 न केवलं शब्दादेव कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वम्, प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिभावाच्च तयोरनन्यत्वमित्यर्थः;
It means, that it is not only because of the Scriptures (that we say) that there is nondifference between cause and effect, but also because it is directly seen [and recognized] to be so.

2.1.15 L.14 भवति हि प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिः कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे;
Such non-difference between cause and effect does happen to be directly perceived.

2.1.15 L.15 तद्यथा – तन्तुसंस्थाने पटे तन्तुव्यतिरेकेण पटो नाम कार्यं नैवोपलभ्यते,
It is this way: — In the case of a cloth which is a construction of threads, we do not of course perceive merely an effect, viz., the cloth as such, as apart from the threads themselves,

2.1.15 L.16 केवलास्तु तन्तव आतानवितानवन्तः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यन्ते, तथा तन्तुष्वंशवः, अंशुषु तदवयवाः।
But what we actually and directly see are merely the threads only in their condition as warps and woofs, and similarly, we perceive [or behold] fibres only, in the condition of threads, and minute parts of the fibres only, in the condition of fibres.

2.1.15 L.17 अनया प्रत्यक्षोपलब्ध्या लोहितशुक्लकृष्णानि त्रीणि रूपाणि,
ततो वायुमात्रमाकाशमात्रं चेत्यनुमेयम्,
And thus by this same process of direct observation, it ought to be inferred that the minute parts of the fibres are but the three colours viz. the red, white and black (representing the fire, water and earth [energy, binding cohesion and solidity]),
And thereafter, that the three colours are but the Vāyu, and that Vāyu is but merely the Ākāśa (ChanU.6.4),

2.1.15 L.18 ततः परं ब्रह्मैकमेवाद्वितीयम्; And thereafter that the Ākāśa is but the transcendent Brahman, which is one only without a second,

2.1.15 L.19 तत्र सर्वप्रमाणानां निष्ठामवोचाम॥१५॥
And in which, as we have already said, all means-of-proof have their ultimate culmination. — 15.

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Sattvāt: Because of the existence; Ca: and; Avarasya: of the posterior, i.e., of the effect as it comes after the cause, i.e., of the world.

🔗 Because an effect (Avara) (i.e. one which comes into existence later on) already exists (as the cause). — 2.1.16.

2.1.16 L.1 इतश्च कारणात्कार्यस्यानन्यत्वम्,
This again why the effect is non-different from the cause,

2.1.16 L.2 यत्कारणं प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणात्मनैव कारणे सत्त्वमवरकालीनस्य कार्यस्य श्रूयते –
Viz. because the Scriptures say, that the Avara i.e. the one which comes into existence later on as the effect is, before its creation, already in existence in the cause, as the cause itself,

2.1.16 L.3 ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ (ChanU.6.2.1)
‘आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्’ (AitU.1.1.1)
इत्यादाविदंशब्दगृहीतस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यात्;
Because in the Scriptural passages “Oh mild one, this was mere existence ‘Sat’ only, in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1),
“This in the beginning was only the Self (Ātmā)” (AitU.1.1.1),
The word ‘this’ (Idam) by which the effect (i.e. this world) is understood, and the cause the Ātmā (the Self), have the same case-endings (showing their oneness).

2.1.16 L.4 यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते,
That (viz. the effect) which does not happen to exist in that form in any thing which is its cause,

2.1.16 L.5 न तत्तत उत्पद्यते, यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम्;
Can never come into existence from it, as for instance, oil (which does not exist in the form of the sand as the cause of itself, can never be produced) from sand.

2.1.16 L.6 तस्मात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरनन्यत्वादुत्पन्नमप्यनन्यदेव कारणात्कार्यमित्यवगम्यते।
Therefore being in fact non-different (from the cause) before creation, it is understood, that the effect even when it is created, is non-different from its cause.

2.1.16 L.7 यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति, एवं कार्यमपि जगत्त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति।
Just as Brahman during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future) never deviates from existence (Sattva), even so, the effect viz. this world also during all the three times never deviates from existence (Sattva).

2.1.16 L.8 एकं च पुनः सत्त्वम्;
And again as existence itself as such (i.e. Sat) is but one only,

2.1.16 L.9 अतोऽप्यनन्यत्वं कारणात्कार्यस्य॥१६॥
It follows that the effect is non-different from the cause. — 16.

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A-sad-vyapadeśāt: on account of its being described as non-existent; Na: not; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no: Dharma-antareṇa: by another attribute or characteristic; Vākya-śeṣāt: from the latter part of the text or passage, because of the complementary passage.

🔗 If it be said, that as an effect (Kārya) is said to be non-existent i.e. ‘Asat’ (before its creation, and that, therefore, the doctrine of the Vedāntin is) not (correct), (we reply) — No (i.e. it is not that an effect is not ‘Sat’ i.e. Existent), because from the complementary part of the passage, it is seen (that it is called non-existent i.e. Asat) because of its having a different attribute (Dharma). — 2.1.17.

2.1.17 L.1 ननु क्वचिदसत्त्वमपि प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः –
But (says the opponent) the Scriptures do also occasionally refer to the effect before its creation as non-existent (Asat), thus: —

2.1.17 L.2 ‘असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्’ (ChanU.3.19.1) इति,
“This merely was non-existent in the beginning” (ChanU.3.19.1),

2.1.17 L.3 ‘असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्’ (TaitU.2.7.1) इति च;
And also “In the beginning this indeed was non-existent” (TaitUEng.2.7.1).

2.1.17 L.4 तस्मादसद्व्यपदेशान्न प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमिति चेत् –
Therefore, if it be said, that by reason of an effect being non-existent (Asat) before creation, effect does not exist (before its creation),

2.1.17 L.5 नेति ब्रूमः; न ह्ययमत्यन्तासत्त्वाभिप्रायेण प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्यासद्व्यपदेशः –
(We reply) — no. This reference to an effect before its creation, as non-existent (Asat) is not meant to convey its absolute or total non-existence.

2.1.17 L.6 किं तर्हि? – व्याकृतनामरूपत्वाद्धर्मादव्याकृतनामरूपत्वं धर्मान्तरम्,
तेन धर्मान्तरेणायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत एव कार्यस्य कारणरूपेणानन्यस्य।
What then is meant? What is meant is that the condition (of an entity) in which its name and form have become evolved, is a condition different from its condition, in which such name and form have not yet been evolved,
And this reference to an entity as being non-existent (Asat) (in the Scriptures) is with respect to this latter condition, nondifferent though the effect is from its nature as the cause.

2.1.17 L.7 कथमेतदवगम्यते? वाक्यशेषात्।
How is it understood to be so? Because of the complementary passage.

2.1.17 L.8 यदुपक्रमे सन्दिग्धार्थं वाक्यं तच्छेषान्निश्चीयते;
The meaning of the sentence, which, in the introductory portion, is ambiguous in meaning, is made definite from the complementary passage.

2.1.17 L.9 इह च तावत् ‘असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्’
As for the sentence here (under consideration), viz. “This was but merely non-existent (Asat) in the beginning”,

2.1.17 L.10 इत्यसच्छब्देनोपक्रमे निर्दिष्टं ‘यत्’,
What (Yat) in the introductory portion was indicated by the word ‘non-existent’ (Asat),

2.1.17 L.11 तदेव पुनस्तच्छब्देन परामृश्य,
And is again referred to by the word ‘that’ (Tat),

2.1.17 L.12 सदिति विशिनष्टि – ‘तत्सदासीत्’ इति –
Is (afterwards) particularized as ‘existent’ (Sat) by the sentence — “That was Sat i.e. existent”.

2.1.17 L.13 असतश्च पूर्वापरकालासम्बन्धात् आसीच्छब्दानुपपत्तेश्च;
The use of the word ‘Āsīt’ (in the sentence ‘it was existent’) cannot be reasonably sustainable because, ‘Asat’ (non-existent) has no connection either with the past or the future time.

2.1.17 L.14 ‘असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्’ (TaitU.2.7.1) इत्यत्रापि
‘तदात्मानꣳ स्वयमकुरुत’ (TaitU.2.7.1) इति वाक्यशेषे विशेषणान्नात्यन्तासत्त्वम्;
In the sentence “This of course was non-existent in the beginning” also,
Absolute i.e. total non-existence could not be meant, because it is particularized (as ‘it’) in the complementary passage — “It made itself manifest”.

2.1.17 L.15 तस्माद्धर्मान्तरेणैवायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य;
Hence this reference to an entity before its creation, as ‘non-existent’, is with reference to this other condition of it.

2.1.17 L.16 नामरूपव्याकृतं हि वस्तु सच्छब्दार्हं लोके प्रसिद्धम्;
It is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only a thing which is evolved with name and form that deserves to have the word ‘existent’ (Sat) applied to it.

2.1.17 L.17 अतः प्राङ्नामरूपव्याकरणादसदिवासीदित्युपचर्यते॥२७॥
Hence, prior to its evolution by name and form, a thing is figuratively referred to as ‘was non-existent as it were’. — 17.

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Yukteḥ: from reasoning; Śabda-antarāt: from another Śruti text; Ca: and.

🔗 Because of reasoning, and because of another Scriptural word also (non-difference between cause and effect and the identity between them is understood). — 2.1.18.

2.1.18 L.1 युक्तेश्च प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणादवगम्यते, शब्दान्तराच्च॥
The existence of the effect (prior to its creation) and its non-difference with the cause is understood by reasoning (Yukti) and by another Scriptural word also.

2.1.18 L.2 युक्तिस्तावद्वर्ण्यते –
Now, for the present, reasoning will be described.

2.1.18 L.3 दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीरमृत्तिकासुवर्णादीन्युपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते;
It is seen in the ordinary world that those who desire to have curds or pots or ornaments, as a rule invariably make use of milk, clay and gold respectively, which are their definitely well-established causes.

2.1.18 L.4 न हि दध्यर्थिभिर्मृत्तिकोपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः क्षीरम्;
Those who desire to have curds do not make use of clay, and those who desire to have pots do not make use of milk,

2.1.18 L.5 तदसत्कार्यवादे नोपपद्येत।
Which would not be reasonably sustainable, so far as the doctrine of the non-existence of an effect prior to its creation (i.e. Asat-kārya-Vāda) is concerned.

2.1.18 L.6 अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः सर्वस्य सर्वत्रासत्त्वे
कस्मात्क्षीरादेव दध्युत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकायाः,
मृत्तिकाया एव च घट उत्पद्यते, न क्षीरात्?
[If] Non-existence of everything everywhere prior to its creation, being general i.e. common,
Why is it that curds is produced from milk only, and not from clay?
And why are pots produced from clay only, and not from milk?

2.1.18 L.7 अथाविशिष्टेऽपि प्रागसत्त्वे
क्षीर एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयो न मृत्तिकायाम्, मृत्तिकायामेव च घटस्य कश्चिदतिशयो न क्षीरे – इत्युच्येत – तर्ह्यतिशयवत्त्वात्प्रागवस्थाया असत्कार्यवादहानिः, सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिश्च;
(If the opponent were to say) — even though the non-existence of effects prior to their creation is common i.e. general (to all effects),
There is a special property i.e. idiosyncrasy (Atiśaya) of curds, that subsists in milk only [and not in clay pots], And a special property or idiosyncrasy of pots, that subsist in clay only [and not in curds], Then (the assumption of) such property or idiosyncrasy of their prior state (of effects), would necessarily mean the abandonment of the doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to its creation (i.e. Asat-kārya-Vāda), and the establishment of the doctrine of the prior existence of the effect as the cause, prior to its creation (i.e. Sat-kārya-Vāda).

2.1.18 L.8 शक्तिश्च कारणस्य कार्यनियमार्था कल्प्यमाना नान्या असती वा कार्यं नियच्छेत्,
If such potentiality capable of regulating the effect were to be imagined to exist (in a cause), then, if it is either different (from the cause and the effect) or nonexistent, it would not regulate the effect,

2.1.18 L.9 असत्त्वाविशेषादन्यत्वाविशेषाच्च;
(Because if it is either non-existent or different (from the cause and the effect) it will not be able to regulate the creation of a particular effect), because of common non-existence (Asattva) and common difference (Anyatva), (in as much as, on the one hand it is as non-existent as the non-existent effect, and on the other hand it is quite as different from the cause and the effect, as the cause is different from the effect).

2.1.18 L.10 तस्मात्कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः, शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम्।
Therefore, this potentiality (Śakti) is the essential nature of the cause, and the essential nature of such potentiality, is the effect (which ultimately means that the cause, the potentiality and the effect are both one and the same thing).

2.1.18 L.11 अपि च कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाश्वमहिषवद्भेदबुद्ध्यभावात्तादात्म्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।
Besides in the absence of the existence of any notion of difference — such as there is as between a horse and a buffalo — between cause and effect, and also as between substance and quality etc., their identity i.e. unity must necessarily be understood.

2.1.18 L.12 समवायकल्पनायामपि,
Even in the assumption of a Samavāya relation (invariable concommitance)

2.1.18 L.13 समवायस्य समवायिभिः सम्बन्धेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने,
If it is understood that there is a relation as between the Samavāya on the one hand, and the two entities between which such Samavāya exists (viz. the Samavāyins) on the other,

2.1.18 L.14 तस्य तस्यान्योन्यः सम्बन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः,
Then such another Samavāya relation of that, and then still such another Samavāya relation of that, ad infinitum, will have to be imagined, and hence the predicament of a regressus ad infinitum would result;

2.1.18 L.15 अनभ्युपगम्यमाने च विच्छेदप्रसङ्गः;
And if it is not assumed that there is a relation between a Samavāya and the Samavāyins, then the predicament of the destruction of any such notion of a Samavāya relation between two entities (such as cause and effect) would result.

2.1.18 L.16 अथ समवायः स्वयं सम्बन्धरूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैवापरं सम्बन्धं सम्बध्येत,
Now (if the opponent were to say) that a Samavāya itself being of the nature of a relation, establishes such relation (between two entities) without requiring any other relation (of another Samavāya),

2.1.18 L.17 संयोगोऽपि तर्हि स्वयं सम्बन्धरूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैव समवायं सम्बध्येत;
Then (we would reply) that contact or conjunction (Saṃyoga), also, being of the nature of a relation, it would establish such Saṃyoga relation, without necessarily requiring a Samavāya (which according to you is necessary).

2.1.18 L.18 तादात्म्यप्रतीतेश्च द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकल्पनानर्थक्यम्।
Moreover, as an identity between substance and quality etc. (by etc. a material cause and an effect should be understood) is actually experienced, the notion of such a Samavāya is meaningless.

2.1.18 L.19 कथं च कार्यमवयविद्रव्यं कारणेष्ववयवद्रव्येषु वर्तमानं वर्तेत?
Moreover in which manner (according to you, the opponent) does the material (i.e. Dravya) of an Avayavī (effect, product, construction, the class, the whole) subsist or abide in the material (Dravya) of the Avayava (cause, material, part, the individual, the member)?

2.1.18 L.20 किं समस्तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तेत, उत प्रत्यवयवम्?
Does it subsist in all the parts i.e. Avayavas (of the cause) together, or in each individual part (i.e. Avayava)?

2.1.18 L.21 यदि तावत्समस्तेषु वर्तेत,
Supposing it subsists in all parts (i.e. Avayavas) together,

2.1.18 L.22 ततोऽवयव्यनुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत,
There would be no perception of the Avayavī (i.e. the effect)

2.1.18 L.23 समस्तावयवसन्निकर्षस्याशक्यत्वात्;
Because the (necessary) connection (Sannikarṣa) between the sense-organ and the objects of sense i.e. all the Avayavas together, would be impossible,

2.1.18 L.24 न हि बहुत्वं समस्तेष्वाश्रयेषु वर्तमानं व्यस्ताश्रयग्रहणेन गृह्यते;
Because, plurality or manyness (Bahutva) which subsists in all the substrata together, would not be perceivable by perceiving any one substratum only.

2.1.18 L.25 अथावयवशः समस्तेषु वर्तेत,
Now (if the opponent were to say) that the Avayavī material subsists Avayava by Avayava, on all the substrata of the cause (i.e. the Avayava material),

2.1.18 L.26 तदाप्यारम्भकावयवव्यतिरेकेणावयविनोऽवयवाः कल्प्येरन्, यैरारम्भकेष्ववयवेष्ववयवशोऽवयवी वर्तेत;
Then it would be necessary to imagine that the Avayavī (i.e. effect), has Avayavas, different from those which started the bringing about of the Avayavī i.e. effect by which the Avayavī could subsist Avayava by Avayava on the Avayavas which started the bringing about of the Avayavī.

2.1.18 L.27 कोशावयवव्यतिरिक्तैर्ह्यवयवैरसिः कोशं व्याप्नोति;
A sword (for instance) occupies its scabbard by Avayavas different from the Avayavas of the scabbard.

2.1.18 L.28 अनवस्था चैवं प्रसज्येत, तेषु तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तयितुमन्येषामन्येषामवयवानां कल्पनीयत्वात्;
And as it would be necessary to imagine other and still other Avayavas so that they may subsist in those Avayavas (which come in the series, earlier) ad infinitum, it would lead to a regressus ad infinitum.

2.1.18 L.29 अथ प्रत्यवयवं वर्तेत, तदैकत्र व्यापारेऽन्यत्राव्यापारः स्यात्;
Now, supposing the Avayavī material, together, subsists in every Avayava of the material (Dravya) of the cause, one by one in a series, then it would be that while it operates in one place it could have no operation in another place.

2.1.18 L.30 न हि देवदत्तः स्रुघ्ने सन्निधीयमानस्तदहरेव पाटलिपुत्रेऽपि सन्निधीयते;
Deva-datta while he is living in Srughna cannot on the same day be living in Pāṭali-putra also.

2.1.18 L.31 युगपदनेकत्र वृत्तावनेकत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोरिव स्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रनिवासिनोः;
Being present in two places simultaneously would mean the predicament of there having to be more than one person, as for instance, when Deva-datta and Yajña-datta simultaneously reside in Srughna and Pāṭali-putra respectively.

2.1.18 L.32 गोत्वादिवत्प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तेर्न दोष इति चेत्,
(If the opponent were to say) that like the cowness (of a cow) the Avayavī-material may subsist in every Avayava, and hence there would be no such fault,

2.1.18 L.33 न; तथा प्रतीत्यभावात्;
(We would reply) — No, because it is not so actually perceived.

2.1.18 L.34 यदि गोत्वादिवत्प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तोऽवयवी स्यात्,
If like the cowness which abides in every cow, the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava,

2.1.18 L.35 यथा गोत्वं प्रतिव्यक्ति प्रत्यक्षं गृह्यते, एवमवयव्यपि प्रत्यवयवं प्रत्यक्षं गृह्येत;
Then just as the ‘cowness’ (of a cow) is directly perceived to be abiding in every individual cow, even so, would the Avayavī be directly perceivable in every individual Avayava,

2.1.18 L.36 न चैवं नियतं गृह्यते;
But it is not perceived to be so invariably.

2.1.18 L.37 प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्तौ चावयविनः कार्येणाधिकारात्,
Besides if the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava,

2.1.18 L.38 तस्य चैकत्वात्, शृङ्गेणापि स्तनकार्यं कुर्यात्, उरसा च पृष्ठकार्यम्;
Then as it is but one only, and is competent to function, it may accomplish the function of the udders with a horn, and the function of the back with the chest.

2.1.18 L.39 न चैवं दृश्यते।
But it is not so experienced.

2.1.18 L.40 प्रागुत्पत्तेश्च कार्यस्यासत्त्वे, उत्पत्तिरकर्तृका निरात्मिका च स्यात्;
Again if an effect were to be non-existent (Asat) prior to its creation, then creative action would be without an agent, and it would not have a Self.

2.1.18 L.41 उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति, गत्यादिवत्;
Creation, indeed, is an action, and, like motion etc., action deserves to have an agent.

2.1.18 L.42 क्रिया च नाम स्यात्, अकर्तृका च – इति विप्रतिषिध्येत;
It would be a contradiction in terms to speak of there being action and such action (taking place) without an agent.

2.1.18 L.43 घटस्य चोत्पत्तिरुच्यमाना न घटकर्तृका – किं तर्हि? – अन्यकर्तृका – इति कल्प्या स्यात्;
(If the opponents’ doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to creation were to be accepted) when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it would have to be imagined that it is not caused by the pot (as it is not in existence before its creation), but by some other agent.

2.1.18 L.44 तथा कपालादीनामप्युत्पत्तिरुच्यमानान्यकर्तृकैव कल्प्येत;
Similarly when the creation of the two halves of a pot is spoken of, it also would have to be imagined that it is caused (not by the two halves but) by some other agent.

2.1.18 L.45 तथा च सति ‘घट उत्पद्यते’ इत्युक्ते, ‘कुलालादीनि कारणान्युत्पद्यन्ते’ इत्युक्तं स्यात्;
If it were to be so, then, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would be tantamount to saying, that its causes, such as the potter etc., are being created (because as a pot cannot be its own maker, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would mean by implication, that the causes of a pot are being created),

2.1.18 L.46 न च लोके घटोत्पत्तिरित्युक्ते कुलालादीनामप्युत्पद्यमानता प्रतीयते,
But in the ordinary world when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it is not experienced, that its causes such as the potter etc., are also being created simultaneously,

2.1.18 L.47 उत्पन्नताप्रतीतेश्च;
But on the other hand it is experienced that they have already been in existence.

2.1.18 L.48 अथ स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्ध एवोत्पत्तिरात्मलाभश्च कार्यस्येति चेत् –
Now, (if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that the creation of an effect, merely means the establishment of its relation with its cause, and the obtainment by the effect of its own existence (Sattā),

2.1.18 L.49 कथमलब्धात्मकं सम्बध्येतेति वक्तव्यम्;
Then the opponent has to explain, as to how, anything which has not as yet acquired its own existence, can ever establish its relation (with something else).

2.1.18 L.50 सतोर्हि द्वयोः सम्बन्धः सम्भवति, न सदसतोरसतोर्वा;
It is when two entities are in existence that a relation between them is possible, and not when one exists and the other does not, nor when neither of them are in existence.

2.1.18 L.51 अभावस्य च निरुपाख्यत्वात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति मर्यादाकरणमनुपपन्नम्;
Besides non-existence by itself being of the nature of falsity or unreality (Nirupākhyatva), it would not be reasonably sustainable to set a time limit to it, such as, non-existence prior to the creation (of an effect).

2.1.18 L.52 सतां हि लोके क्षेत्रगृहादीनां मर्यादा दृष्टा नाभावस्य;
In the ordinary world, it is when there are already existing things such as a field or a house that it is seen that a limit is set to them, and never to mere non-existence.

2.1.18 L.53 न हि वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा बभूव प्राक्पूर्णवर्मणोऽभिषेकादित्येवंजातीयकेन मर्यादाकरणेन
निरुपाख्यो वन्ध्यापुत्रः – राजा बभूव भवति भविष्यतीति वा – विशेष्यते;
By setting a limit of this sort for instance, viz. that the ‘son of a barren woman’ became a king before the coronation of Purṇa-varman,
It can never be that an absolute non-entity (Tuccha-Vastu) such as the ‘son of a barren woman’, ever was, is, or will be, a king.

2.1.18 L.54 यदि च वन्ध्यापुत्रोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वमभविष्यत्,
तत इदमप्युपापत्स्यत – कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं भविष्यतीति;
If even ‘the son of a barren woman’ could come into existence, after the operation of a casual agent,
Then it may also be that an effect which is non-existent prior to its creation, may also come into existence after the operation of a casual agent.

2.1.18 L.55 वयं तु पश्यामः – वन्ध्यापुत्रस्य कार्याभावस्य चाभावत्वाविशेषात्,
What we see, however, is that non-existence being common both to the (non-existence of the) ‘son of a barren woman’ and (the non-existence of) an effect prior to its creation,

2.1.18 L.56 यथा वन्ध्यापुत्रः कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं न भविष्यति,
Just as the ‘son of a barren woman’ does not ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent,

2.1.18 L.57 एवं कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं न भविष्यतीति।
Even so, the non-existent effect (which is non-existent prior to its creation), cannot ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent.

2.1.18 L.58 नन्वेवं सति कारकव्यापारोऽनर्थकः प्रसज्येत;
But (says the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin) in that case the operation of a casual agent would be rendered purposeless.

2.1.18 L.59 यथैव हि प्राक्सिद्धत्वात्कारणस्वरूपसिद्धये न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते,
Just as no one endeavours to bring about a cause which already exists,

2.1.18 L.60 एवं प्राक्सिद्धत्वात्तदनन्यत्वाच्च कार्यस्य स्वरूपसिद्धयेऽपि न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियेत;
व्याप्रियते च;
Even so, no one would bother to bring about an effect which exists already, and is non-different from the cause (as you the Sat-kārya-vādin hold),
But we do see that people always do so endeavour (to bring about effects).

2.1.18 L.61 अतः कारकव्यापारार्थवत्त्वाय मन्यामहे प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावः कार्यस्येति चेत्,
So, in order that the operation of a casual agent may not be rendered purposeless, we believe in the nonexistence of an effect prior to its creation.

2.1.18 L.62 नैष दोषः; यतः कार्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः कारकव्यापारस्यार्थवत्त्वमुपपद्यते;
(To this, we reply) — This is not proper, because it would be reasonably sustainable to say, that operation by a casual agent, which modifies the cause into the form of an effect, could have a purpose.

2.1.18 L.63 कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्यात्मभूत एव, अनात्मभूतस्यानारभ्यत्वात् – इत्यभाणि;
We have said already, that the form of an effect-as-such, is but the form of the cause itself, and nothing that has no form in itself can ever be set on (to establish an effect in a similar form).

2.1.18 L.64 न च विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति;
A thing as such does not become another different thing altogether, by merely appearing in a different aspect.

2.1.18 L.65 न हि देवदत्तः सङ्कोचितहस्तपादः प्रसारितहस्तपादश्च विशेषेण दृश्यमानोऽपि वस्त्वन्यत्वं गच्छति,
Deva-datta, whose hands and legs are (at one time) in a flexed position, and Deva-datta whose hands and legs are (at some other time) in an extended position, and who is thus to be seen in such different attitudes (at different times), does not merely on that account, become different persons,

2.1.18 L.66 स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्;
Because he is still recognizable as the same one person (Deva-datta).

2.1.18 L.67 तथा प्रतिदिनमनेकसंस्थानानामपि पित्रादीनां न वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति, मम पिता मम भ्राता मम पुत्र इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्;
Similarly, a father etc. who every day happen to be in different capacities do not become different individuals because they are recognized as being — ‘my father’, ‘my brother’ and ‘my son’ etc.

2.1.18 L.68 जन्मोच्छेदानन्तरितत्वात्तत्र युक्तम्, नान्यत्रेति चेत्,
(If the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) — In that case it may well be so, because of their having (during such capacities) no connection with birth and death, but it is not so, in other cases,

2.1.18 L.69 न; क्षीरादीनामपि दध्याद्याकारसंस्थानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात्;
(We reply) — no, because milk etc. also are directly seen to materialize as curds etc. (without undergoing destruction).

2.1.18 L.70 अदृश्यमानानामपि वटधानादीनां समानजातीयावयवान्तरोपचितानामङ्कुरादिभावेन दर्शनगोचरतापत्तौ जन्मसंज्ञा;
When seeds of the Vaṭa (Banyan) tree etc., which are not visible, become visible as sprouts, as a result of their cells multiplying themselves into many such cells, and ultimately developing into a sprout, it is termed (their) ‘birth’,

2.1.18 L.71 तेषामेवावयवानामपचयवशाददर्शनापत्तावुच्छेदसंज्ञा;
And when as a result of the diminution of these very cells, they again become invisible, it is termed (their) ‘death’.

2.1.18 L.72 तत्रेदृग्जन्मोच्छेदान्तरितत्वाच्चेदसतः सत्त्वापत्तिः, सतश्चासत्त्वापत्तिः,
Now (if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say), that what is nonexistent (Asat) becomes existent (Sat) because of its having no connection with birth and death,

2.1.18 L.73 तथा सति गर्भवासिन उत्तानशायिनश्च भेदप्रसङ्गः;
(We reply) that in that case there would result this predicament, viz., that the unborn embryo, and a new-born child lying face upwards on its back, would become different entities.

2.1.18 L.74 तथा बाल्ययौवनस्थाविरेष्वपि भेदप्रसङ्गः,
Similarly there would also be the predicament, of the same man in his childhood, youth and old age, being different entities,

2.1.18 L.75 पित्रादिव्यवहारलोपप्रसङ्गश्च।
And there would also be the predicament of the destruction of the use of such conventional terms as father etc.

2.1.18 L.76 एतेन क्षणभङ्गवादः प्रतिवदितव्यः।
By all this (preceding argument) the doctrine of all existence being momentary (Buddhistic doctrine) should also be understood to be refuted.

2.1.18 L.77 यस्य तु पुनः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यम्,
In the case of the adherents of the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect prior to its creation,

2.1.18 L.78 तस्य निर्विषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यात्, अभावस्य विषयत्वानुपपत्तेः –
The operation of a causal agent would not have any object (such as a cause) on which it can operate, and again non-existence not being an object, it cannot also be the object of any operation by a causal agent,

2.1.18 L.79 आकाशहननप्रयोजनखड्गाद्यनेकायुधप्रयुक्तिवत्;
Even as the Ākāśa cannot be the object, for the purpose of mowing it down by striking it with a sword etc.

2.1.18 L.80 समवायिकारणविषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यादिति चेत्,
(Now if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that the operation of a causal agent may have the material cause (of an effect) — such as earth etc. — as the object of its operation,

2.1.18 L.81 न; अन्यविषयेण कारकव्यापारेणान्यनिष्पत्तेरतिप्रसङ्गात्;
(We reply) — No, because it would in that case lead to a strange result (Atiprasaṅga) viz. that by the operation of a causal agent on one object (i.e. earth), another different object (i.e. a pot) would be produced.

2.1.18 L.82 समवायिकारणस्यैवात्मातिशयः कार्यमिति चेत्,
(If the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that an effect is but an idiosyncrasy of the Self of the material cause,

2.1.18 L.83 न; सत्कार्यतापत्तेः।
(We reply) — No, as it would lead to the establishment of Sat-kārya-Vāda i.e. the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to creation, (which would be awkward for the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin).

2.1.18 L.84 तस्मात्क्षीरादीन्येव द्रव्याणि दध्यादिभावेनावतिष्ठमानानि कार्याख्यां लभन्त इति
न कारणादन्यत्कार्यं वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
Therefore, in as much as substances such as milk etc., only when they attain the form of curds etc., acquire the name of an effect,
It is not possible even after (wrangling about it for) a hundred years, to establish, that an effect is different from its cause.

2.1.18 L.85 तथा मूलकारणमेव आ अन्त्यात्कार्यात् तेन तेन कार्याकारेण नटवत्सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते।
Similarly, it is only the fundamental cause, which, like an actor, assumes different forms as effects right down to the last effect, and becomes amenable to all worldly transactions.

2.1.18 L.86 एवं युक्तेः, कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वम्, अनन्यत्वं च कारणात्, अवगम्यते॥
In this way it is understood through ‘reasoning’ that the effect does exist prior to its creation, and that it is non-different from the cause.

2.1.18 L.87 शब्दान्तराच्चैतदवगम्यते –
The same proposition is proved by other Scriptural passages.

2.1.18 L.88 पूर्वसूत्रेऽसद्व्यपदेशिनः शब्दस्योदाहृतत्वात्ततोऽन्यः सद्व्यपदेशी शब्दः शब्दान्तरम् –
In the preceding Sūtra a passage which indicated the Scriptural word ‘Asat’ (i.e. non-existent) was cited and now the word ‘Sat’ (i.e. existent) i.e. a Scriptural word different from it (Śabdāntara), is cited, in the passage —

2.1.18 L.89 ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ (ChanU.6.2.1) इत्यादि।
“Oh mild one, the ‘Sat’ alone was existing in the beginning, the only one without a second” etc.,

2.1.18 L.90 ‘तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीत्’ इति चासत्पक्षमुपक्षिप्य,
After challenging the view of the non-existence of the effect (before creation) thus — “Some said, this was not in existence in the beginning”,

2.1.18 L.91 ‘कथमसतः सज्जायेत’ इत्याक्षिप्य,
And then by saying thus — “How can existence spring from non-existence?”,

2.1.18 L.92 ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ इत्यवधारयति;
It is finally concluded by the Scriptures, thus — “Sat alone was existing in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1).

2.1.18 L.93 तत्रेदंशब्दवाच्यस्य कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सच्छब्दवाच्येन कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यस्य श्रूयमाणत्वात्,
Now in as much as it is understood from the Scriptures that the effect which is indicated by the word ‘Idam’ has the same case-ending as the cause indicated by the word ‘Sat’ (existing) i.e. there is oneness between them, the existence of (the effect) prior to its creation

2.1.18 L.94 सत्त्वानन्यत्वे प्रसिध्यतः।
And its non-difference with the cause, becomes established.

2.1.18 L.95 यदि तु प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यं स्यात्,
If on the other hand, an effect prior to its creation were to be non-existent

2.1.18 L.96 पश्चाच्चोत्पद्यमानं कारणे समवेयात्,
And were it to establish a relation with the material cause after its creation

2.1.18 L.97 तदान्यत्कारणात्स्यात्,
Then it would be an entity different from the cause,

2.1.18 L.98 तत्र ‘येनाश्रुतꣳ श्रुतं भवति’ (ChanU.6.1.3) इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा पीड्येत;
And in that case the original declaration, viz., “By which that which is unheard becomes heard” (ChanU.6.1.3), would be contradicted,

2.1.18 L.99 सत्त्वानन्यत्वावगतेस्त्वियं प्रतिज्ञा समर्थ्यते॥१८॥
And it is only by understanding that the effect exists prior to its creation and that it is non-different from the cause, that the original declaration can be upheld. — 18.

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Paṭavat: like a piece of cloth; Ca: and.

🔗 Also, similarly to a piece of cloth (the effect is non-different from the cause). — 2.1.19.

2.1.19 L.1 यथा च संवेष्टितः पटो न व्यक्तं गृह्यते – किमयं पटः, किं वान्यद्द्रव्यमिति;
Just as when a piece of cloth happens to be folded, it is not definitely understood whether it is a piece of cloth or some other material,

2.1.19 L.2 स एव प्रसारितः, यत्संवेष्टितं द्रव्यं तत्पट एवेति प्रसारणेनाभिव्यक्तो गृह्यते।
But when it is unfolded it becomes clearly understood to be a piece of cloth,

2.1.19 L.3 यथा च संवेष्टनसमये पट इति गृह्यमाणोऽपि न विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते;
Or, it is understood to be a piece of cloth even when it is yet folded, but it is not understood as to how long and broad it is,

2.1.19 L.4 स एव प्रसारणसमये विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते –
But when it is unfolded it is known to be of a particular dimension in length and breadth

2.1.19 L.5 न संवेष्टितरूपादन्योऽयं भिन्नः पट इति,
And that it is not a piece of cloth different from the one which happened to be in a folded condition,

2.1.19 L.6 एवं तन्त्वादिकारणावस्थं पटादिकार्यमस्पष्टं सत्,
Similarly, an effect such as a piece of cloth etc., unrecognizable as it is, while it is in the condition of its cause viz. as threads etc.,

2.1.19 L.7 तुरीवेमकुविन्दादिकारकव्यापाराभिव्यक्तं स्पष्टं गृह्यते।
Becomes clearly recognizable when it is made manifest by the operations of the causal agents, such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver.

2.1.19 L.8 अतः संवेष्टितप्रसारितपटन्यायेनैवानन्यत्कारणात्कार्यमित्यर्थः॥१९॥
Hence the meaning is, that it is precisely in accordance with ‘the maxim of the folded and unfolded piece of cloth’ that an effect is non-different from its cause. — 19.

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Yathā: as; Ca: and; Prāṇa-ādi: in the case of Prāṇas or vital airs.

🔗 Also like the (minor) Prāṇas (Vital Airs, the effect is non-different from the cause). — 2.1.20.

2.1.20 L.1 यथा च लोके प्राणापानादिषु प्राणभेदेषु प्राणायामेन निरुद्धेषु
Just as in the ordinary world, when the different kinds of minor Prāṇas such as the Prāṇa, Apāna (ascending and descending Prāṇa) etc. are controlled, (and put out of action) by Prāṇāyāma (breathing exercises)

2.1.20 L.2 कारणमात्रेण रूपेण वर्तमानेषु
And they then subsist merely in the form of a cause,

2.1.20 L.3 जीवनमात्रं कार्यं निर्वर्त्यते, नाकुञ्चनप्रसारणादिकं कार्यान्तरम्;
Only the life (of a man) is sustained and no other function such as the flexion or stretching (of the limbs) takes place,

2.1.20 L.4 तेष्वेव प्राणभेदेषु पुनः प्रवृत्तेषु जीवनादधिकमाकुञ्चनप्रसारणादिकमपि कार्यान्तरं निर्वर्त्यते;
And when these different Prāṇas start functioning again, flexion and stretching (of the limbs) in addition to mere living also is restored.

2.1.20 L.5 न च प्राणभेदानां प्रभेदवतः प्राणादन्यत्वम्,
समीरणस्वभावाविशेषात् –
Now just as during all this time, the different minor Prāṇas, though they appear to be different, are not essentially different from the chief vital Prāṇa,
Because of the chief vital Prāṇa and the other minor Prāṇas being all of the same nature of air,

2.1.20 L.6 एवं कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वम्।
Even so, the effects are nondifferent from their causes.

2.1.20 L.7 अतश्च कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात्तदनन्यत्वाच्च
Hence, as the whole world is an effect of Brahman (as its cause), and is non-different from it,

2.1.20 L.8 सिद्धैषा श्रौती प्रतिज्ञा – ‘येनाश्रुतꣳ श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्’ (ChanU.6.1.1) इति॥२०॥
The Scriptural declaration — “By (the knowledge of) which, what is not heard becomes heard, what is not perceived becomes perceived, what is not known becomes known” (ChanU.6.1.1) — is thus established. — 20.

Su.2.1.21 Su..22 Su..23

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Itara-vyapadeśāt: on account of the other being stated (as non-different from Brahman); Hita-akaraṇa-ādi-doṣa-prasaktiḥ: defects of not doing what is beneficial and the like would arise. (Itara: other than being Brahman, i.e. the individual soul; Vyapadeśāt: from the designation, from the expression; Hita: good, beneficial; A-karaṇa-ādi: not creating, etc.; Doṣa: imperfection, defect, faults; Prasaktiḥ: result, consequence.)

🔗 Because of the reference to the other (i.e. the Jīva-Self is of the nature of Brahman), a fault — viz. that which is beneficial is eschewed etc. (by the Self) — attaches. — 2.1.21.

2.1.21 L.1 अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकारणवाद आक्षिप्यते –
Again, the doctrine of a sentient thing being the cause (of the world) is objected to.

2.1.21 L.2 चेतनाद्धि जगत्प्रक्रियायामाश्रीयमाणायां हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते।
If it is accepted that the creation of the world is due to a sentient cause (such as Brahman), faults such as the eschewing (by it) of what is beneficial etc. do attach themselves (to Brahman).

2.1.21 L.3 कुतः? इतरव्यपदेशात्।
Whence is it so? Because of the reference to other (i.e. the Jīva-Self).

2.1.21 L.4 इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः –
‘स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो’ (ChanU.6.8.7) इति प्रतिबोधनात्;
The Scriptures indicate that the other, i.e. the Jīva-Self, has Brahman as its Self (i.e. both are one and the same), by enlightening (Śveta-ketu), thus —
“That is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śevta-keto” (ChanU.6.8.7).

2.1.21 L.5 यद्वा – इतरस्य च ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति –
Or else (it may be construed) that the Scriptures declare, that the other (i.e. Brahman) is the Self of the embodied Jīva-Self, thus —

2.1.21 L.6 ‘तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति
“Having created that (world) it entered into it” (TaitUEng.2.6),

2.1.21 L.7 स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यानुप्रवेशेन शारीरात्मत्वदर्शनात्;
By stating the Creator (Brahman) which never undergoes any modification, as entering into that which it has created (viz. the body etc.).

2.1.21 L.8 ‘अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (ChanU.6.3.2) इति च
The Scriptural passage “May I, by myself entering (into my own creation) as the Jīva-Self, evolve names and forms”,

2.1.21 L.9 परा देवता जीवमात्मशब्देन व्यपदिशन्ती, न ब्रह्मणो भिन्नः शारीर इति दर्शयति;
By indicating that the transcendent deity (i.e. Brahman) refers to the Jīva-Self as its own Self, shows, how the Jīva-Self is not different from Brahman.

2.1.21 L.10 तस्माद्यद्ब्रह्मणः स्रष्टृत्वं तच्छारीरस्यैवेति।
Hence the creative activity of Brahman is but the creative activity of the Jīva-Self only.

2.1.21 L.11 अतस्सः स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता सन् हितमेवात्मनः सौमनस्यकरं कुर्यात्,
Hence being thus an independent creator in itself, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) would rather create what is beneficial to itself and conducive to its own satisfaction,

2.1.21 L.12 नाहितं जन्ममरणजरारोगाद्यनेकानर्थजालम्;
And avoid creating that which is not so beneficial, such as this snare of all the evils of birth, death, old age, and disease.

2.1.21 L.13 न हि कश्चिदपरतन्त्रो बन्धनागारमात्मनः कृत्वानुप्रविशति;
No one who is not dependent ever voluntarily creates a prison for himself and enters into it.

2.1.21 L.14 न च स्वयमत्यन्तनिर्मलः सन् अत्यन्तमलिनं देहमात्मत्वेनोपेयात्;
No one who himself is extremely pure and stainless, would ever accept this extremely unclean body as his own (tabernacle).

2.1.21 L.15 कृतमपि कथञ्चिद्यद्दुःखकरं तदिच्छया जह्यात्;
Even if anything is done by him which causes pain, he would voluntarily give it up

2.1.21 L.16 सुखकरं चोपाददीत;
And would undertake only that which gives happiness.

2.1.21 L.17 स्मरेच्च – मयेदं जगद्बिम्बं विचित्रं विरचितमिति;
Further he would also remember that he himself has created this wonderful sphere of the universe.

2.1.21 L.18 सर्वो हि लोकः स्पष्टं कार्यं कृत्वा स्मरति – मयेदं कृतमिति;
All persons who have done any definite thing, necessarily remember it as their own handiwork.

2.1.21 L.19 यथा च मायावी स्वयं प्रसारितां मायामिच्छया अनायासेनैवोपसंहरति,
Just as an illusionist, at will and without any effort withdraws an illusion spread by him,

2.1.21 L.20 एवं शारीरोऽपीमां सृष्टिमुपसंहरेत्;
Even so would the embodied Jīva-Self, at will, demolish his own creation.

2.1.21 L.21 स्वकीयमपि तावच्छरीरं शारीरो न शक्नोत्यनायासेनोपसंहर्तुम्;
The Jīva-Self, however, is not easily able even to do away with its own body.

2.1.21 L.22 एवं हितक्रियाद्यदर्शनादन्याय्या चेतनाज्जगत्प्रक्रियेति गम्यते॥२१॥
Hence, as it is not seen that a thing which is beneficial is done (by the embodied Jīva-Self), it is understood that the acceptance of the theory that the world is created by a sentient being, is not reasonable. — 21.

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Adhikam: something more, greater than the Jīva; Tu: but; Bheda-nirdeśāt: because of the pointing out of differences on account of the statement of difference. (Bheda: difference; Nirdeśāt: because of the pointing out).

🔗 But (Brahman is) greater (and therefore, other than the Jīva-Self) because of the mention of a distinction (between Brahman and the Jīva-Self). — 2.1.22.

2.1.22 L.1 तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति।
The word ‘But’ rebuts the (opponent’s) view.

2.1.22 L.2 यत्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शारीरादधिकमन्यत्, तत् वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः;
We maintain that Brahman, which is omniscient, and omnipotent, and which possesses a nature which is eternally pure and enlightened, and which is free and is greater than the Jīva-Self, and is different (from it), is the creator of the world.

2.1.22 L.3 न तस्मिन्हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते;
The faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do not attach themselves to it.

2.1.22 L.4 न हि तस्य हितं किञ्चित्कर्तव्यमस्ति, अहितं वा परिहर्तव्यम्,
नित्यमुक्तस्वभावत्वात्;
Possessing as it does the nature of being eternally free,
It has no duties either to perform anything beneficial or not to perform anything unbeneficial (to itself).

2.1.22 L.5 न च तस्य ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो वा क्वचिदप्यस्ति,
सर्वज्ञत्वात्सर्वशक्तित्वाच्च।
Because of being omniscient and omnipotent
There is also not the least let or hindrance either to its knowledge or power.

2.1.22 L.6 शारीरस्त्वनेवंविधः;
The Jīva-Self on the other hand is unlike that

2.1.22 L.7 तस्मिन्प्रसज्यन्ते हिताकरणादयो दोषाः;
And the faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do of course attach to it,

2.1.22 L.8 न तु तं वयं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रूमः।
But, we do not maintain that the Jīva-Self is the creator of the world.

2.1.22 L.9 कुत एतत्? भेदनिर्देशात् –
‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5)
How is that? Because of the mention of a distinction (between it and Brahman).
Scriptural passages such as “The Self (Oh Maitreyī) is to be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon” (BrhUEng.2.4.5),

2.1.22 L.10 ‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (ChanU.8.7.1)
“He should be sought for and desired to be known” (ChanU.8.7.1),

2.1.22 L.11 ‘सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति’ (ChanU.6.8.1)
“He in that condition (of deep sleep) becomes one with the Sat” (ChanU.6.8.1),

2.1.22 L.12 ‘शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढः’ (BrhU.4.3.35)
“The embodied Jīva-Self being mounted upon by the intelligential Self (Prājña)” (BrhUEng.4.3.35),

2.1.22 L.13 इत्येवंजातीयकः कर्तृकर्मादिभेदनिर्देशो जीवादधिकं ब्रह्म दर्शयति।
Which speak of a distinction as between an agent (Kartā) and an object (Karma) etc., show that Brahman is greater i.e. other than the Jīva-Self.

2.1.22 L.14 नन्वभेदनिर्देशोऽपि दर्शितः – ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इत्येवंजातीयकः;
But (says the opponent) there is a mention also of the non-distinction between the two, such as — “That thou art”.

2.1.22 L.15 कथं भेदाभेदौ विरुद्धौ सम्भवतः?
How can distinction and non-distinction which are contrary to each other be both possible?

2.1.22 L.16 नैष दोषः, महाकाशघटाकाशन्यायेनोभयसम्भवस्य तत्र तत्र प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात्।
(We reply) — this is no fault, because we have already established in several proper places, that according to the maxim of “The Ākāśa and the Ākāśa of the pot”, both are possible.

2.1.22 L.17 अपि च यदा ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इत्येवंजातीयकेनाभेदनिर्देशेनाभेदः प्रतिबोधितो भवति;
Besides when the non-distinction (between the two) comes to be realized, by means of such reference to non-distinction, as “That thou art”,

2.1.22 L.18 अपगतं भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्वं ब्रह्मणश्च स्रष्टृत्वम्,
Then the nature of the transmigratory existence of the Jīva-Self, and the creative activity of Brahman, both vanish,

2.1.22 L.19 समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात्;
On account of the removal of the entire set of transactions, depending upon the notion of distinction which is but only a display of false-knowledge, by true knowledge.

2.1.22 L.20 तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतो वा हिताकरणादयो दोषाः।
Whence could then there be any creation (of the world) at all or any such faults of not doing that which is beneficial?

2.1.22 L.21 अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकरणसङ्घातोपाध्यविवेककृता हि
भ्रान्तिर्हिताकरणादिलक्षणः संसारः,
न तु परमार्थतोऽस्तीति
असकृदवोचाम –
We have said more than once,
That this transmigratory existence characterized by the avoidance of what is beneficial etc., is nothing but a delusion,
[Since this delusion is] Caused by the failure to realize the limiting adjuncts, such as the aggregates of bodies and organs of sense, and names and forms brought about by Nescience,
And it is not as if it exists in the truest sense,

2.1.22 L.22 जन्ममरणच्छेदनभेदनाद्यभिमानवत्;
And that it (i.e. this delusion) is of a piece with the supposed notions, of birth or death or of being hurt or wounded.

2.1.22 L.23 अबाधिते तु भेदव्यवहारे
As long as the notion of distinction (between the Jīva-Self and Brahman) continues unobliterated,

2.1.22 L.24 ‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ इत्येवंजातीयकेन
भेदनिर्देशेनावगम्यमानं ब्रह्मणोऽधिकत्वं
हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिं निरुणद्धि॥२२॥
The notion of Brahman being different from (and more than) the Jīva-Self, as understood
From the Scriptural passage “He should be searched for and understood”,
Precludes the possibility of the attachment to Brahman, of any such faults as the not doing of things beneficial etc. (to itself). — 22.

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Aśma-ādivat: like stone, etc.; Ca: and; Tat anupapattiḥ: its untenability, unreasonableness, impossibility; (Tat: of that; Tasya: its, of the objection raised in Sūtra 21).

🔗 And (this) being similar to the case of stones etc., that (i.e. the objection of the opponent of the Vedānta view) is not reasonably sustainable. — 2.1.23.

2.1.23 L.1 यथा च लोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यान्वितानामप्यश्मनां
केचिन्महार्हा मणयो वज्रवैडूर्यादयः,
अन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः सूर्यकान्तादयः,
अन्ये प्रहीणाः श्ववायसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः पाषाणाः –
इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्‌यं दृश्यते;
Just as in the ordinary world, though stones in general are the effects of earth,
We find that there is quite a variety in them, as for instance,
Some are highly precious such as diamonds and lapis lazuli,
Some are of an intermediate quality such as crystals and sun-stones,
And some are of the lowest type, fit only to be thrown at dogs and crows,

2.1.23 L.2 यथा चैकपृथिवीव्यपाश्रयाणामपि बीजानां
बहुविधं पत्रपुष्पफलगन्धरसादिवैचित्र्‌यं
चन्दनकिंपाकचम्पकादिषूपलक्ष्यते;
Or just as in the case of seeds which are all planted in earth,
We find a great variety of leaves, flowers, fruits, smells and tastes,<,br> As in sandlewood and Kim-pāka (Giant Palm fruit)

2.1.23 L.3 यथा चैकस्याप्यन्नरसस्य लोहितादीनि केशलोमादीनि च विचित्राणि कार्याणि भवन्ति –
Or just as from one and the same food chyle, a variety of effects such blood etc. and hair and down etc. result,

2.1.23 L.4 एवमेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो
जीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वं कार्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यत इत्यतः तदनुपपत्तिः,
परपरिकल्पितदोषानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः।
In the same way in the case of Brahman, one only though it is,
Such distinction as by way of the Jīva-Self and the intelligent Self is possible, and also a variety of its effects, is reasonably sustainable, and hence the objection raised by the opponents of the Vedānta view, is not reasonably sustainable.
The meaning is that the fault imagined by the opponent is not reasonably sustainable.

2.1.23 L.5 श्रुतेश्च प्रामाण्यात्,
Also other reasons, such as that the Scriptures are the ultimate authority,

2.1.23 L.6 विकारस्य च वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वात्
That effects (Vikāras) are such as are merely made current in speech,

2.1.23 L.7 स्वप्नदृश्यभाववैचित्र्यवच्च – इत्यभ्युच्चयः॥२३॥
And that there is a variety of dream experiences (though the person who experiences dreams is but one only), can be cumulatively mentioned. — 23.

Su.2.1.24 Su..25

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Upasaṃhāra-darśanāt: because collection of materials is seen; Na: not; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no; Kṣīravat: like milk; Hi: because, as. (Darśanāt: because of the seeing; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Vat: like, has the force of an instrumental case here. (See Sūtra of Pāṇini, Tena tulyaṃ kriyā etc.)

🔗 (If it be said that the Vedānta view) is not correct because it is seen (in the ordinary world) that (for producing an effect) there is preparation or an assemblage (of means, we reply) — No, because it (Brahman) is like milk. — 2.1.24.

2.1.24 L.1 चेतनं ब्रह्मैकमद्वितीयं जगतः कारणमिति यदुक्तम्, तन्नोपपद्यते।
What is said by the opponent — viz., the statement (by the Vedāntin) that sentient Brahman, which is alone without a second, is the cause of the world — is not reasonably sustainable.

2.1.24 L.2 कस्मात्? उपसंहारदर्शनात्।
Whence is it so? Because it is seen that there is preparation or assemblage (of means).

2.1.24 L.3 इह हि लोके कुलालादयो घटपटादीनां कर्तारो
मृद्दण्डचक्रसूत्रसलिलाद्यनेककारकोपसंहारेण सङ्गृहीतसाधनाः सन्तः
तत्तत्कार्यं कुर्वाणा दृश्यन्ते।
In the ordinary world, it is observed that potters (and weavers) etc., the manufacturers of pots and cloth etc.,
Accomplish those different things,
After furnishing themselves with the necessary means or implements, by assembling together clay, staff, wheel and threads, etc., and many such causal agents,

2.1.24 L.4 ब्रह्म चासहायं तवाभिप्रेतम्;
While you maintain that Brahman is without any such help.

2.1.24 L.5 तस्य साधनान्तरानुपसङ्ग्रहे सति कथं स्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्येत?
Hence how can it be reasonably sustainable, that Brahman, which you understand to have no such helpful means, can have the ability to create in the absence of any such assemblage of means?

2.1.24 L.6 तस्मान्न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति चेत्,
Ergo, Brahman could not be the cause of the world.

2.1.24 L.7 नैष दोषः; यतः क्षीरवद्द्रव्यस्वभावविशेषादुपपद्यते –
(To this, we reply) — This is no fault. It is reasonably so sustainable, because Brahman, like milk, is a special peculiar material (Dravya).

2.1.24 L.8 यथा हि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमकरकादिभावेन परिणमतेऽनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनम्,
Just as in the ordinary world, milk and water, by themselves undergo modifications into curds and snow respectively without expecting any extraneous means,

2.1.24 L.9 तथेहापि भविष्यति।
Even so, it might be the case here (i.e. in the case of Brahman).

2.1.24 L.10 ननु क्षीराद्यपि दध्यादिभावेन परिणममानमपेक्षत एव बाह्यं साधनमौष्ण्यादिकम्;
कथमुच्यते ‘क्षीरवद्धि’ इति?
(If the opponent says) How do you say that the case is analogous to milk,
When even milk etc. do require such outside help as heat etc.?

2.1.24 L.11 नैष दोषः; स्वयमपि हि क्षीरं यां च यावतीं च परिणाममात्रामनुभवत्येव त्वार्यते त्वौष्ण्यादिना दधिभावाय;
(We reply) — this is no fault, because whatever modification milk undergoes in turning into curds is by itself only, and whatever potentiality or the limit of potentiality which milk has in itself for the modificatory process of conversion into curds is but merely accelerated by heat etc., that is all.

2.1.24 L.12 यदि च स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यात्,
Because, were milk not to possess in itself this potentiality of modifying itself into curds,

2.1.24 L.13 नैवौष्ण्यादिनापि बलाद्दधिभावमापद्येत;
It would never undergo such modification per force alone, by means of heat etc.

2.1.24 L.14 न हि वायुराकाशो वा औष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते;
Ākāśa and Vāyu, for instance, do not modify themselves per force into curds, by heat etc.,

2.1.24 L.15 साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता सम्पाद्यते;
And (in the case of milk) its capacity (for modification) is merely perfected by the assemblage of means.

2.1.24 L.16 परिपूर्णशक्तिकं तु ब्रह्म;
Brahman on the other hand is fully powerful by itself,

2.1.24 L.17 न तस्यान्येन केनचित्पूर्णता सम्पादयितव्या;
And nothing else is necessary to make its capacity perfect.

2.1.24 L.18 श्रुतिश्च भवति – ‘न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च’ (SvetU.6.8) इति।
For the Scriptures say — “There is nothing that it has to create, nor has it any extraneous instrument or means, (it may also mean — it i.e. Brahman has neither a body nor any sense-organ), nothing equal to or greater than it, is to be seen,
And its powers are (seen to be) manifold and transcendental, and it has the natural power to know all things and to regulate and overcome everything by its mere presence” (SvetU.6.8).

2.1.24 L.19 तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगात् क्षीरादिवद्विचित्रपरिणाम उपपद्यते॥२४॥
Therefore, only one, as Brahman is, that it has diverse powers inherent in itself, and that it can, like milk, modify itself in diverse ways, is reasonably sustainable. — 24.

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Deva-ādivat: like gods and others (saints); Api: even, also; Loke: in the world.

🔗 (The case of Brahman) may he, as it is in the ordinary world, like that of Gods etc. (it may also become active). — 2.1.25.

2.1.25 L.1 स्यादेतत् – उपपद्यते क्षीरादीनामचेतनानामनपेक्ष्यापि बाह्यं साधनं दध्यादिभावः, दृष्टत्वात्;
May be (says the opponent), it may be reasonably sustainable, that non-sentient milk and such things may modify themselves into curds etc. without expecting any extraneous means (to aid them), because it actually is so seen.

2.1.25 L.2 चेतनाः पुनः कुलालादयः साधनसामग्रीमपेक्ष्यैव तस्मै तस्मै कार्याय प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते;
But potters etc., who are sentient, are seen to proceed to do their various different works only by depending on extraneous means (to help them).

2.1.25 L.3 कथं ब्रह्म चेतनं सत् असहायं प्रवर्तेतेति –
How then can Brahman, which is sentient, proceed to work unaided?

2.1.25 L.4 देवादिवदिति ब्रूमः –
We reply, that, it may be so, as in the case of Gods, etc.

2.1.25 L.5 यथा लोके
देवाः पितर ऋषय इत्येवमादयो महाप्रभावाश्चेतना अपि सन्तोऽनपेक्ष्यैव किञ्चिद्बाह्यं साधनमैश्वर्यविशेषयोगादभिध्यानमात्रेण स्वत एव बहूनि नानासंस्थानानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि रथादीनि च निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते,
मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणप्रामाण्यात्;
Just as in the ordinary world
It is understood on the authority of Veda, Mantras, History and Purāṇas,
That Gods, the manes and sages etc., very powerful and sentient as they are, and unaided by extraneous means as they are, are seen to create bodies of different sorts, and chariots and palaces etc. merely by themselves by means of their special power and by mere meditation, and by mere volition,

2.1.25 L.6 तन्तुनाभश्च स्वत एव तन्तून्सृजति;
Or just as a spider produces its own threads itself,

2.1.25 L.7 बलाका चान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते;
Or just as a crane conceives without insemination,

2.1.25 L.8 पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात्सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते –
Or just as an assemblage of lotuses proceeds from one lake to another without any extraneous means of movement,

2.1.25 L.9 एवं चेतनमति ब्रह्म अनपेक्ष्यैव बाह्यं साधनं स्वत एव जगत्स्रक्ष्यति।
Even so, Brahman, sentient as it is, may, well by itself, create the world unaided by any extraneous means.

2.1.25 L.10 स यदि ब्रूयात् – य एते देवादयो ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता उपात्तास्ते दार्ष्टान्तिकेन ब्रह्मणा न समाना भवन्ति;
(If the opponent were to say) — But these Gods etc., which are cited (by the Vedāntin) as illustrations for Brahman, bear no similarity to Brahman, which is sought to be illustrated by them.

2.1.25 L.11 शरीरमेव ह्यचेतनं देवादीनां शरीरान्तरादिविभूत्युत्पादने उपादानम्, न तु चेतन आत्मा;
It is the non-sentient body of the Gods, and not their sentient selfs, that furnishes the material for producing other bodies,

2.1.25 L.12 तन्तुनाभस्य च क्षुद्रतरजन्तुभक्षणाल्लाला कठिनतामापद्यमाना तन्तुर्भवति;
And it is the saliva of a spider which becomes coagulated by feeding on inferior insects, that modifies itself into threads,

2.1.25 L.13 बलाका च स्तनयित्नुरवश्रवणाद्गर्भं धत्ते;
And the crane conceives on hearing the sound of thunder [Keep in mind this is maybe a 800AD belief, that gets the point across as the opponents also believe, ‘know’, this],

2.1.25 L.14 पद्मिनी च चेतनप्रयुक्ता सती अचेतनेनैव शरीरेण सरोन्तरात्सरोन्तरमुपसर्पति, वल्लीव वृक्षम्, न तु स्वयमेवाचेतना सरोन्तरोपसर्पणे व्याप्रियते;
And an assemblage of lotuses, impelled by an indwelling sentient being, moves with its non-sentient body from one lake to another, just as a creeper climbs up a tree, and not that the non-sentient assemblage of lotuses, by itself endeavours to move towards another lake.

2.1.25 L.15 तस्मान्नैते ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता इति –
Therefore these cannot be illustrations with regard to Brahman.

2.1.25 L.16 तं प्रति ब्रूयात् – नायं दोषः;
We would reply — This is no fault,

2.1.25 L.17 कुलालादिदृष्टान्तवैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वादिति –
Because, what we wish to stress, is only the dissimilarity of the illustrations such as that of the potter etc. (which you, the opponent referred to).

2.1.25 L.18 यथा हि कुलालादीनां देवादीनां च समाने चेतनत्वे कुलालादयः कार्यारम्भे बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षन्ते, न देवादयः;
Just as, though sentiency is common both to the potter and the Gods, it is only the potter etc. that need extraneous means (to help them) in doing their work, but not so the Gods,

2.1.25 L.19 तथा ब्रह्म चेतनमपि न बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षिष्यत इत्येतावद्वयं
देवाद्युदाहरणेन विवक्षामः।
Even so, all that we wish to say by the illustration of the Gods,
Is that sentient Brahman, also need not require any extraneous means (to help it in creating the world).

2.1.25 L.20 तस्माद्यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथा सर्वेषामेव भवितुमर्हतीति नास्त्येकान्त इत्यभिप्रायः॥२५॥
What we therefore mean, is, that it is not an invariable rule, that just as a particular power is observed to exist in one thing, similarly all other things also must necessarily have the same power. — 25.

Su.2.1.26 Su..27 Su..28 Su..29

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Kṛtsna-prasaktiḥ: possibility of the entire (Brahman being modified); Nir-avayavatva-śabda-kopaḥ: contradiction of the scriptural statement that Brahman is without parts; Va: or, otherwise. (Kṛtsna: entire, full, total; complete; Prasaktiḥ: exigency, employment; activity; Nir-avayavatva: without parts, without form, without members, indivisible; Śabda: word, text, expressions in Śruti; Kopaḥ: contradiction, violation, incongruity, stultification; Va: or.)

🔗 (If Brahman be the cause of the world, the conclusion would be), that the entire Brahman undergoes modification, or else the Scriptural declaration that Brahman has no parts would be vitiated. — 2.1.26.

2.1.26 L.1 चेतनमेकमद्वितीयं ब्रह्म क्षीरादिवद्देवादिवच्चानपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं स्वयं परिणममानं जगतः कारणमिति स्थितम्;
It is established, that Brahman, which is the only one without a second, and which undergoes modification without expecting any extraneous means (to help it) — like milk or like the Gods — , is the cause of the world.

2.1.26 L.2 शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धये तु पुनराक्षिपति।
Objection however is taken to this (by the Sūtra-kāra himself), for securing the purification of the meaning of the Śāstra, thus —

2.1.26 L.3 कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिः कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यरूपेण परिणामः प्राप्नोति,
A conclusion, that there would be modification of the entire Brahman, into its effects, would result,

2.1.26 L.4 निरवयवत्वात् –
As Brahman is without any parts.

2.1.26 L.5 यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत्सावयवमभविष्यत्, ततोऽस्यैकदेशः पर्यणंस्यत्, एकदेशश्चावास्थास्यत;
Were Brahman to have parts like the earth for instance, it may be that while one part of it would undergo modification the other part may remain as it is.

2.1.26 L.6 निरवयवं तु ब्रह्म श्रुतिभ्योऽवगम्यते –
‘निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम्’ (SvetU.6.19)
‘दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः’ (MunU.2.1.2)
‘इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एव’ (BrhU.2.4.2)
‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ (BrhU.3.9.26)
‘अस्थूलमनणु’ (BrhU.3.8.8)
इत्याद्याभ्यः सर्वविशेषप्रतिषेधिनीभ्यः;
But it is understood from the Scriptures which deny any special attribute in Brahman, that Brahman has no parts, thus —
“(Brahman is) without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless and untainted” (SvetU.6.19),
“That celestial and incorporeal Puruṣa is both inside and outside and is unborn” (MunU.2.1.2),
“This great being, is infinite, endless and fully knowledge-incarnate” (BrhUEng.2.4.12),
“(Whatever is predicated to be Brahman) — it is not that, not that, it is the Self” (BrhUEng.3.9.26),
“Neither gross nor atomic” (BrhUEng.3.8.8).

2.1.26 L.7 ततश्चैकदेशपरिणामासम्भवात्कृत्स्नपरिणामप्रसक्तौ
सत्यां मूलोच्छेदः प्रसज्येत;
Hence, as there is the impossibility of only a part of Brahman undergoing modification, and the conclusion about its modification in its entirety being therefore inevitable,
The destruction of the very basis itself (i.e. Brahman) would thus result.

2.1.26 L.8 द्रष्टव्यतोपदेशानर्थक्यं च आपद्येत,
अयत्नदृष्टत्वात्कार्यस्य,
तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽसम्भवात्;
Now, as effects as such (of Brahman) are recognizable without any effort,
The Scriptural instruction that “it (Brahman) should be seen” would be rendered purposeless,
And the existence of Brahman as apart from its modification would not be possible, (as Brahman will have undergone modification in its entirety).

2.1.26 L.9 अजत्वादिशब्दव्याकोपश्च।
Besides, it would militate against the Scriptural declaration of its not being subject to origination (Ajatva) etc.

2.1.26 L.10 अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया सावयवमेव ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्येत,
If, in order to remove this fault, it is understood, that Brahman has parts,

2.1.26 L.11 तथापि ये निरवयवत्वस्य प्रतिपादकाः शब्दा उदाहृतास्ते प्रकुप्येयुः;
Then the Scriptural statements cited in illustration of its being without any parts would be contradicted.

2.1.26 L.12 सावयवत्वे चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति –
Besides, if it is understood to have parts, the predicament of its not being eternal would arise.

2.1.26 L.13 सर्वथायं पक्षो न घटयितुं शक्यत इत्याक्षिपति॥२६॥
Hence (the opponent avers) it is not possible to reconcile this (Vedānta) view. — 26.

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Śruteḥ: from Śruti, as it is stated in Śruti, on account of scriptural texts; Tu: but; Śabda-mūlatvāt: on account of being based on the scripture, as Śruti is the foundation.

🔗 But (the objection of the opponent is not correct) because of Scriptural passages, and also because it (Brahman) has the Scriptures as its basis (lit. root). — 2.1.27.

2.1.27 L.1 तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति।
By the word ‘But’ (the Sūtra-kāra) refutes the objection (of the opponent).

2.1.27 L.2 न खल्वस्मत्पक्षे कश्चिदपि दोषोऽस्ति।
Really there is no fault of any kind in our view (i.e. the view of the Vedāntin).

2.1.27 L.3 न तावत्कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिरस्ति।
In the first place there is no modification of Brahman in its entirety.

2.1.27 L.4 कुतः? श्रुतेः –
Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptures.

2.1.27 L.5 यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते,
Just as the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world from Brahman,

2.1.27 L.6 एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते –
They also speak of the existence of Brahman, as apart from its modifications,

2.1.27 L.7 प्रकृतिविकारयोर्भेदेन व्यपदेशात्
Inasmuch as they speak of the cause (i.e. Prakṛti, Brahman) and its modification (Vikāra) as being different from each other,

2.1.27 L.8 ‘सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (ChanU.6.3.2) इति,
By passages of the type of “This deity thought, I will now enter into these three divinities (i.e. into the Pṛthivī, Āpaḥ and Tejas) as the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2)

2.1.27 L.9 ‘तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायाꣳश्च पूरुषः। पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि’ (ChanU.3.12.6) इति चैवंजातीयकात्;
And “So much is its greatness, and the Puruṣa is even greater than that. His one foot (i.e. quarter) represents all the beings, and the other three feet (quarters) represent that which is immortal in heaven” (ChanU.3.12.6).

2.1.27 L.10 तथा हृदयायतनत्ववचनात्; सत्सम्पत्तिवचनाच्च –
Also, as the Scriptures speak of the Hṛdaya as its (Brahman’s) abode, and that in deep sleep, it, i.e. the Jīva-Self, becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman).

2.1.27 L.11 यदि च कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म कार्यभावेनोपयुक्तं स्यात्,
Were entire Brahman to be used up in modifying itself into effects, then the special mention, in the Scriptural passage

2.1.27 L.12 ‘सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति’ (ChanU.6.8.1) इति सुषुप्तिगतं विशेषणमनुपपन्नं स्यात्,
“Oh mild one, in deep sleep the Jīva-Self becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman)” (ChanU.6.8.1), about this peculiarity pertaining to deep sleep, would not be reasonably sustainable,

2.1.27 L.13 विकृतेन ब्रह्मणा नित्यसम्पन्नत्वादविकृतस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽभावात्;
Because (in such a case) it (i.e. the Sat i.e. Brahman) would always be as one with the modified Brahman, (because according to the opponent, the entire Brahman would have modified itself) and because there would be no unmodified Brahman as such.

2.1.27 L.14 तथेन्द्रियगोचरत्वप्रतिषेधात् ब्रह्मणो, विकारस्य चेन्द्रियगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः;
And also because it is denied (by the Scriptures) that Brahman is perceptible to sense-organs, and it is reasonably sustainable that the effects (i.e. the world etc.) are perceptible to sense-organs.

2.1.27 L.15 तस्मादस्त्यविकृतं ब्रह्म।
Therefore, unevolved Brahman does necessarily exist.

2.1.27 L.16 न च निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपोऽस्ति,
There can be no contradiction of the Scriptural statement about Brahman being without any parts,

2.1.27 L.17 श्रूयमाणत्वादेव निरवयवत्वस्याप्यभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात्;
As it is understood from Scriptures themselves that Brahman has no parts.

2.1.27 L.18 शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म शब्दप्रमाणकम्, नेन्द्रियादिप्रमाणकम्;
As Brahman has the Scriptures as its basis, and Scriptures alone and not the sense-organs are authoritative about it,

2.1.27 L.19 तद्यथाशब्दमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्;
it should necessarily be understood to be just as it is spoken of in the Scriptures.

2.1.27 L.20 शब्दश्चोभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति – अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च;
And the Scriptures speak of Brahman as being both without parts and at the same time as not modifying itself wholly.

2.1.27 L.21 लौकिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रौषधिप्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशाच्छक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्यविषया दृश्यन्ते;
Even ordinary things of the world such as gems, Mantras and herbs are observed to possess powers to exhibit properties producing incompatible effects depending upon the varieties of environment, time, and occasion,

2.1.27 L.22 ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते –
And in the absence of any instruction about them, it cannot be known merely by reasoning,

2.1.27 L.23 अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तय इति;
That they possess such and such powers, which require such and such help and which produce such and such effects and are effective for such and such purposes.

2.1.27 L.24 किमुताचिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत;
Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahman, without (the help of) the Scriptures?

2.1.27 L.25 तथा चाहुः पौराणिकाः – ‘अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्।
प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्’ इति।
The Purāṇikas also say, similarly — “Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable.
To be beyond the material effects (Prakṛti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable”.

2.1.27 L.26 तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः।
Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahman, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source.

2.1.27 L.27 ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धोऽर्थः प्रत्याययितुम् – निरवयवं च ब्रह्म परिणमते न च कृत्स्नमिति;
But (says the opponent) things which are contradictory — as for instance, that Brahman which is without parts, modifies itself but not entirely — cannot be realized even on the authority of the Scriptures.

2.1.27 L.28 यदि निरवयवं ब्रह्म स्यात्, नैव परिणमेत, कृत्स्नमेव वा परिणमेत;
If, Brahman is (in fact) without parts, it will either not modify itself at all, or modify itself entirely.

2.1.27 L.29 अथ केनचिद्रूपेण परिणमेत केनचिच्चावतिष्ठेतेति, रूपभेदकल्पनात्सावयवमेव प्रसज्येत;
If it were to be supposed that it has different aspects, so that it modifies itself in some of its aspects and remains unmodified in some other of its aspects, it would mean necessarily that it has parts.

2.1.27 L.30 क्रियाविषये हि ‘अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’ ‘नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’ इत्येवंजातीयकायां विरोधप्रतीतावपि
In the case of matters connected with actions (Karma), when a conflict is discernible, such as “He uses the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup in Atirātra sacrifice”, and “He does not use the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup in Atirātra sacrifice”,

2.1.27 L.31 विकल्पाश्रयणं विरोधपरिहारकारणं भवति, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वाच्चानुष्ठानस्य;
As action depends upon a man, a resort to an option constitutes the means of removing the contradiction,

2.1.27 L.32 इह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः सम्भवति, अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः;
But in the present case, even a resort to option would be unable to remove a contradiction, because, an entity (Vastu) as such is independent of man,

2.1.27 L.33 तस्माद्दुर्घटमेतदिति।
And therefore, it is difficult to reconcile this (contradiction).

2.1.27 L.34 नैष दोषः, अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदाभ्युपगमात्।
(To this we reply) This is no fault, because here it is understood that these different aspects of Brahman are imagined through Nescience.

2.1.27 L.35 न ह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु सम्पद्यते;
A thing is not rendered as being a thing having parts, merely by imagining through Nescience (Avidyā) that it has different aspects.

2.1.27 L.36 न हि तिमिरोपहतनयनेनानेक इव चन्द्रमा दृश्यमानोऽनेक एव भवति;
The moon, for instance, does not in fact become more than one, merely because she appears to be more than one, to an eye affected by double vision (Timira i.e. Diplopia).

2.1.27 L.37 अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन
ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते;
Brahman appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of modifications etc.,
By reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahman,

2.1.27 L.38 पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्वव्यवहारातीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते,
While in its truest nature Brahman subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour,

2.1.27 L.39 वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वाच्चाविद्याकल्पितस्य नामरूपभेदस्य –
And, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech,

2.1.27 L.40 इति न निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः कुप्यति;
The fact that Brahman has no parts is not thereby vitiated.

2.1.27 L.41 न चेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था,
Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about the modification (of Brahman) is not meant to propound the fact of modification itself,

2.1.27 L.42 तत्प्रतिपत्तौ फलानवगमात्;
As such realization is not understood to have any fruit as such,

2.1.27 L.43 सर्वव्यवहारहीनब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था त्वेषा,
While on the other hand it is intended to establish how Brahman which is the Self of all is devoid of any real phenomenal behaviour,

2.1.27 L.44 तत्प्रतिपत्तौ फलावगमात्;
As it is understood that a fruit results by such realization.

2.1.27 L.45 ‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ इत्युपक्रम्याह
The Scriptures, after declaring in the beginning that “(whatever is predicated to be Brahman) is not that, not that”,

2.1.27 L.46 ‘अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि’ (BrhU.4.2.4) इति;
Proceed to say later on — “Oh Janaka, verily hast thou attained fearlessness” (BrhUEng.4.2.4).

2.1.27 L.47 तस्मादस्मत्पक्षे न कश्चिदपि दोषप्रसङ्गोऽस्ति॥२७॥
Therefore there could never be a predicament of any kind of fault attaching to our view (i.e. that of the Vedāntins). — 27.

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Ātmani: in the individual soul; Ca: also, and; Evam: thus; Vicitrāḥ: diverse, manifold, variegated; Ca: and, also; Hi: because.

🔗 It is similar in (the case of) the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) also, (during dream experiences), and such different (creations exist in the case of Gods, illusionists etc.). — 2.1.28.

2.1.28 L.1 अपि च नैवात्र विवदितव्यम् – कथमेकस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः स्यादिति;
It should not be disputed in this matter (of Brahman), as to how creations of different sorts, originating out of Brahman which is but one only, can be possible without the destruction of its own nature,

2.1.28 L.2 यत आत्मन्यप्येकस्मिन्स्वप्नदृशि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः पठ्यते –
Since the Scriptures speak of similar creations of different sorts in the case of the dreaming Jīva-Self also without any destruction of its own nature thus —

2.1.28 L.3 ‘न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान्रथयोगान्पथः सृजते’ (BrhU.4.3.10) इत्यादिना;
“(In the dream condition) there are no chariots, nor steeds, nor roads, but he creates chariots, steeds and roads etc.” (BrhUEng.4.3.10)

2.1.28 L.4 लोकेऽपि देवादिषु मायाव्यादिषु च स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैव विचित्रा हस्त्यश्वादिसृष्टयो दृश्यन्ते;
It is seen in the ordinary world also, that Gods, illusionists etc. cause such creations as elephants and horses, without their own forms undergoing destruction,

2.1.28 L.5 तथैकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति॥२८॥
And hence, even in the case of Brahman, one and only one as it is, there may well be creation of different sorts without involving destruction of its own nature. — 28.

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Svapakṣa: in one’s own view; Doṣāt: because of the defects; Ca: also, and.

🔗 Also because the faults (attributed to the Vedānta doctrine by the opponents) are common to their own (i.e. of the opponent’s) view. — 2.1.29.

2.1.29 L.1 परेषामप्येष समानः स्वपक्षे दोषः –
The same faults are common to their own view (i.e. to the view of the opponents of Vedānta).

2.1.29 L.2 प्रधानवादिनोऽपि हि निरवयवमपरिच्छिन्नं शब्दादिहीनं प्रधानं
Their own view also is, that the Pradhāna which is without parts, undelimited, and devoid of attributes such as sound etc.,

2.1.29 L.3 सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य शब्दादिमतः कार्यस्य कारणमिति स्वपक्षः;
Is the cause of effects which have parts, which are delimited and which have the attributes of sound (such as the world etc.).

2.1.29 L.4 तत्रापि कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वात्प्रधानस्य प्राप्नोति,
In that case also, the Pradhāna being without parts, there would also be the same conclusion, viz., that the Pradhāna as a whole undergoes modification,

2.1.29 L.5 निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोपो वा।
Or that the assumption that Pradhāna has no parts would be contradicted.

2.1.29 L.6 ननु नैव तैर्निरवयवं प्रधानमभ्युपगम्यते;
(The opponent may suggest) — they (i.e. the opponents) do not understand that the Pradhāna is without parts,

2.1.29 L.7 सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि हि त्रयो गुणाः;
Because its three qualities (Guṇas) of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are eternal

2.1.29 L.8 तेषां साम्यावस्था प्रधानम्;
And Pradhāna means their condition of balanced equipoise,

2.1.29 L.9 तैरेवावयवैस्तत्सावयवमिति
And that it is because of these three qualities (Guṇas) that their Pradhāna has parts.

2.1.29 L.10 नैवंजातीयकेन सावयवत्वेन प्रकृतो दोषः परिहर्तुं पार्यते, –
(We say to this) — they would not be able to remove the present fault by any such supposition about the Pradhāna being endowed with parts,

2.1.29 L.11 यतः सत्त्वरजस्तमसामप्येकैकस्य समानं निरवयवत्वम्
Because (according to them) each of their Guṇas viz. Sattva, Rajas or Tamas is by itself equally partless,

2.1.29 L.12 एकैकमेव चेतरद्वयानुगृहीतं सजातीयस्य प्रपञ्चस्योपादानमिति –
And each one of these three helped by the other two, is the material cause of diverse creations, homogeneous to themselves (i.e. having all these qualities in every creation),

2.1.29 L.13 समानत्वात्स्वपक्षदोषप्रसङ्गस्य।
And therefore, there would be the same common predicament of a similar fault occurring in their own view also.

2.1.29 L.14 तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्सावयवत्वमेवेति चेत् –
(If the opponent says) — As this reasoning (viz. that each of these three qualities i.e. Guṇas of Pradhāna has no parts) has no basis, we understand that the Pradhāna has parts,

2.1.29 L.15 एवमप्यनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसङ्गः।
Even then (we reply) there still would occur the predicament of its being non-eternal etc. (because a thing which has parts is not everlasting i.e. is Anitya).

2.1.29 L.16 अथ शक्तय एव कार्यवैचित्र्‌यसूचिता अवयवा इत्यभिप्रायः,
(Again if the opponent says) We assume that the diverse potential powers of the Pradhāna, as suggested by the variety of created effects themselves, constitute the parts of the Pradhāna,

2.1.29 L.17 तास्तु ब्रह्मवादिनोऽप्यविशिष्टाः।
Then (we reply) that the assumption of such potential powers is equally common to the Vedānta view.

2.1.29 L.18 तथा अणुवादिनोऽप्यणुरण्वन्तरेण संयुज्यमानो निरवयवत्वाद्यदि कार्त्स्न्येन संयुज्येत,
Now, in the case of the Atomists (Vaiseṣikas) also, when one atom combines with another, it would combine entirely because atoms are without parts,

2.1.29 L.19 ततः प्रथिमानुपपत्तेरणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः;
And then as no dimensions i.e. extensions would emerge (from such combination of partless atoms) there would occur the predicament of the resulting combination (of one atom with another) also being atomic.

2.1.29 L.20 अथैकदेशेन संयुज्येत, तथापि निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोप इति –
If it then be said, that an atom combines with only one part (of it) with one part (of another), it would contradict their own assumption of atoms being without parts,

2.1.29 L.21 स्वपक्षेऽपि समान एष दोषः।
And the fault would then be common to the Atomist’s view also.

2.1.29 L.22 समानत्वाच्च नान्यतरस्मिन्नेव पक्षे उपक्षेप्तव्यो भवति।
Such a fault therefore being in such a case common to both the views (of the Vedāntin’s and the Atomist’s) it would not be proper (for any one) to urge it only against one’s opponent’s view only.

2.1.29 L.23 परिहृतस्तु ब्रह्मवादिना स्वपक्षे दोषः॥२९॥
The possibility of any fault attaching to the Vedānta view has already been refuted by the adherent of the Vedānta view. — 29.

Su.2.1.30 Su..31

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Sarva-upetā: endowed with all powers, all-powerful; Ca: also, and; Tad-darśanāt: because it is seen (from the scriptures). (Sarva: all; Upetā: endowed with, possessed with; Tat: that, the possession of such powers.)

🔗 (Brahman, parā devatā) is equipped with all powers, because it is so seen (from the Scriptures). — 2.1.30.

2.1.30 L.1 एकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगादुपपद्यते विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्च इत्युक्तम्;
It has already been said that though Brahman is one only, its modification in the form of this diverse world appearance, is reasonably sustainable, because of its being equipped with all powers.

2.1.30 L.2 तत्पुनः कथमवगम्यते – विचित्रशक्तियुक्तं परं ब्रह्मेति;
Again (it may be asked), how is it known that the Highest Brahman is equipped with diverse powers?

2.1.30 L.3 तदुच्यते – सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्।
(We reply) — Because it is seen that it is so equipped (with diverse powers).

2.1.30 L.4 सर्वशक्तियुक्ता च परा देवतेत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।
It has necessarily to be understood that this Highest deity is equipped with all powers.

2.1.30 L.5 कुतः? तद्दर्शनात्। तथा हि दर्शयति श्रुतिः सर्वशक्तियोगं परस्या देवतायाः –
Whence is it so? Because it is seen (from Scriptures) that it has all such powers, thus —

2.1.30 L.6 ‘सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः’ (ChanU.3.14.4)
“He, to whom all actions, all desires, all smells, all tastes belong, who is immanent in i.e. occupies all this (world appearance), who has no speech and who is indifferent and calm” (ChanU.3.14.4);

2.1.30 L.7 ‘सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः’ (ChanU.8.7.1)
“His desires are true, his resolutions are true” (ChanU.8.7.1);

2.1.30 L.8 ‘यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्’ (MunU.1.1.9)
“Who is omniscient and who cognizes everything” (MunU.1.1.9);

2.1.30 L.9 ‘एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः’ (BrhU.3.8.9) इत्येवंजातीयका॥३०॥
“Oh Gārgi, it is at the behest of him who is unperishable that the sun and the moon hold themselves suspended in position (in space)” (BrhUEng.3.8.9). — 30.

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Vikaraṇatvāt: because of want of organs of action and perception; Na: not; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Tat: that, that objection; Uktam: has been explained or answered.

🔗 (If it be said) — not being endowed with sense-organs, (Brahman) (cannot effect modifications) (we reply) it has been answered already. — 2.1.31.

2.1.31 L.1 स्यादेतत् – विकरणां परां देवतां शास्ति शास्त्रम् –
The Scriptures have stated that the transcendent deity (Brahman) is not endowed with organs, thus —

2.1.31 L.2 ‘अचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनाः’ (BrhU.3.8.8) इत्येवंजातीयकम्।
“(Brahman is) sans-eyes, sans-ears, sans-speech and sans-mind” (BrhUEng.3.8.8).

2.1.31 L.3 कथं सा सर्वशक्तियुक्तापि सती कार्याय प्रभवेत्?
How then, can such transcendent deity be able to effect modifications, even though it be equipped with all powers?

2.1.31 L.4 देवादयो हि चेतनाः सर्वशक्तियुक्ता अपि सन्त आध्यात्मिककार्यकरणसम्पन्ना एव तस्मै तस्मै कार्याय प्रभवन्तो विज्ञायन्ते;
Intelligent and equipped with all powers as Gods etc. are, they are understood to be able to effect all such several modifications, only when they are possessed of physical organs as the means (of effecting modifications).

2.1.31 L.5 कथं च ‘नेति नेति’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इति प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषाया देवतायाः सर्वशक्तियोगः सम्भवेत्, इति चेत् –
(If it be said) — how is it possible, that a deity which can be referred to only negatively as “not that, not that” (BrhUEng.3.9.26) and about which all specific attributes are thus denied, can still have a connection with all such powers?

2.1.31 L.6 यदत्र वक्तव्यं तत्पुरस्तादेवोक्तम्;
(We would reply) — All that can be said in reply to this has already been stated before.

2.1.31 L.7 श्रुत्यवगाह्यमेवेदमतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म न तर्कावगाह्यम्;
This extremely solemn Brahman is capable of being understood only through the Scriptures and never through reasoning.

2.1.31 L.8 न च यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथान्यस्यापि सामर्थ्येन भवितव्यमिति नियमोऽस्तीति।
There is no such rule that because one entity is observed to possess certain powers, any other entity must necessarily possess all these powers.

2.1.31 L.9 प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः सम्भवतीति
That it is possible, that Brahman, with regard to which all special attributes are denied, may yet possibly possess all powers when it is borne in mind that it has already been stated that even though all specific attributes are denied in the case of Brahman,

2.1.31 L.10 एतदप्यविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव।
Still when it is assumed that it has different forms or natures imagined through Nescience (Avidyā), it becomes possible that it can have a connection with all powers.

2.1.31 L.11 तथा च शास्त्रम् – ‘अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः’ (SvetU.3.19)
इत्यकरणस्यपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वसामर्थ्ययोगं दर्शयति॥३१॥
Even so teaches the Śāstra (Scriptures), viz., that unequipped with physical organs though Brahman is, it still is possessed of all powers, by the passage —
“Though he has neither hands nor feet, he grasps and is capable of swift movement, he sees even though he has no eyes and hears even though he has no ears to hear” (SvetU.3.19). — 31.

Su.2.1.32 Su..33

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Na: not (i.e. Brahman cannot be the creator); Prayojana-vattvāt: on account of having motive.

🔗 (Brahman) is not the cause of the world, because (all endeavours by sentient entities are) with some object. — 2.1.32.

2.1.32 L.1 अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकर्तृकत्वं जगत आक्षिपति –
Again in another way an objection is raised (by the opponent) to (the doctrine of) this transitory world being the handiwork of a sentient entity (i.e. Brahman).

2.1.32 L.2 न खलु चेतनः परमात्मेदं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितुमर्हति।
Verily this sentient Highest Self (i.e. Brahman) does not deserve to create (i.e. be the creator of) this world-sphere.

2.1.32 L.3 कुतः? प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्प्रवृत्तीनाम्।
Why so? Because all endeavours presuppose an objective (behind such endeavour).

2.1.32 L.4 चेतनो हि लोके बुद्धिपूर्वकारी पुरुषः प्रवर्तमानो
न मन्दोपक्रमामपि तावत्प्रवृत्तिमात्मप्रयोजनानुपयोगिनीमारभमाणो दृष्टः,
(For instance) in the ordinary world a sentient man whose every endeavour is invariably preceded by previous thought,
Is never seen to engage himself in any the least endeavour which is useless for his own objective.

2.1.32 L.5 किमुत गुरुतरसंरम्भाम्;
How then about this stupendous undertaking?

2.1.32 L.6 भवति च लोकप्रसिद्ध्यनुवादिनी श्रुतिः –
There is a passage in the Scriptures which agrees with ordinary well-known worldly experience, thus —

2.1.32 L.7 ‘न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति;
“All this does not become dear for the sake of all, but it all is so dear, because it is desired by one’s own self (Ātmā)” (BrhUEng.2.4.5).

2.1.32 L.8 गुरुतरसंरम्भा चेयं प्रवृत्तिः – यदुच्चावचप्रपञ्चं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितव्यम्;
It is a stupendous undertaking this, viz. the creation of this worldly sphere, which is comprised of all such high and low worldly phenomena.

2.1.32 L.9 यदीयमपि प्रवृत्तिश्चेतनस्य परमात्मन आत्मप्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्प्येत,
Now, if it were to be conceived that this endeavour of the Highest Self is useful to itself because of its own desire,

2.1.32 L.10 परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत;
Then such supposition would contradict the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being always quite contented.

2.1.32 L.11 प्रयोजनाभावे वा प्रवृत्त्यभावोऽपि स्यात्;
If, on the other hand, one were to conceive no such purpose (behind such endeavour), one would have to concede that (in such a case) there would not be any such endeavour,

2.1.32 L.12 अथ चेतनोऽपि सन् उन्मत्तो बुद्ध्यपराधादन्तरेणैवात्मप्रयोजनं प्रवर्तमानो दृष्टः,
(If one were to say) that it is seen that if a person even though sentient, happens to be unsound in mind, such person, through the fault of his intellect, is seen to be engaged in activity quite useless to his purpose, by reason of his inability to discriminate properly,

2.1.32 L.13 तथा परमात्मापि प्रवर्तिष्यते इत्युच्येत –
And even so, may the Highest Self also endeavour,

2.1.32 L.14 तथा सति सर्वज्ञत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत;
Then (in such a case) the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being omniscient, would be contradicted.

2.1.32 L.15 तस्मादश्लिष्टा चेतनात्सृष्टिरिति॥३२॥
For these reasons, therefore, (the doctrine) that the creation (of this world) is by a sentient being, is not tenable. — 32.

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Lokavat: as in the world, as in ordinary life; Tu: but; Līlā-kaivalyam: mere pastime. (Līlā: sport, play; Kaivalyam: merely; Līlā-mātram: mere pastime.)

🔗 But (the act of creation) is a mere sport (of the Lord) even as is seen in the ordinary world. — 2.1.33.

2.1.33 L.1 तुशब्देनाक्षेपं परिहरति;
The word “But” refutes the objection.

2.1.33 L.2 यथा लोके कस्यचिदाप्तैषणस्य राज्ञो राजामात्यस्य वा
Just as in the ordinary world, in the case of a king who has attained all his desires or of his minister,

2.1.33 L.3 व्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमनभिसन्धाय केवलं लीलारूपाः प्रवृत्तयः क्रीडाविहारेषु भवन्ति;
Their activities in sports and pastimes are merely of the nature of a sport and are indulged in without any particular aim in mind,

2.1.33 L.4 यथा चोच्छ्वासप्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसन्धाय बाह्यं किञ्चित्प्रयोजनं स्वभावादेव सम्भवन्ति;
Or just as the inspiration or expiration etc. (of a man) takes place naturally, without any extraneous purpose,

2.1.33 L.5 एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति;
Even so may the Lord also engage in such sportful activity without any purpose, and merely as the result of his nature.

2.1.33 L.6 न हीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितो वा सम्भवति;
It is not possible to explain on the ground of reasoning or the Scriptures that there is any other purpose on the part of the Lord.

2.1.33 L.7 न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते।
It is not possible to question the nature (of the Lord).

2.1.33 L.8 यद्यप्यस्माकमियं जगद्बिम्बविरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति,
Though the creation of this world-sphere appears to us as a stupendous undertaking,

2.1.33 L.9 तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयम्,
Yet to the Lord, it is but a mere pastime,

2.1.33 L.10 अपरिमितशक्तित्वात्।
Because of his measureless power.

2.1.33 L.11 यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित्सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत,
May be, that in the case of the ordinary world, we may imagine perhaps some minute purpose even for sports,

2.1.33 L.12 तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते,
But here in the case of the Lord, it is not possible to imagine any such purpose,

2.1.33 L.13 आप्तकामश्रुतेः।
Because of the Scriptural statement about His being one who has obtained all his desires.

2.1.33 L.14 नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वा,
Nor can we say that the Lord has no such activity or that such activity is that of a person who is possessed of an evil spirit or of one who is insane,

2.1.33 L.15 सृष्टिश्रुतेः, सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च।
Because of the Scriptural statement about creation and about his being Omniscient.

2.1.33 L.16 न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः
अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात्,
ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च –
इत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्॥३३॥
Nor should it ever be forgotten,
That even this Scriptural statement about creation (by the Lord) is not so in the truest sense,
But with reference to the perception of the transactions of names and forms being merely imagined through Nescience,
And also because it purports to propound how Brahman is the Self (of everything). — 33.

Su.2.1.34 Su..35 Su..36

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Vaiṣamya: inequality, partiality; Nairghṛṇye: cruelty, unkindness; Na: not (cannot be ascribed to Brahman); Sa-apekṣatvāt: because of dependence upon, as it is dependent on something else, i.e., upon the Karma of the souls; Tathā: so; Hi: because; Darśayati: the scripture declares.

🔗 (Faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not (attach themselves to the Lord) because of (the Lord’s) having regard (for the merit or demerit of a person). The Scriptures themselves bear it out. — 2.1.34.

2.1.34 L.1 पुनश्च जगज्जन्मादिहेतुत्वमीश्वरस्याक्षिप्यते,
Objection is again taken (by the Sūtra-kāra himself) to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the creation etc. of the world,

2.1.34 L.2 स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्य दृढीकरणाय।
In order to confirm the declaration of that doctrine, in accordance with the ‘maxim of driving a pile deeper (in order to make it firm) (Sthūṇā-nikhanana Nyāya)’, thus —

2.1.34 L.3 नेश्वरो जगतः कारणमुपपद्यते।
It is not reasonably sustainable that the Lord is the cause of the world,

2.1.34 L.4 कुतः? वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गात् –
Because (supposing it is so) there would result the predicament of (the fault of) discrimination and cruelty (attaching themselves to the Lord).

2.1.34 L.5 कांश्चिदत्यन्तसुखभाजः करोति देवादीन्,
कांश्चिदत्यन्तदुःखभाजः पश्वादीन्,
कांश्चिन्मध्यमभोगभाजो मनुष्यादीन् –
इत्येवं विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमाणस्येश्वरस्य
It would be reasonably sustainable to hold, that the Lord in bringing about such unequal creation —
Such as Gods etc. who enjoy great happiness,
Animals etc. who suffer great misery,
And men etc. who enjoy happiness or suffer misery in moderation —

2.1.34 L.6 पृथग्जनस्येव रागद्वेषोपपत्तेः,
Is like an ordinary man subject to passion and hatred.

2.1.34 L.7 श्रुतिस्मृत्यवधारितस्वच्छत्वादीश्वरस्वभावविलोपः प्रसज्येत;
It would thus bring about the effacement of the Lord’s nature of extreme purity as understood from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis.

2.1.34 L.8 तथा खलजनैरपि जुगुप्सितं निर्घृणत्वमतिक्रूरत्वं दुःखयोगविधानात्सर्वप्रजोपसंहाराच्च प्रसज्येत;
Similarly by his inflicting misery and by destroying all his creation, faults of such pitilessness and cruelty, as would be abhorred even by a villain, would attach themselves to the Lord.

2.1.34 L.9 तस्माद्वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गान्नेश्वरः कारणमित्येवं प्राप्ते
Therefore, because of the predicament of (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty resulting, the Lord could not be the cause of the world.

2.1.34 L.10 ब्रूमः – वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये नेश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते।
To this (we reply) — (The faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not affect the Lord.

2.1.34 L.11 कस्मात्? सापेक्षत्वात्।
How is this so? Because of the regard (which the Lord has for the merit or demerit of a person).

2.1.34 L.12 यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते,
Were the Lord to bring about such unequal creation without any such regard (for a person’s merit or demerit),

2.1.34 L.13 स्यातामेतौ दोषौ – वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च;
Then surely (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty would attach themselves to Him,

2.1.34 L.14 न तु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति;
But no one who has no such regard, has any such creativity i.e. an impulse to create.

2.1.34 L.15 सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते।
It is because the Lord just has such regard (for a person’s merit or demerit) that he brings about such unequal creation.

2.1.34 L.16 किमपेक्षत इति चेत् –
What then, is his regard about?

2.1.34 L.17 धर्माधर्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः;
We say that he has a regard for the merit or demerit of persons.

2.1.34 L.18 अतः सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिरिति
नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः;
Surely it is no fault of the Lord,
That his bringing about of such unequal creation is due to the regard he has for the merit and demerit of the beings about to be created.

2.1.34 L.19 ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवद्द्रष्टव्यः –
The Lord should rather be looked upon to be like ‘rain’.

2.1.34 L.20 यथा हि पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति,
Just as rain is the general cause which makes rice and barley grow,

2.1.34 L.21 व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति,
While the different potentialities inherent in their seeds, are the cause of the disparity between such rice and barley,

2.1.34 L.22 एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति,
Even so in the creation of Gods and men etc. the Lord is but the general common cause only,

2.1.34 L.23 देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति;
While for the inequality between Gods and men etc., they have their own different individual actions as the cause,

2.1.34 L.24 एवमीश्वरः सापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याभ्यां दुष्यति।
And in this way, the Lord, because of this regard (for men’s merits and demerits) is not vitiated by (such faults as of) discrimination and cruelty.

2.1.34 L.25 कथं पुनरवगम्यते सापेक्ष ईश्वरो नीचमध्यमोत्तमं संसारं निर्मिमीत इति?
But, how again is it understood that the Lord brings about such low, middling and high transmigratory existences because of such regard on his part (for a person’s merits and demerits)?

2.1.34 L.26 तथा हि दर्शयति श्रुतिः –
The Scriptures themselves state so, thus —

2.1.34 L.27 ‘एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषत एष उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषते’ (कौ. ब्रा. ३-८) इति,
“The Lord when he wishes to raise a person higher than this world, he causes such person to do good deeds, and when he wishes to lead him down to the nether regions, he causes him to do bad deeds” (Kauṣ. Brā. 3.8);

2.1.34 L.28 ‘पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन’ (BrhU.3.2.13) इति च;
Also, “A man becomes meritorious by meritorious actions and sinful by sinful actions” (BrhUEng.3.2.13).

2.1.34 L.29 स्मृतिरपि प्राणिकर्मविशेषापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्यानुग्रहीतृत्वं निग्रहीतृत्वं च दर्शयति –
Smṛti also shows how the vouchsafing of grace by the Lord (to a person) or his condemnation (of him) depends upon the particular actions of these beings, thus —

2.1.34 L.30 ‘ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम्’ (BhG.4.11) इत्येवंजातीयका॥३४॥
“I respond to men in the same measure in which they serve me” — (BhG.4.11). — 34.

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Na: not; Karma-avibhagāt: because of the non-distinction of work (before creation); Iti cet: if it be said, if it be objected in this way; Na: no, the objection cannot stand; An-āditvāt: because of beginninglessness.

🔗 (If the Lord’s having regard (for merit or demerit) is objected to as being impossible, on the ground that, prior to creation, because of the absence of distinction (between merit and demerit), there is no Karma (action), — (we reply) No, because (transmigratory existence) is beginningless. — 2.1.35.

2.1.35 L.1 ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ (ChanU.6.2.1) इति
प्राक्सृष्टेरविभागावधारणात्
नास्ति कर्म, यदपेक्ष्य विषमा सृष्टिः स्यात्;
If the objection (by the opponent) is thus: Because as it has already been understood from the Scriptural passage
“Oh mild one, in the beginning, ‘Sat’ alone, one without a second, existed” (ChanU.6.2.1)
There could be no action (Karma), having regard to which there would be this disparity in the creation,
Inasmuch as it is understood that prior to creation, differences did not exist.

2.1.35 L.2 सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं हि शरीरादिविभागापेक्षं कर्म,
Action would take place only after creation, depending upon differences such as physical bodies etc.,

2.1.35 L.3 कर्मापेक्षश्च शरीरादिविभागः –
And differences such as physical bodies etc. would depend upon action taking place,

2.1.35 L.4 इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वं प्रसज्येत;
And thus there would occur (the fault of) mutual interdependence (Itaretarāśrayatva).

2.1.35 L.5 अतो विभागादूर्ध्वं कर्मापेक्ष ईश्वरः प्रवर्ततां नाम;
Hence, well may the Lord function, having regard to action, after such differences (of bodies etc.) have taken place,

2.1.35 L.6 प्राग्विभागाद्वैचित्र्यनिमित्तस्य कर्मणोऽभावात्तुल्यैवाद्या सृष्टिः प्राप्नोतीति चेत्,
But because of the absence of action which is the cause of the variety (of creation) prior to such differences, it would come to this, that creation would be homogeneous.

2.1.35 L.7 नैष दोषः; अनादित्वात्संसारस्य;
(We reply) — This is no fault, because of transmigratory existence being beginningless.

2.1.35 L.8 भवेदेष दोषः, यद्यादिमानयं संसारः स्यात्;
The fault (as referred to by the opponent) may well occur provided transmigratory existence were to have a beginning.

2.1.35 L.9 अनादौ तु संसारे
But transmigratory existence being beginningless,

2.1.35 L.10 बीजाङ्कुरवद्धेतुहेतुमद्भावेन कर्मणः सर्गवैषम्यस्य च प्रवृत्तिर्न विरुध्यते॥३५॥
There need not be any objection for action and the variety of creation, to act alternately as cause and effect of each other, like the seed and the sprout, and to have a tendency for creation having such disparity. — 35.

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2.1.36 L.1 कथं पुनरवगम्यते – अनादिरेष संसार इति? अत उत्तरं पठति –
But (says the opponent) how is it understood that this transmigratory existence is beginningless?

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Upapadyate: is proved by reasoning, is reasonable that it should be so; Ca: and; Api: and, also, assuredly; Upalabhyate: is seen, is found in Śruti or Scriptures; Ca: also, and.

🔗 (The Sūtra-kāra) replies (that transmigratory existence is beginningless) is reasonably sustainable and is understood (from the Scriptures) also. — 2.1.36.

2.1.36 L.2 उपपद्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वम् –
That transmigratory existence is beginningless is reasonably sustainable.

2.1.36 L.3 आदिमत्त्वे हि संसारस्याकस्मादुद्भूतेर्मुक्तानामपि पुनः संसारोद्भूतिप्रसङ्गः,
If it were to have a beginning, then it having come into existence capriciously without any cause, the predicament of persons who have attained Final Release being again involved in transmigratory existence, would take place,

2.1.36 L.4 अकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गश्च,
As also the predicament of ‘fruit’ arising without any action having taken place,

2.1.36 L.5 सुखदुःखादिवैषम्यस्य निर्निमित्तत्वात्;
Because (under such supposition) there would be no cause for the disparity between pleasure and misery (to come into existence).

2.1.36 L.6 न चेश्वरो वैषम्यहेतुरित्युक्तम्;
It has already been said that the Lord cannot be the cause for such disparity,

2.1.36 L.7 न चाविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणम्, एकरूपत्वात्;
Nor can mere Nescience also be the cause of such disparity, because it is of a uniform nature.

2.1.36 L.8 रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्तकर्मापेक्षा त्वविद्या वैषम्यकरी स्यात्;
Nescience at best could produce such disparity, if it were to depend on action produced by subconscious impressions of misery resulting from passion etc.

2.1.36 L.9 न च कर्म अन्तरेण शरीरं सम्भवति, न च शरीरमन्तरेण कर्म सम्भवति –
(Assuming that a physical body is the cause of variety) Without action, a physical body would not result, nor would action result in the absence of a physical body,

2.1.36 L.10 इतीतरेतराश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गः;
And hence it would all result in the fault of mutual interdependence.

2.1.36 L.11 अनादित्वे तु बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनोपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद्दोषो भवति।
If on the other hand, transmigratory existence is understood to be beginningless, then it would all be reasonably sustainable in accordance with the maxim of “the seed and the sprout” and hence there would not be any fault.

2.1.36 L.12 उपलभ्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः।
That, transmigratory existence is beginningless, is understood both from the Scriptures and Smṛtis.

2.1.36 L.13 श्रुतौ तावत् –
‘अनेन जीवेनात्मना’ (ChanU.6.3.2) इति
सर्गप्रमुखे शारीरमात्मानं जीवशब्देन
प्राणधारणनिमित्तेनाभिलपन्न्
अनादिः संसार इति दर्शयति।
So far as the Scriptures are concerned,
They in the beginning of creation by referring to the embodied Self by the word Jīva,
Which comes into use by reason of the action of ‘sustaining life’ (Prāṇa-dhāraṇa),
By the Scriptural passage — “By this Jīva-Self” (ChanU.6.3.2),
Show, that transmigratory existence is beginningless.

2.1.36 L.14 आदिमत्त्वे तु प्रागनवधारितप्राणः सन्
If it were to have a beginning, then lifeless as the Self (Ātmā) would necessarily be,

2.1.36 L.15 कथं प्राणधारणनिमित्तेन जीवशब्देन सर्गप्रमुखेऽभिलप्येत?
How could the embodied Self be ever referred to, in the beginning of creation, by the term Jīva-Self, which becomes applicable because of the sustaining of life?

2.1.36 L.16 न च धारयिष्यतीत्यतोऽभिलप्येत –
It cannot be said, that it would be so referred to in anticipation,

2.1.36 L.17 अनागताद्धि सम्बन्धादतीतः सम्बन्धो बलवान्भवति,
Because a relationship which is already in existence has greater force than a relationship which is yet to supervene,

2.1.36 L.18 अभिनिष्पन्नत्वात्;
Because it (the first relationship) is an already established thing.

2.1.36 L.19 ‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्’ (ऋ. सं. १०-१९०-३) इति च मन्त्रवर्णः पूर्वकल्पसद्भावं दर्शयति।
The Scriptural Mantra passage — “The Creator created the sun and the moon as before” (Ṛg. Sam. 10.190.3), shows the existence of a prior Kalpa.

2.1.36 L.20 स्मृतावप्यनादित्वं संसारस्योपलभ्यते –
That transmigratory existence is beginningless, we find mentioned in the Smṛti thus —

2.1.36 L.21 ‘न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते नान्तो न चादिर्न च सम्प्रतिष्ठा’ (BhG.15.3) इति;
“Neither is its (i.e. Brahman’s) form known here (like for instance the form of an earthen pot), nor its beginning, existence and end” (BhG.15.3).

2.1.36 L.22 पुराणे चातीतानागतानां च कल्पानां न परिमाणमस्तीति स्थापितम्॥३६॥
In the Purāṇas also it has been well established, that there is no measure of the past and future Kalpas. — 36.

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Sarva: all; Dharma: attributes, qualities; Upapatteḥ: because of the reasonableness, because of being proved; Ca: and, also.

🔗 (The Vedānta doctrine is valid) because all qualities (attributed to Brahman) are reasonably sustainable. — 2.1.37.

2.1.37 L.1 चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्मिन्नवधारिते वेदार्थे परैरुपक्षिप्तान्विलक्षणत्वादीन्
दोषान्पर्यहार्षीदाचार्यः;
The Ācārya (Sūtra-kāra) has thus refuted the faults
Attributed by the opponent of Vedānta to the doctrine of [the intelligence] Brahman being the material and accidental cause of this world, by the Sūtra “On account of dissimilarity (between cause and effect) etc.”.

2.1.37 L.2 इदानीं परपक्षप्रतिषेधप्रधानं प्रकरणं प्रारिप्समाणः
Now with a view to begin the subject chiefly dealing with the refutation of the opponent’s doctrines,

2.1.37 L.3 स्वपक्षपरिग्रहप्रधानं प्रकरणमुपसंहरति।
The Ācārya proposes to conclude the chief subject of the establishment of his own (Vedānta) doctrine,

2.1.37 L.4 यस्मादस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि कारणे परिगृह्यमाणे
In as much as, when once this Brahman is accepted as the cause of this world,

2.1.37 L.5 प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण सर्वे कारणधर्मा उपपद्यन्ते
All qualities attributable to the cause, become reasonably sustainable in the manner indicated,

2.1.37 L.6 ‘सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति महामायं च ब्रह्म’ इति,
Viz. — that Brahman is omniscient, omnipotent and possesses the great power of Maya,

2.1.37 L.7 तस्मादनतिशङ्कनीयमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनमिति॥३७॥
And that therefore one should not doubt the Upaniṣad doctrine over much. — 37.