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Brahma Sūtra Catus-Sūtrī
translated by V. M. Apte (1960)


(Only for 1st Four Sūtras)

(Upaniṣad Śānti Mantras)

Samanvaya Adhyāya (Chapter):

Adhikaraṇas (Topics):

Bhāṣya Introduction 1. Jijñāsā (1.1.1) 2. Janma-ādi (1.1.2) 3. Śāstra-yonitva (1.1.3) 4. Samanvaya (1.1.4)


Format by A.K. Aruna, 2021 ver.1.0: UpasanaYoga. If downloaded, requires installed Devanāgarī Siddhanta1.ttf font, downloadable from UpasanaYoga. If run from UpasanaYoga website, it alternatively can use online Web Font. Any Devanāgarī in parentheses () is an alternate reading of text in Red. Top button "Collapse all panels" contracts the view in which individual items (the four Adhikaraṇas) can be re-expanded, or again the top button "Restore all panels" reloads page to original view. The same for "Show all translits", but the "Hide all translits" does not restore the page, as it only toggles all the individual "Translit" buttons from whatever state they were currently on.
The commentary of Ādi-Śaṅkara's Bhāṣyam covering the introduction and the first four Sūtras is called the Catus-Sūtrī. Devanagarī text source is the Sharada Peetham, Sringeri (advaitasharada.sringeri.net). The English translation is from V. M. Apte. It comprises for the students of the Upaniṣads an excellent introduction and summary of the main purport of the Upaniṣads.

by A.K. Aruna
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1. L.1 युष्मदस्मत्-प्रत्ययगोचरयोर्विषय-विषयिणोः
तमःप्रकाशवद् विरुद्धस्वभावयोः
इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तौ सिद्धायाम्,

Yuṣmad-asmat-pratyaya-gocarayoḥ viṣaya-viṣayiṇoḥ
Tamaḥ-prakāśavad viruddha-sva-bhāvayoḥ
Itaretara-bhāva-anupapattau siddhāyām—
That the sense-object (Viṣaya) and the subject of sense-objects (Viṣayin) which are within the range of the denotative power of the words ‘Yuṣmat’ (‘You’, including the Lord as an object of my prayers) and ‘Asmat’ (‘I’) respectively,
And have natures as opposed to each other as darkness and light,
Cannot transform themselves into each other, being (a matter) firmly established,

1. L.2 तद्धर्माणामपि सुतराम् इतरेतरभावानुपपत्तिः —
Tad-dharmāṇām api sutarām itaretara-bhāva-anupapattiḥ—
The attributes of these two also, with a greater reason therefore, cannot transform themselves into the nature of each other.

1. L.3 इत्यतः अस्मत्-प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युष्मत्-प्रत्ययगोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्धर्माणां चाध्यासः,
तद्विपर्ययेण विषयिणस्तद्धर्माणां च विषयेऽध्यासः
मिथ्येति भवितुं युक्तम्।

Iti ataḥ asmat-pratyaya-gocare viṣayiṇi cid-ātmake yuṣmat-pratyaya-gocarasya viṣayasya tad-dharmāṇāṃ ca adhyāsaḥ,
Tad-viparyayeṇa viṣayiṇaḥ tad-dharmāṇāṃ ca viṣaye'dhyāsaḥ,
Mithyeti bhavituṃ yuktam—
And therefore, the [mutual] superimposition of the sense-objects which are within the range of the denotative power of the word ‘Yuṣmat’ and its attributes, on the subject of sense-objects which is within the range of the denotative power of the word ‘Asmat’ and has pure intelligence as its self, and its attributes,
[And the superimposition in the reverse order, i.e. of the subject (Viṣayin) and its attributes on the object (Viṣaya), – Trans. adapted from Panoli]
Is necessarily unreal (Mithyā).

1. L.4 तथापि (or तथाहि)
अन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकताम् अन्योन्य-धर्मांश्चाध्यस्य
इतरेतराविवेकेन अत्यन्त-विविक्तयोर्धर्मधर्मिणोः,
मिथ्याज्ञान-निमित्तः,
सत्यानृते मिथुनीकृत्य, ‘अहमिदम्’ ‘ममेदम्’ इति
नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकव्यवहारः॥

Tathāpi (or Tathāhi)
Anyo'nyasminn anyo'nya-ātmakatām anyo'nya-dharmāṃś ca adhyasya
Itaretara-avivekena atyanta-viviktayoḥ dharma-dharmiṇoḥ,
Mithyā-jñāna-nimittaḥ,
Satya-anṛte mithunī-kṛtya, ‘aham idam, mamedam’ iti
Naisargiko'yaṃ loka-vyavahāraḥ—
All the same,
It is a natural course of worldly conduct
Resulting from false-ignorance (i.e. false-knowledge, Mithyā-jñāna) (in a person),
To superimpose the sense-objects and the subject of sense-objects which are absolutely different from each other,
And their respective attributes, mutually on each other, through failure to discriminate or distinguish either of them from each other,
And by coupling truth and untruth together and to imagine thus — ‘I am this’, ‘This is mine’
[Note: Apte consistently applies this translation of ‘Mithyājñāna’ as being ‘Mithyā-ajñāna false-ignorance’, instead of the usual and more traditional ‘Mithyā-jñāna false-knowledge’, but ‘false-ignorance’ seems to be a confusing double negative, like ‘false lack of knowledge, or false misunderstanding’. As with the word ‘Ākāsa’ rendered as ‘space’ instead of ‘ether’, we choose in the following translation to change the rendering of this word to be the less confusing expressionn ‘false-knowledge’ instead].

अथ अध्यास-लक्षण-भाष्यम्

1. L.5 आह — कोऽयमध्यासो नामेति।
Āha — ko'yam adhyāso nāmeti—
(The opponent asks — ) What indeed then, is this superimposition any way?

1. L.6 उच्यते — स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः।
Ucyate — smṛti-rūpaḥ paratra pūrva-dṛṣṭa-avabhāsaḥ—
We reply — It is the unreal manifestation of some thing previously perceived and which is of the nature of remembrance, on some thing else.

1. L.7 तं केचिद्, ‘अन्यत्रान्यधर्माध्यासः’ इति वदन्ति।
Taṃ kecid, ‘anyatra anya-dharma-adhyāsaḥ’ iti vadanti—
Some describe it as the superimposition of the attributes of one thing, on some other thing.

1. L.8 केचित्तु, ‘यत्र यदध्यासः, तद्विवेकाग्रह-निबन्धनो भ्रमः’ इति।
Kecit tu, ‘yatra yad-adhyāsaḥ, tad-viveka-agraha-nibandhano bhramaḥ’ iti—
(Some describe it) as the confusion based on the inability to discriminate between that which is superimposed on some thing else, and that some thing else on which it is superimposed.

1. L.9 अन्ये तु. ‘यत्र यदध्यासः, तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनाम् आचक्षते’।
Anye tu, ‘yatra yad-adhyāsaḥ, tasyaiva viparīta-dharmatva-kalpanām ācakṣate’—
Others again describe it as the fictitious assumption in a thing, of attributes contrary to the attributes of that thing on which some thing else is superimposed.

1. L.10 सर्वथापि तु अन्यस्यान्यधर्मावभासतां न व्यभिचरति।
Sarvathā api tu anyasya anya-dharma-avabhāsatāṃ na vyabhicarati—
All the same, none of these definitions differ in any way as to the generally unreal assumption about the attributes of one thing as being the attributes of some other thing.

1. L.11 तथा च लोकेऽनुभवः — शुक्तिका हि रजतवद् अवभासते, एकश्चन्द्रः सद्वितीयवदिति॥
Tathā ca loke'nubhavaḥ — śuktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate, ekaś candraḥ sa-dvitīyavad iti—
Even so is our experience in the ordinary world. A mother-of-pearl appears as if it is silver. The moon, one as she is, appears as if she is two moons.

अथ अध्यास-सम्भावना-भाष्यम्

1. L.12 कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषयेऽध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम्?
Kathaṃ punaḥ pratyag-ātmani aviṣaye'dhyāso viṣaya-tad-dharmāṇām—
(Says the opponent — ) How can there be a superimposition of a sense-object and its attributes on the Universal Self (Pratyag-ātmā) which is not an object?

1. L.13 सर्वो हि पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरम् अध्यस्यति;
युष्मत्प्रत्ययापेतस्य च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽविषयत्वं ब्रवीषि।

Sarvo hi puro'vasthita eva viṣaye viṣaya-antaram adhyasyati;
Yuṣmat-pratyaya-apetasya ca pratyag-ātmano'viṣayatvaṃ bravīṣi—
Everybody superimposes one sense-object on another which is right before one’s eyes,
While you have mentioned (earlier), that the Universal Self to which the word ‘Yuṣmat’ is not applicable, is not a sense-object.

समाधानम्

1. L.14 उच्यते — न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्यय-विषयत्वात्, अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः;
Ucyate — na tāvad ayam eka-antena aviṣayaḥ, asmat-pratyaya-viṣayatvāt, aparokṣatvāc ca pratyag-ātma-prasiddheḥ—
We reply — The Universal Self is not a non-object in the extreme sense, because it is an object denoted by the word ‘Asmat’, and it is also well-known that the Universal Self can be directly and intuitively perceived.

1. L.15 न चायमस्ति नियमः — पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरम् अध्यसितव्यमिति;
Na ca ayam asti niyamaḥ — puro'vasthita eva viṣaye viṣaya-antaram adhyasitavyam iti—
There is no such hard and fast rule, that it is only on an object right before one’s eyes that another object should be superimposed.

1. L.16 अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालाः तलमलिनतादि अध्यस्यन्ति;
Apratyakṣe'pi hi ākāśe bālāḥ tala-malinatā-ādi adhyasyanti—
Ignorant people superimpose the attributes of concavity (Tala) and dustiness etc. on the Ākāśa (Space) which is not directly visible.

1. L.17 एवमविरुद्धः प्रत्यगात्मन्यपि अनात्माध्यासः॥
Evam aviruddhaḥ pratyag-ātmani api anātma-adhyāsaḥ—
Therefore to superimpose the non-self on the Universal Self is not inconsistent.

अथ विद्या-अविद्या-विवेक-भाष्यम्

1. L.18 तमेतमेवंलक्षणम् अध्यासं पण्डिता अविद्येति मन्यन्ते।
तद्विवेकेन च वस्तुस्वरूपावधारणं विद्यामाहुः।

Tam etam evaṃ-lakṣaṇam adhyāsaṃ paṇḍitā ‘avidyā’ iti manyante;
Tad-vivekena ca vastu-svarūpa-avadhāraṇaṃ vidyām āhuḥ—
Learned men consider superimposition of this nature as Nescience (Avidyā)
And they (further) say that knowledge (Vidyā) is the determination of the real nature of a thing by discrimination.

1. L.19 तत्रैवं सति, यत्र यदध्यासः, तत्कृतेन दोषेण गुणेन वा अणुमात्रेणापि स न सम्बध्यते।
Tatraivaṃ sati, yatra yad-adhyāsaḥ, tat-kṛtena doṣeṇa guṇena vā aṇumātreṇa api sa na saṃbadhyate—
This being so, that on which some other thing is superimposed is not in the least affected by the faults and merits of the thing superimposed.

अथ व्यवहारमात्रस्य-अविद्यकत्व-प्रतिपादकं भाष्यम्

1. L.20 तमेतमविद्याख्यम् आत्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय-व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः, सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेधमोक्ष-पराणि
Tam etam avidyā-ākhyam ātma-anātmanoḥ itaretara-adhyāsaṃ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahārā laukikā vaidikāś ca pravṛttāḥ, sarvāṇi ca śāstrāṇi vidhi-pratiṣedha-mokṣa-parāṇi—
And it is by entertaining i.e. adopting this reciprocal superimposition of the Self and the non-self, that all worldly conduct and Vedic actions depending on the means-of-proof (Pramāṇa) and the objects of knowledge, and all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions, known as Nescience, [as well as Liberation, Mokṣa] are promoted.

आक्षेपः

1. L.21 कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति,
Kathaṃ punaḥ avidyāvad-viṣayāṇi pratyakṣa-ādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti—
How again (says the opponent) are the means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc. and the Scriptures, concerned with that which is the object of Nescience?

समाधानम्

1. L.22 उच्यते — देहेन्द्रियादिषु अहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः।
Ucyate — dehendriya-ādiṣu ahaṃ-mama-abhimāna-rahitasya pramātṛtva-anupapattau pramāṇa-pravṛtti-anupapatteḥ—
We reply — Because in the case of a person who has no such false sense of ‘I’ or ‘Mine’ with regard to the body and the sense-organs, there is no possibility of his being desirous of knowledge, as there is no possibility of the operation of the means of right knowledge.

1. L.23 न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः सम्भवति।
न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेण इन्द्रियाणां व्यापारः सम्भवति
न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते।

Na hi indriyāṇi anupādāya pratyakṣa-ādi-vyavahāraḥ saṃbhavati.
Na ca adhiṣṭhānam antareṇa indriyāṇāṃ vyavahāraḥ saṃbhavati
Na ca anadhyasta-ātma-bhāvena dehena kaścid vyāpriyate—
Without the employment of the sense-organs, perception is not possible,
And without a basis (such as a body) the operation of senses organs is not possible,
And nobody ever acts or is concerned with a mere body which is not superimposed by the notion of the Self.

1. L.24 न चैतस्मिन् सर्वस्मिन्नसति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते।
न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति।

Na caitasmin sarvasminn asati asaṅgasya ātmanaḥ pramātṛtvam upapadyate;
Na ca pramātṛtvam antareṇa pramāṇa-pravṛttiḥ asti—
Neither in the absence of all this (i.e. mutual superimposition), is it possible either for the Self which is free from all contact, to be a knowing agent,
Nor in the absence of the condition of a knowing agent is any operation of the means of right knowledge possible.

1. L.25 तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति।
Tasmād avidyāvad-viṣayāṇi eva pratyakṣa-ādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ceti—
Therefore, means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc., and the Śāstras have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience.

1. L.26 पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषात्।
Paśu-ādibhiś ca aviśeṣāt—
This a person has in common with the animals etc.

1. L.27 यथा हि पश्वादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति, शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते;
यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य ‘मां हन्तुम् अयमिच्छति’ इति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिम् उपलभ्य तं प्रति अभिमुखीभवन्ति;

Yathā hi paśu-ādayaḥ śabda-ādibhiḥ śrotra-ādīnāṃ saṃbandhe sati, śabdha-ādi-vijñāne prati-kūle jāte tato nivartante, anu-kūle ca pravartante;
Yathā daṇḍodyata-karaṃ puruṣam abhimukham upalabhya ‘māṃ hantum ayam icchati’ iti palāyitum ārabhante, harita-tṛṇa-pūrṇa-pāṇim upalabhya taṃ prati abhimukhī-bhavanti—
Just as animals etc., when sounds are in contact with the ear etc., and the knowledge of the same is not favourable, go away from them, and when it is favourable, are attracted towards them,
As for instance, finding in front of themselves a man holding up a stick, they begin to run away from him, thinking that he wishes to strike them, but when they find him in front of themselves with his hands full of green grass, approach him;

1. L.28 एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान् प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते।
Evaṃ puruṣā api vyutpanna-cittāḥ krūra-dṛṣṭīn ākrośataḥ khaṅgodyata-karān balavata upalabhya tato nivartante, tad-viparītān prati pravartante—
Similarly men even when they are able to discriminate properly, (finding before them) strong men who have swords in their upraised hands and who have a fierce aspect, and who are shouting wildly, go away from them, and approach those who are of an opposite nature,

1. L.29 अतः समानः पश्वादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः।
Ataḥ samānaḥ paśu-ādibhiḥ puruṣāṇāṃ pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāraḥ—
And thus, the employment of the means of right knowledge and the objects of knowledge is common both to animals and men.

1. L.30 पश्वादीनां च प्रसिद्धः अविवेकपूर्वकः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः।
Paśu-ādīnāṃ ca prasiddaḥ aviveka-pūrvakaḥ pratyakṣa-ādi-vyavahāraḥ—
Now, the employment of the means of right knowledge such as direct perception etc. by animals is well-known as being due to their failure to discriminate properly.

1. L.31 तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद् व्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादि-व्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते।
Tat-sāmānya-darśanād vyutpattimatām api puruṣāṇāṃ pratyakṣa-ādi-vyavahāraḥ tat-kālaḥ samāna iti niścīyate—
Similarly, it is thus determined, that even in the case of properly discriminating persons their employment of the means of right knowledge such as direct perception, which is seen to be common to them with animals, is at similar times, also similar.

शास्त्र-व्यवहारस्य अप्य् अविद्या-पुरस्सरत्व-प्रदर्शन-भाष्यम्

1. L.32 शास्त्रीये तु व्यवहारे यद्यपि बुद्धिपूर्वकारी नाविदित्वा आत्मनः परलोकसम्बन्धम् अधिक्रियते,
तथापि न वेदान्तवेद्यम् अशनायाद्यतीतम् अपेतब्रह्मक्षत्रादिभेदम् असंसार्यात्मतत्त्वम् अधिकारेऽपेक्ष्यते,
अनुपयोगात् अधिकारविरोधाच्च।

Śāstrīye tu vyavahāre yadi api buddhi-pūrva-kārī na aviditvā ātmanaḥ para-loka-saṃbandham adhikriyate,
Tathā api na vedānta-vedyam aśanāya-ādi-atītam apeta-brahma-kṣatra-ādi-bhedam asaṃsāri-ātma-tattvam adhikāre'pekṣyate,
Anupayogāt adhikāra-virodhāc ca—
In the case of activities based on the Scriptures (such as sacrifices etc.) though a man motivated by intelligence is not competent to act without the knowledge of the relation of the Self with the world beyond (Para-loka),
Yet the knowledge of the Self which can only be acquired from Vedānta, and is beyond the physical necessities of eating etc., and is beyond the distinctions of Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya and which is not of the nature of transmigratory existence, is not necessary for a man for attaining that competency,
Because it is useless and even opposed to such competency (for performing religious acts).

1. L.33 प्राक् च तथाभूतात्मविज्ञानात् प्रवर्तमानं शास्त्रम् अविद्यावद्विषयत्वं नातिवर्तते।
Prāk ca tathā-bhūta-ātma-vijñānāt pravartamānaṃ śāstram avidyāvad-viṣayatvaṃ na ativartate—
The Śāstra which comes into operation before the realization of such nature of the Self does not exceed its jurisdiction of being concerned only with that which is affected by Nescience.

1. L.34 तथा हि — ‘ब्राह्मणो यजेत’ इत्यादीनि शास्त्राण्यात्मनि वर्णाश्रमवयोऽवस्थादि-विशेषाध्यासम् आश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते।
Tathā hi — ‘brāhmaṇo yajeta’ ityādīni śāstrāṇi ātmani varṇa-āśrama-vayo'vasthā-ādi-viśeṣa-adhyāsam āśritya pravartante—
Thus Scriptural injunctions such as “a Brāhmaṇa should sacrifice” operate by depending on this superimposition on the Self, of caste, stage of life (Āśrama), age and special conditions.

अथ अध्यास-प्रकार-प्रदर्शन-भाष्यम्

1. L.35 अध्यासो नाम अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरित्यवोचाम।
Adhyāso nāma atasmiṃs tad-buddhiḥ iti avocāma—
We have already said that superimposition is the notion of that in something which is not that.

1. L.36 तद्यथा — पुत्रभार्यादिषु विकलेषु सकलेषु वा ‘अहमेव विकलः सकलो वा’ इति बाह्यधर्मानात्मन्यध्यस्यति;
तथा देहधर्मान् ‘स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहं गौरोऽहं तिष्ठामि गच्छामि लङ्घयामि च’ इति;

Tad yathā — putra-bhāryā-ādiṣu vi-kaleṣu sa-kaleṣu vā ‘aham eva vi-kalaḥ, sa-kalo vā’ iti bāhya-dharmān ātmani adhyasyati;
Tathā deha-dharmān ‘sthūlo'ham kṛśo'ham gauro'ham tiṣṭhāmi gacchāmi laṅghayāmi ca’ iti;—
Just as it is, for instance, when a person superimposes on his Self attributes external to his own Self, i.e. when his son or wife etc., are in sound health or otherwise, he considers himself to be similarly sound in health or otherwise,
Or when he superimposes the attributes of his body on his Self, thus — “I am Stout or lean or fair, or I am standing or going or crossing over”,

1. L.37 तथेन्द्रियधर्मान् — ‘मूकः काणः क्लीबो बधिरोऽन्धोऽहम्’ इति;
तथान्तःकरणधर्मान् कामसङ्कल्प-विचिकित्साध्यवसायादीन्।

Tathendriya-dharmān — ‘mūkaḥ kāṇaḥ klībo badhiro'ndho'ham’ iti;
Tathā antaḥkaraṇa-dharmān kāma-saṃkalpa-vicikitsā-adhyavasāya-ādīn—
Or when he superimposes the attributes of his sense-organs on his Self, thus — “I am dumb or squint-eyed or impotent or deaf or blind”,
Or when he superimposes on his own Self the attributes of his internal sense-organ (Antaḥ-karaṇa) i.e. the mind, viz., desire, intention, doubt,' determination etc.

1. L.38 एवमहंप्रत्ययिनम् अशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं
तद्विपर्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति।

Evam ahaṃ-pratyayinam aśeṣa-sva-pracāra-sākṣiṇi pratyag-ātmani adhyasya taṃ ca pratyag-ātmānaṃ sarva-sākṣiṇaṃ
Tad-viparyayeṇa antaḥkaraṇa-ādiṣu adhyasyati—
In this manner he Superimposes that which experiences the ‘I’ or ‘Ego’ viz., the minds on the Universal Self which is a witness of all the processes of the mind,
And conversely superimposes the Universal Self on the internal sense-organ i.e. the mind.

अथ अध्यास-विचारोपसंहार-भाष्यम्

1. L.39 एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्तकः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः।
Evam ayam anādiḥ ananto naisargiko'dhyāso mithyā-pratyaya-rūpaḥ kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-pravartakaḥ sarva-loka-pratyakṣaḥ—
It is in this manner, that there is this beginningless and endless natural process of superimposition, which is of the nature of erroneous conception and which promotes the notion of the Self as being an agent and experiencer, which is perceived by all.’

अथ मीमांसा-अवकरणिका-भाष्यम्

1. L.40 अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय आत्मैकत्वविद्याप्रतिपत्तये सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते।
Asya anartha-hetoḥ prahāṇāya ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye sarve vedāntā ārabhyante—
It is with a view to destroy this cause of all evil, and for acquiring the knowledge of the unity of the Self, that all Vedānta is begun.

1. L.41 यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानाम्, तथा वयमस्यां शारीरक-मीमांसायां प्रदर्शयिष्यामः।
Yathā ca ayam arthaḥ sarveṣāṃ vedāntānāṃ, tathā vayam asyāṃ śāriraka-mīmāṃsāyāṃ pradarśayiṣyāmaḥ—
How this is the meaning of all Vedānta (texts) we will endeavour to show in this present Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā.

– Bhāṣya Introduction.

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1.1.1 L.1 वेदान्त-मीमांसाशास्त्रस्य व्याचिख्यासितस्येदम् आदिमं सूत्रम् —
Vedānta-mīmāṃsā-śāstrasya vyācikhyāsitasyedam ādimaṃ sūtram—
This is the first Sūtra of the Śāstra of the consideration of Vedānta which is desired to be explained.

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अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा॥१.१.१॥
Athāto brahma-jijñāsā.

Atha: now, then, afterwards; Ataḥ: therefore; Brahma-jijñāsā: a desire for the knowledge of Brahman (the enquiry into the real nature of Brahman).

🔗 Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman (should be taken up). — 1.1.1.

1.1.1 L.2 तत्र अथशब्दः आनन्तर्यार्थः परिगृह्यते; नाधिकारार्थः,
ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वात्;

Tatra atha-śabdaḥ ānantarya-arthaḥ parigṛhyate; na adhikāra-arthaḥ,
Brahma-jijñāsāyā anadhikāryatvāt—
The word ‘Now’ is to be understood as meaning something which follows (after the attainment of the requisite spiritual qualities) and not as something which introduces a subject,
Because the desire to know Brahman is not something which is possible to be introduced as a subject,

1.1.1 L.3 मङ्गलस्य च वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात्;
Maṅgalasya ca vākya-arthe samanvaya-abhāvāt—
Nor can the word mean an auspicious recitation (Maṅgala), as it cannot be properly construed in the meaning of the sentence.

1.1.1 L.4 अर्थान्तरप्रयुक्त एव ह्यथशब्दः श्रुत्या मङ्गलप्रयोजनो भवति;
Artha-antara-prayukta eva hi atha-śabdaḥ śrutyā maṅgala-prayojano bhavati—
The word ‘Now’ which is used in a different meaning, has still the effect of an auspicious recitation by its being merely heard.

1.1.1 L.5 पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षायाश्च फलत आनन्तर्याव्यतिरेकात्।
Pūrva-prakṛta-apekṣāyāś ca phalata ānantarya-avyatirekāt—
The expectation of its referring to something relevant to something else which has gone before is virtually not different from a thing’s following after:

1.1.1 L.6 सति च आनन्तर्यार्थत्वे, यथा धर्मजिज्ञासा पूर्ववृत्तं वेदाध्ययनं नियमेनापेक्षते, एवं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापि यत्पूर्ववृत्तं नियमेनापेक्षते तद्वक्तव्यम्।
Sati ca ānantarya-arthatve, yathā dharma-jijñāsā pūrva-vṛttaṃ veda-adhyayanaṃ niyamena apekṣate, evaṃ brahma-jijñāsā api yat pūrva-vṛttaṃ niyamena apekṣate, tad vaktavyam—
The word being understood then, as indicating something which comes after something else, that something else which is expected to have been accomplished, before the desire for the knowledge of Brahman (can be entertained) needs to be mentioned, just as in the case of a desire for the knowledge of duty (Dharma) the study of the Veda is expected to have been accomplished already, before such desire for the knowledge of duty (is entertained).

1.1.1 L.7 स्वाध्यायानन्तर्यं तु समानम्।
Svādhyāya-ānantaryaṃ tu samānam—
The coming after the study of the Veda, is common (to both).


1.1.1 L.8 नन्विह कर्मावबोधानन्तर्यं विशेषः;
Nanu iha karma-avabodha-ānantaryaṃ viśeṣaḥ—
But, (says the opponent) the peculiar difference Here (i.e. in the case of the desire for the knowledge of Brahman) is its coming after the (previous) knowledge of the acts of duty:


1.1.1 L.9 न; धर्मजिज्ञासायाः प्रागपि अधीतवेदान्तस्य ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपपत्तेः।
Na, dharma-jijñāsāyāḥ prāg api adhīta-vedāntasya brahma-jijñāsopapatteḥ—
No (we reply). In the case of a person who has studied the Vedānta, it is reasonably sustainable, that the desire for the knowledge of Brahman may arise (in him) even before the arising of the desire for the knowledge of duty.

1.1.1 L.10 यथा च हृदयाद्यवदानानाम् आनन्तर्यनियमः, क्रमस्य विवक्षितत्वात्, न तथेह क्रमो विवक्षितः;
Yathā ca hṛdaya-ādi-avadānānām ānantarya-niyamaḥ, kramasya vivakṣitatvāt, na tatheha kramo vivakṣitaḥ—
Here (i.e. in the case of the desire to know Brahman) no particular serial order is intended to be prescribed (by the Scriptures), just as in the case of the desire for the knowledge of duty, a serial order is intended to be prescribed, in as much as there is a rule about (a particular thing) coming after (another particular thing) such as in the cutting off of the heart (of the animal sacrificed) etc.,

1.1.1 L.11 शेषशेषित्वे अधिकृताधिकारे वा प्रमाणाभावात्।
धर्मब्रह्म-जिज्ञासयोः फलजिज्ञास्य-भेदाच्च।

Śeṣa-śeṣitve adhikṛta-adhikāre vā pramāṇa-abhāvāt. dharma-brahma-jijñāsayoḥ phala-jijñāsya-bhedāc ca—
Or as there is no proof to hold, that as between the desire for the knowledge of duty and the desire for the knowledge of Brahman, there is a relation of one thing being the principal thing and another a subsidiary thing, or as there is no proof of any similar relation as between competency (Adhikāra) and a person who has such competency (Adhikṛta),
And, as there is a difference between the desire to know ‘duty’ and the desire to know ‘Brahman’, and also a difference in their results and the things to be known.

1.1.1 L.12 अभ्युदयफलं धर्मज्ञानम्, तच्चानुष्ठानापेक्षम्;
निःश्रेयसफलं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानम्, न चानुष्ठानान्तरापेक्षम्;

Abhyudaya-phalaṃ dharma-jñānaṃ, tac ca anuṣṭhāna-apekṣam;
Niḥśreyasa-phalaṃ tu brahma-vijñānam, na ca anuṣṭhāna-antara-apekṣam—
Knowledge of duty has for its result secular prosperity (Abhyudaya) and it expects the performance of certain actions (such as sacrifices etc.).
The knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, has for its result eternal bliss (Niḥśreyasa) and it does not expect the performance of any act.

1.1.1 L.13 भव्यश्च धर्मो जिज्ञास्यो न ज्ञानकालेऽस्ति, पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रत्वात्;
Bhavyaś ca dharmo jijñāsyo na jñāna-kāle'sti, puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantratvāt—
Religious duty is something which is to be done at some future time and it does not exist at the time of the acquirement of its knowledge and it depends upon the activity of a man.

1.1.1 L.14 इह तु भूतं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यं नित्यत्वान्न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रम्।
Iha tu bhūtaṃ brahma jijñāsyaṃ nityatvān na puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantram—
Here on the other hand it is Brahman which is actually eternally in existence, that is desired to be known, and being thus eternal does not depend upon any action on the part of a man.

1.1.1 L.15 चोदनाप्रवृत्तिभेदाच्च।
Codanā-pravṛtti-bhedāc ca—
Also as between the two there is a difference in the operation of the scriptural injunction.

1.1.1 L.16 या हि चोदना धर्मस्य लक्षणम्, सा स्वविषये नियुञ्जानैव पुरुषमवबोधयति।
Yā hi codanā dharmasya lakṣaṇam, sā sva-viṣaye niyuñjānaiva puruṣam avabodhayati—
Injunction which is a characteristic of religious duty instructs a person and at the same time enjoins him to the performance of the same.

1.1.1 L.17 ब्रह्मचोदना तु पुरुषमवबोधयत्येव केवलम्, अवबोधस्य चोदनाजन्यत्वात्, न पुरुषोऽवबोधे नियुज्यते —
Brahma-codanā tu puruṣam avabodhayati eva kevalam, avabodhasya codanā-janyatvāt, na puruṣo'vabodhe niyujyate—
The science of Brahman however merely instructs a person about Brahman, but it does not enjoin a man to any act of acquiring knowledge.

1.1.1 L.18 यथा अक्षार्थसन्निकर्षेणार्थावबोधे, तद्वत्।
Yathā akṣa-artha-saṃnikarṣeṇa artha-avabodhe, tadvat—
The case is similar to the perception of a sense-object merely by the connection of a sense-organ with its object.

1.1.1 L.19 तस्मात्किमपि वक्तव्यम्, यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपदिश्यत इति।
Tasmāt kim api vaktavyaṃ, yad anantaraṃ brahma-jijñāsopadiśyata iti—
Therefore it is necessary to mention something, after (the accomplishment of) which the inquiry into Brahman is advised.


1.1.1 L.20 उच्यते — नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसम्पत्, मुमुक्षुत्वं च।
Ucyate — nitya-anitya-vastu-vivekaḥ, iha-amutra-artha-bhoga-virāgaḥ, śama-dama-ādi-sādhana-saṃpat, mumukṣutvaṃ ca—
We reply — Discrimination between the eternal thing and a transitory thing, distaste for the enjoyment of things here in this world as well as in the world beyond, equipment of oneself with tranquillity, self-restraint, and such other similar means, and the desire for Final Release.

1.1.1 L.21 तेषु हि सत्सु, प्रागपि धर्मजिज्ञासाया ऊर्ध्वं च, शक्यते ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितुं ज्ञातुं च; न विपर्यये।
Teṣu hi satsu, prāg api dharma-jijñāsāyā ūrdhvaṃ ca, śakyate brahma jijñāsituṃ jñātuṃ ca; na viparyaye—
When these are present, it is possible to desire the knowledge of Brahman and to realize it actually, even before the desire for the knowledge of duty or after it, just as you please.

1.1.1 L.22 तस्मात् अथशब्देन यथोक्तसाधन-सम्पत्त्यानन्तर्यमुपदिश्यते॥
Tasmāt atha-śabdena yathokta-sādhana-saṃpatti-ānantaryam upadiśyate—
The word ‘Now’ indicates — following after the acquisition of the means as mentioned (above).


1.1.1 L.23 अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद् वेद एव अग्निहोत्रादीनां श्रेयःसाधनानाम् अनित्यफलतां दर्शयति —
Ataḥ-śabdo hetu-arthaḥ. yasmād veda eva agnihotra-ādīnāṃ śreyaḥ-sādhanānām anitya-phalatāṃ darśayati—
The word ‘Therefore’ (Ataḥ, in the Sūtra) is indicative of the reason, in as much as the Scriptures themselves disclose the transitory nature of the fruit of such means of acquiring secular prosperity as the Agni-hotra etc., thus —

1.1.1 L.24 ‘तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयत एवमेवामुत्र पुण्यचितो लोकः क्षीयते’ (ChanU.8.1.6) इत्यादिः;
‘Tad yatheha karma-cito lokaḥ kṣīyate, evam eva amutra puṇya-cito lokaḥ kṣīyate’ ityādiḥ—
“As here on earth whatever has been acquired by religious actions perishes, even so, in the next world also whatever is acquired by merit, perishes” (ChanU.8.1.6) etc.

1.1.1 L.25 तथा ब्रह्मज्ञानादपि परं पुरुषार्थं दर्शयति — ‘ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्’ (TaitU.2.1)
Tathā brahma-vijñānād api paraṃ puruṣa-arthaṃ darśayati — ‘brahma-vid āpnoti param’—
Similarly the Scriptures also show that by realizing Brahman the highest aim of man is attained, thus — “One who realizes Brahman attains Final Release.” (TaitUEng.2.1).

1.1.1 L.26 तस्मात् यथोक्तसाधन-सम्पत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या॥
Tasmāt yathokta-sādhana-saṃpatti-anantaraṃ brahma-jijñāsā kartavyā—
Therefore the desire for the knowledge of Brahman should be entertained after the acquisition of the four means referred to above.


1.1.1 L.27 ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा।
Brahmaṇo jijñāsā brahma-jijñāsā—
Brahma-jijñāsā’ is the desire to know Brahman.

1.1.1 L.28 ब्रह्म च वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’ इति।
Brahma ca vakṣyamāṇa-lakṣaṇam ‘janma-ādi asya yataḥ’ iti—
Brahman is that whose definition will be stated presently in the subsequent Sūtra, viz., “From which the origination of creation etc., (comes about).”

1.1.1 L.29 अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरम् आशङ्कितव्यम्।
Ata eva na brahma-śabdasya jāti-ādi-artha-antaram āśaṅkitavyam—
One should not therefore think that the word ‘Brahman’ may mean the Brāhmaṇa caste.

1.1.1 L.30 ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी, न शेषे;
जिज्ञास्यापेक्षत्वाज्जिज्ञासायाः, जिज्ञास्यान्तरानिर्देशाच्च।

Brahmaṇa iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī, na śeṣe;
Jijñāsya-apekṣatvāj jijñāsāyāḥ, jijñāsya-antara-anirdeśāc ca—
The form ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is in grammar the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive of Brahman and not the ‘Śeṣe’ genitive,
Because the desire for the knowledge of Brahman presupposes an object such as Brahman, of which knowledge is to be desired, and because no other such object is here indicated.


1.1.1 L.31 ननु शेषषष्ठीपरिग्रहेऽपि ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं न विरुध्यते, सम्बन्धसामान्यस्य विशेषनिष्ठत्वात्;
Nanu śeṣa-ṣaṣṭhī-parigrahe'pi brahmaṇo jijñāsā-karmatvaṃ na virudhyate, saṃbandha-sāmānyasya viśeṣa-niṣṭhatvāt—
But (says the opponent) even if we understand ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ as a ‘Śeṣe’ genitive, the fact that Brahman is the object of the desire to know is not contradicted, for the general relation (indicated by the genitive case) may base itself on the particular relation (indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive).


1.1.1 L.32 एवमपि प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मणः कर्मत्वमुत्सृज्य, सामान्यद्वारेण परोक्षं कर्मत्वं कल्पयतो, व्यर्थः प्रयासः स्यात्।
Evam api pratyakṣaṃ brahmaṇaḥ karmatvam utsṛjya, sāmānya-dvāreṇa parokṣaṃ karmatvaṃ kalpayato, vyarthaḥ prayāsaḥ syāt—
We reply — In giving up Brahman as the object directly indicated (by understanding ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ as the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive) and then by accepting it as the object indicated, in an indirect way (as indicated by the ‘Śeṣe’ genitive) you will be taking needless trouble.

1.1.1 L.33 न व्यर्थः, ब्रह्माश्रिताशेषविचार-प्रतिज्ञानार्थत्वादिति चेत्,
Na vyarthaḥ, brahma-āśrita-aśeṣa-vicāra-pratijñāna-arthatvād iti cet—
If the opponent were to say that it would not be undertaking needless trouble (in understanding ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ as the ‘Śeṣe’ genitive) as it would mean the desire to know all that which is dependent on the word Brahman,

1.1.1 L.34 न; प्रधानपरिग्रहे तदपेक्षितानाम् अर्थाक्षिप्तत्वात्।
Na, pradhāna-parigrahe tad-apekṣitānām artha-ākṣiptatvāt—
We reply — no, because when we accept the principal thing (as indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive) it also necessarily implies that all those secondary things meant by the word Brahman, are included in the principal thing.

1.1.1 L.35 ब्रह्म हि ज्ञानेनाप्तुम् इष्टतमत्वात् प्रधानम्।
Brahma hi jñānena āptum iṣṭatamatvāt pradhānam—
Brahman being the most desirable thing to be realized by knowledge, is of course the principal thing.

1.1.1 L.36 तस्मिन्प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृहीते, यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति, तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येवेति न पृथक्सूत्रयितव्यानि।
Tasmin pradhāne jijñāsā-karmaṇi parigṛhīte, yaiḥ jijñāsitaiḥ vinā brahma jijñāsitaṃ na bhavati, tāni artha-ākṣiptāni eveti na pṛthak-sūtrayitavyāni—
When that principal thing is once accepted as the object of the desire to know, all those other (secondary) things, without desiring to know which Brahman cannot be properly desired to be known, are necessarily implied, and need not be separately mentioned in the Sūtra.

1.1.1 L.37 यथा ‘राजासौ गच्छति’ इत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति, तद्वत्।
Yathā ‘rājā asau gacchati’ iti ukte sa-parivārasya rājño gamanam uktaṃ bhavati, tadvat—
For when we say ‘The king is passing by’, it implies that the passing by of the king along with his retinue is meant.

1.1.1 L.38 श्रुत्यनुगमाच्च।
Śruti-anugamāc ca—
It (i.e. that Brahman is the object as indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive) is in consonance with the Scriptures.

1.1.1 L.39 ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (TaitU.3.1) इत्याद्याः श्रुतयः
‘तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्म’ (TaitU.3.1) इति
प्रत्यक्षमेव ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासाकर्मत्वं दर्शयन्ति। तच्च कर्मणिषष्ठीपरिग्रहे सूत्रेणानुगतं भवति।

‘Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ ityādyāḥ śrutayaḥ
‘Tad vijijñāsasva tad brahma’ iti
Pratyakṣam eva brahmaṇo jijñāsā-karmatvaṃ darśayanti. tac ca karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī-parigrahe sūtreṇa anugataṃ bhavati—
The Scriptural passages “That from which all these things are born” (TaitUEng.3.1) etc.
And “Desire to know that, that is Brahman” (TaitUEng.3.1)
Actually indicate that Brahman is the object indicated by the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive and that alone will be in consonance with the Sūtra.

1.1.1 L.40 तस्माद्ब्रह्मण इति कर्मणि षष्ठी॥
Tasmād brahmaṇa iti karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī—
Therefore the form ‘Brahmaṇaḥ’ is the ‘Karmaṇi’ genitive.


1.1.1 L.41 ज्ञातुम् इच्छा जिज्ञासा।
Jñātum icchā jijñāsā—
Jijñāsā’ means the desire to know.

1.1.1 L.42 अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्याया इच्छायाः कर्म, फलविषयत्वादिच्छायाः।
Avagati-paryantaṃ jñānaṃ san-vācyāyā icchāyāḥ karma, phala-viṣayatvād icchāyāḥ—
Complete comprehension is the object of the suffix ‘San’ which means desire, because desire has for its object the result of action.

1.1.1 L.43 ज्ञानेन हि प्रमाणेनावगन्तुमिष्टं ब्रह्म।
Jñānena hi pramāṇena avagantum iṣṭaṃ brahma—
Knowledge is the only means of comprehending Brahman,

1.1.1 L.44 ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः, निःशेषसंसार-बीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात्।
Brahma-avagatiḥ hi puruṣa-arthaḥ, niḥ-śeṣa-saṃsāra-bīja-avidyā-ādi-anartha-nibarhaṇāt—
And the complete knowledge of Brahman is the highest aim (of man) through the destruction of the evil of Nescience which is the root-cause (lit., the seed) of all transmigratory existence.

1.1.1 L.45 तस्माद्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम्॥
Tasmād brahma jijñāsitavyam—
Therefore the knowledge of Brahman should be desired.


1.1.1 L.46 तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात्;
Tat punaḥ brahma prasiddham aprasiddhaṃ vā syāt—
But again (says the opponent), that Brahman must either be well-known or not known at all.

1.1.1 L.47 यदि प्रसिद्धं न जिज्ञासितव्यम्।
Yadi prasiddhaṃ na jijñāsitavyam—
If it is well-known, it need not be desired to be known.

1.1.1 L.48 अथाप्रसिद्धं नैव शक्यं जिज्ञासितुमिति।
Atha aprasiddhaṃ naiva śakyaṃ jijñāsitum iti—
If it is not known at all, it would not be possible to desire to know it.


1.1.1 L.49 उच्यते — अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्य-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्।
Ucyate — asti tāvad brahma nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sva-bhāvaṃ sarvajñaṃ sarva-śakti-samanvitam—
We reply — Brahman which is omniscient, all-powerful, and of the nature of eternal purity, intelligence and freedom, exists of course.

1.1.1 L.50 ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्य-शुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते, बृंहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात्।
Brahma-śabdasya hi vyutpādyamānasya nitya-śuddhatva-ādayo'rthāḥ pratīyante, bṛhateḥ dhātoḥ artha-anugamāt—
Etymologically, from the root ‘Bṛha’ we understand such things as eternal purity, etc.

1.1.1 L.51 सर्वस्यात्मत्वाच्च ब्रह्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः।
Sarvasya ātmatvāc ca brahma-astitva-prasiddhiḥ—
The existence of Brahman is moreover well-known, because of its being the Self of every one.

1.1.1 L.52 सर्वो ह्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति, न ‘नाहमस्मि’ इति।
Sarvo hi ātma-astitvaṃ pratyeti, na ‘na aham asmi’ iti—
Every one experiences the existence of the Self, and does not experience that he is not.

1.1.1 L.53 यदि हि नात्मास्तित्वप्रसिद्धिः स्यात्, सर्वो लोकः ‘नाहमस्मि’ इति प्रतीयात्।
Yadi hi na ātma-astitva-prasiddhiḥ syāt, sarvo lokaḥ ‘na aham asmi’ iti pratīyāt—
If the well-known existence of the Self were not to be so in fact, every one would experience that he does not exist.

1.1.1 L.54 आत्मा च ब्रह्म।
Ātmā ca brahma—
The Self of course is Brahman.


1.1.1 L.55 यदि तर्हि लोके ब्रह्म आत्मत्वेन प्रसिद्धमस्ति, ततो ज्ञातमेवेत्यजिज्ञास्यत्वं पुनरापन्नम्;
Yadi tarhi loke brahma ātmatvena prasiddham asti, tato jñātam eveti ajijñāsyatvaṃ punaḥ āpannam—
But (says the opponent), if Brahman is known to everybody as the Self, then being already so known, it comes to this, that in that case there could not be any desire to know it.

1.1.1 L.56 न; तद्विशेषं प्रति विप्रतिपत्तेः।
Na, tad-viśeṣaṃ prati vipratipatteḥ—
No (we reply), because there is a conflict of opinion as to its special nature.

1.1.1 L.57 देहमात्रं चैतन्यविशिष्टमात्मेति प्राकृता जना लोकायतिकाश्च प्रतिपन्नाः।
Deha-mātraṃ caitanya-viśiṣṭam ātmeti prākṛtā janā laukāyatikāś ca pratipannāḥ—
Unsophisticated persons and the Lokāyatikas understand that the mere body as such endowed with intelligence is the Self.

1.1.1 L.58 इन्द्रियाण्येव चेतनान्यात्मेत्यपरे।
Indriyāṇi eva cetanāni ātmeti apare—
Others that the sense-organs which are intelligent are the Self.

1.1.1 L.59 मन इत्यन्ये।
Mana iti anye—
Some say that the mind is Ātmā,

1.1.1 L.60 विज्ञानमात्रं क्षणिकमित्येके।
Vijñāna-mātraṃ kṣaṇikam iti eke—
Some say that it is merely momentary knowledge.

1.1.1 L.61 शून्यमित्यपरे।
Śūnyam iti apare—
Some others say that the Self is merely a vacuum (Śūnya).

1.1.1 L.62 अस्ति देहादिव्यतिरिक्तः संसारी कर्ता भोक्तेत्यपरे।
Asti deha-ādi-vyatiriktaḥ saṃsārī kartā bhokteti apare—
Others again say that an entity different from the body which is an agent, an experiencer, and a transmigratory being is in fact in existence.

1.1.1 L.63 भोक्तैव केवलं न कर्तेत्येके।
Bhoktaiva kevalaṃ na karteti eke—
Some others say that the Self is an experiencer only but not an agent.

1.1.1 L.64 अस्ति तद्व्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरिति केचित्।
Asti tad-vyatirikta īśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ sarva-śaktiḥ iti kecit—
Some others think that there is a Lord who is omniscient and all-powerful, and is different from the Self.

1.1.1 L.65 आत्मा स भोक्तुरित्यपरे।
Ātmā sa bhoktuḥ iti apare—
Others that the Ātmā is the Self of the experiencing Jīva.

1.1.1 L.66 एवं बहवो विप्रतिपन्ना युक्तिवाक्यतदाभास-समाश्रयाः सन्तः।
Evaṃ bahavo vipratipannā yukti-vākya-tad-ābhāsa-samāśrayāḥ santaḥ—
In this manner there are many who have resorted to fallacious reasoning or the Scriptures as an authority and have differed amongst themselves in their view (as to what the Self i.e. Brahman is).

1.1.1 L.67 तत्राविचार्य यत्किञ्चित्प्रतिपद्यमानो निःश्रेयसात् प्रतिहन्येत, अनर्थं चेयात्।
Tatra avicārya yat kiñcit pratipadyamāno niḥśreyasāt pratihanyeta, anarthaṃ ca iyāt—
Under these circumstances if one were to conclude recklessly and to understand something else (as the Self), one may miss Final Beatitude and may be ruined.

1.1.1 L.68 तस्माद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते॥१॥
Tasmād brahma-jijñāsopanyāsa-mukhena vedānta-vākya-mīmāṃsā tad-avirodhi-tarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasa-prayojanā prastūyate—
Hence now begins, under the designation of ‘an inquiry into Brahman’, an analysis of the Vedānta texts with the help of Logic (Tarka) conformable to the Scriptures, having the highest Beatitude as its reward. — 1.

– 1. Jijñāsā-Adhikaraṇam.

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1.1.2 L.1 ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तम्।
Brahma jijñāsitavyam iti uktam—
We have said so far that one should desire to know Brahman.

1.1.2 L.2 किंलक्षणं पुनस्तद्ब्रह्मेत्यत आह भगवान्सूत्रकारः —
Kiṃ lakṣaṇaṃ punaḥ tad brahma iti ata āha bhagavān sūtrakāraḥ—
The question arises — What are the characteristics of that Brahman? Therefore Bhagavān Sūtra-kāra has said:

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जन्माद्यस्य यतः॥१.१.२॥
Janmādy asya yahaḥ.

Janma-ādi: origin etc.; Asya: of this (world); Yataḥ: from which.

🔗 (Brahman is that) from which the origin etc. of this (world, proceed). — 1.1.2.

1.1.2 L.3 जन्म उत्पत्तिः आदिः अस्य — इति तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः।
Janma utpattiḥ ādiḥ asya — iti tad-guṇa-saṃvijñāno bahu-vrīhiḥ—
The compound word ‘Janmādi’ is a Bahu-vrīhi compound of the ‘Tat-guṇa-saṃvijñāna’ type, and it is dissolved as follows: — ‘That of which origin is the first’.

1.1.2 L.4 जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः।
Janma-sthiti-bhaṅgaṃ samāsa-arthaḥ—
The meaning of the compound word is — origin, preservation and dissolution.

1.1.2 L.5 जन्मनश्चादित्वं श्रुतिनिर्देशापेक्षं वस्तुवृत्तापेक्षं च।
Janmanaś ca āditvaṃ śruti-nirdeśa-apekṣaṃ vastu-vṛtta-apekṣaṃ ca—
Origin comes first in order, because it is so indicated in the Scriptures and also because it is so in fact.

1.1.2 L.6 श्रुतिनिर्देशस्तावत् — ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (TaitU.3.1) इति,
Śruti-nirdeśaḥ tāvat, ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ iti—
The indication of the Scriptures is “From whence these beings are born” etc. (TaitUEng.3.1) in which origin, preservation and dissolution are mentioned in their order.

1.1.2 L.7 अस्मिन्वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमदर्शनात्। वस्तुवृत्तमपि — जन्मना लब्धसत्ताकस्य धर्मिणः स्थितिप्रलयसम्भवात्।
Asmin vākye janma-sthiti-pralayānāṃ krama-darśanāt. vastu-vṛttam api — janmanā labdha-sattākasya dharmiṇaḥ sthiti-pralaya-saṃbhavāt—
The fact as it is, is that it is only when a thing possessing attributes has attained the condition of existence, that preservation and dissolution of the same are possible.


1.1.2 L.8 अस्येति प्रत्यक्षादिसन्निधापितस्य धर्मिण इदमा निर्देशः।
Asyeti pratyakṣa-ādi-saṃnidhāpitasya dharmiṇa idam ā nirdeśaḥ—
The word ‘Asya’ (in the Sūtra) indicates the thing possessing attributes, which is established by direct means of knowledge etc. as — this is it.

1.1.2 L.9 षष्ठी जन्मादिधर्मसम्बन्धार्था।
Ṣaṣṭī janma-ādi-dharma-saṃbandha-arthā—
The genitive case (of Asya) is for showing the relation with the origin etc.

1.1.2 L.10 यत इति कारणनिर्देशः।
Yata iti kāraṇa-nirdeśaḥ—
The word ‘Yataḥ’ indicates by the ablative case the cause (of the origin).

1.1.2 L.11 अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृभोक्तृ-संयुक्तस्य प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्त-क्रियाफलाश्रयस्य मनसाप्यचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य
जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं यतः सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद्भवति,

Asya jagato nāma-rūpābhyāṃ vyākṛtasya aneka-kartṛ-bhoktṛ-saṃyuktasya pratiniyata-deśa-kāla-nimitta-kriyā-phala-āśrayasya manasā api acintya-racanā-rūpasya
Janma-sthiti-bhaṅgaṃ yataḥ sarvajñāt sarva-śakteḥ kāraṇād bhavati—
The omniscient and all-powerful cause from which (Yataḥ), the origin, preservation and dissolution
Of this transient world, which is distinguished by names and forms, and which is connected with diverse agents and enjoyers, springs, and which is the basis of the fruit of actions depending upon a particular environment, time, and cause, and in even the mere thinking about which, imagination boggles and is unable to comprehend the arrangement,

1.1.2 L.12 तद्ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः।
‘Tad brahma’ iti vākya-śeṣaḥ—
‘That is Brahman’ which is to be understood as the complementary portion of the Sūtra.

1.1.2 L.13 अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामिह ग्रहणम्।
Anyeṣām api bhāva-vikārāṇāṃ triṣu eva antar-bhāva iti janma-sthiti-nāśānām iha grahaṇam—
These three only viz. the origin, preservation and dissolution, are to be understood here, as the other modifications of existence are covered by these three.

1.1.2 L.14 यास्कपरिपठितानां तु ‘जायतेऽस्ति’ इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले सम्भाव्यमानत्वान्मूलकारणाद् उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत;
Yāska-paripaṭhitānāṃ tu ‘jāyate'sti’ ityādīnāṃ grahaṇe teṣāṃ jagataḥ sthiti-kāle saṃbhāvyamānatvān mūla-kāraṇād utpatti-sthiti-nāśā jagato na gṛhītāḥ syuḥ iti āśaṅkyeta—
If we include the other modifications of existence enumerated by Yāska, we may be tempted to doubt the origin, preservation and dissolution as originating from the root-cause, as they (i.e. other modifications) are possible only when the transient world is in existence.

1.1.2 L.15 तन्मा शङ्कि; इति या उत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव गृह्यन्ते।
Tan mā śaṅki; iti yā utpattiḥ brahmaṇaḥ, tatraiva sthitiḥ pralayaś ca, ta eva gṛhyante—
In order that we should not doubt that the preservation and dissolution is of that only which is created, we should understand only these three (by the word Janmādi).

1.1.2 L.16 न च यथोक्तविशेषणस्य जगतो यथोक्तविशेषणमीश्वरं मुक्त्वा, अन्यतः प्रधानादचेतनात् अणुभ्यः अभावात् संसारिणो वा उत्पत्त्यादि सम्भावयितुं शक्यम्।
Na yathokta-viśeṣaṇasya jagato yathokta-viśeṣaṇam īśvaraṃ muktvā, anyataḥ pradhānād acetanāt aṇubhyo abhāvāt saṃsāriṇo vā utpatti-ādi saṃbhāvayituṃ śakyam—
It is not possible to conceive the origin etc. of this transient world of the type described (above) to be from any cause other than the Lord described as above, viz. from the non-sentient Pradhāna (of the Sāṅkhyas) or from the atoms (of the Vaiśeṣikas), or from mere non-existence (as held by the followers of Buddha), or from a transmigratory being (such as Hiraṇya-garbha).

1.1.2 L.17 न च स्वभावतः, विशिष्टदेशकाल-निमित्तानाम् इहोपादानात्।
Na ca sva-bhāvataḥ, viśiṣṭa-deśa-kāla-nimittānām ihopādānāt—
Nor can it ever evolve from its own nature (without any cause), for in such a matter, particular environment, time and cause have to be considered to be necessary.

1.1.2 L.18 एतदेवानुमानं संसारिव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरास्तित्वादि-साधनं मन्यन्ते ईश्वरकारणवादिनः॥
Etad eva anumānaṃ saṃsāri-vyatirikteśvara-astitva-ādi-sādhanaṃ manyante īśvara-kāraṇa-vādinaḥ—
Those who maintain the Lord as the cause of this transient world (such as the Logicians) think that the same inference (as is stated just above) also supplies the means for holding the existence of the Lord as distinguished from the transmigratory Self etc., as being the cause (of this transmigratory world).


1.1.2 L.19 नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे;
Nanu iha api tad evopanyastaṃ janma-ādi-sūtre—
But (says the opponent) the same argument (by inference) is also adopted in this ‘JanmādiSūtra.


1.1.2 L.20 न; वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुम-ग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्।
Na; vedānta-vākya-kusuma-grathana-arthatvāt sūtrāṇām—
No (we reply), for the Sūtras are meant only for the purpose of stringing together the flower-like Vedānta passages.

1.1.2 L.21 वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते।
Vedānta-vākyāni hi sūtraiḥ udāhṛtya vicāryante—
The Sūtras refer to the Vedānta passages which are considered therein.

1.1.2 L.22 वाक्यार्थविचारणाध्यवसाननिर्वृत्ता हि ब्रह्मावगतिः, नानुमानादिप्रमाणान्तरनिर्वृत्ता।
Vākya-artha-vicāraṇa-adhyavasāna-nirvṛttā hi brahma-avagatiḥ, na anumāna-ādi-pramāṇa-antara-nirvṛttā—
For the knowledge of Brahman is effected by the determination (brought about) by the consideration of the meaning of the Vedānta passages, and not by the other means of right knowledge such as inference etc.

1.1.2 L.23 सत्सु तु वेदान्तवाक्येषु जगतो जन्मादिकारणवादिषु,
तदर्थग्रहणदार्ढ्याय अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत्, न निवार्यते,
श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात्।

Satsu tu vedānta-vākyeṣu jagato janma-ādi-kāraṇa-vādiṣu,
Tad-artha-grahaṇa-dārḍhyāya anumānam api vedānta-vākya-avirodhi pramāṇaṃ bhavat, na nivāryate,
Śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasya abhyupetatvāt—
Such Vedānta passages dealing with the cause of the creation etc. of the transitory world being there (for that purpose),
Inference also, which is not antagonistic (to such passages) and furnishes a means of right knowledge, for the strengthening of the understanding of the meaning of these passages, is not rejected,
Because the Scriptures themselves accept the aid of Logic as an auxiliary.

1.1.2 L.24 तथा हि — ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति श्रुतिः
Tathā hi — ‘śrotavyo mantavyaḥ’ iti śrutiḥ—
For Scriptural passages such as “The Self is to be heard and cogitated upon” (BrhUEng.2.4.5),

1.1.2 L.25 ‘पण्डितो मेधावी गन्धारानेवोपसम्पद्येतैवम् एवेहाचार्यवान् पुरुषो वेद’ (ChanU.6.14.2) इति च पुरुषबुद्धिसाहाय्यम् आत्मनो दर्शयति।
‘Paṇḍito medhāvī gandhārān evopasaṃpadyetaivam eveha ācāryavān puruṣo veda’ iti ca puruṣa-buddhi-sāhāyyam ātmano darśayati—
And “A learned and intelligent person does of course reach Gāndhāra, and similarly, a man who has a teacher acquires knowledge (of Brahman)” (ChanU.6.14.2), show that a man’s intelligence is helpful to the Scriptures.

1.1.2 L.26 न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम्।
Na dharma-jijñāsāyām iva śruti-ādaya eva pramāṇaṃ brahma-jijñāsāyām—
It is not that the Scriptures alone are the means of the right knowledge of Brahman, as is the case about the right knowledge of religious duty,

1.1.2 L.27 किन्तु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम्,
अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य।

Kin tu śruti-ādayo'nubhāva-ādayaś ca yathā-saṃbhavam iha pramāṇam,
Anubhava-avasānatvād bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāc ca brahma-jñānasya—
But the Scriptures, as also intuitional experience, so far as is possible, constitute the authoritative or valid means of right knowledge,
Because the knowledge of Brahman culminates in the realization (Anubhava) of Brahman, and has an already existing entity as its object.

1.1.2 L.28 कर्तव्ये हि विषये नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्, पुरुषाधीनात्म-लाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य।
Kartavye hi viṣaye na anubhava-apekṣā asti iti śruti-ādīnām eva prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, puruṣa-adhīna-ātma-lābhatvāc ca kartavyasya—
In the case of religious action there is no expectation of intuitional experience (Anubhava, i.e. direct experience) and the Scriptures alone are the authoritative means of its right knowledge, and action is dependent upon man for its origination.

1.1.2 L.29 कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म;
Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ śakyaṃ laukikaṃ vaidikaṃ ca karma—
In the case of action in ordinary life, or action according to the Vedas, it is possible that it may either be done or not done or done in a different way.

1.1.2 L.30 यथा अश्वेन गच्छति, पद्भ्याम्, अन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति।
Yathā ‘aśvena gacchati, padbhyām, anyathā vā, na vā gacchati’ iti—
For instance a man may use a horse for going (from one place to another) or he may go on foot or in some other way or he may not go at all.

1.1.2 L.31 तथा ‘अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति’ ‘उदिते जुहोति, अनुदिते जुहोति’ इति।
Tathā ‘ati-rātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇāti, na ati-rātre ṣoḍaśinaṃ gṛhṇāti’ ‘udite juhoti, anudite juhoti’ iti—
Similarly, in an Atirātra sacrifice he may optionally use (take up) or may not use (take up) the ‘Ṣo-ḍaśi’ (a particular sacrificial cup) or he may sacrifice either before or after sun-rise,

1.1.2 L.32 विधिप्रतिषेधाश्च अत्र अर्थवन्तः स्युः, विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च।
Vidhi-pratiṣedhāś ca atra arthavantaḥ syuḥ, vikalpotsarga-apavādāś ca—
And in this manner injunctions and prohibitions, options, and rules and their exceptions, have a proper raison d’etre.

1.1.2 L.33 न तु वस्तु ‘एवम्, नैवम्’ ‘अस्ति, नास्ति’ इति वा विकल्प्यते।
Na tu vastu ‘evam, naivam’ ‘asti, na asti’ iti vā vikalpyate—
But there is no such scope for exercising an option in the case of an existing entity, such as that it is like this or not like this or that it does not exist.

1.1.2 L.34 विकल्पनास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः।
Vikalpanāḥ tu puruṣa-buddhi-apekṣāḥ—
Options again depend upon the notions of a person,

1.1.2 L.35 न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम्। किं तर्हि? वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्।
Na vastu-yāthā-ātmya-jñānaṃ puruṣa-buddhi-apekṣam. kiṃ tarhi? vastu-tantram eva tat—
While the knowledge of an entity as it actually is, depends upon the thing itself, and not upon the notions of a man.

1.1.2 L.36 न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् ‘स्थाणुर्वा, पुरुषोऽन्यो वा’ इति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति।
Na hi sthāṇau ekasmin ‘sthāṇuḥ vā, puruṣo'nyo vā’ iti tattva-jñānaṃ bhavati—
In the case of a pillar, for instance, that it is either a pillar or a man or something else cannot (each) be correct knowledge,

1.1.2 L.37 तत्र ‘पुरुषोऽन्यो वा’ इति मिथ्याज्ञानम्। ‘स्थाणुरेव’ इति तत्त्वज्ञानम्,
वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्।

Tatra ‘puruṣo'nyo vā’ iti mithyā-jñānam. ‘sthāṇuḥ eva’ iti tattva-jñānam,
Vastu-tantratvāt—
Because the knowledge that it is a pillar depends upon the entity (the pillar) itself,
[In which case, this is a person or something else is false-knowledge, whereas, this is in fact a pillar is true-knowledge.]

1.1.2 L.38 एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम्।
Evaṃ bhūta-vastu-viṣayāṇāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ vastu-tantram—
In this manner, the authoritativeness or validity of the knowledge of an entity actually in existence depends upon the entity itself.

1.1.2 L.39 तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात्।
Tatraivaṃ sati brahma-jñānam api vastu-tantram eva, bhūta-vastu-viṣayatvāt—
That being so, the knowledge of Brahman also, is knowledge depending upon the entity itself, in as much as it concerns the actually existing entity itself.


1.1.2 L.40 ननु भूतवस्तुविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरविषयत्वमेवेति वेदान्तवाक्यविचारणा अनर्थिकैव प्राप्ता;
Nanu bhūta-vastu-viṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ pramāṇa-antara-viṣayatvam eveti vedānta-vākya-vicāraṇā anarthikaiva prāptā—
But (says the opponent) Brahman being an existing entity, it is the province of other means of right knowledge also, and thus it comes to this that the consideration of the Scriptural passages is therefore purposeless.


1.1.2 L.41 न; इन्द्रियाविषयत्वेन सम्बन्धाग्रहणात्।
Na; indriya-aviṣayatvena saṃbandha-agrahaṇāt—
No (we say), Brahman not being an object of sense, it has no relation with the sense-organs.

1.1.2 L.42 स्वभावतो विषयविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि, न ब्रह्मविषयाणि।
Sva-bhāvato viṣaya-viṣayāṇi indriyāṇi, na brahma-viṣayāṇi—
Sense-organs by their very nature have sense-objects for their province while Brahman is not their province.

1.1.2 L.43 सति हीन्द्रियविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः, इदं ब्रह्मणा सम्बद्धं कार्यमिति गृह्येत।
Sati hi indriya-viṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ, idaṃ brahmaṇā saṃbaddhaṃ kāryam iti gṛhyeta—
Were Brahman to be an object of sense-organs, we would be able to know that this world (the effect of Brahman) is connected with Brahman.

1.1.2 L.44 कार्यमात्रमेव तु गृह्यमाणम् — किं ब्रह्मणा सम्बद्धम्? किमन्येन केनचिद्वा सम्बद्धम्? — इति न शक्यं निश्चेतुम्।
Kāryamātram eva tu gṛhyamāṇaṃ — kiṃ brahmaṇā saṃbaddham? — kim anyena kenacid vā saṃbaddham? — iti na śakyaṃ niścetum—
But we are unable to determine whether the world, which alone we are able to perceive, is connected with Brahman or something else.

1.1.2 L.45 तस्माज्जन्मादिसूत्रं नानुमानोपन्यासार्थम्।
Tasmāj janma-ādi-sūtraṃ na anumāṇopanyāsa-artham—
Therefore, the SūtraJanmādi etc.’ is not meant for the statement of an inference.

1.1.2 L.46 किं तर्हि? वेदान्तवाक्यप्रदर्शनार्थम्।
Kiṃ tarhi? vedāna-vākya-pradarśana-artham—
What is it for, then? It is for commending the Vedānta passage to the notice (of the student).

1.1.2 L.47 किं पुनस्तद्वेदान्तवाक्यं यत् सूत्रेणेह लिलक्षयिषितम्?
Kiṃ punaḥ tad vedānta-vākyaṃ yat sūtreṇeha lilakṣayiṣitam?—
Now what precisely is the Vedānta passage to which the Sūtra is meant to draw attention?

1.1.2 L.48 ‘भृगुर्वै वारुणिः। वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति’ इत्युपक्रम्य
आह — ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। येन जातानि जीवन्ति। यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद्ब्रह्मेति। ’ (TaitU.3.1)

‘Bhṛguḥ vai vāruṇiḥ. varuṇaṃ pitaram upasasāra. adhīhi bhagavo brahmeti’ iti upakramya
Āha — ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante. yena jātāni jīvanti. yat prayanti abhisaṃviśanti. tad vijijñāsasva. tad brahmeti’—
The scriptures beginning thus — “Bhṛgu the son of Varuṇa approached his father Varuṇa (and said) — ‘Oh Bhagavān, teach me what Brahman is’”,
Go on further and say — “That from which all these beings are born, that by which, after being born, they live, and that to which they go and in which they are absorbed, that (you should) try to know, that is Brahman” (TaitUEng.3.1).

1.1.2 L.49 तस्य च निर्णयवाक्यम् — ‘आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते। आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति। आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति’ (TaitU.3.6) इति।
Tasya ca nirṇaya-vākyam — ‘ānandād hi eva khalu imāni bhūtāni jāyante. ānandena jātāni jīvanti. ānandaṃ prayanti abhisaṃviśanti’ iti—
And of that the conclusive passage is — “From Bliss (Ānanda) these things are born, by Bliss, after they are born they live, and into Bliss, at death they enter” (TaitUEng.3.6).

1.1.2 L.50 अन्यान्यप्येवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नित्य-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्वभाव-सर्वज्ञ-स्वरूप-कारण-विषयाणि उदाहर्तव्यानि॥२॥
Anyāni api evaṃ jātīyakāni vākyāni nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāva-sarvajña-svarūpa-kāraṇa-viṣayāṇi udāhartavyāni—
Other similar passages also, having reference to the cause (Brahman) which has eternal purity, intelligence, freedom and omniscience as its nature, should be adduced in illustration. — 2.

– 2. Janma-ādi-Adhikaraṇam.

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1.1.3 L.1 जगत्कारणत्वप्रदर्शनेन सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तम्, तदेव द्रढयन्नाह —
jagat-kāraṇatva-pradarśanena sarva-jñaṃ brahmeti upakṣiptam, tad eva draḍhayann āha—
We have stated, by indicating that Brahman is the cause of the transitory world, that it is omniscient. Now wishing to make that statement firmer (the Sūtra-kāra) says: —

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शास्त्रयोनित्वात्॥१.१.३॥
Śāstra-yonitvāt.

Śāstra: the scripture; Yonitvāt: being the source of or the means of the right knowledge.

🔗 (The omniscience of Brahman) follows from its being the source of the Śāstra i.e. the Scriptures. — 1.1.3.

1.1.3 L.2 महत ऋग्वेदादेः शास्त्रस्य अनेकविद्या-स्थानोपबृंहितस्य प्रदीपवत् सर्वार्थावद्योतिनः सर्वज्ञकल्पस्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्म।
Mahata ṛg-veda-ādeḥ śāstrasya aneka-vidyā-sthānopabṛṃhitasya pradīpavat sarva-artha-avadyotinaḥ sarvajña-kalpasya yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ brahma—
Brahman is the source of i.e. the cause of the Śāstra comprising of the great Ṛg and other Vedas, the Śāstra which is supplemented by many Vidyās and which like a flambeau illuminates all objects and which is almost all-knowing.

1.1.3 L.3 न हीदृशस्य शास्त्रस्य ऋग्वेदादिलक्षणस्य सर्वज्ञगुणान्वितस्य सर्वज्ञादन्यतः सम्भवोऽस्ति।
Na hi īdṛśasya śāstrasya ṛg-veda-ādi-lakṣaṇasya sarvajña-guṇa-anvitasya sarvajñād anyataḥ saṃbhavo'sti—
It is not possible, that such Śāstra of the nature of the Ṛg and the other Vedas, which is endowed with the quality of omniscience can have its origination from any thing other than what is omniscient.

1.1.3 L.4 यद्यद् विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात् पुरुषविशेषात् सम्भवति, यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः ज्ञेयैकदेशार्थमपि, स ततोऽप्यधिकतरविज्ञान इति प्रसिद्धं लोके।
Yadyad vistara-arthaṃ śāstraṃ yasmāt puruṣa-viśeṣāt saṃbhavati, yathā vyākaraṇa-ādi pāṇini-ādeḥ jñeyaika-deśa-artham api, sa tato'pi adhikatara-vijñāna iti prasiddhaṃ loke—
It is well-known in the world that any author from whom any special body of Śāstra emanates — as, for instance, Grammar from Pāṇini — , and refers to only a branch of knowledge, possesses more knowledge than that Śāstra.

1.1.3 L.5 किमु वक्तव्यम् —
अनेकशाखा-भेदभिन्नस्य देवतिर्यङ्मनुष्य-वर्णाश्रमादि-प्रविभागहेतोः ऋग्वेदाद्याख्यस्य सर्वज्ञानाकरस्य
अप्रयत्नेनैव लीलान्यायेन पुरुषनिःश्वासवत् यस्मान् महतो भूतात् योनेः सम्भवः —

Kim u vaktavyam —
Aneka-śākhā-bheda-bhinnasya deva-tiryaṅ-manuṣya-varṇa-āśrama-ādi-pravibhāga-hetoḥ ṛg-veda-ādi-ākhyasya sarvajñāna-ākarasya
Aprayatnenaiva līlā-nyāyena puruṣa-niḥśvāsavat yasmān mahato bhūtāt yoneḥ saṃbhavaḥ—
How can anything (more) be said about
That great Being who is the source (Yoni), i.e. from whom, as if without any special effort and as if in sport and as naturally as its own breathings, is born
The Ṛg-Veda, which is the ocean of all knowledge, the cause of the distinction as between all the different classes and conditions of the Devas, animals and men, and which is divided into many different branches,

1.1.3 L.6 ‘अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतत् यदृग्वेदः’ (BrhU.2.4.10) इत्यादिश्रुतेः — तस्य महतो भूतस्य निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिमत्त्वं चेति॥
‘Asya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitam etad yad ṛg-vedaḥ’ ityādi-śruteḥ — tasya mahato bhūtasya nir-atiśayaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ sarva-śaktimattvaṃ ceti—
According to the Scriptural passage — “That which is the Ṛg-Veda is but merely the breathing (the Divine Afflatus) of that great divine Being” (BrhUEng.2.4.10), and also that the great Being possesses unsurpassed omniscience and is all-powerful?


1.1.3 L.7 अथवा यथोक्तम् ऋग्वेदादिशास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपाधिगमे।
Athavā yathoktam ṛg-veda-ādi-śāstraṃ yoniḥ kāraṇaṃ pramāṇam asya brahmaṇo yathāvat-svarūpa-adhigame—
Or (we may construe the Sūtra in this way) — the Śāstra, Ṛg-Veda etc. described above, is the source, the cause, and the authoritative means of the understanding of the right knowledge of Brahman as it is.

1.1.3 L.8 शास्त्रादेव प्रमाणात् जगतो जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्माधिगम्यत इत्यभिप्रायः।
Śāstrād eva pramāṇāt jagato janma-ādi-kāraṇaṃ brahma adhigamyata iti abhiprāyaḥ—
What is meant to be conveyed is that Brahman which is the cause and origin etc. of this transitory world, is understood from the Śāstra (such as the Scriptures) which is the only means of right knowledge.

1.1.3 L.9 शास्त्रमुदाहृतं पूर्वसूत्रे — ‘यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते’ (TaitU.3.1) इत्यादि।
Śāstram udāhṛtaṃ pūrva-sūtre — ‘yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante’ ityādi—
The Scriptural passage in point is quoted in the former Sūtra — “From which all beings are born” (TaitUEng.3.1 Eng.) etc.

1.1.3 L.10 किमर्थं तर्हीदं सूत्रम्, यावता पूर्वसूत्रेणैव एवंजातीयकं शास्त्रमुदाहरता शास्त्रयोनित्वं ब्रह्मणो दर्शितम्।
Kim arthaṃ tarhi idaṃ sūtram, yāvatā pūrva-sūtreṇaiva evaṃ-jātīyakaṃ śāstram udāharatā śāstra-yonitvaṃ brahmaṇo darśitam—
(The opponent asks) — in that case what is the occasion for this Sūtra, when by quoting the Scriptures you have indicated that Brahman has this Śāstra as its source?

1.1.3 L.11 उच्यते — तत्र सूत्राक्षरेण स्पष्टं शास्त्रस्यानुपादानाज् जन्मादिसूत्रेण केवलम् अनुमानम् उपन्यस्तम् इत्याशङ्क्येत;
Ucyate — tatra (pūrva-)sūtra-akṣareṇa spaṣṭaṃ śāstrasya anupādānāj janma-ādi-sūtreṇa kevalam anumānam upanyastam iti āśaṅkayeta—
We reply — The words of the previous Sūtra did not clearly indicate the Śāstra, and hence one may feel a doubt that by the word ‘Janmādi’ only an inference is stated.

1.1.3 L.12 तामाशङ्कां निवर्तयितुमिदं सूत्रं प्रववृते — ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ इति॥३॥
Tām āśaṅkāṃ nivartayitum idaṃ sūtraṃ pravavṛte — ‘śāstra-yonitvāt’ iti—
And now, this Sūtra endeavours to remove this doubt, (by stating) ‘From its being the source” etc. — 3.

– 3. Śāstra-yonitva-Adhikaraṇam.

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1.1.4 L.1 कथं पुनर्ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वमुच्यते, यावता ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम्’ (जै. सू. १.२.१) इति क्रियापरत्वं शास्त्रस्य प्रदर्शितम्।
Kathaṃ punaḥ brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-pramāṇakatvam ucyate, yāvatā ‘āmnāyasya kriyā-arthatvād ānarthakyam atad-arthānām’ iti kriyā-paratvaṃ śāstrasya pradarśitam—
But (it is again objected) how can it be said that Brahman has the Śāstra (the Scriptures) as its authority, since it has been shown (by me) on the authority — “The Vedas having action (Kriyā) as their purpose, those portions of it which do not indicate any action, are purposeless” (Jai. Sū. 1.2.1), that the Scriptures indicate action.

1.1.4 L.2 अतो वेदान्तानामानर्थक्यम्, अक्रियार्थत्वात्;
Ato vedāntānām ānarthakyam, akriyā-arthatvāt—
Those portions of the Scriptures which are known by the name of Vedānta, are therefore purposeless, because they do not indicate that any action is meant (by them).

1.1.4 L.3 कर्तृदेवतादि-प्रकाशनार्थत्वेन वा क्रियाविधिशेषत्वम्, उपासनादि-क्रियान्तरविधानार्थत्वं वा।
Kartṛ-devatā-ādi-prakāśana-arthatvena vā kriyā-vidhi-śeṣatvam, upāsanā-ādi-kriyā-antara-vidhāna-arthatvaṃ vā—
Or else (it may be said) that by way of indicating an agent or a deity etc., or by way of indicating an injunction to action such as devout meditation, they are but supplementary to an injunction to action.

1.1.4 L.4 न हि परिनिष्ठितवस्तु-प्रतिपादनं सम्भवति; प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वात् परिनिष्ठितवस्तुनः,
Na hi pariniṣṭhita-vastu-pratipādanaṃ saṃbhavati; pratyakṣa-ādi-viṣayatvāt pariniṣṭhita-vastunaḥ—
But it is not at all possible that they are for the purpose of propounding an entity firmly established as an entity, because an established entity is an object of direct perception etc.,

1.1.4 L.5 तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते पुरुषार्थाभावात्।
Tat-pratipādane ca heyopādeya-rahite puruṣa-artha-abhāvāt—
And also because there is absence of any aim of man being served by propounding anything which is not connected with something which has to be given up (Heya) or accepted (Upadeya).

1.1.4 L.6 अत एव ‘सोऽरोदीत्’ इत्येवमादीनाम् आनर्थक्यं मा भूदिति
Ata eva ‘so'rodīt’ iti evam-ādīnām ānarthakyaṃ mā bhūd iti—
It is precisely because of this, viz. that sentences like “He wept” should not be rendered purposeless,

1.1.4 L.7 ‘विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः’ (जै. सू. १.२.७) इति स्तावकत्वेनार्थवत्त्वमुक्तम्।
‘Vidhinā tu eka-vākyatvāt stuti-arthena vidhīnāṃ syuḥ’ iti stāvakatvena arthavattvam uktam—
That they are said to be useful by way of glorification (of the passage with which they are connected) on the authority of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (Jai. Sū. 1.2.7), thus — “These sentences being in syntactical relation with an injunctional passage, they are for the glorification of that injunction.”

1.1.4 L.8 मन्त्राणां च ‘इषे त्वा’ (यजुर्-वेद १.१.१) इत्यादीनां क्रिया-तत्साधनाभिधायित्वेन कर्म-समवायित्वमुक्तम्।
Mantrāṇāṃ ca ‘iṣe tvā’ ityādīnāṃ kriyā-tat-sādhana-abhidhāyitvena karma-samavāyitvam uktam—
In the same way Mantras like “For strength I cut thee (Oh blade of grass)” (recited when Darbhas are being cut for the Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa sacrifice) are said to be in a relation of invariable concomittance to action, by indicating action and the means to accomplish the same.

1.1.4 L.9 अतो न क्वचिदपि वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शम् अन्तरेणार्थवत्ता दृष्टा उपपन्ना वा।
Ato na kvacid api veda-vākyānāṃ vidhi-saṃsparśam antareṇa arthavattā dṛṣṭā upapannā vā—
It is nowhere observed nor is it reasonably understandable from the Scriptural passages, that they are purposeful as apart from their being connected with an injunction in some way.

1.1.4 L.10 न च परिनिष्ठिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः सम्भवति, क्रियाविषयत्वाद्विधेः।
Na ca pariniṣṭhite vastu-svarūpe vidhiḥ saṃbhavati, kriyā-viṣayatvād vidheḥ—
In the case of an entity established as such, an injunction is not possible, because an injunction has action for its province.

1.1.4 L.11 तस्मात् कर्मापेक्षितकर्तृदेवतादि-स्वरूपप्रकाशनेन क्रियाविधि-शेषत्वं वेदान्तानाम्।
Tasmāt karma-apekṣita-kartṛ-devatā-ādi-svarūpa-prakāśanena kriyā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ vedāntānām—
Therefore (the opponent concludes) the Vedāntas are merely supplementary to injunctions for action, by way of making the nature of the agent and the deities necessary for such action, manifest.

1.1.4 L.12 अथ प्रकरणान्तरभयान् नैतदभ्युपगम्यते, तथापि स्ववाक्यगतोपासनादि-कर्मपरत्वम्।
Atha prakaraṇa-antara-bhayān na etad abhyupagamyate, tathā api sva-vākya-gatopāsanā-ādi-karma-paratvam—
If it be said that they cannot be so understood because it is feared that that would necessarily imply a different chapter (Prakaraṇa), then they may be understood as indicating actions such as devout meditation etc. referred to in their passages.

1.1.4 L.13 तस्मान्न ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वमिति प्राप्ते, उच्यते —
Tasmān na brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-yonitvam iti prāpte, ucyate—
The conclusion of the opponent, then, being that Brahman has not the Scriptures as its origin, the reply given is: —

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तत्तु समन्वयात्॥१.१.४॥
Tat tu samanvayāt.

Tat: that; Tu: but; Samanvayāt: on account of agreement or harmony, because it is the main purpose.

🔗 But it is so (i.e. Brahman is so known from the Scriptures), because they (i.e. all Vedānta texts) have that connected sequence. — 1.1.4.

1.1.4 L.14 तुशब्दः पूर्वपक्षव्यावृत्त्यर्थः।
Tu-śabdaḥ pūrva-pakṣa-vyāvṛtti-arthaḥ—
The word ‘Tu’ (but) in the Sūtra means the rebuttal of the objections (of the opponent).

1.1.4 L.15 तद्ब्रह्म सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्राद् एवावगम्यते।
Tad brahma sarvajñaṃ sarva-śakti jagad-utpatti-sthiti-laya-kāraṇaṃ vedānta-śāstrād eva avagamyate—
That the all-powerful cause of the origin, preservation and dissolution of the transient world is the omniscient Brahman, is understood from the Vedānta Śāstra itself.

1.1.4 L.16 कथम्? समन्वयात्।
Katham? samanvayāt—
How so? Because that is the connected sequence (Samanvaya).

1.1.4 L.17 सर्वेषु हि वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्येणैतस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समनुगतानि।
Sarveṣu hi vedānteṣu vākyāni tātparyeṇaitasya arthasya pratipādakatvena samanugatāni—
In all the Vedānta texts the sentences construe properly by intimating that to be the meaning.

1.1.4 L.18 ‘सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् एकमेवाद्वितीयम्’ (ChanU.6.2.1)
‘Sad eva somyedam agra āsīt ekam eva advitīyam’—
For instance (the following texts) — “In the beginning, Oh Saumya, this world was just Being (Sat), the one only without a second” (ChanU.6.2.1),

1.1.4 L.19 ‘आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्’ (AitU.1.1.1)
‘Ātmā vā idam eka eva agra āsīt’—
And “This Self alone was in existence in the beginning” (AitU.1.1.1),

1.1.4 L.20 ‘तदेतद्ब्रह्मापूर्वम् अनपरम् अनन्तरम् अबाह्यम्’
‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः’ (BrhU.2.5.19)

‘Tad etad brahma apūrvam an-aparam an-antaram abāhyam
Ayam ātmā brahma sarva-anubhūḥ’—
And “That precisely is this Brahman, without itself being the cause, without itself being an effect, having nothing inside or outside of it.
This is the Self, the Brahman which perceives everything” (BrhUEng.2.5.19),

1.1.4 L.21 ‘ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्तात्’ (MunU.2.2.11) इत्यादीनि।
‘Brahmaivedam amṛtaṃ purastāt’ ityādīni—
And “It is that immortal Brahman right in front” (MunU.2.2.11) etc.

1.1.4 L.22 न च तद्गतानां पदानां ब्रह्मस्वरूपविषये निश्चिते समन्वयेऽवगम्यमाने अर्थान्तरकल्पना युक्ता,
Na ca tad-gatānāṃ padānāṃ brahma-svarūpa-viṣaye niścite samanvaye'vagamyamāne artha-antara-kalpanā yuktā—
It is not proper to attribute any other meaning to these passages when their connected sequence is determined to be with regard to the nature of Brahman,

1.1.4 L.23 श्रुतहान्यश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसङ्गात्।
Śruta-hāni-aśruta-kalpanā-prasaṅgāt—
Because, otherwise there would be the predicament of the abandonment of what is stated in the Scriptures and the acceptance of something which is not so stated.

1.1.4 L.24 न च तेषां कर्तृदेवतादि-स्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरता अवसीयते, ‘तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.2.4.14) इत्यादिक्रियाकारकफल-निराकरणश्रुतेः।
Na ca teṣāṃ kartṛ-devatā-ādi-svarūpa-pratipādana-paratā avasīyate, ‘tat kena kaṃ paśyet’ ityādi-kriyā-kāraka-phala-nirākaraṇa-śruteḥ—
It cannot be understood that they propound the nature of the agent, because of the Scriptural statement “Then by what should one see and whom?” (BrhUEng.2.4.14) which in effect rejects all actions, agents and fruits.

1.1.4 L.25 न च परिनिष्ठित-वस्तुस्वरूपत्वेऽपि प्रत्यक्षादिविषयत्वं ब्रह्मणः,
Na ca pariniṣṭhita-vastu-svarūpatve'pi pratyakṣa-ādi-viṣayatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ—
Nor can Brahman, though it is determined to be of the nature of an already established entity, be an object of direct perception,

1.1.4 L.26 ‘तत्त्वमसि’ (ChanU.6.8.7…) इति ब्रह्मात्मभावस्य शास्त्रम् अन्तरेणानवगम्यमानत्वात्।
‘Tat tvam asi’ iti brahma-ātma-bhāvasya śāstram antareṇa anavagamyamānatvāt—
Because it is not possible to comprehend, except by means of the Śāstra, that the Self is Brahman, as conveyed by the Scriptural passage — “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7).


1.1.4 L.27 यत्तु हेयोपादेय-रहितत्वाद् उपदेशानर्थक्यमिति,
Yat tu heyopādeya-rahitatvād upadeśa-ānarthakyam iti—
As regards the objection (of the opponent) that any instruction which does not require the giving up or the accepting of anything, is purposeless,


1.1.4 L.28 नैष दोषः; हेयोपादेयशून्य-ब्रह्मात्मतावगमादेव सर्वक्लेश-प्रहाणात् पुरुषार्थसिद्धेः।
Naiṣa doṣaḥ; heyopādeya-śūnya-brahma-ātmatā-avagamād eva sarva-kleśa-prahāṇāt puruṣa-artha-siddheḥ—
(We say) this is no fault, because the highest aim of man is accomplished by knowing, that Brahman, from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added, is the Self, and that it destroys all misery.

1.1.4 L.29 देवतादिप्रतिपादनस्य तु स्ववाक्यगतोपासनार्थत्वेऽपि न कश्चिद्विरोधः।
Devatā-ādi-pratipādanasya tu sva-vākya-gatopāsanā-arthatve'pi na kaścid virodhaḥ—
There is no contradiction even if it be understood that it has the purpose of propounding the deities etc. connected with the devout meditation referred to in its own passages (in Vedānta).

1.1.4 L.30 न तु तथा ब्रह्मण उपासनाविधिशेषत्वं सम्भवति,
Na tu tathā brahmaṇa upāsanā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ saṃbhavati—
Understanding it even in that manner would not render Brahman as being supplementary to an injunction for devout meditation,

1.1.4 L.31 एकत्वे हेयोपादेयशून्यतया क्रियाकारकादि-द्वैतविज्ञानोपमर्दोपपत्तेः।
Ekatve heyopādeya-śūnyatayā kriyā-kāraka-ādi-dvaita-vijñānopamardopapatteḥ—
For it can be reasonably sustainable that when the unity of Brahman and the Self is understood, there is destruction of all notions of duality, of actions, agents etc., there being then nothing to give up or to accept.

1.1.4 L.32 न हि एकत्वविज्ञानेनोन्मथितस्य द्वैतविज्ञानस्य पुनः सम्भवोऽस्ति,
येनोपासनाविधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्येत।

Na hi ekatva-vijñānenonmathitasya dvaita-vijñānasya punaḥ saṃbhavo'sti,
Yenopāsanā-vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ pratipādyeta—
There is no possibility of the revival of the notion of duality which has once been uprooted by the knowledge of absolute unity,
Because of which we would again arrive at the conclusion about Brahman being supplementary to an injunction for devout meditation.

1.1.4 L.33 यद्यप्यन्यत्र वेदवाक्यानां विधिसंस्पर्शमन्तरेण प्रमाणत्वं न दृष्टम्,
Yadi api anyatra veda-vākyānāṃ vidhi-saṃsparśam antareṇa pramāṇatvaṃ na dṛṣṭam—
Though elsewhere (i.e. in the Karma-kāṇḍa) we do not accept the validity or authoritativeness of Vedic passages except when they are connected with injunctions,

1.1.4 L.34 तथाप्यात्मविज्ञानस्य फलपर्यन्तत्वान्न तद्विषयस्य शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यं प्रत्याख्यातुम्।
Tathā api ātma-vijñānasya phala-paryantatvān na tad-viṣayasya śāstrasya prāmāṇyaṃ śakyaṃ pratyākhyātum—
Still as the knowledge of the Self results in its own fruit, it would not be possible to impugn the validity or authoritativeness of the Śāstra dealing with the subject of the Self.

1.1.4 L.35 न चानुमानगम्यं शास्त्रप्रामाण्यम्, येनान्यत्र दृष्टं निदर्शनमपेक्ष्येत।
Na ca anumāna-gamyaṃ śāstra-prāmāṇyam, yena anyatra dṛṣṭaṃ nidarśanam apekṣeta—
It is not that the validity or authoritativeness of this Śāstra is inferable, so that it may expect instances observed elsewhere (to be cited).

1.1.4 L.36 तस्मात्सिद्धं ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वम्॥
Tasmāt siddhaṃ brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-pramāṇakatvam—
Therefore it is proved that Brahman has the Scriptures as its valid authority.


1.1.4 L.37 अत्रापरे प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते — यद्यपि शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्म,
तथापि प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रेण ब्रह्म समर्प्यते;

Atra apare pratyavatiṣṭhante, yadi api śāstra-pramāṇakaṃ brahma,
Tathā api pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayaiva śāstreṇa brahma samarpyate—
Here some others come forward with the objection thus — Even though Brahman has the Śāstra as the only means to its right knowledge,
Still the Śāstra culminates in making Brahman an object of an injunction for Upāsanā i.e. meditation (Pratipatti),

1.1.4 L.38 यथा यूपाहवनीयादीन्यलौकिकान्यपि विधिशेषतया शास्त्रेण समर्प्यन्ते, तद्वत्।
Yathā yūpa-āhavanīya-ādīni alaukikāni api vidhi-śeṣatayā śāstreṇa samarpyante, tadvat—
Just as the Śāstra culminates in making the sacrificial post (Yūpa) and the Āhavanīya Agni etc., though they are not familiar in ordinary life, as being supplementary to an injunction.

1.1.4 L.39 कुत एतत्? प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति-प्रयोजनपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य।
Kuta etat? pravṛtti-nivṛtti-prayojana-paratvāc chāstrasya—
Whence do you get that? Because the Śāstra has the purport of either promoting or discouraging (action).

1.1.4 L.40 तथा हि शास्त्र-तात्पर्य-विदाम् अनुक्रमणम् (विद आहुः) — ‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्’ (शा. भा. १.१.१) इति,
‘चोदनेति क्रियायाः प्रवर्तकं वचनम्’ (शा. भा. १.१.२);

Tathā hi śāstra-tātparya-vidām anukramaṇam (vida āhuḥ) — ‘dṛṣṭo hi tasya arthaḥ karma-avabodhanam’ iti,
‘Codaneti kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam’—
For, those who know the Śāstra have said so, thus — “The obvious meaning of it (i.e. the Veda) is seen to be an instruction to do something” (Śābara Bhā. 1.1.1),
“Injunction is a statement which stimulates action” (Śābara Bhā. 1.1.2),

1.1.4 L.41 ‘तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः’ (जै. सू. १.१.५),
‘Tasya jñānam upadeśaḥ’—
“Instruction is the knowledge of that” (Jai. Sū. 1.1.5),

1.1.4 L.42 ‘तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायः’ (जै. सू. १.१.२५),
‘Tad-bhūtānāṃ kriyā-arthena samāmnāyaḥ’—
“Words in a sentence should be construed as having relation to a word signifying action” (Jai. Sū. 1.1.25),

1.1.4 L.43 ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम् अतदर्थानाम्’ (जै. सू. १.२.१) इति च।
‘Āmnāyasya kriyā-arthatvād ānarthakyam atad-arthānām’ iti ca—
“As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is without a purpose” (Jai. Sū. 1.2.1).

1.1.4 L.44 अतः पुरुषं क्वचिद्विषयविशेषे प्रवर्तयत् कुतश्चिद् विषयविशेषान् निवर्तयच्चार्थवच्छास्त्रम्।
Ataḥ puruṣaṃ kvacid viṣaya-viśeṣe pravartayat kutaścid viṣaya-viśeṣān nivartayac ca arthavac chāstram—
Hence it is in stimulating a person to activity with regard to some particular object, or by making him averse to act with regard to some other object, that the Scriptures have a purpose,

1.1.4 L.45 तच्छेषतया चान्यदुपयुक्तम्।
Tac-cheṣatayā ca anyad upayuktam—
And that (part of it) which does not do so is utilized as being supplementary to action.

1.1.4 L.46 तत्सामान्याद् वेदान्तानामपि तथैवार्थवत्त्वं स्यात्।
Tad-sāmānyād vedāntānām api tathaiva arthavattvaṃ syāt—
In common with it, Vedānta passages likewise, will have a purpose only in the same way.

1.1.4 L.47 सति च विधिपरत्वे, यथा स्वर्गादि-कामस्याग्निहोत्रादि-साधनं विधीयते,
Sati ca vidhi-paratve, yathā svarga-ādi-kāmasya agni-hotra-ādi-sādhanaṃ vidhīyate—
The Scriptures being of the nature of injunctions, it stands to reason that just as Agni-hotra and other means are enjoined on one who is desirous of heaven etc.,

1.1.4 L.48 एवममृतत्वकामस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानं विधीयत इति युक्तम्।
Evam amṛtatva-kāmasya brahma-jñānaṃ vidhīyata iti yuktam—
Similarly acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on one who is desirous of immortality.


1.1.4 L.49 नन्विह जिज्ञास्यवैलक्षण्यमुक्तम् —
Nanu iha jijñāsya-vailakṣaṇyam uktam—
But (says the Bhāṣya-kāra) a difference in the nature of what is desired to be known is mentioned here.

1.1.4 L.50 कर्मकाण्डे भव्यो धर्मो जिज्ञास्यः,
इह तु भूतं नित्यनिर्वृत्तं ब्रह्म जिज्ञास्यमिति;

Karma-kāṇḍe bhavyo dharmo jijñāsyaḥ,
Iha tu bhūtaṃ nitya-nirvṛttaṃ brahma jijñāsyam iti—
In the Karma-kāṇḍa what is indicated as desired to be known is Duty (Dharma), which is performed some time in the future,
But here on the contrary the already existing and eternally established Brahman is indicated as that which is desired to be known.

1.1.4 L.51 तत्र धर्मज्ञानफलाद् अनुष्ठानापेक्षाद् विलक्षणं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलं भवितुमर्हति।
Tatra dharma-jñāna-phalād anuṣṭhāna-apekṣād vi-lakṣaṇaṃ brahma-jñāna-phalaṃ bhavitum arhati—
Therefore the fruit in the form of the knowledge of Brahman is different from the fruit in the form of the knowledge of Duty which expects the doing of some particular act.


1.1.4 L.52 नार्हत्येवं भवितुम्, कार्यविधिप्रयुक्तस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात्।
Na arhati evaṃ bhavitum, kārya-vidhi-prayuktasyaiva brahmaṇaḥ pratipādyamānatvāt—
(The Vṛtti-kāra says — ) It does not deserve to be so, because what is intended to be propounded is Brahman, which is connected with an injunction for something to be done,

1.1.4 L.53 ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5–6)
‘Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ’—
As for instance — “Verily the Self is to be seen (BrhUEng.2.4.5).

1.1.4 L.54 ‘य आत्मापहतपाप्मा … सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः’ (ChanU.8.7.1),
‘Ya ātmā apahata-pāpmā … so'nveṣṭhavyaḥ sa vijijñāsitavyaḥ’—
When the following injunctional statements are there, viz. “That Ātmā (Self), which is sinless — he is to be looked for, he is to be understood” (ChanU.8.7.1),

1.1.4 L.55 ‘आत्मेत्येवोपासीत’ (BrhU.1.4.7)
‘आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत’ (BrhU.1.4.15)

‘Ātmeti evopāsīta’,
‘Ātmānam eva lokam upāsīta’—
“Let (a man) meditate devoutly on the Self only, as his true state” (BrhUEng.1.4.15),

1.1.4 L.56 ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (MunU.3.2.9) इत्यादिषु विधानेषु सत्सु,
‘Brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’ ityādiṣu vidhāneṣu satsu—
“He who knows Brahman, himself becomes Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9), etc.,

1.1.4 L.57 ‘कोऽसावात्मा?’ ‘किं तद्ब्रह्म?’ इत्याकाङ्क्षायां तत्स्वरूपसमर्पणेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुक्ताः —
‘Ko'sau ātmā?’ ‘kiṃ tad brahma?’ iti ākāṅkṣāyāṃ tat-svarūpa-samarpaṇena sarve vedāntā upayuktāḥ—
And when there is a desire to know what that Brahman is and what that Self is, all the Vedānta passages are employed in intimating the nature of Brahman, thus: —

1.1.4 L.58 नित्यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वगतो नित्यतृप्तो नित्य-शुद्ध-बुद्ध-मुक्त-स्वभावो विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म इत्येवमादयः।
Nityaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarva-gato nitya-tṛpto nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvo vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma iti evam-ādayaḥ—
(Brahman) is eternal, omniscient, all-pervading, absolutely eternally satisfied, and is of the nature of being eternally pure, intelligent, and free, and is knowledge and Bliss etc.

1.1.4 L.59 तदुपासनाच्च शास्त्रदृष्टोऽदृष्टो मोक्षः फलं भविष्यति।
Tad-upāsanāc ca śāstra-dṛṣṭo'dṛṣṭo mokṣaḥ phalaṃ bhaviṣyati iti—
It is through devout meditation that the fruit viz. Final Release which is not capable of being seen, but is envisaged by the Śāstra, will accrue.

1.1.4 L.60 कर्तव्यविध्यननुप्रवेशे तु वस्तुमात्रकथने हानोपादानासम्भवात्
Kartavya-vidhi-ananupraveśe vastumātra-kathane hānopādāna-asaṃbhavāt—
If the Vedānta passages were not to lead towards an injunction to some action, and were to be statements of mere things only, then by reason of the impossibility (in such a case) of knowing what is to be given up or what is to be accepted,

1.1.4 L.61 ‘सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती’ ‘राजासौ गच्छति’ इत्यादिवाक्यवद् वेदान्तवाक्यानाम् आनर्थक्यमेव स्यात्।
‘Sapta-dvīpā vasumatī’, ‘rājā asau gacchati’ ityādi-vākyavad vedānta-vākyānām ānarthakyam eva syāt—
The Vedānta passages would be as purposeless as the sentences ‘The Earth consists of seven islands’, ‘Here goes the king’ etc.


1.1.4 L.62 ननु वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि ‘रज्जुरियम्, नायं सर्पः’ इत्यादौ भ्रान्तिजनितभीति-निवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं दृष्टम्;
Nanu vastumātra-kathane'pi ‘rajjuḥ iyaṃ, na ayaṃ sarpaḥ’ ityādau bhrānti-janita-bhīti-nivartanena arthavattvaṃ dṛṣṭam—
But (says the Bhāṣya-kāra) just as even the mere mention of a fact viz. that this is a rope and not a snake, has meaning by way of removing the fear caused by the erroneous opinion (that it is a snake),

1.1.4 L.63 तथेहाप्यसंसार्यात्मवस्तु-कथनेन संसारित्वभ्रान्ति-निवर्तनेनार्थवत्त्वं स्यात्।
Tatheha api asaṃsāri-ātma-vastu-kathanena saṃsāritva-bhrānti-nivartanena arthavattvaṃ syāt—
So also here, the mere mention of the entity i.e. the Self which is not of a transmigratory nature, would have a meaning by way of removing the erroneous opinion about its being of a transmigratory nature.


1.1.4 L.64 स्यादेतदेवम्, यदि रज्जुस्वरूप-श्रवणमात्रेणेव सर्पभ्रान्तिः, संसारित्वभ्रान्तिर्ब्रह्मस्वरूप-श्रवणमात्रेण निवर्तेत;
Syād etad evam, yadi rajju-svarūpa-śravaṇa iva sarpa-bhrāntiḥ, saṃsāritva-bhrāntiḥ brahma-svarūpa-śravaṇamātreṇa nivarteta—
(The Vṛtti-kāra replies —) This would be so, provided the erroneous opinion about the Self being of a transmigratory nature were to be removed by merely hearing about the nature of Brahman, even as the erroneous opinion about a rope being a snake is removed by hearing about the nature of the rope as being a rope only.

1.1.4 L.65 न तु निवर्तते; श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं सुखदुःखादि-संसारिधर्मदर्शनात्,
Na tu nivartate, śruta-brahmaṇo'pi yathā pūrvaṃ sukha-duḥkha-ādi-saṃsāri-dharma-darśanāt—
But it is not so removed, because even in the case of a person who has heard what Brahman is, he is still seen to be affected by pleasure, pain and such other attributes of a transmigratory being,

1.1.4 L.66 ‘श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इति च
श्रवणोत्तरकालयोर्मनन-निदिध्यासनयोर्विधिदर्शनात्।

‘Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ’ iti ca
Śravaṇottara-kālayoḥ manana-nididhyāsanayoḥ vidhi-darśanāt—
And because we see that there are such injunctions (in the Scriptures) about hearing and cogitating upon the Self, thus —
“The Self should be heard and cogitated upon and constantly meditated upon” (BrhUEng.2.4.5).

1.1.4 L.67 तस्मात् प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतयैव शास्त्रप्रमाणकं ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति॥
Tasmāt pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayaiva śāstra-pramāṇakaṃ brahma abhyupagantavyam iti—
Therefore Brahman should be understood as having the Śāstra as the right means of its knowledge, by way of its being an object of an injunction for meditation (i.e. Upāsanā).


1.1.4 L.68 अत्राभिधीयते — न; कर्मब्रह्मविद्याफलयोर्वैलक्षण्यात्।
Atra abhidhīyate — na, karma-brahma-vidyā-phalayoḥ vailakṣaṇyāt—
To all this (The Bhāṣya-kāra replies) — No, because of the dissimilarity between the fruits of actions and the fruits of the knowledge of Brahman.

1.1.4 L.69 शारीरं वाचिकं मानसं च कर्म श्रुतिस्मृतिसिद्धं धर्माख्यम्,
यद्विषया जिज्ञासा ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’ (जै. सू. १। १। १) इति सूत्रिता।

Śārīraṃ vācikaṃ mānasaṃ ca karma śruti-smṛti-siddhaṃ dharma-ākhyam,
Yad-viṣayā jijñāsā ‘atha ato dharma-jijñāsā’ iti sūtritā—
Action, known by the name of ‘duty’ from the Scriptures and Smṛtis, is the activity of the body, speech and the mind,
The desire to know which is expressed in the Sūtra — “Now therefore the inquiry into Duty”,

1.1.4 L.70 अधर्मोऽपि हिंसादिः प्रतिषेधचोदनालक्षणत्वाज् जिज्ञास्यः परिहाराय।
Adharmo'pi hiṃsā-ādiḥ pratiṣedha-codanā-lakṣaṇatvāj jijñāsyaḥ parihārāya—
And that which is non-Duty, such as killing etc., which is of the nature of a prohibition has to be inquired into with a view to avoid the doing of it.

1.1.4 L.71 तयोश्चोदना-लक्षणयोरर्थानर्थयोर्धर्माधर्मयोः फले प्रत्यक्षे सुखदुःखे शरीर-वाङ्-मनोभिरेवोपभुज्यमाने विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगजन्ये ब्रह्मादिषु (देहवत्सु) स्थावरान्तेषु प्रसिद्धे।
Tayoś codanā-lakṣaṇayoḥ artha-anarthayoḥ dharma-adharmayoḥ phale pratyakṣe sukha-duḥkhe śarīra-vāṅ-manobhiḥ evopabhujyamāne viṣayendriya-saṃyoga-janye brahma-ādiṣu (dehavatsu) sthāvara-anteṣu prasiddhe—
The fruits of these good and evil things such as duties and non-duties which are of the nature of an injunction, which actually are pleasure and pain respectively and which arise out of the union of the sense-organs and sense-objects and are experienced only by the body, speech and the mind, are generally known by all, right from the Brahman (Hiraṇya-garbha) down to the inanimate things.

1.1.4 L.72 मनुष्यत्वादारभ्य ब्रह्मान्तेषु देहवत्सु सुखतारतम्यम् अनुश्रूयते।
Manuṣyatvād ārabhya brahma-anteṣu dehavatsu sukha-tāratamyam anuśrūyate—
The Scriptures declare that there are different degrees of pleasure as experienced by all embodied beings, from men right up to the Brahman (Hiraṇya-garbha).

1.1.4 L.73 ततश्च तद्धेतोर्धर्मस्यापि तारतम्यं गम्यते। धर्म-तारतम्याद् अधिकारि-तारतम्यम्।
Tataś ca tad-dhetoḥ dharmasya tāratamyaṃ gamyate. dharma-tāratamyād adhikāri-tāratamyam—
Hence from them we understand that there are comparative degrees of Duty which is their cause and from these comparative degrees of Duty, the comparative degrees of the competency of persons who perform such Duties (is understood).

1.1.4 L.74 प्रसिद्धं चार्थित्वसामर्थ्यादिकृतम् अधिकारितारतम्यम्।
Prasiddhaṃ ca arthitva-sāmarthya-ādi-kṛtam adhikāri-tāratamyam—
The comparative degrees of the competency of persons performing such Duties is well-known as being caused by their ability for actions and their desire for certain results.

1.1.4 L.75 तथा च यागाद्यनुष्ठायिनामेव विद्यासमाधि-विशेषादुत्तरेण पथा गमनम्,
Tathā ca yāga-ādi-anuṣṭhāyinām eva vidyā-samādhi-viśeṣād uttareṇa pathā gamanam—
Thus we learn that only those who perform Sacrifices and have special ability for meditation (Upāsanā) and concentration on Deities etc., proceed by the Northern Path (Devāyana)

1.1.4 L.76 केवलैरिष्टापूर्तदत्त-साधनैर्धूमादिक्रमेण दक्षिणेन पथा गमनम्,
Kevalaiḥ iṣṭā-pūrta-datta-sādhanaiḥ dhūma-ādi-krameṇa dakṣiṇena pathā gamanam—
And those who perform only minor Sacrifices and works of charity and public utility, proceed by the Southern Path (Pitṛ-yāṇa),

1.1.4 L.77 तत्रापि सुख-तारतम्यम्, तत्साधन-तारतम्यं च शास्त्रात् ‘यावत्सम्पातमुषित्वा’ (ChanU.5.10.5) इत्यस्माद्गम्यते।
Tatra api sukha-tāratamyam, tat-sādhana-tāratamyaṃ ca śāstrāt ‘yāvat saṃpātam uṣitvā’ iti asmād gamyate—
And we also know from the Śāstra, such as the Scriptural passage “Having dwelt there till their action is worked out or consumed” (ChanU.5.10.5), that even there such comparative degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure are understood (as existing).

1.1.4 L.78 तथा मनुष्यादिषु (नारक-)स्थावरान्तेषु सुखलवश्चोदनालक्षण-धर्मसाध्य एवेति गम्यते तारतम्येन वर्तमानः।
Tathā manuṣya-ādiṣu (nāraka-)sthāvara-anteṣu sukha-lavaś codanā-lakṣaṇa-dharma-sādhya eveti gamyate tāratamyena vartamānaḥ—
We also know that beginning from man down to those who reside in hell, and all the inanimate things, there exists a comparative modicum of pleasure attainable by ‘Duty’ (Dharma) which is of the nature of an injunction.

1.1.4 L.79 तथोर्ध्वगतेष्वधोगतेषु च देहवत्सु दुःखतारतम्य-दर्शनात् तद्धेतोरधर्मस्य प्रतिषेधचोदना-लक्षणस्य तदनुष्ठायिनां च तारतम्यं गम्यते।
Tathordhva-gateṣu adho-gateṣu ca dehavatsu duḥkha-tāratamya-darśanāt tad-dhetoḥ adharmasya pratiṣedha-codanā-lakṣaṇasya tad-anuṣṭhāyināṃ ca tāratamyaṃ gamyate—
So also in the case of those who possess a body and who have either gone down (the abyss) or gone up (to heaven), in as much as comparative degrees of pain are to be seen, it is understood, that its cause viz. religious demerit (Adharma), which is known from prohibitory injunctions, as well as those who perpetrate such non-meritorious actions, also have such comparative degrees.

1.1.4 L.80 एवमविद्यादिदोषवतां धर्माधर्मतारतम्य-निमित्तं शरीरोपादानपूर्वकं सुखदुःखतारतम्यम् अनित्यं संसाररूपं श्रुतिस्मृतिन्याय-प्रसिद्धम्।
Evam avidyā-ādi-doṣavatāṃ dharma-adharma-tāratamya-nimittaṃ śarīropādāna-pūrvakaṃ sukha-duḥkha-tāratamyam anityaṃ saṃsāra-rūpaṃ śruti-smṛti-nyāya-prasiddham—
In this manner, in the case of those who are affected by the fault of the nature of Nescience etc., that there are differences in the comparative degrees of pleasure and pain which are of the transitory nature of a transmigratory existence and which are caused by their merit or demerit and which are preceded by a prior assumption of a body, is well-known from the Scriptures, Smṛtis and Nyāya (Logic).

1.1.4 L.81 तथा च श्रुतिः ‘न ह वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति’ इति यथावर्णितं संसाररूपम् अनुवदति।
Tathā ca śrutiḥ ‘na ha vai sa-śarīrasya sataḥ priya-apriyayoḥ apahatiḥ asti’ iti yathā-varṇitaṃ saṃsāra-rūpam anuvadati—
The Scriptural passage “As long as he continues to possess a body, there is no freedom for him from pleasure and pain” refers to the transmigratory nature as described above.

1.1.4 L.82 ‘अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः’ (ChanU.8.12.1) इति प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शन-प्रतिषेधाच् चोदनालक्षण-धर्मकार्यत्वं मोक्षाख्यस्याशरीरत्वस्य प्रतिषिध्यत इति गम्यते
‘Aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priya-apriye spṛśataḥ’ iti priya-apriya-sparśana-pratiṣedhāc codanā-lakṣaṇa-dharma-kāryatvaṃ mokṣa-ākhyasya aśarīratvasya pratiṣidhyata iti gamyate—
So also we learn from the Scriptural passage “When he is once rid of this body neither pleasure nor pain affect him” (ChanU.8.12.1), which denies any touch of either pleasure or pain, that the disembodied condition called Final Release is not the result of religious Duty (Dharma) which is of the nature of an injunction.

1.1.4 L.83 धर्मकार्यत्वे हि प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शन-प्रतिषेधो नोपपद्येत।
Dharma-kāryatve hi priya-apriya-sparśana-pratiṣedho nopapadyeta—
Were it to be the result of religious duty, such denial of being touched either by pleasure or pain would not be reasonably sustainable.


1.1.4 L.84 अशरीरत्वमेव धर्मकार्यमिति चेत्,
Aśarīratvam eva dharma-kāryam iti cet—
If it be said (by the opponent) that the disembodied condition is itself the result of Duty,


1.1.4 L.85 न; तस्य स्वाभाविकत्वात् —
Na; tasya svā-bhāvikatvāt—
(We reply that) it is not so, because the condition of being unembodied is natural to the Ātmā

1.1.4 L.86 ‘अशरीरꣳ शरीरेष्वनवस्थेष्ववस्थितम्। महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति’ (KathU.1.2.22)
‘Aśarīraṃ śarīreṣu anavastheṣu avasthitam. mahāntaṃ vibhum ātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati’—
As illustrated by the following Scriptural passages — “The wise one, knowing the Self to be bodiless amongst the embodied, unchanging amongst the changeable, great and omni-present, does not grieve” (KathU.1.2.22),

1.1.4 L.87 ‘अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रः’ (MunU.2.1.2)
‘Aprāṇo hi amanāḥ śubhraḥ’—
“He is without vital breath (Prāṇa), without mind and is pure” (MunU.2.1.2),

1.1.4 L.88 ‘असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः’ (BrhU.4.3.15) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः।
‘Asaṅgo hi ayaṃ puruṣaḥ’ ityādi-śrutibhyaḥ—
“That Puruṣa is without any attachment” (BrhUEng.4.3.15).

1.1.4 L.89 अत एवानुष्ठेयकर्मफल-विलक्षणं मोक्षाख्यमशरीरत्वं नित्यमिति सिद्धम्।
Ata eva anuṣṭheya-karma-phala-vilakṣaṇaṃ mokṣa-ākhyam aśariratvaṃ nityam iti siddham—
It is proved therefore that the eternal unembodied condition called ‘Final Release’ is dissimilar to the fruit of action which has to be performed.

1.1.4 L.90 तत्र किञ्चित्परिणामि-नित्यं यस्मिन्विक्रियमाणेऽपि तदेवेदमिति बुद्धिर्न विहन्यते;
Tatra kiṃcit pariṇāmi-nityaṃ yasmin vikriyamāṇe'pi ‘tad evedam’ iti buddhiḥ na vihanyate—
Amongst these eternal things there are some which are eternal but subject to modification, and though they undergo such modification, the notion of their being the same eternal things is not destroyed,

1.1.4 L.91 यथा पृथिव्यादि जगन्नित्यत्ववादिनाम्, यथा वा सांख्यानां गुणाः।
Yathā pṛthivī-ādi jagan-nityatva-vādinām, yathā ca sāṃkhyānāṃ guṇāḥ—
As for instance, the Earth, as understood by those who hold the view that this transitory world is eternal, or the Attributes (Guṇas) according to the Sāṅkhyas.

1.1.4 L.92 इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थ-नित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यतृप्तं निरवयवं स्वयंज्योतिःस्वभावम्,
Idaṃ tu pārama-arthikaṃ kūṭastha-nityaṃ vyomavat sarva-vyāpi sarva-vikriyā-rahitaṃ nitya-tṛptaṃ niravayavaṃ svayaṃ-jyotiḥ-svabhāvam—
This (Self or Brahman) however is eternal in the highest sense, eternally unchanging, all-pervading like the sky (Ākāśa), free from all modifications, eternally contented, without any parts, and is of the nature of a self-luminant entity,

1.1.4 L.93 यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तेते;
Yatra dharma-adharmau saha kāryeṇa kāla-trayaṃ ca nopāvartete—
In whose case meritorious or unmeritorious religious duty or actions along with their effects, in the past, present or future, do not apply.

1.1.4 L.94 तदेतदशरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम् — ‘अन्यत्र धर्माद् अन्यत्राधर्माद् अन्यत्रास्मात् कृताकृतात्।
अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च’ (KathU.1.2.24) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः।

Tad etad aśarīratvaṃ mokṣa-ākhyam — ‘anyatra dharmād, anyatra adharmād, anyatra asmāt kṛta-akṛtāt.
Anyatra bhūtāc ca bhavyāc ca’ ityādi-śrutibhyaḥ—
And this precisely is that unembodied condition called Final Release, according to such Scriptural passages as “Different from duty (Dharma) and non-duty (Adharma), different from every effect and cause,
And different from past and the future also” (KathU.1.2.24) etc.

1.1.4 L.95 अतस्तद्ब्रह्म, यस्येयं जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता। तद्यदि कर्तव्यशेषत्वेनोपदिश्येत,
Ataḥ tad brahma, yasyeyaṃ jijñāsā prastutā. tad yadi kartavya-śeṣatvenopadiśyeta—
Hence if this Brahman, an inquiry about which is proposed here, were to be propounded (by the Scriptures) as being supplementary to action (Karma)

1.1.4 L.96 तेन च कर्तव्येन साध्यश्चेन्मोक्षोऽभ्युपगम्येत,
अनित्य एव स्यात्।

Tena ca kartavyena sādhyaś cen mokṣo'bhyupagamyeta,
Anitya eva syāt—
And were Final Release (Mokṣa) to be understood as obtainable through action,
It would necessarily be of a transitory nature,

1.1.4 L.97 तत्रैवं सति यथोक्तकर्मफलेष्वेव तारतम्यावस्थितेष्वनित्येषु कश्चिदतिशयो मोक्ष इति प्रसज्येत।
Tatraivaṃ sati yathokta-karma-phaleṣu eva tāratamya-avasthiteṣu anityeṣu kaścid atiśayo mokṣa iti prasajyeta—
And it would then come to this, that Final Release is but only a superior type of a transitory fruit of actions as amongst those described above, and which stand to each other in the comparative degrees (of greatness or smallness).

1.1.4 L.98 नित्यश्च मोक्षः सर्वैर्मोक्षवादिभिरभ्युपगम्यते।
Nityaś ca mokṣaḥ sarvaiḥ mokṣa-vādibhiḥ abhyupagamyate—
All those who regard Final Release as a creed, understand it as being eternal,

1.1.4 L.99 अतो न कर्तव्यशेषत्वेन ब्रह्मोपदेशो युक्तः।
Ato na kartavya-śeṣatvena brahmopadeśo yuktaḥ—
And therefore it would not be proper to propound Brahman as being supplementary to action.

1.1.4 L.100 अपि च ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (MunU.3.2.9)
Api ca ‘brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’—
Besides the following passages from the Scriptures “He who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9),

1.1.4 L.101 ‘क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे’ (MunU.2.2.8)
‘Kṣīyante ca asya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe para-avare’—
“All the sum total of his actions perishes when he who is both the higher and the lower is beheld” (MunU.2.2.8),

1.1.4 L.102 ‘आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्न बिभेति कुतश्चन’ (TaitU.2.9)
‘Ānandaṃ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kutaścana’—
“He who knows the joy of Brahman is never afraid” (TaitUEng.2.9).

1.1.4 L.103 ‘अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि’ (BrhU.4.2.4)
‘Abhayaṃ vai janaka prāpto'si’—
“O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness” (BrhUEng.4.2.4),

1.1.4 L.104 ‘तदात्मानम् एवावेद् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति,
तस्मात्तत्सर्वमभवत्’ (BrhU.1.4.10)

‘Tad ātmānam eva aved ahaṃ brahma asmi iti,
Tasmāt tat sarvam abhavat’—
“That Brahman knew itself, only as itself being Brahman,
Therefore it became all that” (BrhUEng.1.4.10),

1.1.4 L.105 ‘तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः’ (IsU.7) इत्येवमाद्याः श्रुतयो
ब्रह्मविद्यानन्तरमेव मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्यो मध्ये कार्यान्तरं वारयन्ति।

‘Tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ’ ityevam-ādyāḥ śrutayo
Brahma-vidyā-anantaram eva mokṣaṃ darśayantyo madhye kārya-antaraṃ vārayanti—
“To him who realizes the unity of all, whence can there be any infatuation or bewailing” (IsU.7) etc., —
Which show that Final Release comes about simultaneously with the knowledge of Brahman, preclude the possibility of any action in between the two.

1.1.4 L.106 तथा ‘तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च’ (BrhU.1.4.10) इति
ब्रह्मदर्शन-सर्वात्मभावयोर्मध्ये कर्तव्यान्तर-वारणायोदाहार्यम् —

Tathā ‘taddhaitat paśyann ṛṣiḥ vāmadevaḥ pratipede'haṃ manuḥ abhavaṃ sūryaś ca’ iti
Brahma-darśana-sarva-ātma-bhāvayoḥ madhye kartavya-antara-vāraṇāyodāhāryam—
We can similarly quote as an illustration the Scriptural passage “Seeing this the sage Vāma-deva understood, I was Manu, I am the sun” (BrhUEng.1.4.10),
To show, that in between the realization of Brahman and becoming one with the Universal Self there is no other action in between,

1.1.4 L.107 यथा ‘तिष्ठन्गायति’ इति तिष्ठतिगायत्योर्मध्ये तत्कर्तृकं कार्यान्तरं नास्तीति गम्यते।
Yathā ‘tiṣṭhan gāyati’ iti tiṣṭhati-gāyatyoḥ madhye tat-kartṛkaṃ kārya-antaraṃ na asti iti gamyate—
Just as in the sentence “He sings standing” we understand that there is no other action intervening between his singing and standing.

1.1.4 L.108 ‘त्वं हि नः पिता योऽस्माकमविद्यायाः परं पारं तारयसि’ (PrasU.6.8)
‘Tvaṃ hi naḥ pitā yo'smākam avidyāyāḥ paraṃ pāraṃ tārayasi’—
Passages from the Scriptures such as “You indeed are our father, you who carry us from ignorance to the other shore beyond” (PrasU.6.8),

1.1.4 L.109 ‘श्रुतं ह्येव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति;
सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि, तं मा भगवाञ्छोकस्य पारं तारयतु’ (ChanU.7.1.3)

‘Śrutaṃ hi eva me bhagavad-dṛśebhyaḥ tarati śokam ātmavid iti;
So'haṃ bhagavaḥ śocāmi, taṃ mā bhagavāñ chokasya pāraṃ tārayatu’—
“I have heard from men like you, that one who knows the Self overcomes grief,
I myself am in similar grief, the Bhagavān should help me to tide over the grief” (ChanU.7.1.3),

1.1.4 L.110 ‘तस्मै मृदितकषायाय तमसः पारं दर्शयति भगवान्सनत्कुमारः’ (ChanU.7.26.2) इति चैवमाद्याः श्रुतयो
मोक्षप्रतिबन्ध-निवृत्तिमात्रमेवात्मज्ञानस्य फलं दर्शयन्ति।

‘Tasmai mṛdita-kaṣāyāya tamasaḥ pāraṃ darśayati bhagavān sanatkumāraḥ’ iti caivam-ādyāḥ śrutayo
Mokṣa-pratibandha-nivṛttimātram eva ātma-jñānasya phalaṃ darśayanti—
“To him whose faults had been washed off, Bhagavān Sanat-kumāra showed the other side beyond the darkness” (ChanU.7.26.2),
Show that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman consists in merely the removal of the obstacle to Final Release.

1.1.4 L.111 तथा च आचार्यप्रणीतं न्यायोपबृंहितं सूत्रम् –
‘दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोष-मिथ्याज्ञानानाम् उत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायाद् अपवर्गः’ (न्या. सू. १.१.२) इति।

Tathā ca ācārya-praṇītaṃ nyāyopabṛṃhitaṃ sūtram –
‘Duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-doṣa-mithyā-jñānānām uttarottara-apāye tad-anantara-apāyād apavargaḥ’ iti—
Similar is the Sūtra of the great teacher (Gautama) supplemented by reasoning, thus —
Final Release (results) from the successive removal of erroneous ignorance, faults, activity, birth and pain, the removal of each succeeding member of the series serving to cause the removal of the one coming earlier (Nyāya Sū. 1.1.2).

1.1.4 L.112 मिथ्याज्ञानापायश्च ब्रह्मात्मैकत्व-विज्ञानाद्भवति।
Mithyā-jñāna-apāyaś ca brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñānād bhavati—
This removal of the erroneous ignorance moreover results from the knowledge of the unity of one’s own Self with Brahman.


1.1.4 L.113 न चेदं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानं सम्पद्रूपम् —
Na cedaṃ brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñānaṃ saṃpad-rūpam—
This knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing (Sampad-rūpa),

1.1.4 L.114 यथा ‘अनन्तं वै मनोऽनन्ता विश्वेदेवा अनन्तमेव स तेन लोकं जयति’ (BrhU.3.1.9) इति।
Yathā ‘anantaṃ vai mano'nantā viśve devā anantam eva sa tena lokaṃ jayati’ iti—
As for instance in the passage “The mind is infinite, the Viśve-devas are infinite: he thereby conquers the infinite world” (BrhUEng.3.1.9).

1.1.4 L.115 न चाध्यासरूपम् —
Na ca adhyāsa-rūpam—
Nor is it of the nature of a superimposition,

1.1.4 L.116 यथा ‘मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत’ (ChanU.3.18.1)
Yathā ‘mano brahmeti upāsīta’—
As for instance in the passages “Contemplate devoutly on the mind as Brahman” (ChanU.3.18.1),

1.1.4 L.117 ‘आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः’ (ChanU.3.19.1) इति च
मनआदित्यादिषु ब्रह्मदृष्ट्यध्यासः।

‘Ādityo brahmeti ādeśaḥ’ iti ca
Mana-āditya-ādiṣu brahma-dṛṣṭi-adhyāsaḥ—
“The advice is that the sun is Brahman” (ChanU.3.19.1) etc.,
Where there is a superimposition by way of looking upon the mind and the sun respectively as Brahman.

1.1.4 L.118 नापि विशिष्टक्रियायोग-निमित्तम्
‘वायुर्वाव संवर्गः’ (ChanU.4.3.1)
‘प्राणो वाव संवर्गः’ (ChanU.4.3.3) इतिवत्।

Na api viśiṣṭa-kriyā-yoga-nimittam
‘Vāyuḥ vāva saṃvargaḥ’
‘Prāṇo vāva saṃvargaḥ’ itivat—
Nor is it something caused by any special action,
As for instance “Vāyu indeed is the absorber” (ChanU.4.3.1),
“The Vital Breath (Prāṇa) indeed is the absorber” (ChanU.4.3.3).

1.1.4 L.119 नाप्याज्यावेक्षणादिकर्मवत् कर्माङ्गसंस्काररूपम्।
Na api ājya-avekṣaṇa-ādi-karmavat karma-aṅga-saṃskāra-rūpam—
Nor is it of the nature of any special process of the refinement (Saṃskāra) of any thing supplementary to action, such as the act of looking upon the sacrificial ghee etc. (Ājyāvekṣaṇa).

1.1.4 L.120 सम्पदादिरूपे हि ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने,
Saṃpad-ādi-rūpe hi brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñāne'bhyupagamyamāne—
If we were to understand the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman, to be of the nature of attributing greatness to a comparatively small thing,

1.1.4 L.121 ‘तत्त्वमसि’ (ChanU.6.8.7)
‘अहं ब्रह्मास्मि’ (BrhU.1.4.10)
‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ (BrhU.2.5.19) इत्येवमादीनां
वाक्यानां ब्रह्मात्मैकत्ववस्तु-प्रतिपादनपरः पदसमन्वयः पीड्येत।

‘Tat tvam asi’,
‘Ahaṃ brahma asmi’,
‘Ayam ātmā brahma’ iti evam-ādīnāṃ
Vākyānāṃ brahma-ātmaikatva-vastu-pratipādana-paraḥ pada-samanvayaḥ pīḍyeta—
Then the co-ordinated meaning of the sentences such as “That thou art” (ChanU.6.8.7)
And “I am Brahman” (BrhUEng.1.4.10)
And “This Self is Brahman” (BrhUEng.2.5.19)
Which have the purport of propounding the unity of the Self and Brahman, would be done violence to,

1.1.4 L.122 ‘भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः’ (MunU.2.2.8) इति चैवमादीनि
अविद्यानिवृत्ति-फलश्रवणान्युपरुध्येरन्।

‘Bhidyate hṛdaya-granthiś chidyante sarva-saṃśayāḥ’ iti caivam-ādīni
Avidyā-nivṛtti-phala-śravaṇāni uparudhyeran—
And would contradict Scriptural passages about the fruit in the form of the removal of Nescience
Such as “The knots of the Hṛdaya are cut asunder and all doubts are resolved” (MunU.2.2.8),

1.1.4 L.123 ‘ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति’ (MunU.3.2.9) इति चैवमादीनि तद्भावापत्तिवचनानि सम्पदादिरूपत्वे न सामञ्जस्येनोपपद्येरन्।
‘Brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati’ iti caivam-ādīni tad-bhāva-āpatti-vacanāni saṃpad-ādi-rūpatve na sāmañjasyenopapadyeran—
And passages like “knowing Brahman, he became Brahman” (MunU.3.2.9) which speak about the Self attaining the condition of Brahman, cannot be properly understood.

1.1.4 L.124 तस्मान्न सम्पदादिरूपं ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविज्ञानम्।
Tasmān na saṃpad-ādi-rūpaṃ brahma-ātmaikatva-vijñānam—
Therefore the knowledge of the unity of the Self and Brahman is not of the nature of attributing greatness to a small thing etc.;

1.1.4 L.125 अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या।
Ato na puruṣa-vyāpāra-tantrā brahma-vidyā—
Hence also, the science of the knowledge of Brahman does not depend upon some sort of operation by man.

1.1.4 L.126 किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषय-वस्तुज्ञानवद् वस्तुतन्त्रैव।
Kiṃ tarhi? pratyakṣa-ādi-pramāṇa-viṣaya-vastu-jñānavad vastu-tantraiva—
What is it then? It is that it depends upon the thing itself, even as is the knowledge of a thing which is the object of the right means of knowledge such as direct perception.

1.1.4 L.127 एवंभूतस्य ब्रह्मणस्तज्ज्ञानस्य च न कयाचिद्युक्त्या शक्यः कार्यानुप्रवेशः कल्पयितुम्।
Evaṃ-bhūtasya brahmaṇaḥ taj-jñānasya ca na kayācid yuktyā śakyaḥ kārya-anupraveśaḥ kalpayitum—
It is not possible to imagine by any method of reasoning, that Brahman or the knowledge of Brahman which happens to be of such a nature, is supplementary to action.

1.1.4 L.128 न च विदिक्रियाकर्मत्वेन कार्यानुप्रवेशो ब्रह्मणः —
‘अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि’ (KenU.1.3) इति
विदिक्रियाकर्मत्व-प्रतिषेधात्,

Na ca vidi-kriyā-karmatvena kārya-anupraveśo brahmaṇaḥ —
‘Anyad eva tad viditād atho aviditād adhi’ iti
Vidi-kriyā-karmatva-pratiṣedhāt—
Nor can Brahman be said to be supplementary to action, as being an object of the act of knowing,
Because, the Scriptural passage — “It is different from the known as well as the unknown” (KenU.1.3) —
Denies that it is the object of the act of knowing,

1.1.4 L.129 ‘येनेदं सर्वं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्’ (BrhU.2.4.13) इति च।
‘Yenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijānāti taṃ kena vijānīyāt?’ iti ca—
As also the Scriptural passage — “How should one know him, by whose help one knows all this?” (BrhUEng.2.4.13).

1.1.4 L.130 तथोपास्तिक्रियाकर्मत्व-प्रतिषेधोऽपि भवति —
‘यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युद्यते’ (KenU.1.4) इत्यविषयत्वं ब्रह्मण उपन्यस्य,

Tathopāsti-kriyā-karmatva-pratiṣedho'pi bhavati,
‘Yad vācā anabhyuditaṃ yena vāg abhyudyate’ iti aviṣayatvaṃ brahmaṇa upanyasya—
Similarly there is a denial of Brahman being the object of the act of devout meditation,
Because, after having declared Brahman as not being an object (of sense), by the Scriptural passage — “That which is not proclaimed by speech, but by which speech is made manifest” (KenU.1.4) —

1.1.4 L.131 ‘तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि, नेदं यदिदमुपासते’ (KenU.1.8) इति।
‘Tad eva brahma tvaṃ viddhi, nedaṃ yad idam upāsate’ iti—
It is said — “you should know that alone as Brahman, and not this on which you are devoutly meditating” (KenU.1.8).


1.1.4 L.132 अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्,
Aviṣayatve brahmaṇaḥ śāstra-yonitva-anupapattiḥ iti cet—
If there is an objection (by the opponent) that in case Brahman is not an object (of sense), the Śāstra could not possibly be its source (as is said in Sūtra 2),


1.1.4 L.133 न; अविद्याकल्पितभेद-निवृत्तिपरत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य।
Na; avidyā-kalpita-bheda-nivṛtti-paratvāc chāstrasya—
We reply — No, because the Śāstra has concern merely for the removal of difference imagined through Nescience

1.1.4 L.134 न हि शास्त्रमिदंतया विषयभूतं ब्रह्म प्रतिपिपादयिषति।
Na hi śāstram idaṃtayā viṣaya-bhūtaṃ brahma pratipipādayiṣati—
And it does not purport to propound Brahman as being an object objectively, thus — This is Brahman.

1.1.4 L.135 किं तर्हि? प्रत्यगात्मत्वेनाविषयतया प्रतिपादयत्
अविद्याकल्पितं वेद्यवेदितृवेदनादिभेदम् अपनयति।

Kiṃ tarhi? pratyag-ātmatvena aviṣayatayā pratipādayat
Avidyā-kalpitaṃ vedya-veditṛ-vedana-ādi-bhedam apanayati—
What then does it propound? It propounds Brahman as not being an object (of sense), but as being the Universal Self
And thereby removes the distinction between objects to be known, the knower, and the act of knowing etc., as imagined through Nescience.

1.1.4 L.136 तथा च शास्त्रम् — ‘यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः।
अविज्ञातं विजानतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्’ (KenU.2.3)

Tathā ca śāstram — ‘yasya amataṃ tasya mataṃ, mataṃ yasya na veda saḥ.
Avijñātaṃ vijānatāṃ vijñātam avijānatām’—
Similarly the Scriptures say — “It is conceived by him by whom it is not conceived. He by whom it is conceived, knows it not,
It is not understood by those who say they understand it, and it is understood by those who say that they understand it not” (KenU.2.3),

1.1.4 L.137 ‘न दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पश्येः … न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः’ (BrhU.3.4.2) इति चैवमादि।
‘Na dṛṣṭeḥ draṣṭāraṃ paśyeḥ … na vijñāteḥ vijñātāraṃ vijānīyāḥ’ iti caivam-ādi—
“You cannot see the seer of sight, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing, you cannot perceive the perceiver of perception, you cannot know the knower of knowledge” (BrhUEng.3.4.2) etc.

1.1.4 L.138 अतोऽविद्याकल्पितसंसारित्व-निवर्तनेन नित्य-मुक्तात्मस्वरूप-समर्पणान्
न मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वदोषः।

Ato'vidyā-kalpita-saṃsāritva-nivartanena nitya-mukta-ātma-svarūpa-samarpaṇān na mokṣasya anityatva-doṣaḥ—
Hence, Final Release is not open to the fault of being transitory,br> Because the removal of the notion of the transitory condition, imagined through Nescience, culminates in indicating Final Release to be of the nature of the eternally free Self.

1.1.4 L.139 यस्य तूत्पाद्यो मोक्षः, तस्य
मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत इति युक्तम्।

Yasya tu utpādyo mokṣaḥ, tasya
Mānasaṃ vācikaṃ kāyikaṃ vā kāryam apekṣata iti yuktam—
For him however, who holds Final Release as something to be effected (by action),
It would be logical to say that it depends upon the mental, vocal or bodily action.

1.1.4 L.140 तथा विकार्यत्वे च। तयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षस्य ध्रुवमनित्यत्वम्।
Tathā vikāryatve ca. tayoḥ pakṣayoḥ mokṣasya dhruvam anityatvam—
Final Release would certainly be transitory also in the case of those who consider it as being something which undergoes modification.

1.1.4 L.141 न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम् उत्पाद्यं वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके।
Na hi dadhi-ādi vikāryam utpādyaṃ vā ghaṭa-ādi nityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ loke—
In the ordinary worldly life, things like curds which result by modification (of milk) and things like an earthen pot which are the result of manufacture (from earth), are not observed to be everlasting.

1.1.4 L.142 न च आप्यत्वेनापि कार्यापेक्षा, स्वात्मस्वरूपत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात्;
Na ca āpyatvena api kārya-apekṣā, sva-ātma-rūpatve sati anāpyatvāt—
Nor can there be any expectation of some sort of action, by considering Final Release as something to be obtained, for, as Brahman is of the nature of one’s own Self, it is not capable of being obtained (from outside).

1.1.4 L.143 स्वरूपव्यतिरिक्तत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वम्,
सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्तस्वरूपत्वात् सर्वेण ब्रह्मण आकाशस्येव।

Sva-rūpa-vyatiriktatve'pi brahmaṇo na āpyatvam,
Sarva-gatatvena nitya-āpta-svarūpatvāt sarveṇa brahmaṇa ākāśasyeva—
Even if Brahman is considered to be something different from one’s own self, it is not capable of being obtained,
Because of its being all-pervading like the Ākāśa, and as all persons always happen to possess it in themselves as their own nature.

1.1.4 L.144 नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः, येन व्यापारमपेक्षेत।
Na api saṃskāryo mokṣaḥ, yena vyāpāram apekṣeta—
Nor is Final Release something which admits of being subjected to a process of refinement, so that it should expect some sort of operation.

1.1.4 L.145 संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य गुणाधानेन वा स्यात्, दोषापनयनेन वा।
Saṃskāro hi nāma saṃskāryasya guṇa-ādhānena vā syāt, doṣa-apanayanena vā—
Refinement can be effected either by the addition of some attribute (to a thing), or by the removal of some blemish (in it).

1.1.4 L.146 न तावद्गुणाधानेन सम्भवति,
अनाधेयातिशय-ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य।

Na tāvad guṇa-ādhānena saṃbhavati,
Anādheya-atiśaya-brahma-svarūpatvān mokṣasya—
It is not possible to refine Final Release by the addition to it of some attribute,
Because Final Release is of the nature of Brahman to which nothing can possibly be added.

1.1.4 L.147 नापि दोषापनयनेन, नित्यशुद्ध-ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य।
Na api doṣa-apanayanena, nitya-śuddha-brahma-svarūpatvān mokṣasya—
Nor is it possible to refine it by the removal of some blemish, because Final Release is of the nature of Brahman which is eternally pure.


1.1.4 L.148 स्वात्मधर्म एव सन् तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रिययात्मनि संस्क्रियमाणेऽभिव्यज्यते —
यथा आदर्शे निघर्षणक्रियया संस्क्रियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्म इति चेत्,

Sva-ātma-dharma eva san tirobhūto mokṣaḥ kriyayā ātmani saṃskriyamāṇe'bhivyajyate —
Yathā ādarśe nigharṣaṇa-kriyayā saṃskriyamāṇe bhāsvaratvaṃ dharma iti cet—
If it be argued by the opponent, that just as a mirror which is subjected to a process of polishing becomes bright and shining,
Similarly Final Release being an attribute of the Self which for the time being happens to be obscured, becomes manifest when it is subjected to a process of refinement by some sort of action,


1.1.4 L.149 न; क्रियाश्रयत्वानुपपत्तेरात्मनः।
Na; kriyā-āśrayatva-anupapatteḥ ātmanaḥ—
We reply — No, because it cannot be reasonably understood that the Self can ever be an object of any sort of action on it,

1.1.4 L.150 यदाश्रया हि क्रिया, तमविकुर्वती नैवात्मानं लभते।
Yad-āśrayā hi kriyā, tam avikurvatī naiva ātmānaṃ labhate—
Because action can never come into being without causing any modification into that in which it abides.

1.1.4 L.151 यद्यात्मा क्रियया विक्रियेत, अनित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत।
Yady ātmā kriyayā vikriyeta, anityatvam ātmanaḥ prasajyeta—
If the Self were to be liable to modification by action on itself, it would mean that it is not eternal,

1.1.4 L.152 ‘अविकार्योऽयमुच्यते’ इति चैवमादीनि वाक्यानि बाध्येरन्। तच्चानिष्टम्।
‘Avikāryo'yam ucyate’ iti caivam-ādīni vākyāni bādhyeran. tac ca aniṣṭam—
And in that case Scriptural passages such as “It is said to be unmodifiable” would be contradicted, which is not desirable.

1.1.4 L.153 तस्मान्न स्वाश्रया क्रिया आत्मनः सम्भवति।
Tasmān na sva-āśrayā kriyā ātmanaḥ saṃbhavati—
Therefore there is no possibility of the Self ever acting on itself,

1.1.4 L.154 अन्याश्रयायास्तु क्रियाया अविषयत्वान्न तयात्मा संस्क्रियते।
Anya-āśrayāyās tu kriyāyā aviṣayatvān na tayā ātmā saṃskriyate—
And as the Self is not the object of any action which has another object as the sphere of its activity, the Self is in no way modified by any such action.


1.1.4 L.155 ननु देहाश्रयया स्नानाचमन-यज्ञोपवीतधारणादिकया क्रियया देही संस्क्रियमाणो दृष्टः,
Nanu deha-āśrayayā snāna-ācamana-yajñopavītadhāraṇa-ādikayā kriyayā dehī saṃskriyamāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ—
But says the opponent, the Jīva-self (i.e. the individual embodied Self) is observed to acquire refinement by such actions as bathing, performing Ācamana (sipping water) and wearing the sacred thread, which depend upon there being a body.


1.1.4 L.156 न; देहादि-संहतस्यैवाविद्या-गृहीतस्यात्मनः संस्क्रियमाणत्वात्।
Na; deha-ādi-saṃhatasyaiva avidyā-gṛhītasya ātmanaḥ saṃskriyamāṇatvāt—
No, we reply, the one that acquires this refinement is the Jīva-Self, which under the influence of Nescience, has for the time being connection with a body.

1.1.4 L.157 प्रत्यक्षं हि स्नानाचमनादेर्देहसमवायित्वम्।
Pratyakṣaṃ hi snāna-ācamana-ādeḥ deha-samavāyitvam—
For it is a matter of direct perception that such bathing and Ācamana is in direct relation with the body,

1.1.4 L.158 तया देहाश्रयया तत्संहत एव कश्चिदविद्ययात्मत्वेन परिगृहीतः संस्क्रियत इति युक्तम्।
Tayā deha-āśrayayā tat-saṃhata eva kaścid avidyayā ātmatvena parigṛhītaḥ saṃskriyata iti yuktam—
And therefore it is proper to hold, that by that action of which the body is the sphere, it is only that particular Jīva-Self which under the influence of Nescience, is (for the time being) the Self of that body, that acquires the refinement.

1.1.4 L.159 यथा देहाश्रयचिकित्सा-निमित्तेन धातुसाम्येन तत्संहतस्य तदभिमानिन आरोग्यफलम्,
Yathā deha-āśraya-cikitsā-nimittena dhānu-sāmyena tat-saṃhatasya tad-abhimānina ārogya-phalam—
Just as by the re-establishment of the humoral balance (of a body) by means of medical treatment, it is that embodied Jīva-Self which is in connection with such a body which it considers to be its, that gets the fruit in the form of perfect health,

1.1.4 L.160 ‘अहमरोगः’ इति यत्र बुद्धिरुत्पद्यते —
‘Aham arogaḥ’ iti yatra buddhiḥ utpadyate—
And it is that embodied Jīva-Self in which this consciousness of the absence of any such malaise arises.

1.1.4 L.161 एवं स्नानाचमन-यज्ञोपवीतधारणादिकया ‘अहं शुद्धः संस्कृतः’ इति यत्र बुद्धिरुपद्यते, स संस्क्रियते।
Evaṃ snāna-ācamana-yajñopavīta-dhāraṇa-ādikayā ‘ahaṃ śuddhaḥ saṃskṛtaḥ’ iti yatra buddhiḥ utpadyate, sa saṃskriyate—
In a similar way it is that embodied Jīva-Self in which there arises the consciousness of such refinement by such bathing and Ācamana and the wearing of the sacred thread thus — I have been purified and refined — that happens to acquire such refinement.

1.1.4 L.162 स च देहेन संहत एव।
Sa ca dehena saṃhata eva—
He is of course in contact with that body,

1.1.4 L.163 तेनैव ह्यहंकर्त्रा अहंप्रत्ययविषयेण प्रत्ययिना सर्वाः क्रिया निर्वर्त्यन्ते।
Tenaiva hi ahaṃ-kartrā ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣayena pratyayinā sarvāḥ kriyā nirvartyante—
And all actions performed by him, who — as being the object of the terms ‘I’ and ‘agent’ — is the experiencer,

1.1.4 L.164 तत्फलं च स एवाश्नाति, ‘तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति’ (MunU.3.1.1) इति मन्त्रवर्णात् —
Tat-phalaṃ ca sa eva aśnāti, ‘tayoḥ anyaḥ pippalaṃ svādu atti anaśnann anyo'bhicākaśīti’ iti mantra-varṇāt—
And it is he alone that enjoys the fruit, according to the following Scriptural Mantras viz. “One of the two enjoys the delectable Pippala (fruit), and the other one (the Universal Self) refrains from enjoying and merely keeps looking on” (MunU.3.1.1),

1.1.4 L.165 ‘आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तेत्याहुर्मनीषिणः’ (KathU.1.3.4) इति च।
‘Ātmendriya-mano-yuktaṃ bhokteti āhuḥ manīṣiṇaḥ’ iti ca—
“When he is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, the wise people say that he is the experiencer” (KathU.1.3.4).

1.1.4 L.166 तथा ‘एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा।
कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता केवलो निर्गुणश्च’ (SvetU.6.11) इति,

Tathā ‘eko devaḥ sarva-bhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ sarva-vyāpī sarva-bhūta-antar-ātmā.
Karma-adhyakṣaḥ sarva-bhūta-adhivāsaḥ sākṣī cetā kevalo nir-guṇaś ca’ iti—
Also “He is the one God hidden in all beings, who is all-pervading, the Universal Self of all beings,
The director of all actions, dwelling in all beings, the witness, the vitalizer, the one and the only one, and the one free from all attributes” (SvetU.6.11).

1.1.4 L.167 ‘स पर्यगाच्छुक्रम् अकायम् अव्रणम अस्नाविरं शुद्धम् अपापविद्धम्’ (IsU.8) इति, च —
‘Sa paryagāc chukram akāyam avraṇam asnāviraṃ śuddham apāpa-viddham’ iti ca—
And “He pervades all and is bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, (and is) pure and untouched by sin” (IsU.8).

1.1.4 L.168 एतौ मन्त्रावनाधेयातिशयतां नित्यशुद्धतां च ब्रह्मणो दर्शयतः।
Etau mantrau anādheya-atiśayatāṃ nitya-śuddhatāṃ ca brahmaṇo darśayataḥ—
These two Mantras show the eternal purity of Brahman, and that it is not possible to improve upon it in any way.

1.1.4 L.169 ब्रह्मभावश्च मोक्षः।
Brahma-bhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ—
Final Release is nothing but becoming Brahman,

1.1.4 L.170 तस्मान्न संस्कार्योऽपि मोक्षः।
Tasmān na saṃskāryo'pi mokṣaḥ—
Therefore Final Release is also not something which admits of any refinement.

1.1.4 L.171 अतोऽन्यन्मोक्षं प्रति क्रियानुप्रवेशद्वारं न शक्यं केनचिद्दर्शयितुम्।
Ato'nyan mokṣaṃ prati kriyā-anupraveśa-dvāraṃ na śakyaṃ kenacid darśayitum—
Therefore, it is not possible for anybody to show any other way by which Final Release could be connected with action.

1.1.4 L.172 तस्माज्ज्ञानमेकं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते।
Tasmāj jñānam ekaṃ muktvā kriyāyā gandhamātrasya api anupraveśa iha nopapadyate—
Therefore barring knowledge and knowledge alone, action cannot have any the slightest relation to it.


1.1.4 L.173 ननु ज्ञानं नाम मानसी क्रिया,
Nanu jñānaṃ nāma mānasī kriyā—
But (says the opponent) knowledge of course is a mental act.


1.1.4 L.174 न; वैलक्षण्यात्।
Na; vailakṣaṇyāt—
No (we reply), because there is dissimilarity (between the two).

1.1.4 L.175 क्रिया हि नाम सा, यत्र वस्तुस्वरूपनिरपेक्षैव चोद्यते, पुरुषचित्त-व्यापाराधीना च,
Kriyā hi nāma sā yatra vastu-svarūpa-nirapekṣaiva codyate, puruṣa-citta-vyāpāra-adhīnā ca—
Action is of course that which is enjoined, independently of the nature of anything, and is dependent on the operation of the mind of a man,

1.1.4 L.176 यथा — ‘यस्यै देवतायै हविर्गृहीतं स्यात्तां मनसा ध्यायेद् वषट्करिष्यन्’ इति, ‘… संध्यां मनसा ध्यायेत्’ (ऐ. ब्रा. ३.८.१) इति चैवमादिषु।
Yathā — ‘yasyai devatāyai haviḥ gṛhītaṃ syāt tāṃ manasā dhyāyed vaṣaṭ-kariṣyan’ iti ‘… saṃdhyāṃ manasā dhyāyet’ iti caivam-ādiṣu—
For instance as in the following passages viz., “For whatever Divinity an oblation is taken up (by the Adhvaryu priest) one (the Hotṛ) should meditate on that Divinity while. reciting ‘Vaṣaṭ’. “Let him meditate on Sandhyā” (Ait. Brā. 3.8.1) etc.

1.1.4 L.177 ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसम्,
तथापि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यम्, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्।

Dhyānaṃ cintanaṃ yadi api mānasam,
Tathā api puruṣeṇa kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ śakyam, puruṣa-tantratvāt—
Though meditation or reflection is mental,
It is yet possible for a man to do it or not to do it or to do it in some other way, because it solely depends upon a man.

1.1.4 L.178 ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम्।
Jñānaṃ tu pramāṇa-janyam—
Knowledge however is generated by the right means of knowledge.

1.1.4 L.179 प्रमाणं च यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम्।
Pramāṇaṃ ca yathā-bhūta-vastu-viṣayam—
The right means of knowledge has concern with things as they actually exist,

1.1.4 L.180 अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम्।
Ato jñānaṃ kartum akartum anyathā vā kartuṃ aśakyam—
And it is impossible to generate knowledge or not to generate it or to generate it in some other way (optionally),

1.1.4 L.181 केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्; न चोदनातन्त्रम्, नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम्;
Kevalaṃ vastu-tantram eva tat; na codanā-tantram, na api puruṣa-tantram—
Because knowledge depends upon the existing thing itself, and not upon any injunction or upon a man.

1.1.4 L.182 तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम्।
Tasmān mānasatve'pi jñānasya mahad vailakṣaṇyam—
Therefore, knowledge though mental is greatly dissimilar (to meditation).

1.1.4 L.183 यथा च ‘पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः’ (ChanU.5.7.1)
‘योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः’ (5.8.1) इत्यत्र
योषित्पुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति;

Yathā ca ‘puruṣo vāva gautama agniḥ’
‘Yoṣā vāva gautama agniḥ’ iti atra
Yoṣit-puruṣayoḥ agni-buddhiḥ mānasī bhavati—
Just as in the Scriptural passage “A man, verily Oh Gautama, is Agni” (ChanU.5.7.1),
“The woman, verily O Gautama, is Agni” (ChanU.5.8.1)
The conception that a man or a woman is Agni is mental,

1.1.4 L.184 केवलचोदनाजन्यत्वात् क्रियैव सा पुरुषतन्त्रा च।
Kevala-codanā-janyatvāt kriyaiva sā puruṣa-tantrā ca—
And as resulting from an injunction, is action pure and simple and it depends on a man.

1.1.4 L.185 या तु प्रसिद्धेऽग्नावग्निबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा; नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा।
Yā tu prasiddhe'gnau agni-buddhiḥ, na sā codanā-tantrā; na api puruṣa-tantrā—
But the conception of the ordinary fire as Agni is neither any thing which depends upon an injunction or on a man,

1.1.4 L.186 किं तर्हि? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तु-तन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवैतत्; न क्रिया —
Kiṃ tarhi? pratyakṣa-viṣaya-vastu-tantraiveti jñānam evaitat; na kriyā—
But something which depends on the thing (the fire) itself, and it is knowledge pure and simple and not action.

1.1.4 L.187 एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषय-वस्तुषु वेदितव्यम्।
Evaṃ sarva-pramāṇa-viṣaya-vastuṣu veditavyam—
In the case of all things which are objects of the right means of knowledge, one should understand similarly.

1.1.4 L.188 तत्रैवं सति यथाभूत-ब्रह्मात्मविषयमपि ज्ञानं न चोदनातन्त्रम्।
Tatraivaṃ sati yathā-bhūta-brahma-ātma-viṣayam api jñānaṃ na codanā-tantram—
This being so, the knowledge that the eternally existing Brahman is the Self, is not something which depends upon an injunction.

1.1.4 L.189 तद्विषये लिङादयः श्रूयमाणा अपि अनियोज्यविषयत्वात् कुण्ठीभवन्ति उपलादिषु प्रयुक्तक्षुर-तैक्ष्ण्यादिवत्, अहेयानुपादेय-वस्तुविषयत्वात्।
Tad-viṣaye liṅ-ādayaḥ śrūyamāṇā api aniyojya-viṣayatvāt kuṇṭhī-bhavanti upala-ādiṣu prayukta-kṣura-taikṣṇya-ādivat, aheya-anupādeya-vastu-viṣayatvāt—
So Brahman not being the object of an injunction, or not being an entity from which any thing can be discarded or to which any thing can be added, any imperative forms (of verbs) we see used in the Scriptures, become as ineffective as when the sharp edge of a razor is employed on a stone.


1.1.4 L.190 किमर्थानि तर्हि ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः’ (BrhU.2.4.5) इत्यादीनि विधिच्छायानि वचनानि?
Kim arthāni tarhi ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ’ ityādīni vidhi-cchāyāni vacanāni—
What then is the purport (the opponent asks) of passages like “The Self (Oh Maitreyī) is to be seen, heard etc.” (BrhUEng.2.4.5) which have an appearance of an injunction?


1.1.4 L.191 स्वाभाविकप्रवृत्तिविषय-विमुखीकरणार्थानीति ब्रूमः।
Svā-bhāvika-pravṛtti-viṣaya-vimukhī-karaṇa-arthāni iti brūmaḥ—
We reply — They are for the purpose of making (a man) averse to the objects of his natural tendency.

1.1.4 L.192 यो हि बहिर्मुखः प्रवर्तते पुरुषः ‘इष्टं मे भूयादनिष्टं मा भूत्’ इति,
Yo hi bahir-mukhaḥ pravartate puruṣaḥ ‘iṣṭaṃ me bhūyāt, anṣṭiṃ mā bhūt’ iti—
In the case of a man who is an extrovert and acts with a view to attain the objects of his desire and to avoid things distasteful to him,

1.1.4 L.193 न च तत्रात्यन्तिकं पुरुषार्थं लभते, तम् आत्यन्तिकपुरुषार्थ-वाञ्छिनं
स्वाभाविकात् कार्यकरणसङ्घात-प्रवृत्तिगोचराद् विमुखीकृत्य प्रत्यगात्मस्रोतस्तया प्रवर्तयन्ति ‘आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः’ इत्यादीनि;

Na ca tatra ātyantikaṃ puruṣa-arthaṃ labhate, tam ātyantika-puruṣa-artha-vāñchinaṃ
Svā-bhāvikāt kārya-karaṇa-saṃghāta-pravṛtti-gocarād vi-mukhī-kṛtya pratyag-ātma-srotastayā pravartayanti ‘ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ’ ityādīni—
He, having failed to attain the highest aim of man, is yet desirous of attaining such aim,
Passages like “The Self, Oh Maitreyī, should be seen” etc. help him to set his face against the aggregate of the objects of the natural tendency of his body and sense-organs, and to direct the stream of his mind towards the Universal Self.

1.1.4 L.194 तस्यात्मान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तस्याहेयम् अनुपादेयं चात्मतत्त्वमुपदिश्यते —
Tasya ātma-anveṣaṇāya pravṛttasya aheyam anupādeyaṃ ca ātma-tattvam upadiśyate—
To him who has started on the quest of the Self, the Scriptures propound the true nature of the Self from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added, by means of the following passages,

1.1.4 L.195 ‘इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा’ (BrhU.2.4.6)
‘Idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā’—
Viz. “All this is that which is the Self” (BrhUEng.2.4.6),

1.1.4 L.196 ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् तत्केन कं पश्येत् ...
केन कं विजानीयात् ... विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात्’ (BrhU.4.5.15)

‘Yatra tu asya sarvam ātmaiva abhūt tat kena kaṃ paśyet …
Kena kaṃ vijānīyāt … vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt’—
“When the Self only is all this, how should he see another,
How should he know another, how should he know the Knower?” (BrhUEng.4.5.15),

1.1.4 L.197 ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म’ (BrhU.2.5.19) इत्यादिभिः।
‘Ayam ātmā brahma’ ityādibhiḥ—
“This Self is Brahman” (BrhUEng.2.5.19) etc.

1.1.4 L.198 यदप्यकर्तव्यप्रधानम् आत्मज्ञानं हानायोपादानाय वा न भवतीति, तत् तथैवेत्यभ्युपगम्यते।
Yad api akartavya-pradhānam ātma-jñānaṃ hānāyopādānāya vā na bhavati iti, tat tathaiveti abhyupagamyate—
Now we understand, that the knowledge of the Self with respect to which contra-indication of any action as such is the principal thing, and, that it does not admit of the giving up or the taking up of anything, is but too true.

1.1.4 L.199 अलङ्कारो ह्ययमस्माकम् — यद् ब्रह्मात्मावगतौ सत्यां सर्वकर्तव्यताहानिः कृतकृत्यता चेति।
Alaṃkāro hi ayam asmākam — yad brahma-ātma-avagatau satyāṃ sarva-kartavyatā-hāniḥ kṛta-kṛtyatā ceti—
The fact that when there is the realization of Brahman, all duties come to an end and there is satisfaction that the aim is achieved, is something which indeed is a feather in our cap (lit., it is our Alaṅ-kāra i.e. an ornament).

1.1.4 L.200 तथा च श्रुतिः — ‘आत्मानं चेद् विजानीयादयमस्मीति पूरुषः।
किमिच्छन्कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत्’ (BrhU.4.4.12) इति,

Tathā ca śrutiḥ — ‘ātmānaṃ ced vijānīyād ayam asmi iti pūruṣaḥ.
Kim icchan kasya kāmāya śarīram anusaṃjvaret’ iti—
The Scriptures also say similarly thus — “If a man understands the Self as his own Self,
Then wishing for what should he suffer along with his suffering body?” (BrhUEng.4.4.12),

1.1.4 L.201 ‘एतद्बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान्स्यात् कृतकृत्यश्च भारत’ (BhG.15.20) इति च स्मृतिः।
‘Etad buddhvā buddhimān syāt kṛta-kṛtyaś ca bhārata’ iti ca smṛtiḥ—
And the Smṛti also says thus — “Having understood this, O Bhārata, a man becomes enlightened and one who has achieved his aim.” (BhG.15.20).

1.1.4 L.202 तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधि-विषयतया ब्रह्मणः समर्पणम्॥
Tasmān na pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayā brahmaṇaḥ samarpaṇam—
Therefore the Vedānta Śāstra does not culminate in propounding Brahman as being something which could be an object of an injunction to realize it.


1.1.4 L.203 यदपि केचिदाहुः — प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधि-तच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण केवलवस्तुवादी वेदभागो नास्तीति, तन्न;
Yad api kecid āhuḥ — pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vidhi-tac-cheṣa-vyatirekeṇa kevala-vastu-vādī veda-bhāgo na asti iti, tan na—
The objection which some raise, that there is no such portion of the Scriptures which has the purport of merely making a statement about an existing entity (Vastu), as distinguished from an injunction for the doing or for abstaining from doing something, or being supplementary to any such injunction for doing or abstaining from doing something, is not a felicitous statement,


1.1.4 L.204 औपनिषदस्य पुरुषस्यानन्यशेषत्वात्।
Aupaniṣadasya puruṣasya ananya-śeṣatvāt—
Because the Puruṣa of the Upaniṣads is not subsidiary to anything else.

1.1.4 L.205 योऽसावुपनिषत्स्वेवाधिगतः पुरुषोऽसंसारी ब्रह्मस्वरूपः उत्पाद्यादि-चतुर्विधद्रव्यविलक्षणः स्वप्रकरणस्थोऽनन्यशेषः, नासौ नास्ति नाधिगम्यत इति वा शक्यं वदितुम्;
Yo'sau upaniṣatsu eva adhigataḥ puruṣo'saṃsārī brahma-svarūpaḥ utpādya-ādi-catur-vidha-dravya-vilakṣaṇaḥ sva-prakaraṇastho'nanya-śeṣaḥ, na ‘asau na asti na adhigamyate’ iti vā śakyaṃ vaditum—
It cannot be said about that Puruṣa which can be comprehended only from the Upaniṣads, and which is not of a transmigratory nature, and which in fact is Brahman, and is different from the fourfold materials of things which are liable to be created etc., and which is a topic in itself, and is not subsidiary to any thing else, that it is not, or that it cannot be comprehended,

1.1.4 L.206 ‘स एष नेति नेत्यात्मा’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इत्यात्मशब्दात्
‘Sa eṣa neti neti ātmā’ iti ātma-śabdāt—
Because, in the following Scriptural passage it is described as the Ātmā (the Self) thus — (The Self can only be described negatively as) “Ātmā is, not that, not that” (BrhUEng.3.9.26)

1.1.4 L.207 आत्मनश्च प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात्, य एव निराकर्ता तस्यैवात्मत्वात्।
Ātmanaś ca pratyākhyātum aśakyatvāt, ya eva nirākartā tasyaiva ātmatvāt—
And it is not possible to deny the Self, because whosoever endeavours to deny it, is himself the Self (Ātmā).


1.1.4 L.208 नन्वात्मा अहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वाद् उपनिषत्स्वेव विज्ञायत इत्यनुपपन्नम्;
Nanu ātmā ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣayatvād ‘upaniṣatsu eva vijñāyate’ iti anupapannam—
To the objection that it is not reasonably sustainable that the Self is to be understood from the Upaniṣads only, because it is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’,


1.1.4 L.209 न, तत्साक्षित्वेन प्रत्युक्तत्वात्।
Na, tat-sākṣitvena pratyuktatvāt—
(We reply) — No, it is not so, because the Self is the immediate consciousness (Sākṣī) of that Jīva-Self which is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’.

1.1.4 L.210 न ह्यहंप्रत्ययविषय-कर्तृव्यतिरेकेण तत्साक्षी सर्वभूतस्थः सम एकः कूटस्थनित्यः पुरुषो विधिकाण्डे तर्कसमये वा केनचिदधिगतः सर्वस्यात्मा।
Na hi ahaṃ-pratyaya-viṣaya-kartṛ-vyatirekeṇa tat-sākṣī sarva-bhūtasthaḥ sama ekaḥ kūṭastha-nityaḥ puruṣo vidhi-kāṇḍe tarka-samaye vā kenacad adhigataḥ sarvasya ātmā—
Now, because this Puruṣa who is the mere immediate consciousness, as distinguished from the agent who is the object of the notion of ‘I’ or ‘Ego’, which resides in all beings, is uniform, the only one (without a second), is eternally unchanging, is the Self of all, and is not understood by anybody either from the Vedic chapter on injunctions or from the science of reasoning (Nyāya),

1.1.4 L.211 अतः स न केनचित्प्रत्याख्यातुं शक्यः, विधिशेषत्वं वा नेतुम् —
Ataḥ sa na kenacit pratyākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ, vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ vā netum—
And it is not therefore possible for anybody to deny it, or reduce it to the status of being supplementary to an injunction.

1.1.4 L.212 आत्मत्वादेव च सर्वेषाम् — न हेयो नाप्युपादेयः।
Ātmatvād eva ca sarveṣām — na heyo na api upādeyaḥ—
It is precisely because of its being the Self of all that it cannot either be discarded or taken up.

1.1.4 L.213 सर्वं हि विनश्यद्विकारजातं पुरुषान्तं विनश्यति;
Sarvaṃ hi vinaśyad-vikāra-jātaṃ puruṣa-antaṃ vinaśyati—
All things which are the modifications of the root-cause and are perishable, perish only upto the Puruṣa.

1.1.4 L.214 पुरुषो हि विनाशहेत्वभावादविनाशी;
Puruṣo hi vināśa-hetu-abhāvād avināśī—
The Puruṣa is imperishable because of the absence of any cause for such destruction,

1.1.4 L.215 विक्रियाहेत्वभावाच्च कूटस्थनित्यः;
Vikriyā-hetu-abhāvāc ca kūṭastha-nityaḥ—
Is eternally unchanging because of the absence of any cause for its modification,

1.1.4 L.216 अत एव नित्य-शुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः;
Ata eva nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-sva-bhāvaḥ—
And is (therefore) of the nature of being eternally pure, enlightened, and free.

1.1.4 L.217 तस्मात् ‘पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः’ (KathU.1.3.11)
‘तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इति चौपनिषदत्वविशेषणं
पुरुषस्योपनिषत्सु प्राधान्येन प्रकाश्यमानत्वे उपपद्यते।

Tasmāt ‘puruṣān na paraṃ kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ’
‘Taṃ tu aupaniṣadaṃ puruṣaṃ pṛcchāmi’ iti caupaniṣadatva-viśeṣaṇaṃ
Puruṣasyopaniṣatsu prādhānyena prakāśyamānatve upapadyate—
Therefore the particularization of the Puruṣa as the one belonging to the Upaniṣads, in the passages “There is nothing beyond the Puruṣa, he is the final goal and the transcendental condition” (KathU.1.3.11),
And “I ask you about the Puruṣa mentioned in the Upaniṣads” (BrhUEng.3.9.26)
Can be proper, only if the Puruṣa is principally the subject illustrated in the Upaniṣads.

1.1.4 L.218 अतो भूतवस्तुपरो वेदभागो नास्तीति वचनं साहसमात्रम्॥
Ato bhūta-vastu-paro veda-bhāgo na asti iti vacanaṃ sāhasamātram—
Therefore it is but a bold and reckless statement that no portion of the Scriptural texts treats of an existing entity.


1.1.4 L.219 यदपि शास्त्रतात्पर्यविदाम् अनुक्रमणम् — ‘दृष्टो हि तस्यार्थः कर्मावबोधनम्’ इत्येवमादि,
तत् धर्मजिज्ञासाविषयत्वाद् विधिप्रतिषेध-शास्त्राभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्।

Yad api śāstra-tāt-paryavidām anukramaṇam — ‘dṛṣṭo hi tasya arthaḥ karma-avabodhanam’ ityevam-ādi,
Tat dharma-jijñāsā-viṣayatvād vidhi-pratiṣedha-śāstra-abhiprāyaṃ draṣṭavyam—
The statement of those who know the purport of the Śāstras, viz. “We have seen that the meaning of that is the knowledge of action” etc.,
Being with regard to the subject relating to the desire to know ‘Duty’ (Dharma), should be understood as purporting to relate to the Śāstra of injunctions and prohibitions (i.e. the Karma-kāṇḍa of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā).

1.1.4 L.220 अपि च ‘आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वाद् आनर्थक्यमतदर्थानाम्’ (शा. भा. १.१.२) इत्येतदेकान्तेनाभ्युपगच्छतां
भूतोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः।

Api ca ‘āmnāyasya kriyā-arthatvād ānarthakyam atad-arthānām’ iti etad eka-antena abhyupagacchatāṃ
Bhūtopadeśānām ānarthakya-prasaṅgaḥ—
Besides if we were to understand that “action is the purport of the Scriptures, and whatever does not refer to it is purposeless” in the extreme sense,
There would occur the predicament of the mention of existing entities (in the Śāstra) being rendered purposeless.

1.1.4 L.221 प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिविधि-तच्छेषव्यतिरेकेण भूतं चेद्वस्तूपदिशति भव्यार्थत्वेन,
कूटस्थनित्यं भूतं नोपदिशतीति को हेतुः?

Pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vidhi-tac-cheṣa-vyatirekeṇa bhūtaṃ ced vastu upadiśati bhavya-arthatvena,
Kūṭastha-nityaṃ bhūtaṃ nopadiśati iti ko hetuḥ?—
If the Śāstra does in fact propound an existing entity, as apart from an injunction about an action or aversion to it or something supplementary to these, with regard to something (occurring) in the future,
Then where is the reason for maintaining that it does not propound the eternally existing and unchanging entity (such as Brahman)?

1.1.4 L.222 न हि भूतमुपदिश्यमानं क्रिया भवति।
Na hi bhūtam upadiśyamānaṃ kriyā bhavati—
Merely because an existing entity is propounded (in the Scriptures) it does not thereby become ‘action’.


1.1.4 L.223 अक्रियात्वेऽपि भूतस्य क्रियासाधनत्वात् क्रियार्थ एव भूतोपदेश इति चेत्,
Akriyātve'pi bhūtasya kriyā-sādhanatvāt kriyā-artha eva bhūtopadeśa iti cet—
If it were to be objected that although an existing entity may not be ‘action’ as such, still the propounding of an existing entity (by the Śāstra) is for the purpose of ‘action’, because of its being the means of ‘action’,


1.1.4 L.224 नैष दोषः; क्रियार्थत्वेऽपि क्रियानिर्वर्तन-शक्तिमद्-वस्तूपदिष्टमेव;
Naiṣa doṣaḥ; kriyā-arthatve'pi kriyā-nirvartana-śaktimad-vastu upadiṣṭam eva—
We reply — this is no fault, because even if we understand the mention of an existing entity for the purpose of ‘action’, the existing entity possessing such potentiality for bringing about such ‘action’, would thus happen to have been propounded all the same.

1.1.4 L.225 क्रियार्थत्वं तु प्रयोजनं तस्य; न चैतावता वस्त्वनुपदिष्टं भवति।
Kriyā-arthatvaṃ tu prayojanaṃ tasya; na caitāvatā vastu anupadiṣṭaṃ bhavati—
Their aim may very well be to subserve ‘action’, but even if it were to be so, it would not mean that an existing entity is not propounded at all. That it is meant to subserve ‘action’ is its fruit.


1.1.4 L.226 यदि नामोपदिष्टं किं तव तेन स्यादिति,
Yadi nāmopadiṣṭaṃ kiṃ tava tena syād iti—
But (says the opponent) supposing it is so propounded, how does it help you?


1.1.4 L.227 उच्यते — अनवगतात्म-वस्तूपदेशश्च तथैव भवितुमर्हति; तदवगत्या मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारहेतोर्निवृत्तिः प्रयोजनं क्रियत इत्यविशिष्टमर्थवत्त्वं क्रियासाधनवस्तूपदेशेन।
Ucyate — anavagata-ātma-vastu-upadeśaś ca tathaiva bhavitum arhati; tad-avagatyā mithyā-jñānasya saṃsāra-hetoḥ nivṛttiḥ prayojanaṃ kriyata iti aviśiṣṭam arthavattvaṃ kriyā-sādhana-vastu-upadeśena—
We reply — The propounding of an existing entity such as the Self is also of such a nature, and by understanding such existing entity (as the Self or Brahman) which has the result of removing erroneous ignorance, the cause of transmigratory existence, the purpose that an entity has such a meaning, is common between it and the propounding of an entity which is a means for ‘action’.

1.1.4 L.228 अपि च ‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इति चैवमाद्या निवृत्तिरुपदिश्यते।
न च सा क्रिया। नापि क्रियासाधनम्।

Api ca ‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ iti ca evam-ādyā nivṛttiḥ upadiśyate.
Na ca sā kriyā. na api kriyā-sādhanam—
Moreover the Śāstra is seen to teach ‘abstention’ such as — “A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed”,
Which is neither ‘action’ nor a means for ‘action’.

1.1.4 L.229 अक्रियार्थानाम् उपदेशोऽनर्थकश्चेत्,
‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इत्यादिनिवृत्त्युपदेशानाम् आनर्थक्यं प्राप्तम्। तच्चानिष्टम्।

Akriyā-arthānām upadeśo'narthakaś cet,
‘Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ ityādi-nivṛtti-upadeśānām ānarthakyaṃ prāptam. tac ca aniṣṭam—
Now if instruction about entities not meant for the purpose of ‘action’ were to be purposeless,
Then the inevitable conclusion is, that instruction about such ‘abstention’ as that ‘a Brāhmaṇa should not be killed’ would be without a purpose, which would not be desirable.

1.1.4 L.230 न च स्वभावप्राप्त-हन्त्यर्थानुरागेण नञः शक्यम् अप्राप्तक्रियार्थत्वं कल्पयितुं हननक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्य-व्यतिरेकेण।
Na ca sva-bhāva-prāpta-hanti-artha-anurāgeṇa nañaḥ śakyam aprāpta-kriyā-arthatvaṃ kalpayituṃ hanana-kriyā-nivṛtti-audāsīnya-vyatirekeṇa—
From the mere connection of the suffix Nañ (नञ्) with the verb ‘to kill’ (Han) — which means the act of killing which follows naturally from the verb ‘to kill’ — it is not possible to imagine that it expresses some new meaning, and that too ‘an action’ which is different from mere passivity or indifference as to the act of killing.

1.1.4 L.231 नञश्चैष स्वभावः, यत्स्वसम्बन्धिनोऽभावं बोधयतीति।
Nañaś caiṣa sva-bhāvaḥ, yat sva-saṃbandhino'bhāvaṃ bodhayati iti—
The nature of Nañ is such that it makes known the non-existence of that in connection with which it is used,

1.1.4 L.232 अभावबुद्धिश्चौदासीन्यकारणम्।
Abhāva-buddhiś caudāsīnya-kāraṇam—
And the consciousness of such non-existence is the cause of the (resulting) passive indifference.

1.1.4 L.233 सा च दग्धेन्धनाग्निवत् स्वयमेवोपशाम्यति।
Sā ca dagdhendhana-agnivat svayam evopaśāmyati—
That consciousness wears off of itself, like fire after the complete combustion of fuel.

1.1.4 L.234 तस्मात् प्रसक्तक्रियानिवृत्त्यौदासीन्यमेव ‘ब्राह्मणो न हन्तव्यः’ इत्यादिषु प्रतिषेधार्थं मन्यामहे, अन्यत्र प्रजापतिव्रतादिभ्यः।
Tasmāt prasakta-kriyā-nivṛtti-audāsīnyam eva ‘brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ’ ityādiṣu pratiṣedha-arthaṃ manyāmahe, anyatra prajā-pati-vrata-ādibhyaḥ—
Therefore, we consider that everywhere — except in the case of the Prajā-pati-vrata — in the case of passages like “A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed” the passive indifference resulting from the aversion to the suggested act, is itself to be understood in the sense of a prohibition (of an act).

1.1.4 L.235 तस्मात् पुरुषार्थानुपयोग्युपाख्यानादि-भूतार्थवादविषयम् आनर्थक्याभिधानं द्रष्टव्यम्॥
Tasmāt puruṣa-artha-anupayogi-upākhyāna-ādi-bhūta-arthavāda-viṣayam ānarthakya-abhidhānaṃ draṣṭavyam—
Therefore the reference to the purposelessness of passages (which do not imply action according to Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) should be understood to have reference to Artha-vāda passages, like legends, which are useless so far as the highest aim of man is concerned.


1.1.4 L.236 यदप्युक्तम् — कर्तव्यविध्यनुप्रवेशम् अन्तरेण वस्तुमात्रम् उच्यमानम् अनर्थकं स्यात् ‘सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती’ इत्यादिवदिति, तत्परिहृतम्;
Yad api uktam — kartavya-vidhi-anupraveśam antareṇa vastumātram ucyamānam anarthakaṃ stāt ‘sapta-dvīpā vasumatī’ ityādivad iti, tat parihṛtam—
Then with regard also to what has been said, viz. that the mention of actually existing entities which do not lead up to some sort of injunction to action, is purposeless like such sentences as ‘the world is comprised of seven islands’, it has been refuted,

1.1.4 L.237 ‘रज्जुरियम्, नायं सर्पः’ इति वस्तुमात्रकथनेऽपि प्रयोजनस्य दृष्टत्वात्।
‘Rajjuḥ iyam, na ayaṃ sarpaḥ’ iti vastumātra-kathane'pi prayojanasya dṛṣṭatvāt—
Because it has been seen that a fruit does accrue by the mere mention of such an entity, thus — ‘This is a rope and not a snake’.


1.1.4 L.238 ननु श्रुतब्रह्मणोऽपि यथापूर्वं संसारित्वदर्शनान्न रज्जुस्वरूप-कथनवद् अर्थवत्त्वम् इत्युक्तम्।
Nanu śruta-brahmaṇo'pi yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritva-darśanān na rajju-svarūpa-kathanavad arthavattvam iti uktam—
But (retorts the opponent) I have said already that as it is seen that even in the case of a person who has received instruction about Brahman, he is still seen to continue to be in the same transmigratory condition, the Scriptural passages have no such meaning as there is in mentioning that this is a rope and not a snake.


1.1.4 L.239 अत्रोच्यते — नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं शक्यं दर्शयितुम्,
Atrocyate, na avagata-brahma-ātma-bhāvasya yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ śakyaṃ darśayitum—
To this, we reply — it is not possible to show that he who has once understood the condition of the Self’s unity with Brahman, still continues to be affected by the transmigratory condition,

1.1.4 L.240 वेदप्रमाणजनित-ब्रह्मात्मभावविरोधात्।
Veda-pramāṇa-janita-brahma-ātma-bhāva-virodhāt—
Because it is contradictory to the condition of the unity of the Self with Brahman achieved on Scriptural authority.

1.1.4 L.241 न हि शरीराद्यात्माभिमानिनो दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव वेदप्रमाणजनित-ब्रह्मात्मावगमे तदभिमाननिवृत्तौ तदेव मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तं दुःखभयादिमत्त्वं भवतीति शक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
Na hi śarīra-ādi-ātma-abhimānino ‘duḥkha-bhaya-ādimattvaṃ dṛṣṭam’ iti, tasyaiva veda-pramāṇa-janita-brahma-ātma-avagame tad-abhimāna-nivṛttau tad eva mithyā-jñāna-nimittaṃ duḥkha-bhaya-ādimattvaṃ bhavati iti śakyaṃ kalpayitum—
It is not possible to maintain, that because we see that a man who vainly supposes the Self to be the body is affected by pain or fear, he would continue to be affected by the same condition of pain or fear, which in fact is caused by erroneous-ignorance, when his vanity in supposing the Self to be the body is removed by the knowledge of the unity of the Self with Brahman, generated by such right means of knowledge as the Scriptures.

1.1.4 L.242 न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाभिमानिनो धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं दृष्टमिति, तस्यैव प्रव्रजितस्य धनाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति।
Na hi dhanino gṛhasthasya dhana-abhimānino dhana-apahāra-nimittaṃ ‘duḥkhaṃ dṛṣṭam’ iti, tasyaiva pravrajitasya dhana-abhimāna-rahitasya tad eva dhana-apahāra-nimittaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhavati—
It cannot be, that because we see that a rich man who is vain about his wealth, is affected by pain caused by his wealth being taken away from him, is subject to similar pain by his wealth being taken away from him, when he has renounced the world and has become a Sanyāsin and when thereby his vanity about his wealth is removed.

1.1.4 L.243 न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमान-निमित्तं सुखं दृष्टमिति तस्यैव कुण्डलवियुक्तस्य कुण्डलित्वाभिमान-रहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमान-निमित्तं सुखं भवति।
Na ca kuṇḍalinaḥ kuṇḍalitva-abhimāna-nimittaṃ ‘sukhaṃ dṛṣṭam’ iti, tasyaiva kuṇḍala-viyuktasya kuṇḍalitva-abhimāna-rahitasya tad eva kuṇḍalitva-abhimāna-nimittaṃ sukhaṃ bhavati—
Nor can it be, that because it is seen that a man who wears a Kuṇḍala (an ear ornament) feels pleasure caused by his vanity about the Kuṇḍala, continues to have similar pleasure caused by the vanity of being adorned with a Kuṇḍala, when he has divested himself of the Kuṇḍala and is free from the vanity of the adornment by it.

1.1.4 L.244 तदुक्तं श्रुत्या — ‘अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः’ (ChanU.8.12.1) इति।
Tad uktaṃ śrutyā — ‘aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priya-apriye spṛśataḥ’ iti—
This has been expressed by the Scriptures as follows — “Neither pain nor pleasure affect one who is in a disembodied condition” (ChanU.8.12.1).


1.1.4 L.245 शरीरे पतितेऽशरीरत्वं स्यात्, न जीवत इति चेत्,
Śarīre patite'śarīratvaṃ syāt, na jīvata iti cet—
If it be objected, that disembodiedness supervenes after the body falls (i.e. when a person dies), and not while a person continues to live,


1.1.4 L.246 न; सशरीरत्वस्य मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तत्वात्।
Na; sa-śarīratvasya mithyā-jñāna-nimittatvāt—
We reply — no, because the embodied condition itself is caused by erroneous-ignorance.

1.1.4 L.247 न ह्यात्मनः शरीरात्माभिमानलक्षणं मिथ्याज्ञानं मुक्त्वा अन्यतः सशरीरत्वं शक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
Na hi ātmanaḥ śarīra-ātma-abhimāna-lakṣaṇaṃ mithyā-jñānaṃ muktvā anyataḥ sa-śarīratvaṃ śakyaṃ kalpayitum—
In the case of the Self it is not possible to conceive of any corporeality for the Self, otherwise than by the erroneous-ignorance of the nature of the vanity of the Self being possessed of a body.

1.1.4 L.248 नित्यम् अशरीरत्वम् अकर्मनिमित्तत्वाद् इत्यवोचाम।
Nityam aśarīratvam, akarma-nimittatvād iti avocāma—
We have already said that the Self is eternally sans-body, because of its not having action as its cause.


1.1.4 L.249 तत्कृतधर्माधर्म-निमित्तं सशरीरत्वमिति चेत्,
Tat-kṛta-dharma-adharma-nimittaṃ sa-śarīratvam iti cet—
If it is urged that corporeality is caused by meritorious and unmeritorious actions,


1.1.4 L.250 न; शरीरसम्बन्धस्यासिद्धत्वात्
Na; śarīra-saṃbandhasya asiddhatvāt—
We reply — no, because in as much as the relation of the Self with a body is not yet properly established,

1.1.4 L.251 धर्माधर्मयोरात्मकृतत्वासिद्धेः,
Dharma-adharmayoḥ ātma-kṛtatva-asiddheḥ—
Any assumption about the Self having performed meritorious or unmeritorious actions is even still less established.

1.1.4 L.252 शरीरसम्बन्धस्य धर्माधर्मयोस्तत्कृतत्वस्य चेतरेतराश्रयत्व-प्रसङ्गात्;
Śarīra-saṃbandhasya dharma-adharmayoḥ tat-kṛtatvasya cetaretara-āśrayatva-prasaṅgāt—
And also because the assumption of corporeality to the Self as depending upon meritorious and unmeritorious actions and of meritorious and unmeritorious actions as depending upon the corporeality of the Self, would, lead (us) towards (the fallacy of) mutual interdependence as cause and effect.

1.1.4 L.253 अन्धपरम्परैषा अनादित्वकल्पना।
Andha-param-paraiṣā anāditva-kalpanā—
And this notion about the beginninglessness (of these two) would be like a series of the blind leading the blind (Andha-paramparā).

1.1.4 L.254 क्रिया-समवायाभावाच् चात्मनः कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः।
Kriyā-samavāya-abhāvāc ca ātmanaḥ kartṛtva-anupapatteḥ—
And it is not reasonably sustainable to predicate activity as referring to the Self in as much as it has no relation to action.


1.1.4 L.255 सन्निधानमात्रेण राजप्रभृतीनां दृष्टं कर्तृत्वमिति चेत्,
Saṃnidhānamātreṇa rāja-prabhṛtīnāṃ dṛṣṭaṃ kartṛtvam iti cet—
If it be said that we observe activity on the part of kings etc. (without their being actually physically active) merely by their immediate presence,


1.1.4 L.256 न; धनदानाद्युपार्जित-भृत्यसम्बन्धित्वात् तेषां कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः;
Na; dhana-dāna-ādi-upārjita-bhṛtya-saṃbandhitvāt teṣāṃ kartṛtvopapatteḥ—
We reply — no, their apparent activity is understood to be reasonably sustainable because of their relation (as masters) with their servants obtained on wages etc.

1.1.4 L.257 न त्वात्मनो धनदानादिवच्छरीरादिभिः स्वस्वामिभावसम्बन्ध-निमित्तं किञ्चिच्छक्यं कल्पयितुम्।
Na tu ātmano dhana-dāna-ādivac charīra-ādibhiḥ sva-svāmi-bhāva-saṃbandha-nimittaṃ kiṃcic chakyaṃ kalpayitum—
It is not possible to imagine in the case of the Self, any cause such as wages etc. effecting a relation between it and the body, like the relation between a master and a servant,

1.1.4 L.258 मिथ्याभिमानस्तु प्रत्यक्षः सम्बन्धहेतुः।
Mithyā-abhimānaḥ tu pratyakṣaḥ saṃbandha-hetuḥ—
When erroneous-ignorance is there as a direct cause of its relation to a body.

1.1.4 L.259 एतेन यजमानत्वमात्मनो व्याख्यातम्।
Etena yajamānatvam ātmano vyākhyātam—
In this way the host-ship (Yajamānatva) of the Self is explained.


1.1.4 L.260 अत्राहुः — देहादिव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनः आत्मीये देहादावहमभिमानो गौणः, न मिथ्येति चेत्,
Atra āhuḥ — deha-ādi-vyatiriktasya ātmanaḥ ātmīye deha-ādau aham-abhimāno gauṇaḥ, na mithyeti cet—
If one were to object here (as does, for instance a follower of Prabhākara’s view) that the identification by the Self with the body, when in fact it is different from the body, is not erroneous, but is in a secondary sense,


1.1.4 L.261 न; प्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य गौणत्व-मुख्यत्वप्रसिद्धेः।
Na; prasiddha-vastu-bhedasya gauṇatva-mukhyatva-prasiddheḥ—
We reply — no, it is well-known that it is only when there is an evident difference between two entities, that the use of a term in a primary and secondary sense is reasonably sustainable.

1.1.4 L.262 यस्य हि प्रसिद्धो वस्तुभेदः — यथा केसरादिमान् आकृतिविशेषोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययभाङ् मुख्योऽन्यः प्रसिद्धः,
Yasya hi prasiddho vastu-bhedaḥ — yathā kesara-ādimān ākṛti-viśeṣo'nvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ siṃha-śabda-pratyaya-bhāṅ mukhyo'nyaḥ prasiddhaḥ—
Just when the difference between two entities is patent to a man, as for instance when it is well-known to him that an animal with a mane etc. and a peculiar proud form, which by the method of positive and negative instances, deserves to have a designation, viz., a lion, applied to it, is a distinct and separate entity,

1.1.4 L.263 ततश्चान्यः पुरुषः प्रायिकैः क्रौर्यशौर्यादिभिः सिंहगुणैः सम्पन्नः सिद्धः,
तस्य तस्मिन्पुरुषे सिंहशब्दप्रत्ययौ गौणौ भवतः; नाप्रसिद्धवस्तुभेदस्य।

Tataś ca anyaḥ puruṣaḥ prāyikaiḥ kraurya-śaurya-ādibhiḥ siṃha-guṇaiḥ saṃpannaḥ siddhaḥ,
Tasya tasmin puruṣe siṃha-śabda-pratyayau gauṇau bhavataḥ; na aprasiddha-vastu-bhedasya—
And when there also is another person who is endowed with the usual qualities of a lion such as fierceness and boldness, and who is a different entity altogether and is quite distinct from the former (i.e. the lion),
Then the consciousness (Pratyaya, ‘notion’) in such a man, of the other man’s lioninity, and the use by such a man of the term ‘lion’ for that other man, is in a secondary or figurative sense, and not when the difference between the two is not known to him.

1.1.4 L.264 तस्य त्वन्यत्रान्यशब्दप्रत्ययौ भ्रान्तिनिमित्तावेव भवतः, न गौणौ;
Tasya tu anyatra-anya-śabda-pratyayau bhrānti-nimittau eva bhavataḥ, na gauṇau—
Hence a man’s consciousness and the use by him of one term for another (when he is not conscious of the difference between two entities) are caused by his confusion alone and are not in a secondary or figurative sense.

1.1.4 L.265 यथा मन्दान्धकारे स्थाणुरयम् इत्यगृह्यमाणविशेषे पुरुषशब्दप्रत्ययौ स्थाणुविषयौ,
यथा वा शुक्तिकायाम् अकस्माद् रजतमिदम् इति निश्चितौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ

Yathā manda-andhakāre sthāṇuḥ ayam iti agṛhyamāṇa-viśeṣe puruṣa-śabda-pratyayau sthāṇu-viṣayau,
Yathā vā śuktikāyām akasmād rajatam idam iti niścitau śabda-pratyayau—
Just as in the twilight, when a pillar is not cognized as such, a man’s consciousness of it and his use of the term ‘man’ for it,
Or when in the case of a mother-of-pearl his consciousness of it and his use of the term ‘silver’ for it, is prima facie not in a secondary or figurative sense.

1.1.4 L.266 तद्वद्देहादिसङ्घाते अहम् इति निरुपचारेण शब्दप्रत्ययौ आत्मानात्माविवेकेनोत्पद्यमानौ कथं गौणौ शक्यौ वदितुम्।
Tadvad deha-ādi-saṃghāte ahaṃ iti nirupacāreṇa śabda-pratyayau ātma-anātma-avivekenotpadyamānau kathaṃ gauṇau śakyau vaditum—
Similarly, how can the consciousness of and the use by a man of the term ‘I’ with respect to the aggregate of body etc., be said to be in a secondary or figurative sense, when his consciousness and his use of the term ‘I’ for the body are caused by his not being able to discriminate between the Self and that which is not the Self?

1.1.4 L.267 आत्मानात्मविवेकिनामपि पण्डितानाम् अजाविपालानाम् इवाविविक्तौ शब्दप्रत्ययौ भवतः।
Ātma-anātma-vivekinām api paṇḍitānām aja-avi-pālānām iva aviviktau śabda-pratyayau bhavataḥ—
Even in the case of those learned people who are able to discriminate between the Self and the non-Self, their consciousness and use of the term ‘I’ for the body, is, like that of the shepherd’s (Ajāvi-pāla), due to their inability to discriminate between the Self and the non-Self.

1.1.4 L.268 तस्माद् देहादिव्यतिरिक्तात्मास्तित्व-वादिनां देहादावहंप्रत्ययो मिथ्यैव, न गौणः।
Tasmād deha-ādi-vyatirikta-ātma-astitva-vādināṃ deha-ādau ahaṃ-pratyayo mithyaiva, na gauṇaḥ—
Therefore to those who hold that there is a self distinct from the body, the notion of ‘I’ in the body etc. is simply false, not secondary [Trans. from Panoli].

1.1.4 L.269 तस्मान्मिथ्याप्रत्ययनिमित्तत्वात् सशरीरत्वस्य, सिद्धं जीवतोऽपि विदुषोऽशरीरत्वम्।
Tasmān mithyā-pratyaya-nimittatvāt sa-śarīratvasya, siddhaṃ jīvato'pi viduṣo'śarīratvam—
Hence since the conception that the self is embodied is false, it has been proved that even while living the enlightened one can be bodiless [Trans. from Panoli].

1.1.4 L.270 तथा च ब्रह्मविद्विषया श्रुतिः — ‘तद्यथाहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीरं शेते
अथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव’ (BrhU.4.4.7) इति;

Tathā ca brahmavid-viṣayā śrutiḥ — ‘tad yathā ahi-nirlvayanī valmīke mṛtā pratyastā śayītaivam evedaṃ śarīraṃ śete
Atha ayam aśarīro'mṛtaḥ prāṇo brahmaiva teja eva’ iti—
The same is illustrated by the Scriptural passages relating to a person who has realized Brahman, thus — “Just as the slough of a snake lies inert and spread out at length on an ant-hill, even so does this body also.
And this disembodied and immortal vital breath (Prāṇa) is in reality the Brahman, the Tejas” (BrhUEng.4.4.7).

1.1.4 L.271 ‘सचक्षुरचक्षुरिव सकर्णोऽकर्ण इव सवागवागिव समना अमना इव सप्राणोऽप्राण इव’ इति च।
‘Sa-cakṣuḥ acakṣuḥ iva sa-karṇo'karṇa iva sa-vāg avāg iva sa-manā amanā iva sa-prāṇo'prāṇa iva’ iti ca—
Similarly — “While endowed with eyes he is sans-eyes, while endowed with the organ of hearing he is without the organ of hearing, and so on in the case of speech, the mind and the vital breath (Prāṇa)”,

1.1.4 L.272 स्मृतिरपि — ‘स्थितप्रज्ञस्य का भाषा’ (BhG.2.54) इत्याद्या
स्थितप्रज्ञस्य लक्षणान्याचक्षाणा विदुषः सर्वप्रवृत्त्यसम्बन्धं दर्शयति।

Mṛtiḥ api ca — ‘sthita-prajñasya kā bhāṣā’ ityādyā
Sthita-prajñasya lakṣaṇāni ācakṣāṇā viduṣaḥ sarva-pravṛtti-asaṃbandhaṃ darśayati—
Smṛti also, in the passage beginning thus — “What is the nature of the language used by one whose intellect is well-poised” (BhG.2.54)? —
And enumerating the characteristics of a man whose intellect is well-poised, describes the total absence of any the least relation with activity.

1.1.4 L.273 तस्मान् नावगतब्रह्मात्मभावस्य यथापूर्वं संसारित्वम्।
Tasmān na avagata-brahma-ātma-bhāvasya yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritvam—
Therefore, a man who has realized the unity of the Self and Brahman has no further transmigratory life as before.

1.1.4 L.274 यस्य तु यथापूर्वं संसारित्वं नासौ अवगतब्रह्मात्मभाव इत्यनवद्यम्॥
Yasya tu yathā-pūrvaṃ saṃsāritvaṃ na asau avagata-brahma-ātma-bhāva iti anavadyam—
Ergo, it is clear that he who continues to have such transmigratory existence has not realized the unity of the Self and Brahman and the Śāstra therefore is absolutely flawless.


1.1.4 L.275 यत्पुनरुक्तं श्रवणात् पराचीनयोर्मनननिदिध्यासनयोर्दर्शनाद् विधिशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः, न स्वरूप-पर्यवसायित्वमिति,
Yat punar-uktaṃ śravaṇāt parācīnayoḥ manana-nididhyāsanayoḥ darśanād vidhi-śeṣatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ, na svarūpa-paryavasāyitvam iti—
Again with regard to what was said, viz., that because it is observed that further cogitation and meditation should follow the hearing of Brahman, Brahman is merely complementary to an injunction and its knowledge does not culminate in the realization of its own nature,


1.1.4 L.276 तन्न; श्रवणवद् (न,) अवगत्यर्थत्वान् मनननिदिध्यासनयोः।
यदि ह्यवगतं ब्रह्मान्यत्र विनियुज्येत, भवेत्तदा विधिशेषत्वम्;

Tan na; śravaṇavad (Na,) avagati-arthatvān manana-nididhyāsanayoḥ.
Yadi hi avagataṃ brahma anyatra viniyujyeta, bhavet tadā vidhi-śeṣatvam—
If Brahman after being fully realized were to be employed elsewhere (for some other purpose) then it would very well happen to be complementary to an injunction,
But it is not so, because (as said above) cogitation and meditation also, like hearing, are meant ultimately to culminate in the complete realization (of Brahman).

1.1.4 L.277 न तु तदस्ति, मनननिदिध्यासनयोरपि श्रवणवद् अवगत्यर्थत्वात्।
Na tu tad asti, manana-nididhyāsanayoḥ api śravaṇavad avagati-arthatvāt—
We reply — no, because cogitation and meditation are [like hearing] for the purpose of their ultimate culmination in the realization (of Brahman).

1.1.4 L.278 तस्मान्न प्रतिपत्तिविधिविषयतया शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः सम्भवतीति
Tasmān na pratipatti-vidhi-viṣayatayā śāstra-pramāṇakatvaṃ brahmaṇaḥ saṃbhavati iti—
Therefore it is not possible (to say) that Brahman is something, to know which the Śāstra is the right means of knowledge, only in so far as it is the object of an injunction to meditate upon,

1.1.4 L.279 अतः स्वतन्त्रमेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रप्रमाणकं
वेदान्तवाक्यसमन्वयादिति सिद्धम्।

Ataḥ sva-tantram eva brahma śātra-pramāṇakaṃ
Vedānta-vākya-samanvayād iti siddham—
And it is conclusively established by the proper co-ordination of the Scriptural passages
That Brahman is independent in itself, having the Śāstra as the right means of its knowledge.

1.1.4 L.280 एवं च सति ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति तद्विषयः पृथक्शास्त्रारम्भ उपपद्यते।
Evaṃ ca sati ‘atha ato brahma-jijñāsā’ iti tad-viṣayaḥ pṛthak-śāstra-ārambha upapadyate—
This being so, an altogether separate beginning of the Śāstra, thus — “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman” — is perfectly justified.

1.1.4 L.281 प्रतिपत्तिविधिपरत्वे हि ‘अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा’ इत्येवारब्धत्वान्न पृथक्शास्त्रमारभ्येत;
Pratipatti-vidhi-paratve hi ‘atha ato dharma-jijñāsā’ iti eva ārabdhatvān na pṛthak-śāstram ārabhyeta—
Were it to be of the nature of an injunction to realize, the Śāstra-kāra would begin it thus — “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Dharma” — and he would not begin a new Śāstra at all.

1.1.4 L.282 आरभ्यमाणं चैवमारभ्येत — अथातः परिशिष्टधर्मजिज्ञासेति,
Ārabhyamāṇaṃ caivam ārabhyeta — ‘atha ataḥ pariśiṣṭa-dharma-jijñāsā’ iti—
And even if he were to follow the former course, he would begin it like this — “Now, therefore, the inquiry into the supplementary part of Dharma”,

1.1.4 L.283 ‘अथातः क्रत्वर्थपुरुषार्थयोर्जिज्ञासा’ (जै. सू. ४.१.१) इतिवत्।
‘Atha ataḥ kratu-artha-puruṣa-arthayoḥ jijñāsā’ itivat—
Similar to “Now therefore an inquiry into the aim of a sacrifice (Kratu) or the highest aim of a man” (as in the Jai. Sū. 4.1.1).

1.1.4 L.284 ब्रह्मात्मैक्यावगतिस्त्वप्रतिज्ञातेति
तदर्थो युक्तः शास्त्रारम्भः — ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ इति।

Brahma-ātmaikya-avagatiḥ tu apratijñāteti
Tad-artho yuktaḥ śāstra-ārambhaḥ — ‘atha ato brahma-jijñāsā’ iti—
And as the knowledge of the unity of the Self and Brahman is not described to be the scope of the Śāstra of Dharma (i.e. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā),
It is quite logical that the beginning in the present case is thus — “Now therefore an inquiry into Brahman”.

1.1.4 L.285 तस्मात् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्येतदवसाना एव सर्वे विधयः सर्वाणि चेतराणि प्रमाणानि।
Tasmāt ‘ahaṃ brahma asmi’ iti etad-avasānā eva sarve vidhayaḥ, sarvāṇi cetarāṇi pramāṇāni—
Therefore all injunctions and all other means of knowledge are valid only upto the realization thus — “I am Brahman”.

1.1.4 L.286 न ह्यहेयानुपादेयाद्वैतात्मावगतौ सत्याम्, निर्विषयाण्यप्रमातृकाणि च प्रमाणानि भवितुमर्हन्तीति।
Na hi aheya-anupādeya-advaita-ātma-avagatau satyām, nir-viṣayāṇi apramātṛkāṇi ca pramāṇāni bhavitum arhanti iti—
For when the knowledge of the Self from which nothing can be discarded and to which nothing can be added has supervened, the right means of knowledge no longer continue to be the right means of knowledge.

1.1.4 L.287 अपि चाहुः —
Api ca āhuḥ—
Besides it is said —

1.1.4 L.288
‘गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात्।
सद्ब्रह्मात्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत्॥

Gauṇa-mithyātmano'sattve putra-dehādi-bādhanāt.
Sad-brahmātmāham ityevaṃ bodhe kāryaṃ kathaṃ bhavet—
When there has arisen (in a man’s mind) the knowledge viz. “I am the Sat, the Brahman is but myself”,
And when owing to the ablation of the conceptions of the son, the body etc. as being one’s own Self, the figurative and false-ignorance about the Self has come to an end,
How should then any Kārya i.e. effect (originating in wrong conceptions) exist any longer?

1.1.4 L.289
अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः।
अन्विष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः॥

Anveṣṭavyātma-vijñānāt prāk pramātṛtvam ātmanaḥ.
Anviṣṭaḥ syāt pramātaiva pāpma-doṣādi-varjitaḥ—
As long as the knowledge of the Self, which the Scriptures want us to endeavour after, has not arisen, so long, the Self is a knowing agent,
But the same knowing agent becomes that which is searched after, viz. the Highest Self, which is free from all evil and blemish, when the real nature of the Self is realized.

1.1.4 L.290
देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वाऽऽत्मनिश्चयात्॥’

Dehātma-pratyayo yadvat pramāṇatvena kalpitaḥ.
Laukikaṃ tadvad evedaṃ pramāṇaṃ tu ā ātma-niścayāt—
Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life),
So also all the Pramāṇas (i.e. the means of right knowledge such as perception etc.) are valid only until the one and the only one Self is properly realized.

1.1.4 L.291 इति॥४॥
Iti—
– Thus. — 4.

इति श्री-शङ्कर-भगवत्-पाद-कृतौ शारीरक-मीमांसा-भाष्ये चतुर्थं समन्वय-अधिकरणं संपूर्णम्॥
– 4. Samanvaya-Adhikaraṇam.
This ends the Sūtra-quartette (Catus-sūtrī).

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Abbreviation References
AitU.Aitareyopaniṣad
Ait. Ār.Aitareya Āraṇyakaऐ. आ.
Ait. Brā.Aitareya Brāhmaṇaऐ. ब्रा.
BhG.Bhagavadgītā
BrS.Brahma-Sūtras
Bra. Sū. Bhā.Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya
BrhU.Brihad-āraṇyakopaniṣad
ChanU.Chandogyopaniṣad
Dhar. Sū.Dharma-Sūtra
IsU.Īṣavāsyopaniṣad
Jāb. Up.Jābālopaniṣadजा. उ.
Jai. Sū.Jaimini Sūtraजै. सू.
KathU.Kaṭhopaniṣad
KenU.Kenopanishad
KaivU.Kaivalyopaniṣad
KausU.Kauṣītakyopanishadकौ. उ.
Kauṣ. Brā.Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇaकौ. ब्रा.
Mahā-Bhā.Mahā-bhārataम. भा.
ManKa.Māndukya-Kārikā or
Gaudapāda-Kārikā
Manu. or
Manu. Smṛ.
Manu-Smṛti or -Saṃhitāमनु. स्मृ.
Mukti. Up.Muktikopaniṣad
MunU.Muṇḍakopaniṣad
Nār. Up.Nārāyaniyopaniṣad
Nyāya Sū.Nyāya-Sūtraन्या. सू.
PrasU.Praṣnopaniṣad
Jai. Sū. or
Pū. Mī.
Jaimani Sūtra or
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā
जै. सू.
Ṛg. Sam.Ṛg-Veda Saṃhitāऋ. सं.
Śābara Bhā.Śābara Bhāṣya
of Jaimani Sūtras
शा. भा.
Śat. Brā.Śata-patha-Brāhmaṇaश. ब्रा.
SvetU.Śvetāśvatāropaniṣad
Ṣaḍ-viṃśa Brā.Ṣaḍviṃśa Brāhmaṇa षड्विंश. ब्रा.
Sarvānu.Sarvānukramaṇī
TaitU.Taittirīyopaniṣad
Tait. Ār.Taittirīya-Āraṇyakaतै. आ.
Tait. Brā.Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇaतै. ब्रा.
Tait. Sam.Taittirīya-Saṃhitā
Tāṇ. Brā.Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇaताण्ड्य. ब्रा.
Vaiś. Sū.Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra

॥इति ब्रह्मसूत्र-शानङ्कर-भाष्यम् Translation॥