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This is V. M. Apte’s 1960 English translation of Ādi-Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyam (commentary) comprising for the students of Vedānta an excellent introduction and summary of the main topics concerning the proper textual understanding of the Upaniṣads.
by A.K. Aruna
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सर्वज्ञः सर्वेश्वरो जगतः उत्पत्तिकारणम्, मृत्सुवर्णादय इव घटरुचकादीनाम्;
उत्पन्नस्य जगतो नियन्तृत्वेन स्थितिकारणम्, मायावीव मायायाः;
प्रसारितस्य जगतः पुनः स्वात्मन्येवोपसंहारकारणम्, अवनिरिव चतुर्विधस्य भूतग्रामस्य; स एव च सर्वेषां न आत्मा –
In the first Adhyāya,
It has been propounded (Pratipāditam) by co-ordinating the statements in Vedānta, that
The Omniscient Lord of all, is the cause of the origination of the world, even as clay and gold etc. are (the cause of the origination) of a pot and an ornament respectively,
That he is the cause of the preservation of the created world, even as the illusionist is (the cause) of the illusion,
That he is again the cause of the absorption into himself of the world spread out (i.e. projected) by himself, even as the Earth (is the cause of the absorption) of the four classes of creatures, and that he is the Self of us all.
The doctrines that Pradhāna etc. are the cause, have been refuted on the ground of there being no Scriptural authority for the same.
इदानीं स्वपक्षे स्मृतिन्यायविरोधपरिहारः प्रधानादिवादानां च न्यायाभासोपबृंहितत्वं प्रतिवेदान्तं च सृष्ट्यादिप्रक्रियाया अविगीतत्वमित्यस्यार्थजातस्य प्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय आरभ्यते।
Now the second Adhyāya is begun for the purpose of propounding the refutation of the opposition of Smṛti and Nyāya to our own view i.e. to show as to how the doctrines of the Pradhāna etc. (as the cause) are supported by fallacious reasoning, and as to how in every Vedānta the doctrines about the mode of the Genesis of all things in general, are not in conflict with each other.
Smṛti: the Sāṅkhya philosophy; An-avakāśa: no room; Doṣa: defect; Prasaṅgaḥ: Result, chance; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Na: not; Anya-smṛti: other Smṛtis; An-avakāśa-doṣa-prasaṅgāt: because there would result the defect of want of room for other Smṛtis.
🔗 If it be said (that Brahman is not the cause of the world) because there would be the predicament of the fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛti, (we reply), no, because, thus, there would be the predicament of a fault of the want of scope for another Smṛti. — 184.108.40.206.1.1 L.2
यदुक्तं ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणम् इति, तदयुक्तम्।
(Says the opponent) — What you have said, viz. that the Omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world, is not logical.
कुतः? स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् –
How so? Because thereby occurs the predicament of the fault of the want of scope of a (certain) Smṛti.
स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता शिष्टपरिगृहीता अन्याश्च तदनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः, ता एवं सत्यनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन्।
Because, in that case the Smṛti known as (Sāṅkhya) Tantra, promulgated by the great sage (Kapila) and accepted by learned people, and the other Smṛtis which follow this (Tantra) Smṛti would be without any scope.
तासु ह्यचेतनं प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रं जगतः कारणमुपनिबध्यते।
In those Smṛtis the non-sentient Pradhāna is spoken of as the independent cause of the world.
मन्वादिस्मृतयस्तावच्चोदनालक्षणेनाग्निहोत्रादिना धर्मजातेनापेक्षितमर्थं समर्पयन्त्यः सावकाशा भवन्ति –
On the other hand, the Smṛtis of Manu and others, which purport to mention all matters of religious duties such as Agni-hotra etc. as having the characteristic of an injunction, would be having due scope;
अस्य वर्णस्यास्मिन्कालेऽनेन विधानेनोपनयनम्, ईदृशश्चाचारः,
As for instance — that (a man of) such and such caste should receive initiation by the investiture of a sacred thread at such and such time and by such and such rite, it has such and such rule of conduct,
इत्थं वेदाध्ययनम्, इत्थं समावर्तनम्,
Its study of Vedas should be in such and such a way, a pupil’s return home after finishing his course of holy study should be in such and such a way,
इत्थं सहधर्मचारिणीसंयोग इति;
And in such and such a way should he enter wedlock (i.e., lit., should be joined with a coadjutor in religious duties).
तथा पुरुषार्थांश्च वर्णाश्रमधर्मान्नानाविधान्विदधति।
They give injunctions about the proper aims of life, and the various religious duties of the castes (Varṇas) and the various types of the orders of life (Āśramas).
नैवं कापिलादिस्मृतीनामनुष्ठेये विषये अवकाशोऽस्ति।
The Smṛtis of Kapila etc. have no such scope with regard to the subject of the performance of rites,
मोक्षसाधनमेव हि सम्यग्दर्शनमधिकृत्य ताः प्रणीताः।
As they have been written with special reference to the correct knowledge as a means of bringing about Final Release,
यदि तत्राप्यनवकाशाः स्युः, आनर्थक्यमेवासां प्रसज्येत।
And if they don’t have scope even for that, then they would be rendered meaningless.
तस्मात्तदविरोधेन वेदान्ता व्याख्यातव्याः।
Therefore, Vedāntas ought to be explained by avoiding any conflict with them.
कथं पुनरीक्षत्यादिभ्यो हेतुभ्यो ब्रह्मैव सर्वज्ञं जगतः कारणमित्यवधारितः श्रुत्यर्थः स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेन पुनराक्षिप्यते?
But when the meaning of Scriptures is determined thus, viz. that the Omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world, on the grounds of “thinking etc.”, how ever can it be objected to on the ground of any such predicament as that of a fault of want of scope for a certain Smṛti?
May be, no such objection can arise in the case of those whose intellect is independent,
परतन्त्रप्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुमशक्नुवन्तः प्रख्यातप्रणेतृकासु स्मृतिष्ववलम्बेरन्;
But in the case of ordinary men who depend upon others for knowledge, and are unable to understand the meaning of the Scriptures independently, and who may well depend upon Smṛtis written by well-known authors (such as Kapila),
तद्बलेन च श्रुत्यर्थं प्रतिपित्सेरन्;
And who would understand the meaning of Scriptures on the strength of these Smṛtis,
अस्मत्कृते च व्याख्याने न विश्वस्युः, बहुमानात्स्मृतीनां प्रणेतृषु;
And, as naturally, they would have great respect for the writers (of such Smṛtis), they would not believe in our (i.e. of the Vedāntin’s) explanation.
कपिलप्रभृतीनां चार्षं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतं स्मर्यते;
Smṛtis speak of the knowledge of Kapila and others, as being Ṛṣi-like and unobstructed.
श्रुतिश्च भवति ‘ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्’ (SvetU.5.2) इति;
A Scriptural passage moreover says thus — “He, who in the beginning produced out of himself the aureate-complexioned one i.e. Hiraṇya-garbha (Kapila) and sustained him by wisdom.” (SvetU.5.2).
तस्मान्नैषां मतमयथार्थं शक्यं सम्भावयितुम्;
Therefore, it is not possible to consider the opinion of such as these, as improper.
तर्कावष्टम्भेन चैतेऽर्थं प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति;
They determine the meaning by having recourse to reasoning.
तस्मादपि स्मृतिबलेन वेदान्ता व्याख्येया इति पुनराक्षेपः॥
Therefore, the objection again is, that Vedānta texts should be explained on the strength of Smṛtis.
तस्य समाधिः – ‘नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात्’ इति।
The refutation of this (objection, is by the latter part of the Sūtra) thus: — “(In that case) there would result the predicament of the fault of there being no scope for (these) other Smṛtis”.
यदि स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गेनेश्वरकारणवाद आक्षिप्येत,
If the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, were to be objected to, on the ground of the predicament of a fault of want of scope for some Smṛtis,
एवमप्यन्या ईश्वरकारणवादिन्यः स्मृतयोऽनवकाशाः प्रसज्येरन्;
Then, other Smṛtis which lay down that the Lord is the cause, would have no scope left for them.
ता उदाहरिष्यामः – ‘यत्तत्सूक्ष्ममविज्ञेयम्’ इति परं ब्रह्म प्रकृत्य, ‘स ह्यन्तरात्मा भूतानां क्षेत्रज्ञश्चेति कथ्यते’ इति चोक्त्वा,
We will cite them by way of illustration: — (The Smṛti) after saying with reference to the Highest Brahman “That this which is subtle and unknowable”, says, “it is said that he is the Universal Self of all beings, and the knower of the Kṣetra (i.e. the body)”.
‘तस्मादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नं त्रिगुणं द्विजसत्तम’ इत्याह;
It further says — “Oh, the best of the twice-born, from that (i.e. Brahman) was born the undeveloped i.e. unevolved (Avyakta), having the three qualities (Guṇas)”.
तथान्यत्रापि ‘अव्यक्तं पुरुषे ब्रह्मन्निर्गुणे सम्प्रलीयते’ इत्याह;
In another place also, it says — “Oh great Brāhmaṇa, the unevolved is absorbed in the Puruṣa (Brahman) which has no qualities.”
‘अतश्च संक्षेपमिमं शृणुध्वं नारायणः सर्वमिदं पुराणः। स सर्गकाले च करोति सर्वं संहारकाले च तदत्ति भूयः’ इति पुराणे;
The Purāṇa also says — “Hence, listen to this conclusion, that the ancient Nārāyaṇa is all this. He creates everything at the time of creation, and at the time of destruction consumes all this”.
भगवद्गीतासु च – ‘अहं कृत्स्नस्य जगतः प्रभवः प्रलयस्तथा’ (BhG.7.6) इति;
The Bhagavad-gīta says — “I am both the source (Prabhava), as also the great flood (Pralaya) of the whole world.” (BhG.7.6).
परमात्मानमेव च प्रकृत्यापस्तम्बः पठति – ‘तस्मात्कायाः प्रभवन्ति सर्वे स मूलं शाश्वतिकः स नित्यः’ (ध. सू. १-८-२३-२) इति।
Āpastamba with reference to the same Highest Self says — “All bodies are born from it, it is the root cause and is everlasting and unchanging” (Dhar. Sū. 220.127.116.11).
एवमनेकशः स्मृतिष्वपीश्वरः कारणत्वेनोपादानत्वेन च प्रकाश्यते।
In this manner, even in the Smṛtis, often, the Lord is explained as being the material and the accidental cause.
स्मृतिबलेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठमानस्य स्मृतिबलेनैवोत्तरं वक्ष्यामीत्यतोऽयमन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषोपन्यासः।
This Sūtra, which mentions the fault of the want of scope for some other Smṛtis (in the latter half), is so stated, because it is desired to refute him — who raises an objection on the strength of (the fault about) the want of scope for some Smṛti — by raising a similar objection with regard to some other Smṛtis.
दर्शितं तु श्रुतीनामीश्वरकारणवादं प्रति तात्पर्यम्;
That the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world is the substance of the Scriptures, has been shown already.
विप्रतिपत्तौ च स्मृतीनामवश्यकर्तव्येऽन्यतरपरिग्रहेऽन्यतरपरित्यागे च श्रुत्यनुसारिण्यः स्मृतयः प्रमाणम्;
When Smṛtis differ, and when one has necessarily to be accepted and the others rejected, those which follow the Scriptures are an authority and the others are irrelevant.
अनपेक्ष्या इतराः; तदुक्तं प्रमाणलक्षणे – ‘विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम्’ (जै. सू. १-३-३) इति।
This is mentioned in the Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa (Jai. Su. 1.3.3) — “When a Smṛti conflicts with the Scriptures, it is to be neglected, and where it does not, the inference is (that it follows some original Scriptural text)”.
न चातीन्द्रियानर्थान् श्रुतिमन्तरेण कश्चिदुपलभत इति शक्यं सम्भावयितुम्, निमित्ताभावात्।
It is not possible to understand, that a person can perceive supersensuous things without (the help of) the Scriptures, as there is no valid reason for that.
शक्यं कपिलादीनां सिद्धानामप्रतिहतज्ञानत्वादिति चेत्,
If it be said, that it is possible because gifted persons such as Kapila and others have unobstructed knowledge,
न; सिद्धेरपि सापेक्षत्वात्; धर्मानुष्ठानापेक्षा हि सिद्धिः, स च धर्मश्चोदनालक्षणः;
(We reply) — no, because super-natural faculty itself is dependent upon the performance of religious duty, of which injunction is the characteristic.
ततश्च पूर्वसिद्धायाश्चोदनाया अर्थो न पश्चिमसिद्धपुरुषवचनवशेनातिशङ्कितुं शक्यते।
Hence the meaning of an injunction which is in existence already, cannot be doubted by reliance on the word of a person who has become so gifted, afterwards.
सिद्धव्यपाश्रयकल्पनायामपि बहुत्वात्सिद्धानां प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां
Even if we were to accept the idea of resorting to a person who has attained such supernatural faculty, such persons being many, in the case of a conflict of Smṛtis in the manner indicated (above),
There is no other means of arriving at a decision except by a resort to the Scriptures.
परतन्त्रप्रज्ञस्यापि नाकस्मात्स्मृतिविशेषविषयः पक्षपातो युक्तः,
Even in the case of one who is dependent on others for knowledge, his sudden partiality i.e. predilection for a particular Smṛti is not logically justifiable,
कस्यचित्क्वचित्पक्षपाते सति पुरुषमतिवैश्वरूप्येण तत्त्वाव्यवस्थानप्रसङ्गात्।
Because, if any one has such partiality or predilection, then there would be the predicament of truth remaining unsettled, as men’s intellects are of the nature of the variety of the universe.
तस्मात्तस्यापि स्मृतिविप्रतिपत्त्युपन्यासेन श्रुत्यनुसाराननुसारविषयविवेचनेन च सन्मार्गे प्रज्ञा सङ्ग्रहणीया।
So, even in his case, his intellect deserves to be focussed or fixed on the right path, by explaining to him the disparity between Smṛtis, and by way of explaining the point as to how some Smṛtis are in accordance with the Scriptures, and that some others are not.
या तु श्रुतिः कपिलस्य ज्ञानातिशयं प्रदर्शयन्ती प्रदर्शिता न तया श्रुतिविरुद्धमपि कापिलं मतं श्रद्धातुं शक्यम्,
It is not possible to believe in the doctrine of Kapila (the Sāṅkhya sage) contrary as it is to the Scriptures, merely on the authority of a Scriptural passage which has been cited as showing superabundance of his knowledge,
कपिलमिति श्रुतिसामान्यमात्रत्वात्, अन्यस्य च कपिलस्य सगरपुत्राणां प्रतप्तुर्वासुदेवनाम्नः स्मरणात्,
In as much as, it merely mentions the name Kapila, because one Smṛti also refers to another Kapila, called Vāsu-deva, the tormentor of the sons of Sagara.
अन्यार्थदर्शनस्य च प्राप्तिरहितस्यासाधकत्वात्।
If any thing is stated casually in connection with a passage which purports to indicate an altogether different thing, then that thing stated so casually, is not established by the passage in which it is mentioned so casually.
भवति चान्या मनोर्माहात्म्यं प्रख्यापयन्ती श्रुतिः – ‘यद्वै किञ्च मनुरवदत्तद्भेषजम्’ (तै. सं. २-२-१०-२) इति;
There is besides another Scriptural passage establishing the greatness of Manu, thus: — “Verily, whatever Manu has said, is medicine” (Tait. Sam. 18.104.22.168).
मनुना च ‘सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि। सम्पश्यन्नात्मयाजी वै स्वाराज्यमधिगच्छति’ (मनु. स्मृ. १२-९१) इति सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनं प्रशंसता कापिलं मतं निन्द्यत इति गम्यते;
Manu, who extols looking upon everything as the Self, thus — “One who sees the Self in everything, and everything in the Self, and is a sacrificer to the Self, verily attains Final Release — Svā-rājya” (12.91), seems thereby to censure i.e. to disapprove of the doctrine of Kapila,
कपिलो हि न सर्वात्मत्वदर्शनमनुमन्यते, आत्मभेदाभ्युपगमात्।
Who does not agree with the doctrine of seeing the Self in everything, in as much as he holds that there is difference between Selfs (and that they are many).
महाभारतेऽपि च – ‘बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मन्नुताहो एक एव तु’ इति विचार्य, ‘बहवः पुरुषा राजन्सांख्ययोगविचारिणाम्’ इति परपक्षमुपन्यस्य तद्व्युदासेन –
In the Mahā-bhārata also, when the question is whether there are many Puruṣas or there is only one, after laying down first the view of the opponent thus — The follower of Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines, consider the Selfs to be many — ,
‘बहूनां पुरुषाणां हि यथैका योनिरुच्यते। तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमाख्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम्’ इत्युपक्रम्य
‘ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्ये देहसंस्थिताः। सर्वेषां साक्षिभूतोऽसौ न ग्राह्यः केनचित्क्वचित्॥
विश्वमूर्धा विश्वभुजो विश्वपादाक्षिनासिकः। एकश्चरति भूतेषु स्वैरचारी यथासुखम्’ –
इति सर्वात्मतैव निर्धारिता।
It refutes it, and establishes the doctrine of the Universal Self,
By stating in the beginning — “I shall explain to you that Universal Self which transcends the Guṇas, and also as to how it is said to be the one and the only one origin of all Puruṣas”,
And afterwards by stating — “It is the witness of all, the Self of mine and yours too, and the Self of all embodied beings, and is not comprehensible by anybody.
He is the Universal head-arms-legs-eyes-and-nose, and alone moves as it pleases Him amongst the things.”
श्रुतिश्च सर्वात्मतायां भवति –
There is a Scriptural passage also, about the Self of all,
‘यस्मिन्सर्वाणि भूतान्यात्मैवाभूद्विजानतः। तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः’ (IsU.7) इत्येवंविधा।
Thus — “When a person sees that all beings are but the Self only, then, to him who sees such unity, what infatuation, what grief, can possibly affect?” (IsU.7).
अतश्च सिद्धमात्मभेदकल्पनयापि कापिलस्य तन्त्रस्य वेदविरुद्धत्वं
Hence it is established that because of his doctrine of the plurality of Selfs also, the system of Kapila is against the Scriptures (Vedas),
And against the statement of Manu who follows the Vedas,
न केवलं स्वतन्त्रप्रकृतिकल्पनयैवेति।
And not merely because of his imagining the doctrine of Prakṛti (i.e. the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas) in an independent manner.
वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थे प्रामाण्यम्, रवेरिव रूपविषये;
The authority of the Vedas is direct and independent, with respect to matters which come in their own province, just as that of the Sun in the province of form (Rūpa-viṣaye).
पुरुषवचसां तु मूलान्तरापेक्षं
The authority of the statements of mere men (i.e. of Smṛti-kāras) depends upon another thing (i.e. the Scriptures)
वक्तृस्मृतिव्यवहितं चेति विप्रकर्षः।
And is further away from directness (of authority) because of (their having to rely on) the memory of the speaker, and the necessity of their having to have some other source (viz. the Scriptures).
तस्माद्वेदविरुद्धे विषये स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो न दोषः॥१॥
Hence, the predicament of a fault of want of scope for a Smṛti, when it occurs in a subject which is opposed to the Vedas, is no fault. — 1.
Itareṣām: of others; Ca: and; An-upalabdheḥ: there being no mention.
🔗 Because some others (i.e. things other than the Pradhāna) are not perceived (in the Vedas). — 22.214.171.124.1.2 L.2
प्रधानादितराणि यानि प्रधानपरिणामत्वेन स्मृतौ कल्पितानि महदादीनि, न तानि वेदे लोके वोपलभ्यन्ते।
Mahat etc. which are different from the Pradhāna, but are conceived by the Smṛti to be the modifications of Pradhāna, are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedas.
भूतेन्द्रियाणि तावल्लोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वाच्छक्यन्ते स्मर्तुम्।
As for things, such as elements and sense-organs, well-known as they are in the ordinary world and the Vedas, they may well be mentioned in the Smṛti,
अलोकवेदप्रसिद्धत्वात्तु महदादीनां षष्ठस्येवेन्द्रियार्थस्य न स्मृतिरवकल्पते।
But it could not be possible for Smṛtis to refer to Mahat etc. — as they are not to be met with, either in the ordinary world or in the Vedas — any more than they can possibly refer to a sixth sense-organ and a sixth sense-object.
यदपि क्वचित्तत्परमिव श्रवणमवभासते, तदप्यतत्परं व्याख्यातम् – ‘आनुमानिकमप्येकेषाम्’ (BrS.1.4.1) इत्यत्र।
Even though the Scriptures may occasionally appear to refer to such things (as Mahat etc.), it has been already explained in Brahma-Sūtra (BrS.1.4.1) — “The inferred one (i.e. the Pradhāna) etc.” — that they could not possibly refer to such things (as the Pradhāna and the Mahat).
What is meant by this is, that as Smṛtis which refer to modifications (of the Pradhāna) such as Mahat etc., are not authoritative, even so, the Smṛtis which refer to their cause (i.e. the Pradhāna) are properly not authoritative.
तस्मादपि न स्मृत्यनवकाशप्रसङ्गो दोषः।
That is why, want of scope for a certain Smṛti (which refers to the Pradhāna) is no fault.
तर्कावष्टम्भं तु ‘न विलक्षणत्वात्’ (BrS.2.1.4) इत्यारभ्योन्मथिष्यति॥२॥
The objection (to Brahman as the cause) based on reasoning (Tarka) will be refuted (by the Sūtra-kāra) hereafter, beginning with the Sūtra — “No, because of dissimilarity” (BrS.2.1.4). — 2.
Etena: by this viz., by the refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛti; Yogaḥ: the Yoga philosophy; Pratyuktaḥ: is (also) refuted.
🔗 By this (refutation of Sāṅkhya Smṛti) the Yoga Smṛti also is refuted. — 126.96.36.199.1.3 L.1
एतेन सांख्यस्मृतिप्रत्याख्यानेन, योगस्मृतिरपि प्रत्याख्याता द्रष्टव्येत्यतिदिशति।
The Sūtra-kāra extends the application (of these i.e. the first two Sūtras in refutation of the Sāṅkhya Smṛti) to Yoga Smṛti, by saying, that the Yoga (Smṛti) also should be looked upon as refuted similarly.
तत्रापि श्रुतिविरोधेन प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रमेव कारणम्, महदादीनि च कार्याण्यलोकवेदप्रसिद्धानि कल्प्यन्ते।
The Yoga Smṛti also, contrary to the Scriptures, imagines the Pradhāna to be the independent cause and Mahat etc. to be its modifications, though they are not so known both in the ordinary world and in the Vedas.
नन्वेवं सति समानन्यायत्वात्पूर्वेणैवैतद्गतम्;
(Says the opponent) — If it be so, as this ground is covered already by what has gone before, why is it then indicated again by the Atideśa (i.e. extended application)?
The answer is — well, there is this further doubt.
अस्ति ह्यत्राभ्यधिकाशङ्का – सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायो हि योगो वेदे विहितः – ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति;
The Scriptural passage “(The Self) should be heard, cogitated upon and meditated upon” (BrhUEng.2.4.5) prescribes Yoga as the means of realizing correct knowledge.
‘त्रिरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरम्’ (SvetU.2.8) इत्यादिना चासनादिकल्पनापुरःसरं बहुप्रपञ्चं योगविधानं श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि दृश्यते;
It is seen that in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad the practice of Yoga, preceded by the taking up of certain postures (i.e. Āsanas) etc., has been enjoined at great length, thus: — “Keeping the body in perfect poise with the three parts held erect” (SvetU.2.8) etc.
लिङ्गानि च वैदिकानि योगविषयाणि सहस्रश उपलभ्यन्ते –
There are thousands of Scriptural indicatory marks about Yoga, such as —
‘तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरामिन्द्रियधारणाम्’ (KathU.2.3.11) इति,
“A steady abstraction of sense-organs, is considered to be Yoga” (KathU.2.6.11)
‘विद्यामेतां योगविधिं च कृत्स्नम्’ (KathU.2.3.18) इति चैवमादीनि;
And “(Having obtained) this knowledge (of Brahman) and the whole technique of Yoga” (KathU.2.6.18).
योगशास्त्रेऽपि – ‘अथ तत्त्वदर्शनोपायो योगः’ इति सम्यग्दर्शनाभ्युपायत्वेनैव योगोऽङ्गीक्रियते;
In the Yoga Śāstra itself, Yoga has been accepted as the means of realizing correct knowledge thus — “Now (is begun) Yoga, the means of realizing the principle of Truth”. [Notice, this initial sūtra does not occur in the current form of the Yoga Sūtras. It could be that those “offending” sūtras were removed or altered by succeeding teachers of Vedānta to their students, or perhaps they were added or altered by Sāṅkhyans to make the Sūtras to be more like Sāṅkhyā. See this author’s commentary (YogaSutras) regarding the relation or non-relation between the Yoga Sūtras and Sāṅkhyā.]
अतः सम्प्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेशत्वादष्टकादिस्मृतिवद्योगस्मृतिरप्यनपवदनीया भविष्यतीति –
Hence (it may be maintained) that because of the agreement (of both disputants i.e. the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntin) with regard to the meaning of a part of the Yoga-Smṛti being in conformity with the Scriptures, the Yoga-Smṛti — like the Aṣṭakā Smṛti etc. — may well be rendered unobjectionable.
इयमभ्यधिका शङ्कातिदेशेन निवर्त्यते, अर्थैकदेशसम्प्रतिपत्तावप्यर्थैकदेशविप्रतिपत्तेः पूर्वोक्ताया दर्शनात्।
Even this further doubt also is removed here by this ‘Atideśa’ (extended application), because even though one part of the Yoga-Smṛti is in conformity with the Scriptures, still, as has already been indicated above, another part of the Yoga-Smṛti is in conflict with the Scriptures.
सतीष्वप्यध्यात्मविषयासु बह्वीषु स्मृतिषु सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योरेव निराकरणे यत्नः कृतः;
Even though there are many Smṛtis on the subject of Adhyātma (the relation between the Supreme Self and the Jīva-Self i.e. the individual soul) an attempt is made here to refute the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Smṛtis only,
सांख्ययोगौ हि परमपुरुषार्थसाधनत्वेन लोके प्रख्यातौ, शिष्टैश्च परिगृहीतौ, लिङ्गेन च श्रौतेनोपबृंहितौ –
Because, they, as having the reputation of being the means of attaining the highest aim of life, have been accepted by the wise, and have been supported by i.e. bolstered up with indicatory marks in the Scriptures, such as: —
‘तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः’ (SvetU.6.13) इति;
“He who has understood that cause (of the world) which can be known from the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga, is relieved from all nooses or fetters” (SvetU.6.13).
निराकरणं तु – न सांख्यज्ञानेन वेदनिरपेक्षेण योगमार्गेण वा निःश्रेयसमधिगम्यत इति;
The refutation (of the above) is, that final beatitude is not attained by the mere knowledge of Sāṅkhya Smṛti or the path of Yoga, without reference to the Veda.
श्रुतिर्हि वैदिकादात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादन्यन्निःश्रेयससाधनं वारयति –
The Scriptures obviate the possibility of any other means of attaining Final Beatitude, except the knowledge of the unity of the Selfs referred to in the Vedas, thus —
‘तमेव विदित्वाति मृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय’ (SvetU.3.8) इति;
“It is by knowing that (Ātmā i.e. Brahman) alone, that a person transcends death, and there is no other path to final emancipation” (SvetU.3.8).
द्वैतिनो हि ते सांख्या योगाश्च नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः।
The followers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines are dualists (i.e. they recognize duality of Ātmās) and do not countenance the unity of the Self.
यत्तु दर्शनमुक्तम् ‘तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाभिपन्नम्’ इति, वैदिकमेव तत्र ज्ञानं ध्यानं च सांख्ययोगशब्दाभ्यामभिलप्येते प्रत्यासत्तेरित्यवगन्तव्यम्।
As to the instance quoted — viz. “That cause which is known from the Sāṅkhya and Yoga” — , It should be understood that by the words “Sāṅkhya and Yoga”, only knowledge and meditation as understood by the Scriptures is meant, because of their proximity (to the subject).
येन त्वंशेन न विरुध्येते, तेनेष्टमेव सांख्ययोगस्मृत्योः सावकाशत्वम्;
So far as that portion of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga Smṛtis which does not conflict (with the Scriptures) is concerned, we welcome that portion of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as having due scope,
तद्यथा – ‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ (BrhU.4.3.16) इत्येवमादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव पुरुषस्य विशुद्धत्वं निर्गुणपुरुषनिरूपणेन सांख्यैरभ्युपगम्यते;
As for instance, when the Sāṅkhyas understand by their definition of quality-less Puruṣa, the purity of the Puruṣas well-known in the Scriptures, thus — “That this Puruṣa is unattached” (BrhUEng.4.3.16).
तथा यौगैरपि ‘अथ परिव्राड्विवर्णवासा मुण्डोऽपरिग्रहः’ (जा. उ. ५) इत्येवमादि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धमेव निवृत्तिनिष्ठत्वं प्रव्रज्याद्युपदेशेनानुगम्यते।
Similarly, when the followers of Yoga, by its injunction with regard to the order of religious mendicants, understand it to be the same, as belief in actionlessness, by instruction about renunciation of the world, well-known in the Scriptures, thus: — “Then the Parivrājaka (i.e. a Sannyāsin who has renounced the world) who wears colourless dress, is shaven, and is without a wife or other possessions or attendants (attains Final Release).” (Jāb. Up. 5).
एतेन सर्वाणि तर्कस्मरणानि प्रतिवक्तव्यानि;
By this (refutation), all Smṛtis based on reasoning should be refuted.
तान्यपि तर्कोपपत्तिभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानायोपकुर्वन्तीति चेत्, उपकुर्वन्तु नाम;
If it be said, that they also are helpful for the attainment of knowledge, by means of inferences by reasoning, well may they indeed be so helpful,
तत्त्वज्ञानं तु वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव भवति –
But the knowledge of truth can only be attained by Scriptural passages, such as —
‘नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्’ (तै. ब्रा. ३-१२-९-७)
“No one who does not know the Vedas, knows the great one” (Tait. Brā. 188.8.131.52)
‘तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इत्येवमादिश्रुतिभ्यः॥३॥
And “I am asking you about the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads”. (BrhUEng.3.9.26). — 3.
←PrevNext→ न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्॥२.१.४॥ Na vilakṣaṇatvādasya tathātvaṃ ca śabdāt.
Na: not (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world); Vi-lakṣaṇatvāt: because of difference in nature; Asya: its (i.e. of this world); Tathātvam: its being so; Ca: and; Śabdāt: from the word, from the Śruti.
🔗 No (i.e. Brahman is not the cause of the world), because of this (the world) being dissimilar (to Brahman). That it is so (i.e. it is dissimilar) is known from the Scriptures. — 184.108.40.206.1.4 L.1
ब्रह्मास्य जगतो निमित्तकारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्य पक्षस्याक्षेपः स्मृतिनिमित्तः परिहृतः;
The objection to the view — that Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world — , based on Smṛti, has been refuted.
तर्कनिमित्त इदानीमाक्षेपः परिह्रियते।
Now the objection based on reasoning is being refuted.
कुतः पुनरस्मिन्नवधारिते आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षेपस्यावकाशः?
(Says the Vedāntin) — But whence can there be any scope for a doubt based on reasoning, with regard to the meaning of Scriptures which has already been determined?
ननु धर्म इव ब्रह्मण्यप्यनपेक्ष आगमो भवितुमर्हति; –
Just as Scriptures are independent of any other thing with regard to matters pertaining to religious duty, even so should they be understood to be independent in the case of Brahman also.
भवेदयमवष्टम्भो यदि प्रमाणान्तरानवगाह्य आगममात्रप्रमेयोऽयमर्थः स्यादनुष्ठेयरूप इव धर्मः;
(The opponent replies) — Well, such determination would be there, provided, like matters of religious duty which have to be performed, and which are to be understood from the Scriptures only, Brahman also were liable to be determined with the help of the Scriptures alone, and were not to be understandable by other means-of-proof.
परिनिष्पन्नरूपं तु ब्रह्मावगम्यते;
But Brahman is of the nature of an actually established entity
परिनिष्पन्ने च वस्तुनि प्रमाणान्तराणामस्त्यवकाशो यथा पृथिव्यादिषु;
And with regard to such an established thing, like the earth etc., there is scope for other means-of-proof.
यथा च श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधे सत्येकवशेनेतरा नीयन्ते,
Just as, when there is a conflict between Scriptural passages, all the rest have necessarily to be coordinated with only one of them,
एवं प्रमाणान्तरविरोधेऽपि तद्वशेनैव श्रुतिर्नीयेत;
Similarly when there is a conflict of the other means-of-proof with the Scriptures, they i.e. the Scriptures, ought to be coordinated with the other means-of-proof.
दृष्टसाधर्म्येण चादृष्टमर्थं समर्पयन्ती युक्तिरनुभवस्य सन्निकृष्यते, विप्रकृष्यते तु श्रुतिः, ऐतिह्यमात्रेण स्वार्थाभिधानात्;
Reasoning, which establishes invisible entities, on the ground of their similarity with a thing which is visible, is nearer to experience, than the Scriptures which convey their meaning in a traditional dogmatic manner (like an Ipse dixit) and they are further removed from experience.
अनुभवावसानं च ब्रह्मविज्ञानमविद्याया निवर्तकं मोक्षसाधनं च दृष्टफलतयेष्यते;
Knowledge of Brahman however culminates in experience, and by removing Nescience becomes the means of Final Beatitude, and only if it is so understood, can it be said to have a fruit which is visible or tangible.
श्रुतिरपि – ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ इति श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधती तर्कमप्यत्रादर्तव्यं दर्शयति;
The Scriptures by enjoining thus — “(The Ātmā) should be seen and cogitated upon” i.e. by enjoining cogitation in addition to hearing, show that here, reasoning also should be welcomed with respect (as a means).
अतस्तर्कनिमित्तः पुनराक्षेपः क्रियते ‘न विलक्षणत्वादस्य’ इति॥
That is why an objection based on reasoning is here taken, thus — “No, because of this (the world) being dissimilar”.
यदुक्तम् चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिः इति, तन्नोपपद्यते।
It is not reasonably sustainable to say — as is said — that sentient Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world.
कस्मात्? विलक्षणत्वादस्य विकारस्य प्रकृत्याः –
Why so? Because of this alleged modification or effect of Brahman (i.e. this world) being dissimilar to the material cause (Brahman).
इदं हि ब्रह्मकार्यत्वेनाभिप्रेयमाणं जगद्ब्रह्मविलक्षणमचेतनमशुद्धं च दृश्यते;
This world which is alleged to be a modification of Brahman appears to be non-sentient and impure and therefore dissimilar to Brahman,
ब्रह्म च जगद्विलक्षणं चेतनं शुद्धं च श्रूयते;
While the Scriptures declare Brahman to be sentient and pure i.e. dissimilar to the world.
न च विलक्षणत्वे प्रकृतिविकारभावो दृष्टः;
No relationship such as that of a cause to its effect is ever seen where there is dissimilarity (between two things).
न हि रुचकादयो विकारा मृत्प्रकृतिका भवन्ति, शरावादयो वा सुवर्णप्रकृतिकाः;
Modifications such as ornaments etc. cannot have clay as their material cause, nor can earthen pots etc. have gold as their material cause.
मृदैव तु मृदन्विता विकाराः क्रियन्ते, सुवर्णेन च सुवर्णान्विताः;
Modifications having the nature of earth are effected from earth alone, and those having the nature of gold from gold alone.
तथेदमपि जगदचेतनं सुखदुःखमोहान्वितं सत् अचेतनस्यैव सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य कारणस्य कार्यं भवितुमर्हति, न विलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणः।
Similarly, this world, non-sentient and of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, as it is, deserves to be the modification of a cause which similarly is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, and not (a modification) of Brahman which is dissimilar.
ब्रह्मविलक्षणत्वं चास्य जगतोऽशुद्ध्यचेतनत्वदर्शनादवगन्तव्यम्।
Dissimilarity of this world from Brahman should be understood from the world’s impurity and from its being non-sentient.
अशुद्धं हीदं जगत्, सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया प्रीतिपरितापविषादादिहेतुत्वात्स्वर्गनरकाद्युच्चावचप्रपञ्चत्वाच्च।
The world after all is impure, because, on account of its nature of pleasure, pain, and infatuation, it is the cause of happiness, grief and dejection, and because of the diversity of the world with its high and low abodes, such as heaven and hell etc.
अचेतनं चेदं जगत्, चेतनं प्रति कार्यकरणभावेनोपकरणभावोपगमात्।
This world is non-sentient, again, as it is understood that it constitutes itself as the subservient instrument of the intelligent Self by means of a body and sense-organs.
न हि साम्ये सत्युपकार्योपकारकभावो भवति;
When there is similarity (between two things), there never is a relationship between them, by way of the one helping and the other receiving such help.
न हि प्रदीपौ परस्परस्योपकुरुतः।
For instance, two lamps do not help each other.
ननु चेतनमपि कार्यकरणं स्वामिभृत्यन्यायेन भोक्तुरुपकरिष्यति।
But (says the Vedāntin) even a sentient instrument may subserve the enjoying Self, on the analogy of the maxim of a master and a servant?
न, स्वामिभृत्ययोरप्यचेतनांशस्यैव चेतनं प्रत्युपकारकत्वात्;
To the foregoing argument, the opponent replies: — No. In the master and servant illustration also, it is only the non-sentient part (of the servant) that serves the sentient (master).
यो ह्येकस्य चेतनस्य परिग्रहो बुद्ध्यादिरचेतनभागः स एवान्यस्य चेतनस्योपकरोति,
It is the non-sentient property of Buddhi (which is considered to be a sense-organ) of one sentient thing that helps the other sentient thing,
न तु स्वयमेव चेतनश्चेतनान्तरस्योपकरोत्यपकरोति वा;
And not that one sentient thing itself either helps or causes impediment to another sentient thing.
निरतिशया ह्यकर्तारश्चेतना इति सांख्या मन्यन्ते;
The Sāṅkhyas hold that sentient things (such as Selfs) are sans-qualities and inert.
Therefore, the modifications such as a body and sense-organs are non-sentient.
न च काष्ठलोष्टादीनां चेतनत्वे किञ्चित्प्रमाणमस्ति;
There is no authority to hold that things such as wood or clay are sentient.
प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनविभागो लोके।
The division of things into sentient and non-sentient is popularly well-known.
Therefore, since this world is dissimilar to Brahman, it cannot have Brahman as its material cause.
योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत – श्रुत्वा जगतश्चेतनप्रकृतिकताम्,
If somebody were to argue in this connection, thus — As the Scriptures declare that the world has a sentient entity (Brahman) as its material cause,
तद्बलेनैव समस्तं जगच्चेतनमवगमयिष्यामि,
I would on the strength of that very statement hold that the whole world is sentient,
Because the nature of the cause is invariably seen to inhere in the modification or effect,
अविभावनं तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद्भविष्यति;
And that the non-manifestation of sentiency (in the modification) may well be due to a peculiarity of the modification.
यथा स्पष्टचैतन्यानामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्छाद्यवस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते,
And just as, even though the sentiency of Selfs is patent, yet it is not manifest during the condition of sleep or swoon,
एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभावयिष्यते;
Even so, the sentiency of a piece of wood or a clod of earth may not be manifest.
एतस्मादेव च विभावितत्वाविभावितत्वकृताद्विशेषाद्रूपादिभावाभावाभ्यां च
And it may well be, that, because this peculiarity of the existence of form (Rūpa) etc. or its absence, is due to the manifestation or non-manifestation of sentiency,
कार्यकरणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोत्स्यते;
That, it is, that even though the quality of sentiency is common both to effects and their causes, i.e. the Selfs, there is no conflict between them, by way of one amongst them being subordinate and the other superior.
यथा च पार्थिवत्वाविशेषेऽपि मांससूपौदनादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात्परस्परोपकारित्वं भवति, एवमिहापि भविष्यति;
And just as, even though meat, soup, and rice have the common quality of being earthy, they become mutually helpful on account of the peculiarity of each of them in themselves, so may it well be, in the present case,
प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोत्स्यत इति –
And thus there would be no conflict with respect to the well-known division (of things being sentient and nonsentient).
तेनापि कथञ्चिच्चेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विलक्षणत्वं परिह्रियेत;
But (says the opponent), that may at the most be able to refute the dissimilarity of the nature of things being sentient and non-sentient,
शुद्ध्यशुद्धित्वलक्षणं तु विलक्षणत्वं नैव परिह्रियते।
But all the same it won’t be able to refute the dissimilarity of the natures of purity or impurity (as between Brahman and the world).
न चेतरदपि विलक्षणत्वं परिहर्तुं शक्यत इत्याह – तथात्वं च शब्दादिति;
Nor can even dissimilarity of the sort referred to above (i.e. sentient and non-sentient) happen to be really refuted thus, because (as the Sūtra says) — “The Scriptures declare it to be so”.
अनवगम्यमानमेव हीदं लोके समस्तस्य वस्तुनश्चेतनत्वं
Even if the sentient nature of all things (i.e. effects), though non-discernible in the ordinary world, were to be so predicated of them,
And even if all those things were to be so understood, because the Scriptures declare them to have a cause of a sentient nature (i.e. Brahman), by merely considering the Scriptures as the sheet-anchor of authority,
तच्च शब्देनैव विरुध्यते, यतः शब्दादपि तथात्वमवगम्यते;
Even then, it is contradicted by the Scriptures themselves, because, that they are so dissimilar, is understood even on the authority of the Scriptures themselves.
तथात्वमिति प्रकृतिविलक्षणत्वं कथयति;
Because, ‘Tathātvam’ here means, being dissimilar to the material cause (i.e. Brahman).
शब्द एव ‘विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति कस्यचिद्विभागस्याचेतनतां श्रावयंश्चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणो विलक्षणमचेतनं जगच्छ्रावयति॥४॥
The Scriptures themselves speak about this non-sentiency of a part, thus — “It became that which is endowed with knowledge (Vijñāna) and that which is devoid of knowledge (Avijñāna)” (TaitUEng.2.6), and they also declare the non-sentient and inert world to be dissimilar to the sentient Brahman. — 4.
ननु चेतनत्वमपि क्वचिदचेतनत्वाभिमतानां भूतेन्द्रियाणां श्रूयते – यथा ‘मृदब्रवीत्’ ‘आपोऽब्रुवन्’ (श. ब्रा. ६-१-३-२-४) इति ‘तत्तेज ऐक्षत’ (ChanU.6.2.3)
But — says some other opponent — the Scriptures themselves speak of the sentient nature of the elements and sense-organs which have been understood to be non-sentient, thus — “The Earth spake, the waters spake” (Śat. Brā. 6. 1.3.2. 4).
‘ता आप ऐक्षन्त’ (ChanU.6.2.4) इति चैवमाद्या भूतविषया चेतनत्वश्रुतिः;
“That fire thought”, “Water thought” etc., which speak of the sentience of the elements [Trans. from Panoli].
इन्द्रियविषयापि – ‘ते हेमे प्राणा अहंश्रेयसे विवदमाना ब्रह्म जग्मुः’ (BrhU.6.1.7) इति,
With regard to the sense-organs the Scriptures say — “Now these Prāṇas (sense-organs) disputing amongst themselves as to which of them was pre-eminent amongst them, approached Brahman” (BrhUEng.6.1.7),
‘ते ह वाचमूचुस्त्वं न उद्गायेति’ (BrhU.1.3.2) इत्येवमाद्येन्द्रियविषयेति।
“They said to Speech (Vāk), do thou recite (Sāman) for us” (BrhUEng.1.3.2) etc.
अत उत्तरं पठति –
To this objection the Sūtra-kāra replies: —
←PrevNext→ अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम्॥२.१.५॥ Abhimāni-vyapadeśas tu viśeṣānugatibhyām.
Abhimāni: the presiding deity (of the organs and the elements); Vyapadeśaḥ: an expression, an indication, pointing out of, denotation of; Tu: but; Viśeṣa: specific adjunct, on account of distinction, because of so being qualified; Anugatibhyām: the act of pervading; (Viśeṣa-anugatibhyām: from the specific adjunct as well as from the fact of pervading, on account of their entering).
🔗 But, because of special characterization (Viśeṣa) and relation (Sambandha), this reference is to those presiding (deities). — 220.127.116.11.1.5 L.6
The word ‘But’ removes the doubt.
न खलु ‘मृदब्रवीत्’ इत्येवंजातीयकया श्रुत्या भूतेन्द्रियाणां चेतनत्वमाशङ्कनीयम्, यतोऽभिमानिव्यपदेश एषः;
Scriptural passages such as “The Earth spake, the waters spake” etc. should not be suspected of referring to the sentient nature of elements and sense-organs, because this reference is to the presiding entities (deities).
मृदाद्यभिमानिन्यो वागाद्यभिमानिन्यश्च चेतना देवता वदनसंवदनादिषु चेतनोचितेषु व्यवहारेषु व्यपदिश्यन्ते, न भूतेन्द्रियमात्रम्।
When with reference to elements and sense-organs, activities such as speaking and discussing — proper only to sentient entities — are attributed to them, it is really the sentient entities (deities) which preside over speech (Vāk) and Earth etc., that are meant, and not the elements and sense-organs themselves.
कस्मात्? विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् –
Whence is it so? “Because of the special characterization and connection”.
विशेषो हि भोक्तॄणां भूतेन्द्रियाणां च चेतनाचेतनप्रविभागलक्षणः प्रागभिहितः;
The difference between the enjoying Selfs on the one hand, and the elements and sense-organs on the other, as characterized by a division between those that are sentient and those that are non-sentient, has already been referred to before.
सर्वचेतनतायां चासौ नोपपद्येत;
Were all to be sentient, reference to such a difference (between them) would not be reasonably sustainable.
अपि च कौषीतकिनः प्राणसंवादे करणमात्राशङ्काविनिवृत्तयेऽधिष्ठातृचेतनपरिग्रहाय देवताशब्देन विशिंषन्ति –
‘एता ह वै देवता अहंश्रेयसे विवदमानाः’ इति,
‘ता वा एताः सर्वा देवताः प्राणे निःश्रेयसं विदित्वा’ (कौ. उ. २-१४) इति च।
Besides, those who follow the Kauṣītaki branch, distinguish between them by the use of the word ‘deities’ in the dialogue of the Prāṇas, thus: —
“Those deities, each disputatiously claiming to be preeminent (went to Brahma-deva) etc.”
And also thus — “All these deities knowing Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air) to be pre-eminent” (Kauṣ. Brā. 2.14),
In order to remove the suspicion about the sense-organs (being understood to be meant), and to enable the presiding deities (of the sense-organs) to be understood.
अनुगताश्च सर्वत्राभिमानिन्यश्चेतना देवता मन्त्रार्थवादेतिहासपुराणादिभ्योऽवगम्यन्ते –
These sentient presiding deities are also understood to have a relation (with the elements and sense-organs) as seen from Mantras, Artha-Vādas, Iti-hāsas and Purāṇas.
‘अग्निर्वाग्भूत्वा मुखं प्राविशत्’ (ऐ. आ. २-४-२-४) इत्येवमादिका च श्रुतिः करणेष्वनुग्राहिकां देवतामनुगतां दर्शयति;
The Scriptural passage beginning with “Agni transforming itself into speech (Vāk) entered the mouth” (Ait. Ār. 18.104.22.168) shows that the deity which vouchsafes its favour on the sense-organs is meant.
प्राणसंवादवाक्यशेषे च – ‘ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः’ (ChanU.5.1.7) इति श्रेष्ठत्वनिर्धारणाय प्रजापतिगमनम्,
In the concluding portion of the dialogue of the Prāṇas also, by the Scriptural passage, “Those Prāṇas approached the original parent, Prajā-pati, and said” (ChanU.5.1.7), which speaks of their approaching Prajā-pati for the determination, as to which amongst them was the highest,
There is the ultimate realization by the Prāṇas, by each in turn going out (of the body) as instructed by him, and by positive and negative instances (i.e. Anvaya and Vyatireka) of the pre-eminence of the Prāṇa (the Chief Vital Air).
‘तस्मै बलिहरणम्’ (BrhU.6.1.13) इति चैवंजातीयकोऽस्मदादिष्विव व्यवहारोऽनुगम्यमानोऽभिमानिव्यपदेशं द्रढयति;
And such ordinary activities of the sense-organs, which resemble those of human beings such as ourselves, in the passage “The making of offerings to him (by all the sense-organs)” (BrhUEng.6.1.13), strengthens the view that the reference is to the presiding deities.
‘तत्तेज ऐक्षत’ इत्यपि परस्या एव देवताया अधिष्ठात्र्याः स्वविकारेष्वनुगताया इयमीक्षा व्यपदिश्यत इति द्रष्टव्यम्।
In the passage “The Tejas thought” also, it should be understood that this ‘thinking’ is indicated to have been done, only by the presiding deity (viz. the Highest Brahman) which inheres in its own modification.
तस्माद्विलक्षणमेवेदं ब्रह्मणो जगत्; विलक्षणत्वाच्च न ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम्॥५॥
Therefore, this world is dissimilar to Brahman, and being so, Brahman is not its material cause. — 5.
🔗 But it is seen (to be like that). — 22.214.171.124.1.6 L.2
तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति।
The word ‘But’ refutes the opponent’s view.
यदुक्तम् विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकम् इति, नायमेकान्तः;
The objection taken — viz. that this world being dissimilar (to Brahman), Brahman is not its material cause — is not conclusive.
दृश्यते हि लोके – चेतनत्वेन प्रसिद्धेभ्यः पुरुषादिभ्यो विलक्षणानां केशनखादीनामुत्पत्तिः,
We find in the ordinary world that from men etc., who are known to be sentient, hair, nails etc. which are dissimilar to them are produced,
अचेतनत्वेन च प्रसिद्धेभ्यो गोमयादिभ्यो वृश्चिकादीनाम्।
And scorpions etc. are produced from cowdung etc. which are known to be non-sentient.
नन्वचेतनान्येव पुरुषादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां केशनखादीनां कारणानि,
But (says the opponent) we have said already, that it is the non-sentient bodies of men etc. which are the cause of the non-sentient hair, nails, etc.,
अचेतनान्येव च वृश्चिकादिशरीराण्यचेतनानां गोमयादीनां कार्याणीति।
And the non-sentient bodies of the scorpions etc. that are the effects of the nonsentient cow-dung etc.
उच्यते – एवमपि किञ्चिदचेतनं चेतनस्यायतनभावमुपगच्छति किञ्चिन्नेत्यस्त्येव वैलक्षण्यम्।
(We reply) — But even then, dissimilarity does still persist, in as much as some non-sentient things only, constitute the basis for sentient things, while some do not.
महांश्चायं पारिणामिकः स्वभावविप्रकर्षः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादीनां च स्वरूपादिभेदात्, तथा गोमयादीनां वृश्चिकादीनां च।
Great indeed is this disparity of nature, due to modification (of cause into effect), between men etc., and hair and nails etc., because of dissimilarity of form etc. between them, and similarly also between cowdung and scorpions etc.
अत्यन्तसारूप्ये च प्रकृतिविकारभाव एव प्रलीयेत।
Were there to be complete identity of form (between two things) the very relationship between them as cause and effect would be dissolved.
अथोच्येत – अस्ति कश्चित्पार्थिवत्वादिस्वभावः पुरुषादीनां केशनखादिष्वनुवर्तमानो गोमयादीनां च वृश्चिकादिष्विति।
If it were to be said (by the opponent), that a certain quality of ‘earthiness etc.’ in men etc., continues to inhere at least in the hair and nails, etc., and a similar quality of ‘earthiness etc.' in cowdung etc., at least continues to inhere in scorpions etc.,
ब्रह्मणोऽपि तर्हि सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्तमानो दृश्यते।
(The Vedāntin would retort) that Brahman’s nature of having the characteristic of existence as such (Sattā-lakṣaṇaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ) at least appears to continue to inhere in Ākāśa etc.
विलक्षणत्वेन च कारणेन ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वं जगतो दूषयता किमशेषस्य ब्रह्मस्वभावस्याननुवर्तनं विलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेयते, उत यस्य कस्यचित्, अथ चैतन्यस्येति वक्तव्यम्।
Now you, who wish to vitiate the doctrine of the world having Brahman as to its material cause, on the ground of dissimilarity, have to say, whether by dissimilarity, you mean the non-appearance of the total comprehensive nature of Brahman (in the effect i.e. the world), or the non-appearance of any particular nature, or the nonappearance of the nature of sentiency.
प्रथमे विकल्पे समस्तप्रकृतिविकारभावोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः;
न ह्यसत्यतिशये प्रकृतिविकार इति भवति।
In the case of the first alternative, there would be the predicament of the complete destruction of the relationship of cause and effect as between them,
Because, in the absence of there being something extra (in an effect), there would be no such thing as cause and effect.
द्वितीये चासिद्धत्वम्; दृश्यते हि सत्तालक्षणो ब्रह्मस्वभाव आकाशादिष्वनुवर्तमान इत्युक्तम्।
As regards the second alternative, it cannot be substantiated, because it has already been said that the nature of ‘existence as such’ (Sattā) inherent in Brahman (the cause) is seen to reappear in Ākāśa etc. (the effects).
तृतीये तु दृष्टान्ताभावः;
So far as the third alternative is concerned, there is absence of any illustration (to prove it).
किं हि यच्चैतन्येनानन्वितं तदब्रह्मप्रकृतिकं दृष्टमिति ब्रह्मकारणवादिनं प्रत्युदाह्रियेत, समस्तस्य वस्तुजातस्य ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकत्वाभ्युपगमात्।
To what entity — which is at once non-sentient but which is not seen to have Brahman as its cause — can you possibly refer to (as actually existing), as an illustration (of your alternative), in answer to the doctrine of a follower of Vedānta (i.e. Brahmavādin) who holds that all things have Brahman as their cause?
आगमविरोधस्तु प्रसिद्ध एव, चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यागमतात्पर्यस्य प्रसाधितत्वात्।
The opposition of the Scriptures (to the view of the opponent) is well-known, because it has already been established, that the conclusion of the Vedas is, that sentient Brahman is both the accidental and the material cause of the world.
यत्तूक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद्ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि सम्भवेयुरिति,
As regards the objection (of the opponent), viz. that as Brahman is an already established entity, other means-of-proof can come into operation (for establishing Brahman),
(We reply) — that it is mere wishful thinking.
रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः;
This entity (Brahman) devoid of any form as it is, is neither perceptible by any direct (occular) means-of-proof,
Nor is it perceptible by inference etc., as there is absence of any indicatory mark about it (i.e. Brahman).
आगममात्रसमधिगम्य एव त्वयमर्थो धर्मवत्;
Like religious duty, it (i.e. Brahman) is understandable from the Scriptures alone.
तथा च श्रुतिः – ‘नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया प्रोक्तान्येनैव सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ’ (KathU.1.2.9) इति;
So say the Scriptures also — “This knowledge cannot be acquired by reasoning. Oh dear one, it becomes properly understood only when it is taught by another (competent person).” (KathU.1.2.9),
‘को अद्धा वेद क इह प्रवोचत्’ ‘इयं विसृष्टिर्यत आबभूव’ (ऋ. सं. १-३०-६) इति चैते ऋचौ सिद्धानामपीश्वराणां दुर्बोधतां जगत्कारणस्य दर्शयतः;
“Who indeed knows whence came this creation”, and “From what did it originate” (Ṛg. Sam. 1.30.6). These Vedic Ṛks show how difficult it is even for Gods who have acquired super-human powers, to understand this cause of the world.
स्मृतिरपि भवति – ‘अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्’ इति,
The Smṛti also says — “These entities are inscrutable, and one should not try to understand them by reasoning.”
‘अव्यक्तोऽयमचिन्त्योऽयमविकार्योऽयमुच्यते’ (BhG.2.25) इति च,
Smṛtis also are of the same type, thus: — “He is said to be unmanifest or unevolved, inscrutable and unchangeable” (BhG.2.25).
‘न मे विदुः सुरगणाः प्रभवं न महर्षयः। अहमादिर्हि देवानां महर्षीणां च सर्वशः’ (BhG.10.2) इति चैवंजातीयका।
“Not even these hosts of Gods know my origin, as I myself am the comprehensive origin of the Gods and Ṛṣis” (BhG.10.2).
यदपि श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधच्छब्द एव तर्कमप्यादर्तव्यं दर्शयतीत्युक्तम्,
With regard to the objection, viz. that it has been said that as the Scriptures enjoin cogitation in addition to the hearing of it, it shows that they welcome reasoning also with due respect,
नानेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्यात्रात्मलाभः सम्भवति;
(Our reply is) — mere empty reasoning cannot justify its own help (to the understanding of Brahman) on some such pretext.
श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते –
It is only such reasoning as is in consonance with the Scriptures that can be resorted to as a subordinate auxiliary to experience.
For instance, — that (1) as the conditions of dreams and wakefulness mutually differ from each other, the Self is not connected with either of these conditions
सम्प्रसादे च प्रपञ्चपरित्यागेन सदात्मना सम्पत्तेर्निष्प्रपञ्चसदात्मत्वम्,
And (2) in as much as in the condition of deep sleep, the Jīva-Self gives up its phenomenal existence and becomes one with the Highest Self, its nature is purely that of ‘Sat’ Self (i.e. Being) and has no phenomenal existence,
प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वात्कार्यकारणानन्यत्वन्यायेन ब्रह्माव्यतिरेकः – इत्येवंजातीयकः;
And (3) as all phenomenal existence originates from Brahman, in accordance with the maxim of the cause and effect not being different from each other, it is not different from Brahman.
‘तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादि’(BrS.2.1.11) ति च केवलस्य तर्कस्य विप्रलम्भकत्वं दर्शयिष्यति।
The Sūtra-kāra will hereafter illustrate the fallaciousness of mere reasoning, by the Sūtra — “Because of the inconclusiveness of reasoning” (BrS.2.1.11).
योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगतश्चेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षेत,
He, who, on the strength of the Scriptures that speak of a sentient cause, conjectures that the whole world is sentient,
तस्यापि ‘विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति चेतनाचेतनविभागश्रवणं
विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम्।
May be able to explain the division into sentient and non-sentient as referred to by the Scriptures in “He becomes knowledge (Vijñāna), and becomes that which is not-knowledge (Avijñāna)”
As being due to the manifestation or the absence of manifestation of sentiency.
परस्यैव त्विदमपि विभागश्रवणं न युज्यते।
But this division referred to by Scriptures would not be of any help to the other (i.e. our opponent).
कथम्? परमकारणस्य ह्यत्र समस्तजगदात्मना समवस्थानं श्राव्यते – ‘विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चाभवत्’ इति;
How is that? Because the Scriptures by the passage “(He became) knowledge (Vijñāna) and (became) that which is not-knowledge (Avijñāna)” speak about the Highest cause (i.e. Brahman) as constituting itself as the entire world.
तत्र यथा चेतनस्याचेतनभावो नोपपद्यते विलक्षणत्वात्,
So, as according to him, by reason of dissimilarity, it is not reasonably possible to consider, that a sentient cause can become a non-sentient effect,
एवमचेतनस्यापि चेतनभावो नोपपद्यते।
Similarly, a non-sentient cause (such as Pradhāna) also, cannot modify itself into a sentient effect.
प्रत्युक्तत्वात्तु विलक्षणत्वस्य यथा श्रुत्यैव चेतनं कारणं ग्रहीतव्यं भवति॥६॥
Therefore, as the objection based on dissimilarity thus stands refuted, (the view) that the cause (of the world) is sentient as spoken of by Scriptures, has necessarily to be accepted. — 6.
←PrevNext→ असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्॥२.१.७॥ Asad iti cen na pratiṣedha-mātratvāt.
A-sat: non-existence; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no; Pratiṣedha-mātratvāt: because of denial, as it simply denies.
🔗 (If the opponent were to say) (that before creation) it (i.e. the effect) was nonexistent (Asat), (we reply) No. (To say so) would be but only a mere negation. — 126.96.36.199.1.7 L.1
यदि चेतनं शुद्धं शब्दादिहीनं च ब्रह्म तद्विपरीतस्याचेतनस्याशुद्धस्य शब्दादिमतश्च कार्यस्य कारणमिष्येत,
(If the opponent were to say) — If you (the Vedāntin) were to have it, that the sentient, pure, and soundless etc. Brahman is the material cause of quite a dissimilar effect, i.e. an effect which is non-sentient, impure, and is endowed with the quality of sound etc.,
असत्तर्हि कार्यं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति प्रसज्येत;
Then it would necessarily be, that before creation, the effect was non-existent,
अनिष्टं चैतत्सत्कार्यवादिनस्तवेति चेत् –
Which of course would not be acceptable to you, an adherent of ‘the view of the pre-existence of an effect before its origination’ (Sat-kārya-Vāda).
नैष दोषः, प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्; प्रतिषेधमात्रं हीदम्;
(We would reply) — This is no fault, because it (i.e. what you the opponent have said) would but amount to a mere negation only,
नास्य प्रतिषेधस्य प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति।
Having nothing substantial at all of which it can be a negation.
न ह्ययं प्रतिषेधः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रतिषेद्धुं शक्नोति।
This sort of mere negation cannot possibly be able to deny the pre-existence of the effect prior to its creation.
कथम्? यथैव हीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मना सत्, एवं प्रागुत्पत्तेरपीति गम्यते;
How can it be so? It is understood, that just as even at the present moment the effect having its self as its cause does exist, even so does the effect exist before its creation (in the form of the Self, which is its cause).
न हीदानीमपीदं कार्यं कारणात्मानमन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमेवास्ति –
Even at the present moment, the effect does not have existence, independently of the Self of its cause,
‘सर्वं तं परादाद्योऽन्यत्रात्मनः सर्वं वेद’ (BrhU.2.4.6) इत्यादिश्रवणात्;
Because the Scriptures say thus: — “Everything ousts (i.e. abandons or outlaws) him who looks upon everything as (existing) apart from its Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6).
कारणात्मना तु सत्त्वं कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेरविशिष्टम्।
The existence of the effect before its creation, however, as the Self of its cause, is not different (from the existence of the effect, as an effect having that cause as its Self).
ननु शब्दादिहीनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणम्।
Oh, but (says the opponent) Brahman which is soundless etc., is the cause of the world (isn’t it what you hold?).
बाढम् – न तु शब्दादिमत्कार्यं कारणात्मना हीनं प्रागुत्पत्तेरिदानीं वा अस्ति;
(The Vedāntin replies) — Certainly, but an effect which is equipped with the quality of sound etc. is never without its cause ‘the Self’ inhering in it, before its creation, nor is it so now (after the effect is created).
तेन न शक्यते वक्तुं प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यमिति।
Hence, it cannot be maintained that an effect is non-existent before its creation.
विस्तरेण चैतत्कार्यकारणानन्यत्ववादे वक्ष्यामः॥७॥
We will speak at greater length about this, when we discuss the subject of the doctrine of the cause and effect not being different from each other. — 7.
Apitau: at the time of Pralaya or the great dissolution; Tadvat: like that, like the effect; Prasaṅgāt: on account of the consequences; A-samanjasam: inconsistent, absurd.
🔗 (The doctrine of the Vedāntin) is absurd i.e. incongruous because, during the resorption of the world there would be the predicament (of the cause i.e. Brahman) becoming like the effect (i.e. the world). — 188.8.131.52.1.8 L.1
अत्राह – यदि स्थौल्यसावयवत्त्वाचेतनत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वाशुद्ध्यादिधर्मकं कार्यं ब्रह्मकारणकमभ्युपगम्येत,
(Says the opponent here) — If you (the Vedāntin) were to understand that this effect (i.e. this world) which has the qualities of grossness, of having parts, of having no sentiency, of being circumscribed i.e. limited, and impure, has Brahman as its cause,
तदापीतौ प्रलये प्रतिसंसृज्यमानं कार्यं कारणाविभागमापद्यमानं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदिति –
Then during resorption, i.e. during the great flood when the effect is being reabsorbed and is becoming one with its cause, it will contaminate the cause with its own qualities,
अपीतौ कारणस्यापि ब्रह्मणः कार्यस्येवाशुद्ध्यादिरूपताप्रसङ्गात्
And so during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause (i.e. Brahman) acquiring the nature of the qualities of impurity etc.;
सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणमित्यसमञ्जसमिदमौपनिषदं दर्शनम्।
And thus the Upanishadic doctrine, that the Omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, would appear to be absurd i.e. incongruous.
अपि च समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियमकारणाभावाद्भोक्तृभोग्यादिविभागेनोत्पत्तिर्न प्राप्नोतीत्यसमञ्जसम्।
It would also appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous, because, after all the effects have once become one with the cause, in the absence of any rule to guide the recreation (of the effects), there would not be any recreation of the experiencing Selfs and the things to be experienced etc., separately.
अपि च भोक्तॄणां परेण ब्रह्मणा अविभागं गतानां कर्मादिनिमित्तप्रलयेऽपि पुनरुत्पत्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्।
Besides if one were to understand, that after the experiencing Selfs have once become one with Brahman and when Karma (as the cause of recreation) has been destroyed, they are all liable to be recreated, then, there would result the predicament that those who have obtained their Final Release, would also be liable for a rebirth, and thus again, the doctrine would appear to be absurd, i.e. incongruous.
अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेत, एवमप्यपीतिश्च न सम्भवति कारणाव्यतिरिक्तं च कार्यं न सम्भवति
If it were to be maintained again that even after resorption the world would continue to retain its distinctive condition separate from the Highest Brahman, then in that case resorption itself as such, would not be possible, because no effect (according to your doctrine) can possibly exist without its cause being inherent in it.
Thus again the doctrine would appear to be absurd. — 8.
←PrevNext→ न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्॥२.१.९॥ Na tu dṛṣṭānta-bhāvāt.
Na: not; Tu: but; Dṛṣṭānta-bhāvāt: on account of illustrations.
🔗 (To this objection of the opponent) the Vedāntin says — It is not so, however, because there are illustrations. — 184.108.40.206.1.9 L.1
अत्रोच्यते – नैवास्मदीये दर्शने किञ्चिदसामञ्जस्यमस्ति।
There is not the least absurdity or incongruity in our doctrine.
यत्तावदभिहितम् – कारणमपिगच्छत्कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण दूषयेदिति,
What you (the opponent) have said, viz. that the effect as it becomes one with its cause, would contaminate the cause with its own qualities,
Is no such fault at all.
कस्मात्? दृष्टान्तभावात् – सन्ति हि दृष्टान्ताः, यथा कारणमपिगच्छत्कार्यं कारणमात्मीयेन धर्मेण न दूषयति;
How is it so? Because, there are illustrations which show, how, when an effect merges into its cause, it does not contaminate the cause with its qualities.
तद्यथा – शरावादयो मृत्प्रकृतिका विकारा विभागावस्थायामुच्चावचमध्यमप्रभेदाः सन्तः
पुनः प्रकृतिमपिगच्छन्तो न तामात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति;
For instance, earthen troughs etc. which are effects, having earth as their material cause, and which while they exist as effects are individually separate entities having big, small and intermediate dimensions,
Do not contaminate their cause, when they merge back into it (i.e. the earth);
रुचकादयश्च सुवर्णविकारा अपीतौ न सुवर्णमात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजन्ति;
Nor do ornaments etc. which are the effects of gold, contaminate gold with their own qualities when they merge into it.
पृथिवीविकारश्चतुर्विधो भूतग्रामो न पृथिवीमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण संसृजति;
Similarly also, all these beings of the four categories, which are the effects of earth, do not, during resorption, infect the earth with their qualities.
त्वत्पक्षस्य तु न कश्चिद्दृष्टान्तोऽस्ति;
The followers of your (i.e. the opponent’s) view on the other hand have no such illustration to cite.
अपीतिरेव हि न सम्भवेत्, यदि कारणे कार्यं स्वधर्मेणैवावतिष्ठेत।
Resorption itself would not take place, were the effect to (try to) retain its distinctive quality while merging with its cause.
अनन्यत्वेऽपि कार्यकारणयोः, कार्यस्य कारणात्मत्वम्, न तु कारणस्य कार्यात्मत्वम् –
‘आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः’ (BrS.2.1.14) इति वक्ष्यामः।
We will speak hereafter in the Sūtra (BrS.2.1.14)
How, even though cause and effect are not different from each other, it is the effect alone which has the cause as its Self, and it is not as though the cause has the effect as its Self.
अत्यल्पं चेदमुच्यते – कार्यमपीतावात्मीयेन धर्मेण कारणं संसृजेदिति;
It would be a very jejune statement that during resorption the effect would contaminate the cause with its own qualities,
स्थितावपि हि समानोऽयं प्रसङ्गः, कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्;
Because, the same predicament would occur while the effect exists as an effect, because it is well understood that there is non-difference between a (material) cause and its effect.
‘इदꣳ सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (BrhU.2.4.6)
Scriptural passages, such as “All this is the Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6),
‘आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्’ (ChanU.7.25.2)
“The Self is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2),
‘ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्’ (MunU.2.2.12)
“Immortal Brahman is this, which is here right in front” (MunU.2.2.12),
‘सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म’ (ChanU.3.14.1)
इत्येवमाद्याभिर्हि श्रुतिभिरविशेषेण त्रिष्वपि कालेषु कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वं श्राव्यते;
“Verily all this is Brahman” (ChanU.3.14.1),
Purport to say, that without exception during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future), the effect is never different from the cause.
तत्र यः परिहारः कार्यस्य तद्धर्माणां चाविद्याध्यारोपितत्वान्न तैः कारणं संसृज्यत इति, अपीतावपि स समानः।
The refutation in such cases — viz. that as both the effect and its qualities are the result of superimposition through Nescience, the cause is not affected by them — is common to resorption also.
अस्ति चायमपरो दृष्टान्तः –
There is this other illustration also.
यथा स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते, अवस्तुत्वात्,
Just as an illusionist is never affected during all the three times, by the illusion projected by himself, in as much as it (i.e. the illusion) is insubstantial,
एवं परमात्मापि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति;
Even so, the Highest Self is never affected by the illusion of transmigratory existence.
यथा च स्वप्नदृगेकः स्वप्नदर्शनमायया न संस्पृश्यते,
Also, just as a person who experiences a dream is never affected by the illusory nature of the dream vision,
In as much as it does not persist during the conditions of deep sleep and wakefulness,
एवमवस्थात्रयसाक्ष्येकोऽव्यभिचार्यवस्थात्रयेण व्यभिचारिणा न संस्पृश्यते।
Even so, this one unchanging, constant and immediate witness of all the three conditions (viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahman) is not affected by the three changing transmigratory conditions (of creation, preservation, and resorption).
यत्परमात्मनोऽवस्थात्रयात्मनावभासनम्, रज्ज्वा इव सर्पादिभावेनेति।
This manifestation of the Highest Self, by its existing as the Self of these three conditions, is — like the appearance of a snake etc. in a rope —
But a mere illusion.
अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः –
With regard to this the Ācārya who is fully conversant with the traditional meaning of Vedānta has said —
‘अनादिमायया सुप्तो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते।
अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा’ (ManKa.1.16) इति।
“When the Jīva-Self that is in deep sleep brought about by the beginningless Māyā, wakes up,
It realizes the unborn, sleepless, dreamless, non-duality (Brahman)” (ManKa.1.16).
तत्र यदुक्तमपीतौ कारणस्यापि कार्यस्येव स्थौल्यादिदोषप्रसङ्ग इति, एतदयुक्तम्।
Hence, when it is said that during resorption there would result the predicament of the cause being affected by the fault of grossness etc. quite as much as the effect, it would not at all be proper.
यत्पुनरेतदुक्तम् – समस्तस्य विभागस्याविभागप्राप्तेः पुनर्विभागेनोत्पत्तौ नियमकारणं नोपपद्यत इति,
Again, when it is said, that when all this differentiated world has become one (with Brahman) there is no regular cause for its being recreated in its usual differentiated form,
अयमप्यदोषः, दृष्टान्तभावादेव –
It would, again, not be a fault, precisely because an illustration is available.
यथा हि सुषुप्तिसमाध्यादावपि सत्यां स्वाभाविक्यामविभागप्राप्तौ
Just as during sleep and meditative trance, even though there naturally is a complete oneness (of the Jīva-Self and the Highest Self),
मिथ्याज्ञानस्यानपोदितत्वात्पूर्ववत्पुनः प्रबोधे विभागो भवति,
False-knowledge not yet having been eradicated, differentiation (as it was before sleep and the mystic trance) is re-established on the Waking up (of the Jīva-Self),
Even so would it be, in this condition (of resorption).
श्रुतिश्चात्र भवति – ‘इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति सम्पद्य न विदुः सति सम्पद्यामह इति,
त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिꣳहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतङ्गो वा दꣳशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदा भवन्ति’ (ChanU.6.9.2,3) इति।
There is this supporting Scriptural passage — “All these beings having become one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman) still do not realize that they have attained this unity with the ‘Sat’,
And they again become what they were here before, viz. whether (they were) a tiger or a lion, a wolf or a boar, a worm or a midge, or a gnat or a mosquito” (ChanU.6.9.2,3).
यथा ह्यविभागेऽपि परमात्मनि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धो विभागव्यवहारः स्वप्नवदव्याहतः स्थितौ दृश्यते,
Just as, even though there is no differentiation in the Highest Self, still, under the binding influence of false-knowledge, such differentiated condition persists continuously, without let or hindrance, as in a dream,
एवमपीतावपि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबद्धैव विभागशक्तिरनुमास्यते।
Even so, the existence of a potential power of differentiation, due to the binding influence of false-knowledge, may be inferred as still surviving during the condition of resorption also.
एतेन मुक्तानां पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः,
This would effectively answer the objection about the predicament of the likelihood of those who have already obtained Final Release having to be born again,
Because true knowledge will have by then supplanted false-knowledge.
यः पुनरयमन्तेऽपरो विकल्प उत्प्रेक्षितः –
अथेदं जगदपीतावपि विभक्तमेव परेण ब्रह्मणावतिष्ठेतेति,
The last alternative (of the opponent) referred to towards the end,
Viz. that the world would continue to remain differentiated from Brahman even during resorption,
Cannot be countenanced, as it never is so understood (by the Vedāntin).
Hence the Upanishadic doctrine, therefore, is perfectly cogent. — 9.
←PrevNext→ स्वपक्षदोषाच्च॥२.१.१०॥ Svapakṣa-doṣāc ca.
Sva-pakṣa-doṣāt: because of the objections, to his own view; Ca: and.
🔗 Also because the faults (pointed out by the Sāṅkhya opponent, against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) will apply to this own doctrine. — 220.127.116.11.1.10 L.1
स्वपक्षे चैते प्रतिवादिनः साधारणा दोषाः प्रादुःष्युः।
The same faults (which are alleged against the doctrine of the Vedāntin) would be commonly applicable to the doctrine of our opponent also.
कथमित्युच्यते – यत्तावदभिहितम्, विलक्षणत्वान्नेदं जगद्ब्रह्मप्रकृतिकमिति प्रधानप्रकृतिकतायामपि समानमेतत्,
The same allegation, viz. that on account of dissimilarity this world could not have Brahman as its material cause, is equally applicable to the doctrine (of the Sāṅkhyas), as they understand that this world has the Pradhāna as its material cause,
शब्दादिहीनात्प्रधानाच्छब्दादिमतो जगत उत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात्;
In as much as, in that case also, the world which possesses the quality of sound etc. would have the soundless Pradhāna as its cause.
अत एव च विलक्षणकार्योत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात् समानः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यवादप्रसङ्गः;
And therefore, in as much as it is understood (by the Sāṅkhyas) that effects dissimilar to the cause come into existence, there is the same predicament of the view of the non-existence of the effect (such as the world), prior to creation, being equally applicable (to the Sāṅkhyas).
तथापीतौ कार्यस्य कारणाविभागाभ्युपगमात्तद्वत्प्रसङ्गोऽपि समानः;
Similarly, (as understood by the Sāṅkhyas) when the effects have become one with their cause during resorption there would result the same predicament (as in the case of the Vedāntin).
तथा मृदितसर्वविशेषेषु विकारेष्वपीतावविभागात्मतां गतेषु,
Similarly, when once during resorption all the special characteristics of the effects have been effaced by their becoming one with their cause,
प्राक्प्रलयात्प्रतिपुरुषं ये नियता भेदाः, न ते तथैव पुनरुत्पत्तौ नियन्तुं शक्यन्ते,
It would not be possible at the time of the recreation (of the world) to regulate the identical reproduction of the distinctive special characteristics of every person before resorption,
Such as that this particular thing is the material cause of this man, and this particular thing, of the other,
Because of the absence of any such regulating cause.
विनैव च कारणेन नियमेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कारणाभावसाम्यान्
Were we to imagine gratuitously the existence of such a regulating cause, (when there is none), the absence in fact of the existence of such regulating cause being common,
There would result the predicament, in the case of those who have already obtained Final Release, of being again subjected to the bondage (of transmigratory existence).
अथ केचिद्भेदा अपीतावविभागमापद्यन्ते केचिन्नेति चेत् –
If (it be said), that during resorption, only some distinctive characteristics become one (with the cause) and others do not,
ये नापद्यन्ते, तेषां प्रधानकार्यत्वं न प्राप्नोति;
Then those that do not attain such oneness, would not be the effects of the Pradhāna,
इत्येवमेते दोषाः साधारणत्वान्नान्यतरस्मिन्पक्षे चोदयितव्या भवन्तीति अदोषतामेवैषां द्रढयति –
And thus, all these faults being common to both the doctrines, they could not be properly directed (by the Sāṅkhya opponent) against his opponent (the Vedāntin), and hence our view that these faults are no faults at all would be strengthened,
As it would necessarily have to be accepted. — 10.
Tarka: reasoning, argument; A-pratiṣṭhānāt: because of not having any fixity or finality; Api: also; Anyathā: otherwise; Anumeyam: to be inferred, to be ascertained, by arguing; Iti cet: if it be said; Evam api: even thus in this way; A-nirmokṣa: want of release, absence of the way out; Prasaṅgaḥ: consequence.
🔗 If it be said (by the opponent) that reasoning being without any sure basis, (i.e. it being inconclusive), an inference otherwise may be drawn, even then the predicament of the non-attainment of Final Release would occur just the same. — 18.104.22.168.1.11 L.1
इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम्;
This is just why, in the case of entities which are understood through the traditional teaching of the Scriptures alone, no objection on the strength of mere reasoning should be made,
यस्मान्निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति,
Because, reasonings, which are not derived from Scriptural traditions and which depend solely on the conjectures of man, happen to be inconclusive,
In as much as such conjectures are unfettered.
तथा हि – कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते;
Reasonings or deductions made by some highly competent persons with great effort, are seen to be demonstrated as fallacious by more competent persons,
तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तस्ततोऽन्यैराभास्यन्त इति
And those made by these latter ones, are also in their turn demonstrated to be equally fallacious by some other persons,
न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुम्, पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्।
And hence as men’s understanding differs, it is not possible to accept that reasonings have sure basis and that they are conclusive.
अथ कस्यचित्प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्यस्य कपिलस्य अन्यस्य वा सम्मतस्तर्कः प्रतिष्ठित इत्याश्रीयेत –
Even if one were to rely on reasoning, acceptable to men of well-known intellectual eminence such as Kapila and others, as having a sure basis and as being conclusive,
Even so, inconclusiveness would be there all the same,
प्रसिद्धमाहात्म्याभिमतानामपि तीर्थकराणां कपिलकणभुक्प्रभृतीनां परस्परविप्रतिपत्तिदर्शनात्।
Because it is seen that Tīrtha-karas (i.e. founders of religions or philosophical schools) such as Kapila and Kaṇāda whose intellectual eminence is well-known are seen mutually to differ from each other.
अथोच्येत – अन्यथा वयमनुमास्यामहे, यथा नाप्रतिष्ठादोषो भविष्यति;
(If the opponent were to say) — we would infer in such other way as would not cause the fault of inconclusiveness,
न हि प्रतिष्ठितस्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुम्;
Because it cannot possibly be said that there never can be any reasoning which is conclusive,
एतदपि हि तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते,
We say, that you cannot say so because even this inconclusiveness of reasoning is itself established by reasoning alone,
केषाञ्चित्तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वदर्शनेनान्येषामपि तज्जातीयकानां तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात्;
Viz. by conjecturing, that because some reasonings are seen to be inconclusive, other reasonings of a similar nature also are inconclusive.
सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः;
Besides, if all reasoning were to be inconclusive, there would result the predicament of the destruction of all worldly transactions.
अतीतवर्तमानाध्वसाम्येन ह्यनागतेऽप्यध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानो लोको दृश्यते;
It is seen, that people in general are impelled towards activity in their future course, either for acquiring happiness or avoiding pain, by its similarity to the past or the present course.
श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते;
When there is contradiction in Scriptural passages, it is only by means of reasoning, which explains the general force or import of sentences, and by refuting their wrong and apparent meaning, that the correct ascertainment of their meaning is accomplished.
मनुरपि चैवं मन्यते –
Manu also thinks similarly when he says thus: —
‘प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम्। त्रयं सुविदितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता’ इति
“Those who desire the purity of Dharma (i.e. the desire to be able to distinguish Dharma — law of religious duties — from Adharma i.e. wrong notions about it), have to know well the triad of direct perception, inference and Śāstra based on different traditional knowledges of various sorts” (Manu. Smṛ. 12. 105),
‘आर्षं धर्मोपदेशं च वेदशास्त्राविरोधिना। यस्तर्केणानुसन्धत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः’ (मनु. स्मृ. १२-१०५,१०६) इति च ब्रुवन्।
And “He alone and none other really knows Dharma, who combines the instructions about religious duties by sages, with reasoning which is not opposed to the Vedic Śāstra” (Manu. Smṛ. 12. 106).
अयमेव च तर्कस्यालङ्कारः – यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम;
That reasoning is by nature inconclusive, is indeed in itself something which constitutes its glory or ornament (Alaṅ-kāra).
एवं हि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति;
It is exactly because it is so, that faulty reasoning is rejected and faultless reasoning has to be arrived at (just as by refuting the really faulty view of an opponent, the Siddhānta (i.e. final conclusion) is arrived at).
न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणम्।
There is no justification for a person to be an ignoramus because his ancestor happened to be so.
तस्मान्न तर्काप्रतिष्ठानं दोष इति चेत् –
Hence, if it be said that, that reasoning is without a firm basis and is inconclusive, is no fault,
(We reply) — that way also in the case of reasoning there would still be the predicament of the absence of escape from fault just the same.
यद्यपि क्वचिद्विषये तर्कस्य प्रतिष्ठितत्वमुपलक्ष्यते,
Even though with regard to some particular subject, reasoning is seen to have a firm basis i.e. it is conclusive,
तथापि प्रकृते तावद्विषये प्रसज्यत एवाप्रतिष्ठितत्वदोषादनिर्मोक्षस्तर्कस्य;
Still so far as the present subject is concerned, the objection that reasoning cannot escape the fault of having no firm basis and being inconclusive, does apply all the same.
न हीदमतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनमागममन्तरेणोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्;
Barring traditional instruction of the Vedas, it is not possible even to indulge in any conjecture about the very deep nature and positive existence of an entity (Brahman) as such, on which Final Release depends.
रूपाद्यभावाद्धि नायमर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनामिति चावोचाम।
Because we have said already, that due to its being formless etc., it is not perceptible directly, and due to its being without any indicatory mark etc., it is not amenable to inference etc.
अपि च सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामभ्युपगमः;
Besides all those who believe in Final Release, understand, that perfect knowledge (of Brahman) results in Final Release.
तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपम्, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्;
That perfect knowledge, which is dependent on the thing-in-itself (for its validity), is of a uniform nature.
एकरूपेण ह्यवस्थितो योऽर्थः स परमार्थः;
That entity which exists uniformly is the highest entity.
लोके तद्विषयं ज्ञानं सम्यग्ज्ञानमित्युच्यते – यथाग्निरुष्ण इति;
In the ordinary world, knowledge about it is understood to be perfect knowledge, as for instance the knowledge that ‘fire is hot’.
तत्रैवं सति सम्यग्ज्ञाने पुरुषाणां विप्रतिपत्तिरनुपपन्ना;
It being so, it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand that men can have differences about perfect knowledge.
तर्कज्ञानानां त्वन्योन्यविरोधात्प्रसिद्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः;
Mutual differences amongst men, about knowledges as a result of reasoning, are notorious.
यद्धि केनचित्तार्किकेणेदमेव सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिष्ठापितम्, तदपरेण व्युत्थाप्यते;
That, whatever is expounded by cne logician as perfect knowledge, is upset by another,
तेनापि प्रतिष्ठापितं ततोऽपरेण व्युत्थाप्यत इति च प्रसिद्धं लोके;
And that established by him, is upset by yet a third, is well-known in the ordinary world.
कथमेकरूपानवस्थितविषयं तर्कप्रभवं सम्यग्ज्ञानं भवेत्;
How ever, then, can knowledge arrived at by reasoning, which is not of one settled aspect, be correct knowledge?
न च प्रधानवादी तर्कविदामुत्तम इति सर्वैस्तार्किकैः परिगृहीतः,
It is not as if a follower of the doctrine of the Pradhāna is accepted by all logicians as the best amongst the professors of logic,
येन तदीयं मतं सम्यग्ज्ञानमिति प्रतिपद्येमहि;
So that we can understand that, that which is understood by him to be correct knowledge, is in fact so.
न च शक्यन्तेऽतीतानागतवर्तमानास्तार्किका एकस्मिन्देशे काले च समाहर्तुम्,
It is not possible to get together all the past, present and future logicians at one time and in one place,
येन तन्मतिरेकरूपैकार्थविषया सम्यङ्मतिरिति स्यात्;
So that the uniform nature of their knowledge about an entity, could be correct knowledge.
वेदस्य तु नित्यत्वे विज्ञानोत्पत्तिहेतुत्वे च सति व्यवस्थितार्थविषयत्वोपपत्तेः,
The Scriptures on the other hand being eternal and being the cause of the attainment of knowledge, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand them to have the ability to possess well-established knowledge of an entity,
तज्जनितस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यक्त्वमतीतानागतवर्तमानैः सर्वैरपि तार्किकैरपह्नोतुमशक्यम्;
So that, it is not possible for the whole lot of past and future logicians to deny the correctness of the knowledge arising from them (i.e. the Scriptures).
अतः सिद्धमस्यैवौपनिषदस्य ज्ञानस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वम्;
Hence, the correctness of the Upanishadic knowledge alone is firmly established.
अतोऽन्यत्र सम्यग्ज्ञानत्वानुपपत्तेः संसाराविमोक्ष एव प्रसज्येत।
In as much as correct knowledge anywhere outside this, is not reasonably sustainable, the predicament of non-release from transmigratory existence would necessarily result.
अत आगमवशेन आगमानुसारितर्कवशेन च
Hence, on the strength of the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, and with the help of reasoning conformable to such traditional instructions of the Scriptures,
चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेति स्थितम्॥११॥
It is thus firmly established that the sentient Brahman is the material as well as the accidental cause of the world. — 11.
←PrevNext→ एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः॥२.१.१२॥ Etena śiṣṭāparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ.
Etena: by this (by the above reasoning, by what has been said against Sāṅkhya); Śiṣṭa-aparigrahāḥ: not accepted by the wise or competent persons; Api: also; Vyākhyātāḥ: are explained or refuted.
🔗 By this (refutation of the Sāṅkhya doctrine) others (i.e. other views) also which competent persons have categorically rejected, and also answered. — 22.214.171.124.1.12 L.1
वैदिकस्य दर्शनस्य प्रत्यासन्नत्वाद्
वेदानुसारिभिश्च कैश्चिच्छिष्टैः केनचिदंशेन परिगृहीतत्वात्
प्रधानकारणवादं तावद्व्यपाश्रित्य यस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेपो वेदान्तवाक्येषूद्भावितः, स परिहृतः;
So far objection to the Vedānta passages based on reasoning, by the adherents of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world, is thus refuted,
As it (i.e. Pradhāna doctrine) is nearest to the Vedānta doctrine,
And as it is further reinforced by weighty reasoning,
And as it has been to a certain extent accepted by learned persons who are followers of the Vedas.
इदानीमण्वादिवादव्यपाश्रयेणापि कैश्चिन्मन्दमतिभिर्वेदान्तवाक्येषु पुनस्तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेप आशङ्क्यत इति अतः प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेनातिदिशति – परिगृह्यन्त इति परिग्रहाः;
Now, some slow-witted persons taking their stand on the Atomic doctrine have raised doubts based on reasoning about the Vedānta passages, so (the Sūtra-kāra) extends the application of the foregoing refutation (of the Sāṅkhya doctrine) to the doctrine of the atom, following the maxim of ‘the knocking out of the best (lit., chief) athlete.’
न परिग्रहाः अपरिग्रहाः; शिष्टानामपरिग्रहाः शिष्टापरिग्रहाः;
(Here the Bhāṣya-kāra explains the word ‘Śiṣṭāparigrahaḥ’ thus: —) What is accepted is ‘Parigraha’, what is not accepted is ‘Aparigraha’, what is not accepted by the learned is ‘Śiṣṭāparigrahaḥ’.
एतेन प्रकृतेन प्रधानकारणवादनिराकरणकारणेन;
By reason of this refutation of the doctrine of the Pradhāna being the cause of the world,
शिष्टैर्मनुव्यासप्रभृतिभिः केनचिदप्यंशेनापरिगृहीता येऽण्वादिकारणवादाः,
तेऽपि प्रतिषिद्धतया व्याख्याता निराकृता द्रष्टव्याः;
The Atomic and other doctrines of the cause (of the world) which are not accepted in the least (i.e. are categorically rejected) by learned persons such as Manu and Vyāsa,
Should also he understood as having been explained as rejected, i.e. refuted,
तुल्यत्वान्निराकरणकारणस्य नात्र पुनराशङ्कितव्यं किञ्चिदस्ति;
because the reasons of refutation are the same, and there is no room for any thing further to be doubted.
तुल्यमत्रापि परमगम्भीरस्य जगत्कारणस्य तर्कानवगाह्यत्वम्,
आगमविरोधश्च – इत्येवंजातीयकं
The reasons which constitute the refutation,
Viz. the ineligibility of understanding the very deep i.e. abstruse cause of the world (viz. Brahman) by reasoning,
The inconclusiveness of reasoning which has no firm basis,
And the non-attainment of Final Release even if an inference in another way is drawn,
And conflict with the traditional instructions of the Scriptures, being the same in this case, as they were in the earlier one. — 12.
←PrevNext→ भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवत्॥२.१.१३॥ Bhoktr-āpatter avibhāgaś cet syāl lokavat.
Bhoktṛ: one who enjoys and suffers; Āpatteḥ: from the objections, if it be objected; A-vibhāgaḥ: non-distinction; Cet: if it be said; Syāt: may exist; Lokavat: as is experienced in the world.
🔗 If it be said, that (if the thing to be experienced) becomes merged into the experiencer or vice versa, non-separation (between the two) would result, the reply is — that such separate existence may well continue as it is met with in the ordinary world. — 126.96.36.199.1.13 L.1
The doctrine of Brahman being the cause, is again objected to in another way on the same ground viz. that of reasoning.
यद्यपि श्रुतिः प्रमाणं स्वविषये भवति,
Even though the Scriptures are authoritative with regard to their own subject,
तथापि प्रमाणान्तरेण विषयापहारेऽन्यपरा भवितुमर्हति, यथा मन्त्रार्थवादौ;
Still, when that which is their province is taken out of their own scope by another means-of-proof, they deserve to be construed in a secondary sense, as for instance in the case of the Mantras (Vedic Ṛks) and Artha-Vādas.
तर्कोऽपि स्वविषयादन्यत्राप्रतिष्ठितः स्यात्, यथा धर्माधर्मयोः।
Even reasoning (applied) beyond Its own particular province, would be inconclusive, as (for instance) in the case of Dharma and Adharma (meritorious and unmeritorious actions).
Supposing it is so — (says the Vedāntin —) so what? —
अत इदमयुक्तम्, यत्प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धार्थबाधनं श्रुतेः।
(The opponent says) it would be improper if the Scriptures were to deny (the truth of) what has been established by another means-of-proof.
कथं पुनः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धोऽर्थः श्रुत्या बाध्यत इति।
In what way (it is asked) do the Scriptures purport to deny what has been established by another means-of-proof?
अत्रोच्यते – प्रसिद्धो ह्ययं भोक्तृभोग्यविभागो लोके –
The reply (of the opponent) is — this distinctive division of the experiencer and the things to be experienced, is well-known in the ordinary world,
भोक्ता चेतनः शारीरः,
As for instance that the sentient Jīva-Self is the experiencer,
भोग्याः शब्दादयो विषया इति;
And the objects-of-sense such as Sound etc., are the things to be experienced —
यथा भोक्ता देवदत्तः, भोग्य ओदन इति;
To wit — that Deva-datta is the experiencer and the boiled rice is the thing to be experienced.
तस्य च विभागस्याभावः प्रसज्येत,
यदि भोक्ता भोग्यभावमापद्येत
भोग्यं वा भोक्तृभावमापद्येत;
If the experiencer were to attain the condition of the thing to be experienced,
Non-existence of the distinction between them would take place.
It would be so, also if the thing to be experienced were to attain the condition of the experiencer.
So these (i.e. the experiencer and the thing to be experienced) being nondifferent from the Highest cause Brahman (as the Vedāntins claim), attainment by them of each other’s condition would thus result.
न चास्य प्रसिद्धस्य विभागस्य बाधनं युक्तम्;
But it is not proper that the well-known distinctive division between them should get obliterated.
यथा त्वद्यत्वे भोक्तृभोग्ययोर्विभागो दृष्टः,
We have necessarily to assume that this distinctive division between the experiencer and the things to be experienced, which obtains, and is seen to exist to-day,
Must have been so in the past, and will continue to be so in the future.
तस्मात्प्रसिद्धस्यास्य भोक्तृभोग्यविभागस्याभावप्रसङ्गादयुक्तमिदं ब्रह्मकारणतावधारणमिति चेत्कश्चिच्चोदयेत्, तं प्रति ब्रूयात् –
Hence if one were to say, that to understand that Brahman is the cause (of the world) is not proper, as that would lead to the predicament of the absence of any distinctive division between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced, which is well-known,
We would reply — Well may such distinctive division exist, just as it is seen to exist in the ordinary world.
उपपद्यत एवायमस्मत्पक्षेऽपि विभागः, एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्।
It is reasonably sustainable, that even in our view of the matter (i.e. of the Vedāntin, that effect is non-different from the cause) such distinctive division is seen to exist because it is so observed to exist in the ordinary world.
तथा हि – समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि
As for instance, even though the sea is not different from water which constitutes its self,
तद्विकाराणां फेनवीचीतरङ्गबुद्बुदादीनामितरेतरविभाग इतरेतरसंश्लेषादिलक्षणश्च व्यवहार उपलभ्यते;
The foam, waves, and bubbles (of the sea) etc., which are modifications of the sea, and are not different from it, are sometimes seen to display a behaviour characterized by being distinctively different from each other, and at another time being in conjunction with each other.
न च समुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्वेऽपि तद्विकाराणां फेनतरङ्गादीनामितरेतरभावापत्तिर्भवति;
These modifications of the sea, viz. the foam, waves etc., even though they are non-different from their cause, i.e. the sea, which has water as its self, still they (i.e. the modifications) do not attain each other’s condition,
न च तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्तावपि समुद्रात्मनोऽन्यत्वं भवति;
And just as even when they do not attain each other’s condition, they are not different from the nature of the sea which is their self,
एवमिहापि – न भोक्तृभोग्ययोरितरेतरभावापत्तिः,
Similarly in the present case also, the experiencers and the things to be experienced do not attain each other’s condition,
न च परस्माद्ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्वं भविष्यति।
Nor do they (because of that) become different from the Highest Brahman.
यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः
Even though the experiencer (i.e. the Jīva-Self) is not (in fact) a modification of Brahman,
‘तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति
And as according to the Scriptural passage “Having created it, he entered into it” (TaitUEng.2.6),
स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात्,
The unevolved Brahman is declared by the Scriptures to be itself the experiencer, as a result of its entering into its own creation,
तथापि कार्यमनुप्रविष्टस्यास्त्युपाधिनिमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटाद्युपाधिनिमित्तः –
Still by reason of its having so entered, there does come about a distinctive difference, as a result of limiting adjuncts, even as the Ākāśa (has distinctive difference) due to the limiting adjunct in the shape of an earthen pot etc.
इत्यतः, परमकारणाद्ब्रह्मणोऽनन्यत्वेऽप्युपपद्यते भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणो विभागः समुद्रतरङ्गादिन्यायेनेत्युक्तम्॥१३॥
Hence, it is said (by the Sūtra-kāra) that distinctive difference between the experiencer and the thing to be experienced — nondifferent though they are from their cause viz. the Highest Self i.e. Brahman — is reasonably sustainable on the analogy of the maxim of the sea and the waves etc. — 13.
Tat: (its, of the universe): An-anyatvam: non-difference; Ārambhaṇa-śabda-ādibhyaḥ: from words like ‘origin’, etc.
🔗 That cause and its effects are non-different from each other, follows from the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ (making current) etc. (occurring in the Scriptures). — 188.8.131.52.1.14 L.1
अभ्युपगम्य चेमं व्यावहारिकं भोक्तृभोग्यलक्षणं विभागम्
Having provisionally accepted this practical distinctive difference between the experiencer and the things to be experienced,
‘स्याल्लोकवत्’ इति परिहारोऽभिहितः;
The Sūtra-kāra has (in the previous Sūtra) rendered the refutation (of that objection on the ground of reasoning) by saying — ‘it may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world’ (the latter part of the previous Sūtra).
न त्वयं विभागः परमार्थतोऽस्ति,
This distinctive difference, however, does not exist in the real sense,
Because it is understood that the cause and its effects are non-different from each other.
कार्यमाकाशादिकं बहुप्रपञ्चं जगत्;
The effects comprise of this diverse world, such as the Ākāśa etc.
कारणं परं ब्रह्म;
And the cause is the Highest Self i.e. Brahman.
It is understood that in a real sense the effect is non-different from the cause i.e. the Highest Self,
I.e. it has no existence as apart from its cause, the Highest Self.
Whence is it so? Because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ and others.
आरम्भणशब्दस्तावदेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाय दृष्टान्तापेक्षायामुच्यते –
As for this word ‘Ārambhaṇa’, the Scriptures, after declaring that by knowing the one (i.e. Brahman) everything else becomes known, and with a desire to cite an illustration, say —
‘यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातꣳ स्याद्
वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ (ChanU.6.1.4) इति;
“Oh mild one, just as by knowing one clod of earth, everything that is made of earth becomes known.
The effect (viz. a pot etc.) is merely a name made current by speech, while that it is earth merely, is the truth” (ChanU.6.1.1).
एतदुक्तं भवति – एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन परमार्थतो मृदात्मना विज्ञातेन
सर्वं मृन्मयं घटशरावोदञ्चनादिकं मृदात्मकत्वाविशेषाद्विज्ञातं भवेत्;
By this is meant that when a clod of earth is understood to be in essence but mere earth only,
All things made of earth such as a jar, a trough and a water-pot, automatically become known, because, having the earth as their Self is common (to them all),
यतो वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयम् – वाचैव केवलमस्तीत्यारभ्यते –
And hence it is (that it is said) that an effect is merely a name made current (Ārabhyate, ‘originated’) by speech, and its existence as an effect is because of speech only.
विकारः घटः शराव उदञ्चनं चेति;
The effect viz. a jar or a trough or a water-pot
न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति;
Is not in existence substantially as an effect as such,
But is merely a name, and is false or untrue,
मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् –
And that it merely is but earth only, is the truth.
इति एष ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्त आम्नातः;
This is stated as an illustration of Brahman.
तत्र श्रुताद्वाचारम्भणशब्दाद्दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्यजातस्याभाव इति गम्यते।
Therefore, because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ occurring in the Scriptures, it is understood that, in the case of the thing illustrated also, all creation as a class as such, has no existence as apart from Brahman.
पुनश्च तेजोबन्नानां ब्रह्मकार्यतामुक्त्वा तेजोबन्नकार्याणां तेजोबन्नव्यतिरेकेणाभावं ब्रवीति –
Again, the Scriptures after speaking of Tejas, Water and the Earth as being the effects of Brahman, proceed to speak about the absence of the existence of the effects of Tejas, Water and the Earth also as apart from them, thus: —
‘अपागादग्नेरग्नित्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम्’ (ChanU.6.4.1) इत्यादिना।
“(In this way) Agni has lost its property of being Agni as such, and the effect Agni) as such is merely a name made current by speech, and that it is but the three colours (Rūpas, by which the three elements Tejas, Water and Earth are expressed individually by Lakṣaṇa) only, that constitute the real substance”. (ChanU.6.4.1).
By the word ‘etc.’ in the passage “because of the word ‘Ārambhaṇa’ etc.”, The following several Scriptural passages —
‘ऐतदात्म्यमिदꣳ सर्वं तत्सत्यꣳ स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि’ (ChanU.6.8.7)
‘इदꣳ सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (BrhU.2.4.6)
‘ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम्’ (MunU.2.2.11)
‘आत्मैवेदꣳ सर्वम्’ (ChanU.7.25.2)
‘नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन’ (BrhU.4.4.19)
Viz. “In that all, this has its self, it is the Truth, this is the Self, that thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7);
“All this, is that which is the Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6);
“All this is Brahman” (MunU.2.2.11);
“The Self is all this” (ChanU.7.25.2);
“There is no diversity here about anything” (BrhUEng.4.4.19) —
Which have the purpose of expounding the unity of the Selfs, should also be understood to have been cited (in illustration).
न चान्यथा एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं सम्पद्यते।
Otherwise, it would not be possible to uphold in any other way, that by the knowledge of one, the knowledge of everything else is attained.
तस्माद्यथा घटकरकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशादनन्यत्वम्,
यथा च मृगतृष्णिकोदकादीनामूषरादिभ्योऽनन्यत्वम्, दृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्वात् स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्;
एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्॥
Therefore it should be seen, that just as Ākāśas circumscribed by jars and water-pots are nondifferent from the great Ākāśa,
Or just as mirages etc., whose nature is that they seem and then again seem not, and whose nature is thus inexplicable, are non-different from the sandy plain etc.,
Even so, this aggregate of transmigratory existences consisting of experiencers and the things to be experienced, have, as apart from Brahman, no real existence.
But (says the opponent) Brahman is of more than one form
And just as a tree has many branches,
Even so Brahman is equipped with various powers and propensities (for creating effects),
अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव –
So that, (its) oneness and manifoldness are both necessarily equally true,
यथा वृक्ष इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति च नानात्वम्;
Just as, for instance, a tree as a tree is one, but considered in its aspect as one consisting of branches it is manifold,
यथा च समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनतरङ्गाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्,
Or just as the sea as sea is one, yet considered in its aspect as foam, waves etc. it is manifold,
यथा च मृदात्मनैकत्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वम्;
Or just as the earth is one only, but considered in its aspect as a jar or a trough, it is manifold.
तत्रैकत्वांशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति;
The circumstances being such, Brahman, considered in its aspect of being one only, may well accomplish the process of Final Release,
नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति;
And considered in its manifold aspect, may help the accomplishment of worldly transactions and Vedic observances appertaining to the “Karma-kāṇḍa”.
एवं च मृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुरूपा भविष्यन्तीति।
It is only in this way that the illustrations of the earth etc. can be appropriate.
नैवं स्यात् –
(To this, we reply) — No, it could not be like that.
‘मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्’ इति प्रकृतिमात्रस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यत्वावधारणात्,
By the passage “That it is but earth merely, is the truth” it is understood that in the illustration it is the material cause alone that is considered to be true,
वाचारम्भणशब्देन च विकारजातस्यानृतत्वाभिधानात्,
And by the words ‘made current by speech’ the whole aggregate of effects is spoken of as being unreal.
दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि ‘ऐतदात्म्यमिदꣳ सर्वं तत्सत्यम्’ इति च
In the case of that which is illustrated, also, by the passage “In all that, this has its Self, that is the truth”,
That one, the highest cause alone, is understood to be true,
‘स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो’ इति च शारीरस्य ब्रह्मभावोपदेशात्;
Because in the passage “He is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śveta-ketu” the instruction is, that the embodied Jīva-Self is, in essence, Brahman.
स्वयं प्रसिद्धं ह्येतच्छारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वमुपदिश्यते,
It is only about this Jīva-Self’s having Brahman, which is an already well-established thing, as its Self, that instruction is here given,
And also that it (Brahman) is something which cannot be attained with any extraneous effort.
अतश्चेदं शास्त्रीयं ब्रह्मात्मत्वमवगम्यमानं स्वाभाविकस्य शारीरात्मत्वस्य बाधकं सम्पद्यते,
Hence it is this Brahma-hood of the Jīva-Self, which is understood to be based on the Śāstra, that serves to obliterate the natural notion of a man, about the Jīva-Self being of the nature of the body,
रज्ज्वादिबुद्धय इव सर्पादिबुद्धीनाम्;
Even as the appreciation of the rope etc., as a rope, obliterates the notion of a snake (which is, till then, entertained about the rope).
बाधिते च शारीरात्मत्वे तदाश्रयः समस्तः स्वाभाविको व्यवहारो बाधितो भवति, यत्प्रसिद्धये नानात्वांशोऽपरो ब्रह्मणः कल्प्येत;
All this notion of phenomenal worldly transactions depending upon the Jīva-Self, for substantiating which you (the opponent) would want to hold that Brahman has a manifold aspect also, would itself become obliterated,
When once the notion that the Jīva-Self is of the nature of a body, is itself obliterated.
दर्शयति च – ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.4.5.15) इत्यादिना
The Scriptures, by the passage “When all this becomes but the Self to him, by what can he see and whom” (BrhUEng.4.5.15) etc.,
ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शिनं प्रति समस्तस्य क्रियाकारकफललक्षणस्य व्यवहारस्याभावम्;
Would discover to a person who understands Brahman as the Self of all, the non-existence of all phenomenal transactions such as actions, agents and the fruit of actions.
न चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयते इति युक्तं वक्तुम्,
It would not be proper to say, that this non-existence of all phenomenal transactions is spoken of as confined to any special condition (such as that of Final Release),
‘तत्त्वमसि’ इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानवस्थाविशेषनिबन्धनत्वात्;
Because the Scriptural words “That thou art” show that the realization (of the fact) that Brahman is the Self of all, as mentioned in these very words, is not confined to any particular specific condition.
तस्करदृष्टान्तेन चानृताभिसन्धस्य बन्धनं सत्याभिसन्धस्य च मोक्षं दर्शयन्
The Scriptures also show by the ‘illustration of the thief’, that one who banks on falsehood convicts himself i.e. becomes tied down (to phenomenal existence), and one who depends on truth, secures an acquittal i.e. attains Final Release,
एकत्वमेवैकं पारमार्थिकं दर्शयति,
And they also show further, that the oneness of Brahman is the only one and the highest truth (ChanU.6.16)
मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितं च नानात्वम्।
And that its (so-called) manifoldness is merely the display of false-knowledge.
उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्तुरनृताभिसन्ध इत्युच्येत।
For, if both could be true, how could a person observed to be involved in phenomenal worldly existence be said (by the Scriptures) to bank on a falsehood?
‘मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति’ (BrhU.4.4.19) इति च
The Scriptures indicate this very thing, by finding fault with the viewing of things as different, by the passage —
“He who sees differences in things meets with death after death” (BrhU.4.4.19).
न चास्मिन्दर्शने ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इत्युपपद्यते,
The doctrine (of our opponent) does not recognize Final Release as resulting from knowledge to be reasonably sustainable,
सम्यग्ज्ञानापनोद्यस्य कस्यचिन्मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारकारणत्वेनानभ्युपगमात्;
Because it does not hold (like the Vedānta doctrine) that false-knowledge which is capable of being removed by true knowledge, is the cause of all transmigratory existence.
उभयसत्यतायां हि कथमेकत्वज्ञानेन नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यत इत्युच्यते।
If both the unitary and the manifold aspects of Brahman were to be true, how ever would the knowledge that Brahman is one and one only, be able to obliterate the knowledge of its manifoldness?
But (argues some other opponent here), if one were to understand the pure absolute oneness (of Brahman),
नानात्वाभावात्प्रत्यक्षादीनि लौकिकानि प्रमाणानि व्याहन्येरन्,
Then (in that case) its manifoldness being necessarily nonexistent, all those worldly means-of-proof, such as direct perception etc., would cease to operate as such means-of-proof,
Because of the absence of any scope for their operation,
Just as they would cease to operate as means-of-proof, for instance, when in the case of a pillar etc., there is a realization that it is a pillar and not a man.
तथा विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रमपि भेदापेक्षत्वात्तदभावे व्याहन्येत;
Similarly, a Śāstra which enjoins the doing of something, or inhibits some other thing, would — as it depends on the manifoldness of things — be rendered hors de combat in the absence of such manifoldness,
मोक्षशास्त्रस्यापि शिष्यशासित्रादि भेदापेक्षत्वात्तदभावे व्याघातः स्यात्;
And equally so would be the Śāstra of Final Release also, which depends (for its validity) on the distinctive difference between the teacher and the taught, in the absence of any such distinction between them.
कथं चानृतेन मोक्षशास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितस्यात्मैकत्वस्य सत्यत्वमुपपद्येतेति।
How could this truth about the absolute one-ness (of Brahman) as propounded by this (palpably) untrue Śāstra of Final Release, be reasonably sustainable?
अत्रोच्यते – नैष दोषः,
To this the reply (of the Vedāntin) is — This is no fault.
It would be reasonably sustainable to understand that prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all transactions (of the phenomenal world) for the time being are real enough,
Even as the transactions in dreams are real enough (for the time being) until waking consciousness returns.
यावद्धि न सत्यात्मैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिः
As long as the truth of the one-ness of the Self is not realized,
तावत्प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु विकारेष्वनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुत्पद्यते;
The knowledge, that all these effects, i.e. modifications, as characterized by the means-of-proof, the thing to be known, and the fruit, are unreal, does not arise in any one,
विकारानेव तु ‘अहम्’ ‘मम’ इत्यविद्यया आत्मात्मीयेन भावेन सर्वो जन्तुः प्रतिपद्यते स्वाभाविकीं ब्रह्मात्मतां हित्वा;
And on the other hand, people in general under the influence of Nescience, consider these effects or modifications as being their own Selfs, viz., that this body is myself, or that this is mine, by ignoring their own Brahmic nature.
तस्मात्प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबोधादुपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः –
Therefore, prior to the realization of Brahman as the Self of all, all worldly and religious transactions based on the Scriptures, are reasonably sustainable i.e. valid,
यथा सुप्तस्य प्राकृतस्य जनस्य स्वप्ने उच्चावचान्भावान्पश्यतो
निश्चितमेव प्रत्यक्षाभिमतं विज्ञानं भवति प्राक्प्रबोधात्,
Even as an ordinary man, while he is asleep and dreaming, sees all the high and low entities,
And definitely considers his experiences quite as real as they are when they are directly perceived,
न च प्रत्यक्षाभासाभिप्रायस्तत्काले भवति, तद्वत्।
And has no notion, then, of their having only an unreal appearance (of direct perception).
कथं त्वसत्येन वेदान्तवाक्येन सत्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तिरुपपद्येत?
But (says the opponent) how ever can the realization of the unity of Brahman as the Self of all, in fact, arise, through such palpably untrue Vedānta passages?
न हि रज्जुसर्पेण दष्टो म्रियते;
A man who thinks he is bitten, by what in the place of a rope he considers to be a snake, does not die thereby,
नापि मृगतृष्णिकाम्भसा पानावगाहनादिप्रयोजनं क्रियत इति।
Nor can anybody make use of the water as seen in a mirage, for drinking or bathing etc.
नैष दोषः, शङ्काविषादिनिमित्तमरणादिकार्योपलब्धेः,
(The reply is) — This is no fault, because we do observe an effect such as death, supervening by reason of even the suspicion of being poisoned (by a snake-bite).
स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य च सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यदर्शनात्।
And it is also seen that a man experiencing a dream sees actions such as that of his being bitten by a snake or of his having a bath.
If the opponent were to say, that like the dream itself, even that action in a dream (of a snake-bite or of bathing) is untrue,
अत्र ब्रूमः – यद्यपि स्वप्नदर्शनावस्थस्य सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यमनृतम्,
We reply that though the action of being bitten by a snake or having a bath, experienced by a person dreaming, is no doubt untrue,
तथापि तदवगतिः सत्यमेव फलम्, प्रतिबुद्धस्याप्यबाध्यमानत्वात्;
The fruit of that action, viz. his experience of that action, is indeed true enough, because that experience is not effaced or removed even after such person awakens.
न हि स्वप्नादुत्थितः स्वप्नदृष्टं सर्पदंशनोदकस्नानादिकार्यं मिथ्येति मन्यमानः
तदवगतिमपि मिथ्येति मन्यते कश्चित्।
No man, who after waking up from a dream considers the action of such a snakebite or his own bath as experienced by him in his dream as unreal,
Ever considers his knowledge of the experience of that action also, as unreal.
एतेन स्वप्नदृशोऽवगत्यबाधनेन देहमात्रात्मवादो दूषितो वेदितव्यः।
This non-effacement of the knowledge of the dream experience of a person, should be understood to invalidate the doctrine (of the Lokāyatikas), that the body as such alone is the Self.
तथा च श्रुतिः – ‘यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु स्त्रियं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति। समृद्धिं तत्र जानीयात्तस्मिन्स्वप्ननिदर्शने’ (ChanU.5.2.9)
Similarly, a Scriptural passage — “When a man who engages himself in some religious ritual with a desire to gain some end, sees a woman in a dream, he should infer from his dream experience, the certain fulfilment of his desire” (ChanU.5.2.9) —
इत्यसत्येन स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यायाः समृद्धेः प्राप्तिं दर्शयति,
Which shows that even by his experience of the unreal dream, there is a very real fulfilment (of his desire).
तथा प्रत्यक्षदर्शनेषु केषुचिदरिष्टेषु जातेषु ‘न चिरमिव जीविष्यतीति विद्यात्’ इत्युक्त्वा
Similarly Scriptures in another place, after saying that “When some ill omens are seen one should know that he would not live long”, indicate further that by the very experiencing of that dream, which (of course) is of an unreal nature, death, which indeed is too real, is suggested,
‘अथ स्वप्नाः पुरुषं कृष्णं कृष्णदन्तं पश्यति स एनं हन्ति’ इत्यादिना
By the passage — “Now about dreams — if one sees a dark man with black teeth, he kills him.”
तेन तेनासत्येनैव स्वप्नदर्शनेन सत्यमरणं सूच्यत इति दर्शयति;
Which reveals the fact that one is forewarned of real death by an unreal dream [Trans. from Panoli].
प्रसिद्धं चेदं लोकेऽन्वयव्यतिरेककुशलानामीदृशेन स्वप्नदर्शनेन साध्वागमः सूच्यते, ईदृशेनासाध्वागम इति;
It is well-known, that experts in the interpretation of dreams, by positive and negative instances, interpret how a dream of one sort indicates a good result and a dream of another sort indicates a bad result.
तथा अकारादिसत्याक्षरप्रतिपत्तिर्दृष्टा रेखानृताक्षरप्रतिपत्तेः।
It is similarly seen, how, by mere letters of the nature of lines which are unreal in themselves (in as much as they are mere conventional symbols), the Akāra (i.e. the letter ‘अ A’) etc., which are very real, are indicated.
अपि चान्त्यमिदं प्रमाणमात्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकम् – नातःपरं किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति;
Now what is more is, that this is the final conclusive means-of-proof which declares the oneness of Self, and there is nothing further which is desired to be known.
यथा हि लोके यजेतेत्युक्ते, किं केन कथम् इत्याकाङ्क्ष्यते;
Just as in the ordinary world, when an injunction to perform a sacrifice is given, it is necessary to know with what (material) and how one should perform the sacrifice,
नैवं ‘तत्त्वमसि’ ‘अहं ब्रह्मास्मि’ इत्युक्ते, किञ्चिदन्यदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति – सर्वात्मैकत्वविषयत्वावगतेः;
But when it is said “That thou art” or “I am Brahman” and one understands how the Ātmā i.e. Brahman is the Self of all, there is nothing which need be known beyond that,
सति ह्यन्यस्मिन्नवशिष्यमाणेऽर्थे आकाङ्क्षा स्यात्;
For it is only when there still remains something which ought to be known, that there can be any further desire to know,
न त्वात्मैकत्वव्यतिरेकेणावशिष्यमाणोऽन्योऽर्थोऽस्ति, य आकाङ्क्ष्येत।
And as apart from one’s unity with the Self nothing still remains which one would further want to know.
न चेयमवगतिर्नोत्पद्यत इति शक्यं वक्तुम्,
It is not possible to say that such realization cannot arise,
‘तद्धास्य विजज्ञौ’ (ChanU.6.16.3) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः,
For a Scriptural passage says — “He (i.e. Śveta-ketu) understood that (viz. the oneness of Self) from him (i.e. his father)” (ChanU.6.16.3),
अवगतिसाधनानां च श्रवणादीनां वेदानुवचनादीनां च विधीयमानत्वात्।
And there is besides instruction (in Scriptures) about listening to the Scriptures and reciting them, as the means of such realization.
न चेयमवगतिरनर्थिका भ्रान्तिर्वेति शक्यं वक्तुम्;
Nor is it possible to say that such realization is meaningless or is a delusion,
Because it is seen, that it has the result of removing ignorance, and there is absence of any other knowledge, which would invalidate it.
प्राक्चात्मैकत्वावगतेरव्याहतः सर्वः सत्यानृतव्यवहारो लौकिको वैदिकश्चेत्यवोचाम।
We have already said before, that prior to the realization of one’s identity with the Self, the course of all these falsely-true worldly and religious transactions, runs uninterrupted.
तस्मादन्त्येन प्रमाणेन प्रतिपादिते आत्मैकत्वे
In this way, therefore, when one’s identity with the Self is duly propounded with the help of this ultimate means-of-proof,
समस्तस्य प्राचीनस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य बाधितत्वात्
There is no scope for imagining Brahman to be of diverse types,
Because all the earlier consciousness of distinctive differences happens then to be eliminated.
ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रणयनात्परिणामवद्ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतमिति गम्यते;
But (says the opponent), by adducing the illustration of clay etc., the Śāstra seems to accept Brahman to be capable of undergoing modification.
परिणामिनो हि मृदादयोऽर्था लोके समधिगता इति।
In the ordinary world also things like clay etc. are understood as undergoing modification.
To this we reply — No. The Scriptures by the following passages such as
‘स वा एष महानज आत्माजरोऽमरोऽमृतोऽभयो ब्रह्म’ (BrhU.4.4.25)
“Indeed the great unborn Self i.e. Brahman is undecaying, undying, immortal and fearless” (BrhUEng.4.4.25),
‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ (BrhU.3.9.26)
“This Self (which can be only expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’” (BrhUEng.3.9.26),
‘अस्थूलमनणु’ (BrhU.3.8.8) इत्याद्याभ्यः
सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधश्रुतिभ्यः ब्रह्मणः कूटस्थत्वावगमात्;
“(The Self) is neither gross nor atomic” (BrhUEng.3.8.8),
Which deny every kind of modification of Brahman, understand Brahman as absolutely unchangeable.
न ह्येकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम्।
The same one and only one Brahman cannot at one and th,e same time be understood, both to possess the quality of modification and yet be unchangeable i.e. without that quality of modification also.
(If the opponent were to suggest) — It may well be (like something which is both) stationary and at the same time have movement,
न; कूटस्थस्येति विशेषणात्;
We reply — no, because it has been particularized as being absolutely unchangeable.
न हि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः स्थितिगतिवदनेकधर्माश्रयत्वं सम्भवति;
It is not possible, that one and the same unchangeable Brahman can at one and the same time be the substratum of many (opposite) qualities, such as being fixed and yet capable of movement.
कूटस्थं च नित्यं ब्रह्म सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधादित्यवोचाम।
We have already said that Brahman is unchangeable and eternal because of the denial (by the Scriptures) of its undergoing any modification.
न च यथा ब्रह्मण आत्मैकत्वदर्शनं मोक्षसाधनम्,
Nor is it, that just as the realization of the doctrine of Brahman being the only one Self leads to the fruit of Final Release,
एवं जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्शनमपि स्वतन्त्रमेव कस्मैचित्फलायाभिप्रेयते, प्रमाणाभावात्;
The knowledge that it is capable of modification in the form of this world also leads to some other independent fruit, because there is no authority for it.
कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानादेव हि फलं दर्शयति शास्त्रम् –
It is by the realization of the unchangeable Brahman alone that the Śāstras show that there is a fruit, because the Scriptures after first stating that —
‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ इत्युपक्रम्य
“This Self (which can only be expressed negatively as) ‘not this’, ‘not this’”
‘अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि’ (BrhU.4.2.4) इत्येवंजातीयकम्। तत्रैतत्सिद्धं भवति –
Indicate by the passage “Oh Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness” (BrhUEng.4.2.4), that there is a fruit of that type (viz. Final Release).
ब्रह्मप्रकरणे सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव फलसिद्धौ सत्याम्,
So this much is established, that in the chapter dealing with Brahman, when it is stated that the desired result is obtained only by realizing that Brahman is devoid of any special attributes,
यत्तत्राफलं श्रूयते ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि,
And some other thing having no such fruit is also mentioned along with it — such as, that Brahman has the quality of modification in the form of the world — ,
It should be employed only as a means of realizing Brahman,
(In accordance with the maxim of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) — viz. “Whenever something which is fruitless is mentioned in proximity with something which has some fruit, the former should be understood as being subordinate to the latter,
न तु स्वतन्त्रं फलाय कल्प्यत इति।
And also that it has no independent fruit of its own.”
न हि परिणामवत्त्वविज्ञानात्परिणामवत्त्वमात्मनः फलं स्यादिति वक्तुं युक्तम्, कूटस्थनित्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य।
As Final Release is unchangeable and eternal, it would not be proper to say that the knowledge, that Brahman undergoes modification, is itself the fruit which the Jīva-self acquires by such knowledge.
ननु कूटस्थब्रह्मात्मवादिन एकत्वैकान्त्यात्
(If it be said by the opponent) that if according to the adherent of the doctrine of the unchangeable Brahman, this eternal oneness (of Brahman) is the only view,
It would mean the absence of the relationship of a ruler and the ruled,
ईश्वरकारणप्रतिज्ञाविरोध इति चेत्,
And it would contradict the declaration that the Lord is the cause,
(We reply) — No, the omniscience (of Brahman as the Lord) depends upon the evolving of the seed of the nature of names and forms which are the result of Nescience,
‘तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः’ (TaitU.2.1.1) इत्यादिवाक्येभ्यः
And on the Scriptural passage — “The Ākāśa was born of this very Self” (TaitUEng.2.1),
And that the origin, preservation and resorption of the world proceed from the Lord who is of an eternally pure, wise, and free nature,
नाचेतनात्प्रधानादन्यस्माद्वा – इत्येषोऽर्थः प्रतिज्ञातः – ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’ (BrS.1.1.2) इति;
And neither from the non-sentient Pradhāna nor from any other things, is what is declared (by the Sūtra-kāra) by the Sūtra — “From whom is the origin etc. of this world” (BrS.1.1.2).
सा प्रतिज्ञा तदवस्थैव, न तद्विरुद्धोऽर्थः पुनरिहोच्यते।
That declaration still holds the ground as before, and nothing contrary to that is here suggested.
कथं नोच्यते, अत्यन्तमात्मन एकत्वमद्वितीयत्वं च ब्रुवता?
(The opponent says) — How can you say that you do not say so (i.e. you do not contradict the declaration) when you talk of the Self’s eternal one-ness and non-duality?
शृणु यथा नोच्यते –
(We reply) — Listen, how we do not say so.
सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूते इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे
सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च
It is declared by both the Scriptures and the Smṛtis,
That names and forms which are imagined through Nescience and which are as it were the Self of the Omniscient Lord,
And about which it is impossible to say, either that they are one with Brahman or that they are different from it,
And which are the seeds of this entire expanse of transmigratory existence,
Are the illusion-causing power and the nature (Prakṛti) of the Lord.
ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञ ईश्वरः, ‘आकाशो वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म’ (ChanU.8.14.1) इति श्रुतेः,
That the omniscient Lord is different from them is indicated by the Scriptural passage “The Ākāśa is the revealer of the names and forms, and that in which they are contained, is Brahman” (ChanU.8.14.1),
‘नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (ChanU.6.3.2)
And also according to the Scriptural passages — “May I evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2);
‘सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य धीरो नामानि कृत्वाभिवदन्यदास्ते’ (तै. आ. ३-१२-७)
“Having created all beings and given them names, the Lord keeps on voicing them” (Tait. Ār. 3.12.7).
‘एकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति’ (SvetU.6.12) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च;
“He makes the one seed manifold” (SvetU.6.12) [Trans. from Panoli].
एवमविद्याकृतनामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधीश्वरो भवति, व्योमेव घटकरकाद्युपाध्यनुरोधि;
It is in this way that the Lord (as the Īśvara) conforms to the limiting adjuncts of names and forms produced by Nescience, just as the Ākāśa conforms to the limiting adjuncts of the jars and pots.
स च स्वात्मभूतानेव घटाकाशस्थानीयान्
जीवाख्यान् विज्ञानात्मनः प्रतीष्टे व्यवहारविषये;
During the condition of phenomenal existence, the Lord rules over the so-called Jīva-Selfs i.e. the cognitional Selfs,
Which are but only his own alter egos and which conform to the multitude of effects and causes brought about by names and forms, which in their turn are brought about by Nescience,
And stands in the same relation to these Jīva-Selfs i.e. cognitional Selfs, as the great Ākāśa stands to the Ākāśa of the jars and pots.
तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च,
न परमार्थतो विद्यया अपास्तसर्वोपाधिस्वरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितव्यसर्वज्ञत्वादिव्यवहार उपपद्यते;
So the Lord’s over-lordship, omniscience and omnipotence, depend upon the determinate distinctions caused by the limiting adjuncts of Nescience,
While in the truest sense, in the case of the Self whose limiting adjuncts have been swept off by knowledge, all such behaviour as that of being the ruler and the ruled or of being an omniscient entity etc., cannot be reasonably sustainable.
तथा चोक्तम् – ‘यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा’ (ChanU.7.24.1) इति;
The Scriptures also say so, thus — “Where one does not see, hear or know anything, other than its Self, that is the great one” (ChanU.7.24.1);
‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.4.5.15) इत्यादि च;
“But when the Self alone has become all this, by what can one see, and whom (can one see)?” (BrhUEng.4.5.15).
एवं परमार्थावस्थायां सर्वव्यवहाराभावं वदन्ति वेदान्ताः सर्वे;
And in this manner, all Vedānta texts declare, that in the condition of the Highest Truth, there is absence of all phenomenal transactions.
‘न कर्तृत्वं न कर्माणि लोकस्य सृजति प्रभुः। न कर्मफलसंयोगं स्वभावस्तु प्रवर्तते॥’ (BhG.5.14)
नादत्ते कस्यचित्पापं न चैव सुकृतं विभुः। अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः’ (BhG.5.15) इति
In the Īśvara-Gītā also, in the passage
“The Lord does not create in any one, the capacity to act, nor any actions, nor their connection to the fruit, but they tend towards activity by reason of their own nature.
He neither receives the sins nor the merits of any person. Knowledge is enveloped in Nescience and hence creatures become infatuated i.e. confused” (BhG.5.14–5),
It is indicated that there is absence of all behaviour as that of a ruler or the ruled in the condition of perfect knowledge,
व्यवहारावस्थायां तूक्तः श्रुतावपीश्वरादिव्यवहारः –
While in the condition of phenomenal existence, even the Scriptures do speak of the Selfs behaviour as the Lord, thus —
‘एष सर्वेश्वर एष भूताधिपतिरेष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसम्भेदाय’ (BrhU.4.4.22) इति;
“He is the Lord of all, the King and the protector of all beings, and he is the bund which upholds the worlds so that they may not be confounded (by promiscuity)” (BrhUEng.4.4.22).
तथा चेश्वरगीतास्वपि – ‘ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति। भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया’ (BhG.18.61) इति;
Similarly it is said in the Īśvara-Gītā again — “Oh Arjuna, the Lord is immanent in the region of the heart of all beings, and by this power of Māyā makes them go round and round as in a whirligig” (BhG.18.61).
सूत्रकारोऽपि परमार्थाभिप्रायेण ‘तदनन्यत्वम्’ इत्याह;
The Sūtra-kāra also speaks of the non-difference of cause and effects, in the real sense only,
व्यवहाराभिप्रायेण तु ‘स्याल्लोकवत्’ इति महासमुद्रस्थानीयतां ब्रह्मणः कथयति,
And so far as the phenomenal transactions are concerned, he has likened Brahman to the ocean, in the preceding Sūtra thus — “It may well be so, as observed in the ordinary world”.
अप्रत्याख्यायैव कार्यप्रपञ्चं परिणामप्रक्रियां चाश्रयति सगुणेषूपासनेषूपयोक्ष्यत इति॥१४॥
He (the Sūtra-kāra) accepts and does not refute the view about Brahman being liable to modification, in so far as it can be made use of in meditations on Brahman in its qualified (Sa-guṇa) aspect. — 14.
Bhāve: on the existence; Ca: and; Upalabdheḥ: is experienced effect (world) is in separable from its material cause, Brahman, is continued.
🔗 (Cause and effect are non-different) because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect exists. — 184.108.40.206.1.15 L.1
इतश्च कारणादनन्यत्वं कार्यस्य, यत्कारणं भाव एव कारणस्य कार्यमुपलभ्यते, नाभावे;
Again why the effect is non-different from its cause, is, because it is only when the cause exists, that the effect is seen to exist, and not when it does not.
तद्यथा – सत्यां मृदि घट उपलभ्यते, सत्सु च तन्तुषु पटः;
For instance, it is in the presence of clay only that a pot is seen to exist, and in the presence of yarns only that cloth is seen to exist.
न च नियमेनान्यभावेऽन्यस्योपलब्धिर्दृष्टा;
It is not, that when one thing exists, that, as a rule, another thing is to be seen to exist.
न ह्यश्वो गोरन्यः सन्गोर्भाव एवोपलभ्यते;
It is not, that a horse, different as it is from a cow, exists, only when a cow exists.
न च कुलालभाव एव घट उपलभ्यते, सत्यपि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेऽन्यत्वात्।
Nor is it, that a pot is seen to exist only when a potter exists, even when there subsists a relation of an effect and an accidental cause between them, because the one thing is different from the other (and hence there is no non-difference between them).
नन्वन्यस्य भावेऽप्यन्यस्योपलब्धिर्नियता दृश्यते, यथाग्निभावे धूमस्येति;
(The opponent says) — But it is seen that when a particular thing exists, as a rule another particular thing is seen to exist, as for instance, smoke necessarily is seen to exist, when fire exists.
नेत्युच्यते – उद्वापितेऽप्यग्नौ गोपालघुटिकादिधारितस्य धूमस्य दृश्यमानत्वात्।
(To this) we reply — no, because smoke held up in a cowherd’s pot is seen (to exist), even after the fire is put out.
अथ धूमं कयाचिदवस्थया विशिंष्यात् – ईदृशो धूमो नासत्यग्नौ भवतीति,
If the opponent were to say — if smoke is particularized by a certain condition (such as, smoke which has ascended high up into the sky from something on the ground), then such and such particular smoke does not exist, if fire does not exist — ,
Even then (we reply), there is no fault whatever even if it were to be so (understood),
तद्भावानुरक्तां हि बुद्धिं कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे हेतुं वयं वदामः;
Because we say, that the reason for holding, that there is non-difference between cause and effect, is (not only that an effect is to be seen to exist only when the cause exists) but that intelligence (Buddhi) coloured by (i.e. impressed with) the consciousness, of the cause being always jointly discernible with the effect, also is such a cause [i.e. a Hetu has a mental aspect as much as it has a perceptual aspect],
And such consciousness does not exist in the case of fire and smoke, (because there never is a consciousness that the smoke which is perceived is Agni).
‘भावाच्चोपलब्धेः’ – इति वा सूत्रम्।
There may also be another reading of this Sūtra, thus — “Bhāvāt ca upalabdheḥ”.
न केवलं शब्दादेव कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वम्, प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिभावाच्च तयोरनन्यत्वमित्यर्थः;
It means, that it is not only because of the Scriptures (that we say) that there is nondifference between cause and effect, but also because it is directly seen [and recognized] to be so.
भवति हि प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धिः कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वे;
Such non-difference between cause and effect does happen to be directly perceived.
तद्यथा – तन्तुसंस्थाने पटे तन्तुव्यतिरेकेण पटो नाम कार्यं नैवोपलभ्यते,
It is this way: — In the case of a cloth which is a construction of threads, we do not of course perceive merely an effect, viz., the cloth as such, as apart from the threads themselves,
केवलास्तु तन्तव आतानवितानवन्तः प्रत्यक्षमुपलभ्यन्ते, तथा तन्तुष्वंशवः, अंशुषु तदवयवाः।
But what we actually and directly see are merely the threads only in their condition as warps and woofs, and similarly, we perceive [or behold] fibres only, in the condition of threads, and minute parts of the fibres only, in the condition of fibres.
अनया प्रत्यक्षोपलब्ध्या लोहितशुक्लकृष्णानि त्रीणि रूपाणि,
ततो वायुमात्रमाकाशमात्रं चेत्यनुमेयम्,
And thus by this same process of direct observation, it ought to be inferred that the minute parts of the fibres are but the three colours viz. the red, white and black (representing the fire, water and earth [energy, binding cohesion and solidity]),
And thereafter, that the three colours are but the Vāyu, and that Vāyu is but merely the Ākāśa (ChanU.6.4),
ततः परं ब्रह्मैकमेवाद्वितीयम्;
And thereafter that the Ākāśa is but the transcendent Brahman, which is one only without a second,
तत्र सर्वप्रमाणानां निष्ठामवोचाम॥१५॥
And in which, as we have already said, all means-of-proof have their ultimate culmination. — 15.
Sattvāt: Because of the existence; Ca: and; Avarasya: of the posterior, i.e., of the effect as it comes after the cause, i.e., of the world.
🔗 Because an effect (Avara) (i.e. one which comes into existence later on) already exists (as the cause). — 220.127.116.11.1.16 L.1
This again why the effect is non-different from the cause,
यत्कारणं प्रागुत्पत्तेः कारणात्मनैव कारणे सत्त्वमवरकालीनस्य कार्यस्य श्रूयते –
Viz. because the Scriptures say, that the Avara i.e. the one which comes into existence later on as the effect is, before its creation, already in existence in the cause, as the cause itself,
‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ (ChanU.6.2.1)
‘आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्’ (AitU.1.1.1)
इत्यादाविदंशब्दगृहीतस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यात्;
Because in the Scriptural passages “Oh mild one, this was mere existence ‘Sat’ only, in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1),
“This in the beginning was only the Self (Ātmā)” (AitU.1.1.1),
The word ‘this’ (Idam) by which the effect (i.e. this world) is understood, and the cause the Ātmā (the Self), have the same case-endings (showing their oneness).
यच्च यदात्मना यत्र न वर्तते,
That (viz. the effect) which does not happen to exist in that form in any thing which is its cause,
न तत्तत उत्पद्यते, यथा सिकताभ्यस्तैलम्;
Can never come into existence from it, as for instance, oil (which does not exist in the form of the sand as the cause of itself, can never be produced) from sand.
Therefore being in fact non-different (from the cause) before creation, it is understood, that the effect even when it is created, is non-different from its cause.
यथा च कारणं ब्रह्म त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति, एवं कार्यमपि जगत्त्रिषु कालेषु सत्त्वं न व्यभिचरति।
Just as Brahman during all the three times (i.e. past, present and future) never deviates from existence (Sattva), even so, the effect viz. this world also during all the three times never deviates from existence (Sattva).
एकं च पुनः सत्त्वम्;
And again as existence itself as such (i.e. Sat) is but one only,
It follows that the effect is non-different from the cause. — 16.
A-sad-vyapadeśāt: on account of its being described as non-existent; Na: not; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no: Dharma-antareṇa: by another attribute or characteristic; Vākya-śeṣāt: from the latter part of the text or passage, because of the complementary passage.
🔗 If it be said, that as an effect (Kārya) is said to be non-existent i.e. ‘Asat’ (before its creation, and that, therefore, the doctrine of the Vedāntin is) not (correct), (we reply) — No (i.e. it is not that an effect is not ‘Sat’ i.e. Existent), because from the complementary part of the passage, it is seen (that it is called non-existent i.e. Asat) because of its having a different attribute (Dharma). — 18.104.22.168.1.17 L.1
ननु क्वचिदसत्त्वमपि प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः –
But (says the opponent) the Scriptures do also occasionally refer to the effect before its creation as non-existent (Asat), thus: —
‘असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्’ (ChanU.3.19.1) इति,
“This merely was non-existent in the beginning” (ChanU.3.19.1),
‘असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्’ (TaitU.2.7.1) इति च;
And also “In the beginning this indeed was non-existent” (TaitUEng.2.7.1).
तस्मादसद्व्यपदेशान्न प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमिति चेत् –
Therefore, if it be said, that by reason of an effect being non-existent (Asat) before creation, effect does not exist (before its creation),
नेति ब्रूमः; न ह्ययमत्यन्तासत्त्वाभिप्रायेण प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्यासद्व्यपदेशः –
(We reply) — no. This reference to an effect before its creation, as non-existent (Asat) is not meant to convey its absolute or total non-existence.
किं तर्हि? – व्याकृतनामरूपत्वाद्धर्मादव्याकृतनामरूपत्वं धर्मान्तरम्,
तेन धर्मान्तरेणायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत एव कार्यस्य कारणरूपेणानन्यस्य।
What then is meant? What is meant is that the condition (of an entity) in which its name and form have become evolved, is a condition different from its condition, in which such name and form have not yet been evolved,
And this reference to an entity as being non-existent (Asat) (in the Scriptures) is with respect to this latter condition, nondifferent though the effect is from its nature as the cause.
How is it understood to be so? Because of the complementary passage.
यदुपक्रमे सन्दिग्धार्थं वाक्यं तच्छेषान्निश्चीयते;
The meaning of the sentence, which, in the introductory portion, is ambiguous in meaning, is made definite from the complementary passage.
इह च तावत् ‘असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्’
As for the sentence here (under consideration), viz. “This was but merely non-existent (Asat) in the beginning”,
इत्यसच्छब्देनोपक्रमे निर्दिष्टं ‘यत्’,
What (Yat) in the introductory portion was indicated by the word ‘non-existent’ (Asat),
तदेव पुनस्तच्छब्देन परामृश्य,
And is again referred to by the word ‘that’ (Tat),
सदिति विशिनष्टि – ‘तत्सदासीत्’ इति –
Is (afterwards) particularized as ‘existent’ (Sat) by the sentence — “That was Sat i.e. existent”.
असतश्च पूर्वापरकालासम्बन्धात् आसीच्छब्दानुपपत्तेश्च;
The use of the word ‘Āsīt’ (in the sentence ‘it was existent’) cannot be reasonably sustainable because, ‘Asat’ (non-existent) has no connection either with the past or the future time.
‘असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्’ (TaitU.2.7.1) इत्यत्रापि
‘तदात्मानꣳ स्वयमकुरुत’ (TaitU.2.7.1) इति वाक्यशेषे विशेषणान्नात्यन्तासत्त्वम्;
In the sentence “This of course was non-existent in the beginning” also,
Absolute i.e. total non-existence could not be meant, because it is particularized (as ‘it’) in the complementary passage — “It made itself manifest”.
तस्माद्धर्मान्तरेणैवायमसद्व्यपदेशः प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य;
Hence this reference to an entity before its creation, as ‘non-existent’, is with reference to this other condition of it.
नामरूपव्याकृतं हि वस्तु सच्छब्दार्हं लोके प्रसिद्धम्;
It is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only a thing which is evolved with name and form that deserves to have the word ‘existent’ (Sat) applied to it.
Hence, prior to its evolution by name and form, a thing is figuratively referred to as ‘was non-existent as it were’. — 17.
←PrevNext→ युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च॥२.१.१८॥ Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca.
Yukteḥ: from reasoning; Śabda-antarāt: from another Śruti text; Ca: and.
🔗 Because of reasoning, and because of another Scriptural word also (non-difference between cause and effect and the identity between them is understood). — 22.214.171.124.1.18 L.1
युक्तेश्च प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणादवगम्यते, शब्दान्तराच्च॥
The existence of the effect (prior to its creation) and its non-difference with the cause is understood by reasoning (Yukti) and by another Scriptural word also.
Now, for the present, reasoning will be described.
दधिघटरुचकाद्यर्थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि क्षीरमृत्तिकासुवर्णादीन्युपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते;
It is seen in the ordinary world that those who desire to have curds or pots or ornaments, as a rule invariably make use of milk, clay and gold respectively, which are their definitely well-established causes.
न हि दध्यर्थिभिर्मृत्तिकोपादीयते, न घटार्थिभिः क्षीरम्;
Those who desire to have curds do not make use of clay, and those who desire to have pots do not make use of milk,
Which would not be reasonably sustainable, so far as the doctrine of the non-existence of an effect prior to its creation (i.e. Asat-kārya-Vāda) is concerned.
अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः सर्वस्य सर्वत्रासत्त्वे
कस्मात्क्षीरादेव दध्युत्पद्यते, न मृत्तिकायाः,
मृत्तिकाया एव च घट उत्पद्यते, न क्षीरात्?
[If] Non-existence of everything everywhere prior to its creation, being general i.e. common,
Why is it that curds is produced from milk only, and not from clay?
And why are pots produced from clay only, and not from milk?
क्षीर एव दध्नः कश्चिदतिशयो न मृत्तिकायाम्,
मृत्तिकायामेव च घटस्य कश्चिदतिशयो न क्षीरे – इत्युच्येत –
तर्ह्यतिशयवत्त्वात्प्रागवस्थाया असत्कार्यवादहानिः, सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिश्च;
(If the opponent were to say) — even though the non-existence of effects prior to their creation is common i.e. general (to all effects),
There is a special property i.e. idiosyncrasy (Atiśaya) of curds, that subsists in milk only [and not in clay pots],
And a special property or idiosyncrasy of pots, that subsist in clay only [and not in curds],
Then (the assumption of) such property or idiosyncrasy of their prior state (of effects), would necessarily mean the abandonment of the doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to its creation (i.e. Asat-kārya-Vāda), and the establishment of the doctrine of the prior existence of the effect as the cause, prior to its creation (i.e. Sat-kārya-Vāda).
शक्तिश्च कारणस्य कार्यनियमार्था कल्प्यमाना नान्या असती वा कार्यं नियच्छेत्,
If such potentiality capable of regulating the effect were to be imagined to exist (in a cause), then, if it is either different (from the cause and the effect) or nonexistent, it would not regulate the effect,
(Because if it is either non-existent or different (from the cause and the effect) it will not be able to regulate the creation of a particular effect), because of common non-existence (Asattva) and common difference (Anyatva), (in as much as, on the one hand it is as non-existent as the non-existent effect, and on the other hand it is quite as different from the cause and the effect, as the cause is different from the effect).
तस्मात्कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः, शक्तेश्चात्मभूतं कार्यम्।
Therefore, this potentiality (Śakti) is the essential nature of the cause, and the essential nature of such potentiality, is the effect (which ultimately means that the cause, the potentiality and the effect are both one and the same thing).
अपि च कार्यकारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाश्वमहिषवद्भेदबुद्ध्यभावात्तादात्म्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।
Besides in the absence of the existence of any notion of difference — such as there is as between a horse and a buffalo — between cause and effect, and also as between substance and quality etc., their identity i.e. unity must necessarily be understood.
Even in the assumption of a Samavāya relation (invariable concommitance)
समवायस्य समवायिभिः सम्बन्धेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने,
If it is understood that there is a relation as between the Samavāya on the one hand, and the two entities between which such Samavāya exists (viz. the Samavāyins) on the other,
तस्य तस्यान्योन्यः सम्बन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः,
Then such another Samavāya relation of that, and then still such another Samavāya relation of that, ad infinitum, will have to be imagined, and hence the predicament of a regressus ad infinitum would result;
अनभ्युपगम्यमाने च विच्छेदप्रसङ्गः;
And if it is not assumed that there is a relation between a Samavāya and the Samavāyins, then the predicament of the destruction of any such notion of a Samavāya relation between two entities (such as cause and effect) would result.
अथ समवायः स्वयं सम्बन्धरूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैवापरं सम्बन्धं सम्बध्येत,
Now (if the opponent were to say) that a Samavāya itself being of the nature of a relation, establishes such relation (between two entities) without requiring any other relation (of another Samavāya),
संयोगोऽपि तर्हि स्वयं सम्बन्धरूपत्वादनपेक्ष्यैव समवायं सम्बध्येत;
Then (we would reply) that contact or conjunction (Saṃyoga), also, being of the nature of a relation, it would establish such Saṃyoga relation, without necessarily requiring a Samavāya (which according to you is necessary).
तादात्म्यप्रतीतेश्च द्रव्यगुणादीनां समवायकल्पनानर्थक्यम्।
Moreover, as an identity between substance and quality etc. (by etc. a material cause and an effect should be understood) is actually experienced, the notion of such a Samavāya is meaningless.
कथं च कार्यमवयविद्रव्यं कारणेष्ववयवद्रव्येषु वर्तमानं वर्तेत?
Moreover in which manner (according to you, the opponent) does the material (i.e. Dravya) of an Avayavī (effect, product, construction, the class, the whole) subsist or abide in the material (Dravya) of the Avayava (cause, material, part, the individual, the member)?
किं समस्तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तेत, उत प्रत्यवयवम्?
Does it subsist in all the parts i.e. Avayavas (of the cause) together, or in each individual part (i.e. Avayava)?
यदि तावत्समस्तेषु वर्तेत,
Supposing it subsists in all parts (i.e. Avayavas) together,
There would be no perception of the Avayavī (i.e. the effect)
Because the (necessary) connection (Sannikarṣa) between the sense-organ and the objects of sense i.e. all the Avayavas together, would be impossible,
न हि बहुत्वं समस्तेष्वाश्रयेषु वर्तमानं व्यस्ताश्रयग्रहणेन गृह्यते;
Because, plurality or manyness (Bahutva) which subsists in all the substrata together, would not be perceivable by perceiving any one substratum only.
अथावयवशः समस्तेषु वर्तेत,
Now (if the opponent were to say) that the Avayavī material subsists Avayava by Avayava, on all the substrata of the cause (i.e. the Avayava material),
तदाप्यारम्भकावयवव्यतिरेकेणावयविनोऽवयवाः कल्प्येरन्, यैरारम्भकेष्ववयवेष्ववयवशोऽवयवी वर्तेत;
Then it would be necessary to imagine that the Avayavī (i.e. effect), has Avayavas, different from those which started the bringing about of the Avayavī i.e. effect by which the Avayavī could subsist Avayava by Avayava on the Avayavas which started the bringing about of the Avayavī.
कोशावयवव्यतिरिक्तैर्ह्यवयवैरसिः कोशं व्याप्नोति;
A sword (for instance) occupies its scabbard by Avayavas different from the Avayavas of the scabbard.
अनवस्था चैवं प्रसज्येत, तेषु तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तयितुमन्येषामन्येषामवयवानां कल्पनीयत्वात्;
And as it would be necessary to imagine other and still other Avayavas so that they may subsist in those Avayavas (which come in the series, earlier) ad infinitum, it would lead to a regressus ad infinitum.
अथ प्रत्यवयवं वर्तेत, तदैकत्र व्यापारेऽन्यत्राव्यापारः स्यात्;
Now, supposing the Avayavī material, together, subsists in every Avayava of the material (Dravya) of the cause, one by one in a series, then it would be that while it operates in one place it could have no operation in another place.
न हि देवदत्तः स्रुघ्ने सन्निधीयमानस्तदहरेव पाटलिपुत्रेऽपि सन्निधीयते;
Deva-datta while he is living in Srughna cannot on the same day be living in Pāṭali-putra also.
युगपदनेकत्र वृत्तावनेकत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात्, देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोरिव स्रुघ्नपाटलिपुत्रनिवासिनोः;
Being present in two places simultaneously would mean the predicament of there having to be more than one person, as for instance, when Deva-datta and Yajña-datta simultaneously reside in Srughna and Pāṭali-putra respectively.
गोत्वादिवत्प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तेर्न दोष इति चेत्,
(If the opponent were to say) that like the cowness (of a cow) the Avayavī-material may subsist in every Avayava, and hence there would be no such fault,
न; तथा प्रतीत्यभावात्;
(We would reply) — No, because it is not so actually perceived.
यदि गोत्वादिवत्प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तोऽवयवी स्यात्,
If like the cowness which abides in every cow, the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava,
यथा गोत्वं प्रतिव्यक्ति प्रत्यक्षं गृह्यते, एवमवयव्यपि प्रत्यवयवं प्रत्यक्षं गृह्येत;
Then just as the ‘cowness’ (of a cow) is directly perceived to be abiding in every individual cow, even so, would the Avayavī be directly perceivable in every individual Avayava,
न चैवं नियतं गृह्यते;
But it is not perceived to be so invariably.
प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्तौ चावयविनः कार्येणाधिकारात्,
Besides if the Avayavī were to abide fully in every Avayava,
तस्य चैकत्वात्, शृङ्गेणापि स्तनकार्यं कुर्यात्, उरसा च पृष्ठकार्यम्;
Then as it is but one only, and is competent to function, it may accomplish the function of the udders with a horn, and the function of the back with the chest.
न चैवं दृश्यते।
But it is not so experienced.
प्रागुत्पत्तेश्च कार्यस्यासत्त्वे, उत्पत्तिरकर्तृका निरात्मिका च स्यात्;
Again if an effect were to be non-existent (Asat) prior to its creation, then creative action would be without an agent, and it would not have a Self.
उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सा सकर्तृकैव भवितुमर्हति, गत्यादिवत्;
Creation, indeed, is an action, and, like motion etc., action deserves to have an agent.
क्रिया च नाम स्यात्, अकर्तृका च – इति विप्रतिषिध्येत;
It would be a contradiction in terms to speak of there being action and such action (taking place) without an agent.
घटस्य चोत्पत्तिरुच्यमाना न घटकर्तृका – किं तर्हि? – अन्यकर्तृका – इति कल्प्या स्यात्;
(If the opponents’ doctrine of the non-existence of effect prior to creation were to be accepted) when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it would have to be imagined that it is not caused by the pot (as it is not in existence before its creation), but by some other agent.
तथा कपालादीनामप्युत्पत्तिरुच्यमानान्यकर्तृकैव कल्प्येत;
Similarly when the creation of the two halves of a pot is spoken of, it also would have to be imagined that it is caused (not by the two halves but) by some other agent.
तथा च सति ‘घट उत्पद्यते’ इत्युक्ते, ‘कुलालादीनि कारणान्युत्पद्यन्ते’ इत्युक्तं स्यात्;
If it were to be so, then, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would be tantamount to saying, that its causes, such as the potter etc., are being created (because as a pot cannot be its own maker, when it is said that a pot is being created, it would mean by implication, that the causes of a pot are being created),
न च लोके घटोत्पत्तिरित्युक्ते कुलालादीनामप्युत्पद्यमानता प्रतीयते,
But in the ordinary world when the creation of a pot is spoken of, it is not experienced, that its causes such as the potter etc., are also being created simultaneously,
But on the other hand it is experienced that they have already been in existence.
अथ स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्ध एवोत्पत्तिरात्मलाभश्च कार्यस्येति चेत् –
Now, (if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that the creation of an effect, merely means the establishment of its relation with its cause, and the obtainment by the effect of its own existence (Sattā),
कथमलब्धात्मकं सम्बध्येतेति वक्तव्यम्;
Then the opponent has to explain, as to how, anything which has not as yet acquired its own existence, can ever establish its relation (with something else).
सतोर्हि द्वयोः सम्बन्धः सम्भवति, न सदसतोरसतोर्वा;
It is when two entities are in existence that a relation between them is possible, and not when one exists and the other does not, nor when neither of them are in existence.
अभावस्य च निरुपाख्यत्वात्प्रागुत्पत्तेरिति मर्यादाकरणमनुपपन्नम्;
Besides non-existence by itself being of the nature of falsity or unreality (Nirupākhyatva), it would not be reasonably sustainable to set a time limit to it, such as, non-existence prior to the creation (of an effect).
सतां हि लोके क्षेत्रगृहादीनां मर्यादा दृष्टा नाभावस्य;
In the ordinary world, it is when there are already existing things such as a field or a house that it is seen that a limit is set to them, and never to mere non-existence.
न हि वन्ध्यापुत्रो राजा बभूव प्राक्पूर्णवर्मणोऽभिषेकादित्येवंजातीयकेन मर्यादाकरणेन
निरुपाख्यो वन्ध्यापुत्रः – राजा बभूव भवति भविष्यतीति वा – विशेष्यते;
By setting a limit of this sort for instance, viz. that the ‘son of a barren woman’ became a king before the coronation of Purṇa-varman,
It can never be that an absolute non-entity (Tuccha-Vastu) such as the ‘son of a barren woman’, ever was, is, or will be, a king.
यदि च वन्ध्यापुत्रोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वमभविष्यत्,
तत इदमप्युपापत्स्यत – कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं भविष्यतीति;
If even ‘the son of a barren woman’ could come into existence, after the operation of a casual agent,
Then it may also be that an effect which is non-existent prior to its creation, may also come into existence after the operation of a casual agent.
वयं तु पश्यामः – वन्ध्यापुत्रस्य कार्याभावस्य चाभावत्वाविशेषात्,
What we see, however, is that non-existence being common both to the (non-existence of the) ‘son of a barren woman’ and (the non-existence of) an effect prior to its creation,
यथा वन्ध्यापुत्रः कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं न भविष्यति,
Just as the ‘son of a barren woman’ does not ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent,
एवं कार्याभावोऽपि कारकव्यापारादूर्ध्वं न भविष्यतीति।
Even so, the non-existent effect (which is non-existent prior to its creation), cannot ever come into existence by and after the operation of a casual agent.
नन्वेवं सति कारकव्यापारोऽनर्थकः प्रसज्येत;
But (says the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin) in that case the operation of a casual agent would be rendered purposeless.
यथैव हि प्राक्सिद्धत्वात्कारणस्वरूपसिद्धये न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते,
Just as no one endeavours to bring about a cause which already exists,
एवं प्राक्सिद्धत्वात्तदनन्यत्वाच्च कार्यस्य स्वरूपसिद्धयेऽपि न कश्चिद्व्याप्रियेत;
Even so, no one would bother to bring about an effect which exists already, and is non-different from the cause (as you the Sat-kārya-vādin hold),
But we do see that people always do so endeavour (to bring about effects).
अतः कारकव्यापारार्थवत्त्वाय मन्यामहे प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावः कार्यस्येति चेत्,
So, in order that the operation of a casual agent may not be rendered purposeless, we believe in the nonexistence of an effect prior to its creation.
नैष दोषः; यतः कार्याकारेण कारणं व्यवस्थापयतः कारकव्यापारस्यार्थवत्त्वमुपपद्यते;
(To this, we reply) — This is not proper, because it would be reasonably sustainable to say, that operation by a casual agent, which modifies the cause into the form of an effect, could have a purpose.
कार्याकारोऽपि कारणस्यात्मभूत एव, अनात्मभूतस्यानारभ्यत्वात् – इत्यभाणि;
We have said already, that the form of an effect-as-such, is but the form of the cause itself, and nothing that has no form in itself can ever be set on (to establish an effect in a similar form).
न च विशेषदर्शनमात्रेण वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति;
A thing as such does not become another different thing altogether, by merely appearing in a different aspect.
न हि देवदत्तः सङ्कोचितहस्तपादः प्रसारितहस्तपादश्च विशेषेण दृश्यमानोऽपि वस्त्वन्यत्वं गच्छति,
Deva-datta, whose hands and legs are (at one time) in a flexed position, and Deva-datta whose hands and legs are (at some other time) in an extended position, and who is thus to be seen in such different attitudes (at different times), does not merely on that account, become different persons,
स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्;
Because he is still recognizable as the same one person (Deva-datta).
तथा प्रतिदिनमनेकसंस्थानानामपि पित्रादीनां न वस्त्वन्यत्वं भवति, मम पिता मम भ्राता मम पुत्र इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्;
Similarly, a father etc. who every day happen to be in different capacities do not become different individuals because they are recognized as being — ‘my father’, ‘my brother’ and ‘my son’ etc.
जन्मोच्छेदानन्तरितत्वात्तत्र युक्तम्, नान्यत्रेति चेत्,
(If the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) — In that case it may well be so, because of their having (during such capacities) no connection with birth and death, but it is not so, in other cases,
न; क्षीरादीनामपि दध्याद्याकारसंस्थानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वात्;
(We reply) — no, because milk etc. also are directly seen to materialize as curds etc. (without undergoing destruction).
अदृश्यमानानामपि वटधानादीनां समानजातीयावयवान्तरोपचितानामङ्कुरादिभावेन दर्शनगोचरतापत्तौ जन्मसंज्ञा;
When seeds of the Vaṭa (Banyan) tree etc., which are not visible, become visible as sprouts, as a result of their cells multiplying themselves into many such cells, and ultimately developing into a sprout, it is termed (their) ‘birth’,
And when as a result of the diminution of these very cells, they again become invisible, it is termed (their) ‘death’.
तत्रेदृग्जन्मोच्छेदान्तरितत्वाच्चेदसतः सत्त्वापत्तिः, सतश्चासत्त्वापत्तिः,
Now (if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say), that what is nonexistent (Asat) becomes existent (Sat) because of its having no connection with birth and death,
तथा सति गर्भवासिन उत्तानशायिनश्च भेदप्रसङ्गः;
(We reply) that in that case there would result this predicament, viz., that the unborn embryo, and a new-born child lying face upwards on its back, would become different entities.
तथा बाल्ययौवनस्थाविरेष्वपि भेदप्रसङ्गः,
Similarly there would also be the predicament, of the same man in his childhood, youth and old age, being different entities,
And there would also be the predicament of the destruction of the use of such conventional terms as father etc.
एतेन क्षणभङ्गवादः प्रतिवदितव्यः।
By all this (preceding argument) the doctrine of all existence being momentary (Buddhistic doctrine) should also be understood to be refuted.
यस्य तु पुनः प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यम्,
In the case of the adherents of the doctrine of the non-existence of the effect prior to its creation,
तस्य निर्विषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यात्, अभावस्य विषयत्वानुपपत्तेः –
The operation of a causal agent would not have any object (such as a cause) on which it can operate, and again non-existence not being an object, it cannot also be the object of any operation by a causal agent,
Even as the Ākāśa cannot be the object, for the purpose of mowing it down by striking it with a sword etc.
समवायिकारणविषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यादिति चेत्,
(Now if the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that the operation of a causal agent may have the material cause (of an effect) — such as earth etc. — as the object of its operation,
न; अन्यविषयेण कारकव्यापारेणान्यनिष्पत्तेरतिप्रसङ्गात्;
(We reply) — No, because it would in that case lead to a strange result (Atiprasaṅga) viz. that by the operation of a causal agent on one object (i.e. earth), another different object (i.e. a pot) would be produced.
समवायिकारणस्यैवात्मातिशयः कार्यमिति चेत्,
(If the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin were to say) that an effect is but an idiosyncrasy of the Self of the material cause,
(We reply) — No, as it would lead to the establishment of Sat-kārya-Vāda i.e. the doctrine of the existence of the effect prior to creation, (which would be awkward for the opponent Asat-kārya-vādin).
तस्मात्क्षीरादीन्येव द्रव्याणि दध्यादिभावेनावतिष्ठमानानि कार्याख्यां लभन्त इति
न कारणादन्यत्कार्यं वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
Therefore, in as much as substances such as milk etc., only when they attain the form of curds etc., acquire the name of an effect,
It is not possible even after (wrangling about it for) a hundred years, to establish, that an effect is different from its cause.
तथा मूलकारणमेव आ अन्त्यात्कार्यात् तेन तेन कार्याकारेण नटवत्सर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते।
Similarly, it is only the fundamental cause, which, like an actor, assumes different forms as effects right down to the last effect, and becomes amenable to all worldly transactions.
एवं युक्तेः, कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सत्त्वम्, अनन्यत्वं च कारणात्, अवगम्यते॥
In this way it is understood through ‘reasoning’ that the effect does exist prior to its creation, and that it is non-different from the cause.
The same proposition is proved by other Scriptural passages.
पूर्वसूत्रेऽसद्व्यपदेशिनः शब्दस्योदाहृतत्वात्ततोऽन्यः सद्व्यपदेशी शब्दः शब्दान्तरम् –
In the preceding Sūtra a passage which indicated the Scriptural word ‘Asat’ (i.e. non-existent) was cited and now the word ‘Sat’ (i.e. existent) i.e. a Scriptural word different from it (Śabdāntara), is cited, in the passage —
‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ (ChanU.6.2.1) इत्यादि।
“Oh mild one, the ‘Sat’ alone was existing in the beginning, the only one without a second” etc.,
‘तद्धैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीत्’ इति चासत्पक्षमुपक्षिप्य,
After challenging the view of the non-existence of the effect (before creation) thus — “Some said, this was not in existence in the beginning”,
‘कथमसतः सज्जायेत’ इत्याक्षिप्य,
And then by saying thus — “How can existence spring from non-existence?”,
‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्’ इत्यवधारयति;
It is finally concluded by the Scriptures, thus — “Sat alone was existing in the beginning” (ChanU.6.2.1).
तत्रेदंशब्दवाच्यस्य कार्यस्य प्रागुत्पत्तेः सच्छब्दवाच्येन कारणेन सामानाधिकरण्यस्य श्रूयमाणत्वात्,
Now in as much as it is understood from the Scriptures that the effect which is indicated by the word ‘Idam’ has the same case-ending as the cause indicated by the word ‘Sat’ (existing) i.e. there is oneness between them, the existence of (the effect) prior to its creation
And its non-difference with the cause, becomes established.
यदि तु प्रागुत्पत्तेरसत्कार्यं स्यात्,
If on the other hand, an effect prior to its creation were to be non-existent
पश्चाच्चोत्पद्यमानं कारणे समवेयात्,
And were it to establish a relation with the material cause after its creation
Then it would be an entity different from the cause,
तत्र ‘येनाश्रुतꣳ श्रुतं भवति’ (ChanU.6.1.3) इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा पीड्येत;
And in that case the original declaration, viz., “By which that which is unheard becomes heard” (ChanU.6.1.3), would be contradicted,
सत्त्वानन्यत्वावगतेस्त्वियं प्रतिज्ञा समर्थ्यते॥१८॥
And it is only by understanding that the effect exists prior to its creation and that it is non-different from the cause, that the original declaration can be upheld. — 18.
🔗 Also, similarly to a piece of cloth (the effect is non-different from the cause). — 126.96.36.199.1.19 L.1
यथा च संवेष्टितः पटो न व्यक्तं गृह्यते – किमयं पटः, किं वान्यद्द्रव्यमिति;
Just as when a piece of cloth happens to be folded, it is not definitely understood whether it is a piece of cloth or some other material,
स एव प्रसारितः, यत्संवेष्टितं द्रव्यं तत्पट एवेति प्रसारणेनाभिव्यक्तो गृह्यते।
But when it is unfolded it becomes clearly understood to be a piece of cloth,
यथा च संवेष्टनसमये पट इति गृह्यमाणोऽपि न विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते;
Or, it is understood to be a piece of cloth even when it is yet folded, but it is not understood as to how long and broad it is,
स एव प्रसारणसमये विशिष्टायामविस्तारो गृह्यते –
But when it is unfolded it is known to be of a particular dimension in length and breadth
न संवेष्टितरूपादन्योऽयं भिन्नः पट इति,
And that it is not a piece of cloth different from the one which happened to be in a folded condition,
एवं तन्त्वादिकारणावस्थं पटादिकार्यमस्पष्टं सत्,
Similarly, an effect such as a piece of cloth etc., unrecognizable as it is, while it is in the condition of its cause viz. as threads etc.,
तुरीवेमकुविन्दादिकारकव्यापाराभिव्यक्तं स्पष्टं गृह्यते।
Becomes clearly recognizable when it is made manifest by the operations of the causal agents, such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver.
Hence the meaning is, that it is precisely in accordance with ‘the maxim of the folded and unfolded piece of cloth’ that an effect is non-different from its cause. — 19.
←PrevNext→ यथा च प्राणादि॥२.१.२०॥ Yathā ca prāṇādi.
Yathā: as; Ca: and; Prāṇa-ādi: in the case of Prāṇas or vital airs.
🔗 Also like the (minor) Prāṇas (Vital Airs, the effect is non-different from the cause). — 188.8.131.52.1.20 L.1
यथा च लोके प्राणापानादिषु प्राणभेदेषु प्राणायामेन निरुद्धेषु
Just as in the ordinary world, when the different kinds of minor Prāṇas such as the Prāṇa, Apāna (ascending and descending Prāṇa) etc. are controlled, (and put out of action) by Prāṇāyāma (breathing exercises)
कारणमात्रेण रूपेण वर्तमानेषु
And they then subsist merely in the form of a cause,
जीवनमात्रं कार्यं निर्वर्त्यते, नाकुञ्चनप्रसारणादिकं कार्यान्तरम्;
Only the life (of a man) is sustained and no other function such as the flexion or stretching (of the limbs) takes place,
तेष्वेव प्राणभेदेषु पुनः प्रवृत्तेषु जीवनादधिकमाकुञ्चनप्रसारणादिकमपि कार्यान्तरं निर्वर्त्यते;
And when these different Prāṇas start functioning again, flexion and stretching (of the limbs) in addition to mere living also is restored.
न च प्राणभेदानां प्रभेदवतः प्राणादन्यत्वम्,
Now just as during all this time, the different minor Prāṇas, though they appear to be different, are not essentially different from the chief vital Prāṇa,
Because of the chief vital Prāṇa and the other minor Prāṇas being all of the same nature of air,
एवं कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वम्।
Even so, the effects are nondifferent from their causes.
अतश्च कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात्तदनन्यत्वाच्च
Hence, as the whole world is an effect of Brahman (as its cause), and is non-different from it,
सिद्धैषा श्रौती प्रतिज्ञा – ‘येनाश्रुतꣳ श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्’ (ChanU.6.1.1) इति॥२०॥
The Scriptural declaration — “By (the knowledge of) which, what is not heard becomes heard, what is not perceived becomes perceived, what is not known becomes known” (ChanU.6.1.1) — is thus established. — 20.
Itara-vyapadeśāt: on account of the other being stated (as non-different from Brahman); Hita-akaraṇa-ādi-doṣa-prasaktiḥ: defects of not doing what is beneficial and the like would arise. (Itara: other than being Brahman, i.e. the individual soul; Vyapadeśāt: from the designation, from the expression; Hita: good, beneficial; A-karaṇa-ādi: not creating, etc.; Doṣa: imperfection, defect, faults; Prasaktiḥ: result, consequence.)
🔗 Because of the reference to the other (i.e. the Jīva-Self is of the nature of Brahman), a fault — viz. that which is beneficial is eschewed etc. (by the Self) — attaches. — 184.108.40.206.1.21 L.1
अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकारणवाद आक्षिप्यते –
Again, the doctrine of a sentient thing being the cause (of the world) is objected to.
चेतनाद्धि जगत्प्रक्रियायामाश्रीयमाणायां हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते।
If it is accepted that the creation of the world is due to a sentient cause (such as Brahman), faults such as the eschewing (by it) of what is beneficial etc. do attach themselves (to Brahman).
Whence is it so? Because of the reference to other (i.e. the Jīva-Self).
इतरस्य शारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति श्रुतिः –
‘स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो’ (ChanU.6.8.7) इति प्रतिबोधनात्;
The Scriptures indicate that the other, i.e. the Jīva-Self, has Brahman as its Self (i.e. both are one and the same), by enlightening (Śveta-ketu), thus —
“That is the Self, that thou art, Oh Śevta-keto” (ChanU.6.8.7).
यद्वा – इतरस्य च ब्रह्मणः शारीरात्मत्वं व्यपदिशति –
Or else (it may be construed) that the Scriptures declare, that the other (i.e. Brahman) is the Self of the embodied Jīva-Self, thus —
‘तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्’ (TaitU.2.6.1) इति
“Having created that (world) it entered into it” (TaitUEng.2.6),
स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यानुप्रवेशेन शारीरात्मत्वदर्शनात्;
By stating the Creator (Brahman) which never undergoes any modification, as entering into that which it has created (viz. the body etc.).
‘अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (ChanU.6.3.2) इति च
The Scriptural passage “May I, by myself entering (into my own creation) as the Jīva-Self, evolve names and forms”,
परा देवता जीवमात्मशब्देन व्यपदिशन्ती, न ब्रह्मणो भिन्नः शारीर इति दर्शयति;
By indicating that the transcendent deity (i.e. Brahman) refers to the Jīva-Self as its own Self, shows, how the Jīva-Self is not different from Brahman.
तस्माद्यद्ब्रह्मणः स्रष्टृत्वं तच्छारीरस्यैवेति।
Hence the creative activity of Brahman is but the creative activity of the Jīva-Self only.
अतस्सः स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता सन् हितमेवात्मनः सौमनस्यकरं कुर्यात्,
Hence being thus an independent creator in itself, it (i.e. the Jīva-Self) would rather create what is beneficial to itself and conducive to its own satisfaction,
And avoid creating that which is not so beneficial, such as this snare of all the evils of birth, death, old age, and disease.
न हि कश्चिदपरतन्त्रो बन्धनागारमात्मनः कृत्वानुप्रविशति;
No one who is not dependent ever voluntarily creates a prison for himself and enters into it.
न च स्वयमत्यन्तनिर्मलः सन् अत्यन्तमलिनं देहमात्मत्वेनोपेयात्;
No one who himself is extremely pure and stainless, would ever accept this extremely unclean body as his own (tabernacle).
कृतमपि कथञ्चिद्यद्दुःखकरं तदिच्छया जह्यात्;
Even if anything is done by him which causes pain, he would voluntarily give it up
And would undertake only that which gives happiness.
स्मरेच्च – मयेदं जगद्बिम्बं विचित्रं विरचितमिति;
Further he would also remember that he himself has created this wonderful sphere of the universe.
सर्वो हि लोकः स्पष्टं कार्यं कृत्वा स्मरति – मयेदं कृतमिति;
All persons who have done any definite thing, necessarily remember it as their own handiwork.
यथा च मायावी स्वयं प्रसारितां मायामिच्छया अनायासेनैवोपसंहरति,
Just as an illusionist, at will and without any effort withdraws an illusion spread by him,
एवं शारीरोऽपीमां सृष्टिमुपसंहरेत्;
Even so would the embodied Jīva-Self, at will, demolish his own creation.
स्वकीयमपि तावच्छरीरं शारीरो न शक्नोत्यनायासेनोपसंहर्तुम्;
The Jīva-Self, however, is not easily able even to do away with its own body.
एवं हितक्रियाद्यदर्शनादन्याय्या चेतनाज्जगत्प्रक्रियेति गम्यते॥२१॥
Hence, as it is not seen that a thing which is beneficial is done (by the embodied Jīva-Self), it is understood that the acceptance of the theory that the world is created by a sentient being, is not reasonable. — 21.
←PrevNext→ अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्॥२.१.२२॥ Adhikaṃ tu bheda-nirdeśāt.
Adhikam: something more, greater than the Jīva; Tu: but; Bheda-nirdeśāt: because of the pointing out of differences on account of the statement of difference. (Bheda: difference; Nirdeśāt: because of the pointing out).
🔗 But (Brahman is) greater (and therefore, other than the Jīva-Self) because of the mention of a distinction (between Brahman and the Jīva-Self). — 220.127.116.11.1.22 L.1
तुशब्दः पक्षं व्यावर्तयति।
The word ‘But’ rebuts the (opponent’s) view.
यत्सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शारीरादधिकमन्यत्, तत् वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः;
We maintain that Brahman, which is omniscient, and omnipotent, and which possesses a nature which is eternally pure and enlightened, and which is free and is greater than the Jīva-Self, and is different (from it), is the creator of the world.
न तस्मिन्हिताकरणादयो दोषाः प्रसज्यन्ते;
The faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do not attach themselves to it.
न हि तस्य हितं किञ्चित्कर्तव्यमस्ति, अहितं वा परिहर्तव्यम्,
Possessing as it does the nature of being eternally free,
It has no duties either to perform anything beneficial or not to perform anything unbeneficial (to itself).
न च तस्य ज्ञानप्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो वा क्वचिदप्यस्ति,
Because of being omniscient and omnipotent
There is also not the least let or hindrance either to its knowledge or power.
The Jīva-Self on the other hand is unlike that
तस्मिन्प्रसज्यन्ते हिताकरणादयो दोषाः;
And the faults of not doing what is beneficial etc. do of course attach to it,
न तु तं वयं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रूमः।
But, we do not maintain that the Jīva-Self is the creator of the world.
कुत एतत्? भेदनिर्देशात् –
‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5)
How is that? Because of the mention of a distinction (between it and Brahman).
Scriptural passages such as “The Self (Oh Maitreyī) is to be seen, heard, cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon” (BrhUEng.2.4.5),
‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (ChanU.8.7.1)
“He should be sought for and desired to be known” (ChanU.8.7.1),
‘सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति’ (ChanU.6.8.1)
“He in that condition (of deep sleep) becomes one with the Sat” (ChanU.6.8.1),
‘शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मनान्वारूढः’ (BrhU.4.3.35)
“The embodied Jīva-Self being mounted upon by the intelligential Self (Prājña)” (BrhUEng.4.3.35),
इत्येवंजातीयकः कर्तृकर्मादिभेदनिर्देशो जीवादधिकं ब्रह्म दर्शयति।
Which speak of a distinction as between an agent (Kartā) and an object (Karma) etc., show that Brahman is greater i.e. other than the Jīva-Self.
नन्वभेदनिर्देशोऽपि दर्शितः – ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इत्येवंजातीयकः;
But (says the opponent) there is a mention also of the non-distinction between the two, such as — “That thou art”.
कथं भेदाभेदौ विरुद्धौ सम्भवतः?
How can distinction and non-distinction which are contrary to each other be both possible?
नैष दोषः, महाकाशघटाकाशन्यायेनोभयसम्भवस्य तत्र तत्र प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात्।
(We reply) — this is no fault, because we have already established in several proper places, that according to the maxim of “The Ākāśa and the Ākāśa of the pot”, both are possible.
अपि च यदा ‘तत्त्वमसि’ इत्येवंजातीयकेनाभेदनिर्देशेनाभेदः प्रतिबोधितो भवति;
Besides when the non-distinction (between the two) comes to be realized, by means of such reference to non-distinction, as “That thou art”,
अपगतं भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्वं ब्रह्मणश्च स्रष्टृत्वम्,
Then the nature of the transmigratory existence of the Jīva-Self, and the creative activity of Brahman, both vanish,
समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेदव्यवहारस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात्;
On account of the removal of the entire set of transactions, depending upon the notion of distinction which is but only a display of false-knowledge, by true knowledge.
तत्र कुत एव सृष्टिः कुतो वा हिताकरणादयो दोषाः।
Whence could then there be any creation (of the world) at all or any such faults of not doing that which is beneficial?
न तु परमार्थतोऽस्तीति
We have said more than once,
That this transmigratory existence characterized by the avoidance of what is beneficial etc., is nothing but a delusion,
[Since this delusion is] Caused by the failure to realize the limiting adjuncts, such as the aggregates of bodies and organs of sense, and names and forms brought about by Nescience,
And it is not as if it exists in the truest sense,
And that it (i.e. this delusion) is of a piece with the supposed notions, of birth or death or of being hurt or wounded.
अबाधिते तु भेदव्यवहारे
As long as the notion of distinction (between the Jīva-Self and Brahman) continues unobliterated,
‘सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ इत्येवंजातीयकेन
The notion of Brahman being different from (and more than) the Jīva-Self, as understood
From the Scriptural passage “He should be searched for and understood”,
Precludes the possibility of the attachment to Brahman, of any such faults as the not doing of things beneficial etc. (to itself). — 22.
←PrevNext→ अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः॥२.१.२३॥ Aśmādivac ca tad-anupapattiḥ.
Aśma-ādivat: like stone, etc.; Ca: and; Tat anupapattiḥ: its untenability, unreasonableness, impossibility; (Tat: of that; Tasya: its, of the objection raised in Sūtra 21).
🔗 And (this) being similar to the case of stones etc., that (i.e. the objection of the opponent of the Vedānta view) is not reasonably sustainable. — 18.104.22.168.1.23 L.1
यथा च लोके पृथिवीत्वसामान्यान्वितानामप्यश्मनां
केचिन्महार्हा मणयो वज्रवैडूर्यादयः,
अन्ये मध्यमवीर्याः सूर्यकान्तादयः,
अन्ये प्रहीणाः श्ववायसप्रक्षेपणार्हाः पाषाणाः –
इत्यनेकविधं वैचित्र्यं दृश्यते;
Just as in the ordinary world, though stones in general are the effects of earth,
We find that there is quite a variety in them, as for instance,
Some are highly precious such as diamonds and lapis lazuli,
Some are of an intermediate quality such as crystals and sun-stones,
And some are of the lowest type, fit only to be thrown at dogs and crows,
यथा चैकपृथिवीव्यपाश्रयाणामपि बीजानां
Or just as in the case of seeds which are all planted in earth,
We find a great variety of leaves, flowers, fruits, smells and tastes,<,br>
As in sandlewood and Kim-pāka (Giant Palm fruit)
यथा चैकस्याप्यन्नरसस्य लोहितादीनि केशलोमादीनि च विचित्राणि कार्याणि भवन्ति –
Or just as from one and the same food chyle, a variety of effects such blood etc. and hair and down etc. result,
जीवप्राज्ञपृथक्त्वं कार्यवैचित्र्यं चोपपद्यत इत्यतः तदनुपपत्तिः,
In the same way in the case of Brahman, one only though it is,
Such distinction as by way of the Jīva-Self and the intelligent Self is possible, and also a variety of its effects, is reasonably sustainable, and hence the objection raised by the opponents of the Vedānta view, is not reasonably sustainable.
The meaning is that the fault imagined by the opponent is not reasonably sustainable.
Also other reasons, such as that the Scriptures are the ultimate authority,
विकारस्य च वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वात्
That effects (Vikāras) are such as are merely made current in speech,
स्वप्नदृश्यभाववैचित्र्यवच्च – इत्यभ्युच्चयः॥२३॥
And that there is a variety of dream experiences (though the person who experiences dreams is but one only), can be cumulatively mentioned. — 23.
←PrevNext→ उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि॥२.१.२४॥ Upasaṃhāra-darśanān neti cen na kṣīravad-dhi.
Upasaṃhāra-darśanāt: because collection of materials is seen; Na: not; Iti cet: if it be said; Na: no; Kṣīravat: like milk; Hi: because, as. (Darśanāt: because of the seeing; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Vat: like, has the force of an instrumental case here. (See Sūtra of Pāṇini, Tena tulyaṃ kriyā etc.)
🔗 (If it be said that the Vedānta view) is not correct because it is seen (in the ordinary world) that (for producing an effect) there is preparation or an assemblage (of means, we reply) — No, because it (Brahman) is like milk. — 22.214.171.124.1.24 L.1
चेतनं ब्रह्मैकमद्वितीयं जगतः कारणमिति यदुक्तम्, तन्नोपपद्यते।
What is said by the opponent — viz., the statement (by the Vedāntin) that sentient Brahman, which is alone without a second, is the cause of the world — is not reasonably sustainable.
Whence is it so? Because it is seen that there is preparation or assemblage (of means).
इह हि लोके कुलालादयो घटपटादीनां कर्तारो
मृद्दण्डचक्रसूत्रसलिलाद्यनेककारकोपसंहारेण सङ्गृहीतसाधनाः सन्तः
तत्तत्कार्यं कुर्वाणा दृश्यन्ते।
In the ordinary world, it is observed that potters (and weavers) etc., the manufacturers of pots and cloth etc.,
Accomplish those different things,
After furnishing themselves with the necessary means or implements, by assembling together clay, staff, wheel and threads, etc., and many such causal agents,
ब्रह्म चासहायं तवाभिप्रेतम्;
While you maintain that Brahman is without any such help.
तस्य साधनान्तरानुपसङ्ग्रहे सति कथं स्रष्टृत्वमुपपद्येत?
Hence how can it be reasonably sustainable, that Brahman, which you understand to have no such helpful means, can have the ability to create in the absence of any such assemblage of means?
तस्मान्न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति चेत्,
Ergo, Brahman could not be the cause of the world.
नैष दोषः; यतः क्षीरवद्द्रव्यस्वभावविशेषादुपपद्यते –
(To this, we reply) — This is no fault. It is reasonably so sustainable, because Brahman, like milk, is a special peculiar material (Dravya).
यथा हि लोके क्षीरं जलं वा स्वयमेव दधिहिमकरकादिभावेन परिणमतेऽनपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनम्,
Just as in the ordinary world, milk and water, by themselves undergo modifications into curds and snow respectively without expecting any extraneous means,
Even so, it might be the case here (i.e. in the case of Brahman).
ननु क्षीराद्यपि दध्यादिभावेन परिणममानमपेक्षत एव बाह्यं साधनमौष्ण्यादिकम्;
कथमुच्यते ‘क्षीरवद्धि’ इति?
(If the opponent says) How do you say that the case is analogous to milk,
When even milk etc. do require such outside help as heat etc.?
नैष दोषः; स्वयमपि हि क्षीरं यां च यावतीं च परिणाममात्रामनुभवत्येव त्वार्यते त्वौष्ण्यादिना दधिभावाय;
(We reply) — this is no fault, because whatever modification milk undergoes in turning into curds is by itself only, and whatever potentiality or the limit of potentiality which milk has in itself for the modificatory process of conversion into curds is but merely accelerated by heat etc., that is all.
यदि च स्वयं दधिभावशीलता न स्यात्,
Because, were milk not to possess in itself this potentiality of modifying itself into curds,
It would never undergo such modification per force alone, by means of heat etc.
न हि वायुराकाशो वा औष्ण्यादिना बलाद्दधिभावमापद्यते;
Ākāśa and Vāyu, for instance, do not modify themselves per force into curds, by heat etc.,
साधनसामग्र्या च तस्य पूर्णता सम्पाद्यते;
And (in the case of milk) its capacity (for modification) is merely perfected by the assemblage of means.
परिपूर्णशक्तिकं तु ब्रह्म;
Brahman on the other hand is fully powerful by itself,
न तस्यान्येन केनचित्पूर्णता सम्पादयितव्या;
And nothing else is necessary to make its capacity perfect.
श्रुतिश्च भवति – ‘न तस्य कार्यं करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते।
परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च’ (SvetU.6.8) इति।
For the Scriptures say — “There is nothing that it has to create, nor has it any extraneous instrument or means, (it may also mean — it i.e. Brahman has neither a body nor any sense-organ), nothing equal to or greater than it, is to be seen,
And its powers are (seen to be) manifold and transcendental, and it has the natural power to know all things and to regulate and overcome everything by its mere presence” (SvetU.6.8).
तस्मादेकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगात् क्षीरादिवद्विचित्रपरिणाम उपपद्यते॥२४॥
Therefore, only one, as Brahman is, that it has diverse powers inherent in itself, and that it can, like milk, modify itself in diverse ways, is reasonably sustainable. — 24.
←PrevNext→ देवादिवदपि लोके॥२.१.२५॥ Devādivad api loke.
Deva-ādivat: like gods and others (saints); Api: even, also; Loke: in the world.
🔗 (The case of Brahman) may he, as it is in the ordinary world, like that of Gods etc. (it may also become active). — 126.96.36.199.1.25 L.1
स्यादेतत् – उपपद्यते क्षीरादीनामचेतनानामनपेक्ष्यापि बाह्यं साधनं दध्यादिभावः, दृष्टत्वात्;
May be (says the opponent), it may be reasonably sustainable, that non-sentient milk and such things may modify themselves into curds etc. without expecting any extraneous means (to aid them), because it actually is so seen.
चेतनाः पुनः कुलालादयः साधनसामग्रीमपेक्ष्यैव तस्मै तस्मै कार्याय प्रवर्तमाना दृश्यन्ते;
But potters etc., who are sentient, are seen to proceed to do their various different works only by depending on extraneous means (to help them).
कथं ब्रह्म चेतनं सत् असहायं प्रवर्तेतेति –
How then can Brahman, which is sentient, proceed to work unaided?
देवादिवदिति ब्रूमः –
We reply, that, it may be so, as in the case of Gods, etc.
देवाः पितर ऋषय इत्येवमादयो महाप्रभावाश्चेतना अपि सन्तोऽनपेक्ष्यैव किञ्चिद्बाह्यं साधनमैश्वर्यविशेषयोगादभिध्यानमात्रेण स्वत एव बहूनि नानासंस्थानानि शरीराणि प्रासादादीनि रथादीनि च निर्मिमाणा उपलभ्यन्ते,
Just as in the ordinary world
It is understood on the authority of Veda, Mantras, History and Purāṇas,
That Gods, the manes and sages etc., very powerful and sentient as they are, and unaided by extraneous means as they are, are seen to create bodies of different sorts, and chariots and palaces etc. merely by themselves by means of their special power and by mere meditation, and by mere volition,
तन्तुनाभश्च स्वत एव तन्तून्सृजति;
Or just as a spider produces its own threads itself,
बलाका चान्तरेणैव शुक्रं गर्भं धत्ते;
Or just as a crane conceives without insemination,
पद्मिनी चानपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रस्थानसाधनं सरोन्तरात्सरोन्तरं प्रतिष्ठते –
Or just as an assemblage of lotuses proceeds from one lake to another without any extraneous means of movement,
एवं चेतनमति ब्रह्म अनपेक्ष्यैव बाह्यं साधनं स्वत एव जगत्स्रक्ष्यति।
Even so, Brahman, sentient as it is, may, well by itself, create the world unaided by any extraneous means.
स यदि ब्रूयात् – य एते देवादयो ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता उपात्तास्ते दार्ष्टान्तिकेन ब्रह्मणा न समाना भवन्ति;
(If the opponent were to say) — But these Gods etc., which are cited (by the Vedāntin) as illustrations for Brahman, bear no similarity to Brahman, which is sought to be illustrated by them.
शरीरमेव ह्यचेतनं देवादीनां शरीरान्तरादिविभूत्युत्पादने उपादानम्, न तु चेतन आत्मा;
It is the non-sentient body of the Gods, and not their sentient selfs, that furnishes the material for producing other bodies,
तन्तुनाभस्य च क्षुद्रतरजन्तुभक्षणाल्लाला कठिनतामापद्यमाना तन्तुर्भवति;
And it is the saliva of a spider which becomes coagulated by feeding on inferior insects, that modifies itself into threads,
बलाका च स्तनयित्नुरवश्रवणाद्गर्भं धत्ते;
And the crane conceives on hearing the sound of thunder [Keep in mind this is maybe a 800AD belief, that gets the point across as the opponents also believe, ‘know’, this],
पद्मिनी च चेतनप्रयुक्ता सती अचेतनेनैव शरीरेण सरोन्तरात्सरोन्तरमुपसर्पति, वल्लीव वृक्षम्, न तु स्वयमेवाचेतना सरोन्तरोपसर्पणे व्याप्रियते;
And an assemblage of lotuses, impelled by an indwelling sentient being, moves with its non-sentient body from one lake to another, just as a creeper climbs up a tree, and not that the non-sentient assemblage of lotuses, by itself endeavours to move towards another lake.
तस्मान्नैते ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्ता इति –
Therefore these cannot be illustrations with regard to Brahman.
तं प्रति ब्रूयात् – नायं दोषः;
We would reply — This is no fault,
कुलालादिदृष्टान्तवैलक्षण्यमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वादिति –
Because, what we wish to stress, is only the dissimilarity of the illustrations such as that of the potter etc. (which you, the opponent referred to).
यथा हि कुलालादीनां देवादीनां च समाने चेतनत्वे कुलालादयः कार्यारम्भे बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षन्ते, न देवादयः;
Just as, though sentiency is common both to the potter and the Gods, it is only the potter etc. that need extraneous means (to help them) in doing their work, but not so the Gods,
तथा ब्रह्म चेतनमपि न बाह्यं साधनमपेक्षिष्यत इत्येतावद्वयं
Even so, all that we wish to say by the illustration of the Gods,
Is that sentient Brahman, also need not require any extraneous means (to help it in creating the world).
तस्माद्यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथा सर्वेषामेव भवितुमर्हतीति नास्त्येकान्त इत्यभिप्रायः॥२५॥
What we therefore mean, is, that it is not an invariable rule, that just as a particular power is observed to exist in one thing, similarly all other things also must necessarily have the same power. — 25.
Kṛtsna-prasaktiḥ: possibility of the entire (Brahman being modified); Nir-avayavatva-śabda-kopaḥ: contradiction of the scriptural statement that Brahman is without parts; Va: or, otherwise. (Kṛtsna: entire, full, total; complete; Prasaktiḥ: exigency, employment; activity; Nir-avayavatva: without parts, without form, without members, indivisible; Śabda: word, text, expressions in Śruti; Kopaḥ: contradiction, violation, incongruity, stultification; Va: or.)
🔗 (If Brahman be the cause of the world, the conclusion would be), that the entire Brahman undergoes modification, or else the Scriptural declaration that Brahman has no parts would be vitiated. — 188.8.131.52.1.26 L.1
चेतनमेकमद्वितीयं ब्रह्म क्षीरादिवद्देवादिवच्चानपेक्ष्य बाह्यं साधनं स्वयं परिणममानं जगतः कारणमिति स्थितम्;
It is established, that Brahman, which is the only one without a second, and which undergoes modification without expecting any extraneous means (to help it) — like milk or like the Gods — , is the cause of the world.
शास्त्रार्थपरिशुद्धये तु पुनराक्षिपति।
Objection however is taken to this (by the Sūtra-kāra himself), for securing the purification of the meaning of the Śāstra, thus —
कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिः कृत्स्नस्य ब्रह्मणः कार्यरूपेण परिणामः प्राप्नोति,
A conclusion, that there would be modification of the entire Brahman, into its effects, would result,
As Brahman is without any parts.
यदि ब्रह्म पृथिव्यादिवत्सावयवमभविष्यत्, ततोऽस्यैकदेशः पर्यणंस्यत्, एकदेशश्चावास्थास्यत;
Were Brahman to have parts like the earth for instance, it may be that while one part of it would undergo modification the other part may remain as it is.
निरवयवं तु ब्रह्म श्रुतिभ्योऽवगम्यते –
‘निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तं निरवद्यं निरञ्जनम्’ (SvetU.6.19)
‘दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः’ (MunU.2.1.2)
‘इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एव’ (BrhU.2.4.2)
‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ (BrhU.3.9.26)
But it is understood from the Scriptures which deny any special attribute in Brahman, that Brahman has no parts, thus —
“(Brahman is) without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless and untainted” (SvetU.6.19),
“That celestial and incorporeal Puruṣa is both inside and outside and is unborn” (MunU.2.1.2),
“This great being, is infinite, endless and fully knowledge-incarnate” (BrhUEng.2.4.12),
“(Whatever is predicated to be Brahman) — it is not that, not that, it is the Self” (BrhUEng.3.9.26),
“Neither gross nor atomic” (BrhUEng.3.8.8).
सत्यां मूलोच्छेदः प्रसज्येत;
Hence, as there is the impossibility of only a part of Brahman undergoing modification, and the conclusion about its modification in its entirety being therefore inevitable,
The destruction of the very basis itself (i.e. Brahman) would thus result.
द्रष्टव्यतोपदेशानर्थक्यं च आपद्येत,
तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽसम्भवात्;
Now, as effects as such (of Brahman) are recognizable without any effort,
The Scriptural instruction that “it (Brahman) should be seen” would be rendered purposeless,
And the existence of Brahman as apart from its modification would not be possible, (as Brahman will have undergone modification in its entirety).
Besides, it would militate against the Scriptural declaration of its not being subject to origination (Ajatva) etc.
अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षया सावयवमेव ब्रह्माभ्युपगम्येत,
If, in order to remove this fault, it is understood, that Brahman has parts,
तथापि ये निरवयवत्वस्य प्रतिपादकाः शब्दा उदाहृतास्ते प्रकुप्येयुः;
Then the Scriptural statements cited in illustration of its being without any parts would be contradicted.
सावयवत्वे चानित्यत्वप्रसङ्ग इति –
Besides, if it is understood to have parts, the predicament of its not being eternal would arise.
सर्वथायं पक्षो न घटयितुं शक्यत इत्याक्षिपति॥२६॥
Hence (the opponent avers) it is not possible to reconcile this (Vedānta) view. — 26.
←PrevNext→ श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्॥२.१.२७॥ Śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt.
Śruteḥ: from Śruti, as it is stated in Śruti, on account of scriptural texts; Tu: but; Śabda-mūlatvāt: on account of being based on the scripture, as Śruti is the foundation.
🔗 But (the objection of the opponent is not correct) because of Scriptural passages, and also because it (Brahman) has the Scriptures as its basis (lit. root). — 184.108.40.206.1.27 L.1
By the word ‘But’ (the Sūtra-kāra) refutes the objection (of the opponent).
न खल्वस्मत्पक्षे कश्चिदपि दोषोऽस्ति।
Really there is no fault of any kind in our view (i.e. the view of the Vedāntin).
In the first place there is no modification of Brahman in its entirety.
कुतः? श्रुतेः –
Whence is it so? Because of the Scriptures.
यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते,
Just as the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world from Brahman,
एवं विकारव्यतिरेकेणापि ब्रह्मणोऽवस्थानं श्रूयते –
They also speak of the existence of Brahman, as apart from its modifications,
Inasmuch as they speak of the cause (i.e. Prakṛti, Brahman) and its modification (Vikāra) as being different from each other,
‘सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि’ (ChanU.6.3.2) इति,
By passages of the type of “This deity thought, I will now enter into these three divinities (i.e. into the Pṛthivī, Āpaḥ and Tejas) as the Jīva-Self and evolve names and forms” (ChanU.6.3.2)
‘तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायाꣳश्च पूरुषः। पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि’ (ChanU.3.12.6) इति चैवंजातीयकात्;
And “So much is its greatness, and the Puruṣa is even greater than that. His one foot (i.e. quarter) represents all the beings, and the other three feet (quarters) represent that which is immortal in heaven” (ChanU.3.12.6).
तथा हृदयायतनत्ववचनात्; सत्सम्पत्तिवचनाच्च –
Also, as the Scriptures speak of the Hṛdaya as its (Brahman’s) abode, and that in deep sleep, it, i.e. the Jīva-Self, becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman).
यदि च कृत्स्नं ब्रह्म कार्यभावेनोपयुक्तं स्यात्,
Were entire Brahman to be used up in modifying itself into effects, then the special mention, in the Scriptural passage
‘सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति’ (ChanU.6.8.1) इति सुषुप्तिगतं विशेषणमनुपपन्नं स्यात्,
“Oh mild one, in deep sleep the Jīva-Self becomes one with the ‘Sat’ (Brahman)” (ChanU.6.8.1), about this peculiarity pertaining to deep sleep, would not be reasonably sustainable,
विकृतेन ब्रह्मणा नित्यसम्पन्नत्वादविकृतस्य च ब्रह्मणोऽभावात्;
Because (in such a case) it (i.e. the Sat i.e. Brahman) would always be as one with the modified Brahman, (because according to the opponent, the entire Brahman would have modified itself) and because there would be no unmodified Brahman as such.
तथेन्द्रियगोचरत्वप्रतिषेधात् ब्रह्मणो, विकारस्य चेन्द्रियगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः;
And also because it is denied (by the Scriptures) that Brahman is perceptible to sense-organs, and it is reasonably sustainable that the effects (i.e. the world etc.) are perceptible to sense-organs.
Therefore, unevolved Brahman does necessarily exist.
न च निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपोऽस्ति,
There can be no contradiction of the Scriptural statement about Brahman being without any parts,
As it is understood from Scriptures themselves that Brahman has no parts.
शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म शब्दप्रमाणकम्, नेन्द्रियादिप्रमाणकम्;
As Brahman has the Scriptures as its basis, and Scriptures alone and not the sense-organs are authoritative about it,
it should necessarily be understood to be just as it is spoken of in the Scriptures.
शब्दश्चोभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादयति – अकृत्स्नप्रसक्तिं निरवयवत्वं च;
And the Scriptures speak of Brahman as being both without parts and at the same time as not modifying itself wholly.
लौकिकानामपि मणिमन्त्रौषधिप्रभृतीनां देशकालनिमित्तवैचित्र्यवशाच्छक्तयो विरुद्धानेककार्यविषया दृश्यन्ते;
Even ordinary things of the world such as gems, Mantras and herbs are observed to possess powers to exhibit properties producing incompatible effects depending upon the varieties of environment, time, and occasion,
ता अपि तावन्नोपदेशमन्तरेण केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते –
And in the absence of any instruction about them, it cannot be known merely by reasoning,
अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तय इति;
That they possess such and such powers, which require such and such help and which produce such and such effects and are effective for such and such purposes.
किमुताचिन्त्यस्वभावस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत;
Need it be mentioned, therefore, that it is not possible to explain the inscrutable nature of Brahman, without (the help of) the Scriptures?
तथा चाहुः पौराणिकाः – ‘अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्।
प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्’ इति।
The Purāṇikas also say, similarly — “Do not employ reasoning to entities which are unthinkable.
To be beyond the material effects (Prakṛti) is the criterion of that which is unfathomable”.
Therefore, the realization of the supersensuous Brahman, as it is in fact, depends upon the Scriptures as its source.
ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धोऽर्थः प्रत्याययितुम् – निरवयवं च ब्रह्म परिणमते न च कृत्स्नमिति;
But (says the opponent) things which are contradictory — as for instance, that Brahman which is without parts, modifies itself but not entirely — cannot be realized even on the authority of the Scriptures.
यदि निरवयवं ब्रह्म स्यात्, नैव परिणमेत, कृत्स्नमेव वा परिणमेत;
If, Brahman is (in fact) without parts, it will either not modify itself at all, or modify itself entirely.
अथ केनचिद्रूपेण परिणमेत केनचिच्चावतिष्ठेतेति, रूपभेदकल्पनात्सावयवमेव प्रसज्येत;
If it were to be supposed that it has different aspects, so that it modifies itself in some of its aspects and remains unmodified in some other of its aspects, it would mean necessarily that it has parts.
क्रियाविषये हि ‘अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’ ‘नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’ इत्येवंजातीयकायां विरोधप्रतीतावपि
In the case of matters connected with actions (Karma), when a conflict is discernible, such as “He uses the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup in Atirātra sacrifice”, and “He does not use the Ṣo-ḍaśi cup in Atirātra sacrifice”,
विकल्पाश्रयणं विरोधपरिहारकारणं भवति, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वाच्चानुष्ठानस्य;
As action depends upon a man, a resort to an option constitutes the means of removing the contradiction,
इह तु विकल्पाश्रयणेनापि न विरोधपरिहारः सम्भवति, अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तुनः;
But in the present case, even a resort to option would be unable to remove a contradiction, because, an entity (Vastu) as such is independent of man,
And therefore, it is difficult to reconcile this (contradiction).
नैष दोषः, अविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदाभ्युपगमात्।
(To this we reply) This is no fault, because here it is understood that these different aspects of Brahman are imagined through Nescience.
न ह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु सम्पद्यते;
A thing is not rendered as being a thing having parts, merely by imagining through Nescience (Avidyā) that it has different aspects.
न हि तिमिरोपहतनयनेनानेक इव चन्द्रमा दृश्यमानोऽनेक एव भवति;
The moon, for instance, does not in fact become more than one, merely because she appears to be more than one, to an eye affected by double vision (Timira i.e. Diplopia).
अविद्याकल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपभेदेन व्याकृताव्याकृतात्मकेन तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीयेन
ब्रह्म परिणामादिसर्वव्यवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते;
Brahman appears to become susceptible of (i.e. appears to be the basis of) all phenomenal behaviour by way of modifications etc.,
By reason of the distinctions of aspects or forms characterized by names and forms imagined through Nescience, which are at once both evolved and unevolved, and about whom it is not possible to predicate that they either are or are not Brahman,
पारमार्थिकेन च रूपेण सर्वव्यवहारातीतमपरिणतमवतिष्ठते,
While in its truest nature Brahman subsists only in its unmodified aspect, and is beyond all phenomenal behaviour,
वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वाच्चाविद्याकल्पितस्य नामरूपभेदस्य –
And, as names and forms imagined through Nescience are but merely made current by speech,
इति न निरवयवत्वं ब्रह्मणः कुप्यति;
The fact that Brahman has no parts is not thereby vitiated.
न चेयं परिणामश्रुतिः परिणामप्रतिपादनार्था,
Besides, on the one hand this Scriptural statement about the modification (of Brahman) is not meant to propound the fact of modification itself,
As such realization is not understood to have any fruit as such,
While on the other hand it is intended to establish how Brahman which is the Self of all is devoid of any real phenomenal behaviour,
As it is understood that a fruit results by such realization.
‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ इत्युपक्रम्याह
The Scriptures, after declaring in the beginning that “(whatever is predicated to be Brahman) is not that, not that”,
‘अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि’ (BrhU.4.2.4) इति;
Proceed to say later on — “Oh Janaka, verily hast thou attained fearlessness” (BrhUEng.4.2.4).
तस्मादस्मत्पक्षे न कश्चिदपि दोषप्रसङ्गोऽस्ति॥२७॥
Therefore there could never be a predicament of any kind of fault attaching to our view (i.e. that of the Vedāntins). — 27.
←PrevNext→ आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि॥२.१.२८॥ Ātmani caivaṃ vicitrāś ca hi.
Ātmani: in the individual soul; Ca: also, and; Evam: thus; Vicitrāḥ: diverse, manifold, variegated; Ca: and, also; Hi: because.
🔗 It is similar in (the case of) the Ātmā (Jīva-Self) also, (during dream experiences), and such different (creations exist in the case of Gods, illusionists etc.). — 220.127.116.11.1.28 L.1
अपि च नैवात्र विवदितव्यम् – कथमेकस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः स्यादिति;
It should not be disputed in this matter (of Brahman), as to how creations of different sorts, originating out of Brahman which is but one only, can be possible without the destruction of its own nature,
यत आत्मन्यप्येकस्मिन्स्वप्नदृशि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिः पठ्यते –
Since the Scriptures speak of similar creations of different sorts in the case of the dreaming Jīva-Self also without any destruction of its own nature thus —
‘न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान्रथयोगान्पथः सृजते’ (BrhU.4.3.10) इत्यादिना;
“(In the dream condition) there are no chariots, nor steeds, nor roads, but he creates chariots, steeds and roads etc.” (BrhUEng.4.3.10)
लोकेऽपि देवादिषु मायाव्यादिषु च स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैव विचित्रा हस्त्यश्वादिसृष्टयो दृश्यन्ते;
It is seen in the ordinary world also, that Gods, illusionists etc. cause such creations as elephants and horses, without their own forms undergoing destruction,
तथैकस्मिन्नपि ब्रह्मणि स्वरूपानुपमर्देनैवानेकाकारा सृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति॥२८॥
And hence, even in the case of Brahman, one and only one as it is, there may well be creation of different sorts without involving destruction of its own nature. — 28.
←PrevNext→ स्वपक्षदोषाच्च॥२.१.२९॥ Sva-pakṣa-doṣāc ca.
Svapakṣa: in one’s own view; Doṣāt: because of the defects; Ca: also, and.
🔗 Also because the faults (attributed to the Vedānta doctrine by the opponents) are common to their own (i.e. of the opponent’s) view. — 18.104.22.168.1.29 L.1
परेषामप्येष समानः स्वपक्षे दोषः –
The same faults are common to their own view (i.e. to the view of the opponents of Vedānta).
प्रधानवादिनोऽपि हि निरवयवमपरिच्छिन्नं शब्दादिहीनं प्रधानं
Their own view also is, that the Pradhāna which is without parts, undelimited, and devoid of attributes such as sound etc.,
सावयवस्य परिच्छिन्नस्य शब्दादिमतः कार्यस्य कारणमिति स्वपक्षः;
Is the cause of effects which have parts, which are delimited and which have the attributes of sound (such as the world etc.).
तत्रापि कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वात्प्रधानस्य प्राप्नोति,
In that case also, the Pradhāna being without parts, there would also be the same conclusion, viz., that the Pradhāna as a whole undergoes modification,
Or that the assumption that Pradhāna has no parts would be contradicted.
ननु नैव तैर्निरवयवं प्रधानमभ्युपगम्यते;
(The opponent may suggest) — they (i.e. the opponents) do not understand that the Pradhāna is without parts,
सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि हि त्रयो गुणाः;
Because its three qualities (Guṇas) of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas are eternal
तेषां साम्यावस्था प्रधानम्;
And Pradhāna means their condition of balanced equipoise,
And that it is because of these three qualities (Guṇas) that their Pradhāna has parts.
नैवंजातीयकेन सावयवत्वेन प्रकृतो दोषः परिहर्तुं पार्यते, –
(We say to this) — they would not be able to remove the present fault by any such supposition about the Pradhāna being endowed with parts,
यतः सत्त्वरजस्तमसामप्येकैकस्य समानं निरवयवत्वम्
Because (according to them) each of their Guṇas viz. Sattva, Rajas or Tamas is by itself equally partless,
एकैकमेव चेतरद्वयानुगृहीतं सजातीयस्य प्रपञ्चस्योपादानमिति –
And each one of these three helped by the other two, is the material cause of diverse creations, homogeneous to themselves (i.e. having all these qualities in every creation),
And therefore, there would be the same common predicament of a similar fault occurring in their own view also.
तर्काप्रतिष्ठानात्सावयवत्वमेवेति चेत् –
(If the opponent says) — As this reasoning (viz. that each of these three qualities i.e. Guṇas of Pradhāna has no parts) has no basis, we understand that the Pradhāna has parts,
Even then (we reply) there still would occur the predicament of its being non-eternal etc. (because a thing which has parts is not everlasting i.e. is Anitya).
अथ शक्तय एव कार्यवैचित्र्यसूचिता अवयवा इत्यभिप्रायः,
(Again if the opponent says) We assume that the diverse potential powers of the Pradhāna, as suggested by the variety of created effects themselves, constitute the parts of the Pradhāna,
Then (we reply) that the assumption of such potential powers is equally common to the Vedānta view.
तथा अणुवादिनोऽप्यणुरण्वन्तरेण संयुज्यमानो निरवयवत्वाद्यदि कार्त्स्न्येन संयुज्येत,
Now, in the case of the Atomists (Vaiseṣikas) also, when one atom combines with another, it would combine entirely because atoms are without parts,
And then as no dimensions i.e. extensions would emerge (from such combination of partless atoms) there would occur the predicament of the resulting combination (of one atom with another) also being atomic.
अथैकदेशेन संयुज्येत, तथापि निरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमकोप इति –
If it then be said, that an atom combines with only one part (of it) with one part (of another), it would contradict their own assumption of atoms being without parts,
स्वपक्षेऽपि समान एष दोषः।
And the fault would then be common to the Atomist’s view also.
समानत्वाच्च नान्यतरस्मिन्नेव पक्षे उपक्षेप्तव्यो भवति।
Such a fault therefore being in such a case common to both the views (of the Vedāntin’s and the Atomist’s) it would not be proper (for any one) to urge it only against one’s opponent’s view only.
परिहृतस्तु ब्रह्मवादिना स्वपक्षे दोषः॥२९॥
The possibility of any fault attaching to the Vedānta view has already been refuted by the adherent of the Vedānta view. — 29.
←PrevNext→ सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्॥२.१.३०॥ Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt.
Sarva-upetā: endowed with all powers, all-powerful; Ca: also, and; Tad-darśanāt: because it is seen (from the scriptures). (Sarva: all; Upetā: endowed with, possessed with; Tat: that, the possession of such powers.)
🔗 (Brahman, parā devatā) is equipped with all powers, because it is so seen (from the Scriptures). — 22.214.171.124.1.30 L.1
एकस्यापि ब्रह्मणो विचित्रशक्तियोगादुपपद्यते विचित्रो विकारप्रपञ्च इत्युक्तम्;
It has already been said that though Brahman is one only, its modification in the form of this diverse world appearance, is reasonably sustainable, because of its being equipped with all powers.
तत्पुनः कथमवगम्यते – विचित्रशक्तियुक्तं परं ब्रह्मेति;
Again (it may be asked), how is it known that the Highest Brahman is equipped with diverse powers?
तदुच्यते – सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्।
(We reply) — Because it is seen that it is so equipped (with diverse powers).
सर्वशक्तियुक्ता च परा देवतेत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।
It has necessarily to be understood that this Highest deity is equipped with all powers.
कुतः? तद्दर्शनात्। तथा हि दर्शयति श्रुतिः सर्वशक्तियोगं परस्या देवतायाः –
Whence is it so? Because it is seen (from Scriptures) that it has all such powers, thus —
‘सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः’ (ChanU.3.14.4)
“He, to whom all actions, all desires, all smells, all tastes belong, who is immanent in i.e. occupies all this (world appearance), who has no speech and who is indifferent and calm” (ChanU.3.14.4);
‘सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः’ (ChanU.8.7.1)
“His desires are true, his resolutions are true” (ChanU.8.7.1);
‘यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्’ (MunU.1.1.9)
“Who is omniscient and who cognizes everything” (MunU.1.1.9);
‘एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः’ (BrhU.3.8.9) इत्येवंजातीयका॥३०॥
“Oh Gārgi, it is at the behest of him who is unperishable that the sun and the moon hold themselves suspended in position (in space)” (BrhUEng.3.8.9). — 30.
←PrevNext→ विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम्॥२.१.३१॥ Vikaraṇatvān neti cet tad uktam.
Vikaraṇatvāt: because of want of organs of action and perception; Na: not; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Tat: that, that objection; Uktam: has been explained or answered.
🔗 (If it be said) — not being endowed with sense-organs, (Brahman) (cannot effect modifications) (we reply) it has been answered already. — 126.96.36.199.1.31 L.1
स्यादेतत् – विकरणां परां देवतां शास्ति शास्त्रम् –
The Scriptures have stated that the transcendent deity (Brahman) is not endowed with organs, thus —
‘अचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनाः’ (BrhU.3.8.8) इत्येवंजातीयकम्।
“(Brahman is) sans-eyes, sans-ears, sans-speech and sans-mind” (BrhUEng.3.8.8).
कथं सा सर्वशक्तियुक्तापि सती कार्याय प्रभवेत्?
How then, can such transcendent deity be able to effect modifications, even though it be equipped with all powers?
देवादयो हि चेतनाः सर्वशक्तियुक्ता अपि सन्त आध्यात्मिककार्यकरणसम्पन्ना एव तस्मै तस्मै कार्याय प्रभवन्तो विज्ञायन्ते;
Intelligent and equipped with all powers as Gods etc. are, they are understood to be able to effect all such several modifications, only when they are possessed of physical organs as the means (of effecting modifications).
कथं च ‘नेति नेति’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इति प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषाया देवतायाः सर्वशक्तियोगः सम्भवेत्, इति चेत् –
(If it be said) — how is it possible, that a deity which can be referred to only negatively as “not that, not that” (BrhUEng.3.9.26) and about which all specific attributes are thus denied, can still have a connection with all such powers?
यदत्र वक्तव्यं तत्पुरस्तादेवोक्तम्;
(We would reply) — All that can be said in reply to this has already been stated before.
श्रुत्यवगाह्यमेवेदमतिगम्भीरं ब्रह्म न तर्कावगाह्यम्;
This extremely solemn Brahman is capable of being understood only through the Scriptures and never through reasoning.
न च यथैकस्य सामर्थ्यं दृष्टं तथान्यस्यापि सामर्थ्येन भवितव्यमिति नियमोऽस्तीति।
There is no such rule that because one entity is observed to possess certain powers, any other entity must necessarily possess all these powers.
प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः सम्भवतीति
That it is possible, that Brahman, with regard to which all special attributes are denied, may yet possibly possess all powers when it is borne in mind that it has already been stated that even though all specific attributes are denied in the case of Brahman,
Still when it is assumed that it has different forms or natures imagined through Nescience (Avidyā), it becomes possible that it can have a connection with all powers.
तथा च शास्त्रम् – ‘अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः’ (SvetU.3.19)
इत्यकरणस्यपि ब्रह्मणः सर्वसामर्थ्ययोगं दर्शयति॥३१॥
Even so teaches the Śāstra (Scriptures), viz., that unequipped with physical organs though Brahman is, it still is possessed of all powers, by the passage —
“Though he has neither hands nor feet, he grasps and is capable of swift movement, he sees even though he has no eyes and hears even though he has no ears to hear” (SvetU.3.19). — 31.
←PrevNext→ न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्॥२.१.३२॥ Na prayojanavattvāt.
Na: not (i.e. Brahman cannot be the creator); Prayojana-vattvāt: on account of having motive.
🔗 (Brahman) is not the cause of the world, because (all endeavours by sentient entities are) with some object. — 188.8.131.52.1.32 L.1
अन्यथा पुनश्चेतनकर्तृकत्वं जगत आक्षिपति –
Again in another way an objection is raised (by the opponent) to (the doctrine of) this transitory world being the handiwork of a sentient entity (i.e. Brahman).
न खलु चेतनः परमात्मेदं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितुमर्हति।
Verily this sentient Highest Self (i.e. Brahman) does not deserve to create (i.e. be the creator of) this world-sphere.
Why so? Because all endeavours presuppose an objective (behind such endeavour).
चेतनो हि लोके बुद्धिपूर्वकारी पुरुषः प्रवर्तमानो
न मन्दोपक्रमामपि तावत्प्रवृत्तिमात्मप्रयोजनानुपयोगिनीमारभमाणो दृष्टः,
(For instance) in the ordinary world a sentient man whose every endeavour is invariably preceded by previous thought,
Is never seen to engage himself in any the least endeavour which is useless for his own objective.
How then about this stupendous undertaking?
भवति च लोकप्रसिद्ध्यनुवादिनी श्रुतिः –
There is a passage in the Scriptures which agrees with ordinary well-known worldly experience, thus —
‘न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवत्यात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति;
“All this does not become dear for the sake of all, but it all is so dear, because it is desired by one’s own self (Ātmā)” (BrhUEng.2.4.5).
गुरुतरसंरम्भा चेयं प्रवृत्तिः – यदुच्चावचप्रपञ्चं जगद्बिम्बं विरचयितव्यम्;
It is a stupendous undertaking this, viz. the creation of this worldly sphere, which is comprised of all such high and low worldly phenomena.
यदीयमपि प्रवृत्तिश्चेतनस्य परमात्मन आत्मप्रयोजनोपयोगिनी परिकल्प्येत,
Now, if it were to be conceived that this endeavour of the Highest Self is useful to itself because of its own desire,
परितृप्तत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत;
Then such supposition would contradict the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being always quite contented.
प्रयोजनाभावे वा प्रवृत्त्यभावोऽपि स्यात्;
If, on the other hand, one were to conceive no such purpose (behind such endeavour), one would have to concede that (in such a case) there would not be any such endeavour,
अथ चेतनोऽपि सन् उन्मत्तो बुद्ध्यपराधादन्तरेणैवात्मप्रयोजनं प्रवर्तमानो दृष्टः,
(If one were to say) that it is seen that if a person even though sentient, happens to be unsound in mind, such person, through the fault of his intellect, is seen to be engaged in activity quite useless to his purpose, by reason of his inability to discriminate properly,
तथा परमात्मापि प्रवर्तिष्यते इत्युच्येत –
And even so, may the Highest Self also endeavour,
तथा सति सर्वज्ञत्वं परमात्मनः श्रूयमाणं बाध्येत;
Then (in such a case) the Scriptural statement about the Highest Self being omniscient, would be contradicted.
For these reasons, therefore, (the doctrine) that the creation (of this world) is by a sentient being, is not tenable. — 32.
←PrevNext→ लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्॥२.१.३३॥ Lokavat tu līlā-kaivalyam.
Lokavat: as in the world, as in ordinary life; Tu: but; Līlā-kaivalyam: mere pastime. (Līlā: sport, play; Kaivalyam: merely; Līlā-mātram: mere pastime.)
🔗 But (the act of creation) is a mere sport (of the Lord) even as is seen in the ordinary world. — 184.108.40.206.1.33 L.1
The word “But” refutes the objection.
यथा लोके कस्यचिदाप्तैषणस्य राज्ञो राजामात्यस्य वा
Just as in the ordinary world, in the case of a king who has attained all his desires or of his minister,
व्यतिरिक्तं किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमनभिसन्धाय केवलं लीलारूपाः प्रवृत्तयः क्रीडाविहारेषु भवन्ति;
Their activities in sports and pastimes are merely of the nature of a sport and are indulged in without any particular aim in mind,
यथा चोच्छ्वासप्रश्वासादयोऽनभिसन्धाय बाह्यं किञ्चित्प्रयोजनं स्वभावादेव सम्भवन्ति;
Or just as the inspiration or expiration etc. (of a man) takes place naturally, without any extraneous purpose,
एवमीश्वरस्याप्यनपेक्ष्य किञ्चित्प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव केवलं लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिर्भविष्यति;
Even so may the Lord also engage in such sportful activity without any purpose, and merely as the result of his nature.
न हीश्वरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं निरूप्यमाणं न्यायतः श्रुतितो वा सम्भवति;
It is not possible to explain on the ground of reasoning or the Scriptures that there is any other purpose on the part of the Lord.
न च स्वभावः पर्यनुयोक्तुं शक्यते।
It is not possible to question the nature (of the Lord).
यद्यप्यस्माकमियं जगद्बिम्बविरचना गुरुतरसंरम्भेवाभाति,
Though the creation of this world-sphere appears to us as a stupendous undertaking,
तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयम्,
Yet to the Lord, it is but a mere pastime,
Because of his measureless power.
यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित्सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत,
May be, that in the case of the ordinary world, we may imagine perhaps some minute purpose even for sports,
तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित्प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते,
But here in the case of the Lord, it is not possible to imagine any such purpose,
Because of the Scriptural statement about His being one who has obtained all his desires.
Nor can we say that the Lord has no such activity or that such activity is that of a person who is possessed of an evil spirit or of one who is insane,
Because of the Scriptural statement about creation and about his being Omniscient.
न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः
इत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम्॥३३॥
Nor should it ever be forgotten,
That even this Scriptural statement about creation (by the Lord) is not so in the truest sense,
But with reference to the perception of the transactions of names and forms being merely imagined through Nescience,
And also because it purports to propound how Brahman is the Self (of everything). — 33.
←PrevNext→ वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति॥२.१.३४॥ Vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇye na sāpekṣatvāt tathā hi darśayati.
Vaiṣamya: inequality, partiality; Nairghṛṇye: cruelty, unkindness; Na: not (cannot be ascribed to Brahman); Sa-apekṣatvāt: because of dependence upon, as it is dependent on something else, i.e., upon the Karma of the souls; Tathā: so; Hi: because; Darśayati: the scripture declares.
🔗 (Faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not (attach themselves to the Lord) because of (the Lord’s) having regard (for the merit or demerit of a person). The Scriptures themselves bear it out. — 220.127.116.11.1.34 L.1
Objection is again taken (by the Sūtra-kāra himself) to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the creation etc. of the world,
स्थूणानिखननन्यायेन प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्य दृढीकरणाय।
In order to confirm the declaration of that doctrine, in accordance with the ‘maxim of driving a pile deeper (in order to make it firm) (Sthūṇā-nikhanana Nyāya)’, thus —
नेश्वरो जगतः कारणमुपपद्यते।
It is not reasonably sustainable that the Lord is the cause of the world,
कुतः? वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गात् –
Because (supposing it is so) there would result the predicament of (the fault of) discrimination and cruelty (attaching themselves to the Lord).
कांश्चिदत्यन्तसुखभाजः करोति देवादीन्,
कांश्चिन्मध्यमभोगभाजो मनुष्यादीन् –
इत्येवं विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमाणस्येश्वरस्य
It would be reasonably sustainable to hold, that the Lord in bringing about such unequal creation —
Such as Gods etc. who enjoy great happiness,
Animals etc. who suffer great misery,
And men etc. who enjoy happiness or suffer misery in moderation —
Is like an ordinary man subject to passion and hatred.
It would thus bring about the effacement of the Lord’s nature of extreme purity as understood from the Scriptures and the Smṛtis.
तथा खलजनैरपि जुगुप्सितं निर्घृणत्वमतिक्रूरत्वं दुःखयोगविधानात्सर्वप्रजोपसंहाराच्च प्रसज्येत;
Similarly by his inflicting misery and by destroying all his creation, faults of such pitilessness and cruelty, as would be abhorred even by a villain, would attach themselves to the Lord.
तस्माद्वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यप्रसङ्गान्नेश्वरः कारणमित्येवं प्राप्ते
Therefore, because of the predicament of (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty resulting, the Lord could not be the cause of the world.
ब्रूमः – वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये नेश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते।
To this (we reply) — (The faults of) discrimination and cruelty do not affect the Lord.
How is this so? Because of the regard (which the Lord has for the merit or demerit of a person).
यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते,
Were the Lord to bring about such unequal creation without any such regard (for a person’s merit or demerit),
स्यातामेतौ दोषौ – वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च;
Then surely (the faults of) discrimination and cruelty would attach themselves to Him,
न तु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति;
But no one who has no such regard, has any such creativity i.e. an impulse to create.
सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते।
It is because the Lord just has such regard (for a person’s merit or demerit) that he brings about such unequal creation.
किमपेक्षत इति चेत् –
What then, is his regard about?
धर्माधर्मावपेक्षत इति वदामः;
We say that he has a regard for the merit or demerit of persons.
अतः सृज्यमानप्राणिधर्माधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिरिति
Surely it is no fault of the Lord,
That his bringing about of such unequal creation is due to the regard he has for the merit and demerit of the beings about to be created.
ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवद्द्रष्टव्यः –
The Lord should rather be looked upon to be like ‘rain’.
यथा हि पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति,
Just as rain is the general cause which makes rice and barley grow,
व्रीहियवादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तद्बीजगतान्येवासाधारणानि सामर्थ्यानि कारणानि भवन्ति,
While the different potentialities inherent in their seeds, are the cause of the disparity between such rice and barley,
एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति,
Even so in the creation of Gods and men etc. the Lord is but the general common cause only,
देवमनुष्यादिवैषम्ये तु तत्तज्जीवगतान्येवासाधारणानि कर्माणि कारणानि भवन्ति;
While for the inequality between Gods and men etc., they have their own different individual actions as the cause,
एवमीश्वरः सापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्यनैर्घृण्याभ्यां दुष्यति।
And in this way, the Lord, because of this regard (for men’s merits and demerits) is not vitiated by (such faults as of) discrimination and cruelty.
कथं पुनरवगम्यते सापेक्ष ईश्वरो नीचमध्यमोत्तमं संसारं निर्मिमीत इति?
But, how again is it understood that the Lord brings about such low, middling and high transmigratory existences because of such regard on his part (for a person’s merits and demerits)?
तथा हि दर्शयति श्रुतिः –
The Scriptures themselves state so, thus —
‘एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषत एष उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधो निनीषते’ (कौ. ब्रा. ३-८) इति,
“The Lord when he wishes to raise a person higher than this world, he causes such person to do good deeds, and when he wishes to lead him down to the nether regions, he causes him to do bad deeds” (Kauṣ. Brā. 3.8);
‘पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन’ (BrhU.3.2.13) इति च;
Also, “A man becomes meritorious by meritorious actions and sinful by sinful actions” (BrhUEng.3.2.13).
स्मृतिरपि प्राणिकर्मविशेषापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्यानुग्रहीतृत्वं निग्रहीतृत्वं च दर्शयति –
Smṛti also shows how the vouchsafing of grace by the Lord (to a person) or his condemnation (of him) depends upon the particular actions of these beings, thus —
‘ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम्’ (BhG.4.11) इत्येवंजातीयका॥३४॥
“I respond to men in the same measure in which they serve me” — (BhG.4.11). — 34.
←PrevNext→ न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात्॥२.१.३५॥ Na karmāvibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt.
Na: not; Karma-avibhagāt: because of the non-distinction of work (before creation); Iti cet: if it be said, if it be objected in this way; Na: no, the objection cannot stand; An-āditvāt: because of beginninglessness.
🔗 (If the Lord’s having regard (for merit or demerit) is objected to as being impossible, on the ground that, prior to creation, because of the absence of distinction (between merit and demerit), there is no Karma (action), — (we reply) No, because (transmigratory existence) is beginningless. — 18.104.22.168.1.35 L.1
‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ (ChanU.6.2.1) इति
नास्ति कर्म, यदपेक्ष्य विषमा सृष्टिः स्यात्;
If the objection (by the opponent) is thus: Because as it has already been understood from the Scriptural passage
“Oh mild one, in the beginning, ‘Sat’ alone, one without a second, existed” (ChanU.6.2.1)
There could be no action (Karma), having regard to which there would be this disparity in the creation,
Inasmuch as it is understood that prior to creation, differences did not exist.
सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं हि शरीरादिविभागापेक्षं कर्म,
Action would take place only after creation, depending upon differences such as physical bodies etc.,
कर्मापेक्षश्च शरीरादिविभागः –
And differences such as physical bodies etc. would depend upon action taking place,
And thus there would occur (the fault of) mutual interdependence (Itaretarāśrayatva).
अतो विभागादूर्ध्वं कर्मापेक्ष ईश्वरः प्रवर्ततां नाम;
Hence, well may the Lord function, having regard to action, after such differences (of bodies etc.) have taken place,
प्राग्विभागाद्वैचित्र्यनिमित्तस्य कर्मणोऽभावात्तुल्यैवाद्या सृष्टिः प्राप्नोतीति चेत्,
But because of the absence of action which is the cause of the variety (of creation) prior to such differences, it would come to this, that creation would be homogeneous.
नैष दोषः; अनादित्वात्संसारस्य;
(We reply) — This is no fault, because of transmigratory existence being beginningless.
भवेदेष दोषः, यद्यादिमानयं संसारः स्यात्;
The fault (as referred to by the opponent) may well occur provided transmigratory existence were to have a beginning.
अनादौ तु संसारे
But transmigratory existence being beginningless,
बीजाङ्कुरवद्धेतुहेतुमद्भावेन कर्मणः सर्गवैषम्यस्य च प्रवृत्तिर्न विरुध्यते॥३५॥
There need not be any objection for action and the variety of creation, to act alternately as cause and effect of each other, like the seed and the sprout, and to have a tendency for creation having such disparity. — 35.
कथं पुनरवगम्यते – अनादिरेष संसार इति? अत उत्तरं पठति –
But (says the opponent) how is it understood that this transmigratory existence is beginningless?
←PrevNext→ उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च॥२.१.३६॥ Upapadyate cāpy upalabhyate ca.
Upapadyate: is proved by reasoning, is reasonable that it should be so; Ca: and; Api: and, also, assuredly; Upalabhyate: is seen, is found in Śruti or Scriptures; Ca: also, and.
🔗 (The Sūtra-kāra) replies (that transmigratory existence is beginningless) is reasonably sustainable and is understood (from the Scriptures) also. — 22.214.171.124.1.36 L.2
उपपद्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वम् –
That transmigratory existence is beginningless is reasonably sustainable.
आदिमत्त्वे हि संसारस्याकस्मादुद्भूतेर्मुक्तानामपि पुनः संसारोद्भूतिप्रसङ्गः,
If it were to have a beginning, then it having come into existence capriciously without any cause, the predicament of persons who have attained Final Release being again involved in transmigratory existence, would take place,
As also the predicament of ‘fruit’ arising without any action having taken place,
Because (under such supposition) there would be no cause for the disparity between pleasure and misery (to come into existence).
न चेश्वरो वैषम्यहेतुरित्युक्तम्;
It has already been said that the Lord cannot be the cause for such disparity,
न चाविद्या केवला वैषम्यस्य कारणम्, एकरूपत्वात्;
Nor can mere Nescience also be the cause of such disparity, because it is of a uniform nature.
रागादिक्लेशवासनाक्षिप्तकर्मापेक्षा त्वविद्या वैषम्यकरी स्यात्;
Nescience at best could produce such disparity, if it were to depend on action produced by subconscious impressions of misery resulting from passion etc.
न च कर्म अन्तरेण शरीरं सम्भवति, न च शरीरमन्तरेण कर्म सम्भवति –
(Assuming that a physical body is the cause of variety) Without action, a physical body would not result, nor would action result in the absence of a physical body,
And hence it would all result in the fault of mutual interdependence.
अनादित्वे तु बीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनोपपत्तेर्न कश्चिद्दोषो भवति।
If on the other hand, transmigratory existence is understood to be beginningless, then it would all be reasonably sustainable in accordance with the maxim of “the seed and the sprout” and hence there would not be any fault.
उपलभ्यते च संसारस्यानादित्वं श्रुतिस्मृत्योः।
That, transmigratory existence is beginningless, is understood both from the Scriptures and Smṛtis.
श्रुतौ तावत् –
‘अनेन जीवेनात्मना’ (ChanU.6.3.2) इति
सर्गप्रमुखे शारीरमात्मानं जीवशब्देन
अनादिः संसार इति दर्शयति।
So far as the Scriptures are concerned,
They in the beginning of creation by referring to the embodied Self by the word Jīva,
Which comes into use by reason of the action of ‘sustaining life’ (Prāṇa-dhāraṇa),
By the Scriptural passage — “By this Jīva-Self” (ChanU.6.3.2),
Show, that transmigratory existence is beginningless.
आदिमत्त्वे तु प्रागनवधारितप्राणः सन्
If it were to have a beginning, then lifeless as the Self (Ātmā) would necessarily be,
कथं प्राणधारणनिमित्तेन जीवशब्देन सर्गप्रमुखेऽभिलप्येत?
How could the embodied Self be ever referred to, in the beginning of creation, by the term Jīva-Self, which becomes applicable because of the sustaining of life?
न च धारयिष्यतीत्यतोऽभिलप्येत –
It cannot be said, that it would be so referred to in anticipation,
अनागताद्धि सम्बन्धादतीतः सम्बन्धो बलवान्भवति,
Because a relationship which is already in existence has greater force than a relationship which is yet to supervene,
Because it (the first relationship) is an already established thing.
‘सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत्’ (ऋ. सं. १०-१९०-३) इति च मन्त्रवर्णः पूर्वकल्पसद्भावं दर्शयति।
The Scriptural Mantra passage — “The Creator created the sun and the moon as before” (Ṛg. Sam. 10.190.3), shows the existence of a prior Kalpa.
स्मृतावप्यनादित्वं संसारस्योपलभ्यते –
That transmigratory existence is beginningless, we find mentioned in the Smṛti thus —
‘न रूपमस्येह तथोपलभ्यते नान्तो न चादिर्न च सम्प्रतिष्ठा’ (BhG.15.3) इति;
“Neither is its (i.e. Brahman’s) form known here (like for instance the form of an earthen pot), nor its beginning, existence and end” (BhG.15.3).
पुराणे चातीतानागतानां च कल्पानां न परिमाणमस्तीति स्थापितम्॥३६॥
In the Purāṇas also it has been well established, that there is no measure of the past and future Kalpas. — 36.
←PrevNext→ सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च॥२.२.३७॥ Sarva-dharmopapatteś ca.
Sarva: all; Dharma: attributes, qualities; Upapatteḥ: because of the reasonableness, because of being proved; Ca: and, also.
🔗 (The Vedānta doctrine is valid) because all qualities (attributed to Brahman) are reasonably sustainable. — 126.96.36.199.1.37 L.1
चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेत्यस्मिन्नवधारिते वेदार्थे परैरुपक्षिप्तान्विलक्षणत्वादीन् दोषान्पर्यहार्षीदाचार्यः;
The Ācārya (Sūtra-kāra) has thus refuted the faults
Attributed by the opponent of Vedānta to the doctrine of [the intelligence] Brahman being the material and accidental cause of this world, by the Sūtra “On account of dissimilarity (between cause and effect) etc.”.
इदानीं परपक्षप्रतिषेधप्रधानं प्रकरणं प्रारिप्समाणः
Now with a view to begin the subject chiefly dealing with the refutation of the opponent’s doctrines,
The Ācārya proposes to conclude the chief subject of the establishment of his own (Vedānta) doctrine,
यस्मादस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि कारणे परिगृह्यमाणे
In as much as, when once this Brahman is accepted as the cause of this world,
प्रदर्शितेन प्रकारेण सर्वे कारणधर्मा उपपद्यन्ते
All qualities attributable to the cause, become reasonably sustainable in the manner indicated,
‘सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति महामायं च ब्रह्म’ इति,
Viz. — that Brahman is omniscient, omnipotent and possesses the great power of Maya,
And that therefore one should not doubt the Upaniṣad doctrine over much. — 37.
– 52. Sarva-dharmopapatty-Adhikaraṇam. End of Pāda 2.1
यद्यपीदं वेदान्तवाक्यानामैदंपर्यं निरूपयितुं शास्त्रं प्रवृत्तम्,
Although this Śāstra has been commenced with a view to propound that the Vedānta passages mean thus and thus,
न तर्कशास्त्रवत्केवलाभिर्युक्तिभिः कञ्चित्सिद्धान्तं साधयितुं दूषयितुं वा प्रवृत्तम्,
And not with a view — like the Śāstra of reasoning — either to establish or vitiate a particular conclusion by mere reasonings,
तथापि वेदान्तवाक्यानि व्याचक्षाणैः सम्यग्दर्शनप्रतिपक्षभूतानि सांख्यादिदर्शनानि निराकरणीयानीति
Still it is but proper that learned scholars critically explaining the Vedānta passages should refute the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas and others, who have ranged themselves in opposition to the doctrine of correct knowledge (Saṃyag-darśana),
तदर्थः परः पादः प्रवर्तते।
And it is with this view that the following chapter is commenced.
वेदान्तार्थनिर्णयस्य च सम्यग्दर्शनार्थत्वात्तन्निर्णयेन स्वपक्षस्थापनं प्रथमं कृतम् –
As the ascertainment of the correct meaning of Vedānta is meant for the purpose of the determination of the doctrine of correct knowledge, we have first established our own doctrine by ascertaining the correct meaning,
Because that was more desirable than the refutation of the opponent’s doctrine.
ननु मुमुक्षूणां मोक्षसाधनत्वेन सम्यग्दर्शननिरूपणाय स्वपक्षस्थापनमेव केवलं कर्तुं युक्तम्;
But (it may be said by the opponent), — it is proper, only to establish one’s own view for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of correct knowledge as the means for the attainment of Final Release for those who desire to be so liberated,
किं परपक्षनिराकरणेन परविद्वेषकारणेन?
So why trouble yourself then, about the refutation of the opponent’s doctrine which is calculated only to engender their hatred?
बाढमेवम्; तथापि महाजनपरिगृहीतानि महान्ति सांख्यादितन्त्राणि सम्यग्दर्शनापदेशेन प्रवृत्तान्युपलभ्य भवेत्केषाञ्चिन्मन्दमतीनाम् –
Well, it is as you say, but some slow-witted persons, when they know, that these great doctrines of the Sāṅkhyas and others, which, albeit they proceed under the semblance of a true doctrine, are accepted by great people, may expect that the same should be accepted by them also, for the purpose of (attaining) correct knowledge.
एतान्यपि सम्यग्दर्शनायोपादेयानि – इत्यपेक्षा, तथा युक्तिगाढत्वसम्भवेन सर्वज्ञभाषितत्वाच्च श्रद्धा च तेषु –
It may also be, that because they are the result of acute reasoning and are propounded by omniscient sages, such people may pin their faith on them i.e. such other doctrines,
And hence an attempt is therefore made to expound their meaninglessness.
ननु ‘ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्’ (BrS.1.1.5)
‘कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा’ (BrS.1.1.18)
‘एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः’ (BrS.1.4.28) इति च
पूर्वत्रापि सांख्यादिपक्षप्रतिक्षेपः कृतः;
But (it may again be urged by the opponent) that the Sāṅkhya and other doctrines have already been refuted
By Sūtras, such as “On account of thinking — (Pradhāna) is not (the cause) — (it is) not based on the Scriptures.” (BrS.1.1.5),
“On account of (the mention of) a desire (on the part of the ‘Ānandamaya’) there is no necessity of accepting that which is inferred (by the Sāṅkhyas) viz. the Pradhāna (as the cause).” (BrS.1.1.18),
“By this (i.e. all that has gone before) all (other systems) which are opposed to Advaita (Monism) stand (in effect) refuted.” (BrS.1.4.28).
किं पुनः कृतकरणेनेति।
So what is the point, then, in doing it all over again?
तदुच्यते – सांख्यादयः स्वपक्षस्थापनाय वेदान्तवाक्यान्यप्युदाहृत्य स्वपक्षानुगुण्येनैव योजयन्तो व्याचक्षते,
To that we say – The Sāṅkhyas and others, with a view to establish their own doctrine, even cite Vedānta passages as illustrations, and interpret them in such a way as to make them applicable i.e. conformable to their own doctrines,
तेषां यद्व्याख्यानं तद्व्याख्यानाभासम्, न सम्यग्व्याख्यानम् –
And what has been done so far before, is,
That it has been shown that their interpretation (of the Vedānta passages) is fallacious and not a correct explanation at all.
इह तु वाक्यनिरपेक्षः स्वतन्त्रस्तद्युक्तिप्रतिषेधः क्रियत इत्येष विशेषः॥
Now, however, the special feature here is, that without reference to the Vedic passage, an independent refutation of their reasoning is made.
←PrevNext→ रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्॥२.२.१॥ Racanānupapatteś ca nānumānam.
Racanā: construction, the design in creation; An-upapatteh: on account of the impossibility; Ca: and; Na: not; Anumānam: that which is inferred, what is arrived at by inference, i.e., the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas.
🔗 That the inferred one (of the Sāṅkhyas, i.e., the Pradhāna, is the cause of the world) is not (correct), also because (on that assumption) the proper arrangement (of this world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 188.8.131.52.2.1 L.1
तत्र सांख्या मन्यन्ते –
Now, with regard to the present subject, the Sāṅkhyas hold, thus —
यथा घटशरावादयो भेदा मृदात्मतयान्वीयमाना मृदात्मकसामान्यपूर्वका लोके दृष्टाः,
Just as in the ordinary world it is seen that such things as earthen pots and jars etc., which have but clay as their common substance, have but clay as their general material cause,
तथा सर्व एव बाह्याध्यात्मिका भेदाः सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतयान्वीयमानाः
Similarly, all these Bāhya (external) and Ādhyātmika (having a relation with bodies) effects (Bhedas), which have pleasure, misery, and ignorance as their general common nature,
Deserve to have something which has the same pleasure, misery and ignorance as their general common nature, as their material cause,
यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं सामान्यं तत्त्रिगुणं प्रधानं मृद्वदचेतनं
And what this general common substance (viz. pleasure, misery and ignorance taken collectively) is, is but the Pradhāna, comprising of the triple qualities (of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas), which, like the earth, is non-sentient,
चेतनस्य पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं स्वभावेनैव विचित्रेण विकारात्मना प्रवर्तत इति।
And which, by virtue of its own nature, undergoes various modifications (as effects) with a view to fulfil the chief purpose of the sentient Puruṣa.
तथा परिमाणादिभिरपि लिङ्गैस्तदेव प्रधानमनुमिमते॥
They also infer this same Pradhāna (as the cause) because of such indicatory marks as the property of dimension i.e. extension etc. (viz. dimension or extension, the power to be active, proper sequence, origination of effect from a cause, and the merging of the effect into the cause).
तत्र वदामः – यदि दृष्टान्तबलेनैवैतन्निरूप्येत,
To this, we reply — If it is sought to explain this, only on the strength of illustrations,
नाचेतनं लोके चेतनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं किञ्चिद्विशिष्टपुरुषार्थनिर्वर्तनसमर्थान्विकारान्विरचयद्दृष्टम्;
(We may point out that) in the ordinary world no non-sentient thing, independently and without being guided by some sentient entity, is seen to be able to bring about any modifications or effects, which are able to fulfil any particular purpose of man.
गेहप्रासादशयनासनविहारभूम्यादयो हि लोके प्रज्ञावद्भिः शिल्पिभिर्यथाकालं सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहारयोग्या रचिता दृश्यन्ते;
It is seen that in the ordinary world things like a house, a palace, a bed-stead, a seat or a pleasure-ground, calculated to make for pleasure or for the avoidance of discomfort or pain, are created by sentient artisans at the required proper time.
तथेदं जगदखिलं पृथिव्यादि नानाकर्मफलोपभोगयोग्यं बाह्यम्
आध्यात्मिकं च शरीरादि नानाजात्यन्वितं प्रतिनियतावयवविन्यासमनेककर्मफलानुभवाधिष्ठानं दृश्यमानं
प्रज्ञावद्भिः सम्भाविततमैः शिल्पिभिर्मनसाप्यालोचयितुमशक्यं सत्
कथमचेतनं प्रधानं रचयेत्?
How could non-sentient Pradhāna, then, be able to create
This entire external i.e. visible world, comprising of this earth etc. which is fit for the experiencing of the fruit of various actions,
And this Ādhyātmika world of physical bodies of different classes, each having its own particular regular i.e. set arrangement of organs, affording basis for the experience of the fruits of various actions,
Which is not possible even to be mentally imagined by the most respected and highly intelligent architects?
Because, it is not seen, that lumps of earth or stones ever accomplish such things.
मृदादिष्वपि कुम्भकाराद्यधिष्ठितेषु विशिष्टाकारा रचना दृश्यते –
Even in the case of clay etc. it is only when they are directed or presided over (and taken up and manipulated) by potters etc. that they assume particular forms,
So (even if one were to concede that Pradhāna is the cause) there would result the predicament of this Pradhāna also, having to be directed by some other sentient entity.
न च मृदाद्युपादानस्वरूपव्यपाश्रयेणैव धर्मेण मूलकारणमवधारणीयम्,
न बाह्यकुम्भकारादिव्यपाश्रयेण –
There is no such restrictive rule
That the root cause (of any thing) should be determined by having recourse to the qualities having a substratum of the nature of a material thing only (such as earth etc.)
And not by having recourse to the qualities of any external (efficient) causes such as potters etc.
न चैवं सति किञ्चिद्विरुध्यते,
This being so, not only nothing is contradicted thereby,
प्रत्युत श्रुतिरनुगृह्यते, चेतनकारणसमर्पणात्।
But on the other hand the Scriptures would thus be supporting us (because of this agreement of views) by reason (of the fact) that the Scriptures culminate in indicating a sentient entity as the cause (of the world etc.).
अतो रचनानुपपत्तेश्च हेतोर्नाचेतनं जगत्कारणमनुमातव्यं भवति।
Hence it is precisely because of this very reason (stated by the opponent), viz. “That proper arrangement is not reasonably sustainable”, that it cannot be feasible to infer, that a non-sentient entity must be the cause of the world.
अन्वयाद्यनुपपत्तेश्चेति चशब्देन हेतोरसिद्धिं समुच्चिनोति।
The world ‘Also’ (i.e. ‘Ca’ in the Sūtra) cumulatively shows that the other reasons such as Anvaya (logical continuance) etc. (stated by the Sāṅkhyas as arguments in addition to the argument about Racanā i.e. arrangement or design) are not reasonably sustainable.
न हि बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतयान्वय उपपद्यते,
Again Anvaya (i.e. logical continuance) is not reasonably sustainable in the case of external (Bāhya) effects or Kāryas (such as sound i.e. Śabda etc.) and internal (Ādhyātmika) effects or Kāryas (such as a body and sense-organs etc.) of which we have experience, as they have no relation to pleasure, pain, and infatuation i.e. ignorance (Moha),
सुखादीनां चान्तरत्वप्रतीतेः, शब्दादीनां चातद्रूपत्वप्रतीतेः, तन्निमित्तत्वप्रतीतेश्च,
In as much as pleasure etc. are internally apprehended and sound (Śabda) etc. are externally apprehended, and also because sound etc. are apprehended as being the cause of pleasure etc.,
शब्दाद्यविशेषेऽपि च भावनाविशेषात्सुखादिविशेषोपलब्धेः।
And also because, though words etc. are the same (in every case) they create a particular pleasurable or painful sensation depending upon the particular impression or fancy (of the hearer).
तथा परिमितानां भेदानां मूलाङ्कुरादीनां संसर्गपूर्वकत्वं दृष्ट्वा
Again, noticing that objects such as roots and sprouts which have definite dimensions (i.e. extension) spring up as a result of an antecedent contact (of materials),
बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां परिमितत्वात्संसर्गपूर्वकत्वमनुमिमानस्य
If you were to infer, that external and internal Ādhyātmika differences (Bhedas) i.e. effects also having dimensions, are similarly the result of an antecedent contact (of materials),
सत्त्वरजस्तमसामपि संसर्गपूर्वकत्वप्रसङ्गः, परिमितत्वाविशेषात्।
You will land yourself into the predicament that the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas (of which the Pradhāna is made up) also have dimensions (i.e. extension) in common with the above and are the result of an antecedent contact (of materials).
कार्यकारणभावस्तु प्रेक्षापूर्वकनिर्मितानां शयनासनादीनां दृष्ट इति
But because a relation of cause and effect is seen to exist in the case of beds and seats etc. which are created at will,
न कार्यकारणभावाद्बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानामचेतनपूर्वकत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्॥१॥
It is not possible to infer that because a relation of cause and effect exists in the case of external and Ādhyātmika differences (Bhedas) i.e. effects, they also are the result of a nonsentient cause. — 1.
Pravṛtteḥ: because of the activity, of a tendency; Ca: and (it has the force of ‘only’ here).
🔗 Also (on account of the impossibility of) a tendency (in Pradhāna). — 184.108.40.206.2.2 L.1
आस्तां तावदियं रचना;
Let this (discussion about a) proper design or arrangement wait (for the time being).
तत्सिद्ध्यर्था या प्रवृत्तिः – साम्यावस्थानात्प्रच्युतिः, सत्त्वरजस्तमसामङ्गाङ्गिभावरूपापत्तिः,
सापि नाचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्योपपद्यते,
It is not reasonably sustainable that the non-sentient Pradhāna could independently by itself
Ever at all secure the necessary disturbance in its perfectly balanced condition of equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, Tamas (the three constituents of Pradhāna) i.e. by their converting themselves into a condition of reciprocal superiority or inferiority with regard to each other,
And its acquiring the necessary tendency towards accomplishing any particular effect,
Because it is not to be seen, either in the case of (such non-sentient things as) clay etc. or a chariot etc.
न हि मृदादयो रथादयो वा स्वयमचेतनाः सन्तश्चेतनैः कुलालादिभिरश्वादिभिर्वानधिष्ठिता विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तयो दृश्यन्ते;
It is not observed, that clay etc. or a chariot etc., which themselves are non-sentient, when not guided by intelligent entities such as potters etc. or horses etc., ever acquire a tendency towards a particular effect,
And we have to determine about what cannot be seen, from what is actually observed.
अतः प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरपि हेतोर्नाचेतनं जगत्कारणमनुमातव्यं भवति।
Therefore also, because of the reason of the acquisition of such a tendency not being reasonably sustainable, it is not inferable that the non-sentient one (Pradhāna) could be the cause of the world.
ननु चेतनस्यापि प्रवृत्तिः केवलस्य न दृष्टा –
But (the opponent may urge), neither is such tendency observable in the case of a mere sentient entity.
सत्यमेतत् – तथापि चेतनसंयुक्तस्य रथादेरचेतनस्य प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा;
(We reply) It is no doubt true, but the non-sentient chariot etc. are seen to have such tendency only when they are in conjunction with a sentient entity.
न त्वचेतनसंयुक्तस्य चेतनस्य प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा।
But the activity of a sentient – being associated with non-intelligent things – is [itself] not seen [Trans. by Panoli].
किं पुनरत्र युक्तम् –
(Says some third person here) What then, under such circumstances, is logical?
यस्मिन्प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा तस्य सा, उत यत्सम्प्रयुक्तस्य दृष्टा तस्य सेति?
Does such tendency, in fact, belong to that (non-sentient entity) in which it is observed, or to that (sentient entity) with which it (i.e. such non-sentient entity) is in conjunction?
ननु यस्मिन्दृश्यते प्रवृत्तिस्तस्यैव सेति युक्तम्, उभयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात्;
(The opponent says) It is reasonable that such tendency should belong to that in which it is actually observed, because both these (i.e. the tendency and that in which it occurs) are actually perceived,
न तु प्रवृत्त्याश्रयत्वेन केवलश्चेतनो रथादिवत्प्रत्यक्षः;
While a merely sentient entity is not actually perceived to be the basis (Āśraya) i.e. the source of such a tendency, just as chariots etc. (for instance) are actually perceived to be the basis of such a tendency.
प्रवृत्त्याश्रयदेहादिसंयुक्तस्यैव तु चेतनस्य सद्भावसिद्धिः –
केवलाचेतनरथादिवैलक्षण्यं जीवद्देहस्य दृष्टमिति;
That a living body is actually seen to be different from a non-sentient entity such as a chariot etc.,
Is the reason for merely inferring the certain existence only of a sentient entity being in conjunction with a non-sentient body etc. which furnish themselves as the basis of such a tendency.
अत एव च प्रत्यक्षे देहे सति चैतन्यस्य दर्शनादसति चादर्शनाद्देहस्यैव चैतन्यमपीति लोकायतिकाः प्रतिपन्नाः;
It is precisely for this very reason, viz. that sentiency is observed when a body is actually perceived and not observed when such a body is not perceived, that the materialists (Lokāyatikas) also understand that ‘sentiency’ belongs only to such a body.
Therefore (the conclusion of the opponent is that) it is the non-sentient entity to which such tendency belongs.
तदभिधीयते – न ब्रूमः यस्मिन्नचेतने प्रवृत्तिर्दृश्यते न तस्य सेति;
With regard to this we say — We do not say that such tendency does not belong to that non-sentient entity in which it is observed.
भवतु तस्यैव सा;
Well may it so belong to it.
सा तु चेतनाद्भवतीति ब्रूमः,
Only, we maintain, that it results from a sentient entity,
तद्भावे भावात्तदभावे चाभावात् –
Because, it exists when that sentient entity exists (in conjunction with the non-sentient thing) and it does not exist when such sentient entity does not exist (in conjunction with such non-sentient thing).
यथा काष्ठादिव्यपाश्रयापि दाहप्रकाशादिलक्षणा विक्रिया,
Just as, the properties of burning and emitting light, which, even though they subsist in fuel etc.,
अनुपलभ्यमानापि च केवले ज्वलने,
Are not perceivable in mere fire as such (as without fuel, mere fire does not exist),
But they are in fact caused by it (i.e. fire only),
तत्संयोगे दर्शनात्तद्वियोगे चादर्शनात् – तद्वत्;
Because they are seen, when it (fire) is in conjunction (with fuel) and are not seen, when it is not in such conjunction.
लोकायतिकानामपि चेतन एव देहोऽचेतनानां रथादीनां प्रवर्तको दृष्ट इति
Even the materialists hold that as it is seen that it is the sentient body that imparts the tendency to non-sentient chariots etc.,
अविप्रतिषिद्धं चेतनस्य प्रवर्तकत्वम्।
Therefore, that the power to impart such tendency belongs to the sentient body, is incontrovertible.
ननु तव देहादिसंयुक्तस्याप्यात्मनो
विज्ञानस्वरूपमात्रव्यतिरेकेण प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेरनुपपन्नं प्रवर्तकत्वमिति चेत्,
(Even if it be said by the opponent) — In your case even, in as much as, even though the Self is in conjunction with a body etc.,
It is not reasonably sustainable that the Self has such tendency as apart from its nature of mere knowledge, therefore, that the Self could have such power to impart such a tendency, is not reasonably sustainable.
न; अयस्कान्तवद्रूपादिवच्च प्रवृत्तिरहितस्यापि प्रवर्तकत्वोपपत्तेः।
(We reply) — no, like the magnet or like form (Rūpa) etc., it is reasonably sustainable that an entity which is devoid of any such tendency in itself, may however possess a power to impart such a tendency.
यथायस्कान्तो मणिः स्वयं प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽप्ययसः प्रवर्तको भवति,
Just as a magnet having no such tendency [to movement] in itself, still has the capacity to impart such tendency to iron,
यथा च रूपादयो विषयाः स्वयं प्रवृत्तिरहिता अपि चक्षुरादीनां प्रवर्तका भवन्ति,
Or just as sense-objects such as form (Rūpa) etc. which do not possess such tendency [to envision], are still able to induce activity in the organ of sight etc.,
एवं प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽपीश्वरः सर्वगतः सर्वात्मा सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिश्च सन् सर्वं प्रवर्तयेदित्युपपन्नम्।
Similarly it is reasonably sustainable that the Lord, being all-pervading, the Self of all, omniscient, and omnipotent, may, even though He Himself is without any such tendency [to act in any manner], still induce such activity in everything.
एकत्वात्प्रवर्त्याभावे प्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्,
If it be said — the Lord being but one only (without a second) and there being nothing else (in existence) in which he could induce such tendency, that he could still possess such a capacity to impart a tendency, is not reasonably sustainable,
(We reply) — No, because that has already been refuted more than once, on the ground of the influence of Māyā (illusory power) in the form of names and forms which are brought about by Nescience.
तस्मात्सम्भवति प्रवृत्तिः सर्वज्ञकारणत्वे, न त्वचेतनकारणत्वे॥२॥
Therefore the existence of such a tendency is possible in the case of the omniscient (Brahman) which is the cause (of the world), and it is not so possible in the case of a non-sentient entity (like the Pradhāna) which is supposed to be such a cause (of the world. — 2.
←PrevNext→ पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि॥२.२.३॥ Payombuvac cet tatrāpi.
Payo'mbuvat: like milk and water; Cet: if; Tatra: there, in those cases; Api: even, also. (Payaḥ: milk; Ambuvat: like water.)
🔗 If it be said (by the opponent) that (the Pradhāna may show such tendency) even as milk or water do, (we reply) — even there also (such tendency results from a sentient entity). — 220.127.116.11.2.3 L.1
स्यादेतत् – यथा क्षीरमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव वत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थं प्रवर्तते,
May be (says the opponent), just as milk, non-sentient as it is, because of its own nature, flows for promoting the growth of a young one,
यथा च जलमचेतनं स्वभावेनैव लोकोपकाराय स्यन्दते,
Or just as water naturally flows in order to oblige men,
एवं प्रधानमप्यचेतनं स्वभावेनैव पुरुषार्थसिद्धये प्रवर्तिष्यत इति।
Even so may the Pradhāna, non-sentient though it is, act by virtue of its own nature for securing the highest aim of man.
(To this we reply) — This can’t be said to be well spoken,
यतस्तत्रापि पयोम्बुनोश्चेतनाधिष्ठितयोरेव प्रवृत्तिरित्यनुमिमीमहे,
Because even in those cases (i.e. of milk or water) we would infer that such tendency either in milk or water is because of its being controlled by a sentient entity,
उभयवादिप्रसिद्धे रथादावचेतने केवले प्रवृत्त्यदर्शनात्;
Inasmuch as, such tendency is not observed in merely non-sentient entities, such as chariots etc. which are well-known to both of us disputants.
शास्त्रं च – ‘योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् … योऽपोऽन्तरो यमयति’ (BrhU.3.7.4)
‘एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ते’ (BrhU.3.8.9) इत्येवंजातीयकं
समस्तस्य लोकपरिस्पन्दितस्येश्वराधिष्ठिततां श्रावयति;
The Śāstra speaks of all kinds of movements of things as seen in the world to be due to being presided over by the Lord, thus: —
“Who, dwelling in water, governs it from within” (BrhUEng.3.7.4);
“It is at the behest of this Akṣara (the imperishable), Oh Gārgi, that one set of rivers flows eastward” (BrhUEng.3.8.9).
Therefore, because the instances given by you, viz. “like milk and water”, are of a piece with that very much disputed view which you want to establish (viz. that the Pradhāna is the cause of the world), they do not furnish a ground for consideration (Anupanyāsaḥ i.e. Na Vicāra-Bhumiḥ),
चेतनायाश्च धेन्वाः स्नेहेच्छया पयसः प्रवर्तकत्वोपपत्तेः,
Because it is reasonably sustainable, that it is the sentient cow that at her will stimulates the flow of her milk, through instinctive affection (for the calf),
वत्सचोषणेन च पयस आकृष्यमाणत्वात्;
And also because the sucking by the calf causes the milk to be drawn out (from the udders).
Nor is it, that water also does not need any other help in its tendency to flow,
Because, it does need a sloping ground-level etc. so that it may flow.
चेतनापेक्षत्वं तु सर्वत्रोपदर्शितम्।
That in all cases, a sentient entity is needed, has however been shown.
‘उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि’ (BrS.2.1.24) इत्यत्र तु
बाह्यनिमित्तनिरपेक्षमपि स्वाश्रयं कार्यं भवतीत्येतल्लोकदृष्ट्या निदर्शितम्;
In Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya II.i.24,
So far as ordinary worldly experience is concerned, it has been indicated, that a cause depending only on itself, may bring about an effect without needing any outside means;
शास्त्रदृष्ट्या पुनः सर्वत्रैवेश्वरापेक्षत्वमापद्यमानं न पराणुद्यते॥३॥
But from the point of view of the Śāstra, the conclusion that is inevitably arrived at in this Sūtra is that in all cases, effects have to depend upon the Lord, and it does not contradict (what is stated in the previous Sūtra). — 3.
Vyatireka-anavasthiteḥ: There being no external agency besides it; Ca: and also; An-apekṣatvāt: because it is not dependent. (Vyatireka: an external agent; An-avasthiteḥ: from non-existence, as it does not exist.)
🔗 (The Pradhāna is not the cause) also because nothing else (other than the (Pradhāna) exists, on which it can count for help. — 18.104.22.168.2.4 L.1
सांख्यानां त्रयो गुणाः साम्येनावतिष्ठमानाः प्रधानम्;
According to the Sāṅkhyas, their three Guṇas existing in perfectly balanced equipoise, mean the Pradhāna.
न तु तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रधानस्य प्रवर्तकं निवर्तकं वा किञ्चिद्बाह्यमपेक्ष्यमवस्थितमस्ति;
But barring that, there is nothing which is expected as existing outside or apart from it, which has a capacity to induce a tendency or to prevent any tendency arising, in the Pradhāna.
पुरुषस्तूदासीनो न प्रवर्तको न निवर्तकः –
The Puruṣa is passive i.e. apathetic (and according to the Sāṅkhyas takes no part in creation) and as such, has neither the capacity to induce, or to prevent any such tendency (in Pradhāna)
And hence, Pradhāna having nothing else on which it can depend,
अनपेक्षत्वाच्च कदाचित्प्रधानं महदाद्याकारेण परिणमते, कदाचिन्न परिणमते,
It is not reasonable
(To say) that it sometimes does, and at other times does not, modify itself into the form of ‘Mahat’ (greatness) etc.
ईश्वरस्य तु सर्वज्ञत्वात्सर्वशक्तित्वान्महामायत्वाच्च प्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती न विरुध्येते॥४॥
In the case of the Lord, however, because of his being omniscient, omnipotent, and being always in association with the great Māyā (illusory power) his either having such a tendency and or not having such a tendency in Himself (just as it pleases Him), is not incompatible (with reason). — 4.
←PrevNext→ अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत्॥२.२.५॥ Anyatrābhāvāc ca na tṛṇādivat.
Anyatra: elsewhere, in the other case, elsewhere than in cows; A-bhāvāt: because of the absence; Ca: and, also; Na: not; Trṇa-ādivat: like the grass etc.
🔗 (The Pradhāna) could also not have — like grass — a tendency to modify itself (as is supposed by the Sāṅkhyas), because grass etc. do not show such tendency for modification in other cases. — 22.214.171.124.2.5 L.1
स्यादेतत् – यथा तृणपल्लवोदकादि निमित्तान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वभावादेव क्षीराद्याकारेण परिणमते,
May be (says the Sāṅkhya opponent), just as grass, leaves, water etc. by virtue of their own nature modify themselves in the form of milk etc., without needing any other means,
एवं प्रधानमपि महदाद्याकारेण परिणंस्यत इति।
Even so, may the Pradhāna modify itself in the form of Mahat etc.
कथं च निमित्तान्तरनिरपेक्षं तृणादीति गम्यते?
(If we i.e. the Sāṅkhyas — are asked), how do you know that grass etc. do not need any other means (to help them),
(We reply) because, no such other means are observed.
यदि हि किञ्चिन्निमित्तान्तरमुपलभेमहि,
Were we to find any such other means
ततो यथाकामं तेन तेन निमित्तेन तृणाद्युपादाय क्षीरं सम्पादयेमहि;
We could then have, at will, manufactured milk from grass etc. (with the help of such other means),
न तु सम्पादयामहे;
But we are not able to do so (i.e. manufacture milk from grass, with the help of any other means).
Therefore, modification of grass etc. (into milk) takes place because of its own nature,
तथा प्रधानस्यापि स्यादिति।
And even so, there may similarly be a modification of the Pradhāna also (because of its own nature).
अत्रोच्यते – भवेत्तृणादिवत्स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्यापि परिणामः, यदि तृणादेरपि स्वाभाविकः परिणामोऽभ्युपगम्येत;
To this we (Vedāntins) reply — If we were to hold that such modification of grass, comes about by virtue of its own nature, then it may well happen that modification of Pradhāna also may take place by virtue of its nature,
But not only we do not understand it to be so,
But we do (on the other hand) know, that there is such other cause (because of which grass is turned into milk).
(Says the opponent) How do you know that there is such other cause?
Because it (i.e. the turning of grass into milk) is absent in any other cases.
धेन्वैव ह्युपभुक्तं तृणादि क्षीरीभवति,
It is grass etc. which is consumed by the cow only, that modifies itself into milk,
न प्रहीणम् अनडुहाद्युपभुक्तं वा;
And not that which is either rejected (by the cow) or is consumed by a bull etc.
यदि हि निर्निमित्तमेतत्स्यात्,
Were grass to require no other means (such as a cow, for modifying itself into milk),
धेनुशरीरसम्बन्धादन्यत्रापि तृणादि क्षीरीभवेत्;
Grass would have modified itself into milk elsewhere also, and not when in conjunction with the body of a cow only.
न च यथाकामं मानुषैर्न शक्यं सम्पादयितुमित्येतावता निर्निमित्तं भवति;
That men are unable to manufacture milk at will, is no reason for holding that there is no means at all,
भवति हि किञ्चित्कार्यं मानुषसम्पाद्यम्, किञ्चिद्दैवसम्पाद्यम्;
Because some effects are fit to be accomplished by men and some others through Divine pleasure.
मनुष्या अपि शक्नुवन्त्येवोचितेनोपायेन तृणाद्युपादाय क्षीरं सम्पादयितुम्;
Besides, even men are able to produce more milk by using proper means, as for instance by using grass etc.
प्रभूतं हि क्षीरं कामयमानाः प्रभूतं घासं धेनुं चारयन्ति;
Those who desire plentiful milk, feed the cow with plentiful grass
ततश्च प्रभूतं क्षीरं लभन्ते;
And that way get plentiful milk.
तस्मान्न तृणादिवत्स्वाभाविकः प्रधानस्य परिणामः॥५॥
Therefore, it cannot be, (as the opponent claims) that, like grass, the Pradhāna modifies itself by virtue of its own nature. — 5.
Abhyupagame: accepting, admitting, taking for granted; Api: even; Artha: purpose; A-bhāvāt: because of the absence.
🔗 Even if it (i.e. the Sāṅkhya doctrine that the Pradhāna has such tendency) is assumed (to be correct), (the Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world) because of the absence of any purpose. — 126.96.36.199.2.6 L.1
स्वाभाविकी प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न भवतीति स्थापितम्;
That there is no such natural i.e. spontaneous tendency in the Pradhāna, has been established.
अथापि नाम भवतः श्रद्धामनुरुध्यमानाः स्वाभाविकीमेव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिमभ्युपगच्छेम,
Even though falling in in line with your (i.e. opponent’s) belief, however, we were to understand that there is such natural i.e. spontaneous tendency in the Pradhāna,
Still the same fault attaches itself just as well (to the Sāṅkhya doctrine).
Whence is it so? Because of the absence of any purpose (to be fulfilled).
यदि तावत्स्वाभाविकी प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिर्न किञ्चिदन्यदिहापेक्षत इत्युच्यते,
If it be said that such tendency of the Pradhāna is natural i.e. spontaneous and nothing else is here needed,
ततो यथैव सहकारि किञ्चिन्नापेक्षते
Then, just as no auxiliary is needed (by the Pradhāna),
एवं प्रयोजनमपि किञ्चिन्नापेक्षिष्यते –
Even so, no purpose also can be expected (to be fulfilled),
इत्यतः प्रधानं पुरुषस्यार्थं साधयितुं प्रवर्तत इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत।
And hence the declaration (of the Sāṅkhyas) that the Pradhāna acts in order to fulfil the aim of the Puruṣa, would be contradicted.
स यदि ब्रूयात् – सहकार्येव केवलं नापेक्षते, न प्रयोजनमपीति;
If he (the Sāṅkhya) were to say, that it is not, that there is no purpose, but merely, there is no need of an auxiliary (for the Pradhāna),
तथापि प्रधानप्रवृत्तेः प्रयोजनं विवेक्तव्यम् –
Still if some purpose for such tendency has to be ascertained,
भोगो वा स्यात्, अपवर्गो वा, उभयं वेति।
It can either be experience (Bhoga i.e. experience of pleasure or pain by the Self) or Final Release, or both.
भोगश्चेत् – कीदृशोऽनाधेयातिशयस्य पुरुषस्य भोगो भवेत्?
Now, if experience is supposed to be such a purpose, what particular kind of experience could be imagined in the case of a Puruṣa, in whom there is no such scope for any addition (Atiśaya) of the nature of the experience of pleasure or pain?
Besides in such a supposition there would be the predicament of non-release.
अपवर्गश्चेत् – प्रागपि प्रवृत्तेरपवर्गस्य सिद्धत्वात्प्रवृत्तिरनर्थिका स्यात्,
If such purpose on the other hand is supposed to be Final Release (of the Self), then, that being an already established thing, prior to such activity of the Pradhāna, such activity would be meaningless or superfluous.
There would also be the predicament of the non-perception of sound etc. (which are the means of experience).
उभयार्थताभ्युपगमेऽपि भोक्तव्यानां प्रधानमात्राणामानन्त्यादनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्ग एव;
If, both experience and Final Release, are understood to be such a purpose, the effects i.e. modifications of Pradhāna which are fit for experience being infinite, there would still be the predicament of the impossibility of Final Release.
न चौत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्था प्रवृत्तिः;
Such tendency could not also be due to the reversal of the desire for activity (in the Pradhāna),
न हि प्रधानस्याचेतनस्यौत्सुक्यं सम्भवति; न च पुरुषस्य निर्मलस्य;
Nor could such ardent desire be possible in the case of the pure and partless Puruṣa.
If it be said, that such tendency (on the part of the Pradhāna) may be due to apprehension i.e. fear, that the power to witness (Dṛkśakti in the Puruṣa, as the witness of everything), and the power to create (on the part of the Pradhāna), would be rendered unfructuous,
तर्हि दृक्शक्त्यनुच्छेदवत् सर्गशक्त्यनुच्छेदात्
Still as there can never be the destruction of the power to create even as there can never be the destruction of the power of (the Puruṣa) to be the witness,
There would never be the destruction of the power (of the Pradhāna) to create, and, as there would never be the destruction of transmigratory existence, it (in its turn) would cause the predicament of there being no Final Release just the same.
तस्मात्प्रधानस्य पुरुषार्था प्रवृत्तिरित्येतदयुक्तम्॥६॥
Hence it is not reasonable to say, that the tendency of the Pradhāna is for securing the aim of the Puruṣa. — 6.
←PrevNext→ पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि॥२.२.७॥ Puruṣāśmavad iti cet tathāpi.
Puruṣa: a person; Aśma: a lodestone, a magnet; Vat: like; Iti: thus; Cet: if; Tathā api: even then, still.
🔗 (If it be said that the Puruṣa would stimulate the Pradhāna to act) as in the case of a man or a magnetic stone (we reply) even then it would mean just the same (i.e. the same fault would attach). — 188.8.131.52.2.7 L.1
May be, it may be this way (says the Sāṅkhya),
यथा कश्चित्पुरुषो दृक्शक्तिसम्पन्नः प्रवृत्तिशक्तिविहीनः पङ्गुः
अपरं पुरुषं प्रवृत्तिशक्तिसम्पन्नं दृक्शक्तिविहीनमन्धमधिष्ठाय प्रवर्तयति,
यथा वा अयस्कान्तोऽश्मा स्वयमप्रवर्तमानोऽप्ययः प्रवर्तयति,
एवं पुरुषः प्रधानं प्रवर्तयिष्यति –
इति दृष्टान्तप्रत्ययेन पुनः प्रत्यवस्थानम्।
By ranging himself in opposition (to the Vedāntin) and trying to justify his position by illustrations, thus —
Just as some lame person possessing the power of sight but not the power of movement,
Riding pick-a-back on another who is sightless but possesses the power of movement, makes the latter move,
Or just as a magnet which while it itself does not move, makes iron move (i.e. attracts it),
Even so, would the Puruṣa cause the Pradhāna to act.
अत्रोच्यते – तथापि नैव दोषान्निर्मोक्षोऽस्ति;
To this we reply — Even so, there is no escaping the fault.
अभ्युपेतहानं तावद्दोष आपतति,
In the first place, the fault viz. the discarding of the position assumed as hypothesis (by the Sāṅkhya) would arise,
प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य प्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमात्,
Because you (the Sāṅkhya opponent) hold that the Pradhāna possesses such tendency,
पुरुषस्य च प्रवर्तकत्वानभ्युपगमात्।
And you do not hold that the Puruṣa (Self) can cause activity (in Pradhāna).
कथं चोदासीनः पुरुषः प्रधानं प्रवर्तयेत्?
How can the apathetic Puruṣa ever stimulate the Pradhāna to act?
पङ्गुरपि ह्यन्धं पुरुषं वागादिभिः प्रवर्तयति;
The lame man also, directs the blind one to move by words etc.,
नैवं पुरुषस्य कश्चिदपि प्रवर्तनव्यापारोऽस्ति, निष्क्रियत्वान्निर्गुणत्वाच्च;
But no such influence for causing movement is possible in the case of the Puruṣa who is apathetic i.e. inactive,
Nor can it, like a magnet, cause movement by mere proximity,
Because (were we to suppose so) there would thus be the predicament of perpetual activity induced by the constant proximity (between the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa).
अयस्कान्तस्य त्वनित्यसन्निधेरस्ति स्वव्यापारः सन्निधिः,
परिमार्जनाद्यपेक्षा चास्यास्ति –
To say (as the Sāṅkhya opponent avers) that it may be, as in the case of a man or a magnet, is no proper illustration,
Because, as the proximity of a magnet (to iron) is not constant, it may have such influence due to such proximity,
And besides there still is the necessity of cleansing it (i.e. the magnet) etc.
तथा प्रधानस्याचैतन्यात्पुरुषस्य चौदासीन्यात्तृतीयस्य च
Again, that there could be any relation between the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, is not reasonably sustainable,
Because the former is non-sentient and the latter is apathetic,
And there is absence of any third entity which could bring about any such relation between these two.
योग्यतानिमित्ते च सम्बन्धे
If it be said that there would be the relation of capacity i.e. Yogyatā (between the Puruṣa and the Pradhāna to see and be seen),
Then, on account of the indestructibility of such a relation between them, there would, all the same, be the predicament of the absence of Final Release.
Further, as in the previous Sūtra, the alternatives (about the purpose, i.e. whether it is experience, Final Release, or both) should be considered (to show that the Pradhāna) can have no such purpose.
परमात्मनस्तु स्वरूपव्यपाश्रयमौदासीन्यम्, मायाव्यपाश्रयं च प्रवर्तकत्वम् –
In the case of the Highest Self, however, its tendency towards creation depends upon its association with its power of Māyā, and apathy of its own nature (as realized by the Jīva-Self on the attainment of knowledge),
And that is where there is this peculiarity (Atiśaya) in the case of the Highest Self. — 7.
←PrevNext→ अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च॥२.२.८॥ Aṅgitvānupapatteś ca.
Aṅgitva-anupapatteḥ: on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and subordinate); Ca: and, also. (Aṅgitva: the relation of being the principal, being preponderant; An-upapatteḥ: on account of the impossibility and unreasonableness).
🔗 (The Pradhāna cannot have a tendency) Because a relation of being subsidiary (to a principal, as between Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) is not reasonably sustainable. — 184.108.40.206.2.8 L.1
इतश्च न प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिरवकल्पते –
This is again why the Pradhāna cannot have any tendency.
When Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, give up their condition of being reciprocally principal and subsidiary to each other,
And they subsist merely in the condition of balanced equipoise of their own individual natures,
That, constitutes the condition of Pradhāna.
While in that condition and when their nature is such, that they do not need each other’s help,
It is not reasonably sustainable that they would convert themselves into having a reciprocal relation as that of being principal and subsidiary to each other, because of the apprehension of the destruction of their own nature.
बाह्यस्य च कस्यचित्क्षोभयितुरभावात्, गुणवैषम्यनिमित्तो महदाद्युत्पादो न स्यात्॥८॥
Again, in the absence of any extraneous entity to excite them (into activity), the creation of Mahat (the great principle) etc. which results from such disturbance of their balanced equipoise would not take place. — 8.
←PrevNext→ अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात्॥२.२.९॥ Anyathānumitau ca jña-śakti-viyogāt.
Anyathā: otherwise, in other ways; Anumitau: if it be inferred, in case of inference; Ca: even, and; Jña-śakti: power of intelligence; Vi-yogāt: because of being destitute of, because of dissociation.
🔗 Also, even if an inference is drawn in another way, because of the absence (in the Pradhāna) of the power of being a sentient entity, (the same fault would attach). — 220.127.116.11.2.9 L.1
अथापि स्यात् – अन्यथा वयमनुमिमीमहे – यथा नायमनन्तरो दोषः प्रसज्येत;
May be, I will draw an inference in such other way that the fault referred to above would not occur (says the Sāṅkhya opponent).
न ह्यनपेक्षस्वभावाः कूटस्थाश्चास्माभिर्गुणा अभ्युपगम्यन्ते,
I do not hold that the Guṇas (of the Pradhāna viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas) are either unchangeable by nature or such as need no mutual help,
Because there is no authority or means-of-proof (for that).
कार्यवशेन तु गुणानां स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते;
The nature of the Guṇas is understood from the effects (resulting from them).
यथा यथा कार्योत्पाद उपपद्यते, तथा तथैतेषां स्वभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते;
I understand that they are just of that nature as the nature of the effects they bring into existence.
चलं गुणवृत्तमिति चास्त्यभ्युपगमः;
It is understood (by us) that the Guṇas are of an unsteady nature,
तस्मात्साम्यावस्थायामपि वैषम्योपगमयोग्या एव गुणा अवतिष्ठन्त इति।
Therefore they may, even during the condition of equipoise, subsist in a condition, fit for attaining disparity i.e. the relation of being principal and subsidiary (to each other).
एवमपि प्रधानस्य ज्ञशक्तिवियोगाद्
(To this we reply) Even if (it is understood) this way, because of the absence in the Pradhāna of the power of being sentient,
रचनानुपपत्त्यादयः पूर्वोक्ता दोषास्तदवस्था एव;
The faults referred to above, viz. that the proper design or arrangement (of his world) is not reasonably sustainable etc., stand as they are (i.e. unrefuted).
ज्ञशक्तिमपि त्वनुमिमानः प्रतिवादित्वान्निवर्तेत,
If our opponent were to infer that the Pradhāna has such power of being sentient, the result would be that he would cease to be our opponent,
चेतनमेकमनेकप्रपञ्चस्य जगत उपादानमिति ब्रह्मवादप्रसङ्गात्;
Because it would mean, that there would be the predicament for him of (having to accept) the doctrine of Brahman viz. that the only one sentient entity (Brahman) is the material cause of this manifold world appearance.
वैषम्योपगमयोग्या अपि गुणाः
Even though the Guṇas may have a fitness in them for attaining inequality (i.e. of attaining a principal and subsidiary relationship as between themselves, by a disturbance of the condition of balanced equipoise)
साम्यावस्थायां निमित्ताभावान्नैव वैषम्यं भजेरन्,
भजमाना वा निमित्ताभावाविशेषात्सर्वदैव वैषम्यं भजेरन् –
Still, when once they are in the condition of equipoise, they would either never again attain inequality, because of the absence in that condition of equipoise of any cause (for a change),
Or assuming they do so attain inequality, the absence of a cause (for a change) being common (to both the alternatives),
इति प्रसज्यत एवायमनन्तरोऽपि दोषः॥९॥
The predicament would be, that the fault, viz. that they will always continue in that condition of disturbed equipoise, would necessarily occur all the same. — 9.
Vipratiṣedhāt: because of contradiction; Ca: also, and; A-samañjasam: inconsistent, objectionable, not harmonious, untenable.
🔗 (The Sāṅkhya doctrine is) also incongruous because of the contradictions. — 18.104.22.168.2.10 L.1
परस्परविरुद्धश्चायं सांख्यानामभ्युपगमः –
The Sāṅkhya doctrines are moreover mutually contradictory.
In one place, they enumerate the sense-organs to be seven, and then again eleven in another place.
तथा क्वचिन्महतस्तन्मात्रसर्गमुपदिशन्ति, क्वचिदहंकारात्;
Similarly in one place the instruction is that the subtle sense-organs (Tan-mātras) have their origin from Mahat (the great one) and elsewhere that they have their origin from Ego (Ahaṅ-kāra).
तथा क्वचित्त्रीण्यन्तःकरणानि वर्णयन्ति, क्वचिदेकमिति;
In one place, they describe the internal-organs to be three (viz. Ego, intelligence and mind), and then again, as only one, in another place.
प्रसिद्ध एव तु श्रुत्येश्वरकारणवादिन्या विरोधस्तदनुवर्तिन्या च स्मृत्या;
Besides their opposition to the Scriptures, which declare the Lord to be the cause, (of the world), and to the Smṛtis, which follow the Scriptures, is well-known.
तस्मादप्यसमञ्जसं सांख्यानां दर्शनमिति॥
Therefore also, the doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas is incongruous.
अत्राह – नन्वौपनिषदानामप्यसमञ्जसमेव दर्शनम्,
To this the Sāṅkhya replies — Oh, but the doctrine of the Upaniṣads also is equally incongruous,
In as much as they do not recognize the ‘tormented’ (Tapya) and the ‘tormentor’ (Tāpaka) as being two different categories,
एकं हि ब्रह्म सर्वात्मकं सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य कारणमभ्युपगच्छताम् –
एकस्यैवात्मनो विशेषौ तप्यतापकौ,
न जात्यन्तरभूतौ –
Because those who understand the one and only one Brahman, the Self of all, alone, to be the cause of all this world-appearance
Have necessarily to understand,
That the ‘tormented’ (Tapya) and the ‘tormentor’ (Tāpaka) are but two different aspects of the same one Self (Brahman)
And that they do not belong to different categories.
यदि चैतौ तप्यतापकावेकस्यात्मनो विशेषौ स्याताम्,
Now, if the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’ are but only two special aspects of one and the same Self (Ātmā)
स ताभ्यां तप्यतापकाभ्यां न निर्मुच्येत –
Then as the Self can never be freed from being both these viz. the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’,
इति तापोपशान्तये सम्यग्दर्शनमुपदिशच्छास्त्रमनर्थकं स्यात्;
The Śāstra which gives instruction that the truth should be known in order that torment may be assuaged, would be meaningless.
न ह्यौष्ण्यप्रकाशधर्मकस्य प्रदीपस्य तदवस्थस्यैव ताभ्यां निर्मोक्ष उपपद्यते;
It would not be reasonably sustainable that the lamp [i.e. a flame] which possesses the properties of heat and light, can, as long as it is in that particular condition (of being a lamp [a flame]) be ever free from these properties.
With regard also to the statement about water on the one hand, and ripples, waves, and foam of water on the other,
तत्रापि जलात्मन एकस्य वीच्यादयो विशेषा आविर्भावतिरोभावरूपेण नित्या एव –
(We the opponents say) that, even these special forms (of water), viz. the waves etc., essentially one and the same as they are, as water, are, even though they alternately appear and disappear, eternal,
इति समानो जलात्मनो वीच्यादिभिरनिर्मोक्षः।
And for water itself also (as much as for a lamp [flame]) there is a similar want of freedom from having the nature of waves etc.
प्रसिद्धश्चायं तप्यतापकयोर्जात्यन्तरभावो लोके;
Besides, in the ordinary world, that the ‘tormented’ and the ‘tormentor’ are different categories (or entities) is well-known.
तथा हि – अर्थी चार्थश्चान्योन्यभिन्नौ लक्ष्येते;
Similarly also, a person desiring to possess a particular thing (Arthī) and the thing so desired (Artha) are actually seen to be mutually different from each other.
यद्यर्थिनः स्वतोऽन्योऽर्थो न स्यात्,
Were the thing desired not to be an entity different from the person desiring such thing,
यस्यार्थिनो यद्विषयमर्थित्वं स तस्यार्थो नित्यसिद्ध एवेति,
And if the thing desired were to be eternally available to the person desiring such a thing,
न तस्य तद्विषयमर्थित्वं स्यात् –
Then such person would never in fact be a person desirous of such things,
यथा प्रकाशात्मनः प्रदीपस्य प्रकाशाख्योऽर्थो नित्यसिद्ध एवेति, न तस्य तद्विषयमर्थित्वं भवति –
Just as a lamp [flame], which by itself has the form of light, and would have such light ever available in itself, could never be an entity that could itself ever have a desire for light,
अप्राप्ते ह्यर्थेऽर्थिनोऽर्थित्वं स्यादिति;
Because, it is only with respect to a thing which has yet to be acquired, that a person can be said to be desirous of acquiring (it).
तथार्थस्याप्यर्थत्वं न स्यात्;
Similarly a thing desired cannot have the characteristic of being a thing desired (unless the person desiring such a thing, and the thing so desired are different)
यदि स्यात् स्वार्थत्वमेव स्यात्;
And, if ever such a thing, is a desired thing (Artha), it can have such desire only in and for itself.
But this is never so.
सम्बन्धिशब्दौ ह्येतावर्थी चार्थश्चेति;
‘A person desiring’ and the ‘thing desired’ (by him), are in fact two things having a mutual relation between them,
द्वयोश्च सम्बन्धिनोः सम्बन्धः स्यात्, नैकस्यैव;
And a relation can subsist only when there are two things having a mutual relation between them, and not when there is but one thing alone,
And therefore, ‘a person desiring’ and the ‘thing desired’ are in fact different (from each other),
And similarly, ‘a person who has an undesired thing thrust on him’ and such ‘undesired thing’ (also are different).
अर्थिनोऽनुकूलः अर्थः, प्रतिकूलः अनर्थः;
That which is favourable to a person desiring, is a desirable thing, and that which is unfavourable to him, is a thing not desired by him (but still it has itself thrust upon him),
ताभ्यामेकः पर्यायेणोभाभ्यां सम्बध्यते।
And a person alternately comes into contact with these two (i.e. the desired and the undesired thing).
तत्रार्थस्याल्पीयस्त्वात्, भूयस्त्वाच्चानर्थस्य उभावप्यर्थानर्थौ अनर्थ एवेति – तापकः स उच्यते;
Now, as (comparatively) what is desired by a person is so little, and what he does not desire, (but which he finds willy-nilly thrust upon him), is so much, that both these (desired and undesired things) together, in effect, practically mean a thing not desired, and it is called the ‘tormentor’
तप्यस्तु पुरुषः – य एकः पर्यायेणोभाभ्यां सम्बध्यते –
And the person who thus alternately comes into contact with it is the person ‘tormented’,
इति तयोस्तप्यतापकयोरेकात्मतायां मोक्षानुपपत्तिः;
And hence, if (according to you — the Vedāntin) the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’ were to be but one entity, then (the possibility of) Final Release is not reasonably sustainable.
जात्यन्तरभावे तु तत्संयोगहेतुपरिहारात्स्यादपि
But if they were supposed to belong to different categories, and if the cause of their coming into contact (viz. false-knowledge) is removed,
Then perhaps Final Release (Mokṣa) may perchance be so reasonably sustainable.
अत्रोच्यते – न, एकत्वादेव तप्यतापकभावानुपपत्तेः –
To this the reply is — No. It is precisely because of (the Self) being one only, that it is not reasonably sustainable that there could be any such relation as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’.
भवेदेष दोषः, यद्येकात्मतायां तप्यतापकावन्योन्यस्य
This fault might perhaps occur, if, even though the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’ are but one and the same single entity,
Such entity were to be able to attain a relation with itself, as between the object (Viṣaya) and the subject (Viṣayī) (i.e. as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’).
न त्वेतदस्ति, एकत्वादेव;
But precisely because it (i.e. the Self) is essentially one only, it cannot be so.
न ह्यग्निरेकः सन्स्वमात्मानं दहति, प्रकाशयति वा, सत्यप्यौष्ण्यप्रकाशादिधर्मभेदे परिणामित्वे च;
Though in the case of fire Agni), one as it is, even though there is a distinction in its attributes viz. ‘light’ and ‘heat’, and it is liable to undergo modification, it is precisely because fire is but one entity only, that fire can neither burn or illuminate itself.
किमु कूटस्थे ब्रह्मण्येकस्मिंस्तप्यतापकभावः सम्भवेत्।
Need it be said then, that the one, unchangeable Brahman cannot possibly have in itself a relation as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’?
क्व पुनरयं तप्यतापकभावः स्यादिति;
(The opponent may here ask) — where again then is this relation as between the ‘tormentor’ and the ‘tormented’?
उच्यते – किं न पश्यसि – कर्मभूतो जीवद्देहस्तप्यः, तापकः सवितेति?
The reply is — why, can’t you see, that the living body, which is the object of the action (of being scorched), is the one that is tormented, and that the sun is the tormentor?
ननु तप्तिर्नाम दुःखम्;
(The opponent says) This torment indeed is pain,
सा चेतयितुः; नाचेतनस्य देहस्य;
And pain can affect only a sentient entity, and never an inert body.
यदि हि देहस्यैव तप्तिः स्यात्, सा देहनाशे स्वयमेव नश्यतीति तन्नाशाय साधनं नैषितव्यं स्यादिति;
Were torment to be of the body only, it itself would be destroyed, when the destruction of the body takes place and it would not be necessary to wish for some means to bring about its destruction.
उच्यते – देहाभावेऽपि केवलस्य चेतनस्य तप्तिर्न दृष्टा;
To this the reply is — It is not observed, that a mere sentient entity, in the absence of a body, is ever affected by torment.
न च त्वयापि तप्तिर्नाम विक्रिया चेतयितुः केवलस्येष्यते;
Nor do you (the opponent) desire or hold, that a merely sentient entity is subject to an affection (Vikṛti) viz. torment,
नापि देहचेतनयोः संहतत्वम्,
Nor can it be, that a body and a sentient entity get mixed up together,
As that would lead to the predicament of the fault of impurity, etc. (in the Self),
न च तप्तेरेव तप्तिमभ्युपगच्छसि।
Nor again of course would you understand that ‘torment’ itself could be tormented.
कथं तवापि तप्यतापकभावः?
How then would you also assume the existence of a condition, in which one entity) is the ‘tormentor’ and another (entity) the ‘tormented’?
सत्त्वं तप्यम्, तापकं रजः – इति चेत्,
If you were to say that the Guṇa ‘Sattva’ is the ‘tormented’ and the Guṇa ‘Rajas’ is the ‘tormentor’,
न; ताभ्यां चेतनस्य संहतत्वानुपपत्तेः;
(We reply) — no; it cannot be reasonably sustainable that these (Guṇas) can ever be in conjunction with i.e. can ever get mixed up with a sentient entity.
सत्त्वानुरोधित्वाच्चेतनोऽपि तप्यत इवेति चेत् –
If you were to argue, that the sentient entity while conforming with the Guṇa ‘Sattva’, is tormented ‘as it were’,
परमार्थतस्तर्हि नैव तप्यत इत्यापतति इवशब्दप्रयोगात्;
Then it would come to this, that in the truest sense, it is in fact not tormented at all, precisely because of your using the expression ‘as it were’.
न चेत्तप्यते नेवशब्दो दोषाय;
If in fact it is not tormented then it would not be a fault to use the expression ‘as it were’.
न हि – डुण्डुभः सर्प इव – इत्येतावता सविषो भवति, सर्पो वा डुण्डुभ इव – इत्येतावता निर्विषो भवति;
If it is said (by any body) that an amphisbaena (Ḍuṇḍubha, a carnivorous worm) is ‘as it were’ a snake, it would not, simply because it is so said, become a poisonous snake, nor would a snake become non-poisonous, simply because it is said, that, it is, ‘as it were’ an amphisbaena.
अतश्चाविद्याकृतोऽयं तप्यतापकभावः, न पारमार्थिकः –
Therefore it should be understood,
That this condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is caused by Nescience and has no ultimate reality.
नैवं सति ममापि किञ्चिद्दुष्यति।
And our withers are unwrung, even if it were to be so.
अथ पारमार्थिकमेव चेतनस्य तप्यत्वमभ्युपगच्छसि,
If however, you understand that a sentient entity (the Self) is in the truest sense tormented,
तवैव सुतरामनिर्मोक्षः प्रसज्येत,
Then as you of course understand the tormentor (the Pradhāna) to be eternal,
There would be so much the greater reason why there would be no Final Release.
If it be said (by the opponent) that even though the capacities of being the tormentor and being the tormented respectively are everlasting,
Yet as torment (Tapti) is in need of the conjunction of the cause i.e. ignorance,
संयोगनिमित्तादर्शननिवृत्तौ आत्यन्तिकः संयोगोपरमः,
And these two (i.e. the tormented and the tormentor), when the cause (viz. ignorance, of the fact that the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa are different) for such conjunction is not to be seen, there is a total cessation of conjunction,
ततश्चात्यन्तिको मोक्ष उपपन्नः – इति चेत्,
As a result of which, absolute Final Release is reasonably sustainable,
न; अदर्शनस्य तमसो नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्;
We reply — no, because this, ‘not to be seen’ (Adarśana), depends upon Tamas (i.e. ignorance) which (as you hold) also is equally everlasting.
गुणानां चोद्भवाभिभवयोरनियतत्वादनियतः संयोगनिमित्तोपरम इति
Also, as the manifestation or the obliteration of Guṇas is uncontrolled or irregular, the cessation of the cause of conjunction, also, is uncontrolled and irregular,
And hence their disunion also being necessarily uncontrolled or irregular, non-release in the case of the Sāṅkhyas, is unavoidable.
औपनिषदस्य तु आत्मैकत्वाभ्युपगमात्,
So far as the Upanishadic teaching goes, however, as it understands the Self to be but one only,
एकस्य च विषयविषयिभावानुपपत्तेः,
And that inasmuch as one entity can at once be both the subject and object (of the torment) is not reasonably sustainable,
विकारभेदस्य च वाचारम्भणमात्रत्वश्रवणात्,
And as the Scriptural instruction is, that all the different effects are merely made current by speech (while in fact in the truest sense they do not exist),
अनिर्मोक्षशङ्का स्वप्नेऽपि नोपजायते;
No doubt about non-release can ever arise, even in a dream (in the mind of a Vedāntin).
व्यवहारे तु – यत्र यथा दृष्टस्तप्यतापकभावस्तत्र तथैव सः –
So far as the phenomenal world of experience is concerned, however, the well-known condition of one being the tormentor and the other being the tormented, is as valid as it is seen to be for the time being,
इति न चोदयितव्यः परिहर्तव्यो वा भवति॥१०॥
And so it does not become necessary (in such a case) either to raise an objection or to have to refute it. — 10.
The doctrine that the Pradhāna is the cause (of the world) is (already) refuted.
परमाणुकारणवाद इदानीं निराकर्तव्यः;
The doctrine that the Atom is the cause (of the world) has now to be refuted.
तत्रादौ तावत् – योऽणुवादिना ब्रह्मवादिनि दोष उत्प्रेक्ष्यते, स प्रतिसमाधीयते।
In this connection, firstly, the fault which the Atomist (Aṇu-vādi Vaiśeṣika) has levelled against the upholder of Brahman as the cause (Brahma-vādi), is refuted.
This is how the Vaiśeṣikas understand (their doctrine) —
(It is inferred that) qualities which inhere in the material constituting the cause,
कार्यद्रव्ये समानजातीयं गुणान्तरमारभन्ते,
Produce other similar qualities in the material constituting the effect,
शुक्लेभ्यस्तन्तुभ्यः शुक्लस्य पटस्य प्रसवदर्शनात्,
Because it is seen that from white threads, a white piece of cloth is produced,
And we don’t see any contrary result (occurring).
तस्माच्चेतनस्य ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने,
Therefore, if sentient Brahman is understood to be the cause of the world,
कार्येऽपि जगति चैतन्यं समवेयात्;
Then in the effect (i.e. the world) also, sentiency ought to inhere.
तददर्शनात्तु न चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं भवितुमर्हतीति।
But as it is not seen to be so, Brahman does not deserve to be the cause of the world.
इममभ्युपगमं तदीययैव प्रक्रियया व्यभिचारयति –
The Sūtra-kāra now vitiates this conclusion (of the Vaiśeṣika opponent) with his (i.e. Vaiśeṣika’s) own system, (“The engineer is hoist with his own petard”).
Mahat-dīrghavat: like the great and the long; Vā: or; Hrasva-parimaṇḍalābhyām: from the short and the atomic.
🔗 Or just as the ‘Great and long’ (dimensions) can be the effect of the ‘short and spherical’ (dimension of the atom) (even so the world may be the effect of Brahman). — 22.214.171.124.2.11 L.13
एषा तेषां प्रक्रिया –
Their system amounts to this —
परमाणवः किल कञ्चित्कालमनारब्धकार्या यथायोगं रूपादिमन्तः पारिमाण्डल्यपरिमाणाश्च तिष्ठन्ति;
The various kinds of infinitesimal Atoms (Paramāṇus) which possess their respective qualities proper to them and are spherical in dimension or form of extension, merely stand by for the nonce (i.e. during periodical resorption i.e. Pralaya) and refrain from starting on producing effects.
ते च पश्चाददृष्टादिपुरःसराः
Then afterwards, led by the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa i.e. the meritorious and unmeritorious action of the Jīva-Self, taken collectively)
And aided by conjunction (Saṃyoga),
द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण कृत्स्नं कार्यजातमारभन्ते,
They start producing the entire aggregate of effects, in a regular order, of the binary atomic compound (Dvy-aṇuka) etc.,
कारणगुणाश्च कार्ये गुणान्तरम्;
And the qualities of the cause, reproduce other similar qualities in the effects.
यदा द्वौ परमाणू द्व्यणुकमारभेते,
When the two Paramāṇus (infinitesimal Atoms) begin producing a binary atomic compound,
तदा परमाणुगता रूपादिगुणविशेषाः शुक्लादयो द्व्यणुके शुक्लादीनपरानारभन्ते;
Particular qualities such as ‘whiteness etc.’ belonging to the Paramāṇus, begin producing other such similar qualities etc., in the effect (i.e. the binary atomic compound),
परमाणुगुणविशेषस्तु पारिमाण्डल्यं न द्व्यणुके पारिमाण्डल्यमपरमारभते,
But that special quality of the Paramāṇus viz. its sphericity, does not begin to produce a similar other quality of sphericity in the effects,
The tenet (of the Vaiśeṣikas) being, that a binary atomic compound has another Parimāṇa (form of extension or dimension).
अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे हि द्व्यणुकवर्तिनी परिमाणे वर्णयन्ति।
They describe ‘minuteness’ (Aṇutva) and ‘shortness’ (Hrasvatva) to be the Parimānas that inhere in the binary atomic compound.
यदापि द्वे द्व्यणुके चतुरणुकमारभेते,
When two such binary atomic compounds start producing a quaternary atomic compound (Catur-aṇuka),
तदापि समानं द्व्यणुकसमवायिनां शुक्लादीनामारम्भकत्वम्;
There is a similar reproduction of the whiteness and other qualities inherent in themselves, in the quaternary atomic compound,
अणुत्वह्रस्वत्वे तु द्व्यणुकसमवायिनी अपि नैवारभेते,
But they refrain from reproducing in such quaternary atomic compounds, the form of extension or dimension of ‘minuteness’ and ‘shortness’ inherent in themselves,
Because the Vaiśeṣikas hold that quaternary atomic compounds have their own different form of extension or dimension, viz. ‘Bigness’ (Mahat) and ‘Length’ (Dīrgha).
यदापि बहवः परमाणवः, बहूनि वा द्व्यणुकानि, द्व्यणुकसहितो वा परमाणुः कार्यमारभते, तदापि समानैषा योजना।
The same arrangement takes place when many Paramāṇus, or many binary atomic compounds, or a Paramāṇu or a binary atomic compound, begin producing ‘effects’.
अणु ह्रस्वं च द्व्यणुकं जायते,
महद्दीर्घं च त्र्यणुकादि, न परिमण्डलम्;
This being so, just as a binary atomic compound which has the ‘minute and short’ dimension or form of extension
Or a tertiary atomic compound which has ‘greatness and length’ as its dimension or form of extension, (but not sphericity), result
From a Paramāṇu which is spherical,
यथा वा द्व्यणुकादणोर्ह्रस्वाच्च सतो
महद्दीर्घं च त्र्यणुकं जायते,
नाणु, नो ह्रस्वम्;
Or just as from a binary atomic compound, ‘minute’ and ‘short’ as it is,
A tertiary atomic compound having a dimension or the form of extension of ‘greatness’ and ‘length’
And not ‘minuteness and shortness’, results,
एवं चेतनाद्ब्रह्मणोऽचेतनं जगज्जनिष्यते – इत्यभ्युपगमे किं तव च्छिन्नम्॥
Similarly, if it is understood (by us the Vedāntins) that the non-sentient world may well result from the sentient Brahman, how does it harm you (i.e. why should you, a Vaiśeṣika, have an objection)?
अथ मन्यसे – विरोधिना परिमाणान्तरेणाक्रान्तं कार्यद्रव्यं द्व्यणुकादि –
Now, if you (the Vaiśeṣika) were to consider thus — (I understand) that the material constituting such effects as a binary atomic compound, is encompassed with a dimension or form of extension having a nature contrary to the nature of its cause,
इत्यतो नारम्भकाणि कारणगतानि पारिमाण्डल्यादीनि – इत्यभ्युपगच्छामि;
And that is why ‘Sphericity’, the dimension or the form of extension of the cause, which starts the effect, does not encompass the effect with itself,
न तु चेतनाविरोधिना गुणान्तरेण जगत आक्रान्तत्वमस्ति,
While it is not that the world — an effect — is encompassed with any such quality as is contrary to sentiency,
येन कारणगता चेतना कार्ये चेतनान्तरं नारभेत;
So that the sentiency inherent in the cause may not reproduce similar sentiency in the effect.
न ह्यचेतना नाम चेतनाविरोधी कश्चिद्गुणोऽस्ति,
Non-sentiency is not some quality which is contrary to sentiency,
Because it is a mere negation of it,
तस्मात्पारिमाण्डल्यादिवैषम्यात्प्राप्नोति चेतनाया आरम्भकत्वमिति।
And therefore, as sentiency is a quality dissimilar to the quality of sphericity etc., it comes to this that sentiency (of the cause) will necessarily reproduce itself (in the effect viz. the world). —
मैवं मंस्थाः –
(We, the Vedāntins would say) — Do not consider it to be so.
यथा कारणे विद्यमानानामपि पारिमाण्डल्यादीनामनारम्भकत्वम्,
एवं चैतन्यस्यापि –
The two cases are only to this extent common, viz.,
Just as the qualities of sphericity etc. inherent in the cause, do not begin to reproduce similar qualities in the effect,
Similarly sentiency (which is inherent in the cause) does not begin to reproduce itself in the effect (i.e. the world).
न च परिमाणान्तराक्रान्तत्वं पारिमाण्डल्यादीनामनारम्भकत्वे कारणम्,
(It should not be said) — That the effect has a different dimension encompassing it, is not a reason why the sphericity (of the cause) does not begin to reproduce sphericity in the effect,
Because it is reasonably sustainable to hold that prior to the beginning of the production of a different dimension or form of extension in the effect, the sphericity (of the cause) can start reproducing a similar dimension in the effect,
आरब्धमपि कार्यद्रव्यं प्राग्गुणारम्भात्क्षणमात्रमगुणं तिष्ठतीत्यभ्युपगमात्;
Because you understand, that an effect which has been started to be produced, exists for a moment without any quality, before qualities begin to be produced (in the effect).
न च परिमाणान्तरारम्भे व्यग्राणि पारिमाण्डल्यादीनीत्यतः स्वसमानजातीयं परिमाणान्तरं नारभन्ते,
It is not either, that because the spherical dimensions are engrossed in producing other dimensions, that they do not reproduce dimensions of their own kind (in the effect),
For you understand that there is an entirely different cause for the dimension or form of extension (in the effect) being of a different kind.
‘कारणबहुत्वात्कारणमहत्त्वात्प्रचयविशेषाच्च महत्’ (वै. सू. ७-१-९)
‘तद्विपरीतमणु’ (वै. सू. ७-१-१०)
‘एतेन दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वे व्याख्याते’ (वै. सू. ७-१-१७)
इति हि काणभुजानि सूत्राणि;
The Aphorisms of Kaṇa-bhuk (i.e. Kaṇāda the propounder of Vaiśeṣika school) are as follows: —
“Mahat (the great) results from the plurality of the cause, from the bigness of the cause, and an accumulation by a special loose contact” (Vaiś. Sū. 7.1.9);
“The Aṇu dimension is the contrary of that” (Vaiś. Sū. 7.1.10)
And “Thus, are length and shortness explained” (Vaiś. Sū. 7.1.17).
न च – सन्निधानविशेषात्कुतश्चित्कारणबहुत्वादीन्येवारभन्ते,
न पारिमाण्डल्यादीनीति – उच्येत,
It should not be argued, that because of some special kind of proximity (Sannidhāna), ‘plurality’ (Bahutva) of causes etc. alone produce qualities in effects,
But not sphericity, etc. (as they have no such special kind of proximity),
द्रव्यान्तरे गुणान्तरे वा आरभ्यमाणे
Because when a new material or a new quality starts on being produced,
सर्वेषामेव कारणगुणानां स्वाश्रयसमवायाविशेषात्;
All the qualities of the causes inhere in the same common substratum viz. such new material or new quality.
Therefore, it should be understood, that just as dimensions such as sphericity etc. do not reproduce themselves (in the effect) because of their own peculiar nature,
तथा चेतनाया अपीति द्रष्टव्यम्॥
Even so it is, in the case of sentiency also.
संयोगाच्च द्रव्यादीनां विलक्षणानामुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्समानजातीयोत्पत्तिव्यभिचारः।
It is because it is seen that dissimilar substances etc. are produced as a result of ‘conjunction’ (Saṃyoga), that there is a departure from the uniform reproduction of similar species.
द्रव्ये प्रकृते गुणोदाहरणमयुक्तमिति चेत्,
If it is said (by the Vaiśeṣika opponent), that when the relevant subject (under discussion) is a substance, it is not logical to adduce an illustration about quality,
न; दृष्टान्तेन विलक्षणारम्भमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वात्;
(We reply) — no, because by the illustration, we merely wish to point out (the fact of) the starting of the production of dissimilar effects.
न च द्रव्यस्य द्रव्यमेवोदाहर्तव्यम्, गुणस्य वा गुण एवेति कश्चिन्नियमे हेतुरस्ति;
Besides there is no reason for (there being) a rule, that an illustration about a substance only, should be adduced in the case of a substance, and an illustration about a quality only, in the case of a quality.
सूत्रकारोऽपि भवतां द्रव्यस्य गुणमुदाजहार –
Even your own Sūtra-kāra has adduced an illustration about a quality for a substance, in the Sūtra: —
‘प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणामप्रत्यक्षत्वात्संयोगस्य पञ्चात्मकं न विद्यते’ (वै. सू. ४-२-२) इति –
“Because the relation of conjunction (Saṃyoga) between the perceptible and non-perceptible, is not perceptible, a body cannot consist of the five (elements, viz. Earth, Tejas and Water which are perceptible, and Air and Ākāśa which are not)” (Vaiś. Sū. 4.2.2).
यथा प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षयोर्भूम्याकाशयोः समवयन्संयोगोऽप्रत्यक्षः,
For instance, just as a conjunction, which inheres between the Earth and Ākāśa which are perceptible and non-perceptible respectively, is not perceptible,
एवं प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षेषु पञ्चसु भूतेषु समवयच्छरीरमप्रत्यक्षं स्यात्;
Similarly a body in which perceptible and non-perceptible elements inhere, should properly be not-perceptible.
प्रत्यक्षं हि शरीरम्, तस्मान्न पाञ्चभौतिकमिति –
But it actually is so perceptible, therefore, it is not the result of the (conjunction of the) five elements.
एतदुक्तं भवति – गुणश्च संयोगो द्रव्यं शरीरम्।
For it has been said — conjunction is a quality, while a body is a substance.
‘दृश्यते तु’ (BrS.2.1.6) इति चात्रापि विलक्षणोत्पत्तिः प्रपञ्चिता।
In the Sūtra “But it is so seen” (BrS.2.1.6), creation of a dissimilar thing is discussed.
नन्वेवं सति तेनैवैतद्गतम्;
(The opponent says) If that is so then the matter is really finished there.
नेति ब्रूमः – तत्सांख्यं प्रत्युक्तमेतत्तु वैशेषिकं प्रति।
(We reply) no, that was in reply to the Sāṅkhyas, while this, is in reply to the Vaiśeṣikas.
नन्वतिदेशोऽपि समानन्यायतया कृतः –
But (says the opponent) you have also extended the application of that Sūtra about the refutation of the Sāṅkhyas, to other systems, on the ground of parity of reasoning,
‘एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः’ (BrS.2.1.12) इति;
By the Sūtra — “By this, these systems also which are not accepted by the learned, are also explained” (BrS.2.1.12).
(We reply) no doubt it is so.
तस्यैव त्वयं वैशेषिकपरीक्षारम्भे तत्प्रक्रियानुगतेन निदर्शनेन प्रपञ्चः कृतः॥११॥
The same thing, however, is further elaborated here, where we begin discussion about the Vaiśeṣika system, by adducing instances adaptable to their own system. — 11.
←PrevNext→ उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः॥२.२.१२॥ Ubhayathāpi na karmātastadabhāvaḥ.
Ubhayathā: in either case, in both ways, on both assumptions or hypotheses; Api: also; Na: not; Karma: action, activity, motion; Ataḥ: therefore; Tad-abhāvaḥ: absence of that, negation of that, i.e., negation of the creation of the world by union of atoms.
🔗 Considered either way (i.e. that the Paramāṇus are led by the unseen principle i.e. Adṛṣṭa or aided by conjunction i.e. Saṃyoga) no action is possible, hence the absence of that (i.e. Creation and Pralaya). — 126.96.36.199.2.12 L.1
इदानीं परमाणुकारणवादं निराकरोति।
(The Sūtra-kāra) now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the cause (of the world).
स च वाद इत्थं समुत्तिष्ठते –
This is how the doctrine is presented.
पटादीनि हि लोके सावयवानि द्रव्याणि स्वानुगतैरेव संयोगसचिवैस्तन्त्वादिभिर्द्रव्यैरारभ्यमाणानि दृष्टानि;
In the ordinary world it is seen that materials like a piece of cloth etc. consist of parts, and are begun (to be produced) by the very threads etc. which are inherent in them, and which are aided by the relation of conjunction.
तत्सामान्येन यावत्किञ्चित्सावयवम्, तत्सर्वं
स्वानुगतैरेव संयोगसचिवैस्तैस्तैर्द्रव्यैरारब्धमिति गम्यते;
In common with that, it is understood that all things which consist of parts
Are produced out of similar materials inherent in them, which are aided by the relation of conjunction.
स चायमवयवावयविविभागो यतो निवर्तते,
A Paramāṇu is that entity, where during the process of division this distinction between a thing consisting of parts and its parts disappears,
And when such thing consisting of parts is reduced to that utmost limit of subdivision into parts, beyond which no further division is possible.
सर्वं चेदं गिरिसमुद्रादिकं जगत्सावयवम्;
This entire world, consisting of mountains and seas etc. which consists of parts,
Is, for that very reason, something which has a beginning and an end.
न चाकारणेन कार्येण भवितव्यम् – इत्यतः परमाणवो जगतः कारणम् – इति कणभुगभिप्रायः।
An effect cannot be without a cause, thinks Kaṇa-bhuk (i.e. Kaṇāda), and hence he holds that the Paramāṇus are the cause of this world.
तानीमानि चत्वारि भूतानि भूम्युदकतेजःपवनाख्यानि सावयवान्युपलभ्य
Now knowing that the four elements viz. the Earth, Water, Tejas (fire) and Vāyu (Air) are understood to consist of parts,
चतुर्विधाः परमाणवः परिकल्प्यन्ते;
It is assumed, that there are four kinds of Paramāṇus,
तेषां चापकर्षपर्यन्तगतत्वेन परतो विभागासम्भवाद्
And in as much as they have reached the utmost limit of subdivision, and, in as much as no further division of them is possible, after they are thus reduced to their utmost limit (of subdivision),
विनश्यतां पृथिव्यादीनां परमाणुपर्यन्तो विभागो भवति;
The destruction of the Earth etc., when they are in the process of destruction, goes right down to the stage of Paramāṇus,
And that is the stage of Pralaya (Final Dissolution).
ततः सर्गकाले च वायवीयेष्वणुष्वदृष्टापेक्षं कर्मोत्पद्यते;
Thereafter, at the time of creation, activity is generated amongst the Paramāṇus of Vāyu, due to the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) as the cause,
तत्कर्म स्वाश्रयमणुमण्वन्तरेण संयुनक्ति;
And this activity combines the atoms (Aṇus) in which such activity takes place, with other similar atoms (Aṇus)
ततो द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण वायुरुत्पद्यते;
And thus, in the order of the binary atomic compound etc., Vāyu results,
एवमग्निः; एवमापः; एवं पृथिवी;
And the same is the case with Agni (fire), Water and Earth,
एवमेव शरीरं सेन्द्रियम् –
And the physical body along with the organs-of-sense.
इत्येवं सर्वमिदं जगत् अणुभ्यः सम्भवति;
अणुगतेभ्यश्च रूपादिभ्यो द्व्यणुकादिगतानि रूपादीनि सम्भवन्ति,
इति काणादा मन्यन्ते॥
And the followers of Kaṇāda understand,
That in this manner the whole world is created from atoms (Aṇus),
And as in the case of threads and a piece of cloth,
The qualities etc. of the atom(Aṇu) are reproduced in the binary atomic compounds etc.
To this, we have to say thus —
विभागावस्थानां तावदणूनां संयोगः कर्मापेक्षोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः,
It has to be understood, that such conjunction between atoms (Aṇus) in the state of such separate division, depends upon activity,
कर्मवतां तन्त्वादीनां संयोगदर्शनात्;
Because it is seen that it is due to activity in threads etc., that conjunction between them takes place.
कर्मणश्च कार्यत्वान्निमित्तं किमप्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्;
Activity again being an effect, a cause for it has necessarily to be presumed.
अनभ्युपगमे निमित्ताभावान्नाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म स्यात्;
If no such cause is presumed, then, in the absence of any cause, there could be no initial activity in the atoms (Aṇus).
Even if such a cause is presumed,
यदि प्रयत्नोऽभिघातादिर्वा यथादृष्टं किमपि कर्मणो निमित्तमभ्युपगम्येत,
And if any causes such as endeavour or impact etc. as they are seen, are understood,
तस्यासम्भवान्नैवाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म स्यात्;
Still that being impossible, initial activity amongst the atoms (Aṇus) would not be possible.
न हि तस्यामवस्थायामात्मगुणः प्रयत्नः सम्भवति, शरीराभावात्;
In that condition (of Pralaya), endeavour, as an attribute of the Self (Ātmā), is not possible, because of the absence of a physical body,
शरीरप्रतिष्ठे हि मनस्यात्मनः संयोगे सति आत्मगुणः प्रयत्नो जायते।
For it is only after there is a conjunction of the Self with the mind which has its seat in a physical body, that any endeavour as an attribute of the Self, can at all arise.
एतेनाभिघाताद्यपि दृष्टं निमित्तं प्रत्याख्यातव्यम्।
It is because of this same reason, that any cause as is ordinarily observed (in the world) such as impact etc. has also to be discounted.
सर्गोत्तरकालं हि तत्सर्वं नाद्यस्य कर्मणो निमित्तं सम्भवति।
All that, is (possible) after creation (takes place), but it cannot possibly be the cause of initial activity.
अथादृष्टमाद्यस्य कर्मणो निमित्तमित्युच्येत –
Again, if it is said that the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) is the cause of the initial activity,
तत्पुनरात्मसमवायि वा स्यात् अणुसमवायि वा।
Then it can either be inherent in the Self or inherent in the atom (Aṇu).
उभयथापि नादृष्टनिमित्तमणुषु कर्मावकल्पेत,
In neither case can it be imagined, that activity in the atom (Aṇu),
Is due to the unseen principle, because of its being non-sentient.
न ह्यचेतनं चेतनेनानधिष्ठितं स्वतन्त्रं प्रवर्तते प्रवर्तयति वेति
It has already been remarked during the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory,
That no non-sentient entity which is not guided by a sentient entity, can either act independently or cause any activity (in any other entity),
Because during that condition (of Pralaya) the Jīva-Self, in which sentiency has not till then become manifest, is non-sentient.
आत्मसमवायित्वाभ्युपगमाच्च नादृष्टमणुषु कर्मणो निमित्तं स्यात्, असम्बन्धात्;
Besides even if the unseen principle is understood to be inherent in the Jīva-Self, then in the absence of the necessary relation of conjunction between the unseen principle and the atoms, the unseen principle cannot be the cause of activity in an atom (Aṇu).
अदृष्टवता पुरुषेणास्त्यणूनां सम्बन्ध इति चेत् –
If it be said, that there is conjunction between the atoms (Aṇus) and the Jīva-Self which has the unseen principle inherent in it,
Then, such conjunction being constant, there would be the predicament of the tendency for action being constant, in the absence of any other controlling principle.
तदेवं नियतस्य कस्यचित्कर्मनिमित्तस्याभावान्नाणुष्वाद्यं कर्म स्यात्;
This being so, in the absence of any definite cause for (starting) activity, no initial activity would take place,
कर्माभावात्तन्निबन्धनः संयोगो न स्यात्;
And in the absence of activity, conjunction which depends upon such activity, would not take place,
संयोगाभावाच्च तन्निबन्धनं द्व्यणुकादि कार्यजातं न स्यात्।
And in the absence of such conjunction (Saṃyoga), the whole gamut of effects such as a binary atomic compound, etc., which depend upon such conjunction, would not result.
संयोगश्चाणोरण्वन्तरेण सर्वात्मना वा स्यात् एकदेशेन वा?
Besides, this conjunction of one atom (Aṇu) with another can either be total or in only a part of it.
सर्वात्मना चेत्, उपचयानुपपत्तेरणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्गः,
If the conjunction is total, then, as any increase in the form of extension or dimension would not be reasonably probable, there would be the predicament, of there being but one atom (Aṇu) only (as a result of the total conjunction of two Aṇus),
And also a predicament of its being contrary to what is ordinarily observed (viz. that when two things merge into each other there is an increase in the form of extension or dimension) would result,
प्रदेशवतो द्रव्यस्य प्रदेशवता द्रव्यान्तरेण संयोगस्य दृष्टत्वात्;
Because conjunction is observed to be only between two things, each of which has a dimension.
एकदेशेन चेत्, सावयवत्वप्रसङ्गः;
Now, (if it be said) that the conjunction (of the two Aṇus) is only between a part of each Aṇu, the predicament would be that it would mean that an atom (Aṇu) has parts (which is against the Vaiśeṣika assumption).
परमाणूनां कल्पिताः प्रदेशाः स्युरिति चेत्,
Again, if it be said, that Paramāṇus have imaginary surfaces,
कल्पितानामवस्तुत्वादवस्त्वेव संयोग इति
Then as an imagined entity is unreal (i.e. there can never be an entity existing in fact), the conjunction (of such Paramāṇus) would necessarily be unreal,
वस्तुनः कार्यस्यासमवायिकारणं न स्यात्;
And it could not be the efficient (i.e. Asamavāyi) cause of a real thing or effect,
असति चासमवायिकारणे द्व्यणुकादिकार्यद्रव्यं नोत्पद्येत।
And in the absence of an efficient (i.e. Asamavāyi) cause, any material constituting an effect, such as a binary atomic compound, would not come into existence.
यथा चादिसर्गे निमित्ताभावात्संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं कर्म नाणूनां सम्भवति,
Just as at the initial creation, in the absence of a cause, activity in the atoms (Aṇus) for effecting conjunction would not be possible,
एवं महाप्रलयेऽपि विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं कर्म नैवाणूनां सम्भवेत्;
Similarly, even in the great absorption (Pralaya), activity in the atoms (Aṇus) for effecting separation (of the Aṇus) would not be possible,
न हि तत्रापि किञ्चिन्नियतं तन्निमित्तं दृष्टमस्ति;
As in that case also, no definite cause for it can be observed.
Again, the unseen principle (Adṛṣṭa) is for the purpose of effecting experience,
न प्रलयप्रसिद्ध्यर्थम् –
And not for the purpose of effecting Pralaya,
इत्यतो निमित्ताभावान्न स्यादणूनां संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं वा कर्म।
And hence, in the absence of a cause, no activity either for bringing about conjunction or separation between atoms (Aṇus), can be possible.
अतश्च संयोगविभागाभावात्तदायत्तयोः सर्गप्रलययोरभावः प्रसज्येत।
Therefore, in the absence of conjunction or separation, neither creation nor Pralaya which depend upon them, would take place.
Therefore, the doctrine of atoms being the cause (of the world), is not reasonably sustainable. — 12.
←PrevNext→ समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः॥२.२.१३॥ Samavāyābhyupagamāc ca sāmyād anavasthiteḥ.
Samavāya-abhyupagamāt: Samavāya being admitted; Ca: and, also; Sāmyāt: because of equality of reasoning; An-avasthiteḥ: regressus ad infinitum would result.
🔗 And as a Samavāya relation (invariable concomitance) is understood to exist (by a Vaiśeṣika), because of parity (of reasoning) a regressus ad infinitum would result (if the Vaiśeṣika doctrine is accepted). — 188.8.131.52.2.13 L.1
समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च – तदभाव इति –
(The clause) — “Because of the assumption (by the opponent) of a Samavāya relation”, there is absence of it (i.e. there is absence of creation or Pralaya), in the Sūtra,
Connects with the present subject of discussion, viz. the refutation of the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world).
द्वाभ्यां चाणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्यमानमत्यन्तभिन्नमणुभ्यामण्वोः समवैतीत्यभ्युपगम्यते भवता;
You (the Vaiśeṣika) understand, that a binary atomic compound which results from two atoms (Aṇus) and is quite dissimilar to the atoms (Aṇus), is in a relation of Samavāya (invariable concomitance) with the atoms (Aṇus),
न चैवमभ्युपगच्छता शक्यतेऽणुकारणता समर्थयितुम्।
And because you understand it that way, you would not be able to substantiate the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world).
कुतः? साम्यादनवस्थितेः –
How is it so? Because of parity (of reasoning), a regressus ad infinitum would result.
यथैव ह्यणुभ्यामत्यन्तभिन्नं सत् द्व्यणुकं समवायलक्षणेन सम्बन्धेन ताभ्यां सम्बध्यते,
Just as (according to a Vaiśeṣika) a binary atomic compound, quite dissimilar as it is to the atoms (Aṇus), is related to the atoms (Aṇus) by a Samavāya relation,
एवं समवायोऽपि समवायिभ्योऽत्यन्तभिन्नः सन्
Similarly, Samavāya relation itself, quite dissimilar as it is to the two entities having such a Samavāya relation between them (i.e. the Samavāyins),
समवायलक्षणेनान्येनैव सम्बन्धेन समवायिभिः सम्बध्येत,
Will necessarily have to be understood to be related to them (i.e. the Samavāyins) by an altogether separate relation, again of the nature of a Samavāya,
Because, the circumstance of ‘being absolutely dissimilar’ is common (to both these cases).
ततश्च तस्य तस्यान्योऽन्यः सम्बन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थैव प्रसज्येत।
Hence, thus, another and yet another such unending series of Samavāyas will have to be presumed (to exist), and so a regressus ad infinitum would result.
ननु इहप्रत्ययग्राह्यः समवायो नित्यसम्बद्ध एव समवायिभिर्गृह्यते,
(But if it be said by the Vaiśeṣika opponent) — that here, a Samavāya relation which is actually perceivable, is perceived as being eternally related with the Samavāyins (viz. the Dvy-aṇuka and the two atoms),
नासम्बद्धः, सम्बन्धान्तरापेक्षो वा;
And it is not that it is not so related or that it needs another such (Adṛṣṭa) relation (for being so related),
ततश्च न तस्यान्यः सम्बन्धः कल्पयितव्यः येनानवस्था प्रसज्येतेति।
And hence any other separate relation of it, which would inevitably lead to a regressus ad infinitum, need not be imagined,
नेत्युच्यते; संयोगोऽप्येवं सति संयोगिभिर्नित्यसम्बद्ध एवेति
We reply — No, because if it be so (understood) then the relation of contact (Saṃyoga) between two entities which are in such contact (Saṃyoga) also, would be similarly eternal,
And like Samavāya, would not need any other separate relation (to establish the contact i.e. Saṃyoga relation).
(If it is said) that ‘contact’ being an altogether different thing (from the two things which are in such contact i.e. Saṃyoga) it must needs require another relation,
Then Samavāya also being a thing altogether different from the Samavāyins must needs require another such relation.
न च – गुणत्वात्संयोगः सम्बन्धान्तरमपेक्षते, न समवायः अगुणत्वादिति युज्यते वक्तुम्;
It would not be proper to say, that ‘contact’ (Saṃyoga) being a quality (Guṇa) does need another relation, while Samavāya not being a quality does not require it,
Because, the reason for the need for such a relation (viz. that both Saṃyoga and Samavāya being things different from the two things between which such Saṃyoga or Samavāya exists) is common to both these cases,
And the terminology (of the Sāṅkhyas) which represents contact as a quality (Guṇa) has no bearing on the need or otherwise (of such another relation).
तस्मादर्थान्तरं समवायमभ्युपगच्छतः प्रसज्येतैवानवस्था;
Therefore, in the case of those who (like you, the opponent) understand Samavāya to be a thing different (from the Samavāyins), regressus ad infinitum must necessarily result.
And when such regressus ad infinitum results, (as no particular Samavāya relation can be proved to be the last Samavāya relation in all the Samavāyas of the series, all the other preceding relations of Samavāyas in the infinite series also cannot possibly be proved), and when one Samavāya fails to be established,
सर्वासिद्धेर्द्वाभ्यामणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकं नैवोत्पद्येत;
All Samavāyas (of the series) equally fail to be established, and hence a binary atomic compound will by no means result from two atoms (Aṇus).
Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 13.
←PrevNext→ नित्यमेव च भावात्॥२.२.१४॥ Nityam eva ca bhāvāt.
Nityam: eternal; Eva: certainly, even; Ca: and, also; Bhāvāt: because of the existence, from the possibility.
🔗 Also, because of (a tendency for activity or inactivity) being constant (the atomic theory is unsustainable). — 184.108.40.206.2.14 L.1
अपि चाणवः प्रवृत्तिस्वभावा वा, निवृत्तिस्वभावा वा, उभयस्वभावा वा, अनुभयस्वभावा वा अभ्युपगम्यन्ते –
Besides, atoms (Aṇus) have necessarily to be understood to have the nature, either of a tendency for activity or inactivity, or of both or neither,
As no other alternative is possible.
चतुर्धापि नोपपद्यते –
But none of these four kinds (of possibilities) is reasonably sustainable.
If their nature is that of a tendency for activity,
Such activity would continue eternally, and there would be the predicament of the absence of final dissolution.
If their nature is of inactivity,
As such inactivity also would continue eternally, there would be the predicament of the absence of any creation.
Their having both these natures at one and the same time,
Would be, because of the contradiction (involved), incongruous.
अनुभयस्वभावत्वे तु निमित्तवशात्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरभ्युपगम्यमानयोर्
If it be supposed, that they have neither of these natures, and that a tendency for activity or inactivity depends upon a cause,
A cause such as the unseen principle (assumed by the Vaiśeṣikas to be such a cause, albeit wrongly, as shown before), being constantly available i.e. near at hand, such a tendency for activity would be eternal, leading to the predicament of constant activity (making final dissolution impossible).
Now, supposing the unseen principle is not accepted (by the Vaiśeṣikas as a part of their theory) the predicament of constant inactivity would result.
For these reasons also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 14.
←PrevNext→ रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात्॥२.२.१५॥ Rūpādimattvāc ca viparyayo darśanāt.
Rūpa-ādimatvāt: because of possessing colour, etc.; Ca: and, also; Viparyayaḥ: the reverse, the opposite; Darśanāt: because it is seen or observed, from common experience.
🔗 Also because of (the Atoms) being possessed of colour etc. (i.e. Rūpa etc.), (a result) contrary (to Vaiśeṣika assumption) would result, because it is (actually) observed (to be so). — 220.127.116.11.2.15 L.1
सावयवानां द्रव्याणामवयवशो विभज्यमानानां यतः परो विभागो न सम्भवति ते चतुर्विधा रूपादिमन्तः परमाणवः
चतुर्विधस्य रूपादिमतो भूतभौतिकस्यारम्भका नित्याश्चेति
The accepted tenets of the Vaiśeṣikas, viz.
That these Paramāṇus (infinitesimal atoms) are of four kinds, that they result when materials which consist of parts undergo division upto that stage beyond which no further subdivision is possible, that they possess the four qualities of Rūpa etc.,
That they are the initial starting cause of the four kinds of elements, and things resulting from the elements, which possess the four kinds of qualities, and that they are eternal,
स तेषामभ्युपगमो निरालम्बन एव;
Would be without any support,
यतो रूपादिमत्त्वात्परमाणूनामणुत्वनित्यत्वविपर्ययः प्रसज्येत;
Because there would result the predicament of the loss and reversal of their atomicity and eternal nature, as the result of their possessing such qualities.
परमकारणापेक्षया स्थूलत्वमनित्यत्वं च तेषामभिप्रेतविपरीतमापद्येतेत्यर्थः।
The meaning is, that contrary to their assumption, in comparison with the Highest Cause (Brahman), they (i.e. the four kinds of Paramāṇus) would happen to be gross and non-eternal.
कुतः? एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात् –
Whence is it so? Because in the ordinary world, it is observed to be so.
यद्धि लोके रूपादिमद्वस्तु तत् स्वकारणापेक्षया स्थूलमनित्यं च दृष्टम्;
In the ordinary world, anything which possesses colour etc., is seen to be gross and non-eternal, in comparison with its cause.
तद्यथा – पटस्तन्तूनपेक्ष्य स्थूलोऽनित्यश्च भवति;
For instance, a piece of cloth is relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with the threads (the cause of the piece of cloth),
तन्तवश्चांशूनपेक्ष्य स्थूला अनित्याश्च भवन्ति –
And the threads (in their turn) are relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with their minute subdivisions (which are the cause of the threads),
तथा चामी परमाणवो रूपादिमन्तस्तैरभ्युपगम्यन्ते;
And similarly, as these Paramāṇus are understood by them to possess colour etc.,
तस्मात्तेऽपि कारणवन्तस्तदपेक्षया स्थूला अनित्याश्च प्राप्नुवन्ति।
Therefore, they also, as being necessarily effects from their cause would be rendered relatively gross and non-eternal as compared with their cause.
यच्च नित्यत्वे कारणं तैरुक्तम् –
What they (Vaiśeṣikas) mention as the cause for a thing being eternal, viz.
‘सदकारणवन्नित्यम्’ (वै. सू. ४-१-१) इति,
“Whatever exists and is not the effect of some cause, is eternal” (Sad-akāraṇavan-nityam) (Vaiś. Sū. 4.1.1),
तदप्येवं सति अणुषु न सम्भवति,
Would not hold good in the case of atoms (Aṇus),
उक्तेन प्रकारेणाणूनामपि कारणवत्त्वोपपत्तेः।
Because in the manner referred to above, it would be reasonably sustainable to understand, that the atoms (Aṇus) do have a cause.
यदपि नित्यत्वे द्वितीयं कारणमुक्तम् –
The second reason for being eternal mentioned (by them) is: —
‘अनित्यमिति च विशेषतः प्रतिषेधाभावः’ (वै. सू. ४-१-४) इति,
“The absence of any specific denial (of being eternal) such as that a particular thing is non-eternal” (Anityamiti ca viśeṣataḥ pratiṣedhābhāvaḥ) (Vaiś. Sū. 4.1.4).
तदपि नावश्यं परमाणूनां नित्यत्वं साधयति;
That also does not necessarily establish that the Paramāṇus are eternal.
असति हि यस्मिन्कस्मिंश्चिन्नित्ये वस्तुनि नित्यशब्देन नञः समासो नोपपद्यते;
If some eternal entity does not exist i.e. unless some eternal entity exists, a ‘Naña’ (नञ् a prefix of negation) cannot possibly enter into a compound with ‘Nitya’ thus: Na nityaḥ — Anityaḥ.
न पुनः परमाणुनित्यत्वमेवापेक्ष्यते;
(One cannot deny anything as being eternal, unless we know of an entity which is eternal.) Again it is not as if the Paramāṇus (infinitesimal atoms) must, therefore, be necessarily understood to be eternal,
तच्चास्त्येव नित्यं परमकारणं ब्रह्म;
Because (according to the Vedāntins) Brahman, the eternal, and the Highest Cause, is there, already available.
न च शब्दार्थव्यवहारमात्रेण कस्यचिदर्थस्य प्रसिद्धिर्भवति,
It is not that the existence of an entity (Artha) is established, merely because a word signifying that entity is actually in common use,
Because it is only when its existence is proved by other means-of-proof that words and their meaning are received into common use.
यदपि नित्यत्वे तृतीयं कारणमुक्तम् –
Now with respect to the third reason for assuming the atoms (Aṇus) to be eternal, viz.
‘अविद्या च’ इति – तद्यद्येवं विव्रीयेत –
The Sūtra “Also Nescience” (Avidyā ca) (Vaiś. Sū. 4.1.5), if it is explained like this, viz.
सतां परिदृश्यमानकार्याणां कारणानां प्रत्यक्षेणाग्रहणमविद्येति,
That Nescience is the failure to perceive the causes of effects which actually exist and are perceivable,
Then (according to that reason) even the binary atomic compound (Dvy-aṇuka) would be eternal.
अथाद्रव्यत्वे सतीति विशेष्येत,
If the additional proviso, viz. ‘not having any causal material for producing them’, is read into the definition of Nescience to qualify it,
Then it would amount to this, that the circumstance of there being no cause for an effect, would itself be a reason for its being eternal,
तस्य च प्रागेवोक्तत्वात् ‘अविद्या च’ (वै. सू. ४-१-५) इति पुनरुक्तं स्यात्;
And that having been already mentioned (Vaiś. Sū. 4.1.5 above), ‘Also Nescience’ would be a repetition.
अथापि कारणविभागात्कारणविनाशाच्चान्यस्य तृतीयस्य विनाशहेतोरसम्भवोऽविद्या,
सा परमाणूनां नित्यत्वं ख्यापयति –
इति व्याख्यायेत –
Now if it be explained thus, viz.
That Nescience means the impossibility of the existence of any third cause for the destruction of a thing, over and above two such causes, viz. ‘the division of a cause’ or ‘the destruction of a cause’,
And that this ‘Nescience’ would establish the eternal nature of Paramāṇus,
नावश्यं विनश्यद्वस्तु द्वाभ्यामेव हेतुभ्यां विनष्टुमर्हतीति नियमोऽस्ति;
(Then we would reply) — there is no such rule, that a thing which is in the process of destruction, must perish by either of these two reasons only.
संयोगसचिवे ह्यनेकस्मिंश्च द्रव्ये द्रव्यान्तरस्यारम्भकेऽभ्युपगम्यमान एतदेवं स्यात्।
It would be so, if it is understood that more than one causal material, aided by the ‘contact’ (Saṃyoga) relation, start the productive process, of another material effect.
यदा त्वपास्तविशेषं सामान्यात्मकं कारणं विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानमारम्भकमभ्युपगम्यते,
When, however, it is understood, that a cause which is devoid of any special attribute of any kind, and which has only a general characteristic (such as being earthy), initiates the process of bringing an effect into existence, merely by the cause itself attaining another special condition,
तदा घृतकाठिन्यविलयनवन्मूर्त्यवस्थाविलयनेनापि विनाश उपपद्यते।
Then in that case destruction will be achieved merely by the disintegration of the solidity (of the effect), similar, for instance, to the melting of the solidity or hardness of ghee.
Thus in the case of Paramāṇus a result contrary to that which is assumed (by the Vaiśeṣikas viz. that the infinitesimal atoms are minute and eternal) would take place, because of the fact, that Paramāṇus possess colour etc.
Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause (of the world) is not reasonably sustainable. — 15.
←PrevNext→ उभयथा च दोषात्॥२.२.१६॥ Ubhayathā ca doṣāt.
Ubhayathā: in both ways, on either side, in either case; Ca: also, and; Doṣāt: because of defects (or difficulties).
🔗 Also, because (considered) either way, a fault is inevitable. — 18.104.22.168.2.16 L.1
गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शगुणा स्थूला पृथिवी,
The Earth has qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch and it is gross;
रूपरसस्पर्शगुणाः सूक्ष्मा आपः,
Water has the qualities of taste, colour and touch and it is fine;
रूपस्पर्शगुणं सूक्ष्मतरं तेजः,
Tejas (Fire) has the qualities of colour and touch and it is finer;
स्पर्शगुणः सूक्ष्मतमो वायुः –
And Vāyu (Wind) has only the quality of touch and it is superfine,
इत्येवमेतानि चत्वारि भूतान्युपचितापचितगुणानि स्थूलसूक्ष्मसूक्ष्मतरसूक्ष्मतमतारतम्योपेतानि च लोके लक्ष्यन्ते।
And in this way in the ordinary world it is seen that these four elements have an increasing and decreasing number of qualities and they are gross, fine, finer and superfine comparatively,
तद्वत्परमाणवोऽप्युपचितापचितगुणाः कल्प्येरन् न वा?
And (the question is) whether the Paramāṇus also have to be imagined to possess similar increasing and decreasing number of qualities respectively; [Or not].
उभयथापि च दोषानुषङ्गोऽपरिहार्य एव स्यात्।
(Considered) either way, its being open to fault is inevitable.
If it be assumed that the qualities increase or decrease in number,
Then such increasing qualities will produce grossness in them (i.e. the Paramāṇus) and they will cease to be Paramāṇus (as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas),
न चान्तरेणापि मूर्त्युपचयं गुणोपचयो भवतीत्युच्येत,
And it is contended that such increase in qualities without a corresponding increase in grossness is not possible,
कार्येषु भूतेषु गुणोपचये मूर्त्युपचयदर्शनात्।
Because in the ordinary world (it is seen) that as qualities of effects (i.e. created things) increase, they tend to augment their grossness.
अकल्प्यमाने तूपचितापचितगुणत्वे –
Now, if the assumption of an increase or decrease of qualities in the Paramāṇus is rejected
परमाणुत्वसाम्यप्रसिद्धये यदि तावत्सर्व एकैकगुणा एव कल्प्येरन्,
And it is understood for the purpose of ensuring their similarity that all Paramāṇus have only a single quality each,
ततस्तेजसि स्पर्शस्योपलब्धिर्न स्यात्,
Then in the Tejas there would be no perception of touch,
In Water of colour and touch,
पृथिव्यां च रसरूपस्पर्शानाम्,
And in the Earth of taste, colour and touch respectively,
Because the quality of an effect is understood to be reproduced from the quality of its cause.
अथ सर्वे चतुर्गुणा एव कल्प्येरन्, ततोऽप्स्वपि गन्धस्योपलब्धिः स्यात्, तेजसि गन्धरसयोः, वायौ च गन्धरूपरसानाम्।
Again, if all these (different Paramāṇus) are assumed to have all these four qualities, then Water will evince the quality of smell, Tejas of smell and taste, and Vāyu of smell, colour and taste respectively.
न चैवं दृश्यते।
But it is never observed to be so.
Therefore also, the theory of atoms being the cause is not reasonably sustainable. — 16.
A-parigrahāt: because it is not accepted; Ca: and; Atyantam: altogether, totally, completely; An-apekṣā: to be rejected.
🔗 (The theory of atoms being the cause of the world) cannot be accepted, also because, the learned have not accepted it. — 22.214.171.124.2.17 L.1
प्रधानकारणवादो वेदविद्भिरपि कैश्चिन्मन्वादिभिः सत्कार्यत्वाद्यंशोपजीवनाभिप्रायेणोपनिबद्धः;
The theory about the Pradhāna being the cause (of the world) has been accepted to a small extent at least, by Manu and others learned in the Vedas on the ground of its being helpful by reason of its supporting the Sat-kārya-Vāda (viz. the theory that an effect always pre-exists as a cause, before it is created etc.).
अयं तु परमाणुकारणवादो न कैश्चिदपि शिष्टैः केनचिदप्यंशेन परिगृहीते
But the theory of atoms being the cause, has not been accepted by the learned, even to the least little extent
And should not therefore be countenanced at all by those who accept the Vedas (as authoritative i.e. Pramāṇa).
अपि च वैशेषिकास्तन्त्रार्थभूतान् षट्पदार्थान्
द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाख्यान् अत्यन्तभिन्नान् भिन्नलक्षणान् अभ्युपगच्छन्ति –
Besides the Vaiśeṣikas hold that there are six categories, propounded in their Śāstra, called —
‘Substance’ (Dravya), ‘quality’ (Guṇa), ‘action’ (Karma), ‘generality’ (Sāmānya), ‘particularity’ (Viśeṣa) and ‘inherence’ (Samavāya), which are absolutely different from each other and have absolutely different characteristics,
यथा मनुष्योऽश्वः शश इति;
Like a man, a horse, or a hare (which are different from each other and have different characteristics),
तथात्वं चाभ्युपगम्य तद्विरुद्धं द्रव्याधीनत्वं शेषाणामभ्युपगच्छन्ति;
And while holding thus, they also hold, in a way quite contrary to it, that all the other five categories are completely dependent on the category ‘substance’ (because, substance is a sine qua non for their existence).
This of course is not reasonably sustainable.
कथम्? यथा हि लोके शशकुशपलाशप्रभृतीनामत्यन्तभिन्नानां सतां नेतरेतराधीनत्वं भवति,
How is that? Just as in the ordinary world, a hare, grass or a tree which are absolutely different from each other are not mutually interdependent,
एवं द्रव्यादीनामप्यत्यन्तभिन्नत्वात्, नैव द्रव्याधीनत्वं गुणादीनां भवितुमर्हति;
Even so, the categories such as ‘substance’ etc. being absolutely different from each other, categories such as ‘quality’ etc. do not deserve to be dependent on the category ‘substance’,
अथ भवति द्रव्याधीनत्वं गुणादीनाम्, ततो द्रव्यभावे भावाद्द्रव्याभावेऽभावाद्
Inasmuch as they [the other five categories] would then exist only when a ‘substance’ exists, and would not exist when a substance does not exist,
द्रव्यमेव संस्थानादिभेदादनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाग्भवति –
And it would then come to this, that it is the ‘substance’ only that comes to have these several terms applied to it, and becomes the object of knowledge, according to the different forms and conditions in which it happens to be.
यथा देवदत्त एक एव सन् अवस्थान्तरयोगादनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाग्भवति, तद्वत्;
Just as, Deva-datta, one only as he is, becomes the object of different terms and perceptions according to the particular different conditions in which he happens to be, even so it is, in this case.
तथा सति सांख्यसिद्धान्तप्रसङ्गः स्वसिद्धान्तविरोधश्चापद्येयाताम्।
But, if it is understood to be so, there would occur the predicament (for the Vaiśeṣika), of (the acceptance of) the Sāṅkhya doctrine (similar also to Vedānta), and of his going counter to his own theory.
नन्वग्नेरन्यस्यापि सतो धूमस्याग्न्यधीनत्वं दृश्यते;
But (says the Vaiśeṣika), even though ‘fire’ is a different entity (than smoke), ‘smoke’ is seen to be dependent upon ‘fire’.
(We reply) yes, it certainly is seen to be so,
भेदप्रतीतेस्तु तत्राग्निधूमयोरन्यत्वं निश्चीयते;
But it is precisely because of the perception of their being different, that it is concluded that fire and smoke are different (entities).
इह तु – शुक्लः कम्बलः, रोहिणी धेनुः, नीलमुत्पलम् – इति
Here, however, in the case of a substance such as a white blanket or a dun cow, or a blue lotus,
द्रव्यस्यैव तस्य तस्य तेन तेन विशेषणेन प्रतीयमानत्वात्
It is the substance itself, which, because of a particular qualification, is perceived to have its own particular quality,
नैव द्रव्यगुणयोरग्निधूमयोरिव भेदप्रतीतिरस्ति;
And not that a substance and its quality are perceived to be entities different from each other, like fire and smoke.
Therefore, quality has substance as its self.
एतेन कर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां द्रव्यात्मकता व्याख्याता॥
It thus happens to be explained (i.e. by what is said about quality), that, the remaining five other categories viz. action (Karma) etc., have substance as their selfs (because they are not perceived to be different from substances).
गुणानां द्रव्याधीनत्वं द्रव्यगुणयोरयुतसिद्धत्वादिति यदुच्यते,
If it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that this dependence of ‘quality’ etc. on ‘substance’ is, because substances and qualities have a relation of inherence between them (i.e. they are Ayuta-siddha),
तत्पुनरयुतसिद्धत्वमपृथग्देशत्वं वा स्यात्, अपृथक्कालत्वं वा, अपृथक्स्वभावत्वं वा?
Then (we say that) their having such a relation of inherence (i.e. Ayuta-siddhatva) can happen to be because of their being non-separate (from each other) with reference either to space or time or nature,
सर्वथापि नोपपद्यते –
But none of these alternatives would be reasonably sustainable.
अपृथग्देशत्वे तावत्स्वाभ्युपगमो विरुध्येत।
So far as their being non-separate in space is concerned, it would be contradictory to their own assumption.
कथम्? तन्त्वारब्धो हि पटस्तन्तुदेशोऽभ्युपगम्यते, न पटदेशः;
Why would it be so? (Because the Vaiśeṣikas) hold that a piece of cloth which is produced from threads exists in the space occupied by its threads, and not in any separate space of its own,
पटस्य तु गुणाः शुक्लत्वादयः पटदेशा अभ्युपगम्यन्ते, न तन्तुदेशाः;
But the qualities of the piece of cloth, i.e. its whiteness etc., occupy the space of the piece of cloth and not the space occupied by the threads.
तथा चाहुः – ‘द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरम्’ (वै. सू. १-१-१०) इति;
Their Sūtra also lays down that — “Substances reproduce other substances, and qualities reproduce other qualities” (Vaiś. Sū. 1.1.10).
तन्तवो हि कारणद्रव्याणि कार्यद्रव्यं पटमारभन्ते,
Threads which are the causal material produce a piece of cloth, viz. the substance of the effect,
तन्तुगताश्च गुणाः शुक्लादयः कार्यद्रव्ये पटे शुक्लादिगुणान्तरमारभन्ते – इति हि तेऽभ्युपगच्छन्ति;
And the qualities of the threads such as whiteness etc. produce similar qualities in the effect i.e. the piece of cloth.
सोऽभ्युपगमो द्रव्यगुणयोरपृथग्देशत्वेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने बाध्येत।
This assumption (of the Vaiśeṣikas) would be vitiated, if a substance and its qualities were to be understood to be nonseparate in space.
Now, if it is said that their being Ayuta-siddha is because of their not existing in different times,
सव्यदक्षिणयोरपि गोविषाणयोरयुतसिद्धत्वं प्रसज्येत।
Then it would come to mean that the right horn and the left horn of a cow (having been created at one and the same time) are Ayuta-siddha (i.e. have a relation of inherence between them).
तथा अपृथक्स्वभावत्वे त्वयुतसिद्धत्वे,
Similarly, if by Ayuta-siddhatva (i.e. having a relation of inherence), non-separateness in nature is understood,
न द्रव्यगुणयोरात्मभेदः सम्भवति,
Then there would be no difference in the Selfs of substances and qualities,
तस्य तादात्म्येनैव प्रतीयमानत्वात्॥
As they would be perceived to be identical.
युतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः संयोगः,
Their (i.e. of the Vaiśeṣikas) tenet, that the relation of Yuta-siddha entities is the relation of ‘contact’,
अयुतसिद्धयोस्तु समवायः –
And that of the Ayuta-siddha entities is the relation of ‘inherence’,
इत्ययमभ्युपगमो मृषैव तेषाम्, प्राक्सिद्धस्य कार्यात्कारणस्यायुतसिद्धत्वानुपपत्तेः।
Is fallacious and futile, because, to say, that the cause which already exists prior to an effect, and the effect, are Ayuta-siddha, is not reasonably sustainable.
अथान्यतरापेक्ष एवायमभ्युपगमः स्यात् –
Now, (if the Vaiśeṣikas say) that they understand by an Ayuta-siddha relation, the relation of only one of the two Ayuta-siddha entities with the other (and that it is not reciprocal),
अयुतसिद्धस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन सम्बन्धः समवाय इति,
I.e. the Ayuta-siddha relation of the effect only, with the cause, is ‘inherence’ (Samavāya),
एवमपि प्रागसिद्धस्यालब्धात्मकस्य कार्यस्य कारणेन सम्बन्धो नोपपद्यते,
Even then, any relation of an effect with its cause, prior to its creation, when it has not yet attained its existence and has not yet attained its own Self is not reasonably sustainable,
Because relation depends upon (the existence of) two entities.
सिद्धं भूत्वा सम्बध्यत इति चेत्,
Again if it is said, that it (i.e. an effect) may establish a relation (with its cause) after it comes into being,
And if it is also understood that an effect comes into being prior to its establishing any relation with the cause,
Then, in the absence of an Ayuta-siddha relation (which the Vaiśeṣika holds as existing),
कार्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागौ न विद्येते इतीदं दुरुक्तं स्यात्।
To say that, as between an effect and a cause there is neither contact nor disjunction, would be an unhappy utterance (on the part of a Vaiśeṣika).
यथा चोत्पन्नमात्रस्याक्रियस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य विभुभिराकाशादिभिर्द्रव्यान्तरैः सम्बन्धः संयोग एवाभ्युपगम्यते, न समवायः,
Just as the relation of an effect-material (Kārya-Dravya) which has come into being but is yet inactive, with another material, viz. the all-pervading Ākāśa, is that of ‘contact’ only and not ‘inherence’ (Samavāya),
एवं कारणद्रव्येणापि सम्बन्धः संयोग एव स्यात्, न समवायः।
Even so the relation between an entity and its cause would be that of ‘contact’ (Saṃyoga) only and not ‘inherence’ (Samavāya).
नापि संयोगस्य समवायस्य वा सम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धिव्यतिरेकेणास्तित्वे किञ्चित्प्रमाणमस्ति;
Besides, there is no authority i.e. means-of-proof as to the existence of a relation (Sambandha), either of ‘contact’ or ‘inherence’, between two entities, as apart from the two entities themselves which are supposed to have any such relation between them.
सम्बन्धिशब्दप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकेण संयोगसमवायशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्तयोरस्तित्वमिति चेत्,
Now, if it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that the existence of such terms (Śabda) as ‘Saṃyoga’ and ‘Samavāya’ is to be seen, because of the perception of the existence of the two terms ‘Saṃyoga’ (contact) and ‘Samavāya’ (inherence) as apart from the existence of the terms i.e. the names of the entities which themselves are so related,
न; एकत्वेऽपि स्वरूपबाह्यरूपापेक्षया अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययदर्शनात्।
(We reply) — no, because it is seen that even though there is but one entity only, it is seen to be expressed by different terms, and there is a different perception of it, depending upon its own nature and its external aspect.
यथैकोऽपि सन् देवदत्तो लोके स्वरूपं सम्बन्धिरूपं चापेक्ष्य अनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभाग्भवति –
For instance, just as Deva-datta, only a single entity though he is, is with reference to his own nature or his external nature (as caused by other things), known by different terms
मनुष्यो ब्राह्मणः श्रोत्रियो वदान्यो बालो युवा स्थविरः पिता पुत्रः पौत्रो भ्राता जामातेति,
Such as, a man, a Brāhmaṇa, one well-versed in the Vedas (Śrotriya), generous (Vadānya), a child, a youth, an old man, a father, a son, a brother, a son-in-law;
यथा चैकापि सती रेखा स्थानान्यत्वेन निविशमाना एकदशशतसहस्रादिशब्दप्रत्ययभेदमनुभवति,
Or, just as for instance, a mere line, one as it is, when placed in another position is (because of its relative position), understood differently, viz. either as one (Eka), a ten (Daśa), a hundred (Śata) and a thousand (Sahasra) etc.,
तथा सम्बन्धिनोरेव सम्बन्धिशब्दप्रत्ययव्यतिरेकेण संयोगसमवायशब्दप्रत्ययार्हत्वम्,
Similarly, entities which have a relation between them, apart from having their own names, and being known as such entities, become the objects of such terms as ‘Saṃyoga’ (contact) and ‘Samavāya’ (inherence) and their experience as such,
न व्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वस्तित्वेन –
And it is not that they establish the existence of such contact (Saṃyoga) or inherence (Samavāya) as entities different in themselves,
इत्युपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेः अभावः वस्त्वन्तरस्य;
And hence, there is non-existence of any such other entity that has attained the criterion of its own actual experience.
नापि सम्बन्धिविषयत्वे सम्बन्धशब्दप्रत्यययोः सन्ततभावप्रसङ्गः;
Nor is it, that because the perception of the names which express relationship, belongs to the province of the entities which are so related, there would be the predicament of the perception of their existence eternally,
स्वरूपबाह्यरूपापेक्षयेति – उक्तोत्तरत्वात्।
As that has already been answered, by our stating, that it is with reference to the nature of such things and their external aspect, that they acquire several names and there are several perceptions of them.
तथाण्वात्ममनसामप्रदेशत्वान्न संयोगः सम्भवति,
Again, as the Aṇu, the Self (Ātmā), and the internal organ (Manas) have no tangible surfaces (i.e. parts) as such, contact with them is not possible,
प्रदेशवतो द्रव्यस्य प्रदेशवता द्रव्यान्तरेण संयोगदर्शनात्;
Because, it is only an entity which possesses a tangible surface i.e. a part, that is observed to have a contact (Saṃyoga) relation with another such entity.
कल्पिताः प्रदेशा अण्वात्ममनसां भविष्यन्तीति चेत्,
If it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that the Aṇu or the Self, or the internal organ, may be imagined to have such tangible surfaces i.e. parts,
न; अविद्यमानार्थकल्पनायां सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्,
(We reply) — no, because, if a non-existing entity were to be imagined to exist, it would lead to the predicament of the establishment of the existence of any and every thing at pleasure (Sarvārtha-siddhi-prasaṅga),
इयानेवाविद्यमानो विरुद्धोऽविरुद्धो वा अर्थः कल्पनीयः, नातोऽधिकः – इति नियमहेत्वभावात्,
Because, there is no raison d’etre for any such restrictive rule, that only such and such particular non-existing entity, whether contradictory to reason or otherwise, may be imagined to exist, and no other,
कल्पनायाश्च स्वायत्तत्वात्प्रभूतत्वसम्भवाच्च –
And also because imagination being solely dependent upon itself, it is limitless or prolific.
न च वैशेषिकैः कल्पितेभ्यः षड्भ्यः पदार्थेभ्योऽन्येऽधिकाः शतं सहस्रं वा अर्था न कल्पयितव्या इति निवारको हेतुरस्ति;
There is no restrictive reason why more categories than the six categories imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas, say a hundred or a thousand for instance, may not be imagined,
तस्माद्यस्मै यस्मै यद्यद्रोचते तत्तत्सिध्येत्;
And hence anything which anybody may wish for, would result.
कश्चित्कृपालुः प्राणिनां दुःखबहुलः संसार एव मा भूदिति कल्पयेत्;
Some kind-hearted soul may wish that this preponderatingly painful transmigratory existence itself, may not be there at all,
अन्यो वा व्यसनी मुक्तानामपि पुनरुत्पत्तिं कल्पयेत्;
While another, a vicious person may wish that even those who have already secured Final Release should revert to the transmigratory existence,
And who can prevent them?
किञ्चान्यत् – द्वाभ्यां परमाणुभ्यां निरवयवाभ्यां सावयवस्य द्व्यणुकस्याकाशेनेव संश्लेषानुपपत्तिः;
Besides this, it is not reasonably sustainable to expect cohesion, i.e. intimate contact, between two atoms which have no surfaces i.e. parts, and a binary atomic compound having such parts, just’ as it is not possible for a binary atomic compound (Dvy-aṇuka) to have cohesion or intimate contact with the Ākāśa.
न ह्याकाशस्य पृथिव्यादीनां च जतुकाष्ठवत्संश्लेषोऽस्ति;
The Ākāśa has no such cohesion or intimate contact with the Earth etc., as there can be, for instance, between lac and wood.
कार्यकारणद्रव्ययोराश्रिताश्रयभावोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यत इत्यवश्यं कल्प्यः समवाय इति चेत्,
If it be said (by the Vaiśeṣika) that it is absolutely necessary to assume a relation of inherence, as otherwise it would not be reasonably sustainable to understand, that as between a cause and an effect, the condition of one being the abode (Āśraya) and the other being the abider (Āśrita) exists,
न; इतरेतराश्रयत्वात् –
We reply — no, because (by such assumption) the fault of mutual interdependence would result.
Because, it would be only after a distinction between a cause and an effect is established, that a condition, in which one is an abode and the other is the abider, would be established,
आश्रिताश्रयभावसिद्धौ च तयोर्भेदसिद्धिः –
And it would be only after a condition in which one is the abode and the other is the abider is established, that a distinction between a cause and its effect can be established,
कुण्डबदरवत् – इतीतरेतराश्रयता स्यात्;
and thus according to ‘the maxim of the bowl and the berry tree (‘Kuṇḍa-Badara-Nyāya’) the fault of mutual interdependence would occur (because to say that the bowl is near the berry tree and vice versa, fails to locate either definitely).
न हि कार्यकारणयोर्भेद आश्रिताश्रयभावो वा वेदान्तवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते,
The Vedāntins do not hold that there is any distinction between the effect and its cause, or that as between the cause and the effect there is a condition of one (i.e. the cause) being the abode and the other (i.e. the effect) being the abider,
कारणस्यैव संस्थानमात्रं कार्यमित्यभ्युपगमात्॥
Because they hold that an effect is but only a particular special condition of the cause.
किञ्चान्यत् – परमाणूनां परिच्छिन्नत्वात्,
Moreover, as Paramāṇus have a definite extension,
यावत्यो दिशः – षट् अष्टौ दश वा – तावद्भिरवयवैः सावयवास्ते स्युः, सावयवत्वादनित्याश्च –
They must have, therefore, as many parts as there are directions, be they six or eight or ten, and because they have parts they necessarily are non-eternal,
इति नित्यत्वनिरवयवत्वाभ्युपगमो बाध्येत।
And thus, the assumption (of the Vaiśeṣikas) that the Paramāṇus are eternal and without parts would be vitiated.
यांस्त्वं दिग्भेदभेदिनोऽवयवान्कल्पयसि, त एव मम परमाणव इति चेत्,
If they were to say, that the very parts, which, you say, would be there because of such directions, are exactly what we mean by our Paramāṇus,
न; स्थूलसूक्ष्मतारतम्यक्रमेण आ परमकारणाद्विनाशोपपत्तेः –
We reply — No, because it would be reasonably sustainable to understand, that they get destroyed in a way in which they happen to become smaller and smaller, i.e. from gross to fine and from fine to finer, right down upto the Highest Cause.
यथा पृथिवी द्व्यणुकाद्यपेक्षया स्थूलतमा वस्तुभूतापि विनश्यति,
Just as the Earth which is the most gross, in comparison with the binary atomic compound, which (according to you), even though it substantially exists, ultimately, gets destroyed,
ततः सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मतरं च पृथिव्येकजातीयकं विनश्यति,
Even so, things, comparatively fine and finer than the Earth, but which belong to the same category as the Earth, get destroyed,
ततो द्व्यणुकम्, तथा परमाणवोऽपि पृथिव्येकजातीयकत्वाद्विनश्येयुः।
And after them, the binary atomic compound and the Paramāṇus also, which belong to the same category as the Earth, do therefore get destroyed.
विनश्यन्तोऽप्यवयवविभागेनैव विनश्यन्तीति चेत्,
If it is said that, even when they thus get destroyed, it is only by way of a process of being divided into their parts,
नायं दोषः; यतो घृतकाठिन्यविलयनवदपि विनाशोपपत्तिमवोचाम –
We reply, this is no fault, because it has already been said by us, that it would be reasonably sustainable to understand their destruction, to be of the same type, as that of the melting of the hardness or solidity of ghee (Ghṛta-kāṭhinya-vilayanavat).
यथा हि घृतसुवर्णादीनामविभज्यमानावयवानामप्यग्निसंयोगात् द्रवभावापत्त्या काठिन्यविनाशो भवति,
Just as ghee and gold etc. without destruction of their parts, become liquefied by contact with fire and thus lose their hardness,
एवं परमाणूनामपि परमकारणभावापत्त्या मूर्त्यादिविनाशो भविष्यति।
Even so, in the case of the Paramāṇus, the destruction of their solidity is attained, by their merely merging into the Highest Cause.
तथा कार्यारम्भोऽपि नावयवसंयोगेनैव केवलेन भवति,
Similarly, it is not that the creation of the effects starts merely by the conjunction of parts,
Because it is seen that milk and water, without undergoing any other different contact (of their parts) begin to turn themselves into effects, such as curds and snow.
Therefore, inasmuch as the Vaiśeṣika theory of Paramāṇus being the cause (of the world)
Is thus bolstered up by the most vapid reasoning and is contrary to the Scriptures, which declare the Lord to be the cause (of the world),
And is not accepted by respected persons such as Manu and others, it should be totally rejected.
And a passage such as “those who desire to secure their spiritual well-being” should be understood to be a complementary portion of the sentence (of the above Sūtra). — 17.
Samudāye: both aggregates; Ubhaya-hetuke: having two causes; Api: also, even; Tad-aprāptiḥ: it will not take place, it cannot be established.
🔗 Aggregates, assumed to result from both the kinds of causes, would not take place. — 126.96.36.199.2.18 L.1
वैशेषिकराद्धान्तो दुर्युक्तियोगाद्वेदविरोधाच्छिष्टापरिग्रहाच्च नापेक्षितव्य इत्युक्तम्;
It has already been stated that inasmuch as the] doctrine [Rāddhānta = Siddhānta, Apte, unnecessarily adds ‘vicious’, which may refer to its Anavasthā defect, sometimes called ‘vicious regression’] of the Vaiśeṣikas is bolstered up by faulty reasoning, and is opposed to the Vedas, and is not accepted by respectable people, it should not be accepted.
We will now propound, how —
It (i.e. the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas) being semi-Nihilists in nature (because they consider only a few entities, such as Paramāṇus etc., as eternal and the rest as non-eternal),
And by reason of its similarity with Nihilism — the doctrine [Rāddhānta] of total Nihilism (of the Buddhists) has to be still more overlooked.
स च बहुप्रकारः, प्रतिपत्तिभेदाद्विनेयभेदाद्वा;
This doctrine (of the Buddhists) consists of a variety of forms, both because it propounds different views, and because of the different mental calibre of the disciples (of Buddha).
तत्रैते त्रयो वादिनो भवन्ति –
There are in this, three kinds (of disciples) holding three different views.
Some are those who hold that all things really exist (Sarvāstitva-vādins i.e. Realists),
Some are those who hold that thought-forms or ideas (Vijñāna) alone (and not actual entities) really exist (Vijñāna-vādins i.e. Idealists),
अन्ये पुनः सर्वशून्यत्ववादिन इति।
And others again are those who hold that nothing really exists (Śūnya-vādins i.e. Nihilists).
तत्र ये सर्वास्तित्ववादिनो बाह्यमान्तरं च वस्त्वभ्युपगच्छन्ति,
भूतं भौतिकं च, चित्तं चैत्तं च,
We now would refute
The Sarvāstitva-vādins who hold that external (i.e. Bāhya) and internal (i.e. Āntara) things do in fact exist,
Viz. elements i.e. Bhūta and things resulting from elements i.e. Bhautika (are external i.e. Bāhya), and mind i.e. Citta and things resulting from the mind i.e. Caitta (are internal i.e. Āntara).
तत्र भूतं पृथिवीधात्वादयः, भौतिकं रूपादयश्चक्षुरादयश्च,
The elements are the earth etc., and the things resulting from the elements are colour (Rūpa) etc., and the organ of sight (Cakṣus) etc.
चतुष्टये च पृथिव्यादिपरमाणवः खरस्नेहोष्णेरणस्वभावाः,
ते पृथिव्यादिभावेन संहन्यन्ते – इति मन्यन्ते;
The Buddhists hold that the quartette of Paramāṇus viz. those of the Earth, Water, Tejas, and Vāyu, having a hard, viscid, hot and mobile nature respectively,
Come together to form the Earth etc.
तथा रूपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्कारसंज्ञकाः पञ्चस्कन्धाः,
तेऽप्यध्यात्मं सर्वव्यवहारास्पदभावेन संहन्यन्ते – इति मन्यन्ते॥
They also hold that five groups i.e. Skandhas (of internal things) such as Rūpa (sensation), Vijñāna (thought-form or idea), Vedanā (feeling), Sañjnā (verbal knowledge), Saṃskāra (impressions)
Come together and constitute the basis of all Ādhyātmika [internal] transactions.
In connection with this it is said, thus —
योऽयमुभयहेतुक उभयप्रकारः समुदायः परेषामभिप्रेतः –
स्कन्धहेतुकश्च पञ्चस्कन्धीरूपः –
With regard to the two kinds of aggregates,
Viz. the aggregates of the nature of the coming together of the elements, and entities resulting from such elements as caused by the Aṇus, on the one hand,
And the aggregates of the five groups (Skandhas) as caused by the coming together of these five groups (Skandhas) on the other, assumed by others (i.e. the opponents of the Vedānta),
तस्मिन्नुभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदायेऽभिप्रेयमाणे, तदप्राप्तिः स्यात् – समुदायाप्राप्तिः समुदायभावानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः।
We say that even supposing they [the Samudayas, aggregates] are assumed to be so, they would not materialize i.e. such aggregates would not result.
Whence is it so? Because the components of such aggregates are non-sentient.
चित्ताभिज्वलनस्य च समुदायसिद्ध्यधीनत्वात्,
Besides, the flashing of intelligence in the mind, again, is dependent upon such an aggregate materializing.
अन्यस्य च कस्यचिच्चेतनस्य भोक्तुः
प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुरनभ्युपगमात्,
Besides, in the absence of the assumption of any other sentient, experiencing Self,
Or steady ruler, who can bring about such an aggregate,
निरपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे च प्रवृत्त्यनुपरमप्रसङ्गात्,
Supposing such a tendency (for aggregation) is understood to be independent of anything, then there would be the predicament of such tendency never ceasing to be active.
Also the Āśaya (i.e. the constant stream of the cognitions of the ego, [stream of intensions]) cannot be such a cause, as it is incapable of being described as being either the same (as knowledge [‘the single consciousness forming the stream’ – From Panoli]) or otherwise.
Also because, if the Āśaya is supposed to be momentary, then as it cannot have any activity, the assumption of any such tendency in the Āśaya is not reasonably sustainable.
And if this coming about of the aggregate (assumed by the Buddhists) is not reasonably sustainable,
समुदायानुपपत्तौ च तदाश्रया लोकयात्रा लुप्येत॥१८॥
Then in the absence of such an aggregate this stream of mundane existence (Lokayātrā) which depends upon it, would necessarily dry up. — 18.
Itara-itara: mutual, one another; Pratyayatvāt: because of being the cause, one being the cause of the other; Iti: thus; Cet: if; (Iti cet: if it be said); Na: no; Utpatti-mātra-nimittatvāt: because they are merely the efficient cause of the origin.
🔗 (If it be said that aggregates may well result, because Nescience etc. are mutually the cause (Pratyayatva) of each other, (we say) — no, because they merely are the efficient cause of each other. — 188.8.131.52.2.19 L.1
यद्यपि भोक्ता प्रशासिता वा कश्चिच्चेतनः संहन्ता स्थिरो नाभ्युपगम्यते,
(The Buddhists say) — Even though a sentient, experiencing Self or a steady ruler is not understood to be the one who brings about an aggregate of the Paramāṇus and the Skandhas,
Still, as Nescience etc. [Saṃskāra, Vijñāna, etc.] are mutually the cause of each other, the fact of such a stream of mundane existence, is reasonably sustainable,
तस्यां चोपपद्यमानायां न किञ्चिदपरमपेक्षितव्यमस्ति;
And being so reasonably sustainable, nothing else is necessary.
ते चाविद्यादयः – अविद्या संस्कारः विज्ञानं नाम रूपं षडायतनं
स्पर्शः वेदना तृष्णा उपादानं
भवः जातिः जरा मरणं शोकः परिदेवना दुःखं दुर्मनस्ता –
इत्येवंजातीयका इतरेतरहेतुकाः सौगते समये
क्वचित्संक्षिप्ता निर्दिष्टाः, क्वचित्प्रपञ्चिताः;
These Nescience etc., viz. Nescience, impression, knowledge, name, form, the tabernacle of the six (i.e. five sense-organs and intelligence) i.e. the body,
Touch, feeling, desire, activity (of speech, body and mind),
Birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction
And things ejusdem generis with these, which, in the Buddhist doctrine, are understood to be the mutual cause of each other,
Are sometimes indicated briefly and at other times treated in detail.
Besides, this group of Nescience etc. is not denied by the followers of other systems.
तदेवमविद्यादिकलापे परस्परनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन घटीयन्त्रवदनिशमावर्तमानेऽर्थाक्षिप्ते
If it be said — This group of Nescience etc. therefore, recurring constantly like (the pots of) a water-wheel, and being mutually the cause and the effect of each other,
उपपन्नः सङ्घात इति चेत्,
And being actually in existence, the existence of an aggregate has necessarily to be understood by implication, to be reasonably sustainable —
तन्न। कस्मात्? उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात् –
We reply: it is not so. Why is it not so? Because these entities are mutually the cause of each other’s creation only.
यदि सङ्घातस्य किञ्चिन्निमित्तमवगम्येत;
If any cause as such for such an aggregate is actually known,
Then only, such an aggregate is reasonably sustainable.
But in fact it cannot be found out [Trans. from Panoli].
यत इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वेऽप्यविद्यादीनां पूर्वपूर्वम् उत्तरोत्तरस्योत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तं भवत् भवेत्,
न तु सङ्घातोत्पत्तेः किञ्चिन्निमित्तं सम्भवति।
Because, assuming Nescience etc. to be mutually the cause of the creation of each other, if each preceding one (in the series) would be the cause merely of the coming into existence of the one that comes after it, it may well be so,
But even so, no cause for the coming into existence of an aggregate is possible (merely because of that).
नन्वविद्यादिभिरर्थादाक्षिप्यते सङ्घात इत्युक्तम्;
But (says the Buddhist), it has been stated that an aggregate has to be presumed to exist by a necessary implication.
अत्रोच्यते – यदि तावदयमभिप्रायः –
To this we reply — If it is meant to say,
अविद्यादयः सङ्घातमन्तरेणात्मानमलभमाना अपेक्षन्ते सङ्घातमिति,
That as Nescience etc., cannot [by themselves] come into existence without an aggregate and hence the existence of an aggregate is to be understood by implication,
ततस्तस्य सङ्घातस्य किञ्चिन्निमित्तं वक्तव्यम्;
Then some cause for such aggregate has to be stated.
तच्च नित्येष्वप्यणुष्वभ्युगम्यमानेष्वाश्रयाश्रयिभूतेषु च भोक्तृषु सत्सु न सम्भवति
It has already been stated during the examination of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine,
That even if the Atoms (Aṇus, which are understood to be eternal) and the experiencing-Selfs (the abode of the unseen principle which is the abider) are in existence, no cause for an aggregate is possible.
किमङ्ग पुनः क्षणिकेष्वप्यणुषु भोक्तृरहितेष्वाश्रयाश्रयिशून्येषु वाभ्युपगम्यमानेषु सम्भवेत्।
How very much less possible, therefore, must it be, when (as the Buddhists hold) the Atoms (Aṇus) have only a momentary existence and when they are devoid of any such relation, in which one is the abode and the other the abider, and when there are no experiencing-Selfs?
Again, if it is meant that
अविद्यादय एव सङ्घातस्य निमित्तमिति,
Nescience etc. are themselves the cause of the aggregate,
कथं तमेवाश्रित्यात्मानं लभमानास्तस्यैव निमित्तं स्युः।
Then how ever can Nescience etc., which themselves depend upon an aggregate for coming into existence, be themselves the cause of such aggregates?
अथ मन्यसे – सङ्घाता एवानादौ संसारे सन्तत्यानुवर्तन्ते,
Now if you (the Buddhist) think that aggregates by themselves recur constantly in this beginningless transmigratory existence,
And Nescience etc. abide in them,
तदपि सङ्घातात्संघातान्तरमुत्पद्यमानं नियमेन वा सदृशमेवोत्पद्येत,
Even then, an aggregate which comes into being from another aggregate, will either as a rule be similar to it,
अनियमेन वा सदृशं विसदृशं वोत्पद्येत;
Or in the absence of any rule, be either similar or dissimilar to it.
मनुष्यपुद्गलस्य देवतिर्यग्योनिनारकप्राप्त्यभावः प्राप्नुयात्;
If it is understood that it will come into being as a rule,
It will imply the impossibility of a human body ever attaining the body, either of a God, or of an animal (Tiryag-yoni), or of that of a denizen of Hell (Nāraka),
मनुष्यपुद्गलः कदाचित्क्षणेन हस्ती भूत्वा देवो वा पुनर्मनुष्यो वा भवेदिति प्राप्नुयात्;
And if no such rule is assumed
Then it may amount to this, that it (i.e. the human body) may at one moment become an elephant or a God, and may again revert, and be a man.
Both these (consequences) would be contrary to their own doctrine (viz. that a body suffers death every moment).
अपि च यद्भोगार्थः सङ्घातः स्यात्, स जीवो नास्ति स्थिरो भोक्ता इति तवाभ्युपगमः;
Besides your (Buddhist’s) doctrine is, that any such steady experiencing-Self for whose experience this aggregate is to come into being, does not exist.
ततश्च भोगो भोगार्थ एव, स नान्येन प्रार्थनीयः;
Hence, such experience will be for its own sake alone (i.e. it would be useless) and no one else can wish for it.
तथा मोक्षो मोक्षार्थ एवेति मुमुक्षुणा नान्येन भवितव्यम्;
Similarly, Final Release also will be for its own sake alone, and no one else can be an aspirant for such Final Release.
अन्येन चेत्प्रार्थ्येतोभयम्, भोगमोक्षकालावस्थायिना तेन भवितव्यम्;
If it is assumed that some one, other than themselves, viz. a man, may wish for both these, then he will necessarily have to be in existence both during the time of experience and at the time of Final Release,
And if so, it will be contrary to your own assumption of the doctrine of ‘momentariness’ (Kṣaṇikatva).
तस्मादितरेतरोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वमविद्यादीनां यदि भवेत्, भवतु नाम;
Therefore, Nescience etc. may well be (if you so insist) mutually the cause of each other,
न तु सङ्घातः सिध्येत्, भोक्त्रभावात् – इत्यभिप्रायः॥१९॥
Still an aggregate cannot be proved to result, merely from that, because of the absence of an experiencing-Self. — 19.
←PrevNext→ उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्॥२.२.२०॥ Uttarotpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt.
Uttara-utpāde: at the time of the production of the subsequent thing; Ca: and; Pūrva-nirodhāt: because the antecedent one has ceased to exist, because of the destruction of the previous thing. (Uttara: in the next, in the subsequent; Utpāde: on the origination, on the production.)
🔗 (Nor can the earlier one in the series of Nescience etc. be the cause of the one next to it) because when the next (momentary) entity comes into existence, the preceding one ceases to exist. — 184.108.40.206.2.20 L.1
उक्तमेतत् – अविद्यादीनामुत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वान्
It has been said, that as entities such as Nescience etc. are merely the cause of the coming into existence (of the momentary entity (Kṣaṇa) which is the later one in the series),
The aggregate does not result.
तदपि तु उत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वं न सम्भवतीतीदमिदानीमुपपाद्यते।
Now, it will be propounded, how, even their being the cause (of the coming into existence of the momentary entity next in the series) also, is not possible.
Those who hold that everything is momentary (such as, the Buddhists), understand,
उत्तरस्मिन्क्षणे उत्पद्यमाने पूर्वः क्षणो निरुध्यत इति;
That when an entity, that comes into existence at a subsequent moment, does so, the entity that exists in the penultimate moment, ceases to exist.
न चैवमभ्युपगच्छता पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोर्हेतुफलभावः शक्यते सम्पादयितुम्,
And those who hold in this way would never be able to justify the relationship of cause and effect between the entity that exists during the earlier moment and the one that comes into existence at a later moment,
निरुध्यमानस्य निरुद्धस्य वा पूर्वक्षणस्याभावग्रस्तत्वादुत्तरक्षणहेतुत्वानुपपत्तेः;
Because, when the entity that exists in the earlier moment is ceasing to exist, or has ceased to exist, it is swallowed up into non-existence and that it can ever be the cause of the coming into existence of an entity that comes into existence at a later moment, is not reasonably sustainable.
अथ भावभूतः परिनिष्पन्नावस्थः पूर्वक्षण उत्तरक्षणस्य हेतुरित्यभिप्रायः,
Now, if it is meant that an entity that exists during the earlier moment and which actually has come into the condition of existence and has attained the condition of a definite ascertained entity, constitutes the cause of the entity that comes into existence at the later moment,
तथापि नोपपद्यते, भावभूतस्य पुनर्व्यापारकल्पनायां क्षणान्तरसम्बन्धप्रसङ्गात्;
Even then, it is not reasonably sustainable, because, if an entity that has actually come into existence (during the earlier moment) were to be supposed to engage itself into any operative activity, there would be the predicament of its continuing a relationship with the subsequent moment (in which the next entity comes into existence).
अथ भाव एवास्य व्यापार इत्यभिप्रायः,
If it again be said, that the very existence of that entity itself (which exists during the earlier moment) means its operative activity,
Even that view is not reasonably sustainable,
Because it is not possible that an effect (i.e. the entity which is supposed to come into existence at a subsequent moment) which is not coloured with the nature of its cause, can ever come into existence.
स्वभावोपरागाभ्युपगमे च, हेतुस्वभावस्य
And if it is understood that the nature of the cause persists in [colors] the effect,
Then as such nature of the cause would continue to exist during the time (i.e. the next moment) of the existence of the result,
There would be the predicament (for the Buddhist) of having to abandon his doctrine of the momentariness of entities (Kṣaṇikatva).
विनैव वा स्वभावोपरागेण हेतुफलभावमभ्युपगच्छतः
Again if the assumption is that there is a relationship of cause and effect, without the effect being coloured by the nature of its cause,
Then, as such a condition of things would be available at all times, it would thus lead to the predicament of an impossible position (Atiprasaṅga).
अपि चोत्पादनिरोधौ नाम वस्तुनः
स्वरूपमेव वा स्याताम्, अवस्थान्तरं वा, वस्त्वन्तरमेव वा –
Now the ‘coming into existence’ of an entity, and its ‘destruction’,
Can indeed either be the nature of such entity, or they may mean another condition of it, or they may be altogether different entities.
None of these alternatives are however reasonably sustainable.
यदि तावद्वस्तुनः स्वरूपमेवोत्पादनिरोधौ स्याताम्,
If the ‘coming into existence’ and the ‘destruction’ of an entity are themselves the nature of such entity,
ततो वस्तुशब्द उत्पादनिरोधशब्दौ च पर्यायाः प्राप्नुयुः;
Then the term ‘entity’ and the terms ‘coming into existence’ and the ‘destruction’ would be synonymous.
अथास्ति कश्चिद्विशेष इति मन्येत – उत्पादनिरोधशब्दाभ्यां मध्यवर्तिनो वस्तुन आद्यन्ताख्ये अवस्थे अभिलप्येते इति,
Now, if it is understood that an entity is a condition intermediate between the condition of the coming into existence and destruction of an entity, which are the initial and final conditions of the entity,
The doctrine of the momentariness of entities will have to be abandoned, because even if it be so the entity would necessarily be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate and the final moment.
अथात्यन्तव्यतिरिक्तावेवोत्पादनिरोधौ वस्तुनः स्याताम् –
And again if it is understood, that the ‘coming into existence’ of an entity, and its ‘destruction’ are entirely unconnected with the entity itself —
अश्वमहिषवत्, ततो वस्तु उत्पादनिरोधाभ्यामसंस्पृष्टमिति
As a horse and a buffalo for instance are entirely unconnected with each other — then as the entity would necessarily have no connection whatsoever with either its ‘coming into existence’ or ‘destruction’,
There would be the predicament of the entity being rendered eternal (which is against the Buddhist doctrine).
यदि च दर्शनादर्शने वस्तुन उत्पादनिरोधौ स्याताम्,
Now, if, the ‘coming into existence’ of an entity or its ‘destruction’, is understood to be its perception or non-perception respectively,
एवमपि द्रष्टृधर्मौ तौ न वस्तुधर्माविति वस्तुनः शाश्वतत्वप्रसङ्ग एव।
Even then, such perception or non-perception being the properties of the person (i.e. Jīva-Self) who so perceives or fails to perceive, they could not be the properties of the entity, and thus again the predicament of the entity being eternal would result, just the same.
तस्मादप्यसङ्गतं सौगतं मतम्॥२०॥
For these reasons also, the doctrine of ‘Sugata’ (i.e. Buddha) is incongruous. — 20.
A-sati: in the case of non-existence of cause, if it be admitted that an effect is produced without a cause; Pratijñā: proposition, admitted principle; Uparodhaḥ: contradiction, denial; Yauga-padyam: simultaneity, simultaneous existence; Anyathā: otherwise.
🔗 If it be supposed that in the absence (of a cause, an effect takes place), the original declaration would be opposed to it, or, otherwise (there would be) contemporaneity (of cause and effect). — 220.127.116.11.2.21 L.1
With respect to the doctrine of the momentariness of an entity (i.e. destruction of an entity existing at one moment, as another entity comes into existence at a later moment — Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-Vāda)
पूर्वक्षणो निरोधग्रस्तत्वान्नोत्तरस्य क्षणस्य हेतुर्भवतीत्युक्तम्;
It has been said that an entity existing at the earlier moment being swallowed up into destruction it cannot possibly be the cause of an entity which comes into existence at the subsequent moment.
अथासत्येव हेतौ फलोत्पत्तिं ब्रूयात्,
Now, if it is said, that a result may take place even in the absence of a cause,
ततः प्रतिज्ञोपरोधः स्यात् –
Then, the original declaration would be contradicted.
चतुर्विधान्हेतून्प्रतीत्य चित्तचैत्ता उत्पद्यन्त इतीयं प्रतिज्ञा हीयेत;
The declaration, that mind and mental phenomena come into existence after having acquired four kinds of causes (viz. Adhipatipratyaya, Saha-kāri Pratyaya, Samānāntara Pratyaya and Ālambana Pratyaya), will, in the event of such assumption, have been abandoned.
निर्हेतुकायां चोत्पत्तावप्रतिबन्धात्सर्वं सर्वत्रोत्पद्येत।
If it be said, that results take place without any cause, then in the absence of any impediment i.e. an obstructing reason (such as that every effect must have a cause) anything might come into existence in any place.
अथोत्तरक्षणोत्पत्तिर्यावत्तावदवतिष्ठते पूर्वक्षण इति ब्रूयात्,
If it be said, that an entity existing at an earlier moment (i.e. the cause), continues to exist till an entity which exists in the subsequent moment (the effect), comes into existence,
ततो यौगपद्यं हेतुफलयोः स्यात्;
Then it would mean that cause and effect are contemporaneous.
तथापि प्रतिज्ञोपरोध एव स्यात् –
That way also, the original declaration would be contradicted just the same.
क्षणिकाः सर्वे संस्कारा इतीयं प्रतिज्ञोपरुध्येत॥२१॥
Besides, the original declaration that all entities (Saṃskāras) have a momentary existence would be contradicted. — 21.
Pratisaṅkhyā(-nirodha): conscious destruction, destruction due to some cause or agency; causal destruction, destruction depending upon the volition of conscious entity; A-pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha: unconscious destruction, destruction not depending upon any voluntary agency; A-prāptiḥ: non-attainment, impossibility; A-vicchedāt: because of non-interruption, because it goes on without interruption.
🔗 No deliberate annihilation or natural annihilation can be arrived at, because of, the absence of interruption (i.e. destruction). — 18.104.22.168.2.22 L.1
अपि च वैनाशिकाः कल्पयन्ति – बुद्धिबोध्यं त्रयादन्यत्संस्कृतं क्षणिकं चेति;
Moreover the Vaināśikas (i.e. Buddhists who belong to the Nihilist school) hold, that all that is cognized by intelligence and is different from the triad,
तदपि च त्रयम् – प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधौ आकाशं चेत्याचक्षते;
Is something which is artificial (i.e. Saṃskṛta) and momentary, and they mention this triad of entities to consist of the ‘Deliberate Annihilation’ (‘Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha’) and the ‘Natural Annihilation’ (Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha), and the Ākāśa (i.e. space).
त्रयमपि चैतत् अवस्तु अभावमात्रं निरुपाख्यमिति मन्यन्ते;
They consider each of these three to be a mere non-entity, mere non-existence and formless,
बुद्धिपूर्वकः किल विनाशो भावानां प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधो नाम भाष्यते;
And describe Deliberate Annihilation to be the intentional destruction of an entity,
And Natural Annihilation to be the opposite of that,
And the Ākāśa (space) to be merely the absence of any covering entity.
The Sūtra-kāra will speak about the Ākāśa later on,
निरोधद्वयमिदानीं प्रत्याचष्टे –
And will for the present refute the two kinds of annihilations.
प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधयोः अप्राप्तिरसम्भव इत्यर्थः।
Neither Deliberate Annihilation nor Natural Annihilation can be arrived at i.e. they are not possible.
कस्मात्? अविच्छेदात् –
Whence is it so? Because of, absence of interruption (i.e. destruction).
एतौ हि प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधौ सन्तानगोचरौ वा स्याताम्, भावगोचरौ वा;
For these Deliberate or Natural Annihilations ought to be either perceivable with reference to the stream (of momentary entities) or with reference to the entities themselves.
न तावत्सन्तानगोचरौ सम्भवतः,
Now, they cannot possibly be perceivable with reference to the stream (of momentary entities),
सर्वेष्वपि सन्तानेषु सन्तानिनामविच्छिन्नेन हेतुफलभावेन सन्तानविच्छेदस्यासम्भवात्;
Because there is no possibility of the interruption of the stream (of momentary entities), as the constituent members of the stream happen to be in an uninterrupted relation of cause and effect,
नापि भावगोचरौ सम्भवतः –
Nor can these annihilations possibly be perceivable with reference to the entities,
न हि भावानां निरन्वयो निरुपाख्यो विनाशः सम्भवति,
Because an annihilation in which the annihilated entity leaves no unrecognizable form, is not possible,
Inasmuch as during all the conditions (during which they are undergoing annihilation) they are still recognizable as being such entities, and have a connected existence (i.e. there is absence of interruption i.e. destruction).
In those conditions also, in which they are not so recognizable,
An inference as to their existence i.e. non-interruption or absence of destruction etc. can still be drawn from the instances in which such non-interruption i.e. absence of destruction of the entities, and their relationship to each other, is clearly recognizable.
Therefore annihilations of these two kinds, imagined by our opponents (the Vaināśikas) are not reasonably sustainable. — 22.
←PrevNext→ उभयथा च दोषात्॥२.२.२३॥ Ubhayathā ca doṣāt.
Ubhayathā: in either case; Ca: and, also; Doṣāt: because of objections.
🔗 Because faults do arise in both the cases. — 22.214.171.124.2.23 L.1
योऽयमविद्यादिनिरोधः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधान्तःपाती परपरिकल्पितः,
How does this annihilation of Nescience etc., which is included in this Deliberate and Natural Annihilations, as is imagined (by the Vaināśikas), result?
स सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्वा सपरिकरात्स्यात्;
Is it through correct knowledge with its auxiliaries (viz. Self-restraint, rules etc.), or is it spontaneous?
स्वयमेव वा – पूर्वस्मिन्विकल्पे निर्हेतुकविनाशाभ्युपगमहानिप्रसङ्गः;
So far as the first alternative is considered, there would result the predicament of the abandonment (by the Vaināśikas) of the doctrine that such annihilation occurs without any cause,
And so far as the second alternative is concerned, there would result the predicament of the teachings (of Sugata) as to the right path, being rendered useless.
एवमुभयथापि दोषप्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसमिदं दर्शनम्॥२३॥
In this matter, inasmuch as, considered either way, the predicament of a fault resulting cannot be avoided, the doctrine of Sugata is incongruous. — 23.
Ākāśe: in the case of Ākāśa or space; Ca: also, and; Aviśeṣāt: because of no specific difference.
🔗 With regard to Ākāśa (Space) also, (the doctrine of the Vaināśikas that it is formless is not reasonably sustainable), because of (the Ākāśa) not having any special peculiarity. — 126.96.36.199.2.24 L.1
यच्च तेषामेवाभिप्रेतं निरोधद्वयमाकाशं च निरुपाख्यमिति –
With regard to what they (i.e. the Vaināśikas) themselves hold, viz. the doctrine about the two varieties of annihilation and Ākāśa being formless or non-existent,
तत्र निरोधद्वयस्य निरुपाख्यत्वं पुरस्तान्निराकृतम्;
That (part of it) which holds the two varieties of annihilations to be formless or non-existent, has been refuted earlier,
And now (the other part), that the Ākāśa also is formless or non-existent, is being refuted.
आकाशे चायुक्तो निरुपाख्यत्वाभ्युपगमः,
It is unreasonable to apply the doctrine of formlessness to Ākāśa,
Because, in common with the two varieties of annihilations, it is reasonably sustainable to hold the ‘Ākāśa’ to be an existing entity.
आगमप्रामाण्यात्तावत् ‘आत्मन आकाशः सम्भूतः’ (TaitU.2.1.1) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्य आकाशस्य च वस्तुत्वप्रसिद्धिः।
On the authority of the Scriptures, viz. the passage “The Ākāśa came into existence from the Self” (TaitUEng.2.1), Ākāśa is well-known to be a definite existing entity.
विप्रतिपन्नान्प्रति तु शब्दगुणानुमेयत्वं वक्तव्यम् –
Those however who are dissenters (from this authority of the Scriptures), should be answered by the fact, that the Ākāśa is inferred to be an existing entity from its having the quality of sound,
गन्धादीनां गुणानां पृथिव्यादिवस्त्वाश्रयत्वदर्शनात्।
Inasmuch as, qualities such as smell etc. are observed to abide in entities such as the earth etc.
अपि च आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशमिच्छताम्,
In the case of those who hold that Ākāśa is merely the ‘absence of any covering entity’,
एकस्मिन्सुपर्णे पतत्यावरणस्य विद्यमानत्वात्सुपर्णान्तरस्योत्पित्सतोऽनवकाशत्वप्रसङ्गः;
When one bird is already flying (in the sky) and when such a covering entity, to wit, a flying bird, is actually present (in the sky, and when, because of such covering entity there could thus be no Ākāśa), the predicament of another bird wanting to fly but not having any space (Ākāśa) available for flying, would take place.
यत्रावरणाभावस्तत्र पतिष्यतीति चेत् – येनावरणाभावो विशेष्यते,
If the Vaināśika says that the other bird may by all means fly in that part i.e. where there is no such covering entity (as the first bird),
तत्तर्हि वस्तुभूतमेवाकाशं स्यात्, न आवरणाभावमात्रम्;
Then that ‘particular part’ by which such ‘absence of covering entity’ is particularized, would itself be a definite Ākāśa entity, and it would not merely mean the ‘absence of any covering entity’.
अपि च आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशं मन्यमानस्य सौगतस्य स्वाभ्युपगमविरोधः प्रसज्येत;
Besides he (a follower of Sugata) who holds the Ākāśa to be merely the absence of any covering entity would range himself in opposition to Sugata’s own doctrine.
सौगते हि समये ‘पृथिवी भगवः किंसन्निश्रया’ इत्यस्मिन्प्रश्नप्रतिवचनप्रवाहे पृथिव्यादीनामन्ते
Because in the Saugata doctrine, in the stream of replies to questions such as “Oh Bhagavān, in what does the earth abide?” after the Earth etc. are dealt with,
‘वायुः किंसन्निश्रयः’ इत्यस्य प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं भवति – ‘वायुराकाशसन्निश्रयः’ इति;
The reply to the question “In what does Vāyu abide?” is “Vāyu has Ākāśa as its abode”.
तदाकाशस्यावस्तुत्वे न समञ्जसं स्यात्;
Now this would not be plausible, if Ākāśa were not to be an entity.
Hence also, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold the Ākāśa to be a non-entity.
अपि च निरोधद्वयमाकाशं च त्रयमप्येतन्निरुपाख्यमवस्तु नित्यं चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम्;
Besides, it would be contradictory to hold at one and the same time, that this triad, consisting of these two varieties of annihilations and the Ākāśa, are formless or non-existent and non-entities, and again to hold that they are eternal entities.
न ह्यवस्तुनो नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं वा सम्भवति,
Because, in the case of a non-entity, it is not possible to say either that it is eternal or it is non-eternal,
Because, a relationship as between a quality and an entity possessing such a quality, depends upon the existence of such an entity.
धर्मधर्मिभावे हि घटादिवद्वस्तुत्वमेव स्यात्, न निरुपाख्यत्वम्॥२४॥
And when a relationship as between a quality and an entity possessing such quality exists, then alone — like a pot — there is bound to be the existence of such an entity and there would be no formlessness. — 24.
🔗 Because of (the fact of) remembrance i.e. memory also, (the Self is not momentary). — 188.8.131.52.2.25 L.1
अपि च वैनाशिकः सर्वस्य वस्तुनः क्षणिकतामभ्युपयन्
Besides, the Vaināśika who understands that all entities have but a momentary existence,
Must necessarily hold that the Self, the percipient, also, has only a momentary existence.
न च सा सम्भवति;
But that is not possible.
अनुस्मृतेः – अनुभवम् उपलब्धिमनूत्पद्यमानं स्मरणमेव अनुस्मृतिः;
Because of (the fact of) memory i.e. remembrance, which is something which arises following in the wake of perception or experience.
सा चोपलब्ध्येककर्तृका सती सम्भवति,
Such perception (followed by memory or remembrance) is possible only if the perception is by one and the same person.
पुरुषान्तरोपलब्धिविषये पुरुषान्तरस्य स्मृत्यदर्शनात्;
It is never observed that when the perception is experienced by one, it is remembered by another person.
कथं हि ‘अहमदोऽद्राक्षम् – इदं पश्यामि’ इति च पूर्वोत्तरदर्शिन्येकस्मिन्नसति प्रत्ययः स्यात्।
Unless the person who perceives first and the person who perceives afterwards, are one and the same, how possibly can perception such as ‘I who saw that (yesterday), am seeing this (today)’ be possible?
अपि च दर्शनस्मरणयोः कर्तर्येकस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्ययः सर्वस्य लोकस्य प्रसिद्धः –
Besides, it is well-known in the ordinary world, that it is only when the person who sees and the person who remembers are one and the same, that there can be such direct cognition,
‘अहमदोऽद्राक्षम् – इदं पश्यामि’ इति;
Thus — I saw that (yesterday), and I see this (today).
यदि हि तयोर्भिन्नः कर्ता स्यात्,
If the one who perceives and the one who remembers are different,
ततः ‘अहं स्मरामि – अद्राक्षीदन्यः’ इति प्रतीयात्;
Then the perception would be thus — It is I that remember, (but) it was another who perceived.
न त्वेवं प्रत्येति कश्चित्;
But no one ever experiences that way.
यत्रैवं प्रत्ययस्तत्र दर्शनस्मरणयोर्भिन्नमेव कर्तारं सर्वलोकोऽवगच्छति –
When the cognition is in that manner, all persons in this world understand that the person who perceives and the person who remembers are different entities,
‘स्मराम्यहम् – असावदोऽद्राक्षीत्’ इति;
Thus — I remember that he saw.
इह तु ‘अहमदोऽद्राक्षम्’ इति दर्शनस्मरणयोर्वैनाशिकोऽप्यात्मानमेवैकं कर्तारमवगच्छति;
In the present case, however, even the Vaināśika himself knows that it is he himself alone that both perceives and remembers, when he says — ‘I saw this’.
न ‘नाहम्’ इत्यात्मनो दर्शनं निर्वृत्तं निह्नुते –
यथा अग्निरनुष्णोऽप्रकाश इति वा।
And just as he would not care to say, that fire is not hot and that it does not give out light,
Even so, he does not care to deny what he himself has perceived, and does not say that he has not perceived.
तत्रैवं सत्येकस्य दर्शनस्मरणलक्षणक्षणद्वयसम्बन्धे
This being so, when one and the same person is connected with the two moments, the one of perceiving, and another of remembering respectively,
क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरपरिहार्या वैनाशिकस्य स्यात्।
A Vaināśika is not in a position to avoid the abandonment of his own doctrine of the momentariness of entities.
तथा अनन्तरामनन्तरामात्मन एव प्रतिपत्तिं प्रत्यभिजानन्नेककर्तृकाम्
आ उत्तमादुच्छ्वासात्, अतीताश्च प्रतिपत्तीः आ जन्मनः
कथं क्षणभङ्गवादी वैनाशिको
How can then, a Vaināśika, who professes to hold the doctrine of the momentariness of entities,
But knows the successive perceptions to be by himself only,
I.e. who from his first breath since his birth upto now and from now on upto his last breath, definitely knows all past and future perceptions
To have been accomplished by himself alone,
Not feel ashamed?
स यदि ब्रूयात् सादृश्यादेतत्सम्पत्स्यत इति,
Now, if he were to say, that this may well happen as a result of similarity (of successive perceptions),
तं प्रतिब्रूयात् – तेनेदं सदृशमिति द्वयायत्तत्वात्सादृश्यस्य,
We can retort, that inasmuch as similarity, as for instance that “this is similar to that”, necessarily depends upon two entities,
And, as in the case of a person who holds all entities to be momentary, there is absence of any one perceiver as such, of two entities similar to each other,
सादृश्यनिमित्तं प्रतिसन्धानमिति मिथ्याप्रलाप एव स्यात्;
It would be but mere incoherent jargon only, were he to say, that such cognitions are caused by similarity,
स्याच्चेत्पूर्वोत्तरयोः क्षणयोः सादृश्यस्य ग्रहीतैकः,
Because, were he to hold one and the same person to be the perceiver of the similarity between entities that exist in an earlier and in a later moment respectively,
तथा सत्येकस्य क्षणद्वयावस्थानात्
Then such a person must, in that case, necessarily exist during these two moments,
And thus, the initial declaration about the momentariness of all entities would be contradicted.
‘तेनेदं सदृशम्’ इति प्रत्ययान्तरमेवेदम्,
If it is said, that the cognition ‘This is similar to that’ is an altogether different cognition (unrelated to the things)
न पूर्वोत्तरक्षणद्वयग्रहणनिमित्तमिति चेत्,
And is not a recognition caused by perceptions relating to earlier and later moments,
न; तेन इदम् इति भिन्नपदार्थोपादानात्;
(We reply) — No, because (to say that) this is similar to that, necessarily presupposes the acceptance of two different entities.
प्रत्ययान्तरमेव चेत्सादृश्यविषयं स्यात्,
Were perception with reference to similarity to be an altogether different cognition,
‘तेनेदं सदृशम्’ इति वाक्यप्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात्,
A sentence such as ‘This is similar to that’ would be meaningless.
सादृश्यम् इत्येव प्रयोगः प्राप्नुयात्।
(In such a case) ‘Similarity exists’ would be the sentence used.
यदा हि लोकप्रसिद्धः पदार्थः परीक्षकैर्न परिगृह्यते,
Whenever, anything which is quite well-known in the ordinary world, is not accepted by experts,
तदा स्वपक्षसिद्धिः परपक्षदोषो वा उभयमप्युच्यमानं
Then, an attempt by one expert, both for the establishment of his own doctrine and the refutation of (i.e. the attributing of a fault in) his opponent’s views,
परीक्षकाणामात्मनश्च यथार्थत्वेन न बुद्धिसन्तानमारोहति।
Fails to be properly grasped either by the other expert or by him who makes such an attempt.
एवमेवैषोऽर्थः इति निश्चितं यत्, तदेव वक्तव्यम्;
What is definitely ascertained, as ‘This is so and so’ — that alone should be spoken about.
ततोऽन्यदुच्यमानं बहुप्रलापित्वमात्मनः केवलं प्रख्यापयेत्।
If anything other than that is spoken, it would only serve to establish one’s garrulity only.
न चायं सादृश्यात्संव्यवहारो युक्तः;
It is not reasonable to attribute transactions (such as — I saw that yesterday; I see this today) to similarity,
Because the cognition is of the existence of an entity, and not that of a mere similarity.
भवेदपि कदाचिद्बाह्यवस्तुनि विप्रलम्भसम्भवात् ‘तदेवेदं स्यात्, तत्सदृशं वा’ इति सन्देहः;
There may well be a doubt perhaps with regard to an external (Bāhya) entity resulting from optical illusion, as to whether an external entity is the same entity (as is perceived) or whether it is similar to it, because such doubt is possible,
उपलब्धरि तु सन्देहोऽपि न कदाचिद्भवति – ‘स एवाहं स्यां तत्सदृशो वा’ इति,
But no such doubt can possibly arise in a cognizer about himself, viz. as to whether the cognizer is in fact he himself or somebody similar to him,
‘य एवाहं पूर्वेद्युरद्राक्षं स एवाहमद्य स्मरामि’ इति निश्चिततद्भावोपलम्भात्।
Because, the realization of the cognizer’s existence is definite, thus — I who saw yesterday, am the same myself that remembers today.
Therefore, also, the doctrine of the Vaināśika is not reasonably sustainable. — 25.
Na: not; A-sataḥ: from non-existence, of the unreal, of a non-entity; A-dṛṣṭatvāt: because it is not seen.
🔗 Existence (i.e. an entity) does not (result) from non-existence (i.e. non-entity), because it is not so observed. — 184.108.40.206.2.26 L.1
This is again how the doctrine of the Vaināśikas is not reasonably sustainable,
Because, (the fact of) their not recognizing a cause which is stable and which continues to persist (in the effect)
Would lead them towards an undesirable conclusion, viz. that effects result from nonexistence (of any cause).
दर्शयन्ति चाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिम् – ‘नानुपमृद्य प्रादुर्भावात्’ इति;
They do, however, indicate, by the sentence ‘Without the destruction (of the cause) no result takes place’, that entities result from non-existence.
विनष्टाद्धि किल बीजादङ्कुर उत्पद्यते,
For instance, it is only from a seed which has undergone destruction that a sprout results,
And from milk which has undergone destruction that curds results,
And from earth (which has undergone destruction) that an earthen pot results.
(They say) if effects were to result from one unchangeable cause (such as Brahman)
अविशेषात्सर्वं सर्वत उत्पद्येत;
Then such unchangeable cause being everywhere common, everything would come into existence, on every side simultaneously.
तस्मादभावग्रस्तेभ्यो बीजादिभ्योऽङ्कुरादीनामुत्पद्यमानत्वादभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिः – इति मन्यन्ते।
Therefore they consider, that as sprouts result from seeds which have been swallowed up into non-existence, entities result from non-existence.
तत्रेदमुच्यते – ‘नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्’ इति।
To this, the reply is, by the Sūtra “Existence (i.e. an entity) does not (result) from non-existence because it is not so observed” —
I.e. an entity does not result from nonexistence.
Were an entity to result from non-existence,
Such non-existence being common everywhere, any assumption of a special cause (for an effect) would be meaningless.
न हि, बीजादीनामुपमृदितानां योऽभावस्तस्याभावस्य शशविषाणादीनां च,
Non-existence as caused by the destruction of seeds, and the non-existence of the horns of a hare,
Being typically the same, because the nature of non-existence is common, there could not be any such special distinction in such nonexistence,
येन, बीजादेवाङ्कुरो जायते क्षीरादेव दधि –
As a result of which, a sprout should result only from a seed, and curds should result only from milk,
By reason of which the assumption of any such type of special cause could have any meaning.
निर्विशेषस्य त्वभावस्य कारणत्वाभ्युपगमे
And if non-existence, without having any special type, were to be assumed to be the cause (of effects, as the Vaināśika holds),
शशविषाणादिभ्योऽप्यङ्कुरादयो जायेरन्; न चैवं दृश्यते;
Then sprouts etc. may just as well result from the horns of a hare (which are totally non-existent) etc., but it is never observed to be so.
यदि पुनरभावस्यापि विशेषोऽभ्युपगम्येत –
If, however, one were to assume (the existence of) a special attribute of non-existence —
Like, for instance, the blueness of a lotus —
As a special quality, then precisely because of the assumption of the existence of a special quality pertaining to non-existence,
Such non-existence would itself become an existing entity, quite as much as a lotus (which has blueness as its quality) is an existing entity.
नाप्यभावः कस्यचिदुत्पत्तिहेतुः स्यात्,
Nor can non-existence possibly ever be the cause of any creation,
Precisely because of its being such ‘nonexistence’, like, for instance, the total non-existence (Tucchatva) of the horns of a hare.
अभावाच्च भावोत्पत्तावभावान्वितमेव सर्वं कार्यं स्यात्;
Were entities to result from non-existence, all the resulting entities also would necessarily be characterized by non-existence.
न चैवं दृश्यते, सर्वस्य च वस्तुनः स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण भावात्मनैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्;
But it is not observed to be so, because all entities are perceived to possess their own individual specific qualities as existing entities.
न च मृदन्विताः शरावादयो भावास्तन्त्वादिविकाराः केनचिदभ्युपगम्यन्ते;
Nobody ever understands that water-troughs which are earthen, are entities which are the modifications of threads etc.,
मृद्विकारानेव तु मृदन्वितान्भावान् लोकः प्रत्येति।
While everybody cognizes the modifications of earth to be earthen.
यत्तूक्तम् – स्वरूपोपमर्दमन्तरेण कस्यचित्कूटस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः
With respect to the argument advanced (by the Vaināśika), viz. that because it is not reasonably sustainable to understand an unchangeable entity to be the cause (of any effect) unless its own nature is destroyed,
Non-existence has to be understood to be the cause (of effects), (it must be said that) it is a wrong statement,
स्थिरस्वभावानामेव सुवर्णादीनां प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां रुचकादिकारणभावदर्शनात्;
Because it is observed that gold etc. whose nature (as gold etc.) is constant and is recognized to be so, are the cause of results such as ornaments etc.
येष्वपि बीजादिषु स्वरूपोपमर्दो लक्ष्यते,
Even in the case of seeds etc. whose nature is seen to be destroyed,
तेष्वपि नासावुपमृद्यमाना पूर्वावस्था उत्तरावस्थायाः कारणमभ्युपगम्यते,
It is not the antecedent destruction (of the seeds) that is understood to be the cause of their subsequent condition (as sprouts),
Because, it is understood that it is the particles (cells) of the seeds which constitute the seeds themselves, and which persist in the effect, and which do not get destroyed, that are the cause of the sprouts.
तस्मादसद्भ्यः शशविषाणादिभ्यः सदुत्पत्त्यदर्शनात्,
Therefore as actual existence of an entity is never seen to result from the totally nonexisting horns of a hare
सद्भ्यश्च सुवर्णादिभ्यः सदुत्पत्तिदर्शनात्,
And as on the other hand the actual coming into existence (of ornaments) is observed to result from gold etc.,
The doctrine that entities result from nonexistence is not reasonably sustainable.
अपि च चतुर्भिश्चित्तचैत्ता उत्पद्यन्ते परमाणुभ्यश्च भूतभौतिकलक्षणः समुदाय उत्पद्यते – इत्यभ्युपगम्य,
Besides, holding, to begin with (as a Vaināśika does), that mind and mental entities result from four kinds (of causes) and that, the elements, and things resulting from the elements, result from the Paramāṇus, the Vaināśika,
By again imagining that entities result from non-existence, and by thus going back on his own previous assumption,
सर्वो लोक आकुलीक्रियते॥२६॥
Only succeeds in merely perplexing the people in general. — 26.
←PrevNext→ उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः॥२.२.२७॥ Udāsīnānām api caivaṃ siddhiḥ.
Udāsīnām: of the indifferent and non-active; Api: even, also; Ca: and; Evam: thus; Siddiḥ: success accomplishment, and attainment of the goal.
🔗 Even men who are idle or indifferent i.e. apathetic would thus accomplish (what they desire). — 220.127.116.11.2.27 L.1
If it be understood that entities result from nonexistence,
एवं सत्युदासीनानामनीहमानानामपि जनानामभिमतसिद्धिः स्यात्,
Then idle men who do not care to exert would attain the fulfilment of their desire,
Because non-existence is easily available.
कृषीवलस्य क्षेत्रकर्मण्यप्रयतमानस्यापि सस्यनिष्पत्तिः स्यात्;
An agriculturist would succeed in growing corn, even without engaging himself in agricultural pursuits,
कुलालस्य च मृत्संस्क्रियायामप्रयतमानस्यापि अमत्रोत्पत्तिः;
A potter would be able to produce earthen pots, even without the exertion of preparing the necessary clay,
तन्तुवायस्यापि तन्तूनतन्वानस्यापि तन्वानस्येव वस्त्रलाभः;
A weaver would be able to obtain cloth, even without engaging himself in the weaving of yarn, quite as easily as a man who weaves.
स्वर्गापवर्गयोश्च न कश्चित्कथञ्चित्समीहेत।
No one would have to exert for the attainment of Heaven or Final Release.
न चैतद्युज्यते अभ्युपगम्यते वा केनचित्।
But this is neither proper nor does any one understand it to be so.
Therefore also, the doctrine, that entities result from non-existence, is not reasonably sustainable. — 27.
Na: not; Abhāvaḥ: non-existence; Upalabdheḥ: because they are perceived, because of perception, because we are conscious of them on account of their being experienced.
🔗 There could be no non-existence (of external entities) because (they) are actually perceived. — 18.104.22.168.2.28 L.1
एवं बाह्यार्थवादमाश्रित्य समुदायाप्राप्त्यादिषु दूषणेषूद्भावितेषु
When, during what has gone before, faults with respect to the doctrine denying (the existence of) external entities, such as the unavailability of aggregates, have been set forth,
विज्ञानवादी बौद्ध इदानीं प्रत्यवतिष्ठते –
The follower of Buddha who believes in the doctrine of Vijñāna i.e. mere internal cognitions or thought-forms (without there being any external i.e. objective entities corresponding to them) comes forward in opposition (to the Vedāntin).
केषाञ्चित्किल विनेयानां बाह्ये वस्तुन्यभिनिवेशमालक्ष्य तदनुरोधेन बाह्यार्थवादप्रक्रियेयं विरचिता।
The theory of the doctrine of the reality of external entities was propounded (by Buddha), because he noticed the predilection of some of his pupils for believing in the objectivity i.e. reality of external entities (and so as to be in conformity with that view),
But that never was his own view.
तस्य तु विज्ञानैकस्कन्धवाद एवाभिप्रेतः।
To him, the doctrine of mere subjective cognition alone as the sole phase, was acceptable.
According to that doctrine ‘of the reality of mere subjective cognitions’ —
बुद्ध्यारूढेन रूपेणान्तस्थ एव प्रमाणप्रमेयफलव्यवहारः सर्व उपपद्यते,
That all processes, whether they be with regard to the means of knowledge, or the object to be known, or with regard to the result of knowledge in the form of the awareness of the external object by the mind or intellect (Buddhi), are only internal, is what is reasonably sustainable,
सत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे बुद्ध्यारोहमन्तरेण प्रमाणादिव्यवहारानवतारात्।
Because even if external entities did actually exist, means-of-proof etc. do not come into operation, unless the mind or intellect is applied to or becomes aware of such external entities.
कथं पुनरवगम्यते –
(It may be asked by the Vedāntin) — How is it known
अन्तस्थ एवायं सर्वव्यवहारः,
That all these processes are only internal
न विज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तो बाह्योऽर्थोऽस्तीति?
And that apart from mere subjective cognition, no external objective entity as such exists?
(The follower of Buddha replies) Because it (i.e. the existence of external objective entities) is not possible.
स हि बाह्योऽर्थोऽभ्युपगम्यमानः परमाणवो वा स्युः,
The external objective entity as it is understood to be, can either be atoms (Paramāṇus),
तत्समूहा वा स्तम्भादयः स्युः;
Or aggregates of atoms (Paramāṇus) such as (for instance) pillars etc.
तत्र न तावत्परमाणवः स्तम्भादिप्रत्ययपरिच्छेद्या भवितुमर्हन्ति,
The Paramāṇus, however, cannot be fixed accurately or spotted to be the objects of the cognition of a pillar etc.
Because it is not reasonably sustainable that they can be perceived as Paramāṇus,
नापि तत्समूहाः स्तम्भादयः,
Nor are pillars etc. cognized as being the aggregates of Paramāṇus,
तेषां परमाणुभ्योऽन्यत्वानन्यत्वाभ्यां निरूपयितुमशक्यत्वात्।
Because of the impossibility of the aggregates being explained as being either different from, or not different from, the Paramāṇus.
एवं जात्यादीनपि प्रत्याचक्षीत।
‘Universals’ (Jātis) etc., also should be refuted in a similar manner.
अपि च अनुभवमात्रेण साधारणात्मनो ज्ञानस्य जायमानस्य योऽयं प्रतिविषयं पक्षपातः –
Besides, cognitions as they arise have realization (of the object) as their common factor, and this particular selective appropriation with regard to each and every different object of cognition,
स्तम्भज्ञानं कुड्यज्ञानं घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति,
Such as the cognition of a pillar, or of a wall, or a pot, or a piece of cloth,
नासौ ज्ञानगतविशेषमन्तरेणोपपद्यत इत्यवश्यं विषयसारूप्यं ज्ञानस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यम्;
Cannot be reasonably sustainable unless there is a special peculiarity (of form) of each of such cognitions, and hence cognitions have necessarily to be assumed to have the same form as the objects of such cognitions.
अङ्गीकृते च तस्मिन्विषयाकारस्य ज्ञानेनैवावरुद्धत्वाद्
And, when this is accepted, then, in as much as cognitions are thus coextensive in extent with the form of the objects of such cognitions (which are confined to such cognitions),
The notion about the separate existence of a (corresponding) objective external entity is superfluous.
अपि च सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो विषयविज्ञानयोरापतति;
Further as an external object and its cognition are perceived simultaneously, it means that there is no difference between an object and its cognition i.e. they both are one and the same.
When one of the two is not cognized, necessarily the other also is not cognized,
न चैतत्स्वभावविवेके युक्तम्,
But supposing they (i.e. objects and their cognition) are by nature different, that would not be reasonably sustainable,
Because of the absence of any reason for the obstruction of the cognition of one of them, when the other of them is not cognized.
Therefore also, there is non-existence of entities.
स्वप्नादिवच्चेदं द्रष्टव्यम् –
This should be looked upon as in the case of dreams etc.
यथा हि स्वप्नमायामरीच्युदकगन्धर्वनगरादिप्रत्ययाः
विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन ग्राह्यग्राहकाकारा भवन्ति;
Just as in cognitions, in a dream, or in an illusion, or in a mirage, or in a Gandharva Nagara (a phantom city in the sky), there are perceptions
In the forms of the objects of cognition, and cognition itself, without the existence of any corresponding external entities,
एवं जागरितगोचरा अपि स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्तीत्यवगम्यते,
Similarly during wakefulness also, the perceptions of such objects as pillars etc., deserve to be similar (viz. that there could be no external entities existing in fact),
Because perceptions in both these cases have no difference (between them).
कथं पुनरसति बाह्यार्थे प्रत्ययवैचित्र्यमुपपद्यते?
How (it may be asked by a Vedāntin), in the absence of any external entities as such, is this variety of perceptions of external entities reasonably sustainable?
(The follower of Buddha replies) — It is so because of the variety of impressions on the mind (Vāsanās).
अनादौ हि संसारे
बीजाङ्कुरवद्विज्ञानानां वासनानां चान्योन्यनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेन
In this beginningless transmigratory existence,
As cognitions and impressions on the mind succeed each other alternately as cause and effect, quite in the same manner as seeds and sprouts succeed each other alternately, and mutually constitute the causes and effects of each other,
वैचित्र्यं न विप्रतिषिध्यते;
Such variety in them is not contradictory.
अपि च अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वासनानिमित्तमेव ज्ञानवैचित्र्यमित्यवगम्यते,
Besides it is understood from positive and negative instances (Anvaya and Vyatireka) that variety in cognitions is caused by impressions only,
स्वप्नादिष्वन्तरेणाप्यर्थं वासनानिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्य
Inasmuch as in the matter of dreams, it is understood by both of us (i.e. Buddhist and Vedāntin)
That there is a variety of cognitions caused by impressions on the mind, even in the absence of the existence of external entities,
अन्तरेण तु वासनामर्थनिमित्तस्य ज्ञानवैचित्र्यस्य मया अनभ्युपगम्यमानत्वात्;
While I (the Buddhist) do not understand that in the absence of mental impressions, there is a variety in cognition caused by actually existing external entities.
Therefore, also (according to the follower of Buddha) external entities have no existence.
एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः – नाभाव उपलब्धेरिति।
To this we (Vedāntins) reply — There could be no nonexistence (of external entities) because external entities are actually perceived.
न खल्वभावो बाह्यस्यार्थस्याध्यवसातुं शक्यते।
It is not possible to understand that there could be non-existence of external entities.
कस्मात्? उपलब्धेः –
Why so? Because (they are) actually perceived.
उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं बाह्योऽर्थः – स्तम्भः कुड्यं घटः पट इति;
An external entity is invariably perceived in every cognition such as a pillar, a wall, a pot or a piece of cloth.
न चोपलभ्यमानस्यैवाभावो भवितुमर्हति;
It can never be that what is actually perceived is non-existent.
यथा हि कश्चिद्भुञ्जानो भुजिसाध्यायां तृप्तौ स्वयमनुभूयमानायामेवं ब्रूयात् –
For instance, if a man who is actually eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction derived by such eating, were to say —
‘नाहं भुञ्जे न वा तृप्यामि’ इति –
“I am not eating nor am I feeling any satisfaction”,
तद्वदिन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेण स्वयमुपलभमान एव बाह्यमर्थम्,
‘नाहमुपलभे न च सोऽस्ति’ इति ब्रुवन्,
How can he be understood to be a person whose word should be (seriously) accepted?
Similarly how could a man’s word be acceptable, if, while actually perceiving an external entity as a result of its contact with a sense-organ,
He were to say, that he neither perceives such entity nor does it exist?
ननु नाहमेवं ब्रवीमि – ‘न कञ्चिदर्थमुपलभे’ इति;
(If the opponent were to say however) — I do not say that I do not perceive any external entity
किं तु ‘उपलब्धिव्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभे’ इति ब्रवीमि;
But I say that I do not perceive any external entity, existing as apart from a mere subjective cognition of it.
बाढमेवं ब्रवीषि निरङ्कुशत्वात्ते तुण्डस्य,
(We reply) — Of course you say that because there is no curb to your mouth,
न तु युक्त्युपेतं ब्रवीषि,
But then, it is not logical,
यत उपलब्धिव्यतिरेकोऽपि बलादर्थस्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः, उपलब्धेरेव;
Because it is precisely by means of perception only, that the existence of an entity as apart from a mere cognition of it, has necessarily to be understood.
न हि कश्चिदुपलब्धिमेव स्तम्भः कुड्यं चेत्युपलभते;
No one understands perception itself to be the pillar or the wall,
उपलब्धिविषयत्वेनैव तु स्तम्भकुड्यादीन्सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते।
But all persons understand that they i.e. pillars etc. themselves are the objects of perception.
अतश्च एवमेव सर्वे लौकिका उपलभन्ते,
It is in this manner that all people understand,
यत् प्रत्याचक्षाणा अपि बाह्यमर्थम् एवमाचक्षते –
And even those (such as the followers of Buddha) who desire to deny the existence of external entities also do, all the same, as surely speak about the external entity, thus —
‘यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तद्बहिर्वदवभासते’ इति –
Viz. that which is of the nature of an internal subjective cognition, appears as if it is external.
तेऽपि हि सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धां बहिरवभासमानां संविदं प्रतिलभमानाः, प्रत्याख्यातुकामाश्च बाह्यमर्थम्,
Even they, who thus apprehend the perception of an external entity as is well-known to all people generally, but who desire to deny that external entities exist,
‘बहिर्वत्’ इति वत्कारं कुर्वन्ति;
Speak about it, as if it is external,
इतरथा हि कस्मात् ‘बहिर्वत्’ इति ब्रूयुः;
Or else, why should they say ‘as if it is external?
न हि ‘विष्णुमित्रो वन्ध्यापुत्रवदवभासते’ इति कश्चिदाचक्षीत;
No one would say, that Viṣṇu-mitra appears as if he is the son of a barren woman (a total nonentity).
तस्मात् यथानुभवं तत्त्वम् अभ्युपगच्छद्भिः बहिरेवावभासते इति युक्तम् अभ्युपगन्तुम्,
Hence it would be reasonable for those who perceive an entity substantially as an entity, to say that it is perceived to be a substantial external entity,
न तु बहिर्वत् अवभासत इति।
And not that it is perceived as if it is an external entity.
ननु बाह्यस्यार्थस्यासम्भवात् बहिर्वदवभासते इत्यध्यवसितम्;
But (says the follower of Buddha), as the existence of an external entity is not possible (as I have said above) I have perforce come to the conclusion that it is perceived as if it is an external entity.
This conclusion (we reply) is not proper,
यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ सम्भवासम्भवाववधार्येते,
Because the possibility or the absence of possibility of the existence of an entity, depends upon the antecedent operation, or the absence of operation, of the means-of-proof (with regard to such entity)
न पुनः सम्भवासम्भवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती;
And not vice versa, viz. that the operation, or the absence of operation, of the means-of-proof depends upon the possibility or the absence of possibility (of the existence of such an entity).
यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादीनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते, तत्सम्भवति;
That which is actually perceived by the operation of one or other of the means-of-proof, is possible (of existence),
यत्तु न केनचिदपि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते, तन्न सम्भवति;
And that which is not perceived by any of the means-of-proof whatsoever, is not possible (of existence).
इह तु यथास्वं सर्वैरेव प्रमाणैर्बाह्योऽर्थ उपलभ्यमानः
कथं व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकादिविकल्पैर्न सम्भवतीत्युच्येत –
Hence, in this case, how can an entity which is actually perceived as substantially existing according to its own nature by all the various means-of-proof,
Be said to be either possible or not possible (of existence), by raising such alternatives as that such external objective entities are either different or not different (from Paramāṇus),
When as a matter of fact they are actually perceived?
न च ज्ञानस्य विषयसारूप्याद्विषयनाशो भवति,
It is not that because cognitions have the form of the objects of such cognitions, that destruction of such objects results,
असति विषये विषयसारूप्यानुपपत्तेः,
For cognition cannot have the form of external objects if such external objects themselves did not exist,
And also because, such objects are as a matter of fact perceived to be external.
अत एव सहोपलम्भनियमोऽपि प्रत्ययविषययोरुपायोपेयभावहेतुकः,
न अभेदहेतुकः – इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्।
Hence it is that, that an object and its perception are as a rule apprehended simultaneously, is to be understood to mean, that they have a relation of cause and effect between them,
And not that they are one and the same, and have no distinction between them.
अपि च घटज्ञानं पटज्ञानमिति विशेषणयोरेव घटपटयोर्भेदः,
Besides, when there are perceptions of a pot and a piece of cloth, there is a distinction between only the attributes of the cognitions i.e. between the attributes of the pot and the piece of cloth,
न विशेष्यस्य ज्ञानस्य –
And not in the substantive viz. the cognition itself.
यथा शुक्लो गौः कृष्णो गौरिति शौक्ल्यकार्ष्ण्ययोरेव भेदः, न गोत्वस्य।
For instance, when there is a white bull and a dark bull, the distinction is between the whiteness and blackness, the attributes of the bulls, and not in the generic form (Ākṛti) of a bull i.e. bull-ness.
द्वाभ्यां च भेद एकस्य सिद्धो भवति, एकस्माच्च द्वयोः;
It is by means of these two attributes (the whiteness and the blackness) that their distinction from the one (i.e. the generic bullness) results, and vice versa, for it is from the one (i.e. generic bullness) that its distinction from the two attributes (whiteness and blackness) results.
Therefore, there is a distinction between an object and its cognition.
तथा घटदर्शनं घटस्मरणमित्यत्रापि प्रतिपत्तव्यम्;
The same should be understood in the case of the cognition of a pot and the remembrance of it,
अत्रापि हि विशेष्ययोरेव दर्शनस्मरणयोर्भेदः,
Because here also the distinction is between the substantives, viz. cognition and remembrance,
न विशेषणस्य घटस्य –
And not in the object i.e. the pot.
यथा क्षीरगन्धः क्षीररस इति विशेष्ययोरेव गन्धरसयोर्भेदः,
As it is, in the case of the smell of milk and the taste of milk, the distinction is between the attributes, smell and taste,
न विशेषणस्य क्षीरस्य, तद्वत्।
And not in the substantive i.e. the milk.
अपि च द्वयोर्विज्ञानयोः पूर्वोत्तरकालयोः
Besides, as regards two cognitions, one of which is earlier and the other later
And which are exhausted as a result of making themselves cognized (because they are momentary),
It is not reasonably sustainable to understand that they have a relationship of the one being merely a cognition and the other being the subject of cognition (because it is the Self that is the knower, while the Buddhists do not accept the existence of the Self),
ततश्च – विज्ञानभेदप्रतिज्ञा क्षणिकत्वादिधर्मप्रतिज्ञा
स्व-लक्षण-सामान्य-लक्षण-वास्यवासकत्वाविद्योपप्लव-सदसद्धर्म-बन्ध-मोक्षादि-प्रतिज्ञाश्च स्वशास्त्रगताः –
And hence, the several declarations or dogmas (of Buddhist doctrine) — such as those about the distinctions between cognitions, about momentariness,
About the distinction between individuals and classes, about an earlier cognition generating an impression (Vāsaka) which causes a subsequent cognition (Vāsya), about the distinctions in attributes, such as existing, non-existing and both existing and non-existing attributes (Sat, Asat and Sat-Asat Dharma) caused by the influence of Nescience, about the idea of existence and non-existence, and about bondage and Final Release, inherent in the Buddhist system —
Would have to be abandoned.
Besides, there is this other thing —
You (the opponent) who claim to understand cognition as an internal subjective cognition merely,
बाह्योऽर्थः स्तम्भः कुड्यमित्येवंजातीयकः कस्मान्नाभ्युपगम्यत इति वक्तव्यम्।
Have to explain how and why you do not become conscious of the existence of an external entity such as a pillar or a wall etc.
विज्ञानमनुभूयत इति चेत्,
If you (the opponent) say that a cognition is actually experienced,
बाह्योऽप्यर्थोऽनुभूयत एवेति युक्तमभ्युपगन्तुम्;
Then it is equally reasonable to understand that an external entity is also similarly experienced.
अथ विज्ञानं प्रकाशात्मकत्वात्प्रदीपवत्स्वयमेवानुभूयते,
If you (the opponent) say again that a cognition being like a lamp, of a self-illuminating nature, it is like a lamp, self-cognized,
न तथा बाह्योऽप्यर्थ इति चेत् –
While an external entity is not so cognized,
अत्यन्तविरुद्धां स्वात्मनि क्रियामभ्युपगच्छसि –
(Then we reply) in saying so, you understand action as acting on itself — an idea which is against ordinary experience,
Like for instance, fire burning itself — ,
अविरुद्धं तु लोकप्रसिद्धम् –
स्वात्मव्यतिरिक्तेन विज्ञानेन बाह्योऽर्थोऽनुभूयत इति नेच्छसि;
While you refuse to understand what is not contradictory and is well-known in the ordinary world,
Viz. that an external entity is cognized by means of a cognition which is different from the external entity itself,
अहो पाण्डित्यं महद्दर्शितम्;
And in doing so you are indeed making an exhibition of your erudition.
न चार्थाव्यतिरिक्तमपि विज्ञानं स्वयमेवानुभूयते,
Besides it is not possible that cognition can be conscious of itself as apart from an (external) entity,
Precisely because a thing cannot act on itself.
ननु विज्ञानस्य स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यत्वे,
If you (the follower of Buddha) say that in case a cognition were to be apprehended by means of a thing apart from the cognition itself,
तदप्यन्येन ग्राह्यं तदप्यन्येन – इत्यनवस्था प्राप्नोति;
That again will have to be apprehended by something else, and that again by still some other thing, and so a regressus ad infinitum would result,
अपि च प्रदीपवदवभासात्मकत्वाज्ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानान्तरं कल्पयतः
And besides, cognition, like a lamp, being self-illuminating, if it is imagined that for such cognition some other cognition is necessary,
It would be a futile assumption, because, both the cognitions being similar, it would not be reasonably sustainable to hold that they have a relation between them, in which, one cognition is the illuminator and the other the object of such illumination,
(We reply) — Both these assumptions of yours are not valid,
विज्ञानग्रहणमात्र एव विज्ञानसाक्षिणो ग्रहणाकाङ्क्षानुत्पादाद्
Because when a cognition is cognized, no further expectation arises about the immediate witness of such cognition (i.e. the Self), requiring in its own turn, some other witness to apprehend this first immediate witness,
And hence it is not reasonably sustainable to entertain a doubt that a regressus ad infinitum would result.
As the witness (i.e. the Self) and the cognition are of different nature, it is reasonably sustainable that there is a relation between them of one being the cognizer and the other being the object of cognition,
स्वयंसिद्धस्य च साक्षिणोऽप्रत्याख्येयत्वात्।
Because the existence of this witness (i.e. the Self) cannot be denied, inasmuch as the Self is self-proved.
किञ्चान्यत् – प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानमवभासकान्तरनिरपेक्षं स्वयमेव प्रथते –
Moreover when you say that, like a lamp, cognition is self-illumining and does not need anything to illumine it,
इति ब्रुवता अप्रमाणगम्यं विज्ञानमनवगन्तृकमित्युक्तं स्यात् –
It would be tantamount to saying, that cognitions cognize themselves, and do not require any other means-of-proof to make themselves known,
And it would be just as if you were to say, that there are a thousand burning lamps subsisting inside the big mass of a solid monolith.
बाढमेवम् – अनुभवरूपत्वात्तु विज्ञानस्येष्टो नः पक्षस्त्वया अनुज्ञायत इति चेत्,
(Now if you the Buddhist were to retort) that, cognitions being thus of the nature of perception (as you the Vedāntin suggest), you have practically accepted my (i.e. of the follower of Buddha’s) view,
न; अन्यस्यावगन्तुश्चक्षुःसाधनस्य प्रदीपादिप्रथनदर्शनात्;
(We reply) — No, because as it is seen that it is some person endowed with the faculty of vision, that is necessary to perceive the burning of the lamp,
अतो विज्ञानस्याप्यवभास्यत्वाविशेषात्सत्येवान्यस्मिन्नवगन्तरि प्रथनं प्रदीपवदित्यवगम्यते।
Therefore, cognition also being, in common with a lamp, capable of being perceived, would require somebody other than itself to perceive it.
स्वयं प्रथते विज्ञानम् इत्येष एव मम पक्षस्त्वया वाचोयुक्त्यन्तरेणाश्रित इति चेत्,
Again, (if you the opponent were to suggest) — “You (the Vedāntin) who maintain that this witnessing Self is self-existing,
Practically in so many words accept my view, that cognition illumines itself, in a round-about way of reasoning”,
(We reply) — No, because you (i.e. the follower of Buddha) hold that cognitions have particular attributes such as origination, destruction, and plurality, (while, we, the Vedāntins, recognize only the ‘Self’ which is eternal, unborn, indestructible).
अतः प्रदीपवद्विज्ञानस्यापि व्यतिरिक्तावगम्यत्वमस्माभिः प्रसाधितम्॥२८॥
Hence, we have thus established, that cognitions, like a lamp, are cognized by some one different from such cognitions. — 28.
←PrevNext→ वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्॥२.२.२९॥ Vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat.
Vaidharmyāt: on account of difference of nature, because of dissimilarity; Ca: and, also; Na: not; Svapna-ādivat: like dreams etc.
🔗 Because of the difference in their nature, (perceptions during wakeful condition) are not like those in a dream etc. — 22.214.171.124.2.29 L.1
यदुक्तं बाह्यार्थापलापिना –
The argument advanced by him who discountenances the existence of external entities —
Viz. that, as in the case of perceptions in a dream, so in the case of perceptions during waking state,
स्तम्भादिप्रत्यया विनैव बाह्येनार्थेन भवेयुः,
Perceptions of pillars etc. may well occur even without actual corresponding external objective entities (existing),
Inasmuch as, as perceptions, they are similar — has now to be refuted.
अत्रोच्यते – न स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययवज्जाग्रत्प्रत्यया भवितुमर्हन्ति।
It is said with regard to this — Perceptions during waking state do not deserve to be like the perceptions in a dream etc.
कस्मात्? वैधर्म्यात् –
Why (is it) so? Because of the dissimilarity in their nature.
वैधर्म्यं हि भवति स्वप्नजागरितयोः।
Dream-state and waking-state are dissimilar.
What dissimilarity is there?
बाधाबाधाविति ब्रूमः –
We reply — that it consists in the subsequent contradiction, and the absence of such subsequent contradiction respectively.
बाध्यते हि स्वप्नोपलब्धं वस्तु प्रतिबुद्धस्य –
Things perceived in a dream by a person are contradicted on his awakening (from a dream), (for he says) —
मिथ्या मयोपलब्धो महाजनसमागम इति, न ह्यस्ति मम महाजनसमागमः,
निद्राग्लानं तु मे मनो बभूव, तेनैषा भ्रान्तिरुद्बभूवेति;
‘Oh, I wrongly fancied I was in the company of a great person, I did not in fact meet him,
My mind was overcome with sleep and this caused the illusion.’
एवं मायादिष्वपि भवति यथायथं बाधः;
There is a similar contradiction in the case of Māyā (illusion) etc.
नैवं जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु स्तम्भादिकं कस्याञ्चिदप्यवस्थायां बाध्यते।
But a thing perceived in a waking condition — a pillar for instance — is never contradicted under any circumstances.
अपि च स्मृतिरेषा, यत्स्वप्नदर्शनम्;
Besides, dream experience is of course a mere remembrance or memory (of past impressions)
While what is seen during waking condition, is a perception or experience (brought about, by the operation of the means-of-proof).
स्मृत्युपलब्ध्योश्च प्रत्यक्षमन्तरं स्वयमनुभूयते अर्थविप्रयोगसम्प्रयोगात्मकम् –
The actual distinction between remembrance or memory (in a dream) and perception or experience (in a waking condition) which is of the nature of separation from or contact with a thing,
इष्टं पुत्रं स्मरामि, नोपलभे, उपलब्धुमिच्छामीति।
Is directly experienced by a person himself, when he says, for instance, ‘I remember my dear son, but I am not able to see him. But I do wish to see him.’
तत्रैवं सति न शक्यते वक्तुम् –
मिथ्या जागरितोपलब्धिः, उपलब्धित्वात्, स्वप्नोपलब्धिवदिति –
Under these circumstances, a person who himself actually experiences the difference between them, cannot say
That waking perceptions are unreal, because of their actual perception by him, merely because they are perceptions similar to perceptions during dreams.
न च स्वानुभवापलापः प्राज्ञमानिभिर्युक्तः कर्तुम्।
It is not proper or logical for persons who claim to be intelligent, to deny the truth of their own experience.
अपि च अनुभवविरोधप्रसङ्गात्
Besides, lest there may be the predicament of having to contradict their own experience,
जागरितप्रत्ययानां स्वतो निरालम्बनतां वक्तुमशक्नुवता
Those who are unable to say, that waking perceptions are without any support,
Wish to say so, on the ground of their similarity to dream perceptions.
न च, यो यस्य स्वतो धर्मो न सम्भवति
सोऽन्यस्य साधर्म्यात्तस्य सम्भविष्यति;
That, which cannot possibly be the nature of a particular thing,
Can never be its nature merely because of its similarity with some other things.
न ह्यग्निरुष्णोऽनुभूयमान उदकसाधर्म्याच्छीतो भविष्यति;
Fire (for instance) which is experienced to be hot, will never become a cold entity merely because of its similarity to water (merely because both are entities).
दर्शितं तु वैधर्म्यं स्वप्नजागरितयोः॥२९॥
The dissimilarity between the natures of cognitions in a dream condition and of those in a waking condition has already been indicated. — 29.
←PrevNext→ न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः॥२.२.३०॥ Na bhāvo'nupalabdheḥ.
Na: not; Bhāvaḥ: existence (of impressions or Saṃskāras); Anupalabdheḥ: because they are not perceived, because (external things) are not experienced.
🔗 There could he no existence (of the impressions on the mind) because (according to you — the opponent — no external entities) are perceived. — 126.96.36.199.2.30 L.1
यदप्युक्तम् – विनाप्यर्थेन ज्ञानवैचित्र्यं वासनावैचित्र्यादेवावकल्पत इति,
The statement (of the follower of Buddha) that it is possible, that there may be variety in cognitions due to variety of impressions on the mind, even in the absence of the existence of external entities,
Has now to be refuted.
अत्रोच्यते – न भावो वासनानामुपपद्यते,
It is said about it (by the Vedāntin) — As according to your doctrine, there is no perception of the existence of external objective entities,
It is not reasonably sustainable that, there could be any impression on the mind.
अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्यर्थं नानारूपा वासना भवन्ति।
Diverse impressions on the mind, about entities, are caused by the perception of diverse (objective external) entities.
अनुपलभ्यमानेषु त्वर्थेषु किंनिमित्ता विचित्रा वासना भवेयुः?
If (as you maintain) the existence of objective external entities cannot be perceived, to what cause, then, can the variety of different impressions on the mind, be due to?
अनादित्वेऽप्यन्धपरम्परान्यायेनाप्रतिष्ठैवानवस्था व्यवहारविलोपिनी स्यात्,
If impressions on the mind are understood to exist as having no beginning in time, then on the ground of the maxim of the ‘chain of blind men’ (blind leading the blind), the result would be, the absence of any finality based on firm means-of-proof, which would only succeed in terminating all worldly transactions, and bring about an impossible position,
But it would never succeed in proving your statement.
This being so, the positive and negative instances enumerated by those (followers of Buddha) who refuse to concede the existence of actual objective entities,
वासनानिमित्तमेवेदं ज्ञानजातं नार्थनिमित्तमिति,
For the purpose of proving that the whole set of cognitions are caused by impressions and not by actual objective entities,
तावप्येवं सति प्रत्युक्तौ द्रष्टव्यौ,
Should thus be understood to be refuted,
विना अर्थोपलब्ध्या वासनानुपपत्तेः।
Because in the absence of the perception of objective external entities, the existence of the impressions (on the mind) cannot be reasonably sustainable.
अपि च विनापि वासनाभिरर्थोपलब्ध्युपगमात्, विना त्वर्थोपलब्ध्या वासनोत्पत्त्यनभ्युपगमात् अर्थसद्भावमेवान्वयव्यतिरेकावपि प्रतिष्ठापयतः।
Besides, on the other hand, as it is understood that even in the absence of impressions on the mind, perception of objective external entities is possible, and as impressions (on the mind) are not understood to be possible in the absence of the existence of objective external entities, such positive and negative instances also necessarily establish the existence of external entities.
अपि च वासना नाम संस्कारविशेषाः;
Besides, as impressions on the mind indeed are special kinds of Saṃskāras,
They cannot be imagined to be without a basis,
एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्;
Because it is seen to be so in the ordinary world.
न च तव वासनाश्रयः कश्चिदस्ति,
In your (i.e. the opponent’s) case, there is no basis of any sort for the impressions on the mind,
Because they are not perceived by any of the means-of-proof. — 30.
Kṣanikatvāt: on account of the momentariness; Ca: and.
🔗 (Cognition pertaining to the consciousness of Ego i.e. Ahaṅ-kāra i.e. Ālaya-Vijñāna) also, being momentary, (it) cannot be the basis for the impressions on the mind. — 188.8.131.52.2.31 L.1
यदप्यालयविज्ञानं नाम वासनाश्रयत्वेन परिकल्पितम्,
The cognition pertaining to the consciousness of Ego i.e. Ahaṅ-kāra which indeed you (the follower of Buddha) imagine to be the basis for the impressions on the mind,
तदपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमादनवस्थितस्वरूपं सत्,
Also being understood to be but momentary and of a nonpermanent nature, because you hold that entities have but a momentary existence, does not, like impellent cognition.
प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानवन्न वासनानामधिकरणं भवितुमर्हति;
(Pravṛtti-vijñāna) of the reality of external entity (such as a pot or a piece of cloth), deserve to be the basis for the impressions on the mind.
न हि कालत्रयसम्बन्धिन्येकस्मिन्नन्वयिन्यसति
In the absence of the existence of any connecting principle whose nature persists (in every effect) in relation to all the three times (i.e. the past, present and future),
कूटस्थे वा सर्वार्थदर्शिनि
Or in the absence of any unchangeable entity (such as the Self) as the witness of all entities,
No transactions, such as remembrance, recognition etc., which are dependent upon the impressions on the mind, and which depend upon environment, time and cause are possible.
स्थिरस्वरूपत्वे त्वालयविज्ञानस्य सिद्धान्तहानिः।
Were cognitions pertaining to Ego-consciousness, to be assumed (by you) to have a permanent nature, it would mean the abandonment of your own doctrine (of the momentariness of all entities).
अपि च विज्ञानवादेऽपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमस्य समानत्वात्,
यानि बाह्यार्थवादे क्षणिकत्वनिबन्धनानि दूषणान्युद्भावितानि –
‘उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्’ इत्येवमादीनि,
The faults attributed (by us), to the doctrine of the ‘momentariness of external entities’ (in the Buddhist sense), such as —
“Uttarotpāde ca pūrva-nirodhāt” (BrS.2.2.20),
Should be understood to apply equally
To the doctrine of ‘mere internal subjective cognitions’ as the doctrine of ‘the momentariness of entities’, is common to both these tenets.
एवमेतौ द्वावपि वैनाशिकपक्षौ निराकृतौ – बाह्यार्थवादिपक्षो विज्ञानवादिपक्षश्च;
In this way both these tenets (of the Buddhists), viz. the non-existence of external entities and mere internal cognitions, stand refuted.
शून्यवादिपक्षस्तु सर्वप्रमाणविप्रतिषिद्ध इति तन्निराकरणाय नादरः क्रियते।
We do not propose even to extend the courtesy of taking any notice of the doctrine of Nihilism (Śunya-Vāda) by way of refuting it, as it is entirely opposed to all means-of-proof,
न ह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धो लोकव्यवहारोऽन्यत्तत्त्वमनधिगम्य शक्यतेऽपह्नोतुम्,
And as this course of worldly transactions which is established by all the means-of-proof cannot be rejected in the absence of any definite knowledge of any better principle,
And as it is well-known that in the absence of any exception (to be found to be against a rule) the rule is taken as firmly established. — 31.
←PrevNext→ सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च॥२.२.३२॥ Sarvathānupapatteś ca.
Sarvathā: in every way; Anupapatteḥ: because of its not being proved illogical; Ca: and, also.
🔗 Considered in all possible ways (the Buddhist doctrine) is not reasonably sustainable. — 184.108.40.206.2.32 L.1
Why need anything more be said?
सर्वप्रकारेण – यथा यथायं वैनाशिकसमय उपपत्तिमत्त्वाय परीक्ष्यते
The more is this doctrine of Buddha examined, in order to ascertain whether it is reasonably sustainable,
तथा तथा – सिकताकूपवद्विदीर्यत एव;
The more it gets disintegrated, much as a well dug in sand does.
न काञ्चिदप्यत्रोपपत्तिं पश्यामः;
We are unable to find in it even the least little reasonable sustainability of any kind.
Hence also the doctrine of Sugata is not acceptable.
अपि च बाह्यार्थविज्ञानशून्यवादत्रयमितरेतरविरुद्धमुपदिशता सुगतेन
Besides, Sugata by propounding the mutually contradictory doctrines of Bahyārtha-Vāda i.e. ‘the reality of objective external entities’ (in the Buddhistic sense), of the Vijñāna-Vāda i.e. ‘reality of mere internal subjective cognitions, and of Śūnya-Vāda i.e. ‘mere nothingness’ (Nihilism),
स्पष्टीकृतमात्मनोऽसम्बद्धप्रलापित्वम्, प्रद्वेषो वा प्रजासु –
Has merely succeeded in establishing, either his capacity for incoherent babbling, or his actual hatred of all beings (who are his adherents and who do not follow the Vedic Scriptures),
विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपत्त्या विमुह्येयुरिमाः प्रजा इति।
Fondly hoping that by the assimilation of the knowledge of such mutually contradictory theories, they may be perplexed.
सर्वथाप्यनादरणीयोऽयं सुगतसमयः श्रेयस्कामैरित्यभिप्रायः॥३२॥
Therefore, the sense (of the Sūtra-kāra) is, that those who desire real happiness through Final Release should leave Sugata’s doctrine severely alone. — 32.
Na: not; Ekasmin: in one; A-sambhavāt: on account of the impossibility.
🔗 (Contradictory attributes cannot exist) in one and the same entity, because (it) is not possible, (and therefore, the Jaina doctrine is not correct). — 220.127.116.11.2.33 L.1
The doctrine of the followers of Buddha has been refuted.
विवसनसमय इदानीं निरस्यते।
The doctrine of the clothesless Jainas (Sans-collottes?) is now being refuted.
सप्त चैषां पदार्थाः सम्मताः – जीवाजीवास्रवसंवरनिर्जरबन्धमोक्षा नाम;
They acknowledge seven categories, viz. the Jīva-Self (Jīva), entities other than the Jīva-Self (Ajīva), the tendency of sense-organs towards sense-objects (Āsrava), the discipline of sense-organs (Saṃvara), the ordeals (Nirjara), Bondage (Bandha), Final Release (Mokṣa).
संक्षेपतस्तु द्वावेव पदार्थौ जीवाजीवाख्यौ, यथायोगं
They further reduce this number according to circumstances (Yathā-yogam) to two only viz. the Jīva-Self and entities other than the Jīva-Self,
तयोरेवेतरान्तर्भावात् – इति मन्यन्ते।
As they understand that the rest (the remaining five) are covered by these two.
तयोरिममपरं प्रपञ्चमाचक्षते, पञ्चास्तिकाया नाम –
They also talk about these very categories (in another way) as the five Astikāyas (i.e. entities)
जीवास्तिकायः पुद्गलास्तिकायो धर्मास्तिकायोऽधर्मास्तिकाय आकाशास्तिकायश्चेति।
Viz. Jīvāstikāya i.e. the category of Jīva-Self, Pudgalāstikāya i.e. the category of a body (wherein there is a congregation and separation of Atoms), Dharmāstikāya i.e. the category of merit, Adharmāstikāya i.e. the category of demerit, and Ākāśāstikāya i.e. the category of Ākāśa.
They also again describe many other different sub-divisions of these categories, supposed to be comprised in their doctrine.
सर्वत्र चेमं सप्तभङ्गीनयं नाम न्यायमवतारयन्ति –
They also refer to a mode of reasoning called ‘Sapta-bhaṅgī-nāya’,
स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च,
Such as, that, may be an entity exists, may be it does not exist, may be it does and does not exist,
स्यादवक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्च, स्यादस्ति च नास्ति चावक्तव्यश्चेति;
May be [or ‘Somehow’, per Panoli] it is indescribable (Avaktavya), may be it exists and is indescribable, may be it does not exist and is indescribable, may be it does and does not exist and is indescribable.
एवमेवैकत्वनित्यत्वादिष्वपीमं सप्तभङ्गीनयं योजयन्ति॥
Further they employ this Sapta-bhaṅgī method of reasoning to oneness (Ekatva) and eternity (Nityatva) etc. (and thus impugn the doctrine of Brahman).
अत्राचक्ष्महे – नायमभ्युपगमो युक्त इति।
With regard to this, we say: — This doctrine (of the Jainas) is not logical,
Because, contradictory attributes cannot possibly exist (in one and the same entity).
न ह्येकस्मिन्धर्मिणि युगपत्सदसत्त्वादिविरुद्धधर्मसमावेशः सम्भवति, शीतोष्णवत्;
Contradictory attributes such as existing (Sat) and not existing (Asat) cannot at one and the same time belong to one and the same entity possessing an attribute (Dharma), even as coldness or hotness cannot possibly belong to the same entity simultaneously.
य एते सप्तपदार्था निर्धारिता एतावन्त एवंरूपाश्चेति,
These seven categories definitely ascertained (by Jainas) as being so many and as having such and such form,
ते तथैव वा स्युः, नैव वा तथा स्युः;
May (according to the Jaina theory) perhaps be so, or may not be so,
इतरथा हि, तथा वा स्युरतथा वेत्यनिर्धारितरूपं ज्ञानं
And on the other hand, any resulting knowledge, of such an indefinite nature, which may be so, as described, or on the other hand may not be so,
Would be, like doubtful knowledge, certainly unauthoritative.
नन्वनेकात्मकं वस्त्विति निर्धारितरूपमेव ज्ञानमुत्पद्यमानं
(If the Jainas were to say) — But the knowledge of an entity which is definitely ascertained to be of more kinds than one,
Would not deserve to be unauthoritative, like doubtful knowledge,
नेति ब्रूमः – निरङ्कुशं ह्यनेकान्तत्वं सर्ववस्तुषु प्रतिजानानस्य
We reply — No. For, in the case of a man, who in such an unfettered manner, definitely understands that entities are of more than one kind,
The fact of such definitely ascertained knowledge of his, also, having the same common characteristic of its being ‘an entity’ quite as much as other entities,
‘स्यादस्ति स्यान्नास्ति’ इत्यादिविकल्पोपनिपाताद्
Would necessarily induce the application of optional alternatives, such as, that such an entity viz. the definitely ascertained knowledge of his, also, somehow exists or that it somehow does not exist,
And thus, the indefiniteness of such knowledge would certainly be there all the same.
एवं निर्धारयितुर्निर्धारणफलस्य च
Similarly, in the case of a person, who essays to arrive at such determination, as also in the case of the result of such determination,
स्यात्पक्षेऽस्तिता, स्याच्च पक्षे नास्तितेति।
On the one hand, their existence somehow would result, and on the other hand also their non-existence somehow.
एवं सति कथं प्रमाणभूतः सन् तीर्थकरः
How can then, the Tīrtha-kara, authoritative as he is (considered by the Jainas),
प्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमातृप्रमितिष्वनिर्धारितासु उपदेष्टुं शक्नुयात्?
Be able to impart instruction, when the means-of-proof, the object to be known, the knower and knowledge, are all, thus, of an indefinite nature?
कथं वा तदभिप्रायानुसारिणस्तदुपदिष्टेऽर्थेऽनिर्धारितरूपे प्रवर्तेरन्?
Also how can those who follow his opinion act upon his instruction about a doctrine of such an indefinite nature?
ऐकान्तिकफलत्वनिर्धारणे हि सति
It is only when in the case of a thing, a definitely settled result is assured,
तत्साधनानुष्ठानाय सर्वो लोकोऽनाकुलः प्रवर्तते, नान्यथा;
That all people set about employing the means to achieve it unconfusedly, and not otherwise.
अतश्चानिर्धारितार्थं शास्त्रं प्रणयन्
Hence, any one who promulgates a Śāstra about a matter of such an indefinite nature or significance,
Would, like an inebriate or a mad-man, be a person, whose word cannot be accepted.
तथा पञ्चानामस्तिकायानां पञ्चत्वसंख्या ‘अस्ति वा नास्ति वा’ इति विकल्प्यमाना,
Similarly with respect to the five Astikāyas, if one were to employ the option, as to whether their number is five or is not so (i.e. is not five),
स्यात्तावदेकस्मिन्पक्षे, पक्षान्तरे तु न स्यात् –
Then according to one alternative they may be five, and according to the other alternative, they may not be five,
इत्यतो न्यूनसंख्यात्वमधिकसंख्यात्वं वा प्राप्नुयात्।
And thus it would mean, that they may be more or less than five.
न चैषां पदार्थानामवक्तव्यत्वं सम्भवति;
It is not possible that these categories could be indescribable,
Because if they are so indescribable, they cannot possibly be described.
उच्यन्ते चावक्तव्याश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम्;
But to describe them, and also at the same time, to say that they are indescribable (and yet to describe them), would be contradictory.
उच्यमानाश्च तथैवावधार्यन्ते नावधार्यन्त इति च।
Again if they are described, it may be that they either are definitely ascertained to be so or that they are not so ascertained.
तथा तदवधारणफलं सम्यग्दर्शनमस्ति वा नास्ति वा –
एवं तद्विपरीतमसम्यग्दर्शनमप्यस्ति वा नास्ति वा –
Again, if a person were to babble,
That the fruit of understanding them properly, viz. correct knowledge, may supervene, or again, that it may not so supervene,
Or conversely, that imperfect knowledge also may either result or may not result,
मत्तोन्मत्तपक्षस्यैव स्यात्, न प्रत्यायितव्यपक्षस्य।
Then, he would indeed belong to the class of inebriates or mad-men, and certainly not to the class of persons whose word should be trusted.
स्वर्गापवर्गयोश्च पक्षे भावः पक्षे चाभावः,
Again, if Heaven or Final Release were on the one hand understood to exist as a reality and on the other hand understood not so to exist,
तथा पक्षे नित्यता पक्षे चानित्यता –
And again if it were to be understood that they on the one hand are eternal, and on the other hand are non-eternal,
Then, any endeavour with regard to them (for their attainment) would not be reasonably sustainable.
अनादिसिद्धजीवप्रभृतीनां च स्वशास्त्रावधृतस्वभावानामयथावधृतस्वभावत्वप्रसङ्गः।
Also, there would be the predicament, that the Jīva-Self etc., which have been ascertained (by the Jainas), on the strength of their system, to exist, and as not having a beginning in time, and also ascertained as having a particular nature, would with equal facility be understood as not having any such ascertained nature.
एवं जीवादिषु पदार्थेष्वेकस्मिन्धर्मिणि सत्त्वासत्त्वयोर्विरुद्धयोर्धर्मयोरसम्भवात्,
And in this manner, as, in the case of the one and only one entity, such as the Jīva-Self etc., such mutually contradictory attributes of existence or non-existence at one and the same time are not possible,
सत्त्वे चैकस्मिन्धर्मेऽसत्त्वस्य धर्मान्तरस्यासम्भवात्,
And as, if one such nature (of it) is present, the presence of the other nature is not possible,
असत्त्वे चैवं सत्त्वस्यासम्भवात्,
And, vice versa, when a particular nature is not present, its presence there is not possible,
This doctrine of the Arhat (i.e. Jina, the propounder of Jaina doctrine) is incongruous.
एतेनैकानेकनित्यानित्यव्यतिरिक्ताव्यतिरिक्ताद्यनेकान्ताभ्युपगमा निराकृता मन्तव्याः।
This (refutation) should also be understood to refute the tenets about one and the same entity having contradictory attributes such as being one and many, eternal and non-eternal, separate and non-separate.
यत्तु पुद्गलसंज्ञकेभ्योऽणुभ्यः सङ्घाताः सम्भवन्तीति कल्पयन्ति,
As regards their tenet that aggregates of atoms, which are called Pudgalas, are formed,
तत्पूर्वेणैवाणुवादनिराकरणेन निराकृतं भवतीत्यतो न पृथक्तन्निराकरणाय प्रयत्यते॥३३॥
It has already been refuted in the earlier refutation of the doctrine of the Aṇu (of the Vaiśeṣikas) and so a separate refutation of the same again is not attempted (here). — 33.
←PrevNext→ एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम्॥२.२.३४॥ Evaṃ cātmākārtsnyam.
Evam: thus, in the same way, as it is suggested by the Jaina theory; Ca: also, and; Ātma-a-kartsnyam: non-universality of the soul.
🔗 Similarly (the Jaina doctrine is liable to the fault of) the Self not being all-pervading. — 18.104.22.168.2.34 L.1
यथैकस्मिन्धर्मिणि विरुद्धधर्मासम्भवो दोषः
Just as the fault, of the impossibility of an entity which has a particular attribute ever possessing another contrary attribute,
Has attached itself to the Syād-Vāda,
एवमात्मनोऽपि जीवस्य अकार्त्स्न्यमपरो दोषः प्रसज्येत।
Similarly also the fault, that the Self, i.e. the Ātmā, would not be integral, would attach itself (to the Jaina doctrine).
In what manner will it so arise?
शरीरपरिमाणो हि जीव इत्यार्हता मन्यन्ते;
The followers of Arhat hold that the Jīva-Self has the same dimensions as that of the body.
शरीरपरिमाणतायां च सत्याम्,
Now, if it has the same dimensions as that of the body,
अकृत्स्नोऽसर्वगतः परिच्छिन्न आत्मेत्यतो घटादिवदनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत;
Then it would mean that it is neither co-extensive with the universe, nor integral, and is limited in size, and hence, like an earthen pot etc., it will be non-eternal.
And because bodies have not the same fixed dimensions,
मनुष्यजीवो मनुष्यशरीरपरिमाणो भूत्वा
When a man whose Self has the same dimensions as his body,
पुनः केनचित्कर्मविपाकेन हस्तिजन्म प्राप्नुवन्
Acquires the birth of an elephant, as a result of his actions (Karma),
न कृत्स्नं हस्तिशरीरं व्याप्नुयात्;
His Self will not be able to occupy the entire body of the elephant,
पुत्तिकाजन्म च प्राप्नुवन् न कृत्स्नः पुत्तिकाशरीरे संमीयेत;
And conversely, if he acquires the body of an ant, the Self could not possibly be wholly accommodated in an ant’s body.
समान एष एकस्मिन्नपि जन्मनि कौमारयौवनस्थाविरेषु दोषः।
Even in the single life-time of a person, the same fault would supervene during the stages of childhood, youth and old age.
स्यादेतत् – अनन्तावयवो जीवः, तस्य त एवावयवा अल्पे शरीरे सङ्कुचेयुः;
(The follower of Arhat says) — may be, the Jīva-Self is composed of infinite number of parts, and the same may contract in a small body and expand in a large one.
महति च विकसेयुरिति।
(We ask him) — you have to answer whether, that those infinite number of parts of the Self occupy the same space, is not admitted or admitted.
तेषां पुनरनन्तानां जीवावयवानां समानदेशत्वं प्रतिहन्यते वा, न वेति वक्तव्यम्;
If it is not admitted, then these infinite number of parts would not be contained in a limited space,
प्रतिघाते तावत् नानन्तावयवाः परिच्छिन्ने देशे संमीयेरन्;
And if it is admitted, then it would be reasonably sustainable that they would be occupying the space of only a single part,
अप्रतिघातेऽप्येकावयवदेशत्वोपपत्तेः सर्वेषामवयवानां प्रथिमानुपपत्तेर्जीवस्य
And therefore their having a dimension greater than the dimension of one part not being reasonably sustainable,
There would be the predicament of the Self having the dimension of an Aṇu only.
अपि च शरीरमात्रपरिच्छिन्नानां जीवावयवानामानन्त्यं नोत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्॥३४॥
Besides it is not even possible to conceive, that the parts of the Jīva-Self limited by the space of one body only, can ever be considered to be infinite. — 34.
अथ पर्यायेण बृहच्छरीरप्रतिपत्तौ केचिज्जीवावयवा उपगच्छन्ति,
Now if it be said (by the followers of Arhat), that when the Self acquires a big body, some parts accede to the Self,
तनुशरीरप्रतिपत्तौ च केचिदपगच्छन्तीत्युच्येत;
And when it acquires a small body, some parts depart from the Self, alternately,
We reply: —
←PrevNext→ न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः॥२.२.३५॥ Na ca paryāyād apy avirodho vikārādibhyaḥ.
Na: not; Ca: also, and; Paryāyāt: in turn, because of assuming by succession; Api: even; A-virodhaḥ: no inconsistency; Vikāra-ādibhyaḥ: on account of change, etc.
🔗 Even on the assumption of such alternatives, contradiction cannot he avoided, because the faults of modifications etc. (occurring), do supervene all the same. — 22.214.171.124.2.35 L.4
न च पर्यायेणाप्यवयवोपगमापगमाभ्याम्
एतद्देहपरिमाणत्वं जीवस्याविरोधेनोपपादयितुं शक्यते।
Even on the assumption, that some parts accede to and some depart from the Self,
Alternately, it is not reasonably possible to propound, without a contradiction taking place, the Self’s having the same dimensions as those of the body.
कुतः? विकारादिदोषप्रसङ्गात् –
Whence is it so? Because faults, such as that modifications etc. (of the Self) occur, do arise.
Even on the assumption that some parts accede to and some depart from the Self,
अनिशमापूर्यमाणस्यापक्षीयमाणस्य च जीवस्य विक्रियावत्त्वं तावदपरिहार्यम्;
The liability of the Self that thus gets filled up or depleted constantly, to undergo modifications regularly by such accession and depletion, cannot be avoided,
विक्रियावत्त्वे च चर्मादिवदनित्यत्वं प्रसज्येत;
And if, the Self is understood to be so liable to modifications, it will necessarily be rendered non-eternal, say, like a piece of leather etc.
ततश्च बन्धमोक्षाभ्युपगमो बाध्येत –
कर्माष्टकपरिवेष्टितस्य जीवस्य अलाबूवत्संसारसागरे निमग्नस्य
Under the circumstances, the doctrine of bondage and Final Release as understood (by the followers of Arhat),
Viz., that the Self, which is surrounded on all sides by the eightfold actions, and which happens to be engulfed in the ocean of transmigratory existence,
Floats upwards like a gourd, as a result of the severance of such bondage,
Would be contradicted.
किञ्चान्यत् – आगच्छतामपगच्छतां च अवयवानामागमापायधर्मवत्त्वादेव
Besides, as to those parts of the Self, which accede or depart, precisely because of their having this nature of coming into existence and being destroyed,
They could not, just as the body etc. cannot be called the Self, be called the Self,
ततश्चावस्थितः कश्चिदवयव आत्मेति स्यात्;
And it will be, that, that particular part which continues to be there permanently, is the Self,
न च स निरूपयितुं शक्यते – अयमसाविति।
And it would not be possible to point out that this particular part is the one which is there, so permanently.
किञ्चान्यत् – आगच्छन्तश्चैते जीवावयवाः कुतः प्रादुर्भवन्ति, अपगच्छन्तश्च क्व वा लीयन्त इति वक्तव्यम्;
Besides, the thing is, that you have to explain, from what source these acceding parts come, and wherein those that depart are absorbed.
न हि भूतेभ्यः प्रादुर्भवेयुः, भूतेषु च निलीयेरन्, अभौतिकत्वाज्जीवस्य;
They cannot possibly be said to proceed from the elements and be absorbed into them, because the Self (of which they are parts) is not an effect of elements,
नापि कश्चिदन्यः साधारणोऽसाधारणो वा
And by reason of the absence of any means-of-proof,
जीवानामवयवाधारो निरूप्यते, प्रमाणाभावात्।
It is not possible to indicate any general or particular reservoir (for all the parts as a whole or for a particular part) for such parts or for a particular part of the Jīva-Self.
किञ्चान्यत् – अनवधृतस्वरूपश्चैवं सति आत्मा स्यात्,
Besides the thing is that if it is really so the Self would be of an indefinite nature,
आगच्छतामपगच्छतां च अवयवानामनियतपरिमाणत्वात्;
As the dimensions of the acceding and departing parts would be indefinite.
Hence, on account of the predicament of such faults etc. occurring,
न पर्यायेणाप्यवयवोपगमापगमावात्मन आश्रयितुं शक्येते।
It is not possible to accept even this alternate accession and departure of the parts from the Self.
अथवा पूर्वेण सूत्रेण शरीरपरिमाणस्यात्मनः
When it is proved by means of the previous Sūtra, that even though the Self has the same dimensions as the body (as assumed by the followers of Arhat),
Still the predicament of the fault of its not being eternal would occur, (even though it is understood to be reasonably probable, that the Self can acquire other larger or smaller bodies), because the Self would in that case be rendered non-integral i.e. not whole or integral,
पुनः पर्यायेण परिमाणानवस्थानेऽपि
The follower of Arhat may suggest as an alternative, that, may be, that even though the dimensions of the Self do not remain constant,
स्रोतःसन्ताननित्यतान्यायेन आत्मनो नित्यता स्यात् –
The Self would still be eternal, on the strength of the maxim of the eternal nature of the continuous stream of water.
यथा रक्तपटानां विज्ञानानवस्थानेऽपि तत्सन्ताननित्यता, तद्वद्विसिचामपि –
इत्याशङ्क्य, अनेन सूत्रेणोत्तरमुच्यते –
So the Sūtra-kāra deliberately raises a doubt (in favour of the followers of Arhat)
Viz. that, just as the russet-robed one (Buddhist) holds, that even though cognitions are not constant, still their continuous stream may well be eternal, so might it equally well be, in the case of the clothesless Jainas (Sans-collottes),
सन्तानस्य तावदवस्तुत्वे नैरात्म्यवादप्रसङ्गः,
And then answers this doubt by this Sūtra, thus: — If the stream is unreal (and not substantial) there would be the predicament of arriving at the theory of Nihilism,
And even if it is real, there would be the predicament of the fault of the Self being liable to undergo modifications, etc.,
And thus again the doctrine (of the followers of Arhat) would not be reasonably sustainable. — 35.
Antya-avasthiteḥ: because of the permanency of the size at the end; Ca: and; Ubhaya-nityatvāt: as both are permanent; A-viseshaḥ: because there being no difference.
🔗 And because, (according to the Jainas) the dimension of the Jīva-Self in the condition of Final Release is not liable to change, the dimension of the Self in both the previous conditions also would be the same i.e. eternal (and common to all the three conditions), and therefore, there is no distinction. — 126.96.36.199.2.36 L.1
अपि च अन्त्यस्य मोक्षावस्थाभाविनो जीवपरिमाणस्य नित्यत्वमिष्यते जैनैः;
The Jainas hold that the dimension of the Jīva-Self in the final condition of Final Release is constant,
And hence, there is the predicament, of its dimensions during the previous, i.e. initial and intermediate condition also, being constant,
And therefore, its condition would be the same (during all the three conditions).
Therefore, the Jīva-Self would have the constant dimension of one body only,
And there would be no possibility of the acquisition of a greater or lesser body.
अथवा अन्त्यस्य जीवपरिमाणस्य अवस्थितत्वात्
Or else, because of the final dimensions of the Jīva-Self being thus constant
पूर्वयोरप्यवस्थयोरवस्थितपरिमाण एव जीवः स्यात्;
It would have the same constant dimension in the earlier conditions,
ततश्चाविशेषेण सर्वदैव अणुर्महान्वा जीवोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः,
And hence it will have to be understood, to be uniformly either of an Aṇu or Great dimension,
But never of the same dimension as that of the (changing) Body.
अतश्च सौगतवदार्हतमपि मतमसङ्गतमित्युपेक्षितव्यम्॥३६॥
Hence like the Saugata doctrine, the Ārhata doctrine also is incongruous and should therefore be neglected. — 36.
Patyuḥ: of the Lord (Patṛ), of Paśu-pati, of the Lord of animals; A-sāmañjasyāt: on account of inconsistency, on account of untenableness, inappropriateness.
🔗 Because of the incongruity (of the view) the Lord’s (being merely the efficient cause of the world, cannot hold good). — 188.8.131.52.2.37 L.1
इदानीं केवलाधिष्ठात्रीश्वरकारणवादः प्रतिषिध्यते।
Now the doctrine (of the Māheśvaras) that the Lord is (the cause of the world) merely as a superintendent, is being refuted.
How is it understood that the Sūtra means this?
‘प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्’ (BrS.1.4.23) ‘अभिध्योपदेशाच्च’ (BrS.1.4.24) इत्यत्र
प्रकृतिभावेन अधिष्ठातृभावेन च उभयस्वभावस्येश्वरस्य स्वयमेव आचार्येण प्रतिष्ठापितत्वात्;
Because, elsewhere by BrS.1.4.23 and 1.4.24,
The Ācārya has already established that the Lord, by virtue of his being both the material and efficient cause, has both these natures,
यदि पुनरविशेषेणेश्वरकारणवादमात्रमिह प्रतिषिध्येत,
And now if this Sūtra were to be understood to refute the doctrine of the Lord being the cause, without any further qualification,
पूर्वोत्तरविरोधाद्व्याहताभिव्याहारः सूत्रकार इत्येतदापद्येत;
Then it would mean, that the Sūtra-kāra has stultified himself by saying something contrary to what he has said before (as a result of the contradiction involved in the former and later statement).
तस्मादप्रकृतिरधिष्ठाता केवलं निमित्तकारणमीश्वरः –
Therefore, the doctrine that the Lord is not the material cause (Aprakṛti), but only a superintendent, i.e. merely an efficient cause,
इत्येष पक्षो वेदान्तविहितब्रह्मैकत्वप्रतिपक्षत्वात् यत्नेनात्र प्रतिषिध्यते।
Is being refuted here with special effort, because it is opposed to the doctrine of the unity (Ekatva) of Brahman as propounded by the Vedānta.
सा चेयं वेदबाह्येश्वरकल्पना अनेकप्रकारा –
This extra-Vedic concept of the Lord is of various sorts.
केचित्तावत्सांख्ययोगव्यपाश्रयाः कल्पयन्ति –
Some, who are the adherents of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems,
प्रधानपुरुषयोरधिष्ठाता केवलं निमित्तकारणमीश्वरः;
Hold that the Lord is merely a superintendent over the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, and thus merely an efficient cause,
इतरेतरविलक्षणाः प्रधानपुरुषेश्वरा इति;
And that the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa, and the Lord, are mutually different from each other.
माहेश्वरास्तु मन्यन्ते –
The Māheśvaras (i.e. the Śaivas, the Pāśu-patas, the Kāruṇika-Siddhāntins and the Kapālikas) on the other hand hold
कार्यकारणयोगविधिदुःखान्ताः पञ्च पदार्थाः पशुपतिनेश्वरेण पशुपाशविमोक्षणायोपदिष्टाः;
That the Lord i.e. the Paśu-pati (the Lord of the creatures) has prescribed five categories, viz. effect (Kārya), the cause (Kāraṇa), union or meditation (Yoga), injunction (Vidhi) and the end of misery (Duḥkhānta), for the purpose of the liberation of creatures from their snares (of adjuncts),
And (they) describe Paśu-pati i.e. the Lord of the creatures as being only the efficient cause (of the world).
तथा वैशेषिकादयोऽपि केचित्कथञ्चित्स्वप्रक्रियानुसारेण
Similarly the Vaiśeṣikas etc., in some way or other, in accordance with the technique of their doctrine,
निमित्तकारणमीश्वरः – इति वर्णयन्ति॥
Speak of the Lord as being an efficient cause only.
अत उत्तरमुच्यते – पत्युरसामञ्जस्यादिति;
So, this is how a reply is given to all that thus — Because of the incongruity involved (in the Lord’s being the efficient cause only),
पत्युरीश्वरस्य प्रधानपुरुषयोरधिष्ठातृत्वेन जगत्कारणत्वं नोपपद्यते।
The Lord’s being merely an efficient cause of the world, viz. as being only a superintendent over the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, is not reasonably sustainable.
How so? Because of the incongruity.
How is it incongruous?
हीनमध्यमोत्तमभावेन हि प्राणिभेदान्विदधत ईश्वरस्य
(We reply) Inasmuch as the Lord in creating this diversity amongst the creatures, viz., as between the low, intermediate and high grades of creatures,
रागद्वेषादिदोषप्रसक्तेः अस्मदादिवदनीश्वरत्वं प्रसज्येत।
Would be rendered quite as unlordlike as ourselves, by reason of his being contaminated with the fault of likes and dislikes.
प्राणिकर्मापेक्षित्वाददोष इति चेत्,
If it be said that no such fault would attach, because it all would depend upon the difference in the actions of these creatures,
न; कर्मेश्वरयोः प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्तयितृत्वे इतरेतराश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात्।
(We reply) — No, because supposing actions and the Lord have the relationship of, the former being those that are promoted (by the Lord) and the latter being the promoter (of such actions), there would be the predicament of the fault of ‘reciprocal interdependence’ (Itaretarāśrayatva) (i.e. a logical see-saw).
न, अनादित्वात्, इति चेत्,
If it be urged, that such fault would not supervene because of the beginninglessness (of transmigratory existence),
न; वर्तमानकालवदतीतेष्वपि कालेष्वितरेतराश्रयदोषाविशेषाद्
(We reply) — No, because, inasmuch as the fault of reciprocal interdependence would be common, in being quite as applicable to the past as to the present,
The maxim of the chain of the blind leading the blind would apply.
अपि च ‘प्रवर्तनालक्षणा दोषाः’ इति न्यायवित्समयः;
Besides, it is a tenet of those who are experts in the Nyāya system that “Faults such as passion (Rāga) and aversions (Dveṣa) have the characteristic of impelling (a person) to action (Pravartanā-lakṣaṇāḥ doṣāḥ)”. (Nyāya Sū. 1.1.18).
न हि कश्चिददोषप्रयुक्तः स्वार्थे परार्थे वा प्रवर्तमानो दृश्यते;
It is observed, that no one is ever impelled to act, either in his own interest or in the interest of others, unless he is so impelled by such faults.
स्वार्थप्रयुक्त एव च सर्वो जनः परार्थेऽपि प्रवर्तत इत्येवमप्यसामञ्जस्यम्,
Even he who acts in the interest of others, is impelled to act in that way, precisely because of his own interest.
Hence, (if the Māheśvara view were to be accepted) as the Lord would have to be understood to have been impelled to action in his own interest, the predicament of his being rendered unlordlike would take place.
Even if it be understood that the Lord is only a special type of Puruṣa,
Incongruity would attach to the doctrine all the same, because it is understood as a tenet that the Puruṣa is by nature apathetic or indifferent. — 37.
←PrevNext→ सम्बन्धानुपपत्तेश्च॥२.२.३८॥ Sambandhānupapatteś ca.
Sambandha: relation; An-upapatteḥ: because of the impossibility; Ca: and.
🔗 That there is a relation (between the Lord and the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa), is not reasonably sustainable. — 184.108.40.206.2.38 L.1
Again (the fault of) incongruity (does occur).
न हि प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरोऽन्तरेण सम्बन्धं प्रधानपुरुषयोरीशिता;
The Lord who is different from the Pradhāna and the Puruṣa, cannot be their superintendent in the absence of any relation subsisting between them and the Lord.
न तावत्संयोगलक्षणः सम्बन्धः सम्भवति,
In the first place, there could not be a relation by way of contact (Saṃyoga) between them,
Because the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord are all without any parts and all-pervading.
नापि समवायलक्षणः सम्बन्धः,
Nor can a relation of inherence (Samavāya) subsist,
As it is not possible to say that the Lord is the abode and the other two have their abode in the Lord (like a piece of cloth and its threads).
नाप्यन्यः कश्चित्कार्यगम्यः सम्बन्धः शक्यते कल्पयितुम्,
And as it is not yet established that the Lord is the cause of the other two which are his effects, it is not possible to imagine any other relation (between them) which can be understood from the effects,
Because even the existence of a relation of cause and effect (between them) has not yet been established.
ब्रह्मवादिनः कथमिति चेत्,
If it be asked (by the opponent) — How is it in the case of those who are the adherents of the doctrine of Brahman?
न; तस्य तादात्म्यलक्षणसम्बन्धोपपत्तेः;
(We reply) — There is no difficulty in our system. In our system, a relation of the nature of complete identity (Tād-ātmya) (between them i.e. the Lord and His illusion-causing power, Māyā) is reasonably sustainable.
अपि च आगमबलेन ब्रह्मवादी कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति
Besides, as the adherents of the doctrine of Brahman, explain the nature of the cause etc., on the authority of the Scriptures,
नावश्यं तस्य यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति नियमोऽस्ति;
There could be no rule, by which he would be obliged to understand all things, only, as he perceives them.
परस्य तु दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतः
There is a special obligation on the opponent of the Vedānta (the Sāṅkhya) to understand things as he perceives them,
As he explains the nature of the cause etc., on the strength of an illustration (Dṛṣṭānta) i.e. a parallel instance.
परस्यापि सर्वज्ञप्रणीतागमसद्भावात् समानमागमबलमिति चेत्,
If he says, that the authority of the Āgama (as propounded by Kapila etc.) is equally available to him as the Āgama is promulgated by the Omniscient one,
न; इतरेतराश्रयप्रसङ्गात् –
We reply — No, in his case there occurs the predicament of the fault of mutual interdependence,
Inasmuch as the Omniscience of the Omniscient one can be established only as a result of the belief in the Āgama, and a belief in the Āgama can be established only as a result of the belief in the Omniscient one.
Hence the hypothesis about the Lord is not reasonably sustainable, so far as the followers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems are concerned.
A similar fault of incongruity can, in so far as it is possible, be advanced
Against all the other extra-Vedic conceptions about the Lord. — 38.
←PrevNext→ अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च॥२.२.३९॥ Adhiṣṭhānānupapatteś ca.
Adhiṣṭhāna: rulership; Anupapatteḥ: because of the impossibility; Ca: and.
🔗 (The tenet that) the Lord is the superintendent, is not reasonably sustainable. — 220.127.116.11.2.39 L.1
This is again how the conception of the Tārkikas (Logicians) about the Lord is not reasonably sustainable.
स हि परिकल्प्यमानः, कुम्भकार इव मृदादीनि, प्रधानादीन्यधिष्ठाय प्रवर्तयेत्;
The Lord, even if he be as he is conceived to be by the Logicians, can work only by having the Pradhāna (as the material), even as a potter works on the earth (as the material),
But this is not reasonably sustainable.
न ह्यप्रत्यक्षं रूपादिहीनं च प्रधानमीश्वरस्याधिष्ठेयं सम्भवति,
It is not possible that the Lord can work by having the Pradhāna (as his material) as the Pradhāna (according to them) is devoid of any form and is not capable of being perceived,
And because of its being quite dissimilar to earth etc. — 39.
←PrevNext→ करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः॥२.२.४०॥ Karaṇavac cen na bhogādibhyaḥ.
Karaṇavat: like the senses; Cet: if, if it be conceived. Na: not (no it cannot be accepted); Bhoga-ādibhyaḥ: because of enjoyment, etc.
🔗 If it be said, that as the sense-organs (are ruled by the Jīva-Self) so is the Pradhāna by the Lord, (we say) — no, the Lord (in that case) would be, liable to experience pleasure and pain (Bhoga). — 18.104.22.168.2.40 L.1
स्यादेतत् – यथा करणग्रामं चक्षुरादिकमप्रत्यक्षं रूपादिहीनं च पुरुषोऽधितिष्ठति,
(If it be said) May be, just as a man (i.e. the Jīva-Self) controls and uses the unperceivable and formless set of sense-organs such as the sense of sight etc.,
Even so, may the Lord supervise over the Pradhāna —
But even so, it is not reasonably sustainable.
भोगादिदर्शनाद्धि करणग्रामस्य अधिष्ठितत्वं गम्यते;
That such a set of sense-organs is ruled over (by a person) is understood from the fact, that a person experiences pleasure and pain through them,
न चात्र भोगादयो दृश्यन्ते;
But here (in the case of the Pradhāna and the Lord) no such experience of pleasure and pain is actually observed,
करणग्रामसाम्ये च अभ्युपगम्यमाने
And if it be understood that the case is similar to the set of sense-organs,
संसारिणामिव ईश्वरस्यापि भोगादयः प्रसज्येरन्॥
The Lord would also be liable to experience pleasure and pain, quite as much, as a man in the condition of transmigratory existence, is subject to such experience of pleasure and pain.
अन्यथा वा सूत्रद्वयं व्याख्यायते –
Or, alternatively, the two Sūtras can be explained in another way: —
By the previous Sūtra, viz. “This is why (the Lord’s being the superintendent) is not reasonably sustainable”,
It is meant that, that the Lord is as he is conceived to be by the Tārkikas, is not reasonably sustainable.
साधिष्ठानो हि लोके सशरीरो राजा राष्ट्रस्येश्वरो दृश्यते,
In the ordinary world, for instance, it is as one possessing the support of a body, that a king is observed to be the ruler of the nation,
And not as one without any such physical basis,
अतश्च तद्दृष्टान्तवशेनादृष्टमीश्वरं कल्पयितुमिच्छतः
So, he who would infer the Lord on the strength of such parallel instance,
ईश्वरस्यापि किञ्चिच्छरीरं करणायतनं वर्णयितव्यं स्यात्;
Would have to explain how the Lord comes to be possessed of a body as an abode of the sense-organs.
न च तद्वर्णयितुं शक्यते,
But it is not possible to explain it that way,
Because a body can come into existence only after creation takes place,
And prior to such creation, the existence of a body is not reasonably sustainable.
निरधिष्ठानत्वे चेश्वरस्य प्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तिः,
And if the Lord has no such physical basis (such as a body) it is not reasonably sustainable that he could be the promoter (of the world),
एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्।
Because that is how it is observed to be, in the ordinary world.
‘करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः’ – अथ
As regards the present Sūtra (it is said) —
लोकदर्शनानुसारेण ईश्वरस्यापि किञ्चित्करणानामायतनं शरीरं कामेन कल्प्येत –
Now, if on the analogy of what is observed in the ordinary world, it is imagined, that the Lord has, at his own will, equipped himself with a body to serve as an abode for the sense-organs,
Even this is not reasonably sustainable,
सशरीरत्वे हि सति संसारिवद्भोगादिप्रसङ्गात्
Because supposing the Lord does possess a body, then, as in the case of an ordinary person in the condition of transmigratory existence,
There would be the predicament of the Lord being liable to experience pleasure and pain, quite as much as such a man is, and it would then mean that the Lord also would be rendered quite unlordlike. — 40.
Antavattvam: finiteness, terminableness, subject to destruction; A-sarva-jñatā: absence of Omniscience; Vā: or.
🔗 Or it may mean that the Lord is liable to come to an end or that he is not Omniscient. — 22.214.171.124.2.41 L.1
This is again why the Lord’s being as he is conceived to be by the Tārkikas (Logicians), is not reasonably sustainable.
स हि सर्वज्ञस्तैरभ्युपगम्यतेऽनन्तश्च;
अनन्तं च प्रधानम्, अनन्ताश्च पुरुषाः
मिथो भिन्ना अभ्युपगम्यन्ते।
They hold that the Lord is omniscient and infinite (imperishable)
And also that the Pradhāna and the Selfs also are infinite (imperishable)
And different from each other.
तत्र सर्वज्ञेनेश्वरेण प्रधानस्य पुरुषाणामात्मनश्चेयत्ता परिच्छिद्येत वा,
Then (the question arises), as to whether, the Lord has himself determined his own dimension (i.e. limit, Iyattā) and the dimensions of the Pradhāna and the Selfs (to be of such and such definite extent),
न वा परिच्छिद्येत?
Or whether, it has not been so determined.
उभयथापि दोषोऽनुषक्त एव।
Considered either way a fault is inevitable.
How so? In the case of the first alternative
(Viz. that the dimension has been determined by the Lord), the Pradhāna, the Puruṣa and the Lord would be rendered liable to come to an end,
एवं लोके दृष्टत्वात्;
Because it is observed to be so in the ordinary world
यद्धि लोके इयत्तापरिच्छिन्नं वस्तु घटादि,