Aitareya Upanisad

परिसमाप्तं कर्म सहापरब्रह्मविषयविज्ञानेन। सैषा कर्मणो ज्ञानसहितस्य परा गतिरुक्थविज्ञानद्वारेणोपसंहृता।
Introduction: Earlier than this
[•The Aitareya Upaniṣad forms the 4th, 5th and 6th chapters of the second Āraṇyaka of Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. The Upaniṣad is concerned only with knowledge of the Self, whereas the earlier portions deal with Karma, associated with meditation.•]
was finished Karma [•Rites, duties, etc.•] along with the knowledge of (i.e. meditation on) the inferior Brahman (i.e. Hiraṇya-garbha). This highest result that is such and achievable through Karma, associated with meditation, was concluded with the meditation on Uktha
[•Uktha is Prāṇa (lit. Vital Force, i.e. Hiraṇya-garbha – cosmic power of knowledge and action); and meditation on it consists in thinking, ‘I am that Uktha or Prāṇa.’ Such deep concentration ensures identity with Prāṇa.•].

एतत्सत्यं ब्रह्म प्राणाख्यम्। एष एको देवः। एतस्यैव प्राणस्य सर्वे देवा विभूतयः। एतस्य प्राणस्यात्मभावं गच्छन् देवता अप्येति इत्युक्तम्।
It was said, ‘This Brahman that is Truth is called Prāṇa; this is only Deity’ (Kau. II. 2; Mai. VII. 7) ‘All the gods are but manifestations of this Prāṇa’; ‘Attaining identity wit (the Deity, Brahmā, Immortality, that is) this Prāṇa, one becomes united with the gods.’

सोऽयं देवताप्ययलक्षणः परः पुरुषार्थः। एष मोक्षः। स चायं यथोक्तेन ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयेन साधनेन प्राप्तव्यो नातः परमस्तीत्येके प्रतिपन्नाः।
Some people believe that the highest human goal consists in this merger in the Deity, that this is emancipation, that this is attainable by the means of a combination of meditation and Karma as described, and that there is nothing higher than this.

तान्निराचिकीर्षुरुत्तरं केवलात्मज्ञानविधानार्थम् ‘आत्मा वा इदम्’ इत्याद्याह।
With a view to refuting them and enjoining the knowledge of the absolute Self, the subsequent text says, ‘In the beginning this was but the absolute Self alone’, etc. (AitU.1.1.1).

कथं पुनरकर्मसम्बन्धिकेवलात्मविज्ञानविधानार्थ उत्तरो ग्रन्थ इति गम्यते?
Objection: How is it, again, known that the subsequent text is meant for enjoining the knowledge of the absolute Self, unconnected with Karma?

अन्यार्थानवगमात्। तथा च पूर्वोक्तानां देवतानामग्न्यादीनां संसारित्वं दर्शयिष्यत्यशनायादिदोषवत्त्वेन ‘तमशनायापिपासाभ्यामन्ववार्जत्’ (AitU.1.2.1) इत्यादिना। अशनायादिमत्सर्वं संसार एव परस्य तु ह्मणोऽशनायाद्यत्ययश्रुतेः।
Answer: Since no other meaning can be deduced. Moreover, through such texts as ‘He subjected Him
[•Virāṭ, who is the gross manifestation of Hiraṇya-garbha.•]
to hunger and thirst’ (AitU.1.2.1) etc., it will be shown that the gods such as Fire, mentioned earlier, are included in the phenomenal world because of the defects of their hunger etc. All that is subject to hunger etc. is surely within the phenomenal world, whereas the supreme Brahman is mentioned in the Vedas as transcendental to hunger and the rest.

भवत्वेवं केवलात्मज्ञानं मोक्षसाधनम्, न त्वत्राकर्म्येवाधिक्रियते; विशेषाश्रवणात्। अकर्मिण आश्रम्यन्तरस्येहाश्रवणात्।
Objection: Even if it be thus conceded that the knowledge of the absolute Self is the means for emancipation, it does not follow that a non-performer of Karma alone is qualified for this, since no such specification is heard of, there being no mention in this Upaniṣad of any non-performer of Karma (i.e. a sannyāsī) belonging to a distinct order.

कर्म च बृहतीसहस्रलक्षणं प्रस्तुत्य अनन्तरमेवात्मज्ञानं प्रारभ्यते। तस्मात्कर्म्येवाधिक्रियते।
Again, the knowledge of the Self is begun only after introducing the rite called Bṛhatī-sahasra. Therefore it is the performer of karma who is in fact entitled to this.

न च कर्मासम्बन्ध्यात्मविज्ञानम्, पूर्ववदन्ते उपसंहारात्।
Nor is the knowledge of the Self incompatible with karma, for the summing up (here) at the end conforms to what went earlier.

यथा कर्मसम्बन्धिनः पुरुषस्य सूर्यात्मनः स्थावरजङ्गमादिसर्वप्राण्यात्मत्वमुक्तं ब्राह्मणेन मन्त्रेण च ‘सूर्य आत्मा’ (ऋ. सं. १-११५-१) इत्यादिना,
Just as it was stated by the (earlier) brāhmaṇa (portion) that the Puruṣa
[•The conscious, all-pervasive Reality that dwells everywhere.•]
associated with karma and identified with the Sun, is the self of all beings, mobile and immobile,
[•First His identity with the Sun is shown in, ‘He indeed illumines this world – the One that shines as the Being (in the Sun)’, and then He is shown as all-pervading in, ‘Therefore they known Him as a hundred-rayed – on One that is that very Puruṣa’, and, ‘It is the vital force indeed that becomes all these’ (ChanU.5.1.15; 7.15.4).•]
and as it was confirmed by the mantra (portion) in such texts as, ‘The Sun is the Self (of the universe, moving and motionless)’ (R. I. cxv. 1),

तथैव ‘एष ब्रह्मैष इन्द्रः’ (AitU.3.1.3 इत्याद्युपक्रम्य सर्वप्राण्यात्मत्वम्। ‘यच्च स्थावरम्, सर्वं तत्प्रज्ञानेत्रम्’ (AitU.3.1.3) इत्युपसंहरिष्यति।
Similarly (here), too, the start will be made with ‘This one is (the inferior) Brahman; this is Indra’ (AitU.3.1.3), and the conclusion will be, ‘All the creatures that there are, which move or do not move, are impelled by Consciousness’ (AitU.3.1.3).

तथा च संहितोपनिषत् – ‘एतं ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते’ (ऐ. आ. ३-२-३-१२) इत्यादिना कर्मसम्बन्धित्वमुक्त्वा ‘सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते’ इत्युपसंहरति।
Similarly, too, in the Upaniṣad of the saṃhitā (portion) the Self will be spoken of as associated with karma, in the text, ‘The followers of the Ṛg-Veda deliberate on this very Entity in the hymn called Bṛhatī-sahasra’, etc. (Ai. A. III. ii. 3. 12), and the conclusion will be with, ‘They speak of it alone as the Self in all beings,’ etc.

तथा तस्यैव ‘योऽयमशरीरः प्रज्ञात्मा’ इत्युक्तस्य ‘यश्चासावादित्य एकमेव तदिति विद्यात्’ इत्येकत्वमुक्तम्।
Similarly, too, the identity of the One that is referred to in, ‘That which the bodiless conscious Self,’ is spoken of in, ‘One should know That as identical with Him that is in the sun’.

इहापि ‘कोऽयमात्मा’ (AitU.3.1.1) इत्युपक्रम्य प्रज्ञात्मत्वमेव ‘प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म’ (AitU.3.1.3) इति दर्शयिष्यति। तस्मान्नाकर्मसम्बन्ध्यात्मज्ञानम्।
Here, again, commencing with, ‘Which is It that we worship as this Self?’ (AitU.3.1.1), the identity with Consciousness Itself will be shown in ‘Consciousness is Brahman’ (AitU.3.1.3). Therefore the knowledge of the Self is not disconnected with karma.

पुनरुक्त्यानर्थक्यमिति चेत् – ‘प्राणो वा अहमस्म्यृषे’ इत्यादिब्राह्मणेन ‘सूर्य आत्मा’ इति च मन्त्रेण निर्धारितस्यात्मनः ‘आत्मा वा इदम्’ इत्यादिब्राह्मणेन ‘कोऽयमात्मा’ (AitU.3.1.1) इति प्रश्नपूर्वकं पुनर्निर्धारणं पुनरुक्तमनर्थकमिति चेत्,
Counter-objection: (On that supposition) the present text becomes useless because of tautology. How? The Self having been ascertained by the brāhmaṇa (portion) in, ‘O Ṛṣi, I am indeed Prāṇa’, and by the mantra (portion) in, ‘The Sun is the Self’ (R. I. cxv. 1), it is useless and tautological to ascertain It over again by the brāhmaṇa (i.e. the Upaniṣad portion) by raising the question, ‘Which is It that we worship as this Self?’ (AitU.3.1.1) and then answering that ‘all this is but the Self’, and so on.

न; तस्यैव धर्मान्तरविशेषनिर्धारणार्थत्वान्न पुनरुक्ततादोषः। कथम्? तस्यैव कर्मसम्बन्धिनो जगत्सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारादिधर्मविशेषनिर्धारणार्थत्वात् केवलोपास्त्यर्थत्वाद्वा;
Opponent: Not so, for no fault of tautology is involved, inasmuch as this is meant to determine some special qualities of that very Self. How? Of that very Self, as connected with Karma, it is sought to determine some special attributes such as (the power of) creation, protection, and dissolution of the world, or to present It as an object of meditation in Its unconditioned state.

अथवा, आत्मेत्यादिः परो ग्रन्थसन्दर्भः आत्मनः कर्मिणः कर्मणोऽन्यत्रोपासनाप्राप्तौ कर्मप्रस्तावेऽविहितत्वाद्वा केवलोऽप्यात्मोपास्य इत्येवमर्थः। भेदाभेदोपास्यत्वाच्च ‘एक एवात्मा’ कर्मविषये भेददृष्टिभाक्। स एवाकर्मकाले अभेदेनाप्युपास्य इत्येवमपुनरुक्तता।
To explain in the second alternative: From the fact that meditation on the Self (as such) was not enjoined in the context of karma, it might be inferred that the Self, which is (found) associated with karma, is not to be meditated upon apart from karma; therefore the purport of the (following) text, beginning with ‘Ātmā’ etc., is that the unconditioned Self, too, is to be meditated on. Or since the Self is to be worshipped both as different and non-different (from oneself), the same Self that is subject to the idea of difference in a context of karma is again to be meditated on as non-different outside (that) karma. Thus there is no tautology.

‘विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह। अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते’ (IsU.11) इति ‘कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः’ (IsU.2) इति च वाजिनाम्।
Moreover, according to the adherents of the Vāja-saneyā Section (of the Yajur-Veda) there are the statements, ‘He who knows these two, Vidyā (knowledge) and a-vidyā (rites etc.), together, attains immortality through vidyā by crossing over death through a-vidyā’ (IsU.11) and ‘By doing karma indeed should one wish to live here for a hundred years’ (IsU.2).

न च वर्षशतात्परमायुर्मर्त्यानाम्, येन कर्मपरित्यागेन आत्मानमुपासीत। दर्शितं च ‘तावन्ति पुरुषायुषोऽह्नां सहस्राणि भवन्ति’ इति। वर्षशतं चायुः कर्मणैव व्याप्तम्। दर्शितश्च मन्त्रः ‘कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि’ इत्यादि;
Not that mortals can have more than a hundred years as the fullest span of life, so as to able to meditate on the Self after renouncing karma (after a hundred years). And it has been shown in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, ‘The span of a man’s life comprises as many thousands of days.’
[•The Āraṇyaka first points out that the śāstra (hymn) called Bṛhatī-sahasra has got 36,000 letters in it, and then states that a man’s life consists of as many days, that is, 100 years.•]
Now, the hundred years of life are packed with karma; and the mantra, ‘By doing karma indeed…’ has just been quoted.

तथा ‘यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति’ ‘यावज्जीवं दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेत’ इत्याद्याश्च; ‘तं यज्ञपात्रैर्दहन्ति’ इति च। ऋणत्रयश्रुतेश्च।
Similar are the texts, ‘One should perform the Agni-hotra sacrifices as long as one lives’, ‘One should perform the Darśa and Pūrṇa-māsa (new moon and full moon) sacrifices as long as one lives,’ and others, as well as, ‘Him they burn along with the sacrificial vessels.’

तत्र हि पारिव्राज्यादिशास्त्रम् ‘व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति’ (BrhU.3.5.1, BrhU.4.4.22) इत्यात्मज्ञानस्तुति-परोऽर्थवादोऽनधिकृतार्थो वा।
Besides, there is the Veda text speaking of the three debts.
[•‘The Brāhmaṇa, from his birth, is under three debts’ (Tai. S. VI. iii. 10) – to the gods, manes, and sages.•]
As for the scriptural text dealing with monasticism etc., to wit, ‘Knowing this very Self the Brāhmaṇas renounce… and lead a mendicant life’ (BrhUEng.3.5.1, 4.4.22), it is eulogistic, meant to praise the knowledge of the Self. Or it is meant for the disqualified ones (e.g. the blind, the lame, and others [•Who cannot undertake Veda rites.•]).

न, परमार्थात्मविज्ञाने फलादर्शने क्रियानुपपत्तेः –
Vedāntin: Not so, for when the supreme knowledge is achieved, there can be no idea of results, and so no action is possible.

यदुक्तं कर्मिण एव चात्मज्ञानं कर्मसम्बन्धि चेत्यादि,
As for the statements that ‘the knowledge of the Self comes to the man engaged in karma’, that ‘it is associated with karma,’ and so on,

तन्न; परं ह्याप्तकामं सर्वसंसारदोषवर्जितं ब्रह्माहमस्मीत्यात्मत्वेन विज्ञाने, कृतेन कर्तव्येन वा प्रयोजनमात्मनोऽपश्यतः फलादर्शने क्रिया नोपपद्यते। They are wrong. Action is inconceivable in one who has the knowledge of Brahman as his Self, comprised in the realization, ‘I am the supreme Brahman in which all desires are fulfilled and which is above all the worldly shortcomings,’ and who has no idea of results because he feels no need for anything to be got for himself from actions done or to be done (by him).

फलादर्शनेऽपि नियुक्तत्वात्करोतीति चेत्,
Objection: Though he may not perceive any benefit therefrom, he still acts because of the (scriptural) injunction.

न; नियोगाविषयात्मदर्शनात्।
Answer: No, for he has realized the Self that is beyond the range of injunctions.

इष्टयोगमनिष्टवियोगं वात्मनः प्रयोजनं पश्यंस्तदुपायार्थी यो भवति, स नियोगस्य विषयो दृष्टो लोके, न तु तद्विपरीतनियोगाविषयब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शी।
It is seen in the world that one comes within the scope of injunction so long as one feels the need for acquiring some desirable thing or avoiding some undesirable thing for himself and seeks for a means thereof; but not is so the one who is of a contrary disposition and has realized the identity of the Self with Brahman that cannot be subjected to any injunction.

ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्श्यपि संश्चेन्नियुज्येत, नियोगाविषयोऽपि सन्न कश्चिन्न नियुक्त इति सर्वं कर्म सर्वेण सर्वदा कर्तव्यं प्राप्नोति। तच्चानिष्टम्।
If a man who has realized the identity of the Self and Brahman has still to bow down to injunctions, even though he is beyond all mandates, then there will remain none who is outside the pale of scriptural direction; and so all actions will become fit to be undertaken by all and sundry at all times. But that is undesirable.

न च स नियोक्तुं शक्यते केनचित्। आम्नायस्यापि तत्प्रभवत्वात्। न हि स्वविज्ञानोत्थेन वचसा स्वयं नियुज्यते। नापि बहुवित्स्वामी अविवेकिना भृत्येन।
Nor can he be directed by anybody, for even the scriptures emanate from him. Not that anyone can himself be impelled by any sentence issuing out of his own wisdom. Nor is a well-informed master commanded by an ignorant servant.

आम्नायस्य नित्यत्वे सति स्वातन्त्र्यात्सर्वान्प्रति नियोक्तृत्वसामर्थ्यमिति चेत्,
Objection: The Vedas, being eternal, are independent, and hence have the mandatory power over all.

न; उक्तदोषात्। तथापि सर्वेण सर्वदा सर्वमविशिष्टं कर्म कर्तव्यमित्युक्तो दोषोऽप्यपरिहार्य एव।
Answer: No, for the defect (of such an argument) has been already pointed out. Even on this assumption, the defect of every duty becoming fit to be indiscriminately undertaken at all times by all and sundry persists unavoidably.

तदपि शास्त्रेणैव विधीयत इति चेत् – यथा कर्मकर्तव्यता शास्त्रेण कृता, तथा तदप्यात्मज्ञानं तस्यैव कर्मिणः शास्त्रेण विधीयत इति चेत्,
Objection: That, too, is enjoined by the scriptures. (To explain:) As performance of duties is prescribed by scriptures, so is the knowledge of the Self prescribed for that man of karma by the scriptures themselves.

न; विरुद्धार्थबोधकत्वानुपपत्तेः। न ह्येकस्मिन्कृताकृतसम्बन्धित्वं तद्विपरीतत्वं च बोधयितुं शक्यम्। शीतोष्णत्वमिवाग्नेः। न चेष्टयोगचिकीर्षा आत्मनोऽनिष्टवियोगचिकीर्षा च शास्त्रकृता, सर्वप्राणिनां तद्दर्शनात्। शास्त्रकृतं चेत्, तदुभयं गोपालादीनां न दृश्येत, अशास्त्रज्ञत्वात्तेषाम्।
Answer: No, for it is impossible that the scriptures should be prescribing contradictory things. Just as heat and cold cannot both be averred of fire, so it is not possible to instruct, for the same person, association with as well as dissociation from present and future actions. Nor are the desires to attain the delectable and avoid the detestable for oneself creations of the scriptures, for all beings are seen to have them. Had these two been the products of the scriptures, they would not have been found in the cowherds and others, who are ignorant of scriptures.

यद्धि स्वतोऽप्राप्तम्, तच्छास्त्रेण बोधयितव्यम्। तच्चेत्कृतकर्तव्यताविरोध्यात्मज्ञानं शास्त्रेण कृतम्, कथं तद्विरुद्धां कर्तव्यतां पुनरुत्पादयेत् शीततामिवाग्नौ, तम इव च भानौ?
The scriptures have to instruct about those things only that are not self-evident. That being so, if the scriptures have produced the knowledge of the Self, opposed to (ideas of) duties that have been accomplished or are yet to be accomplished, how can they again produce the sense of duty that runs counter to it, like coldness in fire or darkness in the sun?

न बोधयत्येवेति चेत्,
Objection: The scriptures certainly do not generate such a knowledge.

न; ‘स म आत्मेति विद्यात्’ (कौ. उ. ३-९) ‘प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म’ (AitU.3.1.3) इति चोपसंहारात्। ‘तदात्मानमेवावेत्’ (BrhU.1.4.10) ‘तत्त्वमसि’ (ChanU.6.8.7) इत्येवमादिवाक्यानां तत्परत्वात्। उत्पन्नस्य च ब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानस्याबाध्यमानत्वान्नानुत्पन्नं भ्रान्तं वा इति शक्यं वक्तुम्
Answer: No, since the conclusion is made thus: ‘One should know thus: “He is my Self” (Kau. III. 9), ‘Consciousness is Brahman’ (AitU.3.1.3). And sentences such as, ‘It knew only Itself (as “I am Brahman"; therefore It became all)’ (BrhUEng.1.4.10), ‘Thou art That’ (ChanU.6.8.7 – 16.3), bear on the same idea. And since the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman, once it has emerged, is never sublated, its origination cannot be denied or pronounced erroneous.

त्यागेऽपि प्रयोजनाभावस्य तुल्यत्वमिति चेत् ‘नाकृतेनेह कश्चन’ (BhG.3.18) इति स्मृतेः – य आहुर्विदित्वा ब्रह्म व्युत्थानमेव कुर्यादिति, तेषामप्येष समानो दोषः प्रयोजनाभाव इति चेत्,
Objection: With regard to renunciation, too, there is an equal absence of need, in accordance with the Smṛti, ‘(He has no object in this world to gain by doing action), nor by non-performance’ (BhG.3.18). Those who say that after realizing Brahman one must resort to renunciation are equally open to the same charge of ‘absence of need.’

न; अक्रियामात्रत्वाद्व्युत्थानस्य। अविद्यानिमित्तो हि प्रयोजनस्य भावः, न वस्तुधर्मः, सर्वप्राणिनां तद्दर्शनात्,
Answer: No, since renunciation consists in mere cessation from activity. The feeling of want follows from ignorance and is not inherent in any object, for this fact (of feeling of want towards an object) is in evidence in all beings
[•Even in people who are ignorant of the nature of things. This is according to the reading, ‘tad-darśanat’. Āndanda Giri prefers ‘tad-adarśanāt (?) – is not in evidence’. If the feeling inhered in the object, all should have felt it similarly and for ever. The reaction being different, the feeling is subjective.•].

प्रयोजनतृष्णया च प्रेर्यमाणस्य वाङ्मनःकायैः प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात्, ‘सोऽकामयत जाया मे स्यात्’ (BrhU.1.4.17) इत्यादिना पुत्रवित्तादि पाङ्क्तलक्षणं काम्यमेवेति ‘उभे ह्येते साध्यसाधनलक्षणे एषणे एव’ (BrhU.3.5.1) इति वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणेऽवधारणात्।
Moreover, it is noticed that one acts through speech, mind, and body when one is impelled by thirst for desired results; and by the text beginning with, ‘He desired, “Let me have a wife”’ (BrhUEng.1.4.17), and by the text, ‘Both these are but desires (for ends and means)’ (BrhUEng.3.5.1, 4.4.22), of the Vāja-saneyā Brāhmaṇa, it has been emphatically asserted that sons, wealth, etc., that constitute the fivefold karma
[•The metre called Paṅkti has five letters in each foot; and in sacrifices the five factors – wife, son, divine wealth (meditation), human wealth, and rites – get conjoined. Hence sacrifices are paṅkta, constituted by five factors.•]
are comprised within desire.

अविद्याकामदोषनिमित्ताया वाङ्मनःकायप्रवृत्तेः पाङ्क्तलक्षणाया विदुषोऽविद्यादिदोषाभावादनुपपत्तेः क्रियाभावमात्रं व्युत्थानम्, न तु यागादिवदनुष्ठेयरूपं भावात्मकम्।
Since the activities of speech, mind, and body with regard to the (fivefold) Veda rituals, arising from such defects as ignorance, desire, etc., cannot belong to a man of realization because of his freedom from the defects like ignorance etc., his renunciation consists in the mere absence of activity; and it is not a positive something to be accomplished like sacrifice etc.

तच्च विद्यावत्पुरुषधर्म इति न प्रयोजनमन्वेष्टव्यम्। न हि तमसि प्रवृत्तस्य उदित आलोके यद्गर्तपङ्ककण्टकाद्यपतनम्, तत्किंप्रयोजनमिति प्रश्नार्हम्।
And that being a natural accomplishment of a man of illumination, no need is to be sought for it. No such question can be raised as to the need because of which a person, who was (once) enveloped in darkness, does not fall into a pit, swamp, or brambles after the dawn of light.

व्युत्थानं तर्ह्यर्थप्राप्तत्वान्न चोदनार्थ इति। गार्हस्थ्ये चेत्परं ब्रह्मविज्ञानं जातम्, तत्रैवास्त्वकुर्वत आसनं न ततोऽन्यत्र गमनमिति चेत्,
Objection: Then it comes to this that renunciation follows as a matter of course and is not fit to be enjoined. Therefore, if the supreme knowledge of Brahman dawns in domestic life, the inactive
[•One who does not engage any more in scriptural rituals etc.•]
man may continue in that state, and there need be no moving away from it.

न; कामप्रयुक्तत्वाद्गार्हस्थ्यस्य। ‘एतावान्वै कामः’ (BrhU.1.4.17) ‘उभे ह्येते एषणे एव’ (BrhU.3.5.1, BrhU.4.4.22) इत्यवधारणात् कामनिमित्तपुत्रवित्तादिसम्बन्धनियमाभावमात्रम्; न हि ततोऽन्यत्र गमनं व्युत्थानमुच्यते। अतो न गार्हस्थ्य एवाकुर्वत आसनमुत्पन्नविद्यस्य।
Answer: No, since domestic life is induced by desire, for it has been clearly declared, ‘This much indeed is desire’ (BrhUEng.1.4.17)
[•The first part of the sentence is: ‘He desired, “Let me have a wife, so that I may be born (as a child). And let me have wealth, so that I may perform rites.”’•],
‘Both these [•Hankering for ends and means.•]
are indeed desires’ (BrhUEng.3.5.1, 4.4.22). Renunciation is defined as the mere absence of well-established relationship with sons etc. arising from desire, and not as the mere moving away from that domestic life. And so the inactive man of realization cannot continue in the domestic life itself.
[•He cannot consider himself a householder, nor can he deliberately put on the householder’s garb or accept the latter’s duties.•]

एतेन गुरुशुश्रूषातपसोरप्यप्रतिपत्तिर्विदुषः सिद्धा।
Hereby it is established that for an illumined soul there can be no acceptance of such duties as the service of the Guru, or (practice of) austerities.

अत्र केचिद्गृहस्था भिक्षाटनादिभयात्परिभवाच्च त्रस्यमानाः सूक्ष्मदृष्टितां दर्शयन्त उत्तरमाहुः।
भिक्षोरपि भिक्षाटनादिनियमदर्शनाद्देहधारणमात्रार्थिनो गृहस्थस्यापि साध्यसाधनैषणोभयविनिर्मुक्तस्य देहमात्रधारणार्थमशनाच्छादनमात्रमुपजीवतो गृह एवास्त्वासनमिति;
Against this argument, some householders, shy of begging alms and afraid of ridicule, advance the following rejoinder, thereby making a show of their intellectual acumen:
Inasmuch as a mendicant, desirous merely of maintaining his body, is seen to subject himself to regulations about begging, there can be continuance in the domestic life even for that householder who has become freed from both kinds of desires with regard to ends and means, but who has to depend on mere food and raiment for the maintenance of the body.

न, स्वगृहविशेषपरिग्रहनियमस्य कामप्रयुक्तत्वादित्युक्तोत्तरमेतत्। स्वगृहविशेषपरिग्रहाभावे च शरीरधारणमात्रप्रयुक्ताशनाच्छादनार्थिनः स्वपरिग्रहविशेषभावेऽर्थाद्भिक्षुकत्वमेव।
Answer: Not so, for this has already been refuted by saying that the constant habit of resorting to any particular house of one’s own is prompted by desire. When there is no clinging to any particular house of one’s own, there is follows begging alone, as a matter of course, in the case of one who has no special inclination for turning to his own and who seeks for food and raiment under the mere impulsion of maintaining the body.

शरीरधारणार्थायां भिक्षाटनादिप्रवृत्तौ यथा नियमो भिक्षोः शौचादौ च, तथा गृहिणोऽपि विदुषोऽकामिनोऽस्तु नित्यकर्मसु नियमेन प्रवृत्तिर्यावज्जीवादिश्रुतिनियुक्तत्वात्प्रत्यवायपरिहारायेति।
Objection: Just as (for a sannyāsī) there are regulations with regard to engagement in begging for the sake of maintaining the body, as also with regard to personal cleanliness etc., so in the case of the householder, who has become illumined and free from desire, there may be regular engagement in obligatory duties – for the sake of avoiding evil – in pursuance of the injunction implied in the Veda text enjoining karma for the whole life.

एतन्नियोगाविषयत्वेन विदुषः प्रत्युक्तमशक्यनियोज्यत्वाच्चेति।
Answer: This has already been refuted by pointing out that the illumined soul is outside the range of injunction; besides, he cannot be impelled.

यावज्जीवादिनित्यचोदनानर्थक्यमिति चेत्,
Objection: The injunction about obligatory duties contained in, ‘One should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice for life,’ becomes meaningless thereby.

न; अविद्वद्विषयत्वेनार्थवत्त्वात्। यत्तु भिक्षोः शरीरधारणमात्रप्रवृत्तस्य प्रवृत्तेर्नियतत्वम्, तत्प्रवृत्तेर्न प्रयोजकम्। आचमनप्रवृत्तस्य पिपासापगमवन्नान्यप्रयोजनार्थत्वमवगम्यते। न चाग्निहोत्रादीनां तद्वदर्थप्राप्तप्रवृत्तिनियतत्वोपपत्तिः।
Answer: No, because it retains its meaningfulness with regard to the ignorant man. As for the regulation about the activities of the mendicant engaged in the mere support of the body, that regulation does not generate any action. Just as no fresh motive is in evidence in the matter of quenching thirst (pari passu) for a man engaged in sipping water from the palm of the hand as a ceremonial act, similarly (in the matter of rules for begging) no other impulse is in evidence (apart from assuaging hunger)
[•Following the injunction about sipping, a man sips water and the thirst is assuaged pari passu; but the latter fact is not the motive for the sipping. Similarly, a man engages naturally in begging food for life, and consequent on that there occur some rules; but these rules cannot lead to a supposition of some fresh motive for the begging.•]
It cannot be argued on similar grounds that in the case of Agni-hotra, too, the activities are derived naturally and are regulated accordingly
[•For theses activities are not spontaneous, but follow from a desire for heaven etc.•].

अर्थप्राप्तप्रवृत्तिनियमोऽपि प्रयोजनाभावेऽनुपपन्न एवेति चेत्,
Objection: Restriction of even spontaneous activity is uncalled for when it serves no purpose.

न; तन्नियमस्य पूर्वप्रवृत्तिसिद्धत्वात्तदतिक्रमे यत्नगौरवादर्थप्राप्तस्य व्युत्थानस्य पुनर्वचनाद्विदुषो मुमुक्षोः कर्तव्यत्वोपपत्तिः।
Answer: No, since that restriction follows naturally out of past tendencies, and an overriding of them involves great effort
[•Life can be maintained by begging for alms, whether according to rules or not. But before the rise of knowledge, the mendicant had followed good rules as a spiritual discipline, and the habit persists even after illumination. The path of least resistance lies in following the habit and not in counteracting it.•].
From the fact that a fresh injunction of renunciation, despite its emergence as a matter of course (in the case of a man of illumination), is met with,
[•In BrhUEng.3.5.1 etc. – ‘Knowing this very self, the Brāhmaṇas renounce … and lead a mendicant life.’•]
it becomes evident that it is obligatory for the man of illumination.

अविदुषापि मुमुक्षुणा पारिव्राज्यं कर्तव्यमेव; तथा च ‘शान्तो दान्तः’ (BrhU.4.4.23) इत्यादिवचनं प्रमाणम्।
And monasticism is obligatory even for the unillumined soul that hankers after emancipation. With regard to this matter the sentence, ‘Therefore he who knows thus becomes self-controlled, calm,’ etc. (BrhUEng.4.4.23) can be cited as authoritative.

शमदमादीनां चात्मदर्शनसाधनानामन्याश्रमेष्वनुपपत्तेः।
Besides, such means for the realization of the Self as physical and mental control etc., are incompatible with other stages of life.

‘अत्याश्रमिभ्यः परमं पवित्रं प्रोवाच सम्यगृषिसंघजुष्टम्’ (SvetU.6.21) इति च श्वेताश्वतरे विज्ञायते। ‘न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानशुः’ (KaivU.1.3) इति च कैवल्यश्रुतिः। ‘ज्ञात्वा नैष्कर्म्यमाचरेत्’ इति च स्मृतेः।
And it is known from the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, ‘To those (monks) who are above the (four) stages of life he spoke well of that supremely holy Reality that is sought after by seers of Truth’ (SvetU.6.21). And in the Kaivalya Upaniṣad (KaivU.1.3) there occurs this text, ‘Some attained immortality not by karma, not by progeny, not by wealth, but by renunciation.’
[•The idea is that the few who ever realized, did so through renunciation.•]
And the Smṛti says, ‘After attaining knowledge, one should have recourse to inactivity’, and ‘He should continue in that order of life (sannyāsa) which is conducive to the attainment of Brahman.’

‘ब्रह्माश्रमपदे वसेत्’ इति च ब्रह्मचर्यादिविद्यासाधनानां च साकल्येनात्याश्रमिषूपपत्तेर्गार्हस्थ्येऽसम्भवात्। न च असम्पन्नं साधनं कस्यचिदर्थस्य साधनायालम्।
Moreover, the practice of such disciplines as for enlightenment, continence, in their fullness is possible only for those who are above the four stages of life, whereas it is impossible in domestic life. Not that an incomplete means can fulfil any objective (e.g. the realization of the Self).

यद्विज्ञानोपयोगीनि च गार्हस्थ्याश्रमकर्माणि, तेषां परमफलमुपसंहृतं देवताप्ययलक्षणं संसारविषयमेव।
As for the kind of realization to which the karmas pertaining to the householder’s life can lead, their highest result has been summed up as merger in the Deity (Hiraṇya-garbha), and that is within the worldly state itself.

यदि कर्मिण एव परमात्मविज्ञानमभविष्यत्, संसारविषयस्यैव फलस्योपसंहारो नोपापत्स्यत।
If the knowledge of the Self were possible for people engrossed only in karma, the conclusion there would not have been made with a result, (viz merger in the Deity), which is within the worldly state.

अङ्गफलं तदिति चेत्;
Objection: That is only the product of some subsidiary factor (associated with the higher knowledge
[•E.g. the knowledge of Fire and other deities associated with the realization of the Self.•]).

न, तद्विरोध्यात्मवस्तुविषयत्वादात्मविद्यायाः। निराकृतसर्वनामरूपकर्मपरमार्थात्मवस्तुविषयमात्मज्ञानममृतत्वसाधनम्। गुणफलसम्बन्धे हि निराकृतसर्वविशेषात्मवस्तुविषयत्वं ज्ञानस्य न प्राप्नोति; तच्चानिष्टम्, ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्’ (BrhU.2.4.14) इत्यधिकृत्य क्रियाकारकफलादिसर्वव्यवहारनिराकरणाद्विदुषः; तद्विपरीतस्याविदुषः ‘यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति’ (BrhU.2.4.14) इत्युक्त्वा क्रियाकारकफलरूपस्य संसारस्य दर्शितत्वाच्च वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणे। तथेहापि देवताप्ययं संसारविषयं यत्फलमशनायादिमद्वस्त्वात्मकं तदुपसंहृत्य केवलं सर्वात्मकवस्तुविषयं ज्ञानममृतत्वाय वक्ष्यामीति प्रवर्तते।
Answer: No, for the knowledge of the Self relates to the Reality which is the Self, and which is entirely opposed to it (viz the subsidiary). The means to the attainment of immortality is the knowledge of the Self which is the supreme Reality beyond all names, forms, and actions. If that knowledge remains associated with some secondary result (within the world), it cannot pertain to the Reality that is the Self from which are ruled out all distinctions. And that is undesirable, for in the text of the Vāja-saneyā Brāhmaṇa, beginning with ‘Where everything becomes his Self’ (BrhUEng.2.4.14), all empirical dealings, involving actions, auxiliaries, and fruits have been denied for the illumined soul; and by saying, ‘Where there is an appearance of duality’ (BrhUEng.2.4.14), the worldly state comprised of actions, auxiliaries, and fruits has been shown in the case of the unillumined soul who is the opposite of the former. Similarly, here, too, the text thinks, ‘I shall speak of that absolute knowledge of the all-pervasive Reality that leads to immortality after I have dealt with the fruit that consists in the identity with the Deity, exists within the worldly state, and is constituted by things subject to hunger etc.’

ऋणप्रतिबन्धश्चाविदुष एव मनुष्यपितृदेवलोकप्राप्तिं प्रति, न विदुषः; ‘सोऽयं मनुष्यलोकः पुत्रेणैव’ (BrhU.1.5.16) इत्यादिलोकत्रयसाधननियमश्रुतेः। विदुषश्च ऋणप्रतिबन्धाभावो दर्शित आत्मलोकार्थिनः ‘किं प्रजया करिष्यामः’ (BrhU.4.4.22) इत्यादिना। तथा ‘एतद्ध स्म वै तद्विद्वांस आहुर्ऋषयः कावषेयाः’ इत्यादि ‘एतद्ध स्म वै तत्पूर्वे विद्वांसोऽग्निहोत्रं न जुहवांचक्रुः’ (कौ. उ. २-५) इति च कौषीतकिनाम्।
For the unenlightened man, again, and not the enlightened one, do the three debts act as impediments in the way to his attaining the worlds of men, manes, and gods, as it is established by the Veda text, ‘That world of men is to be conquered through the son alone’ etc. (BrhUEng.1.5.16)
[•… the world of manes through rites; and the world of the gods through meditation.’•],
which determines the means for the attainment of the three worlds. And for the man of illumination craving for the world of the Self, the absence of impediment from debts is (BrhUEng.4.4.22). So also there are the texts of the Kauśītakī branch. ‘So the ancient seers, the Kāvaṣeyas, who had realized It said, (“Why should we study the Vedas?”)’ (Kau. II. 5) and ‘The ancient illumined souls who knew It, did not perform the Agni-hotra sacrifice’ (ibid).

अविदुषस्तर्हि ऋणानपाकरणे पारिव्राज्यानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्;
Objection: For the unillumined soul, then, there can be no monasticism before he clears the (three) debts.

न, प्राग्गार्हस्थ्यप्रतिपत्तेर्‌ऋणित्वासम्भवादधिकारानारूढोऽपि ऋणी चेत्स्यात्, सर्वस्य ऋणित्वमित्यनिष्टं प्रसज्येत।
Answer: Not so, because one does not become indebted before entering the householder’s life. If one can become indebted irrespective of his obligation thereto, then all may as well become so, which (conclusion) will lead to undesirable consequences.

प्रतिपन्नगार्हस्थ्यस्यापि ‘गृहाद्वनी भूत्वा प्रव्रजेद्यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रर्जेद्गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा’ (जा. उ. ४) इत्यात्मदर्शनसाधनोपायत्वेनेष्यत एव पारिव्राज्यम्। यावज्जीवादिश्रुतीनामविद्वदमुमुक्षुविषये कृतार्थता। छान्दोग्ये च केषांचिद्द्वादशरात्रमग्निहोत्रं हुत्वा तत ऊर्ध्वं परित्यागः श्रूयते।
In accordance with the text, ‘From the domestic life he should resort to that of the forest-dweller (recluse), and then embrace monasticism; alternatively, one may embrace monasticism from the stage of the celibate, or the householder, or the recluse’ (Ja. 4), even for one who has embraced the householder’s life, monasticism is desirable as a disciplinary means for the realization of the Self. The Veda texts speaking of performance of rites throughout life find their scope among the unenlightened souls who do not long for freedom. In (some recensions of) the Chāndogya, too, it is found that for some people it is enjoined that the Agni-hotra sacrifice can be given up after performing it for twelve nights.

यत्त्वनधिकृतानां पारिव्राज्यमिति, तन्न; तेषां पृथगेव ‘उत्सन्नाग्निरनग्निको वा’ इत्यादिश्रवणात्;
As for the view that monasticism is meant for those who are disqualified (from performing karma), it is unsound, since with regard to them (the monks) an independent injunction occurs in, ‘He whose fire has been extinguished or who has not lighted it up (shall renounce the day he becomes desireless)’ (Np. III. 77).

सर्वस्मृतिषु च अविशेषेण आश्रमविकल्पः प्रसिद्धः, समुच्चयश्च।
Moreover, it as a well-known fact that all the Smṛtis, in a general way, enjoin option with regard to, as well as adoption (in succession) of, all the stages of life.

यत्तु विदुषोऽर्थप्राप्तं व्युत्थानमित्यशास्त्रार्थत्वे, गृहे वने वा तिष्ठतो न विशेष इति, तदसत्। व्युत्थानस्यैवार्थप्राप्तत्वान्नान्यत्रावस्थानं स्यात्।
As for the argument, ‘Inasmuch as renunciation ensues spontaneously in the case of the illumined soul, it is beyond the purview of the scriptures, and therefore it makes little difference as to whether he continues in domestic life or repairs to the forest’, it is unsound, for absolute renunciation being a spontaneous result, there can be no continuance in any other order.

अन्यत्रावस्थानस्य कामकर्मप्रयुक्तत्वं ह्यवोचाम; तदभावमात्रं व्युत्थानमिति च। यथाकामित्वं तु विदुषोऽत्यन्तमप्राप्तम्, अत्यन्तमूढविषयत्वेनावगमात्।
We pointed out that involvement in any other stage of life is a result of the action of desire, and that renunciation consists merely in the absence of this. As for unchecked behaviour in the case of the illumined soul, it is entirely out of place, it being found among the extremely ignorant.

तथा शास्त्रचोदितमपि कर्मात्मविदोऽप्राप्तं गुरुभारतयावगम्यते; किमुत अत्यन्ताविवेकनिमित्तं यथाकामित्वम्? न ह्युन्मादतिमिरदृष्ट्युपलब्धं वस्तु तदपगमेऽपि तथैव स्यात्, उन्मादतिमिरदृष्टिनिमित्तत्वादेव तस्य। तस्मादात्मविदो व्युत्थानव्यतिरेकेण न यथाकामित्वम्, न चान्यत्कर्तव्यमित्येतत्सिद्धम्।
Moreover, seeing that even scriptural duties are known to be inapplicable in the case of the knower of the Self, they being too burdensome, can he have unrestrained behaviour that arises from extreme non-discrimination? Not that a thing perceived under lunacy or through eyes affected by the Timira disease, continues to be exactly so when the disease is cured, that vision being contingent on lunacy or Timira. According, it is proved that for the knower of the Self there can be neither wantonness nor engagement in any other duty apart from renunciation.

यत्तु ‘विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह’ (IsU.11) इति न विद्यावतो विद्यया सहाविद्यापि वर्तत इत्ययमर्थः; कस्तर्हि? एकस्मिन्पुरुषे एते न सह सम्बध्येयातामित्यर्थः; यथा शुक्तिकायां रजतशुक्तिकाज्ञाने एकस्य पुरुषस्य।
As for the text, ‘He who knows these two, vidyā and a-vidyā, together’ (IsU.11), it does not convey the idea that ignorance, too, persists along with enlightenment for the man of knowledge. What is the meaning then? It is meant to imply that they cannot cohere in the same person at the same time, as for instance the ideas of silver and nacre cannot cohere in a person with regard to the same mother of pearl.

‘दूरमेते विपरीते विषूची अविद्या या च विद्येति ज्ञाता’ (KathU.1.2.4) इति हि काठके।
For it is said in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, ‘That which is known as vidyā (knowledge) and that which is known as a-vidyā (rites, duties, etc.) are widely contradictory, and they follow divergent courses’ (KathU.1.2.4). Hence there is no possibility of the continuance of ignorance when knowledge dawns.

तस्मान्न विद्यायां सत्यामविद्यायाः सम्भवोऽस्ति। ‘तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व’ (TaitU.3.2.2) इत्यादिश्रुतेः। तपआदि विद्योत्पत्तिसाधनं गुरूपासनादि च कर्म अविद्यात्मकत्वादविद्योच्यते। तेन विद्यामुत्पाद्य मृत्युं काममतितरति। ततो निष्कामस्त्यक्तैषणो ब्रह्मविद्यया अमृतत्वमश्नुत इत्येतमर्थं दर्शनयन्नाह – ‘अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते’ (IsU.11) इति।
From such Veda texts as ‘Crave to know Brahman through concentration’ (TaitU.3.2.2), it follows that concentration etc. that are conducive to the rise of knowledge, as well as activities like service of the teacher, are called a-vidyā (nescience), since they are the products of nescience. Producing vidyā (knowledge) through them, one transcends death that is the same as desire. Then the passionless man renounces all desires and achieves immortality through the knowledge of Brahman. In order to reveal this idea the (Īśā) Upaniṣad says, ‘Crossing over death through a-vidyā, one attains immortality through vidyā’ (IsU.11).

यत्तु पुरुषायुः सर्वं कर्मणैव व्याप्तम्, ‘कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः’ (IsU.2) इति, तदविद्वद्विषयत्वेन परिहृतम्, इतरथा असम्भवात्।
As for the view that the entire span of a man’s life is packed with karma according to the text, ‘By doing karma indeed should one wish to live here for a hundred years’ (IsU.2), that has been dismissed as relating to the ignorant, for otherwise it would be untenable.

यत्तु वक्ष्यमाणमपि पूर्वोक्ततुल्यत्वात्कर्मणा अविरुद्धमात्मज्ञानमिति, तत्सविशेषनिर्विशेषात्मविषयतया प्रत्युक्तम्; उत्तरत्र व्याख्याने च दर्शयिष्यामः।
And the argument was advanced that what follows (in the present Upaniṣad) is in line with what preceded it, and therefore the knowledge of the Self is not opposed to karma. This view was disposed of by relating the two standpoints to the conditioned and the unconditioned Self, and this will be shown by us in the succeeding explanation.

अतः केवलनिष्क्रियब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रदर्शनार्थमुत्तरो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते॥
Therefore the following text is commenced in order to reveal the knowledge of the oneness of the Self and the absolute, actionless Brahman:

अस्मिन्नध्याये एष वाक्यार्थः – जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयकृदसंसारी सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्ववित्सर्वमिदं जगत्स्वतोऽन्यद्वस्त्वन्तरमनुपादायैव आकाशादिक्रमेण सृष्ट्वा
Introduction: The purport of this Fourth
[•Fourth, counting from the First Part of the Āraṇyaka in which this Upaniṣad is included•]
(i.e. the First) Part (just finished) is this: The Reality that is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe, and is transcendental, omniscient, omnipotent, and all-knowing, created in due order this entire universe beginning with space, without the help of any substance other than Himself.

स्वात्मप्रबोधनार्थं सर्वाणि च प्राणादिमच्छरीराणि स्वयं प्रविवेश; प्रविश्य च स्वमात्मानं यथाभूतमिदं ब्रह्मास्मीति साक्षात्प्रत्यबुध्यत;
Then He Himself entered into all the bodies possessed of vital force etc. for the sake of realizing His own Self. And having entered there, He realized directly His own Self in Its reality, as ‘I am this Brahman’.

तस्मात्स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक एवात्मा, नान्य इति। अन्योऽपि ‘स म आत्मा, ब्रह्मास्मीत्येवं विद्यात्’ इति ‘आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्’ (AitU.1.1.1) ‘ब्रह्म ततमम्’ (AitU.1.3.13) इति चोक्तम्।
Therefore He is the only one Self in all the bodies, and there is none besides. And so everybody else, too, should realize thus: ‘He is my Self’ (Kau. III. i. 8), ‘I am Brahman’ (BrhUEng.1.4.10 [•In the Commentary the two texts seem to have become combined•]).
Moreover, it has been said here, ‘In the beginning this was but the absolute Self alone’ (AitU.1.1.1), and ‘Brahman, the most pervasive’ (AitU.1.3.13), and so also in other Upaniṣads.

अन्यत्र च सर्वगतस्य सर्वात्मनो वालाग्रमात्रमप्यप्रविष्टं नास्तीति कथं सीमानं विदार्य प्रापद्यत पिपीलिकेव सुषिरम्?
Objection: For the One that is all-pervasive and that is the Self of all, there is not so much as the point of a hair unoccupied. Therefore how could He enter by splitting the end like an ant entering into a hole?

नन्वत्यल्पमिदं चोद्यम्। बहु चात्र चोदयितव्यम्।
Answer: This is but an insignificant question to be posed when there are so many others that can be asked here.

अकरणः सन्नीक्षत। अनुपादाय किञ्चिल्लोकानसृजत। अद्भ्यः पुरुषं समुद्धृत्यामूर्छयत्। तस्याभिध्यानान्मुखादि निर्भिन्नं मुखादिभ्यश्चाग्न्यादयो लोकपालाः। तेषां चाशनायादिसंयोजनं तदायतनप्रार्थनं तदर्थं गवादिप्रदर्शनं तेषां च यथायतनप्रवेशनं सृष्टस्यान्नस्य पलायनं वागादिभिस्तज्जिघृक्षेति। एतत्सर्वं सीमाविदारणप्रवेशसममेव।
That without organs He thinks; without the help of anything He created this universe; gathering up (a lump of) the human size from water, He gave it shape; from His brooding parted the mouth etc., from which emerged Fire etc., the presiding deities of the organs; the deities became associated with hunger and thirst; they prayed for abodes; cows etc. were shown to them; they entered into their respective abodes; the created food ran away; there was an attempt at taking it up with the organ of speech etc. – all these are on a par with the (problem of) splitting the end and entering.

अस्तु तर्हि सर्वमेवेदमनुपपन्नम्।
Objection: Then, let all of this, without exception, be incoherent.

न, अत्रात्माववोधमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वात्सर्वोऽयमर्थवाद इत्यदोषः।
Answer: No, there is no fault, since all this is but eulogistic
[•Artha-vāda: meant for emphasizing something other than the idea conveyed literally•],
the only things sought to be taught here being the realization of the Self.

मायाविवद्वा; महामायावी देवः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्वमेतच्चकार सुखावबोधप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं लोकवदाख्यायिकादिप्रपञ्च इति युक्ततरः पक्षः।
Or a more reasonable explanation is that the Deity, who is omniscient and omnipotent and is a greater conjurer, created all this like a magician; but the parable etc. are elaborated for the sake of easy instruction and comprehension just as it is done in ordinary life.

न हि सृष्ट्याख्यायिकादिपरिज्ञानात्किञ्चित्फलमिष्यते। ऐकात्म्यस्वरूपपरिज्ञानात्तु अमृतत्वं फलं सर्वोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धम्। स्मृतिषु च गीताद्यासु ‘समं सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्तं परमेश्वरम्’ (BhG.13.27) इत्यादिना।
For the mere acquaintance with anecdotes regarding creation etc. leads to no useful result, whereas it is well known in all the Upaniṣads that from the knowledge of the unity of the Self as Its real nature follows immortality as a result; and the same fact is in evidence in the Smṛtis like the Gītā in such sentences as ‘(He sees, who sees) the Lord Supreme, existing equally in all beings, (deathless in the dying)’ (BhG.13.27).

ननु त्रय आत्मानो भोक्ता कर्ता संसारी जीव एकः सर्वलोकशास्त्रप्रसिद्धः।
Objection: There are three souls: One is well known in the world and in all the scriptures as the transmigrating soul (Jīva) that enjoys and acts.

अनेकप्राणिकर्मफलोपभोगयोग्यानेकाधिष्ठानवल्लोकदेहनिर्माणेन लिङ्गेन यथाशास्त्रप्रदर्शितेन पुरप्रासादादिनिर्माणलिङ्गेन तद्विषयकौशलज्ञानवांस्तत्कर्ता तक्षादिरिव ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञो जगतः कर्ता द्वितीयश्चेतन आत्मा अवगम्यते।
The second soul is the omniscient God (Īśvara), the creator of the universe, the intelligent one. And He is inferable from the logical ground shown in the scriptures, viz. the creation of bodies and worlds having many localities that are suitable for the enjoyment of the fruits of actions of innumerable beings, just as an architect etc. possessed of the requisite skill and knowledge can be inferred from the fact of the construction of a town, a palace, etc.

‘यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते’ (TaitU.2.4.1) ‘नेति नेति’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इत्यादिशास्त्रप्रसिद्ध औपनिषदः पुरुषस्तृतीयः।
The third is the all-pervading Consciousness (Puruṣa) presented by the Upaniṣads alone and well-known from such texts as: ‘From where speech turns back’ (TaitU.2.4.1), ‘Not this, not this’ (BrhUEng.3.9.26).

एवमेते त्रय आत्मानोऽन्योन्यविलक्षणाः। तत्र कथमेक एवात्मा अद्वितीयः असंसारीति ज्ञातुं शक्यते?
Thus there are these three selves distinct from one another. That being so, how can it be known that the Self is one without a second and transcendental?

तत्र जीव एव तावत्कथं ज्ञायते?
Vedāntin: As to that, how is the individual soul even known?

नन्वेवं ज्ञायते श्रोता मन्ता द्रष्टा आदेष्टाघोष्टा विज्ञाता प्रज्ञातेति।
Opponent: Is he not known as the hearer, thinker, seer, teacher, maker of (inarticulate) sounds, perceiver, and knower?

ननु विप्रतिषिद्धं ज्ञायते यः श्रवणादिकर्तृत्वेन ‘अमतो मन्ता अविज्ञातो विज्ञाता’ इति च। तथा ‘न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः’ (BrhU.3.4.2) इत्यादि च।
Vedāntin: Is it not contradictory to say of him, who is known through the act of hearing etc., that ‘He thinks without being though of, he knows without being known’ (BrhUEng.3.8.11, KenU.1.6), and that ‘You cannot think of that which is the thinker of thought; you cannot know that which is the knower of knowledge’ (BrhUEng.3.4.2) etc.?

सत्यं विप्रतिषिद्धम्, यदि प्रत्यक्षेण ज्ञायेत सुखादिवत्। प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं च निवार्यते ‘न मतेर्मन्तारम्’ (BrhU.3.4.2) इत्यादिना। ज्ञायते तु श्रवणादिलिङ्गेन; तत्र कुतो विप्रतिषेधः?
Opponent: True, it will involve a contradiction if the individual soul is known directly like happiness etc. But as a fact, direct perception is denied by, ‘You cannot think of that which is the thinker of thought’, etc. But he is known through such inferential grounds as hearing etc. Hence how can there be a contradiction?

ननु श्रवणादिलिङ्गेनापि कथं ज्ञायते, यावता यदा शृणोत्यात्मा श्रोतव्यं शब्दम्, तदा तस्य श्रवणक्रिययैव वर्तमानत्वान्मननविज्ञानक्रिये न सम्भवत आत्मनि परत्र वा। तथा अन्यत्रापि मननादिक्रियासु।
Vedāntin: How is he known even through such grounds of inference as hearing etc.? For when the Self is engaged in hearing an audible sound, it cannot have the actions of thinking and knowing with regard to Itself or anything else, since it is engrossed only in the act of hearing. So also with regard to other acts like thinking.

श्रवणादिक्रियाश्च स्वविषयेष्वेव। न हि मन्तव्यादन्यत्र मन्तुः मननक्रिया सम्भवति।
And the acts of hearing etc. pertain to their own objects only (and not to their subjects); not that the act of thinking by the thinker can occur with regard to anything outside the thinkable.
[•The Self is not a thinkable object•]

ननु मनसः सर्वमेव मन्तव्यम्।
Opponent: Is not the mind able to think of everything?

सत्यमेवम्; तथापि सर्वमपि मन्तव्यं मन्तारमन्तरेण न मन्तुं शक्यम्।
Vedāntin: Truly this is so; still no thinkable can by thought of without the thinker
[•Mind being only an instrument for the Self, an agent has to be posited to make the act of thinking possible•].

यद्येवं किं स्यात्?
Opponent: Granted this is so, what follows?

इदमत्र स्यात् – सर्वस्य योऽयं मन्ता, स मन्तैवेति न स मन्तव्यः स्यात्।
Answer: This will be the accruing result here. He who is the thinker of all will simply be the thinker, and he will not be an object of thought.

न च द्वितीयो मन्तुर्मन्तास्ति। यदा स आत्मनैव मन्तव्यः, तदा येन च मन्तव्य आत्मा आत्मना, यश्च मन्तव्य आत्मा, तौ द्वौ प्रसज्येयाताम्।
And there is not a second thinker who can think of that thinker. Should he be thinkable by the Self, then there will be the contingency (of the existence) of two Selves – the one being the Self by which the (thinking) Self is thought of and the other Self which is thought of.

एक एव आत्मा द्विधा मन्तृमन्तव्यत्वेन द्विशकलीभवेद्वंशादिवत्, उभयथाप्यनुपपत्तिरेव। यथा प्रदीपयोः प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिः, समत्वात्, तद्वत्।
Or, the same Self will be split into two halves, like a bamboo, to become the thinker and the thinkable. But it is illogical either way. This is analogous to the case of two lamps which, because of their similarity, cannot be (mutually) the illuminator and the illumined.

न च मन्तुर्मन्तव्ये मननव्यापारशून्यः कालेऽस्त्यात्ममननाय।
Besides, the thinker, while engaged in thinking of the thinkable object, has no time left out from the process of thinking during which to think of himself.
[•The mind engages not in the Self but in things external to it•]

यदापि लिङ्गेनात्मानं मनुते मन्ता, तदापि पूर्ववदेव लिङ्गेन मन्तव्य आत्मा, यश्च तस्य मन्ता, तौ द्वौ प्रसज्येयाताम्; एक एव वा द्विधेति पूर्वोक्तो दोषः।
Even on the supposition that the thinker thinks of the Self through the grounds of inference, there will spring up two Selves – the one that is inferred through logical grounds, and the other that infers. Or the same Self will be split up. And so there will be the defect already mentioned.

न प्रत्यक्षेण, नाप्यनुमानेन ज्ञायते चेत्, कथमुच्यते ‘स म आत्मेति विद्यात्’ (कौ. उ. ३-९) इति, कथं वा श्रोता मन्तेत्यादि?
Objection: If the Self be not known either through perception or inference, why is it said, ‘One should realize thus: “He is my Self”’ (Kau. III. 9)? Or why is the Self called the hearer, the thinker, etc.?

ननु श्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवानात्मा, अश्रोतृत्वादि च प्रसिद्धमात्मनः; किमत्र विषमं पश्यसि?
Answer: Is it not a fact that the Self is possessed of such qualities as the capacity of hearing
[•The Self is the eternal hearer, seer, etc.•],
and is it not well known (in the Upanisads) that It is free from such qualities as the capacity of hearing? What inconsistency do you find here?

यद्यपि तव न विषमम्; तथापि मम तु विषमं प्रतिभाति।
Opponent: Though it may not strike you as incongruous, to me it so.

कथम्?
Vedāntin: How?

यदासौ श्रोता, तदा न मन्ता; यदा मन्ता, तदा न श्रोता। तत्रैवं सति, पक्षे श्रोता मन्ता, पक्षे न श्रोता नापि मन्ता। तथा अन्यत्रापि च। यदैवम्, तदा श्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवानात्मा अश्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवान्वेति संशयस्थाने कथं तव न वैषम्यम्?
Opponent: When the Self is a hearer, It is not a thinker; and when It is a thinker, It is not a hearer. That being so, It becomes a hearer and a thinker from one point of view, while from another It is neither a hearer nor a thinker. So with regard to other situations. That being so, how can you avoid the feeling of an irreconcilability in the face of the doubt that crops up as to whether the Self is possessed of the capacity to hear etc., or possessed of the opposite quality of not being able to hear etc.?

यदा देवदत्तो गच्छति, तदा न स्थाता, गन्तैव। यदा तिष्ठति, न गन्ता, स्थातैव; तदास्य पक्ष एव गन्तृत्वं स्थातृत्वं च, न नित्यं गन्तृत्वं स्थातृत्वं वा, तद्वत्।
At the time when Deva-datta moves, he is not stationary, but he is moving to be sure; and when he is motionless, he is not moving, but staying on. During such a period he can be either moving or staying as an only exclusive continuously. The same is the case here.

तथैवात्र काणादादयः पश्यन्ति। पक्षप्राप्तेनैव श्रोतृत्वादिना आत्मोच्यते श्रोता मन्तेत्यादिवचनात्। संयोगजत्वमयौगपद्यं च ज्ञानस्य ह्याचक्षते।
Similar (also) is the view, in this matter, of the followers of Kaṇāda and others, according to whom the Self is called a hearer, a thinker, and so on because of Its being occasionally possessed of hearing etc. For they say that knowledge is a product of contact (between the mind and the senses), and that this contact is not simultaneous. And (as a proof) they adduce such illustrations as: ‘My mind was occupied with some other object, so I did not see this’.

दर्शयन्ति च अन्यत्रमना अभूवं नादर्शम् इत्यादि युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति च न्याय्यम्।
And (they argue that) it is proper to accept the non-simultaneity of knowledge as a logical ground for inferring the existence of mind.
[•If the mind did not exist, then all the senses, when simultaneously in contact with their objects, would perceive all the objects. But this is not a fact. So the Vaiśeṣikas believe in an atomic mind that gets connected with the senses in succession.•]

भवत्वेवं किं तव नष्टं यद्येवं स्यात्?
Let this be so. What do you lose if it be so?

अस्त्वेवं तवेष्टं चेत्; श्रुत्यर्थस्तु न सम्भवति।
Vedāntin: Let it be so if it be logical and if it pleases you. But it cannot be the meaning of the Upaniṣads.

किं न श्रोता मन्तेत्यादिश्रुत्यर्थः?
Opponent: Is it not implied by the Upaniṣads that the Self is the hearer, thinker, etc.?

न, न श्रोता न मन्तेत्यादिवचनात्।
Vedāntin: No, since there is the statement that It is not the hearer, thinker, etc.
[•Seems to be a reference to BrhUEng.4.4.2.•].

ननु पाक्षिकत्वेन प्रत्युक्तं त्वया;
Opponent: Was not that position denied by you by saying that It is occasionally so?

न, नित्यमेव श्रोतृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमात्, ‘न हि श्रोतुः श्रुतेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते’ (BrhU.4.3.27) इत्यादिश्रुतेः।
Vedāntin: No, for by me the Self is accepted as the eternal hearer etc., according to the Veda text, ‘For the listener’s function of hearing can never be lost’ etc. (BrhUEng.4.3.27).

एवं तर्हि नित्यमेव श्रोतृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमे, प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धा युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिः अज्ञानाभावश्चात्मनः कल्पितः स्यात्। तच्चानिष्टमिति।
Objection: If on that view hearing etc. are admitted as eternal, there will be the simultaneous origin of (all kinds of) knowledge, which will contradict experience. Besides, this will lead to the assumption of absence of ignorance in the Self. And that is unacceptable.

नोभयदोषोपपत्तिः, आत्मनः श्रुत्यादिश्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवत्त्वश्रुतेः।
Answer: Neither of the defects arises, since according to the Upaniṣads, the Self can become the hearer etc. through Its (inherent) power of hearing etc. (BrhUEng.3.4.2).
[•By virtue of Its being the witness of all mental changes involved in the acts of hearing etc.•]

अनित्यानां मूर्तानां च चक्षुरादीनां दृष्ट्याद्यनित्यमेव संयोगवियोगधर्मिणाम्। यथा अग्नेर्ज्वलनं तृणादिसंयोगजत्वात्, तद्वत्। न तु नित्यस्यामूर्तस्यासंयोगविभागधर्मिणः संयोगजदृष्ट्याद्यनित्यधर्मवत्त्वं सम्भवति।
The seeing etc., by the impermanent and gross eyes etc. that are subject to conjunction and disjunction (with their objects), are impermanent indeed, just as the burning of fire is, because of its being produced from contact with hay etc. Not that the eternal and formless Self, which is free from the attributes of conjunction and disjunction, can have transitory qualities like seeing etc. that are caused by contact.

तथा च श्रुतिः ‘न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते’ (BrhU.4.3.23) इत्याद्या। एवं तर्हि द्वे दृष्टी चक्षुषोऽनित्या दृष्टिः, नित्या चात्मनः। तथा च द्वे श्रुती श्रोत्रस्यानित्या, नित्या चात्मस्वरूपस्य। तथा द्वे मती विज्ञाती बाह्याबाह्ये।
In support of this is the Veda text: ‘The vision of the witness can never be lost’ etc. (BrhUEng.4.3.23). From this it follows that there are two kinds of vision – the transitory vision of the eye and the eternal vision of the Self. Similarly, there are two kinds of hearing – the transitory hearing of the ear and the eternal hearing of that which by nature is the Self. So also are there two kinds of thinking and two sorts of knowing – the external and the internal.

एवं ह्येव चेयं श्रुतिरुपपन्ना भवति – ‘दृष्टेर्द्रष्टा श्रुतेः श्रोता’ इत्याद्या।
For on this view alone, and only in the way it has been shown, does the Veda text ‘The seer of seeing and the hearer of hearing’ (BrhUEng.3.4.2) become justifiable.

लोकेऽपि प्रसिद्धं चक्षुषस्तिमिरागमापाययोः नष्टा दृष्टिः जाता दृष्टिः इति चक्षुर्दृष्टेरनित्यत्वम्। तथा च श्रुतिमत्यादीनामात्मदृष्ट्यादीनां च,
It is a matter of experience, too, that the vision of the eye is non-eternal, inasmuch as it is lost or regained in accordance as the disease called Timira sets in or is cured. Similar is the case with hearing and thinking.

नित्यत्वं प्रसिद्धमेव लोके। वदति ह्युद्धृतचक्षुः स्वप्नेऽद्य मया भ्राता दृष्ट इति। तथा अवगतबाधिर्यः स्वप्ने श्रुतो मन्त्रोऽद्येत्यादि। यदि चक्षुःसंयोगजैवात्मनो नित्या दृष्टिस्तन्नाशे नश्येत्, तदा उद्धृतचक्षुः स्वप्ने नीलपीतादि न पश्येत्।
And the eternality of the vision etc. of the Self is well known in the world, for a man whose eyes have been plucked out says, ‘My brother has been seen by me in dream today.’ Similarly, a man who is known to be deaf may say, ‘A mantra has been heard by me today in dream’, etc. Should the eternal vision of the Self be produced merely through the contact of the eye, it should be destroyed on the destruction of the latter; and then a man whose eyes are plucked out should not perceive blue, yellow, etc. in dream.

‘न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेः’ (BrhU.4.3.23) इत्याद्या च श्रुतिः अनुपपन्ना स्यात्। ‘तच्चक्षुः पुरुषे येन स्वप्नं पश्यति’ इत्याद्या च श्रुतिः।
Moreover, such Veda texts as, ‘The vision of the witness can never be lost’ etc. (BrhUEng.4.3.23), would be illogical; and the same will be the fate of such Veda texts as, ‘That is the eye in a man through which one sees in a dream.’

नित्या आत्मनो दृष्टिर्बाह्यानित्यदृष्टेर्ग्राहिका। बाह्यदृष्टेश्च उपजनापायाद्यनित्यधर्मवत्त्वात् ग्राहिकाया आत्मदृष्टेस्तद्वदवभासत्वमनित्यत्वादि भ्रान्तिनिमित्तं लोकस्येति युक्तम्।
The logical position is this: The eternal vision of the Self witnesses the ephemeral external vision; but since the external vision has such changing attributes as growth, decay, etc., the vision of the Self that witnesses it appears accordingly and seems to be ephemeral owing to the error of men.

यथा भ्रमणादिधर्मवदलातादिवस्तुविषयदृष्टिरपि भ्रमतीव, तद्वत्। तथा च श्रुतिः ‘ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव’ (BrhU.4.3.7) इति।
The case is similar to that of the vision fixed on a whirling firebrand or such other things, where the vision seems to be revolving (as the latter does). And in confirmation of this is the Veda text, ‘It thinks as it were, and shakes as it were’ (BrhUEng.4.3.7).

तस्मादात्मदृष्टेर्नित्यत्वान्न यौगपद्यमयौगपद्यं वा अस्ति। बाह्यानित्यदृष्ट्युपाधिवशात्तु लोकस्य तार्किकाणां च आगमसम्प्रदायवर्जितत्वात् अनित्या आत्मनो दृष्टिरिति भ्रान्तिरुपपन्नैव।
Hence the vision of the Self being eternal, it can have neither simultaneity, nor the opposite to it. But, for the ordinary people – owing to their preoccupation with the external limiting adjunct of ephemeral vision – and for the logicians, owing to their remaining outside scriptural tradition, it is quite possible to have the erroneous idea that the vision of the Self is impermanent.

जीवेश्वरपरमात्मभेदकल्पना च एतन्निमित्तैव। तथा अस्ति, नास्ति, इत्याद्याश्च यावन्तो वाङ्मनसयोर्भेदा यत्रैकं भवन्ति, तद्विषयाया नित्याया दृष्टेर्निर्विशेषायाः।
The imagination of difference among God, the individual soul, and the supreme Self can also be traced to this very error; and equally erroneous it is to fancy such ideas as ‘it is’, ‘it is not’, with regard to the eternal and unconditioned vision of that Entity in which all the variations of speech and mind (i.e. name and form) get unified.

अस्ति नास्ति, एकं नाना, गुणवदगुणम्, जानाति न जानाति, क्रियावदक्रियम्, फलवदफलम्, सबीजं निर्बीजम्, सुखं दुःखम्, मध्यममध्यम्, शून्यमशून्यम्, परोऽहमन्यः, इति वा सर्ववाक्प्रत्ययागोचरे स्वरूपे यो विकल्पयितुमिच्छति, स नूनं खमपि चर्मवद्वेष्टयितुमिच्छति, सोपानमिव च पद्भ्यामारोढुम्; जले खे च मीनानां वयसां च पदं दिदृक्षते;
He who entertains (with regard to that Reality beyond all speech and mind) any desire of fancying that It exists or does not exist; that It is one or is many; that It has attributes or has not; that It knows or does not; that It is active or is not; that It is fruitful or is fruitless; that It has a seed or is seedless; that It is happiness or is misery; that It is inside or is outside; that It is void or not; or that ‘It is different (from me)’, or that ‘I am different (from It)’ – (that man) may as well wish to roll up the sky like leather, to ascend there with his feet like ascending up a staircase, or to trace the footprints of the fish and birds in water and sky;

‘नेति नेति’ (BrhU.3.9.26) ‘यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते’ (TaitU.2.4.1) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः, ‘को अद्धा वेद’ (ऋ. सं. १-३०-६) इत्यादिमन्त्रवर्णात्।
For the Upaniṣad texts declare: ‘Not this, not this’ (BrhUEng.3.9.26), ‘From which words turn back’ (TaitU.2.4.1), and so on, And there is the mantra text, ‘Who indeed knows?’ etc. (R. I. xxx. 6).

कथं तर्हि तस्य स म आत्मेति वेदनम्; ब्रूहि केन प्रकारेण तमहं स म आत्मेति विद्याम्।
Objection: How then does he get the realization, ‘He is my Self’? Tell me, how can I realize Him as, ‘He is my Self’.

अत्राख्यायिकामाचक्षते – कश्चित्किल मनुष्यो मुग्धः कैश्चिदुक्तः कस्मिंश्चिदपराधे सति धिक्त्वां नासि मनुष्य इति। स मुग्धतया आत्मनो मनुष्यत्वं प्रत्याययितुं कंचिदुपेत्याह – ब्रवीतु भवान्कोऽहमस्मीति। स तस्य मुग्धतां ज्ञात्वा आह – क्रमेण बोधयिष्यामीति। स्थावराद्यात्मभावमपोह्य न त्वममनुष्य इत्युक्त्वोपरराम। स तं मुग्धः प्रत्याह – भवान्मां बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तस्तूष्णीं बभूव, किं न बोधयतीति।
Answer: Apropos of this, they relate a story: An idiotic person who committed some guilt was told, ‘Fie on you! You are no man!’ Because of his stupidity he approached somebody to get the conviction that he was a man and told him, ‘Tell me who I am.’ The latter understood his silliness and said, ‘I shall make you understand by degrees.’ And then after proving that he was not a motionless thing, and so on, he (the teacher) concluded with, ‘You are none other than a man.’ That dullard then told him, ‘You who started to enlighten me have become silent. Why do you not instruct me?

तादृगेव तद्भवतो वचनम्। नास्यमनुष्य इत्युक्तेऽपि मनुष्यत्वमात्मनो न प्रतिपद्यते यः, स कथं मनुष्योऽसीत्युक्तोऽपि मनुष्यत्वमात्मनः प्रतिपद्येत?
That sentence of yours is just like this. How can he, who does not understand himself to be a man when told, ‘You are none other that a man’, understand himself to be a man even when told, ‘You are a man’?

तस्माद्यथाशास्त्रोपदेश एवात्मावबोधविधिः, नान्यः। न ह्यग्नेर्दाह्यं तृणादि अन्येन केनचिद्दग्धुं शक्यम्। अत एव शास्त्रमात्मस्वरूपं बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तं सत् अमनुष्यत्वप्रतिषेधेनेव ‘नेति नेति’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इत्युक्त्वोपरराम।
Therefore the process to be followed in enlightening about the Self is as it is set forth in the scriptures and nothing else; for hay etc. that can be consumed by fire are not burnt by anything else. It is because of this that the scripture, which started to impart knowledge about the nature of the Self, stopped after declaring, ‘Not this, not this’ (BrhUEng.3.9.26), just as it was done in the story after negating all that was other than man.

तथा ‘अनन्तरमबाह्यम्’ (BrhU.2.5.19, BrhU.3.8.8) ‘अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः’ (BrhU.2.5.19) इत्यनुशासनम्; ‘तत्त्वमसि’ (ChanU.6.8.7) ‘यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्’ (BrhU.2.4.14, BrhU.4.5.15) इत्येवमाद्यपि च।
And similar are the texts, ‘Without interior or exterior’ (BrhUEng.2.5.19, 3.8.8), ‘This Self, the perceiver of everything, is Brahman. This is the teaching’ (BrhUEng.2.5.19), ‘Thou art That’ (ChanU.6.8.7 – 6.16.3), ‘But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, what should one see and through what?’ (BrhUEng.2.4.14, 4.5.15); and there are still others.

यावदयमेव यथोक्तमिममात्मानं न वेत्ति, तावदयं ब्राह्मानित्यदृष्टिलक्षणमुपाधिमात्मत्वेनोपेत्य अविद्यया उपाधिधर्मानात्मनो मन्यमानो ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तेषु स्थानेषु पुनः पुनरावर्तमानः अविद्याकामकर्मवशात्संसरति।
As long as one does not realize thus this Self that has been described, so long does not accept as one’s Self the external limiting adjunct
[•The mind whose vision is identical with itself and is external to the Self.•]
which is in the form of ephemeral vision; and considering through ignorance the attributes of the limiting adjuncts as one’s own, one transmigrates under the influence of ignorance, desire, and action, by rotating again and again through the regions of the gods, animals, and men, that range from Brahmā to a clump of grass.

स एवं संसरन् उपात्तदेहेन्द्रियसङ्घातं त्यजति। त्यक्त्वा अन्यमुपादत्ते। पुनः पुनरेवमेव नदीस्रोतोवज्जन्ममरणप्रबन्धाविच्छेदेन वर्तमानः काभिरवस्थाभिर्वर्तते इत्येतमर्थं दर्शयन्त्याह श्रुतिः वैराग्यहेतोः –
While transmigrating thus, one rejects the body assumed earlier, and giving it up, accepts another. In the course of showing what states one experiences as one continues thus without a break in the current of birth and death, as though in a river, the Upaniṣad says with a view to generating detachment:

स एषः प्रज्ञानरूप आत्मा ब्रह्म अपरं सर्वशरीरस्थः प्राणः प्रज्ञात्मा अन्तःकरणोपाधिष्वनुप्रविष्टो जलभेदगतसूर्यप्रतिबिम्बवत् हिरण्यगर्भः प्राणः प्रज्ञात्मा।
Eṣaḥ, this One, the Self, which is essentially Consciousness; is brahma, Brahman, the inferior one (who is Hiraṇya-garbha and) who as Prāṇa (possessed of the power of action) and the conscious soul (possessed of the power of knowledge) exists in (the sum total of) all the bodies (i.e. in the cosmic gross body) after having entered into all the limiting adjuncts of the internal organs (i.e. into the cosmic subtle body) like the reflection of the sun on diverse waters. He is the power of action and knowledge (in the individual).

एष एव इन्द्रः गुणात्, देवराजो वा।
Eṣaḥ, this One; is verily indraḥ, Indra, who is called so because He possesses the qualities (mentioned earlier in AitU.1.3.13-14); or ‘Indra’ means the lord of the gods.

एष प्रजापतिः यः प्रथमजः शरीरी; यतो मुखादिनिर्भेदद्वारेणाग्न्यादयो लोकपाला जाताः, स प्रजापतिरेष एव। येऽपि एते अग्न्यादयः सर्वे देवा एष एव। इमानि च सर्वशरीरोपादानभूतानि पञ्च पृथिवी-आदीनि महाभूतानि अन्नान्नादत्वलक्षणानि एतानि।
Eṣaḥ, this One; is prajā-patiḥ, Prajā-pati (Virāṭ) who is the first embodied Being.
[•Hiraṇya-garbha identifies Himself with the cosmic subtle body, but Virāṭ with the cosmic gross body•]
That Prajā-pati, from whom the presiding deities of the organs, viz. Fire and others, were born after the formation of the cavity of the mouth etc., is verily this One. And ete sarve devāḥ, all these gods, viz. Fire and others, that there are, are but this One; ca, and; imāni pañca mahā-bhūtāni, these five great elements; viz. etāni, these – starting with earth – which are the materials of all the bodies and which constitute the foods and the eaters;

किञ्च, इमानि च क्षुद्रमिश्राणि क्षुद्रैरल्पकैर्मिश्राणि, इव-शब्दः अनर्थकः, सर्पादीनि। बीजानि कारणानि इतराणि चेतराणि च द्वैराश्येन निर्दिश्यमानानि।
Besides, ca imāni, these also, e.g. snakes etc.; kṣudra-miśrāṇi iva, together with the tiny creatures – the word iva being meaningless; and which are bījāni, the seeds, causes (of others); ca itarāṇi itarāṇi, as well as those others and others, that are mentionable in pairs (e.g. the moving and the stationary).

कानि तानि? उच्यन्ते – अण्डजानि पक्ष्यादीनि, जारुजानि जरायुजानि मनुष्यादीनि, स्वेदजानि यूकादीनि, उद्भिज्जानि च वृक्षादीनि।
Which are they? They are being enumerated: aṇḍa-jāni, born of eggs – birds and others; jāru-jāni, born of wombs – men and others; śveda-jāni, born of moisture – lice etc.; and udbhij-jāni, born of earth – e.g. trees etc.;

अश्वाः गावः पुरुषाः हस्तिनः अन्यच्च यत्किंचेदं प्राणि।
Aśvāḥ, horses; gāvaḥ, cattle; puruṣāḥ, human beings; hastinaḥ, elephants; yat kiñca idam, and whatever living creature there may be.

किं तत्? जङ्गमं यच्चलति पद्भ्यां गच्छति; यच्च पतत्रि आकाशेन पतनशीलम्; यच्च स्थावरम् अचलम्;
Which are they? Whichever is jaṅgamam, moving on feet; and whichever is patatri, flying in the sky; and whatever is sthāvaram, motionless – all that is but this One.

सर्वं तत् अशेषतः प्रज्ञानेत्रम्, प्रज्ञप्तिः प्रज्ञा, तच्च ब्रह्मैव, नीयतेऽनेनेति नेत्रम्, प्रज्ञा नेत्रं यस्य तदिदं प्रज्ञानेत्रम्;
Tat sarvam, all that, without exception; is prajñā-netram, made to exist by Consciousness – (the phrase being derived thus): Prajñā is Consciousness that is the same as Brahman; netra is that by which one is dowered with substance, or that by which one is impelled (to one’s natural activity): therefore that which has Consciousness as the giver of its substance or as its impeller is prajñā-netram.

प्रज्ञाने ब्रह्मण्युत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकालेषु प्रतिष्ठितम्, प्रज्ञाश्रयमित्यर्थः।
Prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam, on Consciousness it is established, that is to say, it is supported by Brahman during creation, existence, and dissolution.

प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोकः पूर्ववत्; प्रज्ञाचक्षुर्वा सर्व एव लोकः। प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा सर्वस्य जगतः।
The sentence, ‘prajñā-netraḥ lokaḥ, the universe has Consciousness as its impeller’, is to be understood as before; or the meaning is that all the universe has got consciousness as its netra, eye (i.e. the source of revelation). Prajñā, Consciousness; is pratiṣṭhā, the support, of the whole universe.
[•Consciousness is self-revealing and is not dependent on any other factor for the revelation of Itself or of others. Or the sentence may mean that Consciousness is the one reality in which all phenomenal things end, just as the superimposed snake etc. end in their bases, the rope etc., after the dawn of knowledge.•]

तस्मात् प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म।
Therefore prajñānam brahma, Consciousness is Brahman.

तदेतत्प्रत्यस्तमितसर्वोपाधिविशेषं सत् निरञ्जनं निर्मलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम् एकम् अद्वयं ‘नेति नेति’ (BrhU.3.9.26) इति सर्वविशेषापोहसंवेद्यं सर्वशब्दप्रत्ययागोचरं
That Entity, thus dealt with, when freed from all distinctions created by the limiting adjuncts, is without stain, without taint, without action, quiescent, one without a second, to be known as ‘Not this, not this’ (BrhUEng.3.9.26), by the elimination of all attributes, and (It is) beyond all words and thoughts.

तदत्यन्तविशुद्धप्रज्ञोपाधिसम्बन्धेन सर्वज्ञमीश्वरं सर्वसाधारणाव्याकृतजगद्बीजप्रवर्तकं नियन्तृत्वादन्तर्यामिसंज्ञं भवति।
That very Entity which is the omniscient God – because of the association with the limiting adjunct of very pure intelligence – and is the ordainer of the common seed of all unmanifested universe, assumes the name of antar-yāmī (the Inner Controller) by virtue of being the Guide.

तदेव व्याकृतजगद्बीजभूतबुद्ध्यात्माभिमानलक्षणं हिरण्यगर्भसंज्ञं भवति।
That Entity Itself assumes the name of Hiraṇya-garbha, who identifies Himself with (cosmic) intelligence which is the seed of the manifested world.

तदेव अन्तरण्डोद्भूतप्रथमशरीरोपाधिमत् विराट्प्रजापतिसंज्ञं भवति।
That Entity Itself gets the name of Virāṭ, Prajā-pati, who has as His limiting adjunct the (gross, cosmic) body born first within the cosmic egg;

तदुद्भूताग्न्याद्युपाधिमत् देवतासंज्ञं भवति।
And It comes to be known as the deities, Fire, etc., by assuming their (respective) limiting adjuncts (viz speech etc.) born from that egg.

तथा विशेषशरीरोपाधिष्वपि ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तेषु तत्तन्नामरूपलाभो ब्रह्मणः।
Similarly, Brahman gets the respective names and forms as conditioned by the divergent bodies, ranging from that of Brahmā to that of a clump of grass.

तदेवैकं सर्वोपाधिभेदभिन्नं सर्वैः प्राणिभिस्तार्किकैश्च सर्वप्रकारेण ज्ञायते विकल्प्यते च अनेकधा। ‘एतमेके वदन्त्यग्निं मनुमन्ये प्रजापतिम्। इन्द्रमेकेऽपरे प्राणमपरे ब्रह्म शाश्वतम्’ (मनु. १२-१२३) इत्याद्या स्मृतिः॥
It is the same Entity that has become diversified according to the variety of the limiting adjuncts and is known in every way and is thought of multifariously by all creatures as well as the logicians. And there are the Smṛti texts, ‘Some call this very Entity Fire, some call It Manu, and some Prajā-pati. Some call It Indra, while others call It Prāṇa and still others, the eternal Brahman’, etc. (M. XII. 123).